peace

In 2016 Colombia signed a historic peace agreement. Then the area dedicated to cocaine cultivation skyrocketed

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In Colombia the 11-24-2016 It is one of those dates that sneak into history books and that schoolchildren study for generations. Or at least that’s what was expected a decade agowhen (after years of negotiations and a complicated procedure with steps forward and back) the Government and the FARC signed a Peace Agreement which was intended to mark a turning point in the country’s history of drug trafficking and violence. The reality today is that the Colombian coca map may be different from that of 2016, but it has not retreated. Quite the opposite. Taking stock. The second round of the Colombian teams will coincide almost with the tenth anniversary of the agreement signed in 2016 by the FARC-EP and the Government, then headed by Juan Manuel Santos. With that backdrop, this week the British newspaper Financial Times public an extensive analysis in which he examines how the cocaine business, drug trafficking and violence in the country have changed over the last decade. And the result is not exactly good. If it had to be summarized, it could be done like this: more hectares of cultivation, greater yield, more business and less ideology. Change of actors. One of the key ideas that leave bouncing FT is that, far from ending drug trafficking and coca cultivation, the 2016 agreement has only served to change its protagonists. The place that the far-left insurgent organization once occupied FARC It is now distributed to armed groups more motivated by the search for profit. From discourse based on politics we move on to business. Not only that. The logistics chain has become fragmented and specialized, although in the new map they would stand out above all three great actors. One is the National Liberation Army (ELN), left-wing guerrilla organization that expands its influence to Venezuela. Another group is made up of former members of the FARC who are dissatisfied with the 2016 pact and who now act as dissidents. The third protagonist is Gaitanista Armyalso known by its acronym (EGC) or as Clan del Golfo, formed by right-wing paramilitaries. For the director of the Ideas for Peace Foundation (FIP), María Victoria Llorente, the latter is “the largest criminal organization in Colombia.” What exactly happened? That the State has not achieved occupy the place left by the FARC, which has translated into a huge opportunity for other organizations interested in drug trafficking. Toby Muse, reporter and author of ‘Kilo’, summed it up not long ago in an interview with ABC: “The FARC had control of many of the places where coca was planted. When they lowered their weapons they clearly told the Government: ‘Now this territory is yours. A minimum of law must be introduced and the peasants must be protected. That is the peace process. This territory is now yours’. The Government was unable to take control. Other groups did so and it generated a new cycle of violence.” Click on the image to go to the tweet. The figure: 253,000 hectares. Geoff Dyer and Joe Daniels, the reporters who sign the report of FT, have not limited themselves to collecting testimonies from experts and locals. In their chronicle they also slip some figures that help understand how the coca map in Colombia has changed since 2016. Of all, perhaps the most resounding are the UN estimates on the cultivated area: between 2018 and 2023 there would be increased by around 50% until reaching 253,000 hectares. This growth has also been accompanied by another just as solid in the production of pure cocaine hydrochloride. A questionable balance. Just a few days ago, President Gustavo Petro assured that the Executive expects that the area with coca crops this year will be around 253,358 hectares, which, he insisted, represents a reduction compared to 2025. In any case, it is still higher than what was expected. the UN calculated in 2022 and questions the success of the policies promoted a decade ago by the Executive to encourage farmers to abandon coca plantations. In 2017, for example, the Transnational Institute (TNI) informed of how a “crop substitution plan” to, through economic incentives, eliminate 50,000 hectares of coca in just one year. Only part of the ‘photo’. It is not just that the cultivated area has increased. In its 2024 report, the UN also points out a noticeable increase in the yield of cultivated hectares, a phenomenon that coincides with the decision of the Government of dispense with of aerial fumigation with glyphosate as a tool to eradicate coca plantations. The decision was made a decade ago due to its impact on the environment and the health of the population, but the Petro Government has had no choice but to reverse and recover fumigations with the help of drones. More sophisticated. In general the analysis of Financial Times points out that new generations have ‘professionalized’ coca production in Colombia, betting on new varieties of crops, more efficient agricultural practices and more sophisticated processing. Even the laboratories have been improved. The British media reports that, taking advantage of their control of the territory, some groups have even gotten into other businesses, such as illegal gold mining. Beyond Colombia. That coca production increases by Colombian forests It has effects beyond the country or even South America. In your ‘World Drug Report 2025’the United Nations recalled that in 2023 the production, seizures and consumption of white powder had reached “new highs”, confirming itself as “the fastest growing illicit drug.” According to their calculations, production shot up almost 34% between 2022 and 2023 and consumption went from 17 million users in 2013 to nearly 25 million in 2023. hunted caches before reaching its destination, but so does production, something that has even been felt in the quote of the bales. The reflection in Europe. In the global chain they are on one side the big producers (Colombia, Peru and Bolivia) and on the other the main consumer markets. In the latter, important changes can also be seen, something that it is clear in … Read more

The US has signed peace with Iran in Versailles. The last time someone did it was the prologue to an unprecedented disaster

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There is a historical irony that is difficult to overcome: the Treaty of Versailles It was signed in the same room (the Hall of Mirrors) where, in 1871, the German Empire was proclaimed after the French defeat. In 1919, France chose that same place on purpose to reverse the humiliation and force Germany to sign its defeat in the same scenario of its triumph. That peace was intended close a war…and twenty years later, Europe was entering an even worse situation. Peace in the same place, again. donald trump has signed an agreement with Iran in a place steeped in history: the Palace of Versailles. The image is powerful because it inevitably refers to the last great peace treaty sealed there, the one from 1919when Europe believed it was healing the wound of the First World War. That peace, however, was an imperfect peace: humiliated Germany, left open economic and political wounds, and fueled resentment that, two decades later, facilitated the rise of Adolf Hitlerthe collapse of the European order and the Second World War. The symbolism today is disturbing because Trump presents this pact as a historic victory, but many see in it the same pattern: a hasty truce, ambiguous concessions and structural problems that remain intact. From surrender to something else. Just a few weeks ago Trump demanded “unconditional surrender” of Iran. He signed memorandum This week it’s practically the opposite. Washington has agreed to release billions in frozen assets, relax sanctions, allow Iranian oil exports and open the door to a reconstruction fund. of 300 billion dollars funded by regional partners. In return, Tehran promises to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, contain its regional allies and continue talking about its nuclear program. The shift is enormous: from maximalist rhetoric to a negotiation that many in Washington consider a strategic transfer. The weapon that defeated Washington. The most striking thing is that Iran did not win this negotiation on the battlefield, but in the global economy. The closure of Hormuz (through which around 20% of the world’s oil passes) unleashed a cimmediate energy crisis. The threat of a global economic collapse was the factor that, according to Trump himselfpushed him to close a quick deal. I feared a spiral similar to that of Herbert Hoover and the Great Depression. Therein lies the great Iranian victory: it has shown that it does not need to militarily defeat the United States to impose conditions; just touch the circulatory system of the world economy. What was not resolved. There is no doubt, the central problem is still alive. The agreement barely touches the Iranian ballistic arsenal, leaves the question of its regional militias in the air and only establishes vague mechanisms to manage its enriched uranium. Trump even has publicly accepted for Iran to keep part of its missiles, something that until recently was a red line. The architecture of the pact is dangerously similar to that of the 2015 nuclear deal which he himself demolished during his first term. The difference is that now he signs it with less pressure and with an Iran that has proven its capacity for economic coercion. A peace that strengthens the adversary. Instead of weakening the regime, the war seems to have consolidated it. The apparatus of the Guardians of the Revolution still intact At its political core, the new leadership presents itself as surviving a direct clash with Washington and the flow of money can reinforce its internal stability. In practice, Trump has saved a regime he claimed he wanted to overthrow. That’s one of the most uncomfortable parallels. with 1919: Sometimes treaties do not close conflicts, they simply reorganize forces and give the actors time to recover. The poison of the 1919 Treaty. When the Treaty of Versailles was signed after the First World War, the winning powers imposed gigantic economic reparations on Germany, the loss of key territories, severe military limitations and, above all, the famous “guilt clause”, which forced Berlin to accept responsibility morale of the entire war. On paper it was a punishment. In practice it was a political bomb watchmaking. German society felt that peace not as closure, but as a historical humiliation that fueled a narrative of national betrayal and desire for revenge. From humiliation to Nazism. That resentment found perfect fuel in the hyperinflation of the 1920s, massive unemployment and the economic collapse after the crash of 1929. It was in that broth that Hitler built his rise: promising to break up Versailles, restore German greatness, and return lost sovereignty. And he did it. He reoccupied the Rhineland, rearmed the country, absorbed Austria, and dismantled the European order as Western democracies tried to buy time with concessions. The peace of 1919 did not prevent the following war; He incubated her slowly. and when broke out in 1939was much more devastating than the first. The lesson of Versailles. The great historical teaching of the Treaty of Versailles It was not that peace failed immediately, but that a very bad peace can incubate a worse war. In 1919 it was believed that the European chaos had been contained and what was done was to postpone it while growing up in silence. Today the risk is not a literal repetition, but the logic is recognizable: United States economic pressure easesIran retains tools of coercion and its nuclear capacity remains not completely neutralized. If Tehran concludes that being on the brink of the bomb is not enough to deter and that the real shield is to become another North Korea, this agreement could end up being remembered not as the end of a war, but as the prologue to a much larger crisis. Image | US NAVY, William Orpen In Xataka | The US entered Iran with the intention of disarming it and changing the regime: it is going to leave by strengthening its position and paying it money In Xataka | Iran always thought it would need a nuclear bomb to defend itself against the US: it has … Read more

We sensed that the peace agreement had been expensive for the US. What we did not imagine is the crazy amount that is going to be paid to Iran

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Exactly 10 years ago, the image of an airplane downloading 400 million of dollars in cash in Iran became one of the most controversial symbols of Barack Obama’s foreign policy. In fact, Trump spent years using that episode as proof that Washington had “paid” for peace. Ten years later, history repeats itself… but with many more zeros. The peace bill. The truth is that it was sensed from the first moment that the cease-fire between the United States and Iran was not exactly going to come free for Washington. What no one imagined was the magnitude of the price: up to 300,000 million of dollars in the form of a reconstruction and investment fund to relaunch the Iranian economy. The figure is so enormous that it completely transforms the narrative of the war. What began as a campaign of maximum pressure and bombings on nuclear facilities has ended up mutating into something much more uncomfortable for the White House: an agreement where the supposedly punished person can leave with a historic financial injection if it complies. Kharg Island From punishing to financing. The paradox could not be more brutal for Donald Trump. For years he built a good part of his speech attacking the Barack Obama nuclear pactdenouncing that he had filled Tehran with “pallets of money.” Now his administration is promoting something that potentially multiplies that concession on another scale. The argument is that the money will not come directly from the US Government, but from Western and Asian companies that would enter Iran if sanctions are lifted. But the geopolitical effect is the same: Iran’s economic survival becomes guaranteed by a deal that Washington desperately needed to close. Hormuz, the key. It we were counting yesterday. The real trigger for the turn was not nuclear, but economic. When Iran blocked the Strait of Hormuz, it left more than a fifth of the world’s oil and gas trade up in the air. The market held out for a few days, but the pressure began to be unbearable. More than 500 ships were trapped, maritime traffic plummeted and the world’s largest shipping companies began to warn that reopening the route would not be immediate. Everything changed there. The war ceased to be a regional issue and became a direct threat to the global economy and, above all, to the pockets of the American consumer. Washington chose oil. That’s where the interests of Washington and Israel diverged. While Benjamin Netanyahu wanted keep pressing To further weaken the Iranian regime and even force a change in regional balance, Trump saw the domestic political cost of prolonging the energy crisis. With elections approaching and the price of oil as a threat, the priority stopped being to subdue Iran and became reopening Hormuz as soon as possible. In practice, this meant accepting a much more limited agreementfocused on navigation, ceasefire and future nuclear negotiations. Israel doesn’t see it. I was counting this morning the wall street journal that in Jerusalem the reading is almost opposite. The fear is not just that Iran will receive billions, but that it will do so without immediately handing over all of its enriched uranium or completely giving up rebuilding its nuclear program. For many Israeli strategists, this means that Tehran gains oxygentime and resources to rearm. Furthermore, they see profound damage to American credibility: after months of military and economic pressure, the end result looks more like a purchased pause than a strategic victory. A peace that strengthens some. The agreement, therefore, leaves an uncomfortable and quite surreal image: the United States bombed, pressured and isolated Iran to end up offering the conditions for its reconstruction. The Iranian regime comes out beaten, yes, but alive, with the Strait as a negotiating weapon and with the possibility of receiving an avalanche of foreign investment. Of course, Trump could possibly sell it as stability and containment nuclear. But seen from the outside, the feeling is very different: peace has not only cost Washington dearly, but it may end up financing the very actor it tried to corner and overthrow. Image | US Navy, Google Earth In Xataka | We have been fearing the Apocalypse for 100 days due to the closure of Hormuz. The blow is going to be given to us by a heat wave in China In Xataka | Ukraine turned drones into hunters. A helicopter shot down in Hormuz has transformed them into a Spielberg film

Google and Apple have been wanting to kill SMS for years. So they have signed peace between their messaging apps

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Apple and Google have been betting on their own protocols for years RCS messaging. Relevant solutions in territories like the United States, but that do not fully penetrate the rest of the world. Despite this, both companies have closed an important agreement, so that when chatting from an Android to an iPhone the communication is encrypted. The novelty. Google has announced an agreement with Apple to implement end-to-end encryption for RCSensuring that chats between Android and iOS are secure by default. Although both systems had encrypted device-to-device communication (Android to Android and iPhone to iPhone), this security measure did not apply when we communicated with a different operating system. Why is it important. From now on, if you are looking for a safe way to communicate without going through applications like WhatsApp or Telegram, use the native Messages app (have an iPhone or have an Android) is an excellent option. There is no need to download anything, files can be shared, and the information does not pass through the hands of anyone other than Apple or Google. It is not the perfect solution for those looking for absolute anonymity, but it is a great plan to do without giants like Meta. What is RCS?. RCS stands for “Rich Communication Service”. It is a protocol that came to succeed SMS, and allows communication to be carried out in an encrypted and fast way. Being a protocol and not an app, developers need to create them to use RCS. In the case of Google it is the Messages app and, on iOS, too. When you send a message via RCS, it goes through our operator’s server, and from there to a server certified by the GSMA. It allows you to send images and videos of up to 10 MB and, most importantly, it does not require an internet connection to work. SMS vibes. Why it fails. Apple and Google’s efforts with RCS have to do with a phenomenon that has been happening for years in the US: the overwhelming success of the iPhone and iMessage. In the United States, iMessage is used more than WhatsAppsomething unthinkable in our country. Spain is the country of absolute dominance of WhatsApp, with Apple representing just over 10% of the market share and making it impossible for iMessage to be a rival for the Meta app. Why will he still be alive?. Google, despite controlling 70% of the mobile market with Android, needs a direct way for its users to communicate. And that way is RCS. Apple was forced to adopt it due to European pressure and, although it may not be a massive protocol, it is a key alternative to rival services. Be that as it may, good news for those who want alternatives to WhatsApp or Telegram when communicating from one mobile phone to another without the need for a network connection. In Xataka | Meta will pay $1.4 billion to Texas for violating the privacy of its users. Used facial recognition without permission

There is a Europe that is suffocating to pay for housing and another that lives in peace. And this map shows the differences

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Beyond the political ups and downs, corruption, unemployment, the war in Ukraine, or the (increasingly) convulsive scenario of international geopolitics, from time to time The CIS reminds us that there is a much more everyday problem that keeps us Spaniards up at night: access to housing. At the end of 2025 39.9% of those surveyed by the organization pointed out housing as “the main problem” facing the country. And it is normal if you take into account the mismatch between supply and demand, the pressure that carries out tourist rentals and (above all) the sharp rise in prices of recent years. Every time we talk about the residential market, however, the same question arises: beyond the exact cost of the square meter (m2), calculated by the General Council of Notaries, the executive or portals like IdealisticHow “unaffordable” is accommodation in Spain? What economic effort does it require from families? Is it more or less than what other European households must assume? Getting perspective Type of housing (in m2) available spending 40% of monthly income. ESPON, the program who is dedicated to studying cohesion of the EU, has published a series of maps that help answer these questions in a quick, direct and, above all, visual way. To prepare them, two parameters have been basically set: the prices of the real estate market for sales and rentals and the income data published by Eurostat. Everything divided by regions. By crossing them the organism has been able to carry out two calculations. The first is to estimate what type of housing (in m2) a person who allocates 40% of their income to this purpose can rent in each EU region. The second is what percentage of their rent that same tenant should dedicate if they wanted a 100 m2 house. Percentage of monthly income necessary to rent a 100 m2 home. ESPON does not stop there. He has also transferred those same questions to the buying and selling market residential. That is, what type of housing could a person willing to invest 40% of their annual income for an entire decade afford? And how many years would you have to endure that same budgetary effort if you wanted to buy a 100 m2 apartment? In both cases the maps are similar and they leave behind a series of conclusions, such as the profound differences that exist within the same country. “Regions containing and surrounding capital cities such as Paris, Berlin, Lisbon and Madrid tend to be less affordable compared to the rest of the nation. Additionally, coastal regions tend to be less affordable, which is also clearly seen in the Netherlands and Germany, Portugal, Spain and France.” Available housing (m2) investing 40% of the income for 10 years. Years necessary to buy a 100 m2 home investing 40% of the income. For example, while a Madrid resident willing to invest 40% of his annual income in housing would need between 20 and 25 years To pay for a 100 m2 house, a resident of the province of Teruel would need at most ten years of effort. In Barcelona it would need around 20-25 years while on the other side of the peninsula, in Pontevedra, between 15 and 20 years would be enough. The worst part in Spain is Malaga, the Balearic Islands and the Canary Islands, where ESPON calculates that on average a buyer would need to invest 40% of their annual income for more than three and a half decades. A very similar effort would have to be endured by the inhabitants of the Algarve, Setúbal, part of the Paris area, Monaco, Corsica or different points spread across Eastern Europe, where ESPON itself recognizes that “quite unaffordable” areas are concentrated. If we talk about the rental market, the panorama It’s not very different. A Madrid resident who would like to rent a 100 m2 apartment would need to dedicate (on average) between 80 and 90% of their income to it. The situation is worse in coastal points, such as Barcelona, ​​Huelva, Malaga and Eastern European regions. In the provinces of Zamora or Huesca they would be enough between 30 and 40%which is closer to the debt ceiling level than recommend assuming the experts. Images | Quique Olivar (Unsplash) and ESPON In Xataka | It is not a country for Spaniards: Madrid and Catalonia are losing national population while gaining foreign population

If there is finally peace in Ukraine, Russia has a surprise for the rest of Europe

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The talks in Berlin have revived the idea of ​​an agreement to end the war in Ukraine like never before, to the point that Donald Trump has assured that peace is “closer than ever” after prolonged contacts with both European leaders and Vladimir Putin. If this horizon occurs, Finland has just sounded the alarm. The peace that appears. The United States has put on the table a plan that, according to its own negotiators, would solve around 90% of friction points and that includes a ceasefire supervised by Washington, security guarantees powerful and a central role for Europe in the stabilization of the country. kyiv admits real progressalthough he emphasizes that the territorial issue remains the most painful core of the negotiation, with Russia demanding concessions in the Donbas that Ukraine is reluctant to accept. Still, the general tone is contained optimismwith the feeling that, for the first time since 2022, there is a minimally viable political architecture to stop the fighting. Security guarantees. The key element of the plan is a package of security guarantees described by US officials as the most robust ever offered to Ukraine, with explicit parallels to NATO’s Article 5. Europe is ready to lead a multinational force on the ground, a “coalition of the willing” that would help regenerate the Ukrainian armed forces, protect its airspace and guarantee maritime security, always with political and operational support from the United States, although no US troops deployed in Ukraine. Furthermore, Washington would assume supervision of a ceasefire and an early warning system for possible violations, while European countries would legally commit to act in the event of new aggression. For kyiv, these guarantees are the essential condition to accept any freezing of the conflict, even leaving aspirations such as membership in NATO on hold, something that Zelenskiy has come to openly raise. The hidden price of peace. However, beneath this apparent diplomatic advance lies growing unrest on Europe’s eastern flank. Finland has issued a warning as clear as it is uncomfortable: peace in Ukraine will not mean the end of the Russian threat, but very likely its geographical displacement. According to Finnish Prime Minister Petteri Orpo, Moscow would take advantage of the end of hostilities to redeploy forces towards NATO’s borders, especially in the Baltic and northern Europe, strengthening its posture vis-à-vis the Alliance in a period of just three to five years. From Helsinki, it is insisted that Russia would continue to be a revisionist power and that interpreting peace as a general de-escalation would be a strategic error of the first order. The eastern flank prepares. The most exposed countries already act accordingly. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland are on track to spend more than 5% of its GDP in defense, well above the traditional objectives of NATO, while coordinate common capabilities in air defense, drones and ground forces, and are working to accelerate the movement of troops and weapons across the continent. Finland, with its historical culture of preparation against Russia, maintains bunkers, strategic reserves and training programs civil, despite going through a serious economic crisis. These countries fear that a peace agreement will lead some European partners, further away from the front, to relax their attention and their military spending just when, in their opinion, the threat would be reconfiguring and not disappearing. Europe and a decision. The debate comes in a critical week for the European Union, forced to decide whether to support financially to Ukraine in the long term, unlocks the use of frozen Russian assets and assumes that your future security It depends less on Washington and more on its own deterrence capabilities. Orpo has been explicit by warning that Europe cannot afford to just talk about peace, but must act quickly and resourcefully, because there is no credible alternative plan if support for kyiv fails. Thus, the paradox is strongly imposed: the advance towards peace in Ukrainefar from closing the chapter on European security, could open another equally delicatein which Russia, freed from the Ukrainian front, once again strains the continental chessboard and forces Europe to finally face the strategic consequences of a conflict that never was only from Ukraine. Image | Ministry of Defense of Ukraine In Xataka | Something unprecedented has happened in North Korea: a video has revealed that they are sending their soldiers in Ukraine to the “slaughterhouse” In Xataka | The drone war in Ukraine is complete nonsense: the manuals that were useful two weeks ago are a death trap today

The round of peace meetings in Ukraine has ended. Russia says it is “ready”, but for war with Europe

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The last two rounds of contacts between the Kremlin and Trump’s envoys have confirmed that the peace process for Ukraine is technically alive, but politically blocked. Putin took advantage of the arrival of the emissaries to launch a verbal offensive: Accused Europe of torpedoing peace, suggested the EU “is on the side of war,” and said Russia does not want a continental conflict but that if Europe starts one, “we are ready right now.” A trapped peace process. For Moscow, the talks are “very useful” as they allow it probe the limits Washington and explore what it is willing to sacrifice in exchange for a stable ceasefire. For the United States, they are an opportunity to zoom in positions without openly acknowledging that the original plan favored Russia too much and was unacceptable to kyiv. Five hours of meeting in Moscow served to review successive versions of the US document, but not to generate a “compromise option”: Russia accepts some elements, rejects others with a “critical and even negative attitude” and, above all, keeps intact its objective of translating its military advances in territorial gains formalized on paper. Moscow red lines. At the center of the disagreement is the territorial question. Moscow insists Ukraine must resign to 20% of Donetsk which he still preserves, while boasting (not without response from kyiv) of having taken Pokrovska key logistical hub that had been in operation for more than a year trying to capture with a great cost in lives and material. This insistence is not only cartographic: is part of a maximization logicin which victories at the front are used as an argument to tighten political conditions. Added to this are other structural requirements: deep cuts in the Ukrainian armed forces, severe limits on Western military aid and a fit of Ukraine into the Russian sphere of influence that would empty its formal sovereignty of content. In this context, talking about “progress” is, in reality, talk about margins: Washington explores how far it can give in without kyiv perceiving it as a capitulation, while Russia calculates how far it can stretch its demands without completely breaking the diplomatic channel that is useful to buy time and legitimize its narrative. Parallel diplomacy and mixed signals. Witkoff and Kushner’s role adds a ambiguity layer to the process. They are not classic diplomats, but political emissaries who operate in a gray zone between official diplomacy and American domestic politics. His presence in Moscow, after meeting with Ukrainians in Florida and reviewing a 28 point plan which initially tilted the board towards Moscow, sends several signals at once: kyiv is shown that Washington “listens” to its objections and tweaks the document, Moscow is made clear that the White House is willing to continue negotiating concession frameworks, and Europe is reminded that the decisive conversation remains, above all, Washington-Moscow. The Trump statement Calling the war a “mess” that is difficult to resolve fits with that approach: rather than a closed strategy, the administration seems to seek an agreement that reduces the political and economic cost of the war for the United States, although the final balance is very delicate for Ukraine. Europe as a scapegoat. The Putin’s words on Europe reveal a perfectly calculated strategy: presenting European capitals as the real obstacle to peace, accusing them of “being on the side of the war” and of preventing Washington from closing an agreement. By saying that “Europe is preventing the US administration from achieving peace in Ukraine,” the Kremlin is trying several things at the same time: put pressure on the Europeans to lower their demands, feed the fatigue of war in Western societies and drive a wedge between the United States and its allies, suggesting that Washington would be more flexible if it were not bound by “European demands.” The added threat that Russia “does not intend to fight Europe, but is ready if Europe starts” has a double effect: it works as a military warning and, at the same time, as an internal message to reinforce the idea of ​​a besieged Russia that only defends itself. The risk of being isolated. For Ukraine, cross-play is especially dangerous. Zelenskiy insists on receiving security guarantees “livable” for the future, that is, mechanisms that prevent a new Russian attack once an agreement has been signed. HE frontally opposes to any formula that forces him to give up territory that he currently controls or to reduce his army to levels that leave him defenseless. But, at the same time, it knows that a part of the European capitals and the American political class are seeking, with increasing urgency, an outcome that freezes the war and stabilizes the front, even if that enshrines a status quo very unfavorable for Ukraine. Its margin consists of supporting in the European bloc tougher (those countries that see a bad agreement as a disastrous precedent for continental security) and to remember that any credible reconstruction involves using frozen russian assets and for a framework of Western guarantees that makes another Kremlin attack politically unaffordable. Putin’s calculation of strength. The threats “cutting off Ukraine from the sea completely” and intensifying attacks on ports and ships entering them fit into a broader strategy: combine slow but steady advances in the Donbas with the ability to strangle the Ukrainian economy and make the protection of its maritime corridors more expensive. Each city taken or partially controlled serves the Kremlin as proof that time is in its favor and that it can rise the price of peace at each plan review. Editorials from related media, as Komsomolskaya Pravdareinforce this idea by presenting the negotiations as a scenario in which Russia can afford to tighten its conditions as “more and more Ukrainian territory” passes into its hands. The implicit message is clear: if the current proposals already seem harsh, the next round could be worse for kyiv if the war continues. Uncertainty. The final result is a peace process that formally remains open, but that moves on a dangerous … Read more

A 28-page US document has brought peace in Ukraine closer than ever. The problem is that it is the translation of a Russian text

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And suddenly a 28 page document unpublished to date has suddenly entered as a missile in the negotiations of the war in Ukraine. Promoted by Washington, it has unleashed a diplomatic storm in Europe and in kyiv because, far from having been prepared with the main parties involved, it had been conceived in discreet negotiations between the American businessman Steve Witkoff and the Russian envoy Kirill Dmitriev, with the participation of Jared Kushner and the late endorsement of Trump. The origin of a plan. The result of these meetings was a text that Europe and Ukraine had not seen and that, to further alarm (according to one Bloomberg exclusive), preserved the linguistic structures typical of an original written in Russian, confirming the suspicions that Moscow had achieved filter your vision of the war in a document presented as a US initiative. The pressure exerted by Dan Driscoll (a close ally of JD Vance) on European and Ukrainian diplomats, urging them to accept territorial concessions in a matter of days, ended up setting off all the alarm signals. For European governments, which considered themselves central partners in any peace negotiations, the origin of the plan became a strategic question: they needed to know who had written it and with what objectives before sitting down to discuss. This information gap triggered a race against time to stop the imposition of a text that, in its initial form, was not only surprising for its demands, but also for its obvious alignment with Moscow’s interests. Territory, legitimization and a threat. The most explosive section of the American plan required that Ukraine will withdraw of the fortified urban centers that it still maintains in Donetsk, breaking the “belt of fortresses” that has slowed the Russian advance since 2014. This withdrawal would not only imply the displacement of tens of thousands of Ukrainian citizens, but it would open a corridor that would leave exposed to key cities like Dnipro and Zaporizhzhia. To make matters worse, the document proposed that the occupied areas be recognized as “de facto Russian”a more favorable formula for Moscow than the already problematic “de facto under Russian control”, and which, in practice, brought the international community closer to accept territorial changes achieved by force. Added to this was the idea of ​​converting the evacuated territories into a demilitarized zone whose violation by Russia (not an implausible scenario given recent history) would allow Moscow to open a new, even deeper offensive in the future. From the Ukrainian perspective, accepting this point would be sowing the conditions for a future war in worse terms, reinforcing the impression that the document did not seek a stable peace, but rather formalized a strategic result that Russia has not been able to obtain through military operations. Security cut and promises broken. The security guarantees included in the plan were vague to the point of irrelevance: they promised “reliable protection” without detailing mechanisms, but simultaneously prohibited Ukraine from entering never in NATOprevented the stationing of allied troops in its territory and forced kyiv to modify its Constitution to renounce accession. For a country marked by the experience of Budapest Memorandum (formal guarantees that prevented neither the annexation of Crimea nor the 2022 invasion), accepting an even more ambiguous framework would amount to to be left helpless facing an aggressor who has systematically broken all previous agreements. Red lines. The absence of a commitment type Article 5 and the refusal to allow training missions or deterrence forces on Ukrainian territory reinforced the conviction that Ukraine would be trapped between a strengthened Russia and a West that would reserve the right to “diplomatically support,” but not to intervene. This component fueled rejection in European capitals, which consider it essential that Ukraine keep an army strong as a land barrier that protects the continent. Limit to 600,000 troops to the only country in Europe at war, without imposing a similar restriction on Russia, was perceived as covert disarmament and a prelude to a future Russian offensive. Amnesty and frozen assets. One of the most shocking elements of the plan was the proposal of a general amnesty and Ukraine’s renunciation of any legal claim about war crimes, deportations or deliberate destruction of infrastructure. For an exposed population to documented atrocitiesthis clause meant not only the denial of justice, but also the elimination of the legal basis that allows Europe to advance the reparations loan backed by frozen Russian assets. That loan, of 140,000 million of euros, is considered by the EU as the more solid path and less expensive to sustain Ukraine during the postwar period. The US plan not only made it unviable, but also redistributed those funds in an unusual way: 100 billion would go to a US investment vehicle that would deliver half of its profits to Washington, another 100 billion would be contributed by Europe and the rest would go to a joint fund with Russia. For Berlin, Paris or Warsaw, the message was clear: Russia would obtain indirect financial relief while the Europeans would see their most effective tool of strategic pressure weakened. The attempt to force kyiv to renounce all moral and legal responsibility for the aggressor reinforced the perception that the plan sought to resolve the war “quickly,” not “fairly.” The Russian strategy. Since the beginning of the invasion, Moscow has not changed their fundamental demands: more territory in the east, military neutralization of Ukraine and permanent veto on its accession to NATO. This strategic immobility, together with gradual advances on the front, has allowed it to capitalize on Western fatigue, the political fractures in kyiv and transatlantic tensions. For the Kremlin, the leaked plan demonstrates that its commitment to prolonged resistance, military pressure and the erosion of Western will is bearing fruit. Putin openly celebrated it, affirming that the document could serve as a basis and that rejecting it would only lead to new Ukrainian defeats. Likewise, Moscow has hinted that even a signed agreement could be used as leverage to resume the … Read more

a 100 square meter spider web where two enemy species live in peace

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He fear of spiders is one of the most common phobias. So much so that there are video games that allow you to change the design of spiders for that of other animals and there is even research into how. recreate them in less scary ways. With this I want to tell you that, if they give you the creepswhat they have discovered in a cave between Albania and Greece will be the new scene of your nightmares: the biggest spider web in the world, a megacity that has more than 111,000 spiders. And the most curious thing has nothing to do with the size of the structure. In short. A few days ago, in the magazine Subterranean Biologya team of researchers described their great discovery: in the Sulfur Cave between Albania and Greece, they had found a mega city of spiders. Actually, the initial discovery was made by speleologists from the Czech Speleological Society in 2022, but scientists from Transylvania University were the ones who visited and documented the cave in recent years. What draws the most attention is a nightmare scenario: a ‘silk’ structure that covers about 106 square meters and in which a whopping 111,000 spiders live. It is located about 50 meters from the cave entrance, in a very narrow, permanently dark area, and researchers believe there are thousands of individual funnel-shaped spider webs that have come together to create the structure. The colony. For that reason alone, the find is worth mentioning, but the most interesting thing is not the size, but rather the people responsible. If we were talking about a single species, well, it would be impressive due to its dimensions, but what is relevant here is that there are two species that coexist in the megacity: The curious thing is that both are solitary species and have never before been documented to form colonies. Furthermore, under normal conditions, the domestic tegenaria would hunt the Prinerigone vagansmuch smaller, but the researchers realized that both coexisted peacefully. Paradise. The reason? The total darkness may be inhibiting the spiders’ senses, allowing coexistence, but the toxic sulfuric environment may also be playing a role. What they are clear about is that the ecosystem is perfectly oiled: There is no photosynthesis as there is no light, so the microorganisms that are present are sulfur-oxidizing bacteriaconverting inorganic compounds into organic matter that sticks to the walls. There are chironomid larvae that feed on these biofilms. From the larvae, Tanytarsus albisutus emerge, mosquitoes that do not bite and that form dense swarms in an inland stream and of which there are an estimated 2.4 million individuals. By accident, they fall into the webs of the spider megacity and estimate that each spider touches 200 mosquitoes, so they are well fed, they do not need to hunt or leave the structure and they continue to expand the colony. The two species in love and company Implications. One of the researchers, István Urák, has commented that they often think they completely know a species “to the point that we think we understand everything about it, but even then unexpected discoveries can happen.” And he does not say this because the two species coexist, but because they have carried out DNA analyzes that have revealed that the populations of the Sulfur Cave are genetically different from their conspecifics that inhabit the surface. This means one thing: in the evolutionary line, those on the surface have gone one way and those in the cave have gone another, remaining isolated enough to evolve in another way and adapt specifically to the hostile environment they inhabit. These differences mean that microbial diversity is lower in cave spiders and females produce fewer eggs per sac than those on the surface, possibly because since they do not have predators, they do not have to produce as many offspring. a mine. Urák’s team is working on a follow-up study that may shed more light on these spiders, but in addition to the silk megacity, other teams have documented another thirty species of invertebrates that have adapted to this peculiar environment. Among them, another spider: the Metellina merianae who, unlike the other two, prefers to live in solitude. And, regardless of curiosity and even scientific interest, researchers have stressed the importance of protecting this colony. For this reason, the exact location of the cave has not been shared, but the situation is complex because it is located on the border between Albania and Greece and it remains to be seen which country has the power to protect it. In the end, they have been developed in a very specific way and any external element that is introduced can be a contaminant. Beyond the rejection that spiders produce for many of us, this discovery puts on the table that, even in conditions as hostile as a cave without light, with little oxygen and the presence of toxic gaseslife not only makes its way, but “enemy” species can form enormous communities that live in harmony. For the sake of the Prinerigone vagansmay there never be a lack of mosquitoes… Images | Marek Audy, Subterranean Biology In Xataka | We have genetically edited a spider to produce a fluorescent red web. And the implications are promising.

After imposing a peace agreement in Gaza, the US is heading to Ukraine to do the same. And that has two nuclear problems

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United States, in omnipresent figure of its president Donald Trump, seems willing to finish once and for all the invasion of Ukraine. It happens that trying to reproduce the same diplomatic “success” that is exhibited after the agreement in Gaza runs into two problems nuclear: on the one hand, the attempt to impose an agreement on Russia calls into question the sovereignty and legitimacy of the process and pushes Moscow to react. On the other hand, perhaps more dangerous, the pressure campaign that is articulated around the threat with long range missiles drastically increases the risk of an escalation that is difficult to control. From ambiguity to challenge. For a long time, Trump’s foreign policy toward Russia and Ukraine moved between deference and confusiona mix of praise for Putin, vague warnings and broken promises to kyiv. But in recent weeks, something has changed. trump has radically changed his speech, going from suggesting that Ukraine should accept territorial losses to presenting himself as the man capable of ending the war. What started as a rhetorical gesture before the UN has become a political process that seeks to consolidate the role of the United States as arbiter of the conflict, with a mix of military pressure, transactional diplomacy and calculated threat. Change and breakup. Trump, who had historically shown a almost personal indulgence towards Putin, surprised his allies and his critics with a speech in which rated Russia “paper tiger” and stated that Ukraine can recover all your territory with the support of Europe and NATO. This change, announced after his meeting with Zelensky and Macron, marks an abandonment of his traditional strategy of avoiding direct confrontations with Moscow. However, behind the turn there does not seem to be an articulated policy yet, but rather a combination of gestures: hints of sanctions, threats of retaliation and an explicit desire to reintroduce the idea of force as an instrument of negotiation. What was once indifference toward kyiv has become an instrumental interest, mixing rivalry with Putin and a desire to demonstrate international leadership. Tomahawks and ultimatums. The most visible symbol of this transformation is the word that has become recurrent in the communications from Washington: Tomahawk. Trump has openly threatened to supply Ukraine with long-range cruise missiles if Putin does not agree to reopen peace negotiations, an ultimatum which has put the Kremlin on alert. Moscow has responded calling the measure a “qualitatively new escalation” and warning that it could not distinguish whether the missiles carry nuclear warheads or not. For Trump, however, the announcement meets a double function: reinforces your image as a negotiator who commands respect and pressures Putin to prevent him from prolonging a war he can no longer win. Zelensky, for his part, sees the possibility of obtaining Tomahawks as not only a military instrument. but psychological: the threat of its use would be enough to push Russia to the negotiation table. The mere fact of discussing its delivery represents a break with the caution of the Biden erain which Washington rejected outright any action that could be considered direct aggression. From Gaza to Ukraine: export a model. The partial success of ceasefire in Gaza has offered Trump a narrative of diplomatic victory that he is now trying to convey on the European front. After freeing the Israeli hostages and achieving a temporary cessation of hostilities, the American president declared that his next objective was to “focus on Russia” and end the war in Ukraine. What is apparently a humanitarian movement also responds to a repositioning strategy global: demonstrate that Washington can impose order in both the Middle East and Europe without needing to deploy large military contingents. Trump has presented this new stage under a classic concept that has republished with pragmatism: “peace through strength.” It is the same logic that he seeks to apply with Putin (that is, not from conciliation, but from a credible threat). Ukraine, which for months feigned faith in some sterile negotiations to ingratiate himself with the White House, now perceives a window of opportunity: to replace the dialogue tables with the delivery of advanced weapons that change the balance of the battlefield. A military agreement. The visit of a Ukrainian delegation to Washington, led by Prime Minister Yuliia Svyrydenko, has sealed the new phase. The negotiators arrived with a list of valued acquisitions in 90,000 million of dollars, including Patriot anti-aircraft systemslong-range missiles and drone co-production agreements. Zelensky has learned to speak Trump’s language: that of transactions. It is no longer about asking for help out of solidarity, but rather offer “mega deals” that benefit both parties, presenting Ukraine as a profitable partner for the US military industry. The White House, in turn, has implicitly accepted that the talks with Moscow they are sold outand that only a substantial increase in military pressure will be able to force Putin to negotiate from weakness. The new strategic calculation. If you like, the Kremlin also crosses a point operational fatigue. Its territorial advances have become more marginal, and Zelensky himself has taken it upon himself to remember this in Washington with maps and figures: in a thousand days of war, Russia has barely conquered less than one percent of additional Ukrainian territory from 2022. The narrative of inevitable victory fades, and Trump seems to have understood. His speech on networks, in which stated that Ukraine is “in a position to recover his entire country in its original form,” was interpreted as confirmation of that change in perception. In other words: it is no longer about keeping a conflict frozen, but about precipitating its outcome through technological superiority and Russian economic collapse. The paradox. Paradoxically, the trump turn does not imply a return to the liberal idealism that defined US foreign policy for decades, but rather a pragmatism that mixes interests, spectacle and coercion. Washington does not seek to rebuild Ukraine, but rather to close a war that has stopped serving its image of power. From that perspective, the American president does not seem … Read more

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