The Komsomolets nuclear submarine sank in European waters almost 40 years ago. The issue is what still frees the sea

Almost 1,700 meters under the Norwegian Sea lies something more than a sunken submarine. Inside the Komsomolets they continue the nuclear reactor that powered the ship and two torpedoes armed with nuclear warheadslocked in a wreck subjected to salt water, pressure and corrosion for decades. They did not get there because of a secret mission or a failed test, but after an accident that turned one of the great naval feats of the Soviet Union into a problem that we are still trying to understand. The history of the Komsomolets did not end when the hull hit bottom. The reactor releases radionuclides in sporadic episodes, a behavior that current studies have been able to observe and measure with much more precision than in the 1990s. These emissions have not caused a broad impact on the marine ecosystem so far, but the question remains open. Before becoming a flotsamas the remains of a sunken ship are called, the Komsomolets had been one of the most ambitious bets of Soviet naval engineering. It entered service in 1983 with a sturdy titanium helmet and the ability to operate at more than 1,000 meters depth, an exceptional level for a military submarine of its time. According to the BBC’s historical reconstructionNATO hoped that this model would inaugurate a new class of attack submarines, but the Soviet Union never built a second unit. The Soviet submarine that ended up becoming a problem at 1,700 meters deep On April 7, 1989, a fire started in one of her compartments while she was sailing in the Norwegian Sea. The crew managed to bring the ship to the surface, but the fire continued to spread and disabled several systems. About five hours later, the submarine sank. Five sailors tried to escape in a capsule that surfaced, but only one managed to abandon it before it filled with water. In total, 42 of the 69 crew members died. What remained on board may lead us to imagine a nuclear explosion, but current assessments they do not identify a spontaneous detonation as the relevant risk. Such an explosion demands that they work arming and initiation mechanisms with a very specific synchronization. The documented concern is that corrosion will end up allowing radioactive material to escape from the reactor or, in the future, from weapons. The containment intervention chosen years later did not consist of refloating the submarine, but rather isolating its most sensitive areas. In 1994, a Russian expedition used submersibles manned to seal the six torpedo tubes and some holes in the bow section with titanium plates. The objective was to reduce the circulation of water through the compartment where the warheads remained and limit an eventual release of plutonium. It was not a complete closure of the hull, but a containment measure that was still apparently intact when the wreck was inspected in 2019. Decades later, the return to the Komsomolets had a different objective: to observe and measure, not to reseal it. In 2019, a scientific expedition sent to the submarine Ægir 6000a remotely operated vehicle equipped with cameras, manipulator arms and sampling instruments. The robot traveled through different areas of the hull and collected water, sediment and organisms near the reactor and torpedo compartment. Thus it was possible to study the state of the wreck without exposing a human crew to those conditions. The results published this year in PNAS They concluded that the assemblies containing the nuclear fuel are damaged and that seawater has reached the reactor material. The analyzes link this deterioration with intermittent emissions of radionuclides, although researchers are still trying to determine the exact mechanisms that cause them. The highest concentrations appeared next to a ventilation shaft and a nearby grate, but the material dilutes quickly and there is little evidence of accumulation in the surroundings of the wreck. No evidence of military-grade plutonium from the warheads was found in the bow area either. Reaching the Komsomolets is not impossible: the submersibles of the 1990s and subsequent expeditions already demonstrated that work can be done at that depth. The difficulty is determining what action would provide a real improvement and what risks would be involved in intervening on a damaged nuclear structure. As explained by the Norwegian nuclear safety authority to the BBC, there are currently no plans for a new containment operation. The answer is still to go back, measure and monitor how a submarine that has been under the sea for almost four decades changes. Images | Norwegian Marine Research Institute In Xataka | The Norwegian colony that has taken over a town in Alicante and even has its own constitution: L’Alfas del Pi

Japan has three red lines on nuclear weapons. One of them no longer seems so untouchable

Japan has a relationship with nuclear weapons that no other country can tell firsthand. Hiroshima and Nagasaki are not just two names in the history booksbut the origin of a political identity built for decades around the rejection of the bomb. And yet, Japanese security also rests on a reality that is difficult to accept: America’s nuclear umbrella. What begins to move now is not necessarily the decision to cross that threshold, but something earlier and perhaps more delicate: the possibility of discussing whether all its red lines are still absolute. The debate. The intervention that reopened that conversation was carried out by Shinjiro KoizumiJapanese Defense Minister, on a Genron TV program broadcast this weekend. His approach was not that Japan should manufacture nuclear weapons or have its own arsenal, but rather that the country should change the idea that certain security issues cannot even be debated. In his words, for Japan it is a difficult issue to debate, but one of the issues that it cannot avoid touching is, precisely, nuclear issues. Three red lines. This framework has its own name in Japanese politics: the three non-nuclear principles. Japan commits to not possess nuclear weapons, not to manufacture them and not to allow their introduction into Japanese territory. The formula comes from the post-war period and has remained a central reference of its security policy, although the country continues to be protected by the extended deterrence of the United States, which includes its nuclear umbrella. The key difference. The third red line functions as a hinge between two worlds that Japan has tried to keep apart: its non-nuclear identity and its dependence on American deterrence. While the first two bans close the door to a Japanese bomb, the third affects how that protection would operate in a real crisis. That is the ground that is beginning to become debatable. Koizumi’s words. The Defense Minister did not present the nuclear debate as a conclusion, but as a debate that Japan would have to allow itself. His central sentence was direct: “For Japan it is a difficult issue to debate, but one of the issues that it cannot avoid touching is, precisely, nuclear issues.” He also pointed out against a political culture that, in his opinion, turns some security issues into forbidden areas: “We must change this idea that certain things are not even allowed to be debated.” The weight of his words is there: in moving the limit of the debate rather than in setting a new policy yet. The European mirror. Koizumi did not talk about nuclear in the abstract. He did so by looking at Europe, where the Ukrainian war has pushed governments like France and Finland to review assumptions that for years seemed established. In this context, he mentioned Paris, for its commitment to strengthening nuclear deterrence, and Helsinki, which has removed legal barriers to the introduction, transport or possession of nuclear weapons within its integration into NATO, although it does not plan to deploy them in its territory. The strategic race. Koizumi connected that debate to a broader idea: Japan faces not only tougher threats, but a world that decides faster. In the interview he spoke about Europe moving with a speed that Tokyo does not always perceive and put on the table the competition between the United States and Chinain addition to the role of AI in military decision-making. His argument is that a crisis is no longer managed with the political times of before, and that Japanese defense needs to discuss all its margins before those margins narrow. Nuclear, in that reasoning, appears as part of a larger review of national security. The line that moves. Japan has not crossed the nuclear threshold, and with what we have it cannot be said that Koizumi ordered a Japanese bomb. What is relevant is more subtle: one of the three red lines that for decades helped to organize its post-war policy is beginning to appear as a debatable issue. There is the fundamental change: the taboo has not fallen, but it no longer seems to protect all the ground that it protected before. Images | Red Shuheart | Japan Ministry of Defense In Xataka | A Russian family lived isolated in Siberia for more than 40 years. He didn’t know about World War II or the space race.

“Quantum computers are the solution to tritium that will fuel nuclear fusion”

The nuclear fusion It promises us clean and practically unlimited energy, but it has been stuck for decades by an obstacle that is difficult to overcome: fuel. The reactors tokamakthe most frequent in experimental projects, work fusing deuterium and tritiumtwo isotopes of hydrogen that when combined release a helium nucleus and a neutron that is ejected with an energy of about 14 MeV (megaelectronvolts). The problem is that the tritium It is an extraordinarily rare isotope on Earth. It is only formed naturally in the atmosphere due to the interaction of cosmic raysand in tiny quantities. In this scenario, for nuclear fusion to have a future as a real energy source, scientists need to find an efficient strategy that allows them to produce tritium in an artificial and sustainable way. This is the context in which the latest research carried out by the Cleveland Clinic, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, IBM’s TJ Watson Research Center and Michigan State University, all in the US, is drawing a lot of attention. And for the first time a team of scientists has used a quantum computer to identify the molecular configurations of the material that acts as a tritium “breeding blanket” within a nuclear fusion reactor. FLiBe: the molten salt that can save fusion The material identified by this quantum machine is called FLiBe, and it is a molten salt composed of lithium fluoride and beryllium fluoride. Inside a reactor tokamak The neutrons released by the fusion plasma impact this molten salt that covers the internal walls of the vacuum chamber, and it is this process that is responsible for producing tritium. Finding the optimal FLiBe configuration is the key to making fuel production viable on an industrial scale. This approach allows you to rule out less promising options in advance, saving time and money. A quick note before moving forward: the technique used by these researchers is known as quantum computing focused on supercomputing, and it is the same as Cleveland Clinic has previously used to simulate protein configurations of thousands of atoms. Applying it now to the chemistry of fusion materials is a novelty. The result of this strategy has been the identification of nine different molecular configurations of the FLiBe material, each with its own electronic structure, atomic behavior and molecular bond strength. Tom Beck, a computational chemist at Oak Ridge Laboratory, has explained that quantum computers are essential tools for accelerating the discovery and design cycles necessary to produce enough tritium to fuel fusion reactors. However, it is important that we temper our expectations. The nine configurations are, for now, simulations, and still have to be validated in the laboratory before making the leap to a real reactor. What this approach does allow is to rule out in advance the least promising optionssaving time and money on experiments that might otherwise go nowhere. IBM researcher Jerry Chow has added These results reinforce the idea that quantum computing is already a practical tool capable of solving problems that have eluded chemists and engineers for years. For now, nuclear fusion still does not have a closed solution to its fuel problem. However, for the first time a quantum computer has put concrete candidate materials on the table with which to begin solving this enormous challenge. Image | Fusion for Energy (F4E) More information | Science Alert In Xataka | The start-up of the largest nuclear fusion reactor on the planet is delayed by a decade. These are the reasons for the ITER gap

No one had ever launched a commercial nuclear satellite. SpaceX and City Labs just did it with Transporter-17

SpaceX has launched the first commercial nuclear satellite in history. This is BOHR, a CubeSat developed by the City Labs company, and has been completely successfully placed into orbit as part of the Transporter-17 mission, from Elon Musk’s space company. This is intended to demonstrate that the use of nuclear energy to power vehicles, satellites and space probes is not just a matter for large public agencies. Tritium to make history in space. Betavoltaic Orbital High-Reliability (BOHR) is a CubeSat in which a nuclear reaction similar to the one that has been used for decades takes place. to propel the Voyager probes through space. Although there is a difference. While these obtain energy from the heat generated by the disintegration of plutonium, in this case the beta particles released by the disintegration of tritium are used. Afterwards, these They are transformed into electricity through a semiconductor. The use of tritium is an advantage, as it emits much less radiation, making its pre-launch handling safer. Speaking of the launch. This nuclear satellite was one of the 81 payloads that were part of the Transporter-17 mission on July 7. A Falcon 9 rocket of SpaceX propelled all of them into space after launching from said company’s platform, located at the Vandenberg base. Just 50 minutes after launch, each of the payloads, including BOHR, were placed into their respective orbits. Two possible uses. The use of nuclear energy in space is something that has been studied a lot for two reasons. Firstly, because it can be useful for ships that are going to travel very far, so that they cannot carry enough fuel on board. It is precisely the reason why this energy source was used with Voyager probes. On the other hand, nuclear energy is useful when solar energy is not an option. The Voyager probes traveled a long way from the Sun, but you don’t have to go that far either. The lunar south pole It is constantly in shadow, so in the future, when the Artemis bases are built there, nuclear power could be very necessary. A project with many supports. The development of BOHR was funded under a contract from the United States Department of Defense. In addition, it is the first nuclear mission that has received nuclear launch approval from the Federal Aviation Administration, specifically under the Presidential National Security Memorandum 20 of Donald Trump. Therefore, despite being a private project, it has received all the public support necessary for its implementation. That, along with its inclusion within a SpaceX mission, shows that there are many powerful eyes on this project. It’s just a test. In fact, BOHR has been used to prove that this way of obtaining nuclear energy is viable in space and that it can be used commercially. Currently, the satellite is in orbit, ready to launch the test reaction. However, the CubeSat uses solar panels to obtain energy for its own operation. The next step could be a satellite that exclusively uses tritium decay. For now, this first proof of concept has marked what may be the future of many commercial space missions. Image | SpaceX In Xataka | NASA’s lunar base begins here and now: an investment of hundreds of millions and a date on the horizon

There’s a reason China doesn’t fire nuclear missiles from its most dangerous submarine. You just broke that rule

The greatest strength of a nuclear submarine is not its firepower, but that no one knows where it is. This ability to remain hidden for months has made these ships the most important pillar of nuclear deterrence since the Cold War and explains why each movement related to them is analyzed with a magnifying glass. It wasn’t just any test. China has insisted that the launch was part of its annual training and that it had previously notified the countries of the region. However, few maneuvers generate as much attention as the ballistic missile shot from a strategic nuclear submarine into the Pacific Ocean. Not only that, since it was an action practically unpublished in decades. Beijing had been avoiding a public demonstration of this type for years and, precisely for this reason, the test has been interpreted as a message directed far beyond the military exercise itself. The letter that is never shown. Missile submarines are the most discreet and valuable component of any nuclear power. Its main advantage is in remaining hidden for weeks or months, guaranteeing a retaliatory capacity even if the country suffers a first attack. This need to maintain secrecy explains why China has barely made public launches from this type of platform and that each demonstration has enormous strategic weight. The signal was directed to the United States. Although the Chinese authorities they emphasized that the missile carried a training warhead and was not directed against any country, the context tell another story. Western analysts believe that the test was intended to demonstrate that Chinese submarines can now launch very long-range missiles. from nearby areas on its own coasts and continue hitting targets thousands of kilometers away. In other words, Beijing wanted to remind that its maritime deterrence capacity is entering a new phase of maturity. Type 094 Submarine A doctrine designed to reduce risks. Everything indicates that the launch took place from protected waters close to China, a strategy known as “bastion.” Instead of sending its submarines to the center of the Pacific, the idea is to keep them under the cover of national aviation, fleet and anti-missile systems while retaining the ability to attack very distant targets. If the new JL-2 or JL-3 missiles They fulfill the benefits attributed to them by analysts, these submarines no longer need to travel too far from home to reach US territory. Nuclear expansion continues. Because the test comes in full modernization process of Chinese strategic forces. Beijing is building new silos for intercontinental missiles, deploying more advanced generations of land-based missiles and increasing the number of ballistically capable nuclear submarines. Pentagon estimates suggest that the Chinese arsenal could exceed a thousand nuclear warheads before 2030a transformation that is changing the military balance in the Indo-Pacific. The Pacific responds worried. Australia, Japan, New Zealand and Taiwan reacted criticizing a pitch which they consider destabilizing for the region, despite having received prior notification. The criticism was not directed solely at the missile, but in the context of a rapid increase in Chinese military capabilities and an increasingly visible naval presence in the Pacific. For many governments, the test represents a new step in a show of force strategy that had already included tests of intercontinental missiles and naval maneuvers increasingly distant from Chinese coasts. The real novelty was not the missile. It is known that China has had ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons for years. What is really new is that he has decided show publicly how one of its strategic submarines can use them, something it had almost completely avoided until now. In fact, the demonstration increases the credibility of your ability of retaliation, forces its rivals to assume that these submarines are fully operational and confirms that Beijing is willing to use its military tests as another tool of political and strategic deterrence. Image | PLA In Xataka | Satellite images leave no doubt: China has launched an underwater creature into the sea that defies naval engineering In Xataka | From cultivating the field to sailing underwater: the Chinese farmer who makes homemade submarines in his free time

Spain is burning and its nuclear power plants notice it. This is your strategy to endure

Spain is sweating again. extreme temperatures At the end of June, alarm bells have gone off in a good part of the country, and the Spanish nuclear park, responsible for about 20% of electricity what we consume, is not alien to this phenomenon. However, it is worth clarifying something from the beginning: whether a plant reduces its power or stops during a heat wave has nothing to do with a security failure. The seven nuclear reactors in operation in Spain (Almaraz I and II, Ascó I and II, Cofrentes, Trillo and Vandellós II) have been dealing with demanding summers for several decades, and their cooling systems were designed precisely with scenarios like this in mind. The Nuclear Safety Council publishes in real time the operational status of each plant, so anyone can check how they are responding. The key is in the external cooling circuitresponsible for evacuating the heat dissipated by the electricity generation process into the environment. In pressurized water plants, such as Almaraz, Ascó and Vandellós II, this circuit is the third in the installation, independent of the primary (which surrounds the core) and the secondary (which moves the turbine). Cofrentes, the only Spanish plant with a boiling water reactor, has a different architecture, a direct cycle, but it also depends on that same external circuit to cool the condenser. And this is where each plant plays its own cards depending on its geographical location. Three ways to beat the heat Ascó I and II, Cofrentes and Trillo are fed by river water, but they do not return it directly to the riverbed after using it. First, it passes by the cooling towers, those structures more than 160 meters high that we have described so many times when explaining the internal workings of a nuclear power plantand that dissipate heat into the air by convection and evaporation before any pouring. This drastically reduces the amount of water they need to extract from the river, up to twenty or thirty times less than if they did not have that tower. The sea has a thermal stability much greater than that of a river Almaraz represents a particular case because it does not depend on the flow of a natural river. It uses the artificial Arrocampo reservoir, conceived as a closed system that acts as a large heat exchanger. This independence of the river regime allows it continue operating normally even when temperatures soar, something especially relevant in a plant that will be the first to shut down: Almaraz I will close in November 2027 according to the current government calendar. Vandellós II draws on another resource: the water of the Mediterranean. The sea has a thermal stability much greater than that of a river, so it absorbs heat without its temperature rising appreciably. And, what’s more, it varies much less during heat waves. It is the same thermodynamic logic that explains why so many power plants in the world, from those that are cooled with seawater to those that use closed circuits like the one in Almaraz, prioritize the thermal stability of the cold source over any other consideration. When safety forces you to stop What can happen, and in fact happens quite frequently during the strictest summers, is that a nuclear power plant reduces its power or stops temporarily. The reason is not to protect the reactor, but the aquatic ecosystem. And the regulations limit the temperature at which water can be returned to a river or the sea, and if these limits are close to being exceeded, the facility prefers to slow down rather than breach them. It is an environmental decision, not a safety emergency. Meanwhile, the clock of the Spanish nuclear blackout continues to tick in parallel to these episodes of extreme heat. The current calendar starts in 2027 with Almaraz I, followed by Almaraz II in 2028. In 2030 it will be the turn of Ascó I and Cofrentes; Ascó II will close in 2032; and The process will be closed in 2035 with Vandellós II and Trillo, the last two plants to go out. Until then, each summer will be another test of resistance for a park that continues to provide a fifth of the national electricity. Image | Nuclear Forum More information | Nuclear Forum In Xataka | SMR reactors are going to make the never seen a reality: the first floating nuclear power plants

force Russia to bunkerize its nuclear fleet

In October 1962, in the midst of Missile Crisis of Cuba, the Soviet Union ordered disperse and hide a good part of its nuclear bombers for fear of a surprise attack by the United States. It was one of the few times in history when Moscow assumed that even its most sensitive strategic assets might not be safe at home. More than sixty years later, that old logic of vulnerability has returned. The image that summarizes a change. For decades, Russian strategic bombers were a military rarity: nuclear machines parked in the open, visible from satellite, relying on Russia’s territorial depth and the logic inherited from the Cold War. The Tu-95 and Tu-160 They were part of the most sensitive core of Moscow’s military power, and yet they never needed mass shelters. That is changing, because new satellite images show something unprecedented: Russia is building huge fortified hangars at the air base in Engels Air Base to protect its strategic fleet. It’s not just a work of engineering. It is proof that Ukraine has achieved something that seemed unthinkable just three years ago: forcing Russia to bunkerize one leg of its nuclear triad. Engels: the heart of the Russian nuclear air arm. Engels is not any base. It is one of the nerve centers of Russian strategic aviation and is home to the 22nd Heavy Bomber Division, including the only operational squadron of Tupolev Tu-160s and several Tupolev Tu-95MS. A good part of the cruise missile attacks against Ukraine take off from there. We talk about irreplaceable devices: The Tu-95 has been out of production for decades and the industrial reactivation of the Tu-160 is progressing extremely slowly. Therefore, losing one is not losing a plane, it is losing a central piece of the Russian nuclear balance. That’s also why the fact that they now need to hide them under concrete says a lot about how war has changed. Ukraine has broken strategic depth. The great transformation of this conflict has been psychological before physical. For decades, Russia’s geographic depth was its greatest shield. Engels is almost 500 kilometers from the Ukrainian border. Once, that distance was equivalent to absolute safety, but not anymore. we have been countingUkrainian drones have repeatedly hit fuel depots, arsenals and logistics areas linked to the base. In 2022 there were already attacks. In 2025, massive fires caused by drones They once again demonstrated that even strategic assets could be reached. Perhaps most important is not just the material damage, it is that Ukraine has collapsed the idea of ​​​​the Russian inner sanctum. Image from June 20 shows the massive construction project in the northeast corner of the base From tires to silhouettes painted on concrete. The evolution of Russian defenses tells a story forced adaptation. First they dispersed planes, then they built retaining walls between aircraft to limit explosion damage. And later they appeared almost improvised measures: tires on the wings to confuse sensors, old used planes like lures and painted silhouettes on landing strips to deceive drones and satellites. All of this reflected an uncomfortable reality: Russia had no doctrine to protect strategic bombers against cheap and persistent threats. Now that improvisation gives way to something much more serious: seventeen giant shelters under construction, designed specifically for their nuclear bombers. Satellite view of damage caused by a Ukrainian drone strike on a weapons depot in Engels in March 2025 The Cold War returns, but in reverse. They remembered the TWZ analysts The most striking thing is that this did not even happen during the Cold War. In that period, the nuclear threat was existential, but the logic of deterrence and the practical impossibility of cheap precision attacks made this level of physical protection unnecessary. Today the change comes from below: not so much by intercontinental missiles, but by relatively cheap drones capable of cross hundreds of kilometers. It is a strategic turnaround in the war scenario. Ukraine, without a strategic air force or nuclear capacity, has forced the second atomic power on the planet to physically reconfigure the protection of its nuclear air arm. Nuclear bombers underground. That said, structures do not guarantee immunity. A heavy cruise missile could penetrate them depending on its final design. But that’s possibly not the point. The objective is raise the cost of the attackmake identification difficult and protect against drones, cluster munitions or secondary explosions. In essence, Moscow is accepting that the threat is no longer sporadic, but structural. That changes how you operate, plan and distribute resources. Even if you want too, it’s a symptombecause when a nuclear power begins to build shelters to protect assets that it previously displayed without concern, it is in some way admitting that its strategic environment has worsened. Lesson to the rest. The Russian case is already being closely watched in the United States. There, bases like Barksdale Air Force they maintain bombers like the Boeing B-52 Stratofortress practically exposed, something that has generated a growing debate after recent incidents with drones. The conclusion is uncomfortable and global: the era in which air superiority or distance was enough to protect strategic aircraft is dying. Ukraine has proven it with crudeness. It has taught that modern warfare allows a weaker actor to threaten assets of maximum value with cheap, persistent and difficult-to-intercept tools. The invisible victory in kyiv. Beyond the front, the maps and the kilometers gained or lost, there are other types of victories that are measured in another way. Force Russia to cover with concrete its nuclear fleet is one of them. It is not a visible destruction, nor a territorial advance nor a flag over a conquered city. It is something deeper: changing the strategic behavior of the enemy. The satellite images of Engels teach precisely that. For the first time since the end of the Cold War, Russia is acting as if its nuclear bombers are no longer safe at home. And that simple fact, alone, says a lot about the real scope of the … Read more

We sensed that Russia’s “flying Chernobyl” was a dangerous nuclear missile. MIT just confirmed that it is much worse

In 1964, the United States canceled the Project Pluto after proving that it worked for a very simple reason: the missile left a radioactive trail in its wake and there was no a “safe” place where to try it. Half a century later, Russia has decided to return to that idea that even Washington considered too extreme. The nickname takes shape. It we count a few months ago. For years the Burevestnik It was almost a technological legend, one of those “super missiles” that Putin presented in 2018 shrouded in mystery and propaganda. It was sensed that it was dangerous for a simple reason: a nuclear reactor inside a missile could never be clean or easy to control. But now the new analysis by MIT scientists puts numbers and logic to that fear, and the conclusion is more disturbing than expected. We are not just talking about a nuclear missile in the classical sense (one that carries a warhead), but rather a missile that converts all your own flight in a form of radioactive contamination. If the popular idea was that of a “flying Chernobyl” (the nickname is used by experts of arms control remembering the physical cost of the concept), the real problem is that it could be something worse: a moving reactor releasing waste throughout its trajectory. The obsession of the Cold War. The concept is not new. In the 1950s, both the United States and the Soviet Union played with reactors on board strategic aircraft such as the Convair B-36 Peacemaker and the Tupolev Tu-95although they never really powered their engines. The big leap was Project Plutoa US program to create a supersonic missile of almost unlimited range that would fly at low altitudes, wreaking nuclear destruction. The project was technically viable, but so brutal and polluting that ended up abandoned. That is the historical key: the West left this idea behind not because it was impossible, but because it understood its implications too well. How the monster really works. The great advance of MIT study is to explain how it really moves the Burevestnik. It doesn’t use Pluto’s old ramjet concept, but something even more compact: a direct cycle turbojet. The system is almost wild in its simplicity. Air enters from the atmosphere, passes directly through the reactor core, is heated by fission, and is expelled to generate thrust. This allows weight and size to be reduced, making it possible to put the entire reactor inside a missile. just 9.5 meters. But this efficiency has a terrible counterpart: the air that comes in clean comes out contaminated. Every second of flight converts the missile in a nuclear chimney that spreads radioactive isotopes over the ground and the atmosphere. The toxic trail that changes everything. Here’s the big twist. A conventional nuclear missile is lethal when it hits. The Burevestnik begins to be dangerous long before it reaches its objective. According to the researchersits exhaust would be loaded with argon, krypton and radioactive carbon, in addition to particles generated by the progressive erosion of the reactor under extreme heat and constant pressure. The longer it stays in the air, more material released. It is a complete inversion of the classic concept of a strategic weapon: it is no longer just the final explosion, but the entire journey. In practice, each mission could leave a contamination corridor behind it, turning the simple transit of the missile into a radiological event. Accidents that already pointed to this. The signs had been there for years. They remembered the TWZ analysts that after the public disclosure of the program, the environmental organization Bellona Foundation detected radiation spikes in the Arctic linked to possible tests. Then came the loss of a prototype at sea and, in 2019, the explosion in the White Sea that killed five Rosatom scientists. The MIT hypothesis It’s devastating: That reactor recovered from the bottom could be reactivated when it was hoisted, causing the explosion. What then seemed like an isolated accident today fits into a logical chain of problems associated with handling a miniaturized and exposed nuclear reactor. Strategic advantage and its limits. The reason for the existence of the Burevestnik is clear: almost unlimited range. It can be launched from the Arctic, remain in flight for hours or even days and attack from impossible vectors, avoiding radars and traditional warning networks. This unpredictability forces rethink air defenseespecially in spatial layers capable of tracking low-level targets. However, this advantage comes with obvious weaknesses. It is subsonic, not very stealthy and, paradoxically, easy to track by its own signature or radioactive signal. Plus: the reactor degrades while it operates, which calls into question the very promise of “infinite range.” More laboratory than weapon for now. All of this leads to an admittedly uncomfortable conclusion: perhaps the Burevestnik matters less as a weapon than as an experiment. Russia may be using this program to validate technologies which would later be applied to nuclear surveillance drones or much more militarily useful space platforms. It is also possible that it is a personal obsession of Putin, fascinated by the idea of ​​a machine that can fly almost without limit. Whatever the reason, the result is the same: Russia has achieved something that no one else had achieved, the first sustained flight of a device truly powered by nuclear energy. The problem is that the price of that achievement may be having resurrected a technology that the Cold War buried precisely because it was too dangerous even for its own creators. Image | x In Xataka | There is something more disturbing than “a Chernobyl”: it is a flying Chernobyl, it is in the hands of Russia and it is already testing it In Xataka | Russia has a missile so powerful and destructive that NATO calls it “Satan II.” And it is already unfolding

the problem was never the nuclear bomb

In October 1973, during the first great oil crisisgas stations in the United States posted signs “Sorry, last car in this line” to cut kilometer-long queues and ration fuel. That image became the symbol of an uncomfortable truth that remains valid half a century later: when energy is what gets stuck, even the great powers change their priorities. The end of a war with another truth. For more than a hundred days, Donald Trump sold the war against Iran as a crusade to prevent Tehran from crossing the nuclear line. The rhetoric was clear: unconditional surrender, dismantling of the atomic program and maximum military pressure. But the agreement that now it just closed with the Iranians reveals another, much more uncomfortable reality: the priority was never really the bomb. In fact, if it had been, Washington would not have accepted a pact that leaves the regime intact, postpones nuclear negotiations and turns the issue of enriched uranium into an issue. for later. What was urgent, what was truly unbearable for the White House and the markets, was something else: reopen Hormuz. The neck of the world. we have been counting these months. The Strait of Hormuz became in the royal center of war because about a fifth of the world’s oil and gas passes through there. When Iran closed it de facto, it not only paralyzed regional exports, but turned the conflict into a systemic threat for the global economy. Oil skyrocketed, gas followed suit, and markets began to discount something much more dangerous than a regional war: a global energy crisis. Trump could continue bombing and wasting ammunition (maybe too much), but each day that Hormuz remained blocked it more damage to Washington than to Tehran. The weapon that Iran did have. For years there was discussion about the hypothetical iranian bombbut in the end Tehran’s real pressure capacity was not underground in those missile cities in Fordow or Natanzbut floating over the Gulf. Tehran demonstrated that it could cut off the planet’s energy artery and keep it closed long enough to bend American strategic logic. Therein lies possibly the great lesson: because it did not need to manufacture a nuclear weapon to acquire deterrent power. It was enough for him control a chokepoint vital and show punitive capacity against US bases and regional allies. That changed the entire balance of the negotiation. The economy and its cracks. While the war continued, the world began to consume strategic reserves at a worrying speed. The United States drained its so-called Strategic Petroleum Reserve to levels not seen since 1983, Japan and South Korea saw reduce your inventories and Europe was beginning to strain its refined fuel supply chains. It is true that there was no collapse yet, but there were clear signs of fragility and that we were approaching red lines. In other words, the market continued to function thanks to these “shock absorbers”, but everyone knew that they were finite. Because the war could continue, but the energy cheap No. The agreement that reveals priority. And then it has arrived the unthinkable pact when the United States launched its bombing campaign. Sixty days of ceasefire, gradual reopening of Hormuz, withdrawal of the US naval blockade and temporary permission for Iran sell oil again. The sequence is revealing: before resolving the nuclear program, Washington has resolved first the flow energetic. Next will come talks on uranium, if there are any, oversight of the International Atomic Energy Agency and possible sanctions relief phases. That is to say: the nuclear issue is still important on paper, but it was no longer the strategic urgency dictated by the clock. An imperfect peace, but necessary. There is no doubt, the agreement It doesn’t close the wound. Benjamin Netanyahu keep hitting to Hezbollah day in and day out, and the Lebanese front can vturn everything back on. Iran maintains its regime, its regional influence and much of its negotiating capacity. But the war has made one conclusion brutally clear: When the stability of the global energy system began to falter, Washington downgraded its maximums to minimums. In the end, the “bomb” was the political argument, oil was the real problem. And when crude oil began to run out, peace stopped being an option and became an imperative necessity. Image | Google Earth, US Navy In Xataka | We have been fearing the Apocalypse for 100 days due to the closure of Hormuz. The blow is going to be given to us by a heat wave in China In Xataka | Ukraine turned drones into hunters. A helicopter shot down in Hormuz has transformed them into a Spielberg film

The US has had an idea to reassure Europe. Instead of soldiers, he is going to bring his nuclear weapons very close to Russia

In 1983, tens of thousands of women surrounded a British air base to protest the deployment of American nuclear missiles. That mobilization, known in time as Greenham Commonbecame one of the major antinuclear symbols of the Cold War and showed the extent to which the location of these weapons could alter European politics. Less soldiers, more “nuclear”. Europe has been trying to figure out what it really means for months the strategic turn of the United States. The reduction of troops, the withdrawal of some military systems and the increasing priority given to the Indo-Pacific have fueled fears that Washington is progressively moving away from the continent. However, conversations within NATO point to a very different response than expected. Instead of reinforcing the conventional presence, the United States would be willing to expand the deployment of nuclear capabilities in Europe to demonstrate that its commitment to the defense of the continent remains intact. The idea is simple but powerful: if there are fewer American uniforms on the ground, the nuclear umbrella must remain visible and credibleeven “closer.” The closer the interest is to Russia. There is no doubt, the allies most interested in this possibility are precisely those who observe Russia from the first line. Poland has been leading for years the list of candidates to host US nuclear capabilities and some Baltic countries have also shown interest in participating in future deterrence formulas. The invasion of Ukraine and Putin’s continued references to its nuclear arsenal have profoundly changed the perception of security in Eastern Europe. I remembered the financial times that, for these countries, hosting aircraft capable of using US nuclear weapons would have enormous political and military value, since it would turn any threat against them into an issue directly linked to Washington’s strategic credibility. The legacy of the Cold War. The proposal does not involve creating a new system, but rather expanding a mechanism that has existed for decades. Currently Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Türkiye and the United Kingdom participate in the program nuclear delivery of NATO, through which they store American nuclear weapons under exclusive control of Washington and train their air forces to operate within that scheme. This model was born during the Cold War to guarantee that European allies could participate in the Alliance’s nuclear strategy without having to develop their own atomic weapons. More than half a century later, the formula is once again gaining prominence in a continent that watches with concern the deterioration of the relationship with Moscow. Europe seeks to replace some capabilities, but not others. European capitals have assumed that they will have to spend more in defense and rebuild conventional capabilities that for decades were delegated to the United States. From anti-missile systems to strategic transportation to military intelligence, much of the current conversation revolves around how to fill those gaps. However, there is one area that many governments they consider it impossible to replace in the short term: the American nuclear deterrent. Although France and the United Kingdom have their own arsenals, Washington’s umbrella continues to be perceived as the central element of the European security architecture and as the ultimate guarantee against any military escalation. The signal that Washington wants to send. They told in the Times that for now there is no final decision and the conversations remain highly confidential. Still, the mere fact that the possibility is on the table reveals how Western strategy toward Russia is changing. For years the US military presence in Europe was measured in bases, brigades and deployed troops. Now the discussion increasingly revolves around another type of message. While Washington concentrates resources in Asia and requires its allies to assume a greater share of the defensive effortthe signal it seeks to convey is that nuclear protection remains intact. In a way, the new formula to reassure Europe is not to bring more soldiers closer to the Russian borders, but to bring closer what for decades has served as a last guarantee of security: American nuclear weapons. Image | Air Force, SJOERD HILCKMANN In Xataka | Spain’s great fear is not an invasion: it is a slow hybrid war with Morocco against its two most vulnerable cities In Xataka | To become technologically “independent” from the US, the European Union already has a plan: four desperate measures

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