Ukraine Archives - usatoday24

Russia shielded its logistics routes against drones. Ukraine has responded by attacking something much more vulnerable: asphalt

June 6, 2026 by usatoday24

In the spring of 1945, the United States launched a campaign called Operation Starvation. Instead of concentrating on destroying Japanese ships one by one, he began laying mines in the straits and sea routes through which they had to pass. The result It was so effective that dozens of convoy routes had to be abandoned and Japanese maritime traffic plummeted, making logistics as valuable a target as the vehicles themselves. From trucks to roads. The logistics war between Russia and Ukraine is entering in a new phase. For months, Ukraine concentrated its efforts in destroying trucksconvoys, fuel depots and other targets that kept the Russian army supplied. Moscow responded by strengthening the protection of its supply routes, deploying anti-aircraft defenses, adapting its movements and building corridors that were increasingly protected against drones. Now kyiv appears to have identified a vulnerability that is more difficult to fix: the infrastructure itself on which those supplies circulate. Instead of only pursuing specific vehicles, Ukrainian drones are beginning to lay mines on the roads that connect Crimea with the occupied territories, transforming essential routes for Russian logistics into spaces where any movement can become a risk. The strategy of the logistical blockade. Ukrainian authorities describe this campaign as an attempt to impose a “logistical blockade” on the Russian military. The goal is not necessarily to completely cut off communications or destroy every vehicle that passes through them. The key is slow down movement of supplies, increase uncertainty and force the enemy to dedicate increasing resources to protection and cleanup tasks. If a convoy must constantly stop to inspect the road, if each journey requires additional escorts, or if a route remains closed for hours after the appearance of a mine, the cumulative effect can be as damaging as the direct destruction of vehicles. Modern warfare depends on both the speed and the volume of supplies, and any reduction in the pace of movement has a direct impact on units deployed on the front. Roads to Crimea under pressure. Information from Russian sources they point because the campaign is focusing especially on the land corridor that connects Russia with Crimea through the occupied territories of southern Ukraine. Roads such as the M-14 between Mariupol, Melitopol and Chongar or the R-280 Novorossiya have suffered partial closures, traffic restrictions and damage caused by mines dropped from drones. In one of the most notable incidentsa Kamaz truck was reportedly destroyed and several vehicles damaged after mines fell on a road near the border between the occupied regions of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia. These episodes also occur after a series of attacks against tankers and convoys that had already forced Russian authorities to modify routes and temporarily limit heavy traffic. Drones that turn asphalt into a trap. The novelty does not lie in the use of mines, a practice that has been present for decades in any conflict, but in the way they are deployed. According to various analystsUkraine is using drones to distribute 3D printed light mines equipped with motion sensors or magnetic systems. These charges do not need to completely destroy a vehicle to be effective. Enough with immobilizing a truck in the middle of a road to create traffic jams, disrupt traffic and create a concentration of targets vulnerable to subsequent air attacks. A single mine can stop a whole column. Several mines spread periodically along a route can paralyze traffic for hours while inspections and clearance operations are carried out. The creation of interdiction zones. The tactic is part of a broader concept that seeks to turn Russian logistics routes into true layered interdiction zones. Drivers traveling these roads must already face ambush FPV dronesautonomous drones assisted by artificial intelligence and attacks directed against the anti-aircraft defenses that protect the logistics corridors. The incorporation of air-dropped mines adds a permanent threat under the wheels of every vehicle. The result is a combination of risks that multiplies the psychological and operational pressure on any movement of supplies, forcing Russia to simultaneously monitor the sky, the roadsides and the asphalt surface itself. The Russian adaptation. The Russian response is already beginning to be seen in some sectors of the front. Ukrainian sources claim to have destroyed Tor-M2 anti-aircraft systems that were being moved to reinforce the protection of these vulnerable routes. At the same time, some analysts believe that Moscow could try extend to roads further from the front the anti-drone network and tunnel structures that it already uses in closer combat zones. However, they remembered in Forbes that protecting hundreds of kilometers of open roads represents a logistical and economic challenge much greater than that of shielding some sections close to the battle lines. Precisely therein lies the logic of the Ukrainian strategy: the more extensive the infrastructure that must be protected, the more difficult it will be to guarantee its security. Crimea as an indirect objective. The pressure on the roads also has a strategic dimension related to Crimea. Ukraine has been attacking anti-aircraft systems, radars, missile launchers and other assets that protect the peninsula for months. If land routes supplying the region become slower and more dangerous, Russia could be forced to rely even more from the Kerch bridgeone of the few high-capacity logistics arteries that continue to directly connect Crimea with Russian territory. This would increase the importance of an infrastructure that has already been a priority objective of kyiv on repeated occasions. Keep a road open to make it useless. In short, the great innovation of this campaign is that it does not necessarily seek to permanently cut a route. Ukraine seems to be pursuing something more subtle: keeping the roads technically open while progressively reducing its usefulness. If each convoy requires more time, if each inspection causes delays and if each stop increases exposure to new attacks, the logistics flow is degraded without the need to destroy the infrastructure. Russia has dedicated enormous efforts to protecting its convoys and supply corridors from drones. The Ukrainian response now consists of moving the … Read more

Ukraine has been left without thousands of drones. An error classified them as electric cars, and the Treasury has fried them with taxes

May 28, 2026 by usatoday24

During World War II, the United States Army created entire systems classification and emergency purchases because normal bureaucracy was too slow to keep up with the pace of war. Eight decades later, Ukraine has discovered the same problem from the opposite side. Drone warfare crashes into bureaucracy. Ukraine has been transforming the front into a war laboratory automated where ground drones have become essential to transport ammunition, evacuate wounded or attack Russian positions without exposing soldiers. The problem is that, while kyiv was trying to accelerate this military revolution, the bureaucracy has ended up mistakenly classifying these unmanned vehicles within the same tax category than electric cars. When an old exemption for EVs expired on January 1, drones began paying a 20% VAT. The result has been devastating: according to the industry, the army could have bought some 5,000 additional drones only in the first half of 2026 if that tax had not come into force. Thousands of drones lost at the worst moment. They counted on Insider that the impact has been especially serious because it has arrived at a critical phase of the war. Ukraine is increasingly relying on autonomous systems to compensate for human and material attrition against Russia, to the point that Zelensky claimed that his forces carried out more than 22,000 missions with ground drones in just three months. kyiv wanted to acquire 50,000 units this year, but the new VAT skyrocketed costs, froze public contracts and left manufacturers whole for months. no state orders. Some companies drastically reduced production to survive, while others tried to reclassify their robots as armored vehicles to avoid the tax burden. A trapped military industry. The chaos also reflects how the military technological revolution is advancing faster than the laws themselves. Ground drones were so new within European and Ukrainian commercial standards that they did not even there was a category clear to classify them. When a former tax exemption for electric vehicles expired, the system automatically absorbed these military robots into the same regulations. The Ministry of Defense suddenly found itself with insufficient budgets and paralyzed purchasing processes because, technically, essential weapons for the front had no longer been considered. exempt military equipment tax. Manufacturers like Tencorecreator of the popular TermIT dronethey spent up to five months without public contracts and had to survive thanks to volunteer organizations that directly supply military units. In a war economy where many companies literally live from order to order, three months without state purchases is equivalent to little less than a heart attack industrial. The big problem is not just making weapons. The episode reveals something deeper about the evolution of modern warfare. For years, drones, artificial intelligence and automation have been talked about as the future of combat, but Ukraine is discovering that the bottleneck is not always in the technology. Sometimes it is in the administrationin legislation or in bureaucratic systems designed for peacetime. Russia and Ukraine are immersed in a race of constant adaptation where every month counts and where losing half a year due to tax procedures can have direct effects on the front. The sector itself calculates that the tax exemption would save about 200 million dollarsa gigantic figure for an industry that still depends on precarious financing and accelerated production. The problem is that even if Parliament now corrects the law, the damage has already been done: delayed contracts, lost capacity and thousands of drones that never made it to the battlefield when they were needed most. The paradox of the war of the future. The story perfectly summarizes one of the great contradictions of this war. Ukraine has become the country that has integrated autonomous systems the fastest in real combat and has built an ecosystem with more than 280 companies and 550 models different from ground drones. However, that same ecosystem remains dependent on sluggish state structures, legacy regulations, and legal frameworks unable to keep pace with military innovation. While the front is filled with robots that transport ammunition, evacuate wounded or attack Russian trenches without a human driver, the State continued to administratively treat them as if they were simple electric cars. The irony could not be more brutal: one of the most technologically advanced wars of the century lost thousands of combat machines not due to lack of industrial capacity or due to Russian attacks, but because the Treasury decided to apply the same tax treatment than to a civil electric vehicle. Image | x In Xataka | A Ukrainian stork has managed to outwit a Russian drone in flight. The video is the best clue about who will win the war In Xataka | Ukraine has been terrorizing Russian soldiers with its heavy drones for years. Now they are literally giving it back.

While Europe looks at Ukraine, the US has sounded the alarms for Spain on a closer front: losing two autonomous cities

May 27, 2026 by usatoday24

In July 2002, a handful of Moroccan soldiers landed on the islet of Perejil and raised a Moroccan flag there. The Spanish response came days later with a military operation so rapid and measured that it ended up becoming one of the diplomatic-military episodes strangest of the recent Mediterranean. What worries Spain. While Europe concentrates much of its military attention in Ukraine and the eastern flank of NATO, a much closer concern is growing in Spain: the south of the Strait. The problem is not just Morocco or the military balance in the Maghreb, but the change in the United States’ attitude toward the region. The appearance in Washington of official documents that describe Ceuta and Melilla like cities “under Spanish administration” in Moroccan territory has generated unprecedented alarm because it breaks a historical diplomatic taboo. For decades, the sovereignty of both cities was considered out of the question for Western allies. Now some American political sectors are beginning to treat her as an open dispute susceptible to future negotiation. US pressure. Spanish concern does not arise solely from a parliamentary report, but from the political context that surrounds it. Republican congressman Mario Diaz-Balartclose to Marco Rubio’s entourage and aligned with positions very favorable to Rabat, has not only publicly defended that Ceuta and Melilla are “in Moroccan territory”, but that the own report encourages the State Department to promote diplomatic talks about their status. All this coincides with the deterioration of the relationship between Donald Trump and the Spanish Government for military spendingNATO and the disagreements over Iran. In certain strategic Spanish sectors, the feeling is beginning to spread that Washington increasingly considers most useful to Morocco as a regional and less essential partner to Spain within its Mediterranean architecture. Morocco and the new balance. The most profound change may be occurring on the other side of the Strait. Morocco has been accelerating for years its military modernization through agreements with the United States, Israel, Türkiye and France, while also promoting its own arms industry. Since 2021, industrial projects linked to drones, weapons and advanced military production have multiplied. At the same time, Rabat has consolidated his diplomatic position in Washington after the American recognition of Western Sahara. For many Spanish analysts, the problem is no longer just migratory pressure or specific border crises, but the emergence of a regional power much more militarily connected to the West and increasingly secure in its strategic position. Spain is left out. The other big concern is that Spain seems have been left out of the new network of military alliances in the Maghreb. Italy has become the main strategic partner of Algeria in the Mediterranean, expanding defense agreements, industrial cooperation and military coordination with one of the most powerful armies in Africa. Morocco, meanwhile, close ties with Washington, Paris and Tel Aviv. Spain has managed to rebuild diplomatic relations with both neighbors, but it hardly has any relevant agreements on defense matters. This vacuum is beginning to be perceived as a serious problem in certain strategic circles, especially when linked reports to the Ministry of Defense they already admit that “South of the Strait of Gibraltar, military pressure is a reality.” Ceuta and Melilla as vulnerable points. That is why the reports of the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies raise with increasing clarity the need to a specific plan defense for Ceuta and Melilla. The focus goes far beyond the military and includes logistics, cybersecurity, maritime surveillance, institutional resilience and protection of critical infrastructure. Fear does not necessarily point to an open conventional conflict, but rather to hybrid scenarios constant pressure: migration crises, diplomatic tensions, partial blockades or political attrition campaigns. Autonomous cities thus appear as especially sensitive enclaves due to their logistical dependence and geographical isolation. A brutal return: geography. If you like, all this reflects something broader: the return of geography as a central factor of European politics. For years, Spain observed the Maghreb mainly from a migratory and commercial perspective, while the greatest threats seemed to be far from the western Mediterranean. But the war in Ukraine has accelerated regional rearmament and has reorganized alliances throughout the area. And in the midst of this transformation, Spain begins to discover that one of its potentially most delicate fronts is not in the Baltic or in Eastern Europe, but just in the other side of the strait. Image | US Army In Xataka | The US threatened to take the Rota base to Morocco. Spain has buried it with an unbeatable offer: more territory In Xataka | ANDhe tunnel between Spain and Morocco seemed like a chimera. Now a tunnel boring machine manufacturer says it is viable

secret training for war in Ukraine

May 24, 2026 by usatoday24

The scene took place a few months ago. Ukrainian soldiers surprised British instructors when they discovered that many NATO armies still They did not use anti-drone networks on a regular basis. After several years of war, Ukraine was beginning to teach the West how to survive on a front dominated by drones. Much more than drones. For much of the Ukraine war, the relationship between China and Russia has been interpreted primarily in terms economic and technological. Beijing bought Russian oil and gas while Chinese companies appeared linked to the supply of electronic components, drones and machinery useful for the Russian military industry. However, the revelations he has had access Reuters on the secret training of Russian military in Chinese facilities point to something much deeper: China would not be limiting itself to indirectly supporting the Russian war economy, but rather participating in the tactical and doctrinal training of soldiers who then return directly to the Ukrainian front. This enormously changes the dimension of the relationship between both countries. War as a military classroom. According to the documents and sources European intelligence agencies, some 200 Russian soldiers were trained discreetly in China at the end of 2025 under an agreement signed between senior commanders of both countries. He program included training in FPV drones, electronic warfare, army aviation, mechanized infantry and demining. Some sessions took place in military centers in Beijing, Nanjing, Zhengzhou or Shijiazhuang. What is important is not only the relatively small number of soldiers, but the profile of many of them: instructors and commanders capable of relaying that knowledge to whole units once back in Ukraine. In other words, China would not simply be sending technology, but helping to perfect the way Russia fights modern war. China learns while Russia fights. It just so happens that the relationship also greatly benefits Beijing. The People’s Liberation Army has not fought a major war in decades and the Russian invasion of Ukraine has become the largest military laboratory real of the planet. Russia brings direct combat experience in drones, trenches, electronic warfare and mass attrition. China provides industrial capacity, advanced simulators, technological production and training methods increasingly sophisticated. The exchange is extremely valuable for both. Moscow gains access to technology and training difficult to obtain under Western sanctions, while Beijing can observe how modern weapons, tactics and doctrines really work without being officially involved in the conflict. Silent revolution. The heart of all this cooperation revolves around drones. Ukraine has completely transformed the way it fights using cheap FPV capable of destroying armored vehicles, fortified positions and even helicopters. Russia had to quickly adapt to that reality and now appears to be turning to China to further professionalize part of that ecosystem. The documents describe simulator training flight, coordinated use of drones with mortars, electronic warfare against enemy drones and physical interception systems through networks. All of this reflects the extent to which modern warfare is ceasing to depend exclusively on large traditional platforms to increasingly focus on cheap, massive and very difficult to neutralize systems. Europe’s concern. For the European agencies, what is truly disturbing is that part of those soldiers trained in China already they would have participated later in combat operations in occupied Crimea and Zaporizhzhia. This means that the knowledge acquired in Chinese facilities ends up being applied directly on the European battlefield. Beijing, for its part, continues to publicly defend a neutral position and continues to present itself as a possible peace mediator, but this type of cooperation seriously erodes that image. In the eyes of many Western governments, China would be entering a much more sensitive gray area: not officially sending its own troops or weapons, but contributing to improving Russian operational capacity in an active war against Ukraine. Increasingly military alliance. The revelation It also confirms the extent to which the “limitless” partnership announced by Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin before the 2022 invasion has evolved far beyond simple joint exercises or diplomatic statements. China and Russia no longer seem to limit themselves to coordinating political positions vis-à-vis the West, they are beginning to share knowledge combat practices, training and doctrine. The most significant detail may be precisely the secrecy of the agreements: prohibition of media coverage, restrictions on information to third parties and programs developed discreetly away from the international spotlight. All this suggests that both countries perfectly understand the political sensitivity of a cooperation that, although still indirect, gets closer and closer to China to the real workings of the war in Ukraine. Image | Vitaly V. Kuzmin In Xataka | The closure of the Strait of Hormuz chokes the Chinese economy. Its only energy solution is a historic pact with Putin In Xataka | While everyone was looking at Hormuz, Russia has found a much more important route to supply drones to Iran

“Slaughterbots” are no longer science fiction in Ukraine. Russians wear masks to avoid the drone that aims at their heads

May 22, 2026 by usatoday24

A few years before the start of the war in Ukraine, a Berkeley computer science professor presented at the UN a short called “Slaughterbots”a piece where small drones with facial recognition chased people autonomously. Many saw it then as another technological exaggeration in the style of the Black Mirror series. A few years later the short… has fallen short. Drones that search for tanks, search for people. For much of the Ukrainian war, drones were seen as a support weapon intended to destroy armor, correct artillery fire or monitor enemy movements. That phase has gone disappearing quickly. What is now emerging is something much more disturbing: cheap drones, produced by the millions, designed specifically to hunt down and kill soldiers. individually. They counted in Forbes that the Russian military channels themselves they are warning of Ukrainian FPVs equipped with thermal vision, reconnaissance systems and munitions capable of firing explosive projectiles at a distance directly against a human body. The detail that is generating the most fear is not the weapon itself, but the possibility that these drones are already learning to identify Where to hit to maximize lethality. The idea of small autonomous devices “hunting” specific people no longer belongs to technological dystopias or viral YouTube videos: it is beginning to form part of the front line’s routine. A gigantic aerial hunting area. The most profound consequence of this revolution is that huge parts of the front have been transformed in “kill zones”those corridors where any human movement can be detected and destroyed from the air in a matter of minutes. Ukraine has especially perfected this model around cities like Kostyantynivka or Chasiv Yarwhere small Russian groups are identified long before approaching the defensive lines. The result has been devastating for classical Russian doctrines: large armored columns and mechanized assaults have become too visible and vulnerable. In response, Moscow is trying to create their own “drone racers”infiltrating small teams of operators hiding in basements, destroyed buildings or tree lines to build temporary bubbles of local air dominance. In other words, war is no longer just about controlling the terrain, it is about controlling the sky just a few meters above each soldier’s head. The true technological leap. The most important thing about these new systems is not the size of the explosive charge, but intelligence that begins to guide them. Many Ukrainian FPVs already integrate autonomy modules capable of continuing the attack even when the operator loses signal due to electronic interference. Western companies and civilian developers have created relatively inexpensive kits that turn commercial drones into smart munitions capable of automatically locking on and pursuing targets. Until recently, that autonomy was mainly used against vehicles; now the focus shifts to the infantry. Some models use EFP loadsformed explosive projectiles that do not need to hit directly to penetrate protection and kill the target from a distance. That eliminates many of the defenses improvised measures that had proliferated on the front, from metal nets even the famous Russian “turtle tanks”. The problem for soldiers is that hiding no longer guarantees survival: the drone can continue observing, wait for the exact moment and attack when it detects vulnerability. “Slaughterbots” stopped seeming over the top. We said it at the beginning, in 2017 Professor Stuart Russell launched the short film “Slaughterbots” as a warning about autonomous drones with facial recognition capable of murdering specific people. At the time it seemed like a futuristic hype designed to open ethical debates about military artificial intelligence. Nine years later, the parallels are beginning to be uncomfortable even for those fighting on the ground. Russian soldiers develop countermeasures that seem straight out of a science fiction movie: using masks to confuse recognition systems, throwing helmets as decoys, hiding their heads behind obstacles or remaining completely still to avoid thermal tracking. Obsession reflects a huge psychological change. For centuries, a soldier could attempt to protect himself from enemy fire using cover, armor, or distance. Many fighters now feel that there is a camera constantly watching them from above, capable of deciding when to attack and possibly where to do it to ensure death. The industrial and algorithmic battle. The great Russian fear is that Ukraine will manage to combine mass production, autonomy and precision on an unprecedented scale. kyiv aims to manufacture millions of FPVs a year, and that completely changes the mathematics of combat. Whether a relatively cheap drone can chase soldiers with hit rates close to 80%human wear and tear begins to take on industrial dimensions. That is why Russia is desperately trying to build its own drone racersdeploy interceptors and saturate local airspace before moving larger troops. However, Ukraine maintains an advantage in both quantity and technological sophistication, especially in optics, autonomous navigation and aerial interception. What is being seen in the Donbas is not simply a tactical evolution of drone warfare: it is rather the birth of a new form of combat where thousands of semi-autonomous machines continually compete to detect, pursue and eliminate individual human beings. And the most disturbing thing is that this transformation is just beginning. Image | Defense Ukraine In Xataka | Satellite images reveal how much Russia fears Ukraine’s drones. 7,000 km away they are covering their nuclear missiles In Xataka | Ukraine has resurrected one of the oldest tactics of warfare. And he is isolating Russian cities without the need for soldiers

Russia turned gliding bombs into Ukraine’s nightmare. 17 months later Ukraine is giving him his own medicine

May 21, 2026 by usatoday24

Two years ago Russia launched a FAB-3000 pump of three tons over Kharkov and the shock wave was so powerful that several local seismic sensors recorded it as if it were a small earthquake. Until then, Ukraine barely had a way to respond to a weapon capable of striking from tens of kilometers away. The nightmare that changed the war. For much of 2023 and 2024, Russian gliding bombs became one of the most devastating weapons of the entire war. Moscow discovered that it could transform old Soviet bombs into long-range munitions simply by adding relatively cheap wings and guidance systems. The result It was devastating: huge FABs of 250, 500 or 1,000 kilos launched from dozens of kilometers away, out of the reach of many Ukrainian anti-aircraft defenses, capable of destroying fortified positions, bridges, logistics centers or entire neighborhoods. For Ukraine, this became a problem almost impossible to solve. Shooting down each bomb was extremely difficult, attacking the launching planes forced them to get too close to the front and each new Russian kit multiplied the pressure on cities like Kharkiv, Sumy or Zaporizhia. Seventeen months searching for an answer. The appearance now of the first gliding bomb Ukrainian marks something much more important than the presentation of new ammunition. It represents the moment in which kyiv believes it has found your own answer to one of the weapons that have done the most damage during the last two years. Development reportedly began in December 2024 and has required 17 months of work until reaching the final tests and the first official order from the Ministry of Defense. The weapon, named like Vyrivniuvach (“Equalizer”), uses a 250-kilogram warhead and has been designed specifically for the real conditions of the Ukrainian war. It is not simply a question of copying a Western or Soviet model: Ukrainian engineers tried to build an adapted pump to a scenario where planes fly at low altitude to avoid radars, where anti-aircraft defenses cover enormous areas and where each weapon must be cheap, quick to manufacture and easy to integrate. The importance of manufacturing at home. The great advantage of this bomb is not only military, but also industrial and strategic. Until now Ukraine depended on Western kits like the JDAM-ER American or French Hammer to convert conventional bombs into long-range guided weapons. The problem is that these systems arrive in limited quantities, depend on external political decisions and often include restrictions on where they can be used. kyiv had been trying for months to escape that dependence by building its own war industry. The Vyrivniuvach fits perfectly into that logic: according to its developers it costs approximately three times less than a JDAM-ER, can be prepared in less than half an hour and is designed to be integrated into already operational platforms such as the Su-24, MiG-29, Su-27 and even Western F-16 or Mirage 2000. A Russian UMPK gliding bomb attached to a Su-34 An increasingly cheaper and more massive war. The evolution of gliding bombs also reflects a profound change in modern warfare. For years, cruise missiles seemed like the ultimate symbol of precision strike. Ukraine and Russia have proven otherwise: It is often more efficient to adapt old weapons with relatively simple kits and mass produce them. Russia understood this earlier and converted its FABs with UMPK modules into a true constant attrition machinery against the Ukrainian defenses. Ukraine has ended up following the same path. The logic is brutally practical: a gliding bomb does not need complex engines, can be launched from great distances, costs much less than an advanced missile and forces the enemy to expend much more expensive anti-aircraft interceptors or accept the impact. The problem of attacking from outside enemy range. They counted the TWZ analysts that what made Russian bombs especially dangerous was the possibility of launching them outside the radius of many Ukrainian defenses. Russian planes could get relatively close to the front, release their ammunition, and return without directly entering areas covered by Patriot or NASAMS. Ukraine now wants exactly that same ability. Your new bomb is designed to hit targets located “tens of kilometers” behind Russian lines, including fortifications, command posts or logistics centers. This allows you to attack without constantly exposing the pilots to the densest air defenses on the front. Furthermore, as it is a national system, kyiv can use it against any target it deems necessary without depending on external authorizations or political limitations imposed by Western allies. Ukraine’s industrial war. The Vyrivniuvach It also symbolizes the extent to which Ukraine has ceased to be simply a country that receives Western weapons and has become a power. of improvised military innovation out of necessity. In just two years, kyiv has developed long-range kamikaze drones, unmanned naval systems, new munitions and electronic warfare solutions built at high speed and at low cost. The glider bomb is part of that same transformation. Ukraine understood that it could not win a long war by relying solely on limited foreign arsenals or deliveries subject to political debates in Washington or Brussels. That’s why the message behind this new weapon is so important: Russia turned gliding bombs into one of the biggest symbols of Ukrainian vulnerability, but seventeen months later Ukraine seems to have managed to hit back using exactly the same weapon. industrial and military logic. Image | Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, Russian Ministry of Defense In Xataka | Satellite images reveal how much Russia fears Ukraine’s drones. 7,000 km away they are covering their nuclear missiles In Xataka | Once again, Ukraine has opened a missile launched by Russia. Once again, surprising manufacturers have been found

Ukraine has resurrected one of the oldest tactics of warfare. And he is isolating Russian cities without the need for soldiers

May 20, 2026 by usatoday24

One of the many movie scenes that took place during the soviet blockade of berlin occurred in 1948, when the United States and its allies kept an entire city alive using an airlift that landed every few minutes with food, coal and medicine. The operation highlighted a lesson that military strategists never forgot: in any war, sometimes the most important thing is not to conquer a city, but to decide who can continue to supply it. A silent return. For centuries, sieges were one of the tools more brutal and effective of the war. Surrounding a city, cutting off supplies, and waiting for hunger, exhaustion, or lack of ammunition to do the job was a military logic as old as empires themselves. Ukraine is now recovering that same idea, but adapted to the drone era. The big difference is that you no longer need to physically surround a city or send thousands of soldiers to isolate it. It is enough to control the roads, monitor movements and constantly destroy everything that enters or leaves. What is happening around Mariupol It is beginning to look less like a traditional war and more like a medieval siege executed from the air and hundreds of kilometers away. Mariupol as a laboratory. After conquering Mariupol in 2022, Russia turned the city into one of the ggreat logistics centers of its southern front, using its roads and port to move fuel, ammunition, troops and equipment towards Donetsk and Zaporizhia. Ukraine has started to attack precisely that circulation network. Reconnaissance and attack drones patrol the main access routes to the city looking for tanker trucks, ammunition transports or logistical convoys. The logic is extremely simple and very old: There is no need to destroy a fortified position if you can prevent it from continuing to function. According to different military sources and published videos by Ukrainian units, some drones already operate up to 160 kilometers within of territory controlled by Russia, turning entire roads into permanent risk zones for any Russian military vehicle. Turn logistics into the new front. The most important transformation of this strategy is that the main objective is no longer necessarily soldiers, tanks or trenches. They are the supplies. Ukraine is exploiting a classic vulnerability: any army depends on fuel, food, ammunition and constant transportation to maintain positions. The drones greatly facilitate that job because logistics trucks are relatively easy targets: they follow predictable routes, have little protection and often transport extremely flammable or explosive material. Even small ammunition can destroy them completely. That explains why Ukraine is dedicating so many resources to chasing supply vehicles instead of directly attacking fortified positions that are much more difficult to neutralize. From Mariupol to Moscow. The same logic also appears behind the massive drone attacks against Moscow. They remembered in Insider that Ukraine no longer uses only small improvised FPVs near the front. Now deploy long-range platforms such as FP-1 Firepointthe RS-1 Bars or the new Bars-SM Gladiatorhybrid drones between a cruise missile and unmanned aircraft capable of traveling hundreds of kilometers and crossing one of the densest anti-aircraft networks in the world. The objective is not only to cause specific damage, but to force Russia to disperse defensesspending resources and living under constant pressure even far from the front. The attack with more than 120 drones on the Moscow region demonstrates the extent to which Ukraine attempts to transfer the logic of attrition and isolation far beyond the traditional battle lines. A battle for movement. What is really important is that Ukraine seems to be redefining a fundamental idea of modern warfare: it is no longer necessary to completely control the terrain to control the situation. Just control movement. If any road can be surveilled by drones, any convoy can be destroyed and any resupply can end up intercepted, maintaining a position begins to be much more difficult even if the enemy retains numerical superiority. There is no doubt, that profoundly changes traditional military logic. The future sieges They may no longer be represented with circles surrounding cities on a map, but with invisible networks of drones capable of slowly collapsing enemy logistics without the need for major ground offensives. The war in Ukraine is demonstrating precisely that: that today you can isolate a city, wear down an army and force it to abandon positions without moving practically a single soldier. Image | Pexels In Xataka | Once again, Ukraine has opened a missile launched by Russia. Once again, surprising manufacturers have been found In Xataka | Russia has been advancing at a snail’s pace in Ukraine for months. That’s about to change because of one season: summer.

Ukraine has opened the missile that devastated kyiv. They have found 100 reasons to be angry, and not exactly with Russia

May 18, 2026 by usatoday24

In 2014, after the downing of flight MH17 over eastern Ukraine, international investigators spent months reconstructing fragments metallic weapons scattered among fields and roads to identify the weapon responsible. One of the biggest surprises was not just the missile itself, but the enormous amount of information that they could reveal small pieces seemingly insignificant. Ukraine has been “surprised” for some time by what is inside Russian war technology, but the latest perhaps exceeds anything seen before. The 100 components that should not be there. It we have been counting with numerous intercepted drones and missiles by kyiv, but the latest “unboxing” has set off alarms. The reason? When the Ukrainian teams they began to analyze the remains of the Kh-101 missiles that had hit residential buildings in the capital, they hoped to find Russian technology, perhaps Chinese parts or improvised systems to avoid sanctions. What they found was much more uncomfortable for the West: more than one hundred components manufactured by American and European companies inside each missile. Chips, microelectronics and systems produced years after sanctions began, including from this same 2026continued to appear in some of the most advanced weapons in the Russian arsenal. For Ukraine, the discovery has ended up generating a particularly bitter sensation: the missiles that they devastate the cities Ukrainians continue to partially depend on technology designed and manufactured by the same countries that support kyiv militarily. The Kh-101 is mounted on pylons The great crack of sanctions. He Kh-101 case is revealing one of the biggest problems of modern technological warfare: sanctioning does not necessarily mean cut off the supply real. Russia continue accessing to Western microelectronics through re-exports, intermediaries, opaque distributors and commercial networks that are extremely difficult to control. Some pieces even arrive from china as clones or compatible copies of Western designs. The result is that Moscow has achieved maintain and expand its missile production despite economic isolation. Ukraine maintains that many of the components found were fOpened in 2024 and 2025years after the sanctions packages that were supposed to strangle Russian military capacity. The feeling in kyiv is that there is a huge difference between announcing restrictions and making them actually work. The missile that Russia does not stop perfecting. Yes, because the Kh-101 has become a of the central pieces of the Russian air campaign. Launched from strategic bombers and designed for long-range flights at low altitude, Moscow has multiplied its production since 2022 to levels far above those before the invasion. But also, Russia is continually modifying the missile to make it more difficult to intercept. Ukraine assures that the new versions incorporate anti-interference improvements, more sophisticated navigation systems, double charges reducing fuel and even fragmentation munitions with zirconium elements to increase damage. kyiv continues to intercept a good part of them, but each new development forces spend more resources defenses and demonstrates that Russia maintains sufficient industrial capacity to sustain a prolonged technological war. The Western Paradox. Also it we have been counting. The history of the Kh-101 reflects, one more timean extremely uncomfortable contradiction for Europe and the United States. As the West delivers anti-aircraft systems, intelligence and economic aid to Ukraine, part of the global technology industry it keeps leaking towards the Russian military machine. In practice, some Western companies may end up seeing their own chips end up inside the missiles which then force the use of expensive Patriot or NASAMS interceptors also financed by the West. That paradox explains much of the Ukrainian frustration. For kyiv, the problem is no longer just Russia, but the inability of global trade chains to prevent critical technology from ending up feeding the Kremlin’s military production. The industrial war of the 21st century. He analysis of the remains The attack on kyiv is also leaving a deeper conclusion about how modern wars work. No great power today manufactures advanced weapons completely isolated of the global market. Missiles, drones and guidance systems depend of an international network of microelectronics, software and components extremely difficult to control. Russia has shown that even under massive sanctions can still access much of that global technological infrastructure. And Ukraine has discovered something equally disturbing: that in the wars of the 21st century, open a missile enemy is no longer only useful for studying its military technology. It also serves to discover to what extent the connected world continues feeding indirectly the war he is trying to stop. Image | Office of the President of Ukraine, Russia MoD In Xataka | Russia has been advancing at a snail’s pace in Ukraine for months. That’s about to change because of one season: summer. In Xataka | The war in Ukraine has entered such a crazy phase that soldiers are shooting at their own drones

Russia has been advancing at a snail’s pace in Ukraine for months. That’s about to change because of one season: summer.

May 16, 2026 by usatoday24

During World War II, many commanders discovered that a simple station could completely alter the rhythm of a military campaign: on the eastern front, the arrival of spring turned roads and fields into seas of mud capable of immobilizing tanks for weeks, while summer suddenly reopened enormous corridors of advance for both armies. The war that no longer advances as before. I counted the weekend the new york times that for months, the Kremlin has tried to sell the idea that a Russian victory in Ukraine is only a matter of time, pressuring even Trump and Western negotiators with the argument that kyiv Donbas will end up losing inevitably. However, on the ground the reality is much less spectacular. Russia has been advancing at a snail’s pace practically all year, to the point that, maintaining the current pace, it would take decades to completely occupy the region whose surrender it demands to negotiate peace. The problem is that this apparent paralysis can be misleading. Both Ukrainian commanders and military analysts carry weeks warning that summer is slowly changing the conditions of the front: the dry terrain allows the use of motorcycles and light vehicles to recover, the vegetation offers coverage against drones and Russian infiltrations are beginning to gain effectiveness after extremely difficult months for Moscow. The front is a drone war. The great transformation of this phase of the war is that Russia can no longer advance as in previous conflicts. Massive assaults with armored columns have become too vulnerable in a field of battle saturated by dronessensors and constant surveillance. Every movement is exposed from the air and any concentration of troops can be quickly destroyed. That has forced Moscow to completely modify its tactics. Now small groups of soldiers predominate slowly infiltratingon foot or on motorcycles, trying to open gradual gaps within a huge “gray zone” where control of the territory is no longer clear for either side. In other words, the conflict is looking less and less like a conventional war and more like a technological competition permanent between drones, electronic warfare and improvised survival systems. Russia makes little progress, but continues to push. The big problem for Ukraine is that even these minimal advances remain generating constant wear. Russia has suffered huge human lossesrecruitment problems and technological difficulties, including communications restrictions and obstacles to coordinate your drones. However, the Kremlin appears to have accepted that a slow and costly war remains preferable to launching large, risky offensives that could end in failure. In places like Pokrovsk or Chasiv YarMoscow has been fighting for years without managing to definitively break the front, but it has not retreated decisively either. Their troops infiltrate little by little, occupy temporary positions and turn huge areas of Donbas into spaces impossible for either army to completely control. The sensation is that of heavy, slow and damaged machinery that still continues advancing meter by meter. Summer is coming. That’s where it comes into play the seasonal factor which worries kyiv so much. During the mud and cold, Ukrainian drones have been especially effective at detecting Russian movements over open terrain. But the arrival of summer changes part of those dynamics. Trees and vegetation make aerial surveillance difficult, dry routes allow faster movement, and small Russian units find more opportunities to infiltrate without being immediately detected. In fact, Ukrainian officials recognize that Russian operations are already showing signs of improvement and that offensive activity is intensifying along the front. This is not yet a large mechanized offensive like those at the beginning of the war, but something much more disturbing: a constant pressure and diffuse design designed to exploit any weakness accumulated after years of wear. Between wear and tear and negotiation. All this greatly complicates international negotiations. Putin needs keep the image of a Russia advancing towards victory to pressure Ukraine and convince the United States that time is on the Kremlin’s side. But the real data show an exhausted army, enormous human losses and a front that barely moves. At the same time, Ukraine also does not have a comfortable situation: suffers from personnel shortages, desertions and difficulties in sustaining such a technological and costly war indefinitely. That’s why summer worries so much on both sides. Not because it will produce an immediate definitive rupture, but because it may slightly alter the balance of a war that has been trapped for months in a kind of lethal stalemate. And in a conflict where every kilometer costs thousands of lives, even small changes in the terrain, vegetation or climate They can end up having enormous strategic consequences. Image | Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 7th Army Training Command In Xataka | While we all look at Iran, something is moving in the Arctic Circle: Russia is sending bombers with missiles In Xataka | To achieve the milestone of building the largest drone industry without China, Ukraine has found an explosive ally: Taiwan

The war in Ukraine has entered such a crazy phase that soldiers are shooting at their own drones

May 15, 2026 by usatoday24

In 1943, during a night mission over Europe, several British pilots returned convinced that they had been pursued by strange luminous objects that appeared and disappeared around their planes. Some thought it was a secret German weapon, others thought it was nervous breakdowns caused by the stress of combat. Decades later, that aerial confusion He continues to remember a disturbing idea: there are moments in wars where the problem is no longer just the enemy. A schizophrenic heaven. They counted on Insider that the war in Ukraine has entered such a phaseDrone Aturation that, in many sectors of the front, soldiers no longer know what aircraft flies over their heads or who controls it. The consequence is an almost absurd situation even by military standards: Ukrainian troops shooting against their own drones for pure survival, operators cutting with scissors fiber optic cables without knowing if they belong to the enemy or a friendly unit and electronic warfare systems blocking any signal that appears in the air even if that means disabling their own equipment. The battlefield has become so crowded with small flying devices, jammers and data links that distinguishing between ally and enemy takes mere seconds. If something approaches too quickly, the automatic reaction is to destroy it first and ask later. Disposable drones due to excess. Part of the problem stems from how both sides have transformed the drone into a mass consumption weapon. These are no longer expensive and scarce platforms like those used by Western powers a decade ago, but rather relatively cheap systems manufactured at enormous speed and designed to be constantly lost. Russia and Ukraine consume drones in such gigantic amounts that losses due to friendly fire have been integrated almost as another operational cost. Units expect to lose devices due to interference, coordination errors, enemy jamming or simply because a nervous soldier open fire against any object that buzzes near your position. The result is a combat environment where technological saturation has begun to generate chaos even within one’s own side. The new logic: destroy them before they exist. This uncontrolled explosion in the use of drones is also pushing the war towards a new strategic stage: attack the factories before the devices in flight. Russia and Ukraine have understood that intercepting drones one by one is no longer enough when both produce thousands of systems continuously. That’s why the long range attacks attacks against industrial plants, logistics centers and component manufacturers have multiplied in recent months. Ukraine is hitting Russian facilities linked to Shahed drones, sensors, navigation modules and jam-resistant electronic systems, as Russia seeks destroy Ukrainian workshops where FPV drones or long-range attack devices capable of penetrating hundreds of kilometers into Russian territory are assembled. The logic begins to look less like a conventional war and more like a permanent industrial hunt. Electronics don’t keep up. The problem for both sides is that technological adaptation it moves too fast. Each defensive upgrade generates an immediate modification to enemy drones. Interference systems stop working when faced with fiber optic links. GPS locks lose effectiveness against new navigation modules. Drones incorporate more autonomy, greater processing capacity and increasing resistance to electronic countermeasures. In parallel, Ukraine and Russia they use satellite intelligencepattern analysis and constant recognition to locate production centers, antennas, warehouses and logistics chains. The front already It doesn’t end in the trenches.: continues hundreds or thousands of kilometers behind, inside factories, industrial parks and supply networks that have become priority military targets. A machine out of control. The most disturbing thing is that this dynamic gives the sensation of having partially independent of the soldiers themselves. There is drones attacking dronesautomatic systems jamming any available signal, operators trying coordinate safe corridors so that their own devices are not demolished and entire factories turned into objectives daily to sustain a rate of losses that seems impossible to absorb. If you like, the war in Ukraine is still a war of artillery and attrition, but it is also transforming into something much stranger: an aerial ecosystem saturated with cheap and disposable machines where survival depends on react before identifying. And when an army ends up shooting at its own drones because there are too many devices in the sky to distinguish them, it means that the conflict has crossed a whole new frontier. And crazy. Image | mod-gov-ua In Xataka | Ukraine has found a new way to assault buildings occupied by Russia: sending a robot with a 300-kilogram surprise In Xataka | The war in Ukraine is being filled with “Mad Max” ships: metal screens and nets against FPV drones in the Black Sea

Log In

Sign In

Forgot password?

Your password reset link appears to be invalid or expired.

Log in

Privacy Policy

Add to Collection

No Collections