china

The Government’s bottleneck slows down its exports to China

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The US Department of Commerce does not give the slightest respite to chip designers to artificial intelligence (AI) Americans. And the largest are NVIDIA and AMD. When these companies receive an order from one of their Chinese clients must apply for an export license to this government entity and indicate which GPU they intend to send to China, their specifications and which client is going to use them, among other relevant information. Once the bureaucracy has been put in place, the Department of Commerce technicians analyze the export requests in the framework established by current regulation and approve or deny the sale of integrated circuits to China. This is the usual procedure, so there is nothing new up to this point. However, as stated BloombergNVIDIA, AMD and other American AI chip designers face a very serious problem: the Commerce Department takes several months to process their export licenses. The US bureaucracy is torpedoing NVIDIA and AMD The staffing of the Department of Commerce has been drastically reduced in recent months, and in the current context this scenario represents a very serious problem. The Industry and Security Office of this entity is not only responsible for processing export licenses linked to AI chips; It is also in charge of carrying out investigations into the tariffs deployed by the Administration led by Donald Trump. And with fewer personnel than in 2024 and 2025 it cannot cope. The Office of Industry and Security has lost 101 employees in recent months According to Bloombergthe Office of Industry and Security has lost 101 employees in recent months, which represents a 19% reduction in staff compared to what it had in 2024. Curiously, the staff who are specifically dedicated to developing regulations linked to the semiconductor industry and reviewing applications for export licenses has decreased by 20%although it has not been revealed at the moment what this personnel flight is due to. Jeffrey Kessler, the Undersecretary of Commerce, wants, according to Tom’s Hardwarepersonally examine all license applications linked to AI chips. Here lies the bottleneck. Many of its office staff are busy with issues arising from the Iran war, and meanwhile NVIDIA has still not been able to send to China not a single H200 GPU. Officially it can do so, but before delivering this chip to its Chinese clients it must receive express approval from Kessler. AMD is in the same situation. It has not yet been able to deliver its MI308 AI GPU to its Chinese customers. However, this problem is not only suffocating exports to China. NVIDIA is still waiting to receive approval from the Department of Commerce to be able to deliver the latest orders it has received from its clients in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. During 2025, the Office of Industry and Security took an average of 76 days to resolve export requests, but this period is increasing in 2026. Very bad news for AMD and NVIDIA. Image | Generated by Xataka with Gemini More information | Tom’s Hardware | Bloomberg In Xataka | We already know what the chips that will arrive until 2039 will be like. The machine that will allow them to be manufactured is close

The US already has the first response to its blockade in the Strait of Hormuz. A boomerang of unpredictable consequences: China

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During a crisis with Japan in 2019, China constantly sent patrol boats and government vessels to the disputed waters of the senkaku islandsmaintaining an almost daily presence without completely crossing the line of direct confrontation. That strategy, based on sustained pressure without shock frontal, showed how Beijing can protect its interests at sea by playing on an ambiguous terrain where every move counts. The block changes the board. USA has finally activated the naval blockade of Iranian ports in response to the failure of negotiations, deploying ships, special forces and interdiction capabilities to cut off the flow of oil and economically suffocate Tehran. The operation does not seek to completely close the Strait of Hormuz, but to control who enters and who leaves of the Iranian energy system, which involves intercepting, diverting or even boarding ships in transit. This movement, long studied by the Pentagon, marks a qualitative leap in war, since it transfers pressure from the air and land to the sea, where the legal, military and commercial implications are much more diffuse. and potentially explosive. The reality of global trade. The fundamental problem of the blockade is not only in its military execution, but in its fit with the global system of energy transport, where the majority of the ships are not Iranian, but from third countries such as India, Iraq or, especially China. Intercepting or pressuring these ships in international waters introduces an entirely different dimension, one where the line between military action and global economic conflict is blurred.becomes extremely thin. Thus, each attempt to stop this flow not only affects Iran, but also removes more crude oil from the market, raises prices and transfers the political and economic cost to the blocker himself. Iran and the long term. I remembered the weekend the new york times that, far from collapsing, Iran has demonstrated remarkable strategic resilience, relying on alternative routes, land trade with Asia and financial networks that include Asian, especially Chinese, banks and partners. Its economy, although under pressure, continues to function thanks to indirect exports, accumulated income and access to credit, while control of the strait allows it to continue conditioning the global energy market. In this context, the time plays in your favor: The longer the crisis continues, the greater the wear and tear on the United States and its allies, both in economic and political terms. Permanent military friction point. The blockade forces the US navy to operate in a extremely delicate environmentone where any interaction with suspicious vessels can escalate quickly. The need to board oil tankers, manage crews or redirect cargo turns each operation into a possible international incidentespecially if those ships are protected or linked to state actors. Added to this is the latent threat from Iran, which maintains sufficient capacity (missiles, drones, fast boats) to turn any mistake or specific confrontation into a major climb. The boomerang effect: China. The great consequence of the blockade at this time has not been long in coming, and it is China’s reactionthe main buyer of Iranian oil and a key player in the region. Beijing has made it clear through a statement that it will continue to defend its energy and commercial interests, keeping its routes open and warning against any external interference. There is no doubt, this introduces a completely new risk to the conflict: that of a direct or indirect shock between US forces and assets linked to China, whether in the form of tankers, escorts or diplomatic and economic pressure. Furthermore, the Asian giant has response tools that go beyond the military sphere, from the use of its commercial weight to the control of critical resources. Dead end scenario. The result is a situation in which the attempt to strangle Iran It becomes a system of crossed tensions with multiple actors, where each movement generates new frictions. Blocking does not guarantee a quick resolutionbut it does increase the chances of miscalculations, incidents at sea and escalations that are difficult to contain. Precisely in this unstable balance, the United States not only faces Iran, but an environment where the consequences rebound outside the region, with China as the actor who turns a regional operation into a first order global problem. Image | US Navy In Xataka | The problem in Hormuz is not that it is closed: it is that Iran has “lost the keys” and without them the balance is broken In Xataka | The most buoyant market right now is selling streaming and satellite images of US movements to Iran.

While half the world wants to distance itself commercially from China, there is a country that is increasingly doing just the opposite: Spain

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Pedro Sanchez Yesterday he took a selfie with the CEO of Xiaomi as part of his official visit to China. In it he has taken advantage of visit also Tsinghua University in BeijingAI talent pool— and of course for meet with the president of the People’s Republic of China, Xi Jinping. But what this official visit tells us is something important about Spain and Europe: we want to depend less on China, but the data says that we are becoming more dependent. The narrative of decoupling. The discourse that we are seeing in general media or in news programs on television networks is usually the same: The West is reducing its dependence on China. There is talk about how supply chains are diversifying or how geopolitics are reordering global trade. Although the message is coherent and is usually supported by European and North American leaders, the reality is different. The numbers simply do not match. The data that dismantles everything. Between 2014 and 2024, EU imports from China increased by 101.9%, while European exports to China grew by only 47%. The relationship between both economic powers is not cooling, but quite the opposite: it is intensifying and, furthermore, becoming unbalanced. In 2024, the EU exported goods worth 213.3 billion euros to China, and imported 517.8 billion euros with a trade deficit of 304.5 billion euros. China remains by far the largest supplier to the EU and represents 21.3% of all extra-EU imports. Behind her are the US with 13.7% and the United Kingdom with 6.8%. Who “buys” more. The three largest importers of Chinese products within the EU in 2024 were Netherlands (109 billion euros), Germany (96 billion) and Italy (50 billion). The only countries with a trade surplus with China in the EU were Ireland and Luxembourg. The case of Germany is paradoxical, because this country leads this discourse of “reducing strategic dependencies”, but at the same time it is the second largest European buyer of Chinese products. One thing is the political message, and another is the commercial reality. Spain has a deficit, but it doesn’t seem to matter. The case of Spain is also special not because of the figures, but because of how it communicates them. In 2024, Spain imported Chinese goods worth 45,174 million euros, only behind Germany. What is striking is that the trade deficit of this exchange was enormous for Spain: 37,706 million, because Spanish exports to China were 7,467 million euros. That is to say: Spain buys China almost seven times more than what it sells. In 2025, imports grew even more, to 50.25 billion euros, but Spain’s discourse is not that of Germany: it does not seem to have any problem with increasing this commercial dependence. The Bank of Spain warns. The products most imported from China were industrial machinery, telecommunications equipment and motors, that is, goods that feed Spanish production. The Bank of Spain warned in 2024 that China is the great commercial weak point for both Spain and the EU. It is due to the volume of imports as well as their concentration and nature. The problem is that this dependency cannot be resolved with speeches: we would need alternative supply chains that are not being created at the moment, at least on the scale necessary to reduce this strategic dependency. Four visits in four years. Pedro Sánchez has visited China in March 2023, September 2024, April 2025 and April 2026. No other European leader has visited the Asian giant with that frequency in this period. It is true that all the presidents of the Government since Felipe González have traveled to China at least once, but none had done so four years in a row. Zapatero also made four trips, but he made them between 2005 and 2011. What Sánchez has done has no Spanish or European precedents. But Europe also builds ties with China. This movement towards rapprochement with China in 2025 and 2026 is not exclusive to Spain. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer and French President Emmanuel Macron have visited China in recent months. All these movements are a clear consequence of the tariffs that Donald Trump activated in 2025 and that have accelerated this European conversation about the need to reduce dependence on Washington. Which difference to Spain from the rest of its European partners is that he has been forging that alliance for years. Many visits, but the deficit grows. Although the relations between China and Spain are notable, the trade deficit has been at historic highs for years and Pedro Sánchez’s visits have not only failed to correct them, but have aggravated them. What grows with each trip are the cooperation agreements or investment statements in renewable energy, but that still does not affect the short-term trade imbalance. Not only that: while Spain sells to China automotive components, chemicals or serrano hamChina sells to us our industrial future. There is an asymmetry not only of volume, but also of structure. To reduce strategic dependence, nothing. The conclusion after analyzing the data is uncomfortable. The rhetoric of decoupling, digital sovereignty and the reduction of strategic dependence collide head-on with that commercial reality in which Europe imports products from China as if there were no tomorrow. The difference between Spain and the rest of Europe is that Spain does not maintain this fiction of distance, and this “honesty” may have strategic value. We will see if that ends up serving to reduce the enormous trade deficit with China. In Xataka | We thought that US tariffs would prohibit Chinese cars from entering. BYD wants to challenge them

China has shown that the good and cheap electric car exists. So Citröen has had to get its act together

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China is doing very well with the cheap electric car. And if not, tell them BYD Dolphin Surfa 100% electric vehicle that the company finances at just over 3% for 125 euros per month. Without financing it costs 19,990 euros which, after aid, can become 11,780 euros. Saving exceptions like Dacia Springwhich compete in a much lower league, Western manufacturers have no choice but to respond. And Citröen has been the first to do so. 11,700 euros. Citroen has been lowering the price of its ë-C3 for more than a yeara car that was launched on the market for more than 20,000 euros and that, since its launch, has been reduced by almost half. Now, after aid, the Citröen C3 costs 11,700 euros, with an eight-year warranty. What it offers. With a price practically identical to the Dolphin Surf, an almost identical autonomy (220 km under the WLTP cycle), and a technology relatively similar to that of the Chinese alternative, we are finally talking about a price at which the company can be competitive. What China offers. Both vehicles, in their most economical version, have LFP batteries. The main difference is in the charging system: 65 kW for the BYD and 30 kW for the Citröen. The key, however, is not in the specs: it is that BYD has been offering a competitive price since its arrival in Spain, which has catapulted it into the top 3 of the best-selling electric cars in the country. Beyond Tesla. There is no electric car that sells more than the Model 3 in Spain. This is to be expected, given the reliability, range and price of the vehicle. Just below Tesla, we have the BYD Dolphin Surf, which has sold more than 1,332 units so far this year (compared to 2,489 for the Model 3 and 2,023 for the Model Y). Taking into account that they play in completely different leagues, the BYD case is a resounding success. A purely urban car that sells practically twice as much as its direct rivals. The electric C3 has 634 units sold, placing it in the top 9. The ranking points to something very clear: the price is the main purchasing factor for the Spanish electric companyand Western manufacturers will have to tighten their grip if they want to compete with China. In Xataka | The electric cars with the most autonomy that can be bought in 2026

While the world looked at Iran, China has seized an island in the Pacific without a single shot. And now he is militarizing it

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For some time now, some countries have been capable of creating land where before there was only open sea, modifying entire maps in a matter of years. These transformations, visible even from space, have come to alter trade routes, ecosystems and regional balances without the need for major confrontations. Because sometimes, the most decisive changes do not begin with a conflict, but with a work that no one stops. A conquest without shooting. While international attention was completely absorbed by the crisis in the middle eastChina has executed a quiet but deeply strategic move in the South China Sea. They counted in Forbes which, without the need for direct military force, has transformed a tiny island, a reef barely visible on the map, into a new key piece of your network of maritime control, taking advantage of the global distraction and the lack of immediate reaction. The late response from countries like Vietnam and the initial silence of the international community have allowed this movement to advance practically without opposition, consolidating a fait accompli before the debate even began. From sandbank to strategic base in months. Through satellite images, the Telegraph explained that the pace of construction at Antelope Reef It revealed extraordinary industrial and logistical capacity, with dozens of dredgers working in coordination to create square kilometers of land in a matter of months. What was once a simple sandbank has now become an expanding platform with visible infrastructurefortified perimeters and enough space to house much more complex facilities. This speed not only demonstrates the ambition of the project, but also Beijing’s ability to alter the physical terrain of the conflict before other actors can react. The image on the left corresponds to December 19, 2025. The image on the right corresponds to February 17, 2026 Legality as a tool, not as a limit. China has accompanied this expansion with a parallel strategy based on reinterpreting international law and presenting construction as an internal issue, diluting the legal conflict in a narrative of civil development. The problem? That, under the framework of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, these constructions they do not grant new rights sovereigns, which places the project in a clearly controversial and diffuse area. Still, the combination of fait accompli and legal argument allows Beijing to move forward no need for confrontation directly, moving the conflict to the diplomatic and narrative terrain. Militarization without concealment. Unlike previous phases, where China denied the militarization of its artificial islands, the current development clearly points for military use from the beginning. The dimensions of the land allow the construction of landing strips capable to operate advanced fightersas well as the future installation of radars, missile systems and surveillance networks. In other words, more than a simple base, the enclave emerges as a node within a larger architecture that connects ports, maritime militias and intelligence capabilities, reinforcing control over one of the most strategic routes on the planet. A new balance under the sea. If you will, too, the result of this effort is a quiet but profound shift in the regional balance, one where each new island expands China’s capabilities. to monitor, deter and project power without resorting to open confrontations. From that perspective, these types of movements, cumulative and discrete, allow consolidate strategic advantages that only become evident when it’s too late to reverse them. Thus, while the world’s focus shifted towards other conflictsChina has continued to redefine the map of the Pacific in its favor, demonstrating that in modern geopolitics it is not always whoever shoots first who wins, but whoever builds without being interrupted. Image | Planet L. In Xataka | Satellite images have revealed something disturbing in China: where there were once villages, there are now unmistakable structures In Xataka | The most buoyant market right now is selling streaming and satellite images of US movements to Iran.

China is building a tunnel under the sea for its high speed. It has already reached a record depth

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Under the seabed, dozens of meters deep, there is a work that is progressing with a minimal margin of error. It cannot be seen from the surface, but it is part of a railway infrastructure key in southern China. According to CGTNthe country has reached a new milestone in the construction of a high-speed underwater tunnel: the excavation has already reached 113 meters under the seabed. The figure is not minor, because it places the work at a point where the geological conditions and water pressure significantly increase the technical difficulty. This advance is part of a much larger infrastructure that is taking shape in the south of the country. The 116-kilometer Shenzhen-Jiangmen high-speed line is designed to connect both cities in less than an hour, integrating into the rail corridor that runs along the Chinese coast. In this way, the project has entered a particularly demanding phase, in which the tunnel under the Pearl River estuary becomes one of the most technically complex points of the entire work. A section under the sea that concentrates the greatest technical challenge At the center of this phase of the project is the underwater infrastructure that requires refinement of each step. To execute it, the work relies on a large diameter tunnel boring machine developed in China. The machine, known as “Shenjiang-1”, has kept the excavation going continuously, even during festive periods such as Qingming. It not only drills the ground, it also allows progress while the interior lining of the tunnel is being built, a system that seeks to gain efficiency in one of the most delicate points of the route. From there, the challenge stops being just mechanical and becomes conditioned by the terrain. The TBM must traverse 13 different strata, with five types of composite geology and six fault zones along the route. These types of conditions force the operation to be constantly adjusted, because each layer can respond differently to the excavation. In this context, moving forward does not depend solely on the power of the machinery, but also on maintaining control in a challenging environment. Added to this complexity of the terrain is a less visible, but equally determining factor: the pressure of the water at those depths. The tunnel is planned to reach a maximum of 116 meters below the seabeda level at which hydraulic conditions become especially demanding for the machinery and the structure itself. To operate in this environment, the system uses a sludge circuit that fulfills a double function: on the one hand, it reduces friction at the excavation face and, on the other, it transports the extracted material to the surface, where it is separated and reused in the process. While the machine advances, the tunnel is not far behind. Just behind the excavation face, the teams are assembling the prefabricated concrete segments that form the interior lining. Each one measures around two meters wide and nine are needed to complete a ring in a structure that exceeds 13 meters in diameter. This system allows excavation and construction to progress at the same time, reducing time and helping to maintain the pace of execution. The magnitude of this work is better understood when put into perspective. Official information indicates that this section extends over 13.69 kilometers and crosses several waterways at the mouth of the river, located between Dongguan and Guangzhou. It is a key piece within a line designed to improve the connection in the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area. Beyond the depth already achieved, the project seeks to strengthen regional connectivity and support economic integration in one of the most active areas of the country. Images | CGTN In Xataka | Singapore is literally coming into its own: reclaiming 25% of land from the sea and turning wastewater into drinking water

In China, 470 series made with AI are produced per day. 99.9% of them do not reach anyone

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In January 2026, the platforms streaming Chinese companies recorded the launch of more than 14,600 short series generated with artificial intelligence. There are 470 new titles a day, all ready to be distributed through applications like Douyin or Hongguo. The fact that is not widely disseminated is where almost all of that content went. Long live the microdramatic. The microdramas (either duanju) They are mobile series with episodes of between two and five minutes, usually adaptations of novels previously published in web format, and which are disseminated on pages financed not with subscriptions, but through micropayments and algorithmic advertising. The narrative of these series is extremely formulaic, despite the fact that on paper it seems very varied: the rich also cry, time travel, sentimental revenge, melodramas concentrated in a few minutes, all designed (circular and repetitive plots, characters that enunciate what is happening) to consume between subway stops. The irresistible growth of duanju. The format had been flourishing for years before AI will arrive. The Chinese microdrama market lost revenue from 500 million dollars in 2021 to 7,000 million in 2024surpassing the national film box office that year for the first time. In 2025, the sector was already close to 9.4 billion. It is estimated that more than 830 million users consumed the format, and about 60% of them pay or make transactions on platforms that offer a few free episodes to hook viewers. As in so many other industrial aspects, China has built, without attracting the attention of the rest of the world, the largest serialized entertainment market in terms of volume on the planet. AI Invasion. A live-action microdrama cost more than one million yuan to produce in 2024. With AI tools like Kling or Seedancethe same project It costs between 50,000 and 100,000 yuan (between 6,000 and 12,000 euros). In the cheapest production studios, the figure drops to 30,000 or 40,000 yuan per complete series. The cost per minute of content fell from between 3,000 and 5,000 yuan at the beginning of 2024 to between 200 and 1,000 today. Everything changes. This fall has transformed the structure of the microdrama industry, and has boosted companies specialized in the AI ​​variant of the genre such as Jiangyou Culture, which with the support of China Literature (the publishing group affiliated with Tencent), grew to a thousand employees and has a turnover of around 1 billion yuan annually with net margins of between 20% and 30%. Judian, another production company, generates around a hundred microdramas photorealistic films per month and between one thousand and two thousand audiodramas with synthesized voice. 99.88%. Of the 127,800 AI series in circulation in February 2026, the proportion that crossed the 100 million views threshold was 0.117%. In 2025, the specialized app Douyin launched 60,000 series generated with AI, and only ninety-six reached that same number. That 0.16% success rate has been dropping as production volume has risen. But there are also differences with live-action microdramas: the most watched AI series accumulated about one billion views, and the most successful live-action series, 4.4 billion. Viewers detect the synthetic quality and the uncanny valley the emotional commitment is burdened, which leads, according to experts, to a significant abyss: the viewer does not want to pay for it. Advertising spending. The dominant business model in this million-dollar sector is known as “traffic arbitrage”: produce cheaply with AI, invest aggressively in advertising within the platforms to generate visits and pray to survive on the margin. In March 2026, daily advertising spending on AI microdramas on Douyin exceeded 70 million yuan, surpassing that of live-action productions for the first time. That is to say: the loop can be financially sustained even if the audiences do not attend. The actors suffer. Actor Li Wenhao entered the microdrama industry in 2023 and worked 50 consecutive days. In March 2026, only six worked, according to Hello China Tech. Castings are increasingly rare, microdrama production companies they hire fewer and fewer humans: For example, Chengdu Zhongdu, a medium-sized studio, announced in March that it was abandoning production live-actionconverting its entire workforce to AI. Actress Hao Lei, one of the most respected figures in Chinese dramatic cinema, has said that AI will replace 90% of actors, adding that in certain records it already surpasses the human equivalent. Stolen faces. The displacement of professional actors was foreseeable, but the massive and unauthorized appropriation of real faces was not so predictable. In early 2026, a 72-episode AI-generated historical drama appeared in Hongguo and gained widespread popularity before a blogger specialized in traditional Chinese clothing discovered that one of the characters had her face. The same thing was detected by another content creator, and neither of them was compensated or informed, Hello China Tech also says. And of course, professional actors have also been victims of this type of practice: Yi Yangqianxi (Jackson Yee), Xiao Zhan and Dilraba Dilmurat are some of them. But the cases of semi-anonymous people, like these content creators, are much more bloody: they discovered the theft of their face almost by chance, so anyone who has uploaded enough content to the internet to train an AI may find themselves in a similar situation. Header | pandaily

China has just launched its first undersea data center with total energy autonomy. The idea makes more sense than it seems

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In the AI ​​race, having a robust data center infrastructure to power it is essential, but first you need energy to power it all. The United States may lead the chip industry (at least, the strategic ones), but China follows closely at an unstoppable pace and furthermore, has the energy. And he is already beginning to connect the dots, showing off his technical power and ingenuity: already It has the largest data center in the worldis also a pioneer to submerge them under the sea. Now it has taken a twist with the first underwater data center that ‘drinks’ directly from the wind that just opened. This project represents the perfect union of two of China’s strategic priorities: digital sovereignty and carbon neutrality. By placing computing infrastructure on the seabed and powering it directly with clean energy on siteChina is solving one of the great current technological problems: the insatiable energy consumption of AI and Big Data. The project. About 10 kilometers off the coast of Shanghai, at the bottom of the East China Sea, a steel cylinder receives electricity directly from wind turbines and is cooled with sea water. It is the Lingang Subsea Data Centeran ambitious project promoted by Shanghai Hailan Cloud Technology (HiCloud) and built by CCCC Third Harbor Engineering. It consists of a series of data storage and processing modules encapsulated in watertight and submerged containers, which are connected via two 35 kV submarine cables to offshore wind turbines operating off the coast of Shanghai. With a planned capacity of 24 MW in two phases, the first is already operational: it has a capacity of 2.3 megawatts and includes a ground control center, a vertical data module installed under the sea and two main 35 kilovolt submarine cables. Why it is important. In addition to the fact that it does not occupy land, in cities as crowded as Shanghai it represents a valuable saving in land and that it can be installed close to where it is needed (if there is a coast, obviously), because it solves at the same time three structural problems of the sector: Refrigeration. Seawater acts as a constant and free heat sink, eliminating the need for industrial air conditioning systems that consume 40 to 50% of electricity. The metric that measures the energy efficiency of a data center by comparing the total energy consumed versus that used purely by the servers is the PUE, which for a standard data center on land is an average slightly higher than 1.5. The project promises to lower it to a figure not greater than 1.15. Without consumption of fresh water. Traditional data centers evaporate millions of liters of water to cool their servers, but this uses thermal exchange with the ocean, so it does not consume water resources. Take advantage of the surplus from wind power. One of the handicaps of wind energy is that generation depends on the wind and not on demand, so if you do not have a battery, the energy that is not consumed is wasted. Thanks to this direct connection, the data center absorbs wind production in real time, functioning as a constant consumer that reduces the waste of renewable energy due to lack of destination, In figures. The magnitude of the project, with some official numbers: The budget is 1.6 billion yuan, about 200 million euros. Total planned operational capacity of 24 MW (2.3 MW in the first phase). The design PUE is less than 1.15. More than 95 percent of electricity comes from renewable sources. Context. The name of HiCloud is not new because in fact it is an old acquaintance: it is the person behind the underwater prototype in front of Hainan which began to install in 2021. However, the international reference is the Natick project from Microsoft (2013–2024), which demonstrated the potential of underwater centers: only 8 of the 864 servers failed, a much lower mortality rate than that of any conventional data center in the same period and also got a very low PUE of only 1.07. Despite this, Microsoft shelved the matter: viability in terms of costs and maintenance is another story. However, the Lingang project has top-level institutional support: is present on the List of Green and Low Carbon Technology Demonstration Projects of the NDRC, China’s top economic planning body. How they have done it. Servers are placed in pressurized steel cabins filled with inert gases to prevent corrosion and fire with a design that maximizes interior space and minimizes the impact of waves. Heat is dissipated by pumping seawater through radiators located behind the racks. The most complicated operation was raising the cabin in the open sea: the separation between the legs of the support structure and the steel piles on the seabed was only 0.18 meters and the maximum allowable deviation was 10 centimeters, so GPS and the Sanhang Fengfan crane vessel were helped. Roadmap. The project follows a staggered progression that leaves certain unknowns. First was the prototype in Hainan (2021-2024). In 2025 the project began in Shanghai, whose phase 1 concluded in October of that year and it has just been launched a few weeks ago. The key phase that will take capacity up to 24 MW has no official public date. Of course, the consortium of companies made up of HiCloud, Shenergy Group, China Telecom Shanghai, INESA and CCCC Third Harbor Engineering signed a cooperation agreement in October 2025 to scale to 500 MW linked to offshore wind, although where and when is unknown. Yes, but. That 2.3 MW of phase 1 is practically a demonstration, not commercial infrastructure as a large conventional data center operates between 50 and 500 MW. And in addition, it has to resolve the issues that Microsoft’s Project Natick left unresolved, such as underwater maintenance: HiCloud has not published protocols or long-term repair costs. And scalability to 500 MW is at the moment more of an intention than a project In Xataka | Where you see a mountain, China sees a … Read more

Europe has grown tired of being NASA’s “supporting actor.” And that is why it is starting to work with China

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The European Space Agency (ESA) and the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) have teamed up to launch an ambitious mission, aimed at studying the mechanisms used by the Earth to protect itself from solar inclement weather. The SMILE mission was scheduled to launch this April 9, but a small technical problem has forced it to be postponed until a date that is still unclear. In any case, it is just a small stone on the road for a mission that reinforces Europe’s intention to join forces with the Today it is considered the direct competition of NASA on many space issues. Given the ups and downs that the United States faces in scientific matters, it could be an interesting idea. The terrestrial sunscreen under a magnifying glass. The SMILE (Solar wind Magnetosphere Ionosphere Link Explorer) mission has four instruments aimed at analyzing the interaction of solar winds with the magnetosphere that acts as the Earth’s shield. It is a necessary mission for many reasons. On the one hand, because many of the mechanisms used by the Earth to protect itself from solar radiation remain partly a mystery. And, on the other hand, because data analysis could help predict solar storms more accurately. Currently it is possible to know with high probability whether they will occur, but the situation is far from being exact. Since these types of events affect terrestrial communications systems, forecasting would be a key point. Four instruments. The instruments that SMILE has They are the Soft X-ray Imager (SXI), the Light Ion Analyzer (LIA), the Detector Plane Assembly (DPA) and the Ultraviolet Imager (UVI). The SXI is responsible for taking X-ray images to study the boundaries of the magnetosphere, while the DPA provides mechanical and thermal support. That is, it helps keep the imaging systems at a stable temperature, something essential given the proximity to the Sun. As for LIA, its function is to analyze ionized particles. Solar winds consist of a flow of ionized particles that form in the Sun’s corona and are released into space. They are directly related to the harmful effects of solar storms, so it is important to analyze them. For its part, UVI is responsible for taking images in the ultraviolet range of the spectrum. Above all, they will take images of auroras, closely linked to peaks in solar activity. European and Chinese contribution. The European Union has provided the SXI and DPA instruments, in addition to the Vega rocket that will propel the satellite and all its instruments into space. For its part, China has developed the UVI and LIA instruments, as well as the SMILE suite satellite platform. Spain is not missing either. One of SMILE’s instruments, the DPA, It has been developed at the Spanish National Institute of Aerospace Technology (INTA). Little recognition. NASA has given Canada a seat on the Orion capsule to travel to the Moon. Canadian Jeremy Hansen is one of the crew members of Artemis II, despite having never traveled to space. Canada has not participated in the technological development of the mission. Europe, on the other hand, has provided the engine system that has propelled the four astronauts towards our satellite. Even so, little mention has been made of ESA’s important contribution during the development of Artemis II. Why China. A long time ago, China stopped being an emerging space power and became one of the most consolidated on the current scene. With its Tiangong Space Station Located in low orbit, it is the only facility of its kind besides the International Space Station. Its lunar mission has great relevance thanks to the exploration of the Chang’e unmanned missions. Besides, hopes to take its own taikonauts (as Chinese astronauts are known) to the satellite in 2030. Its exploration on Mars is also important thanks to rovers like Zhurong. Tiangong Low hours for NASA? Donald Trump’s government wants to make drastic cuts to science with public investment in the United States and possibly NASA will not escape. Therefore, it may be a good time to seek other support in the space race, as ESA is already doing with SMILE. That does not mean that it will stop collaborating with NASA, but it is true that it is open to exploring new partners. If there is one thing that history has taught us, it is that the best way to advance in the space race is to put egos aside and move forward as a team. Closing yourself off only to a traveling companion can end up being counterproductive. Images | ESA | Shujianyang In Xataka | Astronauts’ food is not appetizing at first, especially in China

If the energy and technological future passes through “Electrostates”, there is one that has been living there for years: China

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As the world panics over the lack of fossil fuels, the numbers in the Chinese renewable sector they are vertigo. Shares in battery giant CATL have soared 29.5% on the Hong Kong stock exchange since the conflict began. For its part, electric vehicle leader BYD has seen its sales abroad skyrocket by 65% ​​year-on-year in the month of March. This wave of buying is not new, but it has accelerated dramatically: last year, Chinese exports of solar panels to Africa increased by 48%, sales of electric vehicles rose by 27%, and sales of wind turbines grew by almost 50%. Survival and a career already over. The global turn to renewables at this critical moment is not driven solely by climate promises, but by a need for “energy security”. Fuel shortages in Asia have led vulnerable countries to take drastic measures: Indonesia’s president has announced the construction of 100 gigawatts of solar power over the next two years, while the Philippines is offering state loans of up to $8,300 to install home solar panels. As an analysis by my colleague Javier Lacort points outthe West has been promising alternatives for years, but China “is not winning the battery race; it has already won it,” controlling more than 80% of global manufacturing. Companies like CATL and BYD have already announced or built 68 factories outside China, investing more money abroad than in their own country. The rise of the “Electrostates.” The global landscape is being redefined. We are witnessing a contest between the traditional “Petrostates”, led by the United States, and the new “Electrostates”, anchored by China, which supplies more than 70% of all the green hardware in the world. Excluded from the United States and Europe by protectionist measures, the Chinese solar industry has found its salvation in the Global South. Last year, Chinese manufacturers shipped 18.8 gigawatts of solar panels to Africa. Diplomatically and economically, the war will cement China’s superpower status. The disconnection of Middle East crude oil could even erode the dominance of the “petrodollar” and catalyze the beginnings of the “petroyuan”as countries like Iran negotiate the passage of ships in exchange for payments in Chinese currency. Side B. Despite this overwhelming dominance, Beijing’s path has significant obstacles. In Africa, although cheap technology is welcome, alarm voices are growing about the creation of a new “dependency syndrome.” Some experts lament that while African countries see China as a savior, Beijing considers them a “dump” to get rid of its industrial overcapacity. In the West, mistrust is even greater for reasons of national security. The UK recently vetoed Chinese manufacturer Ming Yang’s plans to build a wind turbine factory in Scotland, alleging risks of espionage or sabotage in critical infrastructure. At the same time, Donald Trump’s US administration has decided from the beginning to withdraw fiscal support for green energy and prioritize fossil fuels so as not to depend on supply chains controlled by foreign adversaries. China is not invulnerable either.. Despite its renewable leadership, the country still imports 78% of oil that it consumes, and the Persian Gulf supplies almost half of those imports. The rise in the barrel is causing havoc due to cost inflation in its vital steel, aluminum and petrochemical factories, reducing its competitive margins. A geopolitical choice. Precisely because this dependence on fossil fuels punishes everyone equally, the green transition has become a race of pure economic survival to shield national economies. The crisis triggered by the war in Iran shows that resilience is today the main driver of global change. As Fatih Birol of the International Energy Agency points outclean energies will accelerate not only because of emissions, but because they are a “national energy source.” However, adopting this technology means choosing which side of the scale you want to be on. The energy transition is no longer a simple choice between fossil or renewable fuels. Today, the degree to which a country decides (or not) to rely on China will define its ability to decarbonize, making an environmental debate the most defining geopolitical decision of the next decade. Image | Unsplash Xataka | The country that controls the electric batteries of electric cars will control the future. And we already have a winner

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