Chinese

Mexico has placed impossible tariffs on Chinese cars. What they didn’t imagine was that the cars were already there.

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Export to buckets. That was China’s goal in 2025 towards Mexico. Alerted by the enormous tariffs that the country was going to impose, as it has been, Chinese manufacturers have done everything possible to be faster than the Government. Now, exporting a car to Mexico from China is unfeasible. But the Chinese cars arrived months ago. taxes. Was a 20% tariff on Chinese cars too little? Mexico believes so and that is why, since January 2026, it has been applying a new 50% tariff on imports of products arriving from countries with which it does not have trade agreements. Come on, what Chinese cars now have to pay 50% tariffs to enter Mexico. The measure, explained in Motorpasión Mexico has a bit of a protectionist flavor compared to China or India (the latter country has Mexico as the third country to which it sends the most cars). But, above all, It has a lot of nods to the United Stateswith whom Mexico has a special trade agreement that has been at risk since Donald Trump returned to the White House. when you go. I will tell an anecdote from the writing of Xataka. In our Slack we have a reaction from Chenoa to point out to someone that we were already contemplating writing on a topic that he now proposes to us again. You know: “when you go…”. And that is what has happened to Mexico with China. Manufacturers, alarmed by the possibility of tariffs being raised in their country of origin (as has finally happened) began to send all the cars they could to Mexico. The result: 625,187 cars exported to Mexico in one year. They have done “a Chenoa” to Mexico. one in three. To understand the magnitude of exports, according to data from the China Passenger Car AssociationMexico is the country to which China exported the most cars in 2025. These more than 625,000 vehicles surpassed those purchased by Russia (582,738 units), which has serious difficulties in obtaining vehicles from abroad. The United Arab Emirates, with 571,937 cars imported from China, was the third country that received the most cars. The figure is enormous. And in Mexico around 1.5 million cars are bought a year. That is, if in 2026 each and every one of the cars exported by China were sold, in 2025 we would be talking about one in every three sales in the country being from Chinese manufacturers. How many are available? Those exports, of course, leave a pool of cheap cars in stock so the impact of Chinese cars on the market will continue to be felt for some time. It must be taken into account that it is calculated that China had already taken 15% market share. The storage of these cars, everything indicates, guarantees that Chinese brands continue selling at the same rate throughout the year. They point out in Motorpasión Mexico In 2025, it is estimated that Mexicans will buy just over 400,000 cars of Chinese origin. The only question is how many of them belong to the more than 630,000 cars imported last year and how much is the stock since a part of them must have been imported into the country in 2024. Photo | aboodi vesakaran and BYD In Xataka | Japan has been charging a 0% tariff on foreign cars for half a century. It will be very difficult for you to find one on the street.

The Chinese side has a weapon that is impossible for the European side.

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Talk about technological and commercial war leads us to look at United States and China. They are the two who star in the great conflict between vetoes and a race for technological independence. But between the Netherlands and China there is a bunch of look at me and don’t touch me. In the eye of the storm is Nexperia, a Chinese semiconductor company, but based in the Netherlands. After a public breakup and a civil war between the two headquarters, Nexperia China has just threatened something very big: they are capable of manufacturing wafers 12 inches… and the unit in Europe no. And it is something that adds to that technological sovereignty that China pursues. Summary of the sauce. Before getting into the matter, it is worth reviewing because history has gone from 0 to 100 in just a few months. Nexperia is a manufacturer that originated from the split of the Dutch company NXP Semiconductors. They are, as their name indicates, a semiconductor company, the material with which the chips that all our devices contain are created. China has been wanting to consolidate its semiconductor industry for years, even before Trump’s veto, and bought Nexperia in 2017 for $2.75 billion. The headquarters were in the Netherlands, but the owner was a Chinese consortium backed by the country’s government. In October 2025, the surprise arrived: Netherlands confiscated Nexperia by surpriseallowing the country full control of its operations. Aim? Protect Europe’s chips. Consequence? Very risky move in relations with China that were already deteriorating. The next move was breakup of the Chinese part of Nexperia with the European onethe stoppage of chip shipping which threatened world automobile production for a time and totally broken communications between both parties. It is not that the company was divided into two separate entities: it was that it was one body with two brains. And they didn’t speak. Be careful what a mess. With this said, we return to the present. Although relations were still very tense, they seemed to have eased somewhat until, a few days ago, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce warned that tensions between Nexperia Netherlands and Nexperia China were flourishing again. It seems that the Dutch side had disabled the professional accounts of all your employees in China (we are talking about key work systems such as Office 365 and similar) and China said “yes? Well, I’m not sending you materials to make wafers.” From China, this action was classified as unforgivable as it “seriously disrupted the company’s normal production and operations.” And the threat came: “if a new crisis arises in global semiconductor production and supply chains, the Netherlands will be to blame.” This is something that would affect, above all, to the automotive industryand we already have enough with the RAM crisis. Shortly after, on March 6, Nexperia China reported that many operations had already resumed and Nexperia Netherlands, without denying the action, questioned whether it had really been as serious for the Chinese side as they were making it out to be. 12 inch wafers. The Dutch side was very well positioned in wafer manufacturing and was supplying them to Nexperia China before they stopped talking to each other. Since then, the Chinese side has secured suppliers and improved its technology on its own. And they are not doing badly. In a statement published by Nexperia China, the company stated have started small-scale production of 12-inch wafers. In them, it “prints” the same components that are also manufactured in the Dutch part, but with a nuance: the Chinese wafers are larger. The larger the wafer, the more you can “print” on it and the easier it is to develop large-scale production. This means more chips at lower prices due to economies of scale. According to the Chinese side, Nexperia Netherlands cannot manufacture 12-inch wafers in European facilities, so they now have the advantage. a wafer And in detail. The larger the wafer, the more it can be “printed” and the more chips can come off a single wafer. Local supply. This has two implications. On the one hand, what we talked about: economies of scale and the ability for automakers to buy from China instead of the Netherlands. On the other hand, the demonstration that they can manage on their own with other suppliers. Now, it esteem that the Shanghai plant has a production capacity of 30,000 wafers per month compared to Nexperia’s 83,000 in Hamburg, but of course, if they have found the key to producing larger wafers, in the end fewer wafers can yield more. And beyond all, it is a demonstration of the extent to which the two sides are going their separate ways and, in recent communicationsnone of them have any intention of fixing things. And, in the end, it is one more example of something bigger: it is currently impossible to separate global technology from geopolitics. Images | Steve JurvetsonJohn McMaster In Xataka | Spain is betting its future in the semiconductor industry on a single card: gallium chips

the Chinese battery giant is becoming more and more giant

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CATL, the world’s largest manufacturer of batteries for electric vehicles, closed 2025 with a net profit of 10.4 billion euros at the exchange rate, 42% more than the previous year. It controls almost 40% of the global market and there is no rival in sight that can overshadow it. It is also a consequence of the transition we are experiencing. We tell you all the details. Why does it matter? When talking about the transition to electric vehicles, the focus usually falls on car manufacturers, but there is a company that makes money from practically all of them, regardless of who sells the most cars. And CATL It’s something like NVIDIA of the automotive sector. If an electric car has a battery, there is almost a 40% chance that it is yours. And the percentage is increasing. The numbers. The company recently published its annual results. The report showed total revenues of 423.7 billion yuan (about 58 billion euros), 17% more than in 2024. Net profit reached 72.2 billion yuan, nearly 10.4 billion euros, which represents a jump of 42% and the highest annual growth in three years. In the fourth quarter alone, profit increased 57% year-on-year, beating forecasts by a wide margin. The electric car battery business represents 75% of revenue. On the other hand, energy storage, another of its businesses, contributes another 15%. As a consequence, its cash flow grows by 37%, to 133.2 billion yuan. Market share. According to data According to South Korean analysis firm SNE Research, CATL closed 2025 with a 39.2% share of the global electric vehicle battery market, up from 38% the previous year. It is the ninth consecutive year in which it leads the global ranking. In fact, it is the only company in the world with a share greater than 30%. Its sales of lithium ion batteries have reached 661 GWh, 39% more. Power batteries (those in cars) totaled 541 GWh, and stationary storage batteries, 121 GWh. Korea loses ground. The three large South Korean battery manufacturers, LG Energy Solution, SK On and Samsung SDI, have seen their accumulated share fall by 10.4% last January, according to collect Automotive World analysis. There are several reasons for this, but the most notable have to do above all with changes in US trade policy, which have weakened supply chains in its local market, and increasing dependency of global automakers on Chinese suppliers for offering lower-cost products. CATL gains share abroad and on top of that its direct competitors lose it. Your most profitable business is outside China. Precisely, income from abroad represents more than 30% of CATL’s total, and its gross margin in those markets reaches 31.4%, compared to the 24% it obtains in China. In other words, the more you sell abroad, the more you earn for each battery. And that turns its international expansion not only into a volume growth strategy, but also into an engine that offers increasingly greater profitability. Beyond the electric car. “The new energy industry is at a new historic turning point,” counted the company’s president, Zeng Yuqun, at the meeting with investors. Here he points to electric aviation, ships, data centers and large-scale energy storage as new fronts for the company’s expansion. CATL already leads the global market for batteries for stationary storage for the fifth consecutive year. At the end of 2025, it had six large R&D centers and 24 factories around the world, with an installed capacity of 772 GWh and another 321 GWh under construction. Two shadows in the painting. Although it is all good news for the company, there are also nuances. And the gross margins in car batteries and storage were slightly reduced in 2025 due to pressure on raw material costs and the price war in the sector. The company has also recorded asset impairment losses of around 9 billion yuan, linked in part to the suspension of its activity at the Jianxiawo lithium mine, paralyzed since August due to a licensing conflict. Production is expected to resume in June this year. On the other hand, we must not lose sight of its direct competitor in the domestic market: BYD and its new Blade battery second generation, which according to the company, is capable of charging from 10% to 97% in nine minutes, which could put CATL in a bind in the ultra-fast charging segment. Although for now BYD too has its own problems in China, since its share in batteries has fallen slightly and has accumulated six consecutive months of decline in domestic sales. Cover image | CHUTTERSNAP and CATL In Xataka | Finding the cheapest gas station in your area is very simple thanks to this very powerful tool

The Iran war is making the best possible advertisement for Chinese renewables. And China knows it

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Oil has skyrocketed again. Brent has crossed 90 dollars, WTI is around 87, and the Strait of Hormuz, through which nearly 20% of the world’s oil transits, has reduced its traffic from 138 ships a day to just two. The most interesting thing here is not the price of crude oil but who wins when that happens. Why is it important. Each shock oil is, for China, a free advertisement on a planetary scale of its energy value proposition. Solar panels, electric cars and batteries do not rise in price when there is a war in the Persian Gulf. Natural gas and gasoline, yes. For countries that have been buying Chinese clean technology for years, this week has been the practical demonstration that they got it right. For those who have not yet done so, it is the best sales argument that China could wish for, and on top of that it has not involved a direct expense. The contrast. The US economy is structurally more vulnerable to the shocks of oil than China. The oil intensity of US GDP, that is, how much oil is needed to generate each dollar of economic activity, is notably higher than that of China, the EU or Russia. When crude oil soars, the blow is felt harder by the American consumer, who fills the tank of his car with gasoline, than by the Chinese consumer, whose fleet of vehicles is already almost 50% electric in new sales. In November 2025, electric cars They exceeded 60% of total sales in China. It is not a country in energy transition: it is a country that has already changed fuel in its largest vehicle fleet. And that is without counting the traffic of motorcycles, all electric for many years in several of its large cities, and with much greater volume than in other countries. Between the lines. China produces more than twice as many solar panels as the world is capable of absorbingand its batteries and electric cars are already reaching Western Europe, the Middle East and Latin America. When oil rises, the economic equation for those exports improves automatically, without your government having to lift a finger. An energy crisis in the Gulf acts as an indirect subsidy to its clean industries: it makes everything China sells more attractive and everything it doesn’t sell more expensive. In figures. The clean energy sector already represents 11.4% of Chinese GDP, according to The analysis published by Carbon Brief last month. Without those industries, China would have grown 3.5% in 2025 instead of the 5% recorded. Electric cars and batteries explain 44% of the economic impact of that sector. China installed 315 GW of solar and 119 GW of wind in 2025, more than the rest of the world combined in both categories. Yes, but. China also imports oil, a lot. It remains one of the world’s largest buyers of crude oil, and the conflict over the Strait of Hormuz complicates its short-term supply. In fact, in recent weeks China has increased its oil imports by almost 16% due to uncertainty. That said, In September it already began to make an unusual collection. What changes the long-term equation is not that China is immune to the shocks oil producers, but each crisis accelerates the internal conversion towards renewables and reinforces the export argument against third countries. It is a temporary pain that finances a structural advantage. Furthermore, this scenario leaves a question in the air: whether the world, by purchasing Chinese clean technology, is ultimately exchanging an energy dependency for a technological dependency. In both the United States and Europe this will end up becoming a question as uncomfortable as it is inevitable. In Xataka | On the roof of the world, China is building the largest solar park on the planet Featured image | Nuno Marques

At the controls of the new MGS6 EV, the new electric competitor of the Chinese firm.

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MG is the Chinese brand of the moment in our country. By sales volume, it is the company that dominates the market, with a clear focus on the low or entry range. Last year they sold 45,163 units and grew by 46.78%. If we expand the focus to the rest of the market, BYD with 25,556 units was the second Chinese brand that sold the most cars (although in this case they only registered plug-in hybrids and electric vehicles) and MG put it in the Spanish market more cars than historical ones like Citroën, Ford, Nissan or Opel. So far this yearthe MG ZS is once again positioned as one of the 10 best-selling cars in our country but there is a clear gap between this SUV, the MG3 (which has a hybrid option) and the rest of the range. In fact, of the 6,031 registrations this year, the sum of both models exceeds 5,000 units. Its electric offer, driven by the MG4 Electric, has been losing strength. Now, the MGS6 EV is the opportunity to get back on track. Why does an electric car have less autonomy than advertised? MGS6 EV technical sheet MGS6 EV BODY TYPE. Five-seater electric SUV. MEASUREMENTS AND WEIGHT. 4,708 mm long, 1,912 mm wide, 1,672 mm high. 2,835 mm wheelbase. 1,908 kg weight for the rear-wheel drive version. 2,005 kg weight for the all-wheel drive version. TRUNK. 674 liters in the rear trunk. Front trunk: 124 liters for the rear-wheel drive version. 102 liters for the rear-wheel drive version. MAXIMUM POWER. 361 HP WLTP CONSUMPTION. Rear-wheel drive version: 16.6 kWh/100 km. All-wheel drive version: 18.1 kWh/100 km. ENVIRONMENTAL DISTINCTIVE. Zero emissions DRIVING AIDS (ADAS). Required by the European Union. OTHERS. Own infotainment system, compatible with Android Auto and Apple CarPlay. Bluetooth connection for the multimedia system. Wireless charging for mobile phone. ELECTRIC HYBRID. No. Plug-in HYBRID. No. electric Yeah. Rear-wheel drive version: 244 HP and 530 km autonomy. All-wheel drive version: 361 HP and 485 km autonomy. price and launch Now available WITHOUT aid from: Rear-wheel drive version: 45,990 euros All-wheel drive version:48,990 euros Now available WITH aid and discounts from: Rear-wheel drive version: 37,789 euros All-wheel drive version: 40,789 euros The battle for the best electric family heats up Cars with an SUV body, electric, about 4.70 meters long and at relatively affordable prices. Space, price and autonomy to convince the client. These are the premises that must be clear to companies that are preparing to move on quicksand terrain. Sizes where price value is important but where the customer already seriously values ​​other attributes. Until not long ago, the Tesla Model Y It was the only candidate for those looking for an SUV electric car of this size without resorting to a premium brand. Right now, Elon Musk’s company already has to face the Skoda Elroqthe most affordable proposal (and one of the most interesting on the market) from the Volkswagen Group. And, as an alternative, Chinese proposals. we have the Lepmotor C10he BYD Seal U electric. Now the MGS6 EV is added and does so with good conditions. Thinking about prioritizing size and price, this electric SUV arrives 4.71 meters long, 1.92 meters wide, 1.67 meters high and, above all, with a wheelbase of 2.82 meters that takes the rear seats to an enormous width. Added to doors that are close to 90º when opening or a trunk that boasts 674 liters (we believe measured to the roof) and another 124-liter front trunk where we have verified that a cabin suitcase fits, the MGS6 EV is clearly committed to the family aspect. He does it with a car that, inside, has presence. Soft plastics well distributed and pleasant to the touch. Physical controls for gear selection and temperature or volume control with a good feel. It is not the best but in cabins where all physical buttons disappear, it is appreciated that the climate temperature and fan speed can be raised and lowered with physical controls. The steering wheel is good, with individual buttons for each function, without touch surfaces. It is accompanied by a 10.25-inch instrument panel screen and a 12.6-inch central one. Not made a larger screen and since it is not integrated, I almost prefer it to the. increasingly common, panels larger than 15 inches. The surface to leave the mobile phone charging wirelessly has a small textile surface and a fan to prevent it from heating up, and in the lower area there are USB sockets and a huge space where you can leave objects. Connectivity with Android Auto and Apple CarPlay is wireless. These are all details that raise the perception of quality and make MG look closely at its rivals. Where I think the proposal is a little weaker is in the system of infotainment. It feels somewhat heavy and the response to touches is not immediate. Luckily, the menus are well structured and the touch surfaces are large, so navigation is easier in this part. In addition, there is an upper drop-down menu with which you can select the personalized driving profile so with a movement of the finger and a touch we can have the car ready in the driving mode (Comfort, Sport, ECO, Snow or custom), the level of regenerative braking and the desired ADAS systems quickly and intuitively. We have not been able to test these driving aids because the route has mostly run along secondary roads. What is certain is that the system is not intrusive at all because it has not been correcting us as we linked curves. Yes, it has surprised us for the better, it has been the first dynamic contact with the car. My prejudices, I expected a car with a soft and long suspension, as usually happens with Chinese cars. Or very artificial direction. But this has not happened by any means. The suspension contains the body more than I expected and the steering transmits practically nothing that happens with the wheels but it … Read more

It is a nod to Chinese Big Tech and a message for NVIDIA

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Huawei has arrived at the Mobile World Congress with one objective: to show the world What good have these last five years been? of vetoes and sanctions. The company has just had the second best year in its history. It seemed impossible when The United States ostracized herbut this five years has served not only to regain the throne in the enormous Chinese market, but to build something: the idea that China’s technological evolution passes through its hands. As a result of this we have the advertisement at the Barcelona fair of a line of SuperPoD supercomputers with a single objective: that the Chinese Big Tech don’t have to depend from NVIDIA. Return. Huawei has been collaborating with SMIC -the great foundry of China- to create chips. Chips that feed both your consumer devices as other high-performance ones for large-scale computing. It is clearly difficult to do this without violating Western vetoes (for example, their mobile processors do not have 5G and are less powerful than those of Qualcomm or MediaTek), but they are making progress. The symbolic thing is that They have turned resilience into their best quality. If in 2020 they competed for the market with Samsung and Apple, achieving a profit of 129,000 yuan, in 2025 registered 127 billion dollars, something impressive if we take into account that, above all, They come from the local market. In this time, Huawei has positioned itself as a lifestyle brand that has consumer devices, but also home automation and even cars. But if there is a great frontier today, it is that of artificial intelligence. And Huawei knows that it was something that had to be attacked not only from the most local perspective, but by launching a global warning. SuperPoD. Because these supercomputers, really, are not new. The company presented them in mid-September last year with a more local focus, for China. And before looking at the products, you have to see what a SuperPoD is. These are high-performance clusters that bring together thousands of specialized AI chips. And those chips are not from NVIDIA, which dominates the global conversation in AI computing, but rather their own. It’s about your Ascendsome that have been developing for years and that China is waiting like May rain to break that hegemony of NVIDIA. The idea is the same as with other technological sectors of the Asian giant: not to depend on anyone else. They are the following: Atlas 950 SuperPoD– A cluster of up to 9,192 Ascend 950DT NPUs per system with up to 1,152 TB of unified memory. TaiShan 950 SuperPoD– First general-purpose computing SuperPoD with two models: 96 cores / 192 threads or 192 cores / 384 threads for, for example, massive virtualization or critical databases. Local ecosystem. Huawei’s approach is very interesting. The Ascend is not close to the power and sophistication of NVIDIA chips, nor to CUDA technology that has become the language of AI. However, if each chip individually cannot compete for the most demanding tasks, what Huawei has thought is that these chips be scalable. To do this, they have developed a connection technology with ultra-high bandwidth that allows all these chips to be connected to each other with the aim that, in practice, it behaves like a single logical computer. This connection technology has been named UnifiedBus and, in the statement, Huawei states that the idea is to “continue defending open source and open systems to accelerate developer innovation and the prosperity of ecosystems. That is something that resonates with the Government’s objective: that its companies such as Tencent, ByteDance, Alibaba or DeepSeek, which have run into the arms of the latest NVIDIA chips As soon as the ban was lifted, they developed their technologies using ‘made in China’ solutions. Ambition at the cost of sanction. All this comes in a tremendously turbulent context. China is betting a lot on artificial intelligence and robotics as pillars of the country’s technological roadmapbut NVIDIA still has the best product. There is analysis that expose that the best of Huawei is still five times less powerful than the best of NVIDIA, and the United States has just made it clear that investment in AI is one in national security. All the mess between Anthropic and the Pentagon has to do with how the United States demands that the AI ​​of its private companies belongs to the State because they claim that the AI ​​of Chinese companies belongs to China, and China will not hesitate to do whatever it wants with that AI. Because computing power is, and will be, at the core of the AI ​​race, Huawei has shown that it is doing everything it can to deliver the best tools. And Western sanctions have only helped China ‘wake up’ and begin to shape these technological solutions at an accelerated pace. NVIDIA was clear. It remains to be seen whether customers around the world will adopt Huawei’s SuperPoD systems as an alternative to NVIDIA, but what is already on the table is that something is happening. At least, in China. In the middle of last year, the CEO of NVIDIA pointed out that before the vetoes, NVIDIA had 95% of the market share in Chinabut currently it is only 50%. These vetoes did not stop China, but rather accelerated the development of its own industry to the point that the competition, now, is fierce. In fact, the manager recently pointed out that it was absurd for the US to try to stop China with vetoes and sanctions, since China would achieve technological sovereignty sooner or later and that the ideal would be to take an economic slice while they could… and make Chinese Big Tech dependent on NVIDIA technology. And there Huawei’s approach is very curious because yes, its chips may not be the most powerful, but they are mass scalable and adaptable to the needs of each of the companies. Images | HuaweiXataka In Xataka | Huawei no longer competes: it is building its own … Read more

We have been talking about “day 996” in Chinese companies for years. The reality is more complex: “day 323”

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In China there are more than 1.4 billion people and nearly a quarter of its active population works in the public sector, a work universe so enormous that any generalization usually falls short. Thus, between global topics and everyday realities, the distance may be greater than it seems. The myth exported from 996. It we have counted on more than one occasion, but just because something is repeated many times does not mean that it is the norm. We have been hearing for so long that China applies infamous day 996 (working from 9:00 am to 9:00 pm, six days a week), that the concept itself has ended up becoming a symbol of a supposed superhuman work ethic, although in its origin it was a criticism to an abusive model within the technology sector and never a general rule. On paper, Chinese law sets weeks five days and 40 hoursalthough its application is irregular and the official unions lack real power, and although there are sectors such as migrant work or the platform economy where the hours are hard and the scarce rights. In any case, they said in a Foreign Policy report that 996 has prospered in the West because fits the fear It calls for China to “work harder” and surpass its rivals, but that narrative simplifies to the point of dehumanizing those 1.4 billion people. Furthermore, it hides a much more diverse reality. The inheritance of work as ideology. The truth is that Chinese work culture was not born with the technologies of Shenzhen, but with a tradition marked by Maoism and heritage. of Soviet Stakhanovismone where productive sacrifice was glorified and consolidated the social weight of the danwei or work unit. In that sense, he remembered the analyst James Palmer that was not until 1995 when the two-day weekend was formalized, and for decades employment was not only a source of income, but also the core of identity, housing and social network. that past explains the coexistence of intense practices with other deeply bureaucratic ones, where political obedience and compliance with quotas weigh as much as real efficiency. The silent reality of 323. As we said at the beginning, beyond from the myth of 996a significant part of Chinese employment (around 23% of the active population) is concentrated in the public sector, where an informal pattern predominates summarize as 323: three hours of work in the morning, a break of two or even three hours to eat and napand another three hours in the afternoon. That long interruption is, in fact, almost sacred and has withstood reform attemptswith offices that dim lights or enable spaces to rest, in a routine that surprises those who expect constant hyperproductivity. The pace can be lax in quiet times and frenetic at the end of the year to meet administrative objectives, often accompanied by creative accounting adjustments. Bureaucracy, patronage and ghost jobs. They recalled in FP that 323 coexists with less visible practices such as fictitious jobs granted by patronage, from positions where hardly any work is done to positions “without presence” that serve to reward loyalty or avoid formal requirements. In that environment, flexibility and frustration coexist: an office may close during a long break, but also show leniency in the face of formal delays. And when the political leadership hardens the toneas happened with the anti-corruption campaign started in 2013 or with extraordinary demands such as imposed on teachers to register vaccinations in 2022, the intensity increases and many of the amenities temporarily disappear. Mandatory socialization and discipline. Furthermore, it must be taken into account that official work life includes banquets, toast and collective meetings that reinforce hierarchies and informal networks, rituals that can become a burden rather than a privilege and that were briefly contents by disciplinary campaigns before eventually returning. That sway between everyday laxity and political pressure explains why 323 makes sense within the system: it does not respond to an ethic of leisure, but to an administration that alternates phases of low demand with bursts of mobilization. Put clearly: in front of the story simplistic 996reality is more contradictory and less hyperbolic, a fragmented work culture where the working day depends as much on the sector and the political climate as on individual will. Image | International Labor Organization ILO In Xataka | China promised them very happy with day 996. Until they realized that it was a shot in the foot In Xataka | China became famous for its eternal work hours. The solution has been to throw the employees out on time.

The owner of Volvo and partner of Renault will also sell Chinese electric cars in our country

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It is possible that if you are not very up to date with the automobile market, the word Geely may not be very familiar to you. Yes, it is more likely that Lotus will tell you something else. And you surely know Smart and Volvo. Any of them, any of those companies that were once European, are owned by Geely, one of the largest Chinese automotive groups in the country. Now, the company lands in Spain with its own brand. Yes, Geely in addition to owning a portfolio with up to 16 brands Under his direction, he also has his own car company. So that we understand it quickly and easily, just as the Volkswagen Group has the Volkswagen brand or as Renault owns Dacia but, of course, sells cars under the Renault brand. Geely, therefore, will arrive in our country with two electrified models. Its presence, as is evident from the first and mentioned brands, is already palpable in Spain but now it will have its own vehicles on the street, with its distribution network separate from any other company and with two SUVs that point to the present and future of the brand. Geely arrives in Spain To have a general photograph of Geely and know what is behind this new brand, the first thing you should know is that in 2024 they became the first Chinese manufacturer to establish itself as one of the 10 most important automotive companies in the world. Shortly after, the brand has been surpassed by the enormous muscle of BYD but In 2025 it managed to put 3.02 million on the market of cars counting only the companies born under its umbrella (without adding Volvo or Smart). With the latter he reached the 4.12 million units sold and was positioned as the ninth largest automotive group in the world, exceeding 2024 sales by 800,000 units. For its arrival in Spain, the company has announced two vehicles. Geely E5 He Geely E5 It is an electric SUV with 160 kW (218 HP) and a maximum range of 475 kilometers according to the WLTP cycle. It will be available with two battery sizes (60.22 kWh and 68.79 kWh) developed in-house. In the press release, Geely does not confirm the total peak power and only mentions that it will go from 30 to 80% autonomy in 20 minutes. Geely Starray EM-i On the other hand, the Geely Starray EM-i It is a plug-in hybrid with a combined power of 262 HP where the greatest weight of its dynamics falls on the electric motor that reaches 160 kW (218 HP). It also has two battery options (18.4 kWh and 29.8 kWh) that increase the total range of the set up to 943 kilometers in the mixed cycle. At the moment, Geely does not specify its autonomy in fully electric mode. It is to be hoped that, little by little, we will learn more details about these two new models, especially in their commitment to software and digital functions focused on the user. We do know that this latest plug-in hybridization system has been developed in the heart of Horse, the joint venture that Geely maintains with Renault to continue looking for solutions focused on combustion engines. Regarding its distribution, Geely says that it is developing a network of nationwide dealers “supported by partners with extensive experience and deep knowledge of the local market.” It is to be expected, therefore, that at least in the first months and years its distribution will be supported by the large groups that have been supporting brands such as BYD or the Chery Group. And the Chinese companies are making a strong investment in dealerships to give customer confidence. At the moment, the Chinese company has not set a specific date for us to see these cars on the street but it does set a deadline of “the first half of 2026”, so in the next four months we should have all the details. It must be taken into account that Geely is making clear efforts to expand its market with its own brands. We recently learned that is interested in entering the United Statesdespite the fact that the geopolitical context is complicated. It has also been rumored that it could occupy part of the Ford plant in Almussafes. Movement is key in an ultra-competitive Chinese market that is slowing down and Spain has shown interest in the firms arriving from this country, especially among entry-level vehicles and plug-in hybrids. Photo | Geely In Xataka | MG, BYD, Lynk&Co, Omoda: who’s who of Chinese car manufacturers in Spain

15 Chinese car manufacturers are going to produce humanoid robots. They will use the same advantage that made them leaders

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China is not late to humanoid robotics: it arrives with factories, suppliers, engineers and software already amortized, an advantage that is difficult to overcome. The supply chain of an electric car (sensors, motors, batteries, chips, perception algorithms…) overlaps by more than 60% with that of a humanoid robot, according to CITIC Securities estimates. XPeng, one of the most technological manufacturers in the sector, It also ensures that its robot reuses 70% of the same AI software as its cars.. If those numbers are real without many asterisks, the Chinese manufacturers of electric vehicles are not that they are aspirants to robotics, it is that they are clear favorites. The panoramic. Fifteen Chinese car brands have announced humanoid robot programs, according to the analysis firm Kaiyuan Securities. China already manufactures 70% of the components of “classic” industrial robotics, and the jump to humanoids takes advantage of the same factories, the same suppliers and the same talent that have given it leadership in electric vehicles. The parallel with what Tesla is doing with Optimus is inevitable, but China is running it with dozens of companies in parallel, at a speed that no single company can match. Between the lines. The bets diverge as much as the companies: Yes, but. There are dark clouds on the sunny day that is humanoid robotics for China. XPeng’s IRON robot crashed in a shopping mall in Shenzhen a few days ago. The company has been in robotics for six years. Driving on roads and moving through the rooms of each parent are very different problems. Roads have lanes, signs, and fairly predictable physics. The rooms have stairs, dozens of small objects, people moving, doors to open, intricate locations or chargers with a cable on the floor. The manual dexterity and dynamic balance required by a humanoid robot have no equivalent in the control architecture of any car. And the most talented engineers in the sector know it: several former XPeng executivesLi Auto and Huawei have left their companies to found their own robotics startups. When the path seems clear, the best are not afraid to go it alone. The contrast. Unitree, a pure robotics company with no ties to the automotive industry, distributed 5,500 robots in 2025. Agibot is approaching 1 billion yuan in revenue, about 122 million euros. These companies built from the ground up for robotics are already delivering their product while car manufacturers are still in the reorganization phase. The technological overlap between cars and robots is real in sensors and perception software, but it quickly thins out when the robot has to manipulate objects with great precision, maintain balance on uneven terrain, or work alongside humans. That last “frontier”, the 30% that does not transfer, may be where it is decided who dominates the industry. In Xataka | China manufactures 90% of the world’s humanoid robots and the reason is not its industrial policy: it is crossing the street Featured image | Xpeng

Anthropic just accused DeepSeek and other Chinese companies of “distilling” Claude

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For months we have talked about the race between the United States and China to dominate artificial intelligence as if it were only a question of who trains the most powerful model or launches the next version first. But the pulse begins to move to another, more delicate area: that of the rules of the game. When one laboratory accuses another of extracting capabilities from its system to accelerate its own development, the discussion goes beyond the technical. That’s exactly what Anthropic just did by denounce “distillation” campaigns against his model Claude. The complaint. In a text published this Monday, the company claims to have detected “industrial-scale campaigns” aimed at extracting Claude’s capabilities. According to their version, the activities attributed to DeepSeekMoonshot and MiniMax reportedly involved more than 16 million queries, question and answer interactions, and were channeled through approximately 24,000 fraudulent accounts, in violation of their terms of service and regional access restrictions. The race and the suspicion. The announcement by the firm led by Darío Amodei occurs in a context of growing tension around the progress of Chinese AI. Let us remember that DeepSeek altered the Silicon Valley landscape a year ago with the launch of R1, a competitive model that was presented as Developed at a fraction of the cost of American alternatives. The impact was immediate on the markets and revived the political debate in Washington about the technological advantage over China. Distilling is not always cheating. Anthropic itself recognizes that distillation is a common technique in the sector. It consists, in simple terms, of training a less capable model using the responses generated by a more powerful one, something that large laboratories use to create smaller, cheaper versions of their own systems. The problem, according to the company, appears when this practice is used to “acquire powerful capabilities from other laboratories in a fraction of the time and at a fraction of the cost” that developing them independently would entail. In that case, distillation would cease to be an internal optimization and would become, always according to Anthropic, a way of taking advantage of the work of others. Recognizable pattern. The three laboratories would have used fraudulent accounts and proxy services to access Claude on a large scale while trying to avoid detection systems. The company details infrastructures, what it calls “hydra cluster”, extensive networks of accounts that distribute traffic between its API and third-party cloud platforms, so that when one account was blocked, another took its place. Anthropic maintains that what differentiated these activities from normal use was not an isolated query, but rather the massive and coordinated repetition of requests aimed at extracting very specific capabilities from the model. Three campaigns. Although Anthropic presents the campaigns as part of the same dynamic, it distinguishes relevant nuances. DeepSeek would have focused its more than 150,000 queries on extracting reasoning capabilities and generating safe alternatives to politically sensitive questions. Moonshot, with more than 3.4 million queries, would have been oriented towards the development of agents capable of using tools and manipulating computing environments. MiniMax would concentrate the largest volume, more than 13 million queries, and according to Anthropic’s account, it reacted in a matter of hours to the launch of a new system, redirecting its traffic to try to extract capabilities from its most recent system. A geopolitical issue. The company states that illicitly distilled models may lose safeguards that seek to prevent state or non-state actors from using AI for purposes such as the development of biological weapons or disinformation campaigns. It also argues that distillation undermines export controls by allowing foreign laboratories to close the gap in other ways, while at the same time recognizing that executing these large-scale extractions requires access to advanced chips, thus reinforcing the logic of restricting their availability while, at the same time, remembering that the risk would grow if these capabilities end up being integrated into military, intelligence or surveillance systems. Images | Xataka with Nano Banana Pro In Xataka | Seedance is the greatest brutality we have seen generating video. And it has an uncomfortable message: it has surpassed Sora and Veo without NVIDIA chips

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