drones

The United Kingdom has a laser capable of shooting down drones flying at 650 km/h. And each shot is the same as two beers.

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For some time now, armies have pursued an idea: weapons that fire energy instead of projectiles. Already in the Cold War was experienced with systems capable of concentrating heat at a distance, although technical limitations relegated them to tests and prototypes for years. Today, with advances in electrical generation and beam control, that ambition has begun to emerge from the laboratory, although it still entailed challenges that for a long time seemed impossible to solve. The UK seems to have solved the most important one. From the laboratory to real combat. He DragonFire program marks a turning point in the evolution of directed energy weapons, and it does so by going from technological demonstrator to embedded operating system. The United Kingdom has decided to accelerate its deployment until 2027integrating it into Type 45 destroyers and becoming the first European country from NATO in deploying a functional naval laser. There is no doubt, the movement is not only technological, but also doctrinal, because it implies changing the way in which air defense at sea is conceived, integrating new layers that do not depend on traditional ammunition. Two beers for the price of a shot. The key element of DragonFire is not only its accuracy, but rather its economy. Each shot costs just about 10 pounds (just over 11 euros) in electricity, just a couple of “pints” in a pub compared to the hundreds of thousands that a conventional interceptor missile can cost, which completely alters the balance between attack and defense. we had seen it in Ukraine and now in Iran. In a scenario where cheap drones are launched by the dozens or hundreds, responding with expensive missiles had become unsustainable, while a laser allows the pace to be maintained. without depleting critical resources. This difference makes the laser an especially attractive tool in modern conflicts where saturation is more important than sophistication. Extreme precision and new capabilities. The system has proven capable of hitting targets the size of a coin a kilometer away, maintaining the beam on moving targets until causing structural failure. More: its architecture combines multiple fiber lasers in a single high-quality beam, guided by electro-optical sensors and continuous tracking systems. Furthermore, its sustained firing capability eliminates one of the main limitations of conventional weapons: need to rechargeallowing you to take on multiple threats consecutively in a matter of seconds. The response to swarms. The rise of cheap drones and swarm attacks has put in check to traditional defense systems, designed to intercept more limited and higher value threats. DragonFire positions itself as the direct response to that change, offering an effective solution against small, fast and numerous targets without compromising missile arsenals intended for strategic threats. In this context, the laser does not replace existing systems, but rather complements themreinforcing short-range defense and freeing up resources for more complex scenarios. From sea to air and land. Beyond its naval deployment, the program aims for broader integration in ground and aerial platformswhich infers a structural change in modern weaponry. Let us think that the possibility of standardizing this type of technology in vehicles, ships or even combat fighters opens the door to a new generation of systems where energy progressively replaces to physical ammunition. Analysts recalled by Army Recognition that although there are still limitations (such as the need for line of sight, electrical power and thermal management), the advancement of DragonFire indicates that that concept before fantastic of “infinite ammunition” has ceased to be a theoretical idea and has become an operational reality in development. Image | UK Ministry of Defense In Xataka | Spain has built a laser that shields the backbone of its Navy: the A400M is now ready for combat In Xataka | China has achieved something hard to believe: reducing the production of laser weapons and parts for electric cars to one second

Neither drones nor missiles nor AI, the war in Ukraine has turned a vehicle from 1950 into a key piece: the M113

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Some of the most produced military vehicles in history exceed 80,000 units manufactured and remain in service in dozens of countries decades after their design. In many cases, their longevity is not due to their power, but to something much simpler: that they simply work, are easy to repair, and never completely disappear. An unexpected veteran. While the algorithms and drones freelancers starred on all the covers of war innovationsin recent times the war in Ukraine has turned in key piece to a vehicle from the 1950s as it was the M113and that says much more about the conflict than any next-generation system. On a battlefield dominated by advanced technology, this armored transport has resurfaced not because it is the most powerful, but because it fits better than anyone else in a war of attrition where the important thing is not sophistication, but the ability to resist, move and continue operating day after day. Simple wins. The M113 was designed for another timebut its qualities (mobility, mechanical simplicity and ease of production) make it have converted surprisingly effective in Ukraine. The reason: in an environment saturated with drones and artillery, where any vehicle can be destroyed in seconds, the key is not so much to survive everything as to be able to be repaired quickly and return to the front. Its ability to operate off-road, transport troops or even drones and adapt with improvised protections makes it a versatile tool in a conflict where conditions are constantly changing. Drones and the rules. The truth is that the proliferation of drones has reduced the usefulness of many traditional systems, including heavy tanks, forcing both sides to rethink how they move and fight. In this context, the M113 does not stand out for its weapons, but for its logistical function: carry soldiers, equipment or drones to forward positions. War, from that perspective, is no longer decided so much by direct fire, but by who manages to best position their resources in an environment monitored from the air, and there this vehicle fits perfectly. Russian “Giga Turtle” captured by Ukrainians Meanwhile, Russia adapts in its own way. On the other side of the front, in recent weeks Russia has attempted to respond with radically different solutions, such as the return of called “giga turtle”in essence, over-armored versions of tanks designed to resist drone attacks. Huge and slow, these machines prioritize protection over mobility, making them easier targets despite their toughness. His reappearance reflects the same conclusion that has been imposed on the battlefield: vehicles are still necessary, but they must adapt to a constant threat from the air. War of attrition and quantity. Ultimately, the success of the M113 It also has to do with something much more basic: that there is a glarge amount of stock available for these models. Thousands of units produced over decades allow Ukraine to quickly replace losses in a war where attrition is brutal. In other words, compared to more expensive and scarce modern systems, this vehicle offers something essential for the fight: continuity. In an extremely slow conflict that is already measured in years, it is not whoever has the most advanced weapon who wins, but whoever can continue fighting the longest. The real change is conceptual. If you like, all this points to a deeper conclusion: the war in Ukraine is not necessarily rewarding the newest, but rather the most useful in an extreme context. AND the M113 symbolizes this change like few others, where cutting-edge technology coexists with solutions from another era that they still work because they respond better to the real needs of combat. In a scenario dominated by drones, sensors and constant fire, the key is not so much to reinvent warfare, but to adapt to it, even if that means returning to vehicles designed more than half a century ago. Image | Armed Forces In Xataka | While everyone was looking at Iran, a drone has made a hole so big that it seems impossible to cover it: the one in the roof of Chernobyl In Xataka | Russia is building its largest warship in the Black Sea. You know it, we know it and the Ukrainian drones know it

drones attacking North Dakota nuclear bases

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The United States’ nuclear strategy has long been based on the so-called “triad”a system that combines submarines, land-based missiles and bombers to ensure responsiveness even in the worst possible scenario. The model, designed in the middle of the Cold War, assumed that the continental territory was practically inaccessible to direct threats, which allowed the defense to be concentrated abroad and not so much on protecting each installation within the country. Until the drones have arrived. An unprecedented attack on the nuclear heart. What happened, according to what they said several analystsis that while the United States bombs Iran in its large-scale operation, something completely unexpected is happening within its own territory. Drone waves They have flown over key bases linked to the US nuclear arsenal. Apparently, these were not isolated incidents or improvised devices. They were coordinated incursions, repeated attacks for days that have forced stop critical operations and activate emergency protocols. For the first time, in the middle of a war, strategic installations on American soil were directly affected by a persistent aerial threat. Barksdale, the critical point. The most striking case occurred in the Barksdale Air Force Baseone of the pillars of the United States nuclear system. Strategic bombers operate there and long-range missiles are stored, making the facility a key node within the country’s deterrence capacity. For several days, the swarms of drones They have flown over the base in organized waves, forcing interrupt bomber sorties who participated in the attacks on Iran. The scene, more typical of a movie, has been difficult to ignore: while the B-52s prepared to project force thousands of kilometers, the airspace above their own runways was committed. Advanced drones. The most worrying thing was not only the presence of these drones, but its technological level. They counted on ABCNews that the devices showed a remarkable resistance to electronic interference, used variable entry and exit routes and operated in dispersed patterns that made them difficult to track. In fact, countermeasures designed to neutralize these types of threats they didn’t work as expected. This suggests that these are not tailored trading systems, but rather platforms much more sophisticatedcapable of operating with partial or total autonomy and collecting information in highly protected environments. More than a physical threat. There is no doubt, these drones not only represent a risk for Washington due to their potential attack capacity, but also due to the type of information that they can get. When flying over critical facilities, they can map electronic emissionsidentify operating patterns and photograph sensitive infrastructure. In other words, they can build a detailed portrait of how a strategic base works from within. And this opens the door to much more precise and effective future attacks, as it turns each raid into a highly valuable reconnaissance mission. Structural vulnerability in national territory. They remembered on TWZ that the raids are not limited to a single point or a specific moment. They have registered similar episodes at other key bases, including strategic bomber-related facilities and advanced technology development centers. In many cases, these infrastructures they lack systems adequate air defense systems against drones, which forces us to rely on improvised or developing solutions. What’s more, even with new tools deployed, the ability to neutralize these threats remains limited and uneven. The strategic paradox. The contrast is more than evident. The United States maintains an unprecedented global military capability and can project force virtually anywhere on the planet. However, at the same time, shows difficulties to fully protect sour own facilities against relatively small, but technologically advanced threats. This paradox reveals a mismatch that already we saw in Ukraine and now in Iranone between traditional defense architecture and new forms of warfare, where cheap and difficult to detect systems can generate disproportionate effects. Paradigm shift underway. In short, what happened, for unpublishedpoints to a deeper transformation in the way military security is understood. Not even the bases, silos and strategic infrastructures of a superpower like the United States can considered safe spaces by the mere fact of being in national territory. Because the combination of advanced drones, sensors and electronic warfare is taking the conflict directly to the heart of powers. And that implies, or opens the disturbing possibility, that the next great battle will not only be fought abroad, but also in the ability to protect what until now was taken for granted. Image | USAF, Airman 1st Class Benjamin Gonsier In Xataka | Iran has turned Hormuz into the entrance to a VIP nightclub. And Spain enters the guest list and the US stays at the door In Xataka | Iran and Russia had been silently exchanging drones and material in the Caspian Sea for months: Israel has just revealed it

96 drones with a science fiction launch

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In recent years, the cost of many drones has dropped to the point that many military models are infinitely cheaper than the missile that tries to shoot them down. At the same time, advances in artificial intelligence have allowed relatively simple machines execute tasks that previously required entire human teams. In China they have taken an unprecedented step towards the war of the future. The next step. Yes, Beijing just taught in a video something that goes far beyond the individual drone: a coordinated swarm of up to 96 units which works like a single system intelligent at a devilish speed. This is not about launching devices, but about orchestrating a distributed air force where each drone has a role and all act as a single organism, marking a clear leap towards a dominated war by software, algorithms and autonomy. The demonstration also leaves a clear idea: the future will not be a more advanced drone, but rather many drones working together as if they were one. The “kill chain” converted into a single system. As can be seen, the Atlas system integrates a single sequence the entire combat process, from detection to attack, eliminating traditional intermediate steps along the way. In the test, the swarm identified a target among several similar ones, made decisions autonomously and executed a precise attack in mid-flight, displaying a chain of destruction continuous and automated. There is no doubt, this approach completely transforms war, because it is no longer a question of isolated platforms, but of complete systems capable of to perceive, decide and act without interruptions. Science fiction. The heart of the system is its deployability: we are talking about a vehicle that can launch drones at a rate of one every three secondsquickly generating a critical mass in the air. This technical detail is key, because it allows one to be built in a matter of minutes. dense and coordinated formationone capable of saturating defenses or executing complex attacks. It is, therefore, not just speed, it is the ability to turn a launch into a controlled avalanche of perfectly synchronized units. A swarm that thinks and reorganizes itself. As we said, each drone is equipped with algorithms that allow you to communicateshare information and adapt in real time, avoiding collisions and adjusting your position within the group. Besides, can be reassigned during the mission, changing functions as the combat evolves, which introduces unprecedented flexibility in conflicts. In other words, this kind of “collective brain” turns the swarm into something closer to a distributed intelligence than to a set of independent machines. Algorithmic control. They had something in the PLA that already we had seen beforethat one of the most profound changes has to do with the fact that a single operator can control the entire system, delegating complex tasks such as target recognition, mission assignment or route planning to artificial intelligence. This reduces human burden and accelerates decision times to levels that are difficult to match by traditional systems. War thus goes from depending on operators to depending on previously trained algorithms. Attack and defend in another way. Plus: the system allows combine different types of drones in the same mission, from reconnaissance to electronic warfare and attack, creating staggered waves capable of overcoming defenses or penetrating in depth. That is to say, for either side, progress blurs the line. between front and rear and forces us to completely rethink anti-aircraft defenses, which no longer face just one missile or drone, but dozens of them acting in a coordinated manner. A new and disturbing scenario where the real weapon is no longer the drone itself, but the system that connects them. Image | CCTV In Xataka | Ukraine is close to achieving a milestone that no one has achieved: building the largest drone industry without China’s help In Xataka | 200 drones in the hands of a single soldier: China is advancing very quickly in a type of war that seemed like science fiction

just bombed the “Uber of shahed drones” between Russia and Iran

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Although more than 90% of world trade travels by sea, there are routes that do not even appear on common trade maps and yet concentrate all types of critical flows of goods and technology. In some of these corridors, it is enough to turn off a simple transponder to disappear from the radar and turn an ordinary journey into something much more difficult to track. And one of them directly “connects” the war in Ukraine with that in Iran. The “Uber of the shahed.” Israel has found and beaten much more than a port: it has attacked the invisible highway that connected two apparently separate wars, that of Ukraine and the Middle East. As? For months, the Caspian Sea functioned as a discreet runner where Russia and Iran exchanged Shahed drones, ammunition and technology far from Western reach, a true “Uber of the Shahed” that moved weapons silently while the ships they turned off their transponders. This logistical system allowed the same drones that fell on kyiv or Kharkiv to also fuel attacks in the Gulf, and its partial destruction It not only aims to disrupt supplies, but also reveals the extent to which both conflicts are intertwined. A key route for two simultaneous wars. Because the Caspian corridor was not a secondary route, but a centerpiece of the Russian and Iranian military equipment, used to transport hundreds of thousands of projectiles and millions of ammunition, in addition to drones that both countries they already produce jointly. They remembered in the Wall Street Journal that Russia depended on this route to sustain its war effort in Ukraine, while Iran used it to project power in the Middle East, turning maritime traffic between Bandar Anzali and Russian ports into a critical logistics artery. Its hybrid nature, mixing civil commerce with military shipments, made its detection and blocking even more difficult. Technological and total war partners. I was counting this morning the financial times that the relationship between Moscow and Tehran has evolved from one-off cooperation to integration ever deeperone in which Russia provides intelligence, satellite images and technological improvements, while Iran provides expertise in cheap drones and mass production. However, that relationship is no longer one-way: Russia has perfected the Shahed in Ukraine (improving navigation, payload and jam resistance) and is now in a position to return Iran vmore advanced versionscapable of increasing the effectiveness of their attacks or serving as a basis for new generations of weapons. The Israeli coup and its effect. Apparently the attack against Bandar Anzali It has destroyed key infrastructure, from ships to command and maintenance centers, with the explicit aim of demonstrating that not even the Caspian is a safe space for Iran. Beyond the physical damage, the operation also seeks to disorganize temporarily the flow of weapons and send a strategic message: Israel can reach critical logistical nodes even in areas considered outside of direct conflict. Plus: By affecting a route that also transports civilian goods such as wheat or energy, the coup places additional pressure on Iranian internal stability. A system also vulnerable. Despite the impact, neither Russia nor Iran depend on a single path, and it is likely that redirect your shipments to other ports or routes, maintaining the flow, although with greater costs and delays. That said, the attack has exposed a structural weaknessThere is no doubt: the need to maintain discreet but concentrated logistics corridors, susceptible to being identified and hit. Put another way, modern war is not only fought on the front lines, but in these invisible networks that sustain production and supply. Strategic message. If you also want, what has happened in the Caspian redefines the map of the conflict, because it shows that wars are no longer a kind of watertight compartments, but rather interconnected systems where a logistics chain can feed multiple fronts. By bombing this route, Israel has not only hit Iran, but also indirectly the russian military machinery in Ukraine, showing that the battle for drones (and the chains that transport them) is a global conflict. From that prism, the “Uber of the Shahed” was not just another route: it was the symbol of a new form of war, one that is now also a priority objective. Image | Alma, Wikimedia, Kyiv City State Administration In Xataka | Drones and ballistic missiles have revolutionized warfare. Iran suspects there is another weapon: rain theft In Xataka | Iran has sent a message with a ballistic missile 4,000 km away: Europe is within reach, including Spain

One trick is unblocking the passage of ships in Hormuz without the need for drones or escorts. And the US is not going to be amused

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In 2023, some of the world’s largest oil tankers have already begun sailing with transponders off in risk areas to avoid being tracked, a known practice like “dark shipping” which makes it difficult to know what cargo they are transporting and where they are going. In scenarios of maximum tension, these opaque movements tend to multiply and anticipate deeper changes in how it circulates really the energy for the world. The new rules. Although it may seem like it, in reality, the Strait of Hormuz is not formally closed, but in practice it has stopped be a neutral space to become a conditional passage through Iran, where transit depends on implicit authorizations and specific routes under its control. In the midst of attacks, mines and a constant threat that has paralyzed hundreds of ships, some oil tankers have managed to cross a simple tactic: follow trajectories close to the Iranian coast, avoiding the usual corridors and suggesting the existence of a selective passage system that redefines who can circulate and under what conditions. Tehran’s invisible filter. The ships that manage to cross the strait do not do so by chance, but within a pattern increasingly clear: negotiated transit, “acceptable” flags and destinations aligned with countries that do not directly participate in the conflict or without directly “friends.” There it appears mainly India and China along with neutral actors who have begun to secure shipments through diplomatic contacts, while ships linked to the West remain outside or directly exposed. This model allows Iran to maintain a minimum flow of energy that avoids a total collapse of the market, but at the same time turns the passage into a tool of geopolitical pressure, where each transit is a concession and not a right. Minimum flow with global impact. Although the number of ships that manage to cross is still a fraction of the usual, that small trickle is enough to influence prices energy and avoid further escalation, especially towards Asia. That said, the bottleneck is enormous, with hundreds of ships waiting and logistics extremely limited in a passage that already functions as a two-lane highway. The constant threat of drones, mines or specific attacks maintains the risk at maximum levels and deters the majority of operators, consolidating a system where the exception, and not the normality, sets the pace of commerce. China in the lead. In this context, China emerges as one of the main beneficiaries of this selective system, absorbing much of the crude oil that manages to get out of the Gulf and using its ambiguous position to keep open supply lines that others cannot guarantee. In other words, the appearance of ships with Chinese ties among the few that cross the strait reinforces the idea that access to Hormuz no longer depends only on geography, but rather on political alignment, consolidating a transit network where Beijing gains margin while other actors lose access. The Eurasian plan B. In parallel, China and Russia are accelerating construction of structural alternatives to vulnerable routes such as Hormuz, promoting its own logistics corridors that include lto Arctic Route and terrestrial networks across Eurasia. With investments in ports, icebreaking vessels and independent logistics systems, both countries seek to reduce their exposure to bottlenecks controlled by third parties and create a commercial architecture more resilient and politically aligned. This strategy not only responds to the current crisis, but also aims at a lasting reorganization of global trade. An uncomfortable scenario for the United States. There is no doubt, the combination of a partially narrow controlled by Iranan energy flow that is redirected towards Asia and development of alternative routes Outside of Western influence, it sets up an increasingly unfavorable scenario for the United States. As Washington tries to respond with naval escorts and pressure international (although at the last minute started again back saying that it does not need help from the allies), its capacity to guarantee free transit is limited compared to a system where a mine or a drone is enough to paralyze everything. The result is a silent but profound change: the control of energy flows begins to depend less on direct military force and more of political and logistical networks that escape US control. Image | x In Xataka | The war with Iran is leading the US to a plan B that no one imagined: avoiding the nuclear objective at all costs In Xataka | The US nuclear supercarrier has a problem: its marines are sleeping on the ground in the middle of the war with Iran

If Ukraine promoted the use of drones, Iran has triggered the Terminator algorithm. And that was already a problem in science fiction

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In the gulf war 1991, the international coalition took more than a month to launch some 100,000 airstrikes after weeks of planning. Three decades later, the ability to process military information has changed radically: satellites, sensors and drones generate amounts of data that no human team could analyze alone. In this new technological environment, the true battlefield is no longer just the air or the land, but the speed at which information is interpreted. From the drone to the algorithm. Recent wars had already anticipated a profound transformation of modern combat, but the conflict with Iran seems to have crossed a different technological frontier. If the war in ukraine popularized the massive use of drones as a dominant tool from the battlefield, the campaign against Iran has introduced a logical even more radical: integration artificial intelligence at the very heart of military decisions. In fact, the initial attacks showed an intensity difficult to imagine just a few years ago, with hundreds of targets hit in a matter of hours and thousands in a few days. That speed was not only the result of greater firepower, but also of the use of capable systems of analyzing enormous volumes of data and transforming that information into almost instantaneous attack plans. Understanding the “kill chain”. I remembered this morning the financial times that traditional war, the so-called chain of destruction (from identifying a target to launching the attack) was a long and bureaucratic process. Intelligence officers analyzed information, wrote reports, commanders evaluated options and finally the coup was authorized. A process that could take hours or even days. The incorporation of AI is reducing that cycle drastically. We are talking about platforms that integrate data from satellites, drones, sensors and intercepted communications that are capable of generating lists of targets, prioritizing them and suggesting the appropriate weapon in a matter of seconds. The result is extreme and disturbing compression of the kill chain: What once required prolonged deliberation now becomes an almost instantaneous sequence. The digital brain of the battlefield. Behind this acceleration are data analysis systems that act as a true operational “brain.” These platforms combine geospatial intelligence, machine learning and advanced language models to interpret information and propose military actions. Its most disruptive capacity is that it no longer only summarizes data, but can reason step by stepevaluate alternatives and generate tactical recommendations. This allows military commanders to process volumes of information that are impossible to handle manually and multiply the number of operational decisions made in the same period of time. In practice, algorithms are allowing select and execute objectives at a scale and speed that were previously unthinkable. Bomb faster than thought. The result of this transformation is a war that begins to move at a rapid speed. higher than human pace. Artificial intelligence can now analyze information, detect patterns and propose attacks faster than a team of analysts could even formulate the right questions. Some experts describe This phenomenon as a form of “compressed decision,” in which planning is reduced to such short windows of time that human managers can barely review what the machine has already processed. In this context, another disturbing idea: that destruction can precede the human reflection process itself, that is, first comes the recommendation generated by the algorithm and then the formal approval of the person who must execute it. And there, there is no doubt, we can have a problem of colossal dimensions. The human dilemma in algorithmic warfare. Because this technological acceleration is generating a growing debate about the real role of humans in military decision-making. Although the armed forces they insist As final control remains in the hands of people, the time available to evaluate system recommendations is increasingly reduced. Some analysts fear that this will lead to a form of “cognitive download”one in which military leaders end up automatically trusting the decisions generated by algorithms. Other countries like China itself observe this evolution with concern and warn of the risk that automated systems end up directly influencing life or death decisions on the battlefield, associating the scenario with the closest thing to the “Terminator algorithm” due to the unequivocal way in which all paths approach James Cameron’s fantastic proposal. A new accelerated war. If you will also, what is emerging is not just a new military technology, but rather a new time of the war. AI makes it possible to process information on a massive scale, identify targets more quickly, and execute attacks with unprecedented simultaneity. This means that military campaigns can develop at a pace that overflows the models traditional planning. From this perspective, war no longer advances solely at the pace of logistics or firepower, but at the pace of algorithms capable of interpreting the battlefield in real time. And in this unprecedented scenario, strategic advantage could increasingly depend on who is able to think (or calculate) faster than the adversary. Although neither of them be human. Image | Ministry of Defense of Ukraine In Xataka | China has just found a hole in the US’s quietest weapon: an algorithm has hacked its B-2s in Iran In Xataka | The great paradox of war: the US ignored Ukraine’s pleas to Russia and now needs it in Iran

The fault lies with some inhibitors to confuse drones

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All eyes are on the Strait of Hormuz, through which it passes 20% of the world’s oil. Chaos reigns in this funnel of just 33km and there is something that is contributing to complicating everything much more: the GPS does not work. It is not a specific problem, it is something increasingly common that is having consequences that go beyond the war itself. Chaos in Hormuz (even more). They count on BBC There are hundreds of ships in the Strait of Hormuz area and the location systems place them in positions that make no sense; some are stacked on top of each other, others form impossible circles on the earth… The cause is that their GPS coordinates have been altered by some type of inhibitor. This increases the risk of maritime collisions, especially if visibility is poor. Objective: confuse. In a complete report of Wall Street Journalsay that GPS signal jammers and spoofers have become an essential tool in conflict zones like Ukraine and, now Iranas you can see on this map. What they do is confuse drones and guided munitions so that they fail. Works. The Ukraine conflict has shown that these systems work. According to a report delivered to the US department of defensethe accuracy of Excalibur artillery was 70% when it was first used in Ukraine, but six weeks later it was only 6% thanks to “the Russians adapting their electronic warfare systems to counter it” with GPS jammers. Many of these devices are very affordable and fit in your pocket, making them very easy to use in the field. Consequences. In 2024, An American Airlines flight flew over Pakistan when the alert started to sound “pull up“, which is what it sounds like when the plane is too close to the ground, but the aircraft was at 32,000 feet above sea level. It was a GPS interference. In April of the same year, the airline Finnair suspended its flights to Tartu for a month. The reason: Russia. Airlines depend a lot on GPS and these interferences sometimes cause errors like the one we mentioned at the beginning. Flights have also had to be diverted to other airports for this reason, such as happened with the flight in which Ursula Von Der Leyen was traveling in September of last year. GPS cracks. He Global Positioning System It is a satellite navigation system created by the United States in the 1960s. It was created for military use, but it has ended up being part of the critical infrastructure of the digital economy. There are other similar systems that use satellites such as GLONASS (Russia), BeiDou (China) and Galileo (Europe), but GPS is the most used globally. The fact that we depend so much on GPS means that any degradation has a cascading impact on many essential services, but the signal also has to travel 20,000 kilometers from the satellite, so when it reaches us it is very weak. It is the perfect breeding ground to make it extremely easy to alter them. Solutions. The weaknesses of GPS make it urgent to search for robust alternatives for critical sectors such as aviation. There are the inertial navigation systems which use gyroscopes and accelerometers to calculate position and are already used in the aerospace industry, defense and autonomous vehicles. Also a system is being developed which uses quantum sensors that orient themselves with the Earth’s magnetism and cameras combined with AI algorithms are used to “read” the terrain. However, despite the weaknesses, GPS remains the most powerful system of all due to its ubiquity and accuracy. These systems do not cover the entire range, so the tendency is to use several sources to cover these gaps. In Xataka | Radar warning, detector and inhibitor: what is legal, what is not and why the DGT can fine me this Easter Image | gpsjam.org

Drones cannot be stored for more than eight weeks

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For years, many European countries filled huge underground warehouses with ammunition capable of remaining operational for decades. In fact, some projectiles stored in Finland They have been waiting for more than 30 years without losing effectiveness. However, the weapons that are redefining today’s conflicts work with software, radios and chips that change at a pace much more similar to that of consumer electronics than that of traditional artillery. This difference is forcing armies to reconsider an unexpected question: how to prepare for a future war when military technology ages almost as quickly as a simple mobile phone. Rearmament enters the era of the drone. Because European defense was based on a relatively simple logic inherited from the Cold War: fill warehouses with ammunition, missiles, mines or artillery shells capable of remaining operational for decades. In countries like Finland, as we said, there are camouflaged deposits with huge reserves of ammunition that have been stored for years and are still fully usable. However, the Ukrainian war has shown that the battlefield of the 21st century increasingly revolves around cheap drones, software and electronic warfare, which has led NATO and European governments to rethink your investments. At the next summit of the alliance, precisely how to shift part of military spending from traditional systems (such as tanks or heavy artillery) will be discussed. towards emerging technologies based on drones, AIs, satellites and digital networks, in an attempt to adapt to a form of warfare where the speed of innovation is as important as firepower. The big problem: drones expire. This strategic change has revealed an unexpected dilemma. Unlike an artillery projectile or missile that can be stored for decades, drones depend on software, communications and electronic components that evolve at a rapid pace. The experience in Ukraine has shown that a dominant model on the front can become unusable a few weeks later due to new jamming systemsfrequency changes or improvements in autonomous navigation. That is why several European officials warn that storing large quantities of drones may be useless: because by the time they reach the battlefield, many will already be obsolete. Even governments calculate that certain models may become outdated in just eight weeksa reality that completely breaks with the classic logic of accumulating arsenals for years for a future conflict. Electronic warfare and useful life of a weapon. The main reason for this accelerated expiration is not so much in the hardware of the drone as in the electronic environment in which it operates. On the Ukrainian front, the constant struggle to dominate the radio spectrum It forces you to continually change frequencies, antennas, radios and control systems to avoid enemy blockade. A drone that works correctly today can stop doing so in a matter of days if the adversary develop new techniques of interference. Therefore, what really ages is not the fuselage of the device but your digital ecosystem: software, data links and navigation algorithms. In this context, the life cycle of a drone is more similar to that of a phone or a computer than that of a tank or a missile, which makes constant updating an essential requirement if the drone is not to become a “brick.” The industrial paradox. This phenomenon places governments before an industrial paradox difficult to solve. To prepare for a crisis, Europe needs an industry capable of producing large-scale drones quickly, but producing them too soon can be counterproductive because they would be left outdated before use. Some manufacturers hold that the only way to solve this dilemma is to buy drones now to train the armed forces, develop doctrines and build an industrial base capable of increasing production in the event of war. However, even the most optimistic companies recognize that multiplying production has limits: They can escalate tenfold in an emergency, but hardly a hundredfold overnight. The military revolution. Despite these challenges, the strategic logic of drones is difficult to ignore. Analysts and companies in the sector highlight that, for the price of two Leopard tanksa country could deploy hundreds of teams of attack drones capable of stopping entire armored units. This economic change is transforming the way we think about war: cheap and numerous systems can neutralize heavy platforms that for decades symbolized military power. For this reason, Bloomberg reported that NATO is studying how to combine traditional hardware with new digital technologies that allow us to close the gap with the United States and adapt to the new operating environment. The future of rearmament. In summary and in view of this new reality, many European governments believe that the solution is not so much to fill warehouses with drones, but create industrial ecosystems able to adapt and quickly produce updated versions when necessary. This implies, a priori, connecting armed forces, software developers, engineers and manufacturers in a continuous cycle of innovation that allows systems to be modified several times a year. Thus, instead of static arsenals, the objective becomes a flexible industry capable of evolving at the pace of electronic warfare. In other words, the great challenge of European rearmament It is no longer just about spending more and more money to stockpile weapons like there is no tomorrow, but about accepting that, in 21st century warfare, even the most decisive weapons can become old before they leave the warehouse. Image | Aerospace, State Border Guard Service of Ukraine In Xataka | Europe has successfully tested a special command against Russia’s biggest threat: underwater drone swarms are ready In Xataka | Europe faces a question it can no longer avoid: how to respond to a war that is rarely declared

Iran’s drones have aimed at the same target as the US. And now that they have pulverized it, they are going to unleash their most dangerous weapon

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In the Middle East there are radars capable of tracking objects thousands of kilometers and distinguish between dozens of targets in mid-flight. They are machines the size of a building, cost hundreds of millions of dollars and are part of the system that detects attacks before they even cross the atmosphere. However, in the current war they are discovering something uncomfortable: the greatest danger to these technological gems may come from weapons that cost a fraction of its price. The eyes of the shield. Since the beginning of the war, Iran has directed a very specific part of his attacks against an objective that rarely appears in the headlines but that underpins the entire defensive architecture of the United States in the Middle East: the radars that allow detecting and tracking missiles in flight. These sensors (like the AN/TPY-2 associated with the THAAD system or the gigantic AN/FPS-132 deployed in Qatar) act as the “eyes” of the regional anti-missile shield, feeding data to Patriot interceptors, THAAD or Aegis destroyers to destroy threats before they reach their objectives. However, several of these systems have been hit in the last days by Iranian attacks, some confirmed through satellite images. Among them is the strategic radar of the Al-Udeid base in Qatar, valued at nearly a billion dollars, and an AN/TPY-2 radar in Jordan directly linked to THAAD batteries. Other locations in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia or Bahrain as well have suffered impacts in facilities related to radar or communications, partially weakening the surveillance capacity of the regional defensive system. The shaheds against the most expensive system. The paradox of these attacks is that many of them have been carried out with unidirectional attack drones relatively cheap, like the Shahed, whose cost is only a fraction of the missiles and sensors they try to neutralize. While US systems were designed to intercept much more expensive and sophisticated ballistic or cruise missiles, Iran has bet for saturating or damaging them with much simpler platforms. These drones fly low and slow, which can make it difficult to detect for defenses designed for faster threats. Furthermore, the country has proven to have the capacity to produce them in large quantitiessomething that is already left patent in Ukraine with its export to Russia. In this war, that industrial advantage translates into a pretty clear strategy: launch constant waves of drones against sensors, command centers and communication systems, gradually eroding the network that allows us to detect threats in the air. An Army and Navy transportable surveillance radar (AN/TPY-2) positioned on Kwajalein Atoll during FTI-01 flight testing Blind the shield. The pattern that emerges suggests that these attacks are not simply scattered retaliation, but rather part of a much more calculated approach. Radars not only detect threats, they are the element that makes it possible to intercept them. Without them, even the most advanced anti-missile systems remain partially blind or rely on incomplete information. Hitting these sensors, therefore, has a multiplier effect– Each radar out of service increases the likelihood that future waves of attacks will penetrate defenses. In that sense, the Shahed seem to have aimed at the same target since the beginning of the conflict: the eyes of the American anti-missile shield. And the more that network is degraded, the greater the scope for other, more dangerous weapons (stored in underground silos and fortified bases) can come into play with greater chances of success. A satellite image taken on March 2, 2026 shows debris around a blackened THAAD radar at Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan The problem of radars. The episode also highlights a structural weakness that analysts have long pointed out. Large early warning radars are extremely sophisticated, but also huge, expensive and largely static. Each one costs hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars and there are very few in the world, which means that replacing them can take years. At the same time, their size and fixed nature make them on relatively easy targets to locate through intelligence or commercial satellite images. Even seemingly minor damage can cause a “mission kill”that is, leaving the radar inoperative for long periods, even if the structure is still standing. In other words, a cheap drone can temporarily disable a central piece of the strategic defense of an entire region. The new logic of air war. Plus: what is happening reflects a deeper change in the way defensive systems are attacked. For decades it was assumed that destroying strategic radars required sophisticated missiles or large-scale complex attacks. The proliferation of drones has altered that equation. Today even actors with limited resources can employ cheap platforms to degrade sensors that cost hundreds of millions. This logic has already been seen in other conflictsfrom Ukrainian attacks against Russian radars to Israeli operations against Iranian air defenses. In all cases the principle is the same: “shoot the archer” before facing his arrows. If the system that detects threats disappears or is degraded, the entire shield loses effectiveness. A warning for the future. Beyond the immediate damage, these attacks have opened a broader strategic debate about resilience of American missile defense. The current architecture relies heavily on a small number of extremely valuable ground sensors. If those sensors are destroyed or neutralized, even temporarily, the defensive balance can quickly shift. That is why more and more experts advocate complementing or replacing part of these capabilities. with space sensors capable of tracking missiles from orbit, creating redundancy against ground attacks. However, these technologies, if they arrive, will take years to be fully deployed. Meanwhile, the current war has left an uncomfortable lesson: a system designed to stop the world’s most sophisticated weapons can be weakened. by swarms of drones cheap. And when the radars stop seeingthe next move on the board can be much more dangerous. Image | Google Earth, X, Missile Defense Agency, Airbus In Xataka | You’ve probably never heard of urea. The missiles in Iran are destroying their production, and that will affect your food In Xataka … Read more

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