If the question is whether we can delay aging, Russia has an unusual plan with the “cousin” of the wild boar and humans

In 1928, a Soviet scientist convinced that young blood could rejuvenate the body exchanged his own with that of a university student. The experiment turned the student into a survivor and the researcher into a of the first victims of the modern pursuit of longevity. The great Russian bet. If the question is whether aging can be delayed, Russia has decided to respond with an initiative of extraordinary dimensions. Under the direct impulse of Vladimir Putin, the weekend counted the wall street journal that the Kremlin has made longevity a national priority through a program valued at about $26 billion that seeks to develop technologies capable of prolonging human life and combating age-related deterioration. What for many Western leaders and businessmen remains a private bet financed by technological fortunes, in Russia has become a state strategy which combines genetic research, organ printing, xenotransplantation and other experimental technologies with the promise of saving hundreds of thousands of lives before the end of the decade. New organs for aging bodies. One of the most ambitious ideas of the project consists of progressively replace the defective parts of the human body as if it were a complex machine. It we have told before and Putin himself even commented publicly on the possibility of achieving a kind of practical immortality through the continuous replacement of damaged organs. To get closer to that goal, Russian scientists are working on two main lines: three-dimensional bioprinting of living tissues and the growth of human organs inside minipigs, a variety of pork considered especially compatible for this type of research. The stated goal is to achieve functional transplants of laboratory-produced organs by 2030, a goal that, if achieved, would represent one of the most important biomedical advances of the century. Genes, tissues and pigs at the service of longevity. The program also includes the development of gene therapies aimed at slowing down cellular aging. According to Russian authorities, these treatments represent some of the most promising tools to combat the biological wear and tear that accompanies the passing of the years. At the same time, researchers they claim having managed to print human cartilage and a mouse thyroid gland using bioprinting techniques, preliminary steps towards much more complex structures. The combination of Genetic engineering, organs grown in animals and the manufacture of artificial tissues paints a vision in which medicine stops limiting itself to repairing damage and begins to replace entire components of the organism. Putin’s daughter and the architects of the project. Behind this strategy appear some of the most influential figures of the presidential circle. Among them stands out Maria Vorontsova, Putin’s daughter and an endocrinologist linked to various state genetics programs, as well as the physicist Mikhail Kovalchuk, director of the historic Kurchatov Institute and one of the Kremlin’s main scientific ideologues. Kovalchuk holds that humanity is approaching an era in which organs can be routinely repaired or replaced, prolonging life for increasingly longer periods. For its defenders, aging will no longer be seen as an inevitable destiny and will begin to be treated as a technical problem susceptible to scientific intervention. Between cutting-edge science and community doubts. However, the program’s promises are far from to generate consensus. Many researchers they point out that much of the progress announced by Russia has barely been published in peer-reviewed international scientific journals. Some scientists who participated in the early stages of these investigations hold that there is a great distance between the proclaimed objectives and the results actually demonstrated. International sanctions, scientific isolation derived from the war in Ukraine and the difficulty of collaborating with Western centers also limit the capacity Russian to validate many of these projects. For critics, some of the statements made by the authorities should be interpreted more as aspirations for the future than as technologies close to becoming a reality. Personal obsession turned into state policy. Putin’s fascination with longevity it’s not new. For years he has cultivated a public image associated with physical strength through exhibitions Carefully constructed for sporting activity, hunting or outdoor adventures. At the same time, their behavior during the pandemic showed a extreme concern due to illness and physical deterioration, with strict quarantines, disinfection protocols and isolation measures that attracted the attention of the entire world. At 73 years old, also surrounded by an aging political and economic elite, the fight against the passage of time seems to have become more than a personal curiosity: it is part of a strategic vision shared by much of the Russian leadership environment. The long Russian tradition. The current project does not come out of nowhere either. Russia and previously the Soviet Union have historically shown a recurring fascination for research aimed at prolonging human life. Since the experiments with rejuvenating blood transfusions carried out by Alexander Bogdanov in the twenties until the theories of Oleksandr Bogomolets Regarding a life expectancy of 150 years supported by Stalin, different generations of Soviet and Russian leaders have pursued the idea of ​​overcoming aging. Paradoxically, many of those pioneers they died long before to reach the extraordinary ages they defended. A race against an uncomfortable demographic reality. The bet is even more striking because it takes place in a country that continues to suffer some of the worst mortality indicators of the developed world. Male life expectancy in Russia He is currently around 68 years, well below that of the United States or Western Europe. In this context, the gigantic longevity program promoted by Putin it reflects both a scientific ambition and a national need. The question is whether printed organs, genetic treatments and minipigs capable of hosting future transplants will bring Russia closer to that vision of a increasingly longer life or if they will end up joining the long list of projects that promised to defeat aging and ended up crashing into a biological reality much more difficult to defeat. Image | IToldYa, Press Service of the President of the Russian Federation, Picryl In Xataka | We knew that living … Read more

Russia is the great missing person in the AI ​​race. He has neither chips nor talent, and his great ally only gives him the leftovers

What’s happening with AI in Russia? The artificial intelligence race has as absolute protagonists to the US and China, and it’s surprising that a power like Russia does not seem to be advancing in this type of field. The truth is that he is doing it, but his situation in this area is worrying. Russia does have AI models. Although they are hardly talked about, there are several AI models that are developed by Russian companies and that, above all, are totally oriented towards their citizens. The country does not have access to Western models such as ChatGPT or Claude, but it does have access to these alternatives: GigaChat: is probably the most advanced Russian model. It is developed by the financial institution Sberbank, and It is available via web although to use it it is necessary to have an account in said entity. Yandex Alice: the company that has already offered a search engine in the image and likeness of Google for years also has its own artificial intelligence model, called Alice AI. It is possible to use from its official website in both English and Russian (Spanish is not supported) like a traditional chatbot. MTS AI – one of the largest telecom operators in Russia also has its own model, MTS AImore aimed at companies and developers with its Cotype models that recently support the ability to create agents for enterprise applications. behind. The veto of chips and advanced technology from the US has been one of the factors that has caused these models to be clearly behind the latest frontier models from companies such as OpenAI or Anthropic. He proves it launched three months ago from GigaChat-3.1-Ultra-702B, an open weights model derived from DeepSeek 702B A36B. In the published benchmarks, the performance of this model is at the level of DeepSeek v3 (launched in December 2024) or Qwen3-235B (launched in April 2025). This model is for example available at Hugging Face. China is your natural ally. China and Russia have long maintained a geopolitical alliance that has an impact in various areas. The curious thing is that in this case that impact is being felt less than one would expect. Russian AI models are based on Chinese open models, but at the moment it seems that These are somewhat old versions which they later adapt to Russian. And as happens with Chinese models, which censor certain topics, Russian models apply that same filtering to avoid sensitive issues. Without chips there is no AI. The big problem Russia faces is the same one China faces, but amplified. They don’t have access to advanced Nvidia chips to train their models, so they have looked Shortcuts to bypass trade restrictions and be able to develop those models. Russia, get in line. Sberbank, for example, is trying to get access to Chinese AI chips like the Huawei Ascend 950 for your projects, but there are two problems here. The first is that these chips are aimed at model inference, not their training. The second, that at the moment those who have priority access to these chips are the Chinese companies themselves, which are reserving large quantities for their future projects. ByteDance, Tencent or Alibaba have placed important orders that leave Russia in a complicated situation. Russian chips in the (distant) future. These problems of access to specialized chips could be solved if Russia manages to boost its semiconductor industry. Baikal Electronics has been working on alternatives to x86 chips from Intel and AMD for some time, but also promise develop AI chips in 2029 or 2030. Once again, commercial and technological vetoes mean that in both scenarios the company’s proposals cannot compete with the latest advances of its Western competitors, at least for now. Industrial and military use. Russian LLM developments not only try to present an option for Russian citizens, but also for military applications. The war with Ukraine has actually revealed how Russia is using the well-known AI miniPCs Nvidia Jetson for its Shahed missiles. Russia has it very difficult. The current situation in Russia makes it difficult for the country to present notable alternatives to the most advanced AI models of the US or China (or even Europe). The war with Ukraine also caused an exodus of talent and Russian engineers, although companies like Sber have tried to boost campaigns to attract talent in the university environment. All of this adds to Russia’s difficult access to the most advanced hardware and software and its dependence on an ally like China that is prioritizing its own AI companies. In Xataka | Russia already has its own multi-core CPUs for AI. What it doesn’t have yet is the most important thing: its GPU

Ukraine has turned military bridges into impossible targets. Russia just responded with a Frankenstein on wheels

In World War II, six soldiers could carry parts by hand of a Bailey bridge and build a passage for tanks in a matter of hours. Eight decades later, the real challenge is no longer building the bridge: it is making it survive long enough to enter service. River crossings are a nightmare. Crossing a river has always been one of the most delicate operations for any army. Crossing points are predictable, vehicles must be concentrated in a small space, and engineers need time to deploy bridges or pontoons. In Ukraine, however, the problem has become a new dimension. Drones constantly monitor roads, accesses and banks, detecting any preparation for a crossing long before it occurs. This means that forces attempting to cross a river can be attacked even before reaching the water. What for decades was a complex engineering operation has been transformed into a race against time under permanent surveillance. A problem since the start of the war. Russian difficulties in crossing rivers they are not new. One of the most remembered episodes occurred in May 2022, when a Russian tactical group was practically destroyed during an attempt to cross the Siverski Donets. More than three years later, the problem remains unresolved. They remembered in Forbes That even relatively modest obstacles like the Vovcha River can slow down entire operations because the challenge is no longer just overcoming the water, but surviving the deployment process. Every bridge, every pontoon and every engineering vehicle automatically becomes a priority target for Ukrainian drones, artillery and other precision strike systems. The strange “Frankenstein”. Thus a scene has taken place that has remained recorded on video by Ukrainian forces. It happened when one of the most peculiar vehicles seen in the war appeared. A Russian unit built an improvised system using military truck chassis, probably Ural or KamAZ, transformed into a kind of articulated pontoon. The structure was made up of a drive section and a large adapted trailer, creating a set long enough to cross narrow sections of the river. Its appearance was so rudimentary and strange that Ukrainian observers compared it to a creation straight out of a Mad Max movie and they baptized as a four-wheeled “Frankenstein”. More than a visual curiosity, the vehicle reflected the need to find alternative solutions to a problem for which conventional means seem increasingly less effective. A mission observed from start to finish. The broadcast images by the Ukrainian Wolfhound unit show the complete route of the vehicle towards its objective. The group advanced at high speed through Vovchansk in an obvious attempt to reduce the time of exposure to possible attacks. During the trip, the trailer repeatedly left the road, knocked down an electrical pole and activated several mines without being disabled. Even so he managed to reach the river bank. However, Ukrainian air surveillance had followed their every move. As the soldiers began to deploy the system and the forward section began entering the water, several attack drones They destroyed the vehicle before he could complete his mission. A deeper problem. The most striking thing about the episode is that Russia has specialized teams capable of carrying out this type of operations. Systems such as launchable bridges MTU-72 or the PMP pontoons They were designed precisely to allow the passage of troops and armor through rivers much larger than the Vovcha. For a unit to resort to a such an improvised solution suggests that these means were not available in that sector or that the losses accumulated during the war have reduced their presence on the front line. It also reflects an industrial reality: the current priority is on producing tanks, armored vehicles, drones, ammunition and artillery, while engineering equipment receives much less attention and replenishment. Modern warfare forces us to reinvent everything. He “Frankenstein” by Vovchansk fits into an increasingly visible trend within the Russian military. In recent years, protected armored vehicles have appeared with anti-drone cagesvehicles covered with netsmodified robots for new features and all types of adaptations carried out directly by combat units. The speed at which threats evolve often outpaces militaries’ ability to develop and deploy new solutions. Although the makeshift pontoon was destroyed, its existence is revealing. It demonstrates the extent to which drones have disrupted a military task as basic as crossing a river, and how soldiers are attempting to fill the gap between battlefield needs and the ability of military machinery to respond with ingenuity, recycled parts, and emergency solutions. Image | x In Xataka | Russia’s enemy in Ukraine is basically an AI. So you’re painting your tanks CAPTCHA color In Xataka | Thousands of elderly Ukrainians are isolated at the front. An army of drones is coming to your rescue

Russia shielded its logistics routes against drones. Ukraine has responded by attacking something much more vulnerable: asphalt

In the spring of 1945, the United States launched a campaign called Operation Starvation. Instead of concentrating on destroying Japanese ships one by one, he began laying mines in the straits and sea routes through which they had to pass. The result It was so effective that dozens of convoy routes had to be abandoned and Japanese maritime traffic plummeted, making logistics as valuable a target as the vehicles themselves. From trucks to roads. The logistics war between Russia and Ukraine is entering in a new phase. For months, Ukraine concentrated its efforts in destroying trucksconvoys, fuel depots and other targets that kept the Russian army supplied. Moscow responded by strengthening the protection of its supply routes, deploying anti-aircraft defenses, adapting its movements and building corridors that were increasingly protected against drones. Now kyiv appears to have identified a vulnerability that is more difficult to fix: the infrastructure itself on which those supplies circulate. Instead of only pursuing specific vehicles, Ukrainian drones are beginning to lay mines on the roads that connect Crimea with the occupied territories, transforming essential routes for Russian logistics into spaces where any movement can become a risk. The strategy of the logistical blockade. Ukrainian authorities describe this campaign as an attempt to impose a “logistical blockade” on the Russian military. The goal is not necessarily to completely cut off communications or destroy every vehicle that passes through them. The key is slow down movement of supplies, increase uncertainty and force the enemy to dedicate increasing resources to protection and cleanup tasks. If a convoy must constantly stop to inspect the road, if each journey requires additional escorts, or if a route remains closed for hours after the appearance of a mine, the cumulative effect can be as damaging as the direct destruction of vehicles. Modern warfare depends on both the speed and the volume of supplies, and any reduction in the pace of movement has a direct impact on units deployed on the front. Roads to Crimea under pressure. Information from Russian sources they point because the campaign is focusing especially on the land corridor that connects Russia with Crimea through the occupied territories of southern Ukraine. Roads such as the M-14 between Mariupol, Melitopol and Chongar or the R-280 Novorossiya have suffered partial closures, traffic restrictions and damage caused by mines dropped from drones. In one of the most notable incidentsa Kamaz truck was reportedly destroyed and several vehicles damaged after mines fell on a road near the border between the occupied regions of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia. These episodes also occur after a series of attacks against tankers and convoys that had already forced Russian authorities to modify routes and temporarily limit heavy traffic. Drones that turn asphalt into a trap. The novelty does not lie in the use of mines, a practice that has been present for decades in any conflict, but in the way they are deployed. According to various analystsUkraine is using drones to distribute 3D printed light mines equipped with motion sensors or magnetic systems. These charges do not need to completely destroy a vehicle to be effective. Enough with immobilizing a truck in the middle of a road to create traffic jams, disrupt traffic and create a concentration of targets vulnerable to subsequent air attacks. A single mine can stop a whole column. Several mines spread periodically along a route can paralyze traffic for hours while inspections and clearance operations are carried out. The creation of interdiction zones. The tactic is part of a broader concept that seeks to turn Russian logistics routes into true layered interdiction zones. Drivers traveling these roads must already face ambush FPV dronesautonomous drones assisted by artificial intelligence and attacks directed against the anti-aircraft defenses that protect the logistics corridors. The incorporation of air-dropped mines adds a permanent threat under the wheels of every vehicle. The result is a combination of risks that multiplies the psychological and operational pressure on any movement of supplies, forcing Russia to simultaneously monitor the sky, the roadsides and the asphalt surface itself. The Russian adaptation. The Russian response is already beginning to be seen in some sectors of the front. Ukrainian sources claim to have destroyed Tor-M2 anti-aircraft systems that were being moved to reinforce the protection of these vulnerable routes. At the same time, some analysts believe that Moscow could try extend to roads further from the front the anti-drone network and tunnel structures that it already uses in closer combat zones. However, they remembered in Forbes that protecting hundreds of kilometers of open roads represents a logistical and economic challenge much greater than that of shielding some sections close to the battle lines. Precisely therein lies the logic of the Ukrainian strategy: the more extensive the infrastructure that must be protected, the more difficult it will be to guarantee its security. Crimea as an indirect objective. The pressure on the roads also has a strategic dimension related to Crimea. Ukraine has been attacking anti-aircraft systems, radars, missile launchers and other assets that protect the peninsula for months. If land routes supplying the region become slower and more dangerous, Russia could be forced to rely even more from the Kerch bridgeone of the few high-capacity logistics arteries that continue to directly connect Crimea with Russian territory. This would increase the importance of an infrastructure that has already been a priority objective of kyiv on repeated occasions. Keep a road open to make it useless. In short, the great innovation of this campaign is that it does not necessarily seek to permanently cut a route. Ukraine seems to be pursuing something more subtle: keeping the roads technically open while progressively reducing its usefulness. If each convoy requires more time, if each inspection causes delays and if each stop increases exposure to new attacks, the logistics flow is degraded without the need to destroy the infrastructure. Russia has dedicated enormous efforts to protecting its convoys and supply corridors from drones. The Ukrainian response now consists of moving the … Read more

The US has had an idea to reassure Europe. Instead of soldiers, he is going to bring his nuclear weapons very close to Russia

In 1983, tens of thousands of women surrounded a British air base to protest the deployment of American nuclear missiles. That mobilization, known in time as Greenham Commonbecame one of the major antinuclear symbols of the Cold War and showed the extent to which the location of these weapons could alter European politics. Less soldiers, more “nuclear”. Europe has been trying to figure out what it really means for months the strategic turn of the United States. The reduction of troops, the withdrawal of some military systems and the increasing priority given to the Indo-Pacific have fueled fears that Washington is progressively moving away from the continent. However, conversations within NATO point to a very different response than expected. Instead of reinforcing the conventional presence, the United States would be willing to expand the deployment of nuclear capabilities in Europe to demonstrate that its commitment to the defense of the continent remains intact. The idea is simple but powerful: if there are fewer American uniforms on the ground, the nuclear umbrella must remain visible and credibleeven “closer.” The closer the interest is to Russia. There is no doubt, the allies most interested in this possibility are precisely those who observe Russia from the first line. Poland has been leading for years the list of candidates to host US nuclear capabilities and some Baltic countries have also shown interest in participating in future deterrence formulas. The invasion of Ukraine and Putin’s continued references to its nuclear arsenal have profoundly changed the perception of security in Eastern Europe. I remembered the financial times that, for these countries, hosting aircraft capable of using US nuclear weapons would have enormous political and military value, since it would turn any threat against them into an issue directly linked to Washington’s strategic credibility. The legacy of the Cold War. The proposal does not involve creating a new system, but rather expanding a mechanism that has existed for decades. Currently Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Türkiye and the United Kingdom participate in the program nuclear delivery of NATO, through which they store American nuclear weapons under exclusive control of Washington and train their air forces to operate within that scheme. This model was born during the Cold War to guarantee that European allies could participate in the Alliance’s nuclear strategy without having to develop their own atomic weapons. More than half a century later, the formula is once again gaining prominence in a continent that watches with concern the deterioration of the relationship with Moscow. Europe seeks to replace some capabilities, but not others. European capitals have assumed that they will have to spend more in defense and rebuild conventional capabilities that for decades were delegated to the United States. From anti-missile systems to strategic transportation to military intelligence, much of the current conversation revolves around how to fill those gaps. However, there is one area that many governments they consider it impossible to replace in the short term: the American nuclear deterrent. Although France and the United Kingdom have their own arsenals, Washington’s umbrella continues to be perceived as the central element of the European security architecture and as the ultimate guarantee against any military escalation. The signal that Washington wants to send. They told in the Times that for now there is no final decision and the conversations remain highly confidential. Still, the mere fact that the possibility is on the table reveals how Western strategy toward Russia is changing. For years the US military presence in Europe was measured in bases, brigades and deployed troops. Now the discussion increasingly revolves around another type of message. While Washington concentrates resources in Asia and requires its allies to assume a greater share of the defensive effortthe signal it seeks to convey is that nuclear protection remains intact. In a way, the new formula to reassure Europe is not to bring more soldiers closer to the Russian borders, but to bring closer what for decades has served as a last guarantee of security: American nuclear weapons. Image | Air Force, SJOERD HILCKMANN In Xataka | Spain’s great fear is not an invasion: it is a slow hybrid war with Morocco against its two most vulnerable cities In Xataka | To become technologically “independent” from the US, the European Union already has a plan: four desperate measures

Russia is hiding its vehicles with paint

The scene is a of the most remembered of the First World War. It happened when the British Navy began painting their ships with huge stripes and geometric shapes in 1917, when many thought they had gone crazy: instead of hiding them, they made them more visible. However, that idea ended up spreading to thousands of ships because it achieved something much more important than hiding them: making it difficult for the enemy to know where to aim. War is no longer just against humans. The evolution of drones in Ukraine is pushing the battlefield into increasingly strange. For centuries, camouflage had an obvious objective: to deceive enemy soldiers, observers or pilots. Now Russia is recovering the technique born in World War I for a completely different purpose. Your trucks Ural and KAMAZ are appearing covered by geometric patterns black and white, similar to used by ships that were trying to confuse German submarines, but this time the recipient of the deception is not a person looking through a periscope, but an algorithm trained to recognize vehicles from the air. When the enemy is an AI. The proliferation of Ukrainian drones equipped with artificial vision systems is changing the rules of the game. These devices already do not depend exclusively of a human operator to identify targets in real time, but they can learn to recognize, classify and track vehicles using image recognition algorithms. The Russian bet consists of visually alter the appearance of their trucks to the point that the software cannot identify them with enough confidence to authorize an attack. It is an unprecedented form of war: physically modifying the world to exploit the limitations of artificial intelligence. USS West Mahomet in dazzling camouflage, 1918 The new race between drones and countermeasures. The painting is only the latest chapter in a long chain of improvisations that emerged during the war. Before and as we have been saying, they arrived metal cages about the armored ones, the so-called “turtle tanks”the protective netsthe structures spiked and even the placed logs on vehicles as improvised armor. Covered Russian bombers also appeared with old tires and warships painted with special patterns to break their silhouette seen from above. All of these solutions respond to the same phenomenon: drones have become such a ubiquitous threat that any method capable of making its identification difficult deserves to be tested. Vehicles are no longer safe in the rear. The importance of these measures reflects the extent to which drones are expanding the scope of the war. Thanks to artificial intelligence, attack systems can autonomously search for targets in huge areas, distinguish active vehicles from destroyed ones and even operate in coordinated swarms. Thus, logistics trucks that could previously move relatively calmly away from the front can now be located and attacked dozens of kilometers away. The rear has become an extension of the battlefield and every moving vehicle is a possible target. A battle between programmers and painters. The big question is whether these paints will really work. Algorithms can be quickly retrained and learn to recognize new patterns, while sensors such as infrared could be seen less affected than conventional cameras. However, even temporary effectiveness would have value if it forces the adversary to devote time, resources, and computing power to solving the problem. That is perhaps the most striking conclusion of the latter and rocambolesca History: The drone war in Ukraine has reached a point where combats no longer only pit weapons against weapons, but also anti camouflage softwareengineers against engineers and algorithms against paint stains designed specifically to fool a machine. Image | X, Wikimedia In Xataka | Thousands of elderly Ukrainians are isolated at the front. An army of drones is coming to your rescue In Xataka | Ukraine has been left without thousands of drones: an error classified them as electric cars and the Treasury has fried them with taxes

is coming back from Russia and bombing its own soldiers

In World War II, many armies reused captured enemy tanks simply painting over their own symbols and returning them to combat days later. Eight decades later, the war in Ukraine has regained that same logic… only now the weapons come flying back at night. The night witch changes owners. The Baba Yaga heavy drones had become one of the weapons most feared of the Ukrainian arsenal. Large, slow and capable of transporting mines, projectiles or supplies during night flights, these devices ended up generating such fear among Russian soldiers that they ended up baptizing them with the name of the Slavic folklore witch that stalks its victims in the dark. The problem for Ukraine is that that same psychological weapon is now beginning to return from the other side of the front. Russia is capturing, repairing and reusing quantities Baba Yaga crescents shot down to bombard Ukrainian positions with exactly the same tactics who for years terrorized their own troops. Drone warfare has thus entered a strange phase where weapons no longer only change hands: they also change identity. The problem with heavy drones. Unlike the small, cheap, disposable FPV drones that dominate much of the battlefield, the Baba Yaga are complex platforms and relatively difficult to manufacture. The reason? They need high lifting capacity, flight stability, sufficient autonomy and robust systems to resist electronic interference. Carrying heavy loads for miles requires huge batteries, powerful motors and strong structures capable of withstanding constant vibrations and partial damage. Ukraine managed to develop these systems thanks to a combination of ingenuity, adaptation of commercial technology and decentralized production outside the slow traditional military channels. Russia, on the other hand, has had much more trouble producing a large-scale operational equivalent despite multiple publicly announced projects. Russian electronic warfare finds an opportunity. The Baba Yaga reuse captured reveals the extent to which Russian electronic warfare remains one of its greatest strengths. Many of these drones are shot down not by sophisticated missiles, but by exploiting something much simpler: its repetitive patterns flight and its permanent radio links. Russian systems detect, track and saturate these signals until they cause the devices to lose control and crash relatively intact. Others are killed by conventional fire because, being large and slow, they are much more visible than the small FPVs. Russia has even deployed specialized equipment of snipers specifically dedicated to destroying these drones. The important detail is that damaging a rotor or a support arm is enough to render the device unusable without completely destroying its structure. From the battlefield to the improvised workshop. They counted in Forbes that the increasing number of recoverable drones has allowed Russia develop an ecosystem Surprisingly effective makeshift repair kit. Workshops operated by soldiers and volunteers disassemble captured Baba Yaga, replace damaged parts through 3D printing and install new systems compatible with Russian communication networks. What started as an emergency solution is gradually becoming a stable supply of drones heavy for Moscow. In a way, Ukraine is inadvertently providing some of the raw material that Russia needed to cover one of the most obvious shortcomings in its unmanned aerial arsenal. The phenomenon reminds us that in a prolonged war of attrition, each downed device can end up having a second life at the service of the enemy. The irony of night attacks. The broadcast images by Russian soldiers already show scenes that just a few years ago would have seemed absurd: Ukrainian Baba Yaga launching anti-tank mines, mortar shells and improvised bombs on kyiv positions. Some Russian commanders even talk about them using the same nickname that previously symbolized the night terror of Ukrainian troops. The irony is especially cruel because these drones were conceived precisely as a Ukrainian technological advantage over Russian industrial superiority. Now some are being employed for supply outposts Russians, attack Ukrainian trenches or support night assaults using thermal cameras identical to those used by kyiv. A new phase of drones. All of this reflects a profound change in the logic of modern technological warfare. For years it was assumed that the key was to design weapons more advanced than the enemy. In Ukraine it has been imposing for some time another reality: It also matters who can best recover, recycle and reuse the material destroyed on the battlefield. Russia has found a relatively cheap way to close part of the technological gap with Ukraine without waiting to develop equivalent platforms from scratch. This now forces kyiv to study unprecedented solutions such as anti-handling systems capable of automatically destroying critical components if the device falls intact into enemy hands or even introduce malicious software designed to sabotage Russian networks after the capture of the drone. Image | X, Armed Forces In Xataka | Russia has discovered a brutal way to strip the Ukrainian defense: force it to spend Patriots it cannot replace In Xataka | Russia has found something more important than drones in China: secret training for the war in Ukraine

Russia turned gliding bombs into Ukraine’s nightmare. 17 months later Ukraine is giving him his own medicine

Two years ago Russia launched a FAB-3000 pump of three tons over Kharkov and the shock wave was so powerful that several local seismic sensors recorded it as if it were a small earthquake. Until then, Ukraine barely had a way to respond to a weapon capable of striking from tens of kilometers away. The nightmare that changed the war. For much of 2023 and 2024, Russian gliding bombs became one of the most devastating weapons of the entire war. Moscow discovered that it could transform old Soviet bombs into long-range munitions simply by adding relatively cheap wings and guidance systems. The result It was devastating: huge FABs of 250, 500 or 1,000 kilos launched from dozens of kilometers away, out of the reach of many Ukrainian anti-aircraft defenses, capable of destroying fortified positions, bridges, logistics centers or entire neighborhoods. For Ukraine, this became a problem almost impossible to solve. Shooting down each bomb was extremely difficult, attacking the launching planes forced them to get too close to the front and each new Russian kit multiplied the pressure on cities like Kharkiv, Sumy or Zaporizhia. Seventeen months searching for an answer. The appearance now of the first gliding bomb Ukrainian marks something much more important than the presentation of new ammunition. It represents the moment in which kyiv believes it has found your own answer to one of the weapons that have done the most damage during the last two years. Development reportedly began in December 2024 and has required 17 months of work until reaching the final tests and the first official order from the Ministry of Defense. The weapon, named like Vyrivniuvach (“Equalizer”), uses a 250-kilogram warhead and has been designed specifically for the real conditions of the Ukrainian war. It is not simply a question of copying a Western or Soviet model: Ukrainian engineers tried to build an adapted pump to a scenario where planes fly at low altitude to avoid radars, where anti-aircraft defenses cover enormous areas and where each weapon must be cheap, quick to manufacture and easy to integrate. The importance of manufacturing at home. The great advantage of this bomb is not only military, but also industrial and strategic. Until now Ukraine depended on Western kits like the JDAM-ER American or French Hammer to convert conventional bombs into long-range guided weapons. The problem is that these systems arrive in limited quantities, depend on external political decisions and often include restrictions on where they can be used. kyiv had been trying for months to escape that dependence by building its own war industry. The Vyrivniuvach fits perfectly into that logic: according to its developers it costs approximately three times less than a JDAM-ER, can be prepared in less than half an hour and is designed to be integrated into already operational platforms such as the Su-24, MiG-29, Su-27 and even Western F-16 or Mirage 2000. A Russian UMPK gliding bomb attached to a Su-34 An increasingly cheaper and more massive war. The evolution of gliding bombs also reflects a profound change in modern warfare. For years, cruise missiles seemed like the ultimate symbol of precision strike. Ukraine and Russia have proven otherwise: It is often more efficient to adapt old weapons with relatively simple kits and mass produce them. Russia understood this earlier and converted its FABs with UMPK modules into a true constant attrition machinery against the Ukrainian defenses. Ukraine has ended up following the same path. The logic is brutally practical: a gliding bomb does not need complex engines, can be launched from great distances, costs much less than an advanced missile and forces the enemy to expend much more expensive anti-aircraft interceptors or accept the impact. The problem of attacking from outside enemy range. They counted the TWZ analysts that what made Russian bombs especially dangerous was the possibility of launching them outside the radius of many Ukrainian defenses. Russian planes could get relatively close to the front, release their ammunition, and return without directly entering areas covered by Patriot or NASAMS. Ukraine now wants exactly that same ability. Your new bomb is designed to hit targets located “tens of kilometers” behind Russian lines, including fortifications, command posts or logistics centers. This allows you to attack without constantly exposing the pilots to the densest air defenses on the front. Furthermore, as it is a national system, kyiv can use it against any target it deems necessary without depending on external authorizations or political limitations imposed by Western allies. Ukraine’s industrial war. The Vyrivniuvach It also symbolizes the extent to which Ukraine has ceased to be simply a country that receives Western weapons and has become a power. of improvised military innovation out of necessity. In just two years, kyiv has developed long-range kamikaze drones, unmanned naval systems, new munitions and electronic warfare solutions built at high speed and at low cost. The glider bomb is part of that same transformation. Ukraine understood that it could not win a long war by relying solely on limited foreign arsenals or deliveries subject to political debates in Washington or Brussels. That’s why the message behind this new weapon is so important: Russia turned gliding bombs into one of the biggest symbols of Ukrainian vulnerability, but seventeen months later Ukraine seems to have managed to hit back using exactly the same weapon. industrial and military logic. Image | Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, Russian Ministry of Defense In Xataka | Satellite images reveal how much Russia fears Ukraine’s drones. 7,000 km away they are covering their nuclear missiles In Xataka | Once again, Ukraine has opened a missile launched by Russia. Once again, surprising manufacturers have been found

Satellite images reveal how much Russia fears Ukraine’s drones. 7,000 km away they are covering their nuclear missiles

The British Navy discovered something truly absurd during naval tests in 1945: a single flock of birds could appear on the radar with a signature similar to that of enemy aircraft. Eight decades later, some of the most sophisticated military systems on the planet clash again to the same problem: Tiny, cheap threats that are difficult to distinguish before it is too late. The drone war against the Russian nuclear arsenal. They counted this week in Naval News that satellite images taken over the Russian submarine base of Rybachiy, on the Kamchatka Peninsula, reveal the extent to which drone warfare in Ukraine is altering Russian military logic even thousands of kilometers from the front. to some 7,400 kilometers of Ukrainetwo strategic nuclear submarines of the Borei class They have appeared completely covered with anti-drone nets while they remain docked in port. The scene is shocking because these submarines are part of the core of Russian nuclear deterrent: each one carries 16 Bulava ballistic missiles capable of launching intercontinental nuclear attacks. However, even that geographical distance no longer seems sufficient for Moscow to feel completely safe from possible surprise Ukrainian operations. From the Black Sea to the Pacific nuclear fleet. The evolution reflects how drones have ceased to be an exclusively tactical problem and have become a strategic threat. Russia had been installing for some time cages, nets and metal structures improvised on ships and patrol boats in the Black Sea to try to stop Ukrainian FPV attacks. Now that same logic has reached some of the most sensitive platforms in its entire military arsenal. The fear does not seem to focus so much on drones launched directly from Ukraine, something practically impossible at such a distance, but on covert operations similar to those that have already hit Russian targets very far from the front. The idea of ​​small cheap drones reaching multi-million dollar strategic assets It has even begun to modify the protection of nuclear submarines. A small threat capable of altering the strategic balance. The nets observed on the Borei do not hide the submarines from satellites nor do they serve as conventional camouflage. Its function It’s purely defensive.: prevent light drones from approaching, landing on the deck or launching explosive charges at vulnerable points, especially on hatches and exposed systems while the submarines are on the surface. Russia had already installed similar protections on some Baltic and Arctic submarines, but on Rybachiy the coverage is much more extensive and envelops practically the entire vessel. There is no doubt, the image conveys a certainly powerful conclusion: the Kremlin already considers it plausible that cheap, improvised and difficult to detect attacks could threaten even part of its nuclear triad. The great psychological change of the war in Ukraine. Beyond the real effectiveness of these networks, the important detail is rather psychological and strategic. Ukraine has managed to get Russia to dedicate resources, time and defensive concern to bases located on the other end of the continent Eurasian. For decades, the logic of nuclear deterrence assumed that submarines hidden in remote bases were virtually untouchable except in an all-out war between great powers. And this is where drones have begun to erode that sense of immunity. The war in Ukraine is showing that a country with limited resources can force a nuclear superpower to cover with mesh improvised some of their most important systems for fear of unexpected attacks. When “nuclear” fears the cheapest. In short, the image of nuclear submarines protected with networks recalls the extent to which the Ukrainian conflict is transforming modern military rules. Platforms designed to survive atomic wars, operate under the ocean for months, and launch intercontinental missiles now also have to worry about cheap quadcopters, commercial explosives, and improvised attacks. Of course, Russia still maintains a huge nuclear and naval advantagebut the proliferation of drones is altering something much more difficult to measure than weapons: the feeling of (in)security. And when even the most remote nuclear bases begin to be armored against small drones, it means that the war in Ukraine has already changed the global perception of military vulnerability. Image | Vantor In Xataka | Once again, Ukraine has opened a missile launched by Russia. Once again, surprising manufacturers have been found In Xataka | Russia has been advancing at a snail’s pace in Ukraine for months. That’s about to change because of one season: summer.

Ukraine has opened the missile that devastated kyiv. They have found 100 reasons to be angry, and not exactly with Russia

In 2014, after the downing of flight MH17 over eastern Ukraine, international investigators spent months reconstructing fragments metallic weapons scattered among fields and roads to identify the weapon responsible. One of the biggest surprises was not just the missile itself, but the enormous amount of information that they could reveal small pieces seemingly insignificant. Ukraine has been “surprised” for some time by what is inside Russian war technology, but the latest perhaps exceeds anything seen before. The 100 components that should not be there. It we have been counting with numerous intercepted drones and missiles by kyiv, but the latest “unboxing” has set off alarms. The reason? When the Ukrainian teams they began to analyze the remains of the Kh-101 missiles that had hit residential buildings in the capital, they hoped to find Russian technology, perhaps Chinese parts or improvised systems to avoid sanctions. What they found was much more uncomfortable for the West: more than one hundred components manufactured by American and European companies inside each missile. Chips, microelectronics and systems produced years after sanctions began, including from this same 2026continued to appear in some of the most advanced weapons in the Russian arsenal. For Ukraine, the discovery has ended up generating a particularly bitter sensation: the missiles that they devastate the cities Ukrainians continue to partially depend on technology designed and manufactured by the same countries that support kyiv militarily. The Kh-101 is mounted on pylons The great crack of sanctions. He Kh-101 case is revealing one of the biggest problems of modern technological warfare: sanctioning does not necessarily mean cut off the supply real. Russia continue accessing to Western microelectronics through re-exports, intermediaries, opaque distributors and commercial networks that are extremely difficult to control. Some pieces even arrive from china as clones or compatible copies of Western designs. The result is that Moscow has achieved maintain and expand its missile production despite economic isolation. Ukraine maintains that many of the components found were fOpened in 2024 and 2025years after the sanctions packages that were supposed to strangle Russian military capacity. The feeling in kyiv is that there is a huge difference between announcing restrictions and making them actually work. The missile that Russia does not stop perfecting. Yes, because the Kh-101 has become a of the central pieces of the Russian air campaign. Launched from strategic bombers and designed for long-range flights at low altitude, Moscow has multiplied its production since 2022 to levels far above those before the invasion. But also, Russia is continually modifying the missile to make it more difficult to intercept. Ukraine assures that the new versions incorporate anti-interference improvements, more sophisticated navigation systems, double charges reducing fuel and even fragmentation munitions with zirconium elements to increase damage. kyiv continues to intercept a good part of them, but each new development forces spend more resources defenses and demonstrates that Russia maintains sufficient industrial capacity to sustain a prolonged technological war. The Western Paradox. Also it we have been counting. The history of the Kh-101 reflects, one more timean extremely uncomfortable contradiction for Europe and the United States. As the West delivers anti-aircraft systems, intelligence and economic aid to Ukraine, part of the global technology industry it keeps leaking towards the Russian military machine. In practice, some Western companies may end up seeing their own chips end up inside the missiles which then force the use of expensive Patriot or NASAMS interceptors also financed by the West. That paradox explains much of the Ukrainian frustration. For kyiv, the problem is no longer just Russia, but the inability of global trade chains to prevent critical technology from ending up feeding the Kremlin’s military production. The industrial war of the 21st century. He analysis of the remains The attack on kyiv is also leaving a deeper conclusion about how modern wars work. No great power today manufactures advanced weapons completely isolated of the global market. Missiles, drones and guidance systems depend of an international network of microelectronics, software and components extremely difficult to control. Russia has shown that even under massive sanctions can still access much of that global technological infrastructure. And Ukraine has discovered something equally disturbing: that in the wars of the 21st century, open a missile enemy is no longer only useful for studying its military technology. It also serves to discover to what extent the connected world continues feeding indirectly the war he is trying to stop. Image | Office of the President of Ukraine, Russia MoD In Xataka | Russia has been advancing at a snail’s pace in Ukraine for months. That’s about to change because of one season: summer. In Xataka | The war in Ukraine has entered such a crazy phase that soldiers are shooting at their own drones

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