Ukraine

Ukraine has opened the missile that devastated kyiv. They have found 100 reasons to be angry, and not exactly with Russia

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In 2014, after the downing of flight MH17 over eastern Ukraine, international investigators spent months reconstructing fragments metallic weapons scattered among fields and roads to identify the weapon responsible. One of the biggest surprises was not just the missile itself, but the enormous amount of information that they could reveal small pieces seemingly insignificant. Ukraine has been “surprised” for some time by what is inside Russian war technology, but the latest perhaps exceeds anything seen before. The 100 components that should not be there. It we have been counting with numerous intercepted drones and missiles by kyiv, but the latest “unboxing” has set off alarms. The reason? When the Ukrainian teams they began to analyze the remains of the Kh-101 missiles that had hit residential buildings in the capital, they hoped to find Russian technology, perhaps Chinese parts or improvised systems to avoid sanctions. What they found was much more uncomfortable for the West: more than one hundred components manufactured by American and European companies inside each missile. Chips, microelectronics and systems produced years after sanctions began, including from this same 2026continued to appear in some of the most advanced weapons in the Russian arsenal. For Ukraine, the discovery has ended up generating a particularly bitter sensation: the missiles that they devastate the cities Ukrainians continue to partially depend on technology designed and manufactured by the same countries that support kyiv militarily. The Kh-101 is mounted on pylons The great crack of sanctions. He Kh-101 case is revealing one of the biggest problems of modern technological warfare: sanctioning does not necessarily mean cut off the supply real. Russia continue accessing to Western microelectronics through re-exports, intermediaries, opaque distributors and commercial networks that are extremely difficult to control. Some pieces even arrive from china as clones or compatible copies of Western designs. The result is that Moscow has achieved maintain and expand its missile production despite economic isolation. Ukraine maintains that many of the components found were fOpened in 2024 and 2025years after the sanctions packages that were supposed to strangle Russian military capacity. The feeling in kyiv is that there is a huge difference between announcing restrictions and making them actually work. The missile that Russia does not stop perfecting. Yes, because the Kh-101 has become a of the central pieces of the Russian air campaign. Launched from strategic bombers and designed for long-range flights at low altitude, Moscow has multiplied its production since 2022 to levels far above those before the invasion. But also, Russia is continually modifying the missile to make it more difficult to intercept. Ukraine assures that the new versions incorporate anti-interference improvements, more sophisticated navigation systems, double charges reducing fuel and even fragmentation munitions with zirconium elements to increase damage. kyiv continues to intercept a good part of them, but each new development forces spend more resources defenses and demonstrates that Russia maintains sufficient industrial capacity to sustain a prolonged technological war. The Western Paradox. Also it we have been counting. The history of the Kh-101 reflects, one more timean extremely uncomfortable contradiction for Europe and the United States. As the West delivers anti-aircraft systems, intelligence and economic aid to Ukraine, part of the global technology industry it keeps leaking towards the Russian military machine. In practice, some Western companies may end up seeing their own chips end up inside the missiles which then force the use of expensive Patriot or NASAMS interceptors also financed by the West. That paradox explains much of the Ukrainian frustration. For kyiv, the problem is no longer just Russia, but the inability of global trade chains to prevent critical technology from ending up feeding the Kremlin’s military production. The industrial war of the 21st century. He analysis of the remains The attack on kyiv is also leaving a deeper conclusion about how modern wars work. No great power today manufactures advanced weapons completely isolated of the global market. Missiles, drones and guidance systems depend of an international network of microelectronics, software and components extremely difficult to control. Russia has shown that even under massive sanctions can still access much of that global technological infrastructure. And Ukraine has discovered something equally disturbing: that in the wars of the 21st century, open a missile enemy is no longer only useful for studying its military technology. It also serves to discover to what extent the connected world continues feeding indirectly the war he is trying to stop. Image | Office of the President of Ukraine, Russia MoD In Xataka | Russia has been advancing at a snail’s pace in Ukraine for months. That’s about to change because of one season: summer. In Xataka | The war in Ukraine has entered such a crazy phase that soldiers are shooting at their own drones

Russia has been advancing at a snail’s pace in Ukraine for months. That’s about to change because of one season: summer.

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During World War II, many commanders discovered that a simple station could completely alter the rhythm of a military campaign: on the eastern front, the arrival of spring turned roads and fields into seas of mud capable of immobilizing tanks for weeks, while summer suddenly reopened enormous corridors of advance for both armies. The war that no longer advances as before. I counted the weekend the new york times that for months, the Kremlin has tried to sell the idea that a Russian victory in Ukraine is only a matter of time, pressuring even Trump and Western negotiators with the argument that kyiv Donbas will end up losing inevitably. However, on the ground the reality is much less spectacular. Russia has been advancing at a snail’s pace practically all year, to the point that, maintaining the current pace, it would take decades to completely occupy the region whose surrender it demands to negotiate peace. The problem is that this apparent paralysis can be misleading. Both Ukrainian commanders and military analysts carry weeks warning that summer is slowly changing the conditions of the front: the dry terrain allows the use of motorcycles and light vehicles to recover, the vegetation offers coverage against drones and Russian infiltrations are beginning to gain effectiveness after extremely difficult months for Moscow. The front is a drone war. The great transformation of this phase of the war is that Russia can no longer advance as in previous conflicts. Massive assaults with armored columns have become too vulnerable in a field of battle saturated by dronessensors and constant surveillance. Every movement is exposed from the air and any concentration of troops can be quickly destroyed. That has forced Moscow to completely modify its tactics. Now small groups of soldiers predominate slowly infiltratingon foot or on motorcycles, trying to open gradual gaps within a huge “gray zone” where control of the territory is no longer clear for either side. In other words, the conflict is looking less and less like a conventional war and more like a technological competition permanent between drones, electronic warfare and improvised survival systems. Russia makes little progress, but continues to push. The big problem for Ukraine is that even these minimal advances remain generating constant wear. Russia has suffered huge human lossesrecruitment problems and technological difficulties, including communications restrictions and obstacles to coordinate your drones. However, the Kremlin appears to have accepted that a slow and costly war remains preferable to launching large, risky offensives that could end in failure. In places like Pokrovsk or Chasiv YarMoscow has been fighting for years without managing to definitively break the front, but it has not retreated decisively either. Their troops infiltrate little by little, occupy temporary positions and turn huge areas of Donbas into spaces impossible for either army to completely control. The sensation is that of heavy, slow and damaged machinery that still continues advancing meter by meter. Summer is coming. That’s where it comes into play the seasonal factor which worries kyiv so much. During the mud and cold, Ukrainian drones have been especially effective at detecting Russian movements over open terrain. But the arrival of summer changes part of those dynamics. Trees and vegetation make aerial surveillance difficult, dry routes allow faster movement, and small Russian units find more opportunities to infiltrate without being immediately detected. In fact, Ukrainian officials recognize that Russian operations are already showing signs of improvement and that offensive activity is intensifying along the front. This is not yet a large mechanized offensive like those at the beginning of the war, but something much more disturbing: a constant pressure and diffuse design designed to exploit any weakness accumulated after years of wear. Between wear and tear and negotiation. All this greatly complicates international negotiations. Putin needs keep the image of a Russia advancing towards victory to pressure Ukraine and convince the United States that time is on the Kremlin’s side. But the real data show an exhausted army, enormous human losses and a front that barely moves. At the same time, Ukraine also does not have a comfortable situation: suffers from personnel shortages, desertions and difficulties in sustaining such a technological and costly war indefinitely. That’s why summer worries so much on both sides. Not because it will produce an immediate definitive rupture, but because it may slightly alter the balance of a war that has been trapped for months in a kind of lethal stalemate. And in a conflict where every kilometer costs thousands of lives, even small changes in the terrain, vegetation or climate They can end up having enormous strategic consequences. Image | Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 7th Army Training Command In Xataka | While we all look at Iran, something is moving in the Arctic Circle: Russia is sending bombers with missiles In Xataka | To achieve the milestone of building the largest drone industry without China, Ukraine has found an explosive ally: Taiwan

The war in Ukraine has entered such a crazy phase that soldiers are shooting at their own drones

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In 1943, during a night mission over Europe, several British pilots returned convinced that they had been pursued by strange luminous objects that appeared and disappeared around their planes. Some thought it was a secret German weapon, others thought it was nervous breakdowns caused by the stress of combat. Decades later, that aerial confusion He continues to remember a disturbing idea: there are moments in wars where the problem is no longer just the enemy. A schizophrenic heaven. They counted on Insider that the war in Ukraine has entered such a phaseDrone Aturation that, in many sectors of the front, soldiers no longer know what aircraft flies over their heads or who controls it. The consequence is an almost absurd situation even by military standards: Ukrainian troops shooting against their own drones for pure survival, operators cutting with scissors fiber optic cables without knowing if they belong to the enemy or a friendly unit and electronic warfare systems blocking any signal that appears in the air even if that means disabling their own equipment. The battlefield has become so crowded with small flying devices, jammers and data links that distinguishing between ally and enemy takes mere seconds. If something approaches too quickly, the automatic reaction is to destroy it first and ask later. Disposable drones due to excess. Part of the problem stems from how both sides have transformed the drone into a mass consumption weapon. These are no longer expensive and scarce platforms like those used by Western powers a decade ago, but rather relatively cheap systems manufactured at enormous speed and designed to be constantly lost. Russia and Ukraine consume drones in such gigantic amounts that losses due to friendly fire have been integrated almost as another operational cost. Units expect to lose devices due to interference, coordination errors, enemy jamming or simply because a nervous soldier open fire against any object that buzzes near your position. The result is a combat environment where technological saturation has begun to generate chaos even within one’s own side. The new logic: destroy them before they exist. This uncontrolled explosion in the use of drones is also pushing the war towards a new strategic stage: attack the factories before the devices in flight. Russia and Ukraine have understood that intercepting drones one by one is no longer enough when both produce thousands of systems continuously. That’s why the long range attacks attacks against industrial plants, logistics centers and component manufacturers have multiplied in recent months. Ukraine is hitting Russian facilities linked to Shahed drones, sensors, navigation modules and jam-resistant electronic systems, as Russia seeks destroy Ukrainian workshops where FPV drones or long-range attack devices capable of penetrating hundreds of kilometers into Russian territory are assembled. The logic begins to look less like a conventional war and more like a permanent industrial hunt. Electronics don’t keep up. The problem for both sides is that technological adaptation it moves too fast. Each defensive upgrade generates an immediate modification to enemy drones. Interference systems stop working when faced with fiber optic links. GPS locks lose effectiveness against new navigation modules. Drones incorporate more autonomy, greater processing capacity and increasing resistance to electronic countermeasures. In parallel, Ukraine and Russia they use satellite intelligencepattern analysis and constant recognition to locate production centers, antennas, warehouses and logistics chains. The front already It doesn’t end in the trenches.: continues hundreds or thousands of kilometers behind, inside factories, industrial parks and supply networks that have become priority military targets. A machine out of control. The most disturbing thing is that this dynamic gives the sensation of having partially independent of the soldiers themselves. There is drones attacking dronesautomatic systems jamming any available signal, operators trying coordinate safe corridors so that their own devices are not demolished and entire factories turned into objectives daily to sustain a rate of losses that seems impossible to absorb. If you like, the war in Ukraine is still a war of artillery and attrition, but it is also transforming into something much stranger: an aerial ecosystem saturated with cheap and disposable machines where survival depends on react before identifying. And when an army ends up shooting at its own drones because there are too many devices in the sky to distinguish them, it means that the conflict has crossed a whole new frontier. And crazy. Image | mod-gov-ua In Xataka | Ukraine has found a new way to assault buildings occupied by Russia: sending a robot with a 300-kilogram surprise In Xataka | The war in Ukraine is being filled with “Mad Max” ships: metal screens and nets against FPV drones in the Black Sea

To achieve the milestone of building the largest drone industry without China, Ukraine has found an explosive ally: Taiwan

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In the midst of the Cold War, several Western engineers they were surprised upon discovering that some of the most reliable small electronic components on the world market came from an island that barely made the big geopolitical headlines. Decades later, that silent specialization in manufacturing tiny and apparently invisible parts would end up becoming one of the industrial capabilities most coveted on the planet. The war that changed an industry. For decades, Taiwan was known primarily for making chipselectronic components and invisible parts that ended up inside telephones, computers or servers spread all over the planet, but modern wars are beginning to push that industrial capacity towards another, much more explosive terrain. The Guardian said that what is happening between Ukraine and Taiwan reflects a quiet change that barely existed a few years ago: the creation of a new technological alliance born directly from drone warfrom Chinese pressure and the desperate need to produce millions of cheap, autonomous and combat-ready systems. Ukraine wants to break its dependence on China. The war forced Ukraine to build at full speed a gigantic industry of drones capable of feeding a front that consumes absurd quantities of devices every month. The problem is that much of the global supply chain remains dominated by China: Motors, batteries, navigation systems, electronic components and rare earths continue to depend heavily on Chinese manufacturers. As we said, kyiv began to consider this dependence as a strategic risk When suspicions grew about indirect support from Beijing to Russia and fears grew of possible export restrictions. There Taiwan began to appear as an alternative unexpectedly important. His huge experience in semiconductors, microelectronics, electronic integration and advanced technological production made it one of the few places capable of supplying critical parts without being completely dependent on the West or trapped under direct Chinese control. For Ukraine, finding industrial partners outside of China stopped being a commercial issue and became literally a matter of survival. And Taiwan found Ukraine. While Ukraine seeks to produce millions of drones, gradually moving away from China, Taiwan observes the conflict with another concern: the possibility of one day confronting Beijing on its own territory. That coincidence of threats is creating a relationship ever deeper between both worlds. In fact, The New York Times said what Taiwanese engineers They send drones to Ukraine to be tested directly in combat, American companies transfer designs born on the Ukrainian front to Taiwanese production and former Taiwanese soldiers who today fight in Ukraine return home telling how modern war really works. Many Taiwanese militaries are beginning to discover that traditional doctrines are completely outweighed by swarms of FPV drones, unmanned maritime systems or cheap ground robots capable of destroying multimillion-dollar vehicles. Ukraine is thus becoming a kind of university improvised military for Taiwan, one where the lessons do not come from simulations but from a real front where every mistake costs lives. The new military industry no longer resembles the old one. One of the most profound changes of this war is that military production no longer depends solely on gigantic state factories or large traditional contractors. Ukraine has developed more than one hundreds of local manufacturers of components while constantly adapting its systems to specific front-line needs. Ukrainian companies modify drones, software and guidance systems at a much higher speed to the Western classical industry. Taiwan fits perfectly in that transformation because it has exactly what Ukraine needs to accelerate that production: advanced electronics, specialized chips and flexible industrial capacity. Several Taiwanese companies already operate from Poland or Lithuania to indirectly supply kyiv, while Taiwanese drone exports to Europe have skyrocketed massively. In parallel, American companies are using Ukraine and Taiwan like two extremes of the same industrial chain: Ukraine provides combat experience and accelerated development, and Taiwan provides technological capacity and scalable manufacturing. The obsession with building drones outside of China. Both Ukraine and Taiwan share another priority that is becoming almost an industrial doctrine: building supply chains at the expense of Beijing. The problem is much more complicated than it seems because even many components manufactured outside China still use materials, batteries or magnets that depend from Chinese suppliers. Even so, both territories try gradually reduce that exhibition. Taiwan wants to build a drone industry completely disengaged from China by 2027 and increase its own production of rare earth magnets, while Ukraine continues to shift production within its borders. There is no doubt, the challenge is gigantic because Chinese products continue to be much cheaper and more abundant, but strategic logic is beginning to outweigh the economic cost. In the middle of a war, the priority shifts from buying the cheapest to ensuring the supply chain continues to function when the next crisis hits. Building something bigger than drones. If you also want, the most important thing in this relationship may not only be the production of drones, but the emergence of a new technological and military axis informal between two territories that live under permanent threat from much larger neighbors. Ukraine contributes real experience of war, proven tactics and a brutal speed of innovation under extreme pressure. Taiwan contributes industrial capacitysemiconductors and access to critical technologies that the West does not produce quickly enough. The result is beginning to look like something much more ambitious: an entire international network of distributed military production where private companies, engineers, volunteers and manufacturers work beyond official diplomatic limitations. Even the Ukrainian government recognize as drone factories based on Ukrainian designs are popping up outside its borders, including one in Taiwan. One more thing. Ultimately, what the war is accelerating is an idea that a few years ago would have seemed improbable: that to build the largest drone industry on the planet outside chinaUkraine has ended up finding one of its most valuable and strategic allies in Taiwan. Image | x, Trydence In Xataka | Today in “the war in Ukraine beyond all comprehension”: drone pilots are training with ‘Grand Theft Auto’ In Xataka | Ukraine has barely … Read more

Iran did to the US what Ukraine did to Russia in Operation Spiderweb

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In the first weeks of the war, published reports on the damage inflicted by Iran to bases and radars of Washington in the Middle East. For example, attacks on 14 US military sites or air defense facilities were documented, or the bombing of a US base in Kuwaitthe first time in years that an enemy fighter jet hit a US base. However, it has now just become known that, in reality, it has been much worse. The war that the images began to reveal. For years, Western armies assumed that absolute control of the air and satellites was enough to hide damage, movements and weaknesses in the middle of a war… until recent conflicts began to demonstrate just the opposite. In Ukraine, simple commercial photographs Taken from space, they allowed Russian convoys to be followed, bombers to be located, and destroyed facilities to be detected long before governments acknowledged anything. To that mission he called it Spiderweb. It so happens that the same thing is happening now in the Middle East. What began as a campaign presented by Washington as a punishment operation against Iran has ended up leaving an image much more uncomfortable: that satellite photographs are showing a level of destruction on US facilities much higher than publicly admitted. The uncomfortable discovery. Latest Washington Post analysis More than a hundred satellite images have revealed that Iran hit at least 228 military structures or equipment Americans distributed throughout bases in the Middle East, a figure much higher than that officially recognized. The impacts hit hangars, barracks, fuel tanks, Patriot systems, THAAD radarscommunications centers, electrical installations and even strategic aircraft, making it clear that Tehran was not launching symbolic or indiscriminate attacks. The most delicate thing for the United States is that many of these images initially came from Iranian media and were subsequently verified through European systems and other independent commercial sources. In other words, the initial narrative of limited attacks began to collapse when the images began to show something much more serious: that Iran had achieved penetrate advanced defenses and hit critical American infrastructure in numerous countries at the same time. Damage to Camp Arifjan in Kuwait visible on March 4 Iran found the weak point of the bases. Wapo counted that one of the most striking aspects of the attacks is the precision with which they were executed. Military analysts highlighted the absence of random craters and the concentration of impacts on specific targets, a sign that Iran had very detailed prior intelligence on US facilities. The attacks were not limited to military runways or depots traditional facilities, they also hit gymnasiums, lodgings, mess halls, and staff buildings, reflecting a deliberate attempt to increase human casualties and force the United States to empty entire bases (as, in fact, that’s how it happened). Because several facilities ended up being considered too dangerous to operate normally, causing partial evacuations and the transfer of troops beyond Iranian reach. Some bases in Kuwait and Bahrain, used to launch attacks against Iran or deploy HIMARS systems, were especially punishedfueling the feeling that Tehran had managed to quickly identify which platforms were directly participating in the campaign. Nine fuel tanks at the Ali al-Salem air base in Kuwait were damaged Drones changed everything. Much of this battlefield transformation is directly related to a lesson learned in Ukraine: cheap and unidirectional attack drones are eroding the traditional advantage of great powers. American experts recognize that the Pentagon did not adapt its bases quickly enough to this new threat, despite spending years observing how relatively simple drones destroyed armored vehicles, radars or critical infrastructure in other conflicts. Although many Iranian drones carried reduced explosive charges, they were extremely difficult to intercept and they could attack stationary targets with enormous precision. This forced the consumption of gigantic quantities of Patriot and THAAD interceptors, dangerously reducing American and allied reserves in just a few weeks. The result was paradoxical: the most advanced military power in the world began to be forced to play defense around its own bases, while Iran found relatively cheap ways to overwhelm multibillion-dollar anti-aircraft systems. The enormous hidden wear. While Washington publicly insisted that the damage did not significantly alter the military campaign, the images they showed a more complex reality. Some key facilities were damaged considered “extensive” even by American officials, and part of the regional command had to be relocated out of the Middle East. As we said, the headquarters of the Fifth Fleet in Bahrain was one of the most affected areasto the point of moving functions to Florida, while the internal debate grows over whether certain bases will operate as before. Worrying signs also emerged on structural failures: Strategic aircraft repeatedly parked in vulnerable positions, insufficiently protected tactical centers, and a shortage of hardened shelters for critical personnel and equipment. All of this fueled one conclusion: that the United States had underestimated both Iranian resilience and the speed with which modern wars are making transparent facilities that previously seemed untouchable. The true strategic signal that this war leaves. Beyond the specific damage, what really worries strategists and military personnel is the change of perception left by satellite images. For decades, the presence of US bases throughout the Middle East functioned as a symbol of absolute control and immediate response capacity, but now those same facilities appear exposedvulnerable and permanently observed from the air and from space. If you will, the conflict has left a feeling that is difficult to ignore: that Iran may not be able to defeat the United States militarily in a conventional confrontation, but it can. inflict enough damageattrition and political pressure to profoundly alter the US strategic calculation in the region. And that idea that began with Spiderweb operation in Ukrainemultiplied by hundreds of photographs of destroyed hangars, hit radars and partially emptied bases, may end up being one of the most important consequences of the entire war. Image | Iran media, Planet In Xataka | Türkiye has taken a look at the … Read more

In three days, Russia celebrates its Victory Day. And Ukraine has a surprise prepared 1,500 kilometers away

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In May 1987, a young 19-year-old German pilot named Mathias Rust He managed to cross a good part of Soviet airspace with a small civilian plane and land next to Red Square. without being stopped. The episode caused enormous humiliation for the USSR because it showed that even the heart of Moscow could be reached in ways that no one expected. Countdown to Putin’s big parade. Russia prepares for May 9, the most symbolic day of its entire political and military calendar, while Ukraine intensifies a campaign of attacks that seems designed precisely to ruin that sense of control and security. The Kremlin has even announced a unilateral truce for the days of the parade, but kyiv has responded by making it clear that it does not intend to coordinate anything with Moscow and remembering that Russia cannot quietly celebrate Victory Day “without the good will of Ukraine.” The situation is especially uncomfortable for Putin because, for the first time in many years, Moscow faces this date with the feeling that even its capital can become a target. Moscow no longer seems like a completely safe place. The recent attack against a skyscraper luxury hotel located a few kilometers from the Kremlin has been much more than a simple symbolic coup. Ukraine has been trying to bother to Moscow ahead of the May 9 parade, but this time the message comes in a different context: Russia has reduced the size of the event, eliminated some of the heavy military deployment and greatly reinforced the defenses around the capital for fear of new drones. Meanwhile, Zelensky has hinted directly that Moscow fears seeing drones flying over Red Square during the parade, something unthinkable just a few years ago and extremely delicate for a celebration designed precisely to project power and control. The big news is the distance. The most important change in this phase of the war is happening far beyond Moscow. Ukraine is managing to attack industrial cities and military bases located more than 1,500 kilometers from the front, reaching regions of the Urals that for decades were considered a safe rear even in Soviet times. Cities like Yekaterinburg, Chelyabinsk or Perm begin to experience airport closuresinternet restrictions and attacks against refineriesmilitary installations or industrial infrastructures. The psychological impact is enormous because many of these areas experienced the war as something distant until just a few months ago. New missiles and drones are changing the rules. The appearance of the transonic missile F-5 Flamingo reflects the extent to which Ukraine is transforming its deep strike capability. kyiv claims to have used this system to destroy a factory Russian military about 1,500 kilometers away, a facility linked to components for missiles, aviation and naval systems. Beyond the specific damage, what is important is the trend: Ukraine no longer depends solely on improvised drones or isolated attacks, but is beginning to build a sustained capacity to hit strategic infrastructure deep inside Russia. The jam-resistant navigation systems, extreme range and possible integration of Western technology clearly show that kyiv is trying to make Russian territorial depth much less useful than it was at the start of the war. The Soviet rearguard in doubt. Plus: there is a huge historical burden in the places that Ukraine is attacking. During the Second World War, much of the Soviet industry was moved to the Urals precisely because they were considered territories impossible to reach from Europe. Cities like Chelyabinsk became known as “Tankograd” because of the concentration of military factories far from the front. Now, eighty years later, Ukrainian drones and missiles are demonstrating that that strategic depth no longer guarantees security. What once required bombers and huge air campaigns can now be achieved with long-range drones and relatively cheap missiles capable of traversing thousands of kilometers. Avoid vulnerability on its most important day. Because he May 9 parade It is not just any ceremony for Russia. It is the great annual showcase of Russian military power, the event where the Kremlin connects the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany with Putin’s current political legitimacy. That is precisely why it is so sensitive that Ukraine is increasing pressure just before the event. Russia is shooting down hundreds of drones around Moscow and strengthening security of the capital while trying to avoid any image of chaos during a day observed by foreign leaders and broadcast throughout the country. The problem for the Kremlin is that Ukraine has already managed to install a most uncomfortable idea: even more than 1,500 kilometers from the front, there is no longer a complete sense of refuge, and that includes beyond the Urals. Image | Fire Point In Xataka | Today in “the war in Ukraine beyond all comprehension”: drone pilots are training with ‘Grand Theft Auto’ In Xataka | Ukraine has barely captured any North Korean soldiers. The reason is brutally simple: they prefer to immolate themselves

Ukraine is bringing its drones dangerously close to Moscow. And he is doing it with an unusual weapon: Grand Theft Auto V

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In 2002, during a US military exercise known like Millennium Challengea retired general managed to surprise to a technologically superior fleet using unconventional tactics and unexpected means, and did so to the point of virtually “sinking” several ships in a matter of minutes. That simulation left an uncomfortable conclusion For many strategists: in certain scenarios, it is not always whoever has the most means who wins, but whoever best understands how to adapt to new forms of combat. From video games to the real battlefield. The story They told Insider. Apparently, Ukraine has found a totally unexpected way to accelerate the training of drone pilots and perfect its field of action: video gamesand in particular in the environment achieved by Rockstar in Grand Theft Auto Vwhere operators perfect reflexes, coordination and decision-making in simulated scenarios. This practice does not replace military training, rather it complements it, and reveals the extent to which modern warfare is absorbing skills born outside the traditional sphereincorporating a generation accustomed to controls, screens and virtual environments. What begins as a simulation ends up moving to real operations where there is no margin for error, consolidating a combat model in which the line between game and war turns increasingly diffuse. Drones are approaching Moscow. In parallel to this training with GTAV, the range of the Ukrainian drones has been growing steadily until reaching areas ever closer to the political heart of Russia. They remembered in Forbes that deep attacks inside Russian territory, some a few kilometers away of the Kremlin, are breaking the perception of invulnerability that protected Moscow for years. The campaign does not seek only to destroy objectives, but to demonstrate penetration capacity and generate constant pressure that forces us to redistribute defenses and assume that the conflict is no longer far away, but increasingly closer. Victory Day under a new shadow. Yes, because the proximity of May 9, one of the most symbolic events For the Kremlin, it adds a particularly delicate dimension to this development. The parade is not only a military display, but a key piece in Russia’s narrative of power and control, and any alteration, even indirect, would have a disproportionate impact. The fact that it is being contemplated reduce its scale or modify Its format reflects the extent to which the drone threat has changed the strategic calculus, turning a celebration designed to project force into a potential point of vulnerability. A defense saturated and tested. The truth is that although Moscow remains one of the most protected spaces of the world, the accumulation of attacks is straining your systems defensive. Multiple layers of air defense, designed to intercept threats, now face a constant stream of drones seeking to overwhelm them, identify gaps, and wear them down over time. This approach does not depend on a single decisive blow, but on prolonged pressure that forces Russia to defend more and more points at the same time, progressively eroding its response capacity. Putin, more isolated and more protected. In fact, this week they explained in the Financial Times that, in this context, security around Vladimir Putin has visibly tightened, reflecting growing concern about possible attacks, including those carried out with drones. How much? Apparently, the president has reduced their movements, spend more time in bunkers and operate under stricter security protocols, while their environment is subjected to increasingly rigorous controls. This evolution not only responds to physical risks, but also to the need to preserve an image of control at a time when the conflict begins to feel closer to the center of power. The psychological war that accompanies technological warfare. Beyond the material impact, the Ukrainian drone campaign is having a increasing psychological effectboth in the political elite and in Russian society. Each raid that breaks through defenses reinforces the idea that no place is completely safe, weakening a narrative built on distance and control. If you want too, while drones continue to advance and pilots train even in virtual worlds like GTAVthe war enters a phase where the perception of risk it’s so important as the real damage, and where the pressure on Moscow increases just when it most needs to project stability. Image | Wiki In Xataka | Ukraine has just opened the last Russian missile and is still amazed: the real enemy has a “friendly” face In Xataka | Russia has named Ukraine’s most fearsome drone: they call it Zhduns and it doesn’t need to show itself, just wait

Now we know that the Iranian Air Force did to the US what Ukraine could not do to Russia with drones: an abysmal hole

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During the Vietnam War, American commanders discovered that some of their most protected bases they could be hit unexpectedly due to coordinated attacks low costforcing to reinforce defenses that until then were considered sufficient and making it clear that, in war, the feeling of security is usually more fragile than it seems. The blow that no one expected. For decades, the US military architecture in the Middle East relied on in a network of bases designed to surround and contain Iran, a direct heir to the Cold War doctrine and designed to project power quickly. However, a report that came to light this weekend on NBC News has revealed a radical inversion of that logic in the war of 2026: what was supposed to be a shield has become a set of exposed objectives, hit in a coordinated manner by Iranian attacks that hit more than a hundred targets in several countries. We are talking about critical infrastructures such as runways, radars, hangars, command centers or defense systems were damaged or destroyed, and the impact was neither marginal nor symbolic, but structuralaffecting the very functioning of the US deployment in the region. The fence that ended up surrounded. The system of bases in Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, the Emirates or Saudi Arabia was designed to suffocate Iran, but its ability to attack key logistics nodes turned the equation around. How much? It appears that critical facilities were left disabled or evacuatedincluding the headquarters of the Fifth Fleet in Bahrainwhile multiple bases in Iraq and Kuwait had to be abandoned or rendered inoperative. The pressure was such that even the resupply became problematicleaving the American forces themselves in a position close to the siege they intended to impose. The encirclement strategy, which seemed unquestionable for decades, suddenly showed its fragility in the face of an adversary with saturation capacity through missiles, drones and aviation. The hole that changes war. What is most revealing is not only the extent of the damage, but what they represent for Washington: for the first time in years, a rival has managed to systematically drill US military infrastructure at multiple points at once. Iran not only hit bases, but achieved something that until now seemed beyond the reach of other recent conflicts: opening a deep and sustained hole in the defensive framework of the United States, affecting radarsair defenses and strategic assets. That ability to simultaneously degrade multiple layers of the system is reminiscent of what other actors have tried unsuccessfully in wars like the one in Ukraine, but here it translated in real effects on the ground, altering the operational balance and forcing us to rethink the assumed superiority. From control to operational chaos. The middle counted American that the intensity of the attacks and the speed with which they occurred generated a scenario of disorganization that overwhelmed the usual command and control mechanisms. Bases evacuatedemergency relocated personnel and even improvised situations what do we countsuch as the use of civil infrastructure, reflect the extent to which operational pressure broke the planned patterns. Plus: the inability to anticipate and managing the real scope of the attacks, added to the lack of clear communication about the damage, fueled the perception of an overwhelmed response to a type of more distributed warfaster and harder to contain. A cost beyond money. Although initial estimates speak of billions dollars in repairs (not counting advanced systems or unrecoverable equipment), the true impact possibly transcends the economic. What has been affected is the military deployment model itself: the idea that a network of advanced bases guarantees regional control. In other words, the war has shown that, faced with an adversary capable of to attack in depth with means relatively accessiblethis hitherto untouchable network may become a rather critical vulnerability. The result in the pavement American is not only a balance sheet of damages, but a strategic warning that forces us to give more than one turn to its scheme of how military power is projected in a world where distance is already does not protect the same. Image | x In Xataka | If the war resumes again, the US runs a risk unprecedented in the history of war: that the only one with missiles will be Iran. In Xataka | If the question is why the US attacked an Iranian ship with a weapon unprecedented in 40 years, we already know the answer: a “gift from China”

The Pentagon wants to invest $54 billion in drones. It is more than the entire military budget of countries like Ukraine

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The defense budget that the Pentagon has presented for fiscal year 2027 amounts to $1.5 trillion. It is the largest year-on-year increase in military spending since World War II, but in that colossal figure there is another that deserves special attention. This is the $53.6 billion allocated exclusively to drones and autonomous warfare technologies. That amount alone exceeds the Ukraine’s full defense budget either of countries like South Korea or Italy. Spain is even further away. autonomous defense. The money for this specific program will be managed by the Defense Autonomous Warfare Group (DAWG), an agency created at the end of 2025. In the 2026 budget it received 226 million dollars, but in 2027 that figure would be multiplied almost by 240. The United States has realized the relevance that drones have gained in war conflicts and wants to be prepared for this new era of defense. Obsolete investment. The Pentagon itself recognized something striking: the vast majority of the money requested will be used to buy technology that already exists, not to develop future solutions. One of the top officials of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Lieutenant General Steven Whitney, admitted that technological evolution on the battlefield currently happens in weeks, not years. It’s like admitting that what you buy now may become obsolete almost immediately. Ukraine showed that change has changed. The urgency of this budget does not come from nowhere. The war in Ukraine has rewritten the rules of modern combat In such a way that there are many countries that are processing how to assume these changes. Iranian Shahed droneswhich cost about $20,000 per unit, have proven capable of saturating air defense systems that cost hundreds of times more. Relatively affordable quadcopter drones have destroyed multi-million euro tanks and armored vehicles. Defense budgets in 2025. The US already spent 921 billion dollars last year, this year it wants to spend 50% more. Everything goes very fast. The speed of tactical adaptation on the Ukrainian front has been so high that innovations and tactics that work in January may be obsolete by March. Not because someone has invented something better, but because the adversary has found a way to counter those strategies. The Pentagon has reached an unusual conclusion: the traditional model of weapons acquisition that operated in cycles of years or even decades is structurally incompatible with the speed at which current war conflicts are developing. The irony of the Shahed. Among the most striking details of the budget is the confirmation that the American army has adapted the technology of the Iranian Shahed dronewhich is the same one that has been attacking cities and energy infrastructures in Ukraine for years. The US has done reverse engineering of your adversary’s design to incorporate it into your own arsenal. This clearly illustrates the current war reality: the origin of the technology does not matter, but its effectiveness. Risks. This tension between “we have to spend more” and the speed at which it is necessary to adapt to this reality poses an enormous risk. Buy en masse what works today guarantees that solutions will be available tomorrow. The problem is that these solutions may be technically inferior to those that the adversary has developed in the meantime. The same thing happens if you decide not to buy anything until you have the perfect technology, because that means arriving late (or not arriving at all). It is a dilemma similar to that of technology companies and their investment in infrastructure: they have to buy solutions now that they know that they will end up being obsolete in the short or medium term. Final approval is missing. The US Congress will have to approve the budget, which introduces an important political variable. Beyond that, there is a fundamental question in those 54,000 million in this budget. If drone technology evolves in weeks, there is no money that will be able to buy that adaptability to the modern battlefield. And that even with this immense budget superiority cannot be guaranteed makes clear the sign of the times. In Xataka | The percentage of GDP that each country allocates to Defense, shown in this graph with an unavoidable protagonist

Ukraine has knocked down Russian shaheds from a hotel 500 kilometers away

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During a military test in the United States, a pilot managed to land a fighter plane without touching the controls and miles away, guiding it only through a remote connection as if it were a simulator. A decade has passed, and what then seemed like an almost experimental technological curiosity revealed a disturbing possibility: that one day the most critical decisions in a conflict could be made very far from where they actually occur. The war from the basement. Ukraine has introduced a silent but profound change on the battlefield: the possibility of fighting without being physically in it, operating drones from secure locations hundreds of kilometers from the target. counted in one piece the financial times that, from spaces as discreet as basements in kyiv, highly specialized operators control interceptors that no longer depend on short-range radio frequencies, but on secure internet connections that eliminate distance as a real limitation. This leap allows the same pilot to intervene in multiple scenarios without exposing himself to enemy fire, transforming the traditional logic of combat and reducing one of the greatest costs of war: direct human risk. The distance no longer matters. The unprecedented fact that a drone has been controlled from a hotel 500 km away to shoot down two Russian shahed drones is not a technological anecdote, but a clear sign of where the conflict is evolving. Until recently, pilots had to operate close to the front, making them priority targets. Now, that vulnerability is diluted. Modern warfare enters a phase in which the location of the operator becomes irrelevant (due to remoteness), and where the range is no longer determined by the vehicle, but the network that connects it. The invisible key. The Times told This leap is based on a combination of advanced connectivity and artificial intelligence that allows you to maintain control even in the most hostile environments, with interference or momentary signal loss. As? It seems that current systems not only transmit orders, they also interpret images, identify targets and correct trajectories in real time, reducing operator burden and increasing accuracy. In this context, connectivity (that kind of militarized “WiFi”) stops being a support and becomes the true core of the system that pulls the strings. From improvisation to mastery. Plus: what started as an emergency solution to the shortage of missiles has become anthe pillar of defense aerial in certain areas, spaces where drones already intercept most threats. The key is once again that low cost and ease of deployment that allow saturate airspace with multiple layers of protection, freeing up more expensive systems for critical missions. This model not only resists massive attacks, but quickly adapts to new threats. Hitting where it was impossible. At the same time, this developing technology is making it possible to bring war to the enemy rear with unprecedented precision. We are talking about drones with autonomous decision-making capacity that are attacking logistics routes (the surrounding area of ​​the city of Donetsk) and weakening key defensive systems, facilitating operations that were previously unfeasible, and the decrease in these defenses opens windows of opportunity for deeper, more frequent and effective attacks. A system without borders. It is the last of the legs to analyze, because the integration of air, land and naval platforms reinforces this entire transformation, creating a kind of distributed combat network where each element amplifies the scope of the whole. In fact, that’s why intercepting drones from the sea (this week they shot down a shahed for the first time from a naval platform) or coordinating attacks from multiple domains is no longer an exception, but the next step logical. In this scenario, war is no longer defined by geographical lines and begins to depend on networks, nodes and connections. Invisibility. If you also want and as a last note, these advances give a conflict model where physical distance loses all the relevance of yesteryear compared to the capacity for connection. In other words, a scenario that until recently was more typical of a science fiction movie is opening up, one where a few operators can manage multiple systems from locations as remote as a room or a basement 500 km away away from “the war”, and where the front dissolves to become an extended network. Image | National Police of Ukraine In Xataka | From printing drones to looking at lasers, 300 reports have revealed that Iran’s battle manual has one name: Ukraine In Xataka | A disturbing idea has begun to take hold in Europe: Ukraine has turned Russia into a fearsome air force

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