Russia

Ukraine has opened the missile that devastated kyiv. They have found 100 reasons to be angry, and not exactly with Russia

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In 2014, after the downing of flight MH17 over eastern Ukraine, international investigators spent months reconstructing fragments metallic weapons scattered among fields and roads to identify the weapon responsible. One of the biggest surprises was not just the missile itself, but the enormous amount of information that they could reveal small pieces seemingly insignificant. Ukraine has been “surprised” for some time by what is inside Russian war technology, but the latest perhaps exceeds anything seen before. The 100 components that should not be there. It we have been counting with numerous intercepted drones and missiles by kyiv, but the latest “unboxing” has set off alarms. The reason? When the Ukrainian teams they began to analyze the remains of the Kh-101 missiles that had hit residential buildings in the capital, they hoped to find Russian technology, perhaps Chinese parts or improvised systems to avoid sanctions. What they found was much more uncomfortable for the West: more than one hundred components manufactured by American and European companies inside each missile. Chips, microelectronics and systems produced years after sanctions began, including from this same 2026continued to appear in some of the most advanced weapons in the Russian arsenal. For Ukraine, the discovery has ended up generating a particularly bitter sensation: the missiles that they devastate the cities Ukrainians continue to partially depend on technology designed and manufactured by the same countries that support kyiv militarily. The Kh-101 is mounted on pylons The great crack of sanctions. He Kh-101 case is revealing one of the biggest problems of modern technological warfare: sanctioning does not necessarily mean cut off the supply real. Russia continue accessing to Western microelectronics through re-exports, intermediaries, opaque distributors and commercial networks that are extremely difficult to control. Some pieces even arrive from china as clones or compatible copies of Western designs. The result is that Moscow has achieved maintain and expand its missile production despite economic isolation. Ukraine maintains that many of the components found were fOpened in 2024 and 2025years after the sanctions packages that were supposed to strangle Russian military capacity. The feeling in kyiv is that there is a huge difference between announcing restrictions and making them actually work. The missile that Russia does not stop perfecting. Yes, because the Kh-101 has become a of the central pieces of the Russian air campaign. Launched from strategic bombers and designed for long-range flights at low altitude, Moscow has multiplied its production since 2022 to levels far above those before the invasion. But also, Russia is continually modifying the missile to make it more difficult to intercept. Ukraine assures that the new versions incorporate anti-interference improvements, more sophisticated navigation systems, double charges reducing fuel and even fragmentation munitions with zirconium elements to increase damage. kyiv continues to intercept a good part of them, but each new development forces spend more resources defenses and demonstrates that Russia maintains sufficient industrial capacity to sustain a prolonged technological war. The Western Paradox. Also it we have been counting. The history of the Kh-101 reflects, one more timean extremely uncomfortable contradiction for Europe and the United States. As the West delivers anti-aircraft systems, intelligence and economic aid to Ukraine, part of the global technology industry it keeps leaking towards the Russian military machine. In practice, some Western companies may end up seeing their own chips end up inside the missiles which then force the use of expensive Patriot or NASAMS interceptors also financed by the West. That paradox explains much of the Ukrainian frustration. For kyiv, the problem is no longer just Russia, but the inability of global trade chains to prevent critical technology from ending up feeding the Kremlin’s military production. The industrial war of the 21st century. He analysis of the remains The attack on kyiv is also leaving a deeper conclusion about how modern wars work. No great power today manufactures advanced weapons completely isolated of the global market. Missiles, drones and guidance systems depend of an international network of microelectronics, software and components extremely difficult to control. Russia has shown that even under massive sanctions can still access much of that global technological infrastructure. And Ukraine has discovered something equally disturbing: that in the wars of the 21st century, open a missile enemy is no longer only useful for studying its military technology. It also serves to discover to what extent the connected world continues feeding indirectly the war he is trying to stop. Image | Office of the President of Ukraine, Russia MoD In Xataka | Russia has been advancing at a snail’s pace in Ukraine for months. That’s about to change because of one season: summer. In Xataka | The war in Ukraine has entered such a crazy phase that soldiers are shooting at their own drones

Russia has been advancing at a snail’s pace in Ukraine for months. That’s about to change because of one season: summer.

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During World War II, many commanders discovered that a simple station could completely alter the rhythm of a military campaign: on the eastern front, the arrival of spring turned roads and fields into seas of mud capable of immobilizing tanks for weeks, while summer suddenly reopened enormous corridors of advance for both armies. The war that no longer advances as before. I counted the weekend the new york times that for months, the Kremlin has tried to sell the idea that a Russian victory in Ukraine is only a matter of time, pressuring even Trump and Western negotiators with the argument that kyiv Donbas will end up losing inevitably. However, on the ground the reality is much less spectacular. Russia has been advancing at a snail’s pace practically all year, to the point that, maintaining the current pace, it would take decades to completely occupy the region whose surrender it demands to negotiate peace. The problem is that this apparent paralysis can be misleading. Both Ukrainian commanders and military analysts carry weeks warning that summer is slowly changing the conditions of the front: the dry terrain allows the use of motorcycles and light vehicles to recover, the vegetation offers coverage against drones and Russian infiltrations are beginning to gain effectiveness after extremely difficult months for Moscow. The front is a drone war. The great transformation of this phase of the war is that Russia can no longer advance as in previous conflicts. Massive assaults with armored columns have become too vulnerable in a field of battle saturated by dronessensors and constant surveillance. Every movement is exposed from the air and any concentration of troops can be quickly destroyed. That has forced Moscow to completely modify its tactics. Now small groups of soldiers predominate slowly infiltratingon foot or on motorcycles, trying to open gradual gaps within a huge “gray zone” where control of the territory is no longer clear for either side. In other words, the conflict is looking less and less like a conventional war and more like a technological competition permanent between drones, electronic warfare and improvised survival systems. Russia makes little progress, but continues to push. The big problem for Ukraine is that even these minimal advances remain generating constant wear. Russia has suffered huge human lossesrecruitment problems and technological difficulties, including communications restrictions and obstacles to coordinate your drones. However, the Kremlin appears to have accepted that a slow and costly war remains preferable to launching large, risky offensives that could end in failure. In places like Pokrovsk or Chasiv YarMoscow has been fighting for years without managing to definitively break the front, but it has not retreated decisively either. Their troops infiltrate little by little, occupy temporary positions and turn huge areas of Donbas into spaces impossible for either army to completely control. The sensation is that of heavy, slow and damaged machinery that still continues advancing meter by meter. Summer is coming. That’s where it comes into play the seasonal factor which worries kyiv so much. During the mud and cold, Ukrainian drones have been especially effective at detecting Russian movements over open terrain. But the arrival of summer changes part of those dynamics. Trees and vegetation make aerial surveillance difficult, dry routes allow faster movement, and small Russian units find more opportunities to infiltrate without being immediately detected. In fact, Ukrainian officials recognize that Russian operations are already showing signs of improvement and that offensive activity is intensifying along the front. This is not yet a large mechanized offensive like those at the beginning of the war, but something much more disturbing: a constant pressure and diffuse design designed to exploit any weakness accumulated after years of wear. Between wear and tear and negotiation. All this greatly complicates international negotiations. Putin needs keep the image of a Russia advancing towards victory to pressure Ukraine and convince the United States that time is on the Kremlin’s side. But the real data show an exhausted army, enormous human losses and a front that barely moves. At the same time, Ukraine also does not have a comfortable situation: suffers from personnel shortages, desertions and difficulties in sustaining such a technological and costly war indefinitely. That’s why summer worries so much on both sides. Not because it will produce an immediate definitive rupture, but because it may slightly alter the balance of a war that has been trapped for months in a kind of lethal stalemate. And in a conflict where every kilometer costs thousands of lives, even small changes in the terrain, vegetation or climate They can end up having enormous strategic consequences. Image | Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 7th Army Training Command In Xataka | While we all look at Iran, something is moving in the Arctic Circle: Russia is sending bombers with missiles In Xataka | To achieve the milestone of building the largest drone industry without China, Ukraine has found an explosive ally: Taiwan

In 1808, a Canarian engineer had to flee Spain and go into exile in Russia. And thus shaped modern St. Petersburg

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Between the winters of his native Puerto de la Cruz and those of Saint Petersburg there are a few degrees of difference; but neither that, nor the change in culture, language or landscapes turned back Agustín de Betancourt when in 1808 he decided to pack his bags and move to the Russia of the tsars. He had fallen into disgrace in the eyes of the almighty GodoyIn Spain he had nothing left but family and memories, he had been in Paris for some time and had influential friends, so… What could he lose? Nothing. And so it was. His steppe adventure would bring him significant profits; but above all to Russia itself. So much so that if you walk around Saint Petersburg you will find several statues in his memory. The country of the tsars, that of the Alexanders and Nicolaseswhich today we associate with pageantry and alambic constructions, would probably have been somewhat less brilliant if it had not been for the genius of Agustín de Betancourt, the inventor who during the early part of the 19th century gave shape to his particular “Russia made in the Canary Islands”. Especially in the capital, Saint Petersburg. From Augustine to Agustinovich The one of Agustín de Betancourt y Molina (1758-1824) is one more name in the long list of national geniuses from whom Spain—before and after him, for one reason or another—did not know how to take full advantage. It happened to Isaac Peral, Monica Sanchez, Angela Ruiz, Emilio Herrera…and Betancourt. In his case, yes, in a peculiar way. At the beginning of the 19th century, the situation of the Canarian engineer in Spain was enviable in its own way. He came from a good birth, he had made a career between Madrid, Paris and London, earning the trust of the counts of Floridablanca either Aranda and enjoyed a well-established prestige with his work on steam engines or the optical telegraph that I had designed with Claude Chappe. As, in addition to being a man of action, he was also a man of letters, Betancourt had also encouraged the creation of the School of Roads and Canals, inspired by the École des Ponts et Chaussées in Paris. Despite all this prestige and status, their situation at the dawn of the 19th century was not what one would call comfortable. In 1805 a report with his seal on the Genil River had earned him the distrust of none other than Manuel Godoy himselfstrong man in the kingdom of Charles IV. That circumstance and the scenario that was emerging internationally encouraged Betancourt to liquidate his properties in Spain and move first to Paris —where Napoleon came to tempt him—and then to Russia. There, in Saint Petersburg, he knew how to gain the favor of the best godfather imaginable: Tsar Alexander Iwho probably saw in the canary a more than valid genius for the development of his country. What Spain had missed would be used in the Russian empire. If the future was not tempting for Agustín in Madrid, perhaps it would be in Madrid. 3,000 kilometers from there. So he collected his belongings, settled his pending matters in France and embarked for Saint Petersburg. There they waited with open arms for Agustín “Agustinovich” Betancour. Persuaded perhaps by his prestige or the interviews with Agustín himself, the tsar He soon showed his confidence in the canary. One of his first orders was the modernization of the Tula cannon factory, a strategic cog in the military apparatus of the Russian Empire. Betancourt was not new to the task and he knew how to take advantage of his knowledge of the double-acting steam engine and the operation of the Yndrid factory to give a twist to the ancient Russian system. Happy The result must have convinced the tsar. Only in this way can we understand that throughout the following years Augustine was in charge of tasks of capital importance for Russia and accumulated greater and greater prestige. In a matter of a few years, the formerly feuding engineer Godoy He became a lieutenant general in the Russian army and general director of Communications. In Moscow he took on the task of building a new Equestrian Exercise Room and around the same time he was in charge of what may have been his greatest contribution—and the most profound—to Russian urban planning: projecting a new commercial precinct able to take over the fair that since the 16th century It was celebrated near the Makaevsky Monastery. Its old center had burned in 1816 and the Russian Government wanted to recover it… but with greater packaging and in a better place, more accessible and capable of achieving greater projection. The responsibility of deciding where and how and coming up with the overall design fell on the canary’s shoulders. The venue opened its doors in July 1822 with a huge fair that brought together more than 200,000 merchants and helped for years development of the Volga region and the wealth of the empire. That Betancourt did not do badly in his endeavor is demonstrated by the fact that upon his death the Russian merchants installed a plaque of gratitude on his grave. Two hundred years later the footprint of the Tenerife native in Nizhny Novgorod still deep. Although the Nizhni Novgorod complex is perhaps its greatest urban heritage, the city in which it was used most thoroughly and in which it left the greatest impact is Saint Petersburg. There, in the capital of the empire, he showed his talent in at least half a dozen capital works for the metropolis: the new paper currency factory, the dredging of the port, several bridges and St. Isaac’s Cathedral. As the Orotava Foundation remindsBetancourt assumed in March 1816 the task of setting up a new money paper factory in Goznak, on the banks of the Fontanka canal, and for two years he was in charge of supervising the works. His involvement was not limited to the building: he organized its areas and machinery, … Read more

Dubai has come to the same conclusion as Russia. To protect your oil from drones there is something better than missiles: giant cages

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In World War II, the British discovered something disconcerting when analyzing the German bombings on its industrial cities: many times it was not necessary to completely destroy a refinery or factory to paralyze it for weeks. It was enough to hit some few vulnerable points to cause fires, disruptions and a disproportionate economic effect. Eight decades later, that same logic once again dominates another war, only now the weapon that attempts to find those weak points fits in an operator’s backpack and costs a fraction of an anti-aircraft missile. Dubai is located in Ukraine. For years, the United Arab Emirates built its security around a very specific idea: cutting-edge technology, advanced anti-aircraft systems and one of the most sophisticated defensive architectures in the Middle East were enough to protect the country’s energy heart. The war with Iran has begun dismantle that trust. After enduring hundreds of missiles and more than 2,200 Iranian drones, Dubai and Abu Dhabi have reached an uncomfortable conclusion that Russia learned before in Ukraine: in the face of cheap, numerous and persistent drones, it is sometimes more effective to raise huge metal structures over oil deposits than spending multimillion-dollar interceptors trying to destroy every threat in the air. The images that appeared near Dubai International Airport show precisely that: those gigantic “cope cages” surrounding fuel tanks, a scene that until recently seemed exclusive to Russian refineries attacked by Ukrainian drones, or in the films of George Miller. The cheap drone war. The problem facing the Emirates has less to do with the individual sophistication of each drone than with the economic logic of the conflict. Iran has demonstrated that it can launch massive waves of Shahed-136-type UAVs and other relatively cheap attack munitions against extremely expensive infrastructure and difficult to replace. Even when air defenses work, the economic drain It’s starting to be absurd: Shooting down low-cost drones using advanced interceptor missiles turns defense into a financially unsustainable battle. That’s where these appear giant metal cages. They are not designed to stop ballistic missiles or complex attacks, but to create a physical separation that reduces the damage of suicide drones or improvised munitions before reaching fuel depots, pipelines or critical facilities. A brutally simple solution, and precisely for this reason it is beginning to spread. Russia led the way. Because what the Emirates is doing now has been going on for years. happening in Russia. Since Ukraine began hitting refineries, oil depots and military bases with long-range drones, Moscow began to cover facilities strategic with nets, metal mesh and improvised structures. What was initially derided as a desperate solution ended up evolving in a defensive system relatively common around vulnerable assets. The logic is simple: an FPV drone or a Shahed does not need to completely destroy a facility to cause a huge problem, it is enough a precise impact on a tank, a pipe or a critical point to cause fires, interruptions and million-dollar costs. The Emirates, despite having practically unlimited resources compared to Russia, is discovering exactly the same structural vulnerability. The difference is that now these cages appear next to the most futuristic skyscrapers and financial centers in the Gulf. Oil as a strategic objective. Iran has focused a good part of its attacks precisely on the Emirati energy heart. Facilities such as the Fujairah oil port or the Habshan gas plant have suffered damage that will take months to fully repair. That explains why the country has accelerated visible defensive measures even after the partial ceasefire between Washington and Tehran. Because the threat has not disappeared. In fact, one of the most disturbing aspects of the conflict is that the attacks continued even after the truce announcements, reinforcing the feeling that any critical infrastructure can become a target again with very little notice. In this context, protecting refineries and warehouses no longer depends only on radars or anti-missile batteries, it also implies physically harden facilities, assume partial impacts and prevent a relatively cheap drone from causing a national energy disaster. The Pentagon changes its mentality. The expansion of these improvised defenses also reflects a broader doctrinal shift within of the US military itself. For years, many officials in Washington considered inefficient invest large amounts of money in physically shielding bases, hangars or critical facilities from cheap drones. Ukraine, Russia and now the Middle East are completely changing that perception. Shortly before the war between Iran and the United States broke out, the Pentagon published new guidelines precisely recommending networks, cables and other passive physical defenses to protect strategic infrastructures. The reasoning is beginning to be difficult to ignore: in an era of massive and cheap dronesthe survival of multi-million dollar facilities may depend less on futuristic systems and more on simple, ugly and gigantic industrial solutions. Dubai, probably one of the most recognizable symbols of global technological modernity, has just assumed exactly that reality. Image | x In Xataka | Every time the US takes stock of Iran’s arsenal and capabilities, it realizes something: it has destroyed very little. In Xataka | Suddenly, a military outpost sprouted up in the Iraq desert: it was Israel in its bombing campaign of Iran

There is a “nuclear” gift from Russia to North Korea off the coast of Spain

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In the 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, many Western experts began to fear that Russian scientists and military technology would end arriving in North Korea through opaque means, silently fueling Pyongyang’s weapons programs. Since then, every strange move between Moscow and the North Korean regime has been observed with a mixture of concern, secrecy and suspicions that are difficult to prove. A collapse full of unknowns. counted this morning CNN in an extensive report that the sinking of the Russian freighter Ursa Major off the Spanish coast has ended up becoming one of the strangest and most opaque stories to emerge around the Ukrainian war, as well as one of the most delicate. Officiallythe ship suffered several explosions in December 2024 before sinking in the Mediterranean. However, from the first moment they began to accumulate details difficult to fit into the version of a simple maritime accident: a cargo absurdly described as “manhole covers”, a Russian military escort for much of the journey, strange maneuvers before the sinking, subsequent explosions on the wreck and a very unusual silence from both Moscow and the Spanish authorities. Little by little, the case began to look less like a conventional shipwreck and more a strategic operation that went wrong in the middle of an extremely sensitive geopolitical context. The suspicion that changes everything. The great suspicion arose when Spanish researchers and sources cited by CNN They began to point out that the Ursa Major could transport nuclear reactor components similar to those used in Russian submarines. The captain himself would have ended up admitting to Spanish investigators that those supposed “manhole covers” were actually linked pieces to two naval reactors, although he claimed not to know if they contained nuclear fuel. The most disturbing hypothesis is that the final destination was not Vladivostok, despite officially appearing on the route, but the North Korean port of Rason. That is where the story takes on a completely different dimension, because the sinking would no longer be just a maritime incident, but the possible interruption of a technology transfer extremely sensitive between Moscow and Pyongyang, just after North Korea sent thousands of soldiers to support Russia in the Ukrainian war. The WC-135 off Spain. The arrival of the WC-135 aircraft Americans was the detail that definitively set off all the alarms. These planes, known as “nuke sniffers,” are not just any aircraft: they are extremely specialized platforms designed to detect radioactive traces and analyze nuclear contamination in the atmosphere. Washington normally uses them to monitor nuclear tests, atomic accidents or sensitive activity in places like the Russian Arctic or Iran, in any case, not to routinely fly over the Mediterranean off Spain. that the United States will send twice These devices over the area where the Ursa Major rests immediately fueled the suspicion that he feared something much more serious than a simple shipwreck. Although there is no public confirmation of radioactive contamination, the simple deployment of these planes left a sensation that is very difficult to ignore: Russia could have had a nuclear “gift” destined for North Korea sunk in front of Europe. Let us remember that a few months later, Kim Yong Un showed the world his alleged nuclear submarine. Explosions, spy ships and an uncomfortable wreck. The sequence after the sinking made the story even stranger. According to the research quoted by CNNthe ship did not seem doomed to sink immediately after the first explosions. However, hours after Spanish rescue resources arrived, the Russian ship Ivan Gren It launched red flares over the area and new explosions were recorded, detected even by Spanish seismic systems. Days later it also appeared the Yantarofficially a Russian research ship but designated for years by NATO as spy platform submarine. He remained on the wreck for several days before to register more explosions underwater. All of this continued to fuel the theory that Moscow may have attempted to destroy sensitive evidence at the bottom of the Mediterranean, especially if the ship was carrying advanced military nuclear technology or compromised documentation related to North Korea. The theory of silent sabotage. Another of the most surprising aspects of the investigation is the possibility that the Ursa Major was attacked with an extremely unusual weapon. The Spanish authorities are handling the hypothesis of a small hole just 50 centimeters caused by a supercavitating torpedo Barracuda typea weapon capable of moving at very high speed by reducing the friction of water using a gas bubble. The disturbing thing about this type of torpedoes is that they can pierce a hull without necessarily generating a large audible explosion, something that would fit with the account of the Russian captain, who stated not having heard no impact as the ship began to lose speed. Other experts believe the use of limpet mines or attached charges to the helmet. In any case, the mere fact that sophisticated sabotage is contemplated in waters near Spain reveals to what extent the case has stopped looking like a conventional accident. The reflection of a new alliance. Beyond the concrete mystery of the Ursa Majorthe case reflects something even more important: the rapid rapprochement between Russia and North Korea. For years, Moscow avoided crossing certain lines related to the transfer of strategic military technology to Pyongyang. However, the war in Ukraine has changed many priorities. As we have been countingNorth Korea contributes ammunition, missiles and soldiers, and Russia could be returning the favor with technical knowledge much more sensitive. The images released months later of the sinking with Kim Jong Un showing the helmet of a supposed North Korean nuclear submarine fit closely with this possibility. If there really was an attempt to move Russian naval reactors to North Korea, the sinking of the Ursa Major could represent one of the most important (and most secret) episodes of the new military relationship between both countries. Whatever it is is still in the Mediterranean. To this day, the wreck remains at about 2,500 meters deep … Read more

While everyone was looking at Hormuz, Russia has found a much bigger secret route. And drones do not stop arriving in Iran

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During the Cold War, Western intelligence services came to suspect that some Soviet freighters that apparently transported grain or machinery were actually hiding military equipment and technology sensitive under false covers. The problem was that, once inside certain internal routes controlled by Moscow and its allies, tracking them became extraordinarily difficult even for the greatest naval powers on the planet. While the world watches Hormuz. For months, the Strait of Hormuz has become the perfect symbol of Western pressure on Iran: US aircraft carriers, oil tankers diverting routes, marine insurance fired and constant threats on one of the great energy bottlenecks on the planet. However, while all international attention was focused there, Russia and Iran have been consolidating a much less visible and probably much more uncomfortable route for Washington: the Caspian Sea. It The New York Times said the weekend. This enormous space of inland water in northern Iran, usually ignored in geopolitical analyses, is being transformed into a true strategic highway to move goods, drones, military components and technology away from the direct reach of the United States. The photo. The most revealing image came when Israel bombed the Iranian port of Bandar Anzali, in the heart of the Caspian, in one of the most significant attacks of its campaign against Iran. The target was not in the Persian Gulf or Hormuz, but hundreds of kilometers further north. It was a clear sign that real logistical warfare no longer revolves solely around the most famous strait on the planet. The route that keeps Iran alive. The importance of the Caspian for Tehran has grown spectacularly since the pressure on Hormuz intensified. Russian and Iranian ships now transport wheat, corn, sunflower oil, animal feed and all kinds of of essential supplies who previously arrived via more vulnerable routes. Four Iranian Caspian ports are working at full capacity to absorb this growing traffic, while Moscow has begun to redirect millions of tons of goods that previously crossed the Black Sea. It turns out that the true strategic core is not in the cereal. According to US officials, Russia is using that route to send drone components to Iran to help it rebuild part of the arsenal lost during the last fighting with Israel and the United States. The relationship is especially symbolic because for years It was Iran that supplied Russia with Shahed drones for the war in Ukraine. Now the flow has partially reversed: Moscow manufactures its own versions under license and returns technology, components and military expertise to Tehran using the Caspian as a protected corridor. A perfect sea to avoid sanctions. The great advantage of the Caspian for Russia and Iran is that it is an extraordinarily difficult to control from outside. Unlike the Persian Gulf, where the US naval presence dominates much of the maritime traffic, in the Caspian they can only operate the five coastal countries. The United States cannot intercept ships there or impose direct blockades. Furthermore, a large part of the ships sail with transponders offdisappearing from satellite tracking systems and feeding an increasingly opaque network of “ghost ships.” In fact, Western analysts describe the Caspian as the ideal place for discreet military transfers and sanctions evasion. Dark shipping traffic has skyrocketed since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and both Moscow and Tehran have perfected methods to hide real shipments, routes and operators. It is no coincidence that Ukraine attacked the Russian port of Olya in 2024, accusing it of being a logistics center for the transfer of Iranian drone components. Nor that Israel Bandar Anzali will hit. Everyone seems to have understood that a logistical rearguard is being built there that is much more resistant than it appears. Moscow’s strategic obsession. Plus: for the Kremlin, the Caspian is not just a temporary solution derived from sanctions or the war in Ukraine. Russia and Iran have two decades imagining a gigantic trade corridor that connects the Baltic with the Indian Ocean, crossing Russia, the Caspian and Iran to avoid routes controlled by the West. The project includes new portsrailway lines and renewal of aging fleets, although many of these plans remain on paper due to lack of resources and the geographical difficulties of the Caspian. Still, the war has accelerated the strategic logic behind that idea: creating an alternative system of commercial and military circulation outside the reach of Western sanctions. For Putin, furthermore, the balance is delicate. Needs to support Iran as a regional ally and military partner, but do so in an all-too-visible way could deteriorate even more so its relationship with Washington and with several Arab countries important for Russian energy trade. The Caspian offers precisely that: sufficient support, but far from the media and military focus that Hormuz dominates. America’s great blind spot. Much of the Western concern arises from a very uncomfortable feeling: for years, the Caspian hardly occupied any space in American strategic planning. Experts in Washington recognize that the region functions almost like a black hole diplomat divided between different military commands and bureaucratic departments. Thus, while the world observed aircraft carriers in the Persian Gulf or drones over Ukraine, Russia and Iran took advantage of an immense, opaque and difficult to monitor geographic space to weave a logistics network that connects both conflicts. The problem for the United States is not that the Caspian completely replaces Hormuz, because it cannot do so, especially in massive oil exports. The real problem is that even under extreme military pressure, sanctions and naval blockades, Iran continues to find ways to stay connectedrearm and receive outside support. And each drone, each component and each shipment that silently crosses the Caspian reinforces an increasingly evident idea: while everyone was looking at the Strait of Hormuz, Russia and Iran they were building an alternative route much more difficult to stop. Image | PexelsNASA In Xataka | We sensed that Iran’s attacks on the US had been important. In reality, they were devastating In Xataka | While the whole world looks at … Read more

Iran did to the US what Ukraine did to Russia in Operation Spiderweb

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In the first weeks of the war, published reports on the damage inflicted by Iran to bases and radars of Washington in the Middle East. For example, attacks on 14 US military sites or air defense facilities were documented, or the bombing of a US base in Kuwaitthe first time in years that an enemy fighter jet hit a US base. However, it has now just become known that, in reality, it has been much worse. The war that the images began to reveal. For years, Western armies assumed that absolute control of the air and satellites was enough to hide damage, movements and weaknesses in the middle of a war… until recent conflicts began to demonstrate just the opposite. In Ukraine, simple commercial photographs Taken from space, they allowed Russian convoys to be followed, bombers to be located, and destroyed facilities to be detected long before governments acknowledged anything. To that mission he called it Spiderweb. It so happens that the same thing is happening now in the Middle East. What began as a campaign presented by Washington as a punishment operation against Iran has ended up leaving an image much more uncomfortable: that satellite photographs are showing a level of destruction on US facilities much higher than publicly admitted. The uncomfortable discovery. Latest Washington Post analysis More than a hundred satellite images have revealed that Iran hit at least 228 military structures or equipment Americans distributed throughout bases in the Middle East, a figure much higher than that officially recognized. The impacts hit hangars, barracks, fuel tanks, Patriot systems, THAAD radarscommunications centers, electrical installations and even strategic aircraft, making it clear that Tehran was not launching symbolic or indiscriminate attacks. The most delicate thing for the United States is that many of these images initially came from Iranian media and were subsequently verified through European systems and other independent commercial sources. In other words, the initial narrative of limited attacks began to collapse when the images began to show something much more serious: that Iran had achieved penetrate advanced defenses and hit critical American infrastructure in numerous countries at the same time. Damage to Camp Arifjan in Kuwait visible on March 4 Iran found the weak point of the bases. Wapo counted that one of the most striking aspects of the attacks is the precision with which they were executed. Military analysts highlighted the absence of random craters and the concentration of impacts on specific targets, a sign that Iran had very detailed prior intelligence on US facilities. The attacks were not limited to military runways or depots traditional facilities, they also hit gymnasiums, lodgings, mess halls, and staff buildings, reflecting a deliberate attempt to increase human casualties and force the United States to empty entire bases (as, in fact, that’s how it happened). Because several facilities ended up being considered too dangerous to operate normally, causing partial evacuations and the transfer of troops beyond Iranian reach. Some bases in Kuwait and Bahrain, used to launch attacks against Iran or deploy HIMARS systems, were especially punishedfueling the feeling that Tehran had managed to quickly identify which platforms were directly participating in the campaign. Nine fuel tanks at the Ali al-Salem air base in Kuwait were damaged Drones changed everything. Much of this battlefield transformation is directly related to a lesson learned in Ukraine: cheap and unidirectional attack drones are eroding the traditional advantage of great powers. American experts recognize that the Pentagon did not adapt its bases quickly enough to this new threat, despite spending years observing how relatively simple drones destroyed armored vehicles, radars or critical infrastructure in other conflicts. Although many Iranian drones carried reduced explosive charges, they were extremely difficult to intercept and they could attack stationary targets with enormous precision. This forced the consumption of gigantic quantities of Patriot and THAAD interceptors, dangerously reducing American and allied reserves in just a few weeks. The result was paradoxical: the most advanced military power in the world began to be forced to play defense around its own bases, while Iran found relatively cheap ways to overwhelm multibillion-dollar anti-aircraft systems. The enormous hidden wear. While Washington publicly insisted that the damage did not significantly alter the military campaign, the images they showed a more complex reality. Some key facilities were damaged considered “extensive” even by American officials, and part of the regional command had to be relocated out of the Middle East. As we said, the headquarters of the Fifth Fleet in Bahrain was one of the most affected areasto the point of moving functions to Florida, while the internal debate grows over whether certain bases will operate as before. Worrying signs also emerged on structural failures: Strategic aircraft repeatedly parked in vulnerable positions, insufficiently protected tactical centers, and a shortage of hardened shelters for critical personnel and equipment. All of this fueled one conclusion: that the United States had underestimated both Iranian resilience and the speed with which modern wars are making transparent facilities that previously seemed untouchable. The true strategic signal that this war leaves. Beyond the specific damage, what really worries strategists and military personnel is the change of perception left by satellite images. For decades, the presence of US bases throughout the Middle East functioned as a symbol of absolute control and immediate response capacity, but now those same facilities appear exposedvulnerable and permanently observed from the air and from space. If you will, the conflict has left a feeling that is difficult to ignore: that Iran may not be able to defeat the United States militarily in a conventional confrontation, but it can. inflict enough damageattrition and political pressure to profoundly alter the US strategic calculation in the region. And that idea that began with Spiderweb operation in Ukrainemultiplied by hundreds of photographs of destroyed hangars, hit radars and partially emptied bases, may end up being one of the most important consequences of the entire war. Image | Iran media, Planet In Xataka | Türkiye has taken a look at the … Read more

In three days, Russia celebrates its Victory Day. And Ukraine has a surprise prepared 1,500 kilometers away

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In May 1987, a young 19-year-old German pilot named Mathias Rust He managed to cross a good part of Soviet airspace with a small civilian plane and land next to Red Square. without being stopped. The episode caused enormous humiliation for the USSR because it showed that even the heart of Moscow could be reached in ways that no one expected. Countdown to Putin’s big parade. Russia prepares for May 9, the most symbolic day of its entire political and military calendar, while Ukraine intensifies a campaign of attacks that seems designed precisely to ruin that sense of control and security. The Kremlin has even announced a unilateral truce for the days of the parade, but kyiv has responded by making it clear that it does not intend to coordinate anything with Moscow and remembering that Russia cannot quietly celebrate Victory Day “without the good will of Ukraine.” The situation is especially uncomfortable for Putin because, for the first time in many years, Moscow faces this date with the feeling that even its capital can become a target. Moscow no longer seems like a completely safe place. The recent attack against a skyscraper luxury hotel located a few kilometers from the Kremlin has been much more than a simple symbolic coup. Ukraine has been trying to bother to Moscow ahead of the May 9 parade, but this time the message comes in a different context: Russia has reduced the size of the event, eliminated some of the heavy military deployment and greatly reinforced the defenses around the capital for fear of new drones. Meanwhile, Zelensky has hinted directly that Moscow fears seeing drones flying over Red Square during the parade, something unthinkable just a few years ago and extremely delicate for a celebration designed precisely to project power and control. The big news is the distance. The most important change in this phase of the war is happening far beyond Moscow. Ukraine is managing to attack industrial cities and military bases located more than 1,500 kilometers from the front, reaching regions of the Urals that for decades were considered a safe rear even in Soviet times. Cities like Yekaterinburg, Chelyabinsk or Perm begin to experience airport closuresinternet restrictions and attacks against refineriesmilitary installations or industrial infrastructures. The psychological impact is enormous because many of these areas experienced the war as something distant until just a few months ago. New missiles and drones are changing the rules. The appearance of the transonic missile F-5 Flamingo reflects the extent to which Ukraine is transforming its deep strike capability. kyiv claims to have used this system to destroy a factory Russian military about 1,500 kilometers away, a facility linked to components for missiles, aviation and naval systems. Beyond the specific damage, what is important is the trend: Ukraine no longer depends solely on improvised drones or isolated attacks, but is beginning to build a sustained capacity to hit strategic infrastructure deep inside Russia. The jam-resistant navigation systems, extreme range and possible integration of Western technology clearly show that kyiv is trying to make Russian territorial depth much less useful than it was at the start of the war. The Soviet rearguard in doubt. Plus: there is a huge historical burden in the places that Ukraine is attacking. During the Second World War, much of the Soviet industry was moved to the Urals precisely because they were considered territories impossible to reach from Europe. Cities like Chelyabinsk became known as “Tankograd” because of the concentration of military factories far from the front. Now, eighty years later, Ukrainian drones and missiles are demonstrating that that strategic depth no longer guarantees security. What once required bombers and huge air campaigns can now be achieved with long-range drones and relatively cheap missiles capable of traversing thousands of kilometers. Avoid vulnerability on its most important day. Because he May 9 parade It is not just any ceremony for Russia. It is the great annual showcase of Russian military power, the event where the Kremlin connects the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany with Putin’s current political legitimacy. That is precisely why it is so sensitive that Ukraine is increasing pressure just before the event. Russia is shooting down hundreds of drones around Moscow and strengthening security of the capital while trying to avoid any image of chaos during a day observed by foreign leaders and broadcast throughout the country. The problem for the Kremlin is that Ukraine has already managed to install a most uncomfortable idea: even more than 1,500 kilometers from the front, there is no longer a complete sense of refuge, and that includes beyond the Urals. Image | Fire Point In Xataka | Today in “the war in Ukraine beyond all comprehension”: drone pilots are training with ‘Grand Theft Auto’ In Xataka | Ukraine has barely captured any North Korean soldiers. The reason is brutally simple: they prefer to immolate themselves

China is filling up with products from Russia. The problem is that many of these products come from China itself.

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At the beginning of 2025, a more than notable event occurred in China. Apparently, trade tensions between Beijing and the EU had opened a new scenario for Russian livestock farmers. In other words, if Spain had made a fortune exporting pork to China, an unexpected enemy appeared on the horizon: Russia. It seems that the hype of Moscow goes much further than “its” pig, and in 2026 has been maintained. Russian Chinese stores. Yes, in recent years a situation has been occurring that no one saw coming: the proliferation of stores selling Russian products in cities throughout China, generating great interest among consumers. These establishments, easily recognizable by their signs in Cyrillic, traditional Russian music such as Kalinka and Katyusha, and/or the display of iconic products such as matryoshka dolls, offer a variety of products: from national sausages to chocolates, honey, vodka or durian confectionery. Thus, with slogans such as “hardcore products” and a blue and white aesthetic, the stores seek to evoke the essence of Moscow. However, as we will see, behind this facade many are more Chinese than they look. The figures. The boom has also coincided with an increase in commercial ties between China and Russia, driven by Western sanctions on Moscow after its invasion of Ukraine, the same ones that have led to Russian ranchers in the Asian nation. Not only that. Bilateral trade reached historic levels in 2022 and 2023and Chinese consumers responded enthusiastically, seeing these products as a way to show solidarity with Russia. According to data from the Qichacha business registry, In January 2025 there were 3,555 companies registered in China engaged in the trade of Russian productswith 696 and 894 new companies registered in 2023 and 2024, respectively. They are not Russian, they are Chinese. Of course, the boom also raised suspicions. In fact, the boom faced increasing scrutiny last year. Many consumers began to question the authenticity of the products offered. Sausages, for example, cannot be legally imported from Russiaand the durian, a tropical fruit, is not typical of Russian regions as far as we know. This led Chinese authorities to investigate some of these stores. For example in Fujian, where a Russian market was pointed out for promoting false health benefits and labeling domestic foods as imported. In Beijing, similar stores closed after several inspections that required proof of the authenticity of their products. In fact, in 2025 the Shanghai authorities announced investigations against seven of the 47 Russian themed stores of the city, accusing them of misleading customers regarding the origin of their products. Some were closedwhile others faced fines and the obligation to clearly label products…made in China. Finally, a Jiemian News investigation revealed that a large part of the food products in the so-called “Russian State Houses” (franchises with no connection to the Russian government) They were locally produced.. Factors of interest. The initial success of these markets and establishments can be attributed to several factors. On the one hand, consumers’ curiosity and desire to explore “exotic” productssomething that has surely played an important role. On the other hand, the geopolitical narrative surely also did its thing: the war in ukraine and tensions with the West caused some Chinese consumers to view consumption of Russian products as a gesture of political support. Furthermore, we must not forget that the increase in bilateral trade was facilitated by the exclusion of Russia from the Swift financial system in 2022forcing the country to become more dependent on the Chinese yuan. This made China Russia’s main trading partner, absorbing products such as oil, gas and food at reduced prices. With an expiration date? The big question. Despite the boom, analysts like Zhang Yi, of iiMedia Research, They believe that the fashion will be temporaryalthough in 2026 they remain patent. The demand for Russian products in the Asian nation is based, a priori, on this novelty and perceived scarcity. Among the causes of the decline are that consumers have lost interest or competition between stores increases, at which time the popularity of these markets will probably decrease. This, added to the increasing doubts about the authenticity of the products Following investigations and regulatory pressure, they could accelerate their decline. Be that as it may, and in the face of growing skepticism, in Shanghai Some stores have changed their names to “Chinese-Russian Mutual Trade Stores” to reflect the true origin of their products. In Beijing, at least one store closed after failing to present documentation proving the authenticity of their imports. Long-term perspectives. Although trade between China and Russia still strongexperts predict that exchange volume could stabilize at $200 billiona figure lower than recent records. In the long term, a change in geopolitical relations, such as the resolution of the conflict in Ukraine, could allow Russia to normalize its trade ties with Europe, thereby reducing its dependence on China. Of course, this last scenario now seems very far away. Be that as it may, the rise of markets for Russian products in China reflects how geopolitical dynamics can influence consumer habits, at least in part. Of course, its sustainability is most uncertain due to the combination of regulatory pressures, doubts about the authenticity of the products and the eventual loss of consumer interest. Just in case, to the Russians they will always have the pork. Image | Weibo In Xataka | The biggest change in war is no longer drones: it is that Russia, the US and China are removing the human from the button In Xataka | Russia and China already had an advantage over the US in the Arctic. After Greenland, it has multiplied A version of this topic was published in 2025. We have updated it with information from 2026

Now we know that the Iranian Air Force did to the US what Ukraine could not do to Russia with drones: an abysmal hole

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During the Vietnam War, American commanders discovered that some of their most protected bases they could be hit unexpectedly due to coordinated attacks low costforcing to reinforce defenses that until then were considered sufficient and making it clear that, in war, the feeling of security is usually more fragile than it seems. The blow that no one expected. For decades, the US military architecture in the Middle East relied on in a network of bases designed to surround and contain Iran, a direct heir to the Cold War doctrine and designed to project power quickly. However, a report that came to light this weekend on NBC News has revealed a radical inversion of that logic in the war of 2026: what was supposed to be a shield has become a set of exposed objectives, hit in a coordinated manner by Iranian attacks that hit more than a hundred targets in several countries. We are talking about critical infrastructures such as runways, radars, hangars, command centers or defense systems were damaged or destroyed, and the impact was neither marginal nor symbolic, but structuralaffecting the very functioning of the US deployment in the region. The fence that ended up surrounded. The system of bases in Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, the Emirates or Saudi Arabia was designed to suffocate Iran, but its ability to attack key logistics nodes turned the equation around. How much? It appears that critical facilities were left disabled or evacuatedincluding the headquarters of the Fifth Fleet in Bahrainwhile multiple bases in Iraq and Kuwait had to be abandoned or rendered inoperative. The pressure was such that even the resupply became problematicleaving the American forces themselves in a position close to the siege they intended to impose. The encirclement strategy, which seemed unquestionable for decades, suddenly showed its fragility in the face of an adversary with saturation capacity through missiles, drones and aviation. The hole that changes war. What is most revealing is not only the extent of the damage, but what they represent for Washington: for the first time in years, a rival has managed to systematically drill US military infrastructure at multiple points at once. Iran not only hit bases, but achieved something that until now seemed beyond the reach of other recent conflicts: opening a deep and sustained hole in the defensive framework of the United States, affecting radarsair defenses and strategic assets. That ability to simultaneously degrade multiple layers of the system is reminiscent of what other actors have tried unsuccessfully in wars like the one in Ukraine, but here it translated in real effects on the ground, altering the operational balance and forcing us to rethink the assumed superiority. From control to operational chaos. The middle counted American that the intensity of the attacks and the speed with which they occurred generated a scenario of disorganization that overwhelmed the usual command and control mechanisms. Bases evacuatedemergency relocated personnel and even improvised situations what do we countsuch as the use of civil infrastructure, reflect the extent to which operational pressure broke the planned patterns. Plus: the inability to anticipate and managing the real scope of the attacks, added to the lack of clear communication about the damage, fueled the perception of an overwhelmed response to a type of more distributed warfaster and harder to contain. A cost beyond money. Although initial estimates speak of billions dollars in repairs (not counting advanced systems or unrecoverable equipment), the true impact possibly transcends the economic. What has been affected is the military deployment model itself: the idea that a network of advanced bases guarantees regional control. In other words, the war has shown that, faced with an adversary capable of to attack in depth with means relatively accessiblethis hitherto untouchable network may become a rather critical vulnerability. The result in the pavement American is not only a balance sheet of damages, but a strategic warning that forces us to give more than one turn to its scheme of how military power is projected in a world where distance is already does not protect the same. Image | x In Xataka | If the war resumes again, the US runs a risk unprecedented in the history of war: that the only one with missiles will be Iran. In Xataka | If the question is why the US attacked an Iranian ship with a weapon unprecedented in 40 years, we already know the answer: a “gift from China”

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