Russia

Porsche owners in Russia woke up this morning without being able to start their car. And they have a suspicion

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They said in Autonotion in 2019 that Russia was a country of extremes. They weren’t talking about the economy (at least not directly), they were talking about car sales. And the Russian market has always been particular, with Lada being the best-selling car brand and, at the same time, having the ability to sneak Porsche ahead of Peugeot. And Porsche lived a decade of love with Russia with constant growth. The wealthiest did not hesitate to opt for the luxury brands Germans. In fact, that report identified Mercedes and BMW as the tenth and eleventh most purchased car companies. In fact, despite the restrictions, Russians continue to buy Western cars, they explained in Motor1.com recently. Those continued sales have thousands of Porsche cars moving through the streets of Russian cities. Or they had them. Because overnight, car owners in Stuttgart keep reporting a problem as simple as it is obvious: their cars don’t move. No, they don’t work. Either they don’t start or they stop after traveling a few meters. The reason for the problem is already known. The origin is more diffuse. My Porsche doesn’t run They pick up their colleagues Motorpassion that since the last days of November, Russian owners of German sports cars are experiencing serious problems starting their cars. The problem seems to lie in the Porsche VTS (Porsche Vehicle Tracking System), a system that the German company offers as a protection measure. With it activated, the vehicle maintains a constant satellite connection so if someone steals the car it is easy to find its location. In that case, a thief must block the satellite signal but in that case the brand understands that, in fact, the car is being stolen and the car automatically does not start or stops after a few meters. This is what has happened in Russia. With a nuance, the Porsche system has incorrectly understood that hundreds or thousands of cars sold since 2013 have been stolen and, therefore, their starting is prevented. The reason is that these cars have lost the satellite connection for a reason that is still unknown. This automatically activates the system and, as we see, leaves the car inoperable. Rolf, the largest dealer group selling Porsche cars in Russia, has confirmed the latter. And the company ceased operations in the country completely in 2022, in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Since then its users have been left without technical service. It is now believed that the lack of maintenance of the servers may have caused a failure that has broken that satellite connection and the Porsches have become a gigantic paperweight. The event is so striking that those responsible for Rolf have assured Russian media that the widespread shutdown “may be deliberate.” However, there is no conclusive evidence for the latter. If so, it would be a hybrid warfare maneuver especially curious. For now, what is certain is that there are hundreds of post-2013 Porsches completely stranded… and with their customers looking for desperate solutions. The companions of Motorpassion They report that some of them claim to have solved the problem with hard reboots, such as turning off the battery for 10 hours. The car would have picked up the satellite signal again at that moment and could start moving again. Others have achieved it rebooting the VTS system or, directly, removing it completely, which involves disassembling the seats and a good part of the dashboard. Whether it was some kind of computer attack or simply due to a lack of server maintenance, the truth is that hundreds of Porsche cars have been stranded and that speaks volumes. how hopelessly connected our cars are nowadays. Almost always, arguing or defending greater driver safety. Our cars have become a connected data center… whether we want it or not. The Porsche case is an example of how an interesting and useful system to prevent car theft can leave us with a completely stopped car if the system architecture suffers irreparable damage. And in this case we are not talking about a failure in the vehicle, we are talking about a direct attack against servers or satellites that directly allow our cars to move. Right now, a new one keeps constant information about our driving in a small black box. We are connected to a network with geolocation to make an emergency call with eCall, mandatory since 2018. Some modern cars can receive notices in your browsers of various incidents, How does the DGT want to send when detect a car stopped on the road with the V-16 beacon active. But it has even been proposed to use the data collected to force us to circulate around the city. in fully electric mode if we have a plug-in hybrid car or harness its power if it is detected that the batteries have not been recharged for too long. Therefore, technically it is possible to turn off cars remotely. It would be very difficult to order a concrete attack against a single vehicle since connected information sent from a car is supposedly anonymous and end-to-end encrypted. As long as that car has not been reported stolen, which can allow the police to contact the manufacturer and him order a remote shutdown. However, vulnerabilities that could leave hundreds or thousands of cars completely stopped or at the mercy of a remote control are one of the industry’s biggest concerns. Especially in a geopolitical context in which hybrid warfare seems to be increasingly present. Photo | Josh Berquist and Vadim Artyukhin In Xataka | If you do not have the V16 beacon you will be fined, but the director of the DGT proposes a grace period: “the agents will be flexible”

Shahed drones were a piece of cake for Ukraine’s helicopters. Russia has just transformed them into its biggest nightmare

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In it huge catalog of innovations improvised measures brought by the war in ukrainefew are as revealing as the decision that Russia has taken to address one of the main vulnerabilities of its drones. In essence, they have turned the Shahed-136 (symbol of its saturation strategy through cheap and disposable platforms) in a rudimentary anti-aircraft fighter. The mutation. What was born as a suicide drone with autonomy to travel hundreds of kilometers following pre-programmed routes has been transformed, in some variants, into a system piloted in real timeequipped with cameras, modems and now with the R-60 missilea veteran infrared-guided missile from the 1970s that, despite its compact size, retains the lethality of a weapon capable of cutting a helicopter in two with its load of continuous rods. The broadcast images by Ukrainian organizations and electronic warfare experts confirm the presence of the R-60 mounted on the Shahed’s noseand the interception of one of them by a Ukrainian Sting drone illustrates that Russia is experimenting with the idea of ​​​​transforming a disposable projectile in a reactive vectorcapable of confronting the devices that, until now, acted as unpunished hunters of these platforms. The new tactical ecosystem. The success of the Ukrainian helicopters in intercepting Shaheds (with devices sporting dozens of shoot-down marks and crews accredited with hundreds of downed drones) had turned these aircraft in key pieces of low-level air defense. The combination of moderate speed, predictable trajectory and total lack of situational awareness made the drone a almost static whitevulnerable to cannon blasts or volleys used at close range. But the introduction of the R-60 upsets that balance: although the platform remains clumsy, slow and limited in maneuver, the simple fact that some drones can carry missiles will force Ukrainian pilots to rethink their proximity to the target. Each interception stops being a procedure and becomes in an unknown about what version of the enemy they will encounter. Extra ball. Even if the actual kill capability of the armed Shahed is small (and the operational window for targeting with a short-range missile is narrow) the statistical nature of swarm warfare change the calculation: In thousands of launches, just getting into a good position will be enough to cause the loss of a valuable helicopter. Technical limitations. The R-60, known by NATO as Aphidwas designed for supersonic fighters, not slow drones intended as loitering munitions. Its integration into the Shahed poses obvious challenges: the operator must manually retarget the drone until it is pointed at the target, achieving an adequate angle to allow the infrared seeker to acquire the thermal signature and maintain alignment long enough to authorize the shot. He narrow field of vision of the missile, the Shahed’s low maneuverability and the possibility of helicopters using infrared flares reduce the chances of success. However, historical experience shows that even imperfect weaponry can achieve victories if the tactical environment favors it. Remains of an intercepted Shahed with the R-60 attached The precedent. If we go back we have the Predator armed american with Stingers in 2002 (failed but deterrent), which reveals that these configurations do not seek air superiority, but rather force the enemy to act with caution. Just as Ukrainian unmanned ships were armed with missiles To scare away the Russian helicopters that were harassing them, Russia adopts the same defensive-offensive logic: a single one of these armed drones, hidden among a swarm of externally identical devices, forces the adversary to increase distance, use more expensive means or modify its interception doctrine. Drones against drones. The Shahed armed with an R-60 is not, by itself, a transformative weapon. It is, however, as symptom of evolution continued unmanned combat. Russia has expanded the Shahed family into versions with real time controljet variants already produced in its own factories and possible improvements based on artificial intelligence for dynamic target identification. Ukraine, for its part, develops interceptors low-cost that allow us to shoot down Russian drones without risking manned aircraft or spending expensive missiles. Every innovation generates a countermeasure: if Ukraine popularizes cheap hunting drones, Russia studies equipping the Shaheds of tiny turrets or new sensors, and if these become reactive, Ukraine adapts its doctrines and strengthens its electronic warfare. The conflict has entered a phase where the value is not in the perfection of each platform, but in the ability to produceadapt and deploy thousands of them in an environment where the line between offensive and defensive becomes blurred. The most dangerous sky. It is the result of these advances. The introduction of Shahed-R-60 marks a turning point because it erodes one of the few stable advantages that Ukraine had maintained: the capacity of its helicopters to hunt drones with relative safety. Now each aircraft must consider the possibility, however remote, of facing a missile that was not foreseen in the original mission design. This not only complicates interceptions, but forces disperse risks and rethink routes, altitudes and speeds. The Ukrainian sky, already saturated with suicide drones, cruise missiles, loitering munitions and manned aircraft operating in densely contested airspace, add another variable to an operational equation in constant mutation. And it is likely that this is just the beginning: the integration of missiles is a first step towards drones that, in addition to attacking by saturation, can defend themselves or even escort other devices in combined waves. Image | Telegram, X In Xataka | There is tourism that flies en masse where tragedies have occurred. So the Low Costs are preparing to travel to Ukraine In Xataka | Ukraine’s problem with peace negotiations is simple: if it rejects them, Russia will get tougher in the next ones.

The round of peace meetings in Ukraine has ended. Russia says it is “ready”, but for war with Europe

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The last two rounds of contacts between the Kremlin and Trump’s envoys have confirmed that the peace process for Ukraine is technically alive, but politically blocked. Putin took advantage of the arrival of the emissaries to launch a verbal offensive: Accused Europe of torpedoing peace, suggested the EU “is on the side of war,” and said Russia does not want a continental conflict but that if Europe starts one, “we are ready right now.” A trapped peace process. For Moscow, the talks are “very useful” as they allow it probe the limits Washington and explore what it is willing to sacrifice in exchange for a stable ceasefire. For the United States, they are an opportunity to zoom in positions without openly acknowledging that the original plan favored Russia too much and was unacceptable to kyiv. Five hours of meeting in Moscow served to review successive versions of the US document, but not to generate a “compromise option”: Russia accepts some elements, rejects others with a “critical and even negative attitude” and, above all, keeps intact its objective of translating its military advances in territorial gains formalized on paper. Moscow red lines. At the center of the disagreement is the territorial question. Moscow insists Ukraine must resign to 20% of Donetsk which he still preserves, while boasting (not without response from kyiv) of having taken Pokrovska key logistical hub that had been in operation for more than a year trying to capture with a great cost in lives and material. This insistence is not only cartographic: is part of a maximization logicin which victories at the front are used as an argument to tighten political conditions. Added to this are other structural requirements: deep cuts in the Ukrainian armed forces, severe limits on Western military aid and a fit of Ukraine into the Russian sphere of influence that would empty its formal sovereignty of content. In this context, talking about “progress” is, in reality, talk about margins: Washington explores how far it can give in without kyiv perceiving it as a capitulation, while Russia calculates how far it can stretch its demands without completely breaking the diplomatic channel that is useful to buy time and legitimize its narrative. Parallel diplomacy and mixed signals. Witkoff and Kushner’s role adds a ambiguity layer to the process. They are not classic diplomats, but political emissaries who operate in a gray zone between official diplomacy and American domestic politics. His presence in Moscow, after meeting with Ukrainians in Florida and reviewing a 28 point plan which initially tilted the board towards Moscow, sends several signals at once: kyiv is shown that Washington “listens” to its objections and tweaks the document, Moscow is made clear that the White House is willing to continue negotiating concession frameworks, and Europe is reminded that the decisive conversation remains, above all, Washington-Moscow. The Trump statement Calling the war a “mess” that is difficult to resolve fits with that approach: rather than a closed strategy, the administration seems to seek an agreement that reduces the political and economic cost of the war for the United States, although the final balance is very delicate for Ukraine. Europe as a scapegoat. The Putin’s words on Europe reveal a perfectly calculated strategy: presenting European capitals as the real obstacle to peace, accusing them of “being on the side of the war” and of preventing Washington from closing an agreement. By saying that “Europe is preventing the US administration from achieving peace in Ukraine,” the Kremlin is trying several things at the same time: put pressure on the Europeans to lower their demands, feed the fatigue of war in Western societies and drive a wedge between the United States and its allies, suggesting that Washington would be more flexible if it were not bound by “European demands.” The added threat that Russia “does not intend to fight Europe, but is ready if Europe starts” has a double effect: it works as a military warning and, at the same time, as an internal message to reinforce the idea of ​​a besieged Russia that only defends itself. The risk of being isolated. For Ukraine, cross-play is especially dangerous. Zelenskiy insists on receiving security guarantees “livable” for the future, that is, mechanisms that prevent a new Russian attack once an agreement has been signed. HE frontally opposes to any formula that forces him to give up territory that he currently controls or to reduce his army to levels that leave him defenseless. But, at the same time, it knows that a part of the European capitals and the American political class are seeking, with increasing urgency, an outcome that freezes the war and stabilizes the front, even if that enshrines a status quo very unfavorable for Ukraine. Its margin consists of supporting in the European bloc tougher (those countries that see a bad agreement as a disastrous precedent for continental security) and to remember that any credible reconstruction involves using frozen russian assets and for a framework of Western guarantees that makes another Kremlin attack politically unaffordable. Putin’s calculation of strength. The threats “cutting off Ukraine from the sea completely” and intensifying attacks on ports and ships entering them fit into a broader strategy: combine slow but steady advances in the Donbas with the ability to strangle the Ukrainian economy and make the protection of its maritime corridors more expensive. Each city taken or partially controlled serves the Kremlin as proof that time is in its favor and that it can rise the price of peace at each plan review. Editorials from related media, as Komsomolskaya Pravdareinforce this idea by presenting the negotiations as a scenario in which Russia can afford to tighten its conditions as “more and more Ukrainian territory” passes into its hands. The implicit message is clear: if the current proposals already seem harsh, the next round could be worse for kyiv if the war continues. Uncertainty. The final result is a peace process that formally remains open, but that moves on a dangerous … Read more

Russia had managed to manufacture drones and missiles despite the sanctions. So selling Zara clothes was a matter of time

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In recent months, a strange wave of western products has begun to reappear in places where, on paper, it is already they shouldn’t exist. Between geopolitical changes, forced business exits and an increasingly opaque market, certain brands have unexpectedly become visible again, fueling rumors, theories about how they are getting there and who is really pulling the strings of their distribution towards Moscow. Now a giant from Spain has (re)appeared: Inditex. A market that does not close completely. After announcing the end of operations in Russia a few days after the invasion of Ukraine, Inditex left behind its second largest market and sold its business in the country. However, more than two years latergarments with official labels from brands such as Zara, Bershka, Oysho, Stradivarius or Massimo Dutti have once again appeared on the shelves of the Russian channel Tvoenow renamed Tvoe n Ko, which boasts a “constantly updated” selection on social networks and presents the collections as almost clandestine finds. The pieces, which match models from previous seasons and carry prices in euros, are now sold in at least 19 stores Russian companies without there being (according to the official version offered) any contractual relationship between the Spanish company and the local distributor. In fact, they occur two months after the executive director of Inditex, Óscar García Maceiras, will declare to the Financial Times that the conditions “were not met” for his return to Russia. The engineering of the Russian gray market. I was counting a few hours ago the FT that the mechanism that allows the reappearance of these garments is based on the system of “parallel imports” established by Moscow to circumvent the massive departures of Western brands. In this scheme operates Disco Club LLCa Russian company that has recorded 18 statements in accordance, citing Inditex as supplier and presenting itself as its “authorized representative”, despite the fact that Inditex flatly denies having granted such permission. The garments come partly from inventories originally destined for various EU countries and partly from Chinese factories, according to labels and documents customs, in a circuit that takes advantage of legal loopholes and the Kremlin’s lack of inhibition to give formal coverage to a trade that would previously have been considered smuggling. The denial. For its part, Tvoe assures that it does not have direct agreements with Inditex and hides behind confidentiality agreements so as not to detail its suppliers, while Disco Club insist in which he only performed a “punctual technical service.” Burkhard Binder, the businessman linked to the founding of the company and based in Dubai, is disassociating himself from current operations. Inditex, known for its tight control of inventory, distribution and franchises, completely reject any link: he claims not to have authorized Disco Club or any Russian entity to act on his behalf and avoids commenting on how his products arrive in the country since he withdrew. Matter of time. we have been counting: the ability of the Russian economy to adapt in the midst of war has shown that international restrictions, no matter how strict, always find cracks. A country that has rebuilt chains complex supply chains to produce drones, precision ammunition or long-range missiles, despite technological embargoes and industrial vetoes, would not have difficulties reopening the door to much more “simpler” products, such as Western fashion clothing. In that context, the reappearance of garments of Zara in Russian stores is not so much surprising as confirming a trend: Moscow has perfected an ecosystem of parallel imports capable of circumventing almost any blockade, from military components even t-shirts and dresses from past seasons, turning the impossible into routine and the forbidden into a merely logistical problem. Russia, a laboratory of consumption in times of sanctions. The appearance of Zara products in Russia despite the exit from the company illustrates the magnitude of the gray market that Moscow has made official since 2022: an ecosystem that allows consumers to access Western brands through private intermediaries and indirect routes, without participation of the original companies. In this context, the reappearance of the Spanish firm in the Russian commercial landscape is not due to a business return, but rather to a state-run mechanism. commercial evasion that turns its garments into parallel import merchandise. If you like, the phenomenon also reveals the extent to which Russia has rebuilt its global consumption through third countries and front companies, and how even the strictest groups in controlling its supply chain cannot prevent its products from reappearing in a market from which they tried to leave definitely. Image | Pexels In Xataka | Ukraine has opened the Russian ballistic missile that has devastated its cities. Your surprise is a condemnation: your main supplier is untouchable In Xataka | Zara has been selling clothes for years. Now he aspires to sell something more difficult: prestige

Russia has found an old ally from other wars to bring down Ukraine’s most impenetrable defense: snowfall

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Winter has once again established itself as a decisive actor in the Ukrainian war. To the mud and fog A new enemy has been added to the Ukrainian defenses. Heavy snowfall and freezing rain are degrading the tool that has allowed kyiv to make up for its numerical inferiority for two years: the swarms of light, agile and deadly FPV drones that form the backbone of their “death zones” defensive. Winter as a weapon. The meteorology, which in other winters had shaped the strategy, this year is dismantling a defensive system which Ukraine had perfected into a nearly impenetrable barrier. Russia understood this before anyone else and launched large scale assaults taking advantage of the climate vulnerability of drones, opening gaps around Kharkiv, Huliaipole and especially Pokrovsk. For the first time in months, Moscow is advancing not because it has decisively improved its military, but because nature has given it a window that it is exploiting. with brutal determination. The unexpected weakness. It turns out that FPV drones, so effective in summer, are extremely fragile in winter. Their lack of inertia makes them victims of the wind, which pushes them and makes their trajectory falter with each gust, humidity and ice fog the cameras, snow reduces contrasts, fog blurs the depth of the visual field and the lenses become covered with drops that distort the image at the most critical moment. The pilot, who needs perfect vision to hit with surgical precision, encounters a blurry screenwithout references, unable to distinguish trenches, obstacles or even the final objective. The slightest loss of clarity turns an attack in a crash against the terrain or in an erratic missile. The result is devastating for the Ukrainian defensive strategy: when the drones do not fly, the death zones they cease to existRussian columns can advance under dark clouds and motorcycles and pickup trucks carrying troops take advantage of the fog to infiltrate towns like Pokrovsk, where urban fighting is already fierce. A dangerous opportunity. The adverse weather has created for Russia an opportunity that it has not enjoyed since the beginning of the war. With Ukrainian drones forced to remain on the ground, Russian forces have managed to maneuver with greater freedom of movement, something that drone warfare had made nearly impossible for months. They have crossed rivers in fog, entered towns with light vehicles without being detected and pushed through Ukrainian lines while the defense was reorganized while waiting for the weather to improve. Moscow’s advance, although limited in territorial terms, is having an impact psychological and tactical significant: it exposes the fragility of the Ukrainian defensive model when it is left without its star tool and shows that Moscow has learned to detect weather patterns to time attacks precisely. The November Fog already allowed its troops to deepen positions in Pokrovsk, a critical point whose control has become a symbol both for the Kremlin (which seeks to show progress to Washington) and for Kyiv, which is struggling to resist on a front where pressure is constant. Innovation against the clock. But the climate does not act in a unidirectional way. Just as quickly as drones became inoperable, atmospheric improvements allowed Ukraine to recover part of their kill zones and launch counterattacks with your FPV. The brigades, such as the 28th Mechanized, have taken advantage of the clear weather to hit Russian units newly deployed in Kostiantynivka, trapping them in exposed positions. This dynamic confirms that Ukraine is not defeated: is forced to adapt faster. Its industry, extremely flexible since 2022, is already developing a new generation of drones with more wind-resistant fuselages, low-light cameras, simplified thermal systems and control algorithms capable of stabilizing flight in adverse conditions. The arrival of these drones, scheduled for the coming months, will be key to reverse the advantage temporary that Russia has obtained. If Ukraine manages to deploy a winter-hardy FPV force, the balance on the front could tip again. The other winter war. While the drones fight in the white sky ahead, winter hits the cities otherwise: with blackouts of up to 16 hours, failed heating, stopped elevators and parents who go to the shelter with their children in their arms between explosions. The BBC told cases like that of Oksana, in her apartment in kyiv, who lives with a 2,000 euro battery that only extends normality by a few hours. Her daughter plays by candlelight and her husband works in the dark when bombing cuts off supplies. Millions of Ukrainians are preparing for what the authorities describe how “the worst winter in our history.” Moscow has intensified its attacks against transmission networks, not only to leave the population without electricity and heat, but to close bakeries, paralyze factories, stop transportation and suffocate the economy until causing social discouragement. According to the Ukrainian government itself, the Russian objective is not only to defeat the country militarily, but to destroy its internal cohesion. human wear and tear. After almost four years of war, fatigue has become widespread. He insomnia affects three times as many Ukrainians as people in countries at peace, and the nights are marked by sirens, Shahed drones and waves of missiles that have reached record numbers. Moral fatigue is mixed with the physical: the front is far away, but the war is in every hallway, in every staircase, in every unlit light bulb. And yet, surprisingly, the surveys show a rebound in optimism: more than half of Ukrainians believe in a better future, even if it is a fragile, oscillating one that depends on the evolution of blocked negotiations, the arrival of foreign aid or the result of a Russian offensive that is still far from a decisive victory. Frozen diplomacy. Plus: international negotiations are going through their most uncertain moment. A possible Trump-Putin summit is on pause. The EU is still discussing how to use 180,000 million on frozen Russian assets, and kyiv sees with concern how Washington sends mixed signals and how some European governments could change with elections less … Read more

Russia has shown on video how to hunt drones with shotguns. And he has also revealed what he did not want us to see

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During the years of Russian invasion of Ukraine we had seen many tactics that copied techniques and weapons from the past. For example, the use of the Davis cannon of the First World War, or the application of anchored shotguns on airplane wings. In fact, the use of shotguns and rifles from the last century has become a normalized scenario over the months due to the lack of modern artillery. Russia has now shown in a video how to hunt drones. Although he has also inadvertently revealed another detail. Shotguns in the front. The silent battle that is fought every day between Russian boats and swarms of FPV drones in the Dnieper has revealed now one of the most unexpected tactical turns of the war: the resurrection of the shotgun as a survival tool on a battlefield dominated by sensors, radio waves and munitions costing just a few hundred dollars. The viral sequence recorded from the helmet of a Russian marine, it offers a deceptively heroic portrait of a crew sailing at full speed through narrow channels while shooting down drone after drone (up to 13), although the meticulous analysis of each fragment shows that the initial epic falls apart as soon as the details are examined and what is behind it is understood: a fragmented combat, recorded on different days, in which the probable casualties are left out of the shot and where the electronics have as much weight as the shots. The mirage of the mission. They counted it analysts at Forbes. What seems like a single continuous episode in reality It’s a montage of multiple confrontations, where the sky changes color between shots and where the marines shoot at both real threats and invisible threats, lost among interference and gusts of wind. The barge sails while three shooters with semi-automatic shotguns, an automatic rifle and a light machine gun try to keep at bay drones that explode at the slightest contact. Thirteen devices fall, but the editing hides both the failures and the side effects. Two explosions centimeters from the hull leave doubts about possible injuries that are never shown, while a revealing detail (a Marine who already has a tourniquet placed preventively on his thigh) speaks of very specific expectations: the probability of being hit is not a hypothesis, but an assumed fact. Elite unit supported by electronic warfare. Forehead to the ‘Mobiks’ sent to slaughter with weeks of instruction and precarious material, this unit stands out for modern equipmentfor the shooting discipline and for the hidden arsenal that really explains part of their survival: a antenna constellation electronic warfare mounted on the boat. These inhibitors, with a range of between 50 and 100 meters, turn many drones into uncontrolled projectiles that fall by pure gravity. The shotgun just finish what electronics has already weakened. In an environment where FPV munitions explode even when the operator loses signal, the difference between living or dying depends not solely on aiming, but on the ability to blind the drone before it gets too close. That is why the shots show drones collapsing far from the effective range of the shooters: they did not fall due to an accurate shot, but due to interference. The limits of the shotgun. That a shotgun can take down an FPV at close range is so true as misleading. The scene has fueled a narrative of false confidence that the soldiers themselves deny off camera. There are testimonies of teams that five drones were shot down followed to fall before the sixth when they ran out of ammunition, or patrols that aimed and fired until the last cartridge before a device entered through the window and destroy the vehicle. If you like, the arms industry has also adapted: Benelli already produces models specific “anti-drone”equipped with tungsten ammunition, and foreign donors have sent hundreds of semi-automatic shotguns to Ukrainian units. But the tactical principle does not change: a shotgun does not compete with the mass production of drones. It is a desperate tool to gain seconds in an environment where each drone costs less than a box of ammunition and where both armies manufacture them by the millions. Desperate defense. He video ends with the boat rescuing another group of marines: one is wounded, others advance with two weapons in their hands, and the scene, far from glorifying the resistance, underlines the true tactical message. The shotgun works, yes, but only when the number of drones is small, when the shooters are trained, or when there are active inhibitors and when luck is on the side. The complete story, the one that never goes viral, remembers that for every boat that returns, another does not. In the Dnieper War, the shotgun is not a weapon of air supremacy: it is the final spark that is fired when all else has failed, a defense of last resort against a swarm cheap and numerous which is redesigning the way armies move, attack and survive. A shotgun may give you time, but in an FPV-saturated front, that time may not be enough. Image | RUSSIAN MOD In Xataka | Ukraine has just reduced what took days to two minutes. And then he began to crush the most feared Russian weapon: his kamikazes In Xataka | The new peace plan in Ukraine has been reduced to 19 aspects. The problem is that the key point measures 900 km

Germany has spent three nights copying Taiwan. If Russia decides to invade it, it has had an idea: surprise them underground

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Last July, the Taiwan subway experienced an unusual day: Instead of passengers loaded with purses and suitcases, soldiers, soldiers and more soldiers armed with anti-tank missiles began to arrive at Taipei stations. The reason was twofold: to send a message inside and outside (China) of the country. That idea seduced Germany, and now that it has begun its rearmament it has launched in Berlin. A disturbing return. The exercise Bollwerk Bärlin III Last week, he returned to the German capital a scene that seemed banished to the memories of the 20th century: soldiers descending U-Bahn stairsjumping onto the tracks and advancing through smoke, simulated gunshots and cars taken over by “saboteurs.” For three nights, between 1 and 4 in the morning, about 250 members of the Wachbataillon (a unit known for its ceremonial role but with infantry functions) transformed stations like Jungfernheide into a real underground battlefield to practice assaults, close combat, evacuation of civilians and protection of critical infrastructure in a realistic environment in which nothing is altered or mocked up: the narrowness of the tunnels, limited visibility and changes in light are the same as they would find in a real war scenario. In the background: Russia. They remembered the TWZ analysts that this return to urban warfare in tunnels and stations, without embellishments or theatrical simulations, symbolizes a profound change in Germany’s strategic priorities and revealed the extent to which the shadow of a possible conflict with Russia has penetrated into the very heart of Germany. his military planning. The metamorphosis. The battalion in charge of displaying honors on state visits had been conceived for decades as a symbol of institutional stability, not as a combat force. However, its real operational mission (protecting the federal government and its facilities in the event of a crisis) today takes on an urgency that has not been seen for a long time. Hence the direct tone of his commanderlieutenant colonel Maik Teichgräber: Berlin is your area of ​​operations and they must prepare for “the worst case scenario,” which means training where you would really fight. The use of stations closed to the public allows practice quick entriesassaults on trains, neutralization of enemies and immediate removal of wounded, integrating snipers, perimeter security and coordination between units in a densely urbanized environment. The presence of additional scenarios (such as the former Rüdersdorf chemical plant or the Ruhleben police complex) underlines the desire to turn the capital’s defense into a multidimensional exercisecapable of absorbing everything from internal sabotage to coordinated incursions that seek to paralyze the political center of Germany. Global dimension of the trend. Which happens in Berlin It is also reflected in other regions of the world. How we countTaiwan uses its subway as a defensive artery during the Han Kuang exercises, aware that, in the event of a Chinese invasion, underground infrastructure they would be vital to move troops and supplies while the surface becomes a continuous target. In parallel, the United States has raised the underground war a priority for its special forces, responding to the proliferation of fortified tunnels, dense urban areas and the expansion of drone swarms that force troops to seek refuge underground. The growing autonomy of unmanned systems, already present in Ukraine, accelerates this trend: in a future where aerial surveillance will be almost constant, defending in depth will mean dominating not only streets and buildings, but subways, tunnels, pipelines and interconnected bunkers. The war of the future, according to these emerging doctrines, will be fought both upwards (against drones, sensors and loitering munitions) and downwards, in an underground network that takes on strategic value. Echoes of the Cold War. He training on the U-Bahn inevitably refers to a divided Berlinwhen the city was a western enclave surrounded by Warsaw Pact forces. At that time, the United States, the United Kingdom and France were rehearsing urban operations aimed at slowing down an invasion to gain political time, aware that holding the city indefinitely was unrealistic. Units like the (secret) Detachment A They practiced sabotage and unconventional warfare techniques from the shadows. Even stations, such as Pankstraße or Siemensdamm, were designed like nuclear shelters for more than 3,000 people for weeks, with armored doors and air filtering. The reunified Germany had left behind that architecture of fear, and today, faced with a panorama of uncertainty, it returns to study how to reactivate these civil protection capabilities. The contrast is evident: what in 1994 seemed unnecessary is once again considered a strategic necessity. Historical rearmament. we have been counting. The exercise is also part of a context transformation unprecedented german military apparatus. By 2029, Berlin plans spend 153,000 million euros per year in defense (around 3.5% of GDP), an enormous jump from the levels that for decades were a source of friction with Washington. It is a rearmament designed not only for modernize capabilitiesbut to adapt the country to threats that They are no longer theoretical: What happens 900 kilometers away, in Ukraine, conditions the entire strategy. This budget increase has led NATO to consider a symbolic turn that would have been unthinkable during the Cold War: that Germany would command the allied forces in Europe. Although that moment has not arrivedthe expectation underscores the pressure on Berlin to demonstrate that it can take on top responsibilities and is willing to prepare its military for complex scenariosfrom urban sabotage to large-scale conventional warfare. Strategic warning. Teichgräber put it clearly: Nobody can guarantee that the war that is currently devastating Ukraine will not one day reach German territory. That phrase sums up the background of Bollwerk Bärlin III. The Bundeswehr trains in the subway tunnels because it understands that contemporary conflicts do not respect borders or capitals. The hybrid warcoordinated attacks on critical infrastructure and the massive use of drones They make the interior of cities as vulnerable as their borders. If you like, what is at stake is not only the defense of Berlin, but Germany’s capacity to react facing a moment in which the strategic … Read more

appears out of nowhere and turns Russia invisible

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At the beginning of November a scene It went viral on networks. The arrival of Russian troops in Pokrovs was more typical of a dystopia, another example that the war in Ukraine seemed to have definitively become a mirror of what the war conflicts of the future will be like. Now we know that that scene was also the prelude to an advantage. The weather in front. Yes, on the eastern lines of Ukraine, the arrival of a winter full of dense fogs has transformed the battlefield in an unpredictable scenario where visibility, which previously determined the pace of drones, has become a strategic resource in itself. The veil of humidity that covers Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and the approaches to Pokrovsk It makes the job of Ukrainian operators who rely on aerial surveillance to track Russian movements, but also offers an opportunity to sneak up, infiltrate and strike at close range. The chaos. In areas like Pokrovskwhere the lines overlap and the front is porous, the fog has caused a kind of calculated chaos that makes war unpredictable, a board where both armies move almost groping between bursts of fire that appear without warning, while the commanders admit that the weather is completely altering the reading of the terrain and the control of the approaches. Exploiting meteorological disorder. The fog has allowed Russian forces to promote specific advances and risky maneuvers. Taking advantage of the lack of aerial surveillance, mechanized units have managed to cross natural obstacles, build improvised bridges and make their way into areas where they were previously stopped by constant reconnaissance from the air. In southern regions, such as Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsklow visibility has coincided with an increase in assaults and intensive bombing that has forced Ukraine to retreat from certain positions in search of more sustainable defensive lines. The accumulation of troops under the cover of fog, the concentration of armored vehicles and the constant infiltrations by small teams seeking to advance without being detected reflect a strategy that combines quantity, continuous pressure and meteorological opportunism. At the same time, the movement of columns towards towns such as Huliaipole and Yablukove confirms that Russia tries to convert each weather window into a territorial advance, aware that controlling logistics nodes at this time of year can set the trend for the entire campaign. Solution: ground robots. Faced with the temporary loss of eyes in the sky, Ukraine has begun to integrate ground robotic systems to replace the surveillance that drones previously guaranteed. The appearance of UGVs In the defense of Pokrovsk it has made it possible to detect enemy movements that would have gone unnoticed in the dense fog and has served to guide subsequent attacks with FPV drones when visibility permitted. These small, discreet and fast platforms have provided an additional layer reconnaissance in areas where even the best aerial optics fail. Its deployment shows that the Ukrainian army is maturing hybrid doctrines where ground robots complete the work of drones that they previously dominated alone. If you will, it’s a preview of how technological warfare could evolve in the coming years: closer integration between autonomous ground sensors and aerial vectors, especially in adverse climates that are becoming more frequent and extreme. Units operating in Pokrovsk describe combat scenes where attacks emerge from the fogguided by machines that detect heat, sound or movement in conditions in which the human eye is practically blind. The pressure on Pokrovsk. The worsening of the weather coincides with a deterioration of the tactical situation in Pokrovska critical point due to its value as a transport hub and link for the defense of the east. Russia has intensified assaults relying both on climate coverage and on a notable numerical imbalance that favors its troops. Ukrainian forces acknowledge that they face waves of infantry in very small groups, teams of two or three soldiers seeking to saturate the defenses through multiple approaches, and that the fog has facilitated the temporary return of mechanized assaultseven using civilian vehicles to advance quickly in the direction of the city. A plan B. This dynamic has forced Ukraine to combine tactical withdrawals, civilian evacuations and robotic ground reconnaissance to avoid surprises. The adverse weather has accelerated the feeling of uncertainty on a front where every meter of ground is contested blindly and where the lack of aerial vision multiplies the risk that an enemy leak becomes an operational rupture. Time changes everything. The combination of persistent fog, limited mobility and low visibility has created a combat ecosystem that rewards both creativity and audacity. In this environment, the infiltration tactics Russians find more room to thrive, but so do quick Ukrainian incursions that seek to disorient the adversary in the chaos of the fog. Climate has become a multiplier of uncertainty: it degrades the precision of drones, distorts sensors, creates gaps in surveillance and pushes both sides to improvise technological and tactical solutions. Ukrainian ground robots represent a popup response to those conditions, while Russian advances under adverse weather show the importance Moscow attaches at any opportunity to break the Ukrainian defense. Image | IDF Spokesperson’s Unit In Xataka | The main problem of Europe’s rearmament is a number. If Russia attacks its borders, it has 45 days to roam freely In Xataka | Ukraine’s “Terminator” against Russian drones: an AI that decides when to shoot has hidden where it is least expected

The main problem of Europe’s rearmament is a number. If Russia attacks its borders, it has 45 days to roam freely

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The scene took place a decade ago at a Polish station, when several American Bradleys lost their turrets when passing under a platform that was too low, symbolizing a problem that Europe never solved: the structural vulnerability of your military logistics network. on a continent that is rearmed at a vunknown speed since the Cold War, the shortcomings are not only found in the absence of more tanks, ammunition or entire brigades, but in the physical inability to move them in time. The hidden fragility. In the month of July already we count the first indication. Then Europe realized that rearmament I had to start on the roads under a very simple premise: a Russian invasion would unleash fatal congestion. In fact, the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 is already exposed that reality. France could not transfer his Leclercs to Romania via the shortest land route through Germany and was forced to send them by sea, a deviation that evidenced what military planners have been pointing out with frustration for years: Europe is not prepared to move a modern army from its western ports to the eastern border in a credible time frame for deterrence. Now, in addition, he is certain of a number: deterrence takes about 45 daysand in a real scenario it would be equivalent to losing a war before appearing on the front, so it is imperative to reduce. How much? The plan is to reduce it five or even three daysaccording to the objectives that Brussels is finalizing. That is the heart of problem that obsesses to German General Alexander Sollfrank: that everything, from documentation to the resistance of a tunnel and the availability of a train driver, will work “like a Swiss clock” when Moscow tests NATO’s reaction capacity. The political challenge. They remembered in the Financial Times that even before the first armored train crosses Europe, the critical obstacle is political. The experience of 2022 showed that, although US intelligence accurately warned of the imminent Russian attack, some European leaders did not believe that Putin would give the order. Military mobilization can only begin once governments accept that the threat is real, and that delay (hours or days) is gold for the aggressor. General Ben Hodges, former commander of US forces in Europe, formulated it to put it bluntly: the key is not just how to move troops, but how to speed up decision-making, open ammunition depots, activate convoys and do it before Russia launch your offensive. And more. Added to this is the strategic unknown of Donald Trump, whose record of oscillations against Russia keeps Europe in constant tension: even if Washington claims to remain committed with Article 5clarity, synchronicity and speed could be conditioned by your posture. Only when that political decision is made will the massive movement to the east begin, a flow whose magnitude (200,000 soldiers and thousands of armored vehicles from the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom) demands a continental precision no priors. Geography as an enemy. That said, almost all analysts agree: the real bottleneck of European defense is on your physical map. Europe, despite being a densely developed continent, is not designed to move heavy divisions from one end to the other. The tunnels are too low, the clearances too narrow, the Baltic roads incompatible with those of the rest of the continent, the bridges (such as the collapsed Carola in Dresden in 2024) too old to support the weight of a modern tank. Even the inclination of the railway track can become at a risk When a train transports armored vehicles: the cargo could overturn. The realization of this reality led Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to launch the Rail Baltica projecta €24 billion investment explicitly designed to support oversized military trains and eliminate the dangerous process of transferring vehicles between networks with different gauges. And on the Peninsula. In Spain and Portugal, the situation is similarmaking any urgent transfer from the peninsula difficult. Germany, which should act as Europe’s great military highway, is perhaps the most worrying example: exhausted roads, bridges in critical condition and a railway network that years ago was no longer suitable for high-intensity operations. The logistical dimension. Moving an army in Europe is not just a matter of infrastructure: it is also a administrative nightmare. Since most of the countries crossed would not be formally at war, their labor and customs laws would remain in force even in full military mobilization. A convoy crossing three borders could clash to three different regulations on mandatory breaks for truck drivers, incompatible customs procedures or transit permits that must be issued on paper, since NATO avoids digital documents for fear of cyberattacks. Germany, Poland and the Netherlands have tried to break this labyrinth by creating a “military Schengen” embryonic, but regulation remains fragmented, slow and vulnerable. Brussels has identified 2,800 critical points of infrastructure that need urgent modernization, although only 500 have been prioritized, and the fulfillment of the plans depends on governments whose political priorities change every year. Added to this complexity is the vehicle multiplication and calibers in service, which makes it almost impossible to standardize the logistics chain. As Sollfrank warnsyou cannot plan every “screw”, but you can plan the scenarios, and today Europe is just beginning to understand the real scale of the problem. The industry as a decisive link. Plus: the modernization of military mobility requires not only adapting bridges and roads, but also rebuilding industrial capacity to transport a contemporary army. A light division may require up to 200 trains, each with more than 40 cars, which represents more than 8,000 logistics platforms for a single operational movement. European railway companies, from Deutsche Bahn to Baltic operators, are signing agreements to reserve military capabilities, while Rheinmetall begins to offer complete services for convoys crossing Germany, from mobile dormitories to emergency workshops. But Europe does not produce enough high-capacity railcars or specialized vehicles, and the industry requires joint tenders and unified specifications to be able to produce … Read more

In 2018 Russia presented its new and revolutionary humanoid robot. The only problem is that it wasn’t a robot.

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Yeah “AI” is a trendy technological concept, the other is robotics. humanoid robotsspecifically. The United States and China have embarked on a race to see who creates humanoid consumer robotsbut when in 2018 it was only Atlas jumpingRussia already had a humanoid robot dancing and putting on a show. His name was Boris, but there was one problem: he wasn’t a robot. robotic cold war. Until the recent generation of robots, which have left laboratories and workshops to become compete even in sports eventsthe great reference in robotics was Boston Dynamics. On the one hand, with Spot, the robot dog. On the other hand, with an Atlas that did parkour and executed very fluid and calculated movements. Although owned by Hyundai, those advances came from the United States, and Russia wanted to get into the conversation. Thus, in December of 2018, something occurred on the state channel Russia-24: a robot that looked like an astronaut and named Boris came on stage. He did so in the city of Yaroslavl, where the Proyektoria Annual Science and Technology Forum had just been inaugurated, aimed at promoting robotics and technology among young people. It was an important event, since it had the support of the Ministry of Education itself and Putin had attended previous versions. The Russian prodigy. Boris was a machine, in the figurative sense. He danced, talked, had dreams and illusions, stating that he wanted to learn musical composition and draw, and it was treaty like a celebrity on the television channel. It was the most advanced example of Russian robotics and seemed finished. Atlas had cables hangingBoris a helmet, little lights and he was a movie robot. There were those who began to wonder things. Appears at the 32nd hour of this video. Suspicions. TJournal is a Russian technology website and was one of the first to question the authenticity of the robot. How to collect BBCthe questions were quite accurate: Why aren’t there any sensors? How has it appeared out of nowhere without prior leaks? Why is no one on the Internet talking about something so advanced? Why were some movements so fluid during the dance? Why was the voice so robotic? And most importantly: why was it so unnecessarily large? But the most important thing is that, beyond the official images of Russia-24, which seemed to be very concerned that the country gave the impression of having this very advanced device, there were other images. Taken by the assistants, in some of those photos from behind a human neck was perfectly visible protruding from the back of Boris’s head. Caught. Very expensive costume. There was no need to investigate much: Boris was nothing more than a suit that a worker had put on. The suit could be bought. If you had 3,600 euros, you could buy the Alyosha model from the Show Robots company, which also came with Iron Man or Robocop suits. In fact, it was a media agency founded by a rival of Putin that public some photos with the actor putting on the suit. Deception? Naaah, a joke. Imagine the embarrassment after pulling on the blanket. The video went viral and was mocked, so much so that, a few days after its publication, Russia-24 removed it from its YouTube channel. However, two days after the original broadcast, they re-uploaded it and published an interview with the journalist who had done the piece. The excuse? He was sure no one would believe it, since he was like Santa Claus: a project for children. The problem is that the journalist narrated the original report as if it were Russia’s latest technological marvel. Those responsible for Proyektoria threw up their hands and said that they had never claimed that it was a robot, that it was not their business and that those at Russia-24 did not find out about the film. The problem is that there were those who pulled the blanket and discovered that Russia-24 had already shown a fake military robot. In fact, in 2019 the play was repeated with another robot taking the kickoff in a match between FC Orenburg and CSK Moscow. It was another man in disguise and the video is brutal. The state of Russian robotics… In the international media there were those who laughed it off, like CBS affirming that “regardless of the intention, Boris will not go down in history as the most embarrassing example of Russian fake news.” And we remember this episode because, recently, Russia has presented AIdol, its first humanoid robot. Already gone… wrong. With the soundtrack of ‘Rocky’ in the background and with a face of “please, what am I doing here”, the first thing the new Russian robot did was take a couple of steps to fall on its face. The scene is high-level unintentional comedy, with the robot kicking on the floor and the employees taking it away and covering the stage with a large black cloth. At least AIdol is real. Images | ПроеКТОриЯ In Xataka | In China they are not satisfied with creating advanced robots: a company has developed a head that gestures like a human

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