Ukraine

The Pentagon wants to invest $54 billion in drones. It is more than the entire military budget of countries like Ukraine

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The defense budget that the Pentagon has presented for fiscal year 2027 amounts to $1.5 trillion. It is the largest year-on-year increase in military spending since World War II, but in that colossal figure there is another that deserves special attention. This is the $53.6 billion allocated exclusively to drones and autonomous warfare technologies. That amount alone exceeds the Ukraine’s full defense budget either of countries like South Korea or Italy. Spain is even further away. autonomous defense. The money for this specific program will be managed by the Defense Autonomous Warfare Group (DAWG), an agency created at the end of 2025. In the 2026 budget it received 226 million dollars, but in 2027 that figure would be multiplied almost by 240. The United States has realized the relevance that drones have gained in war conflicts and wants to be prepared for this new era of defense. Obsolete investment. The Pentagon itself recognized something striking: the vast majority of the money requested will be used to buy technology that already exists, not to develop future solutions. One of the top officials of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Lieutenant General Steven Whitney, admitted that technological evolution on the battlefield currently happens in weeks, not years. It’s like admitting that what you buy now may become obsolete almost immediately. Ukraine showed that change has changed. The urgency of this budget does not come from nowhere. The war in Ukraine has rewritten the rules of modern combat In such a way that there are many countries that are processing how to assume these changes. Iranian Shahed droneswhich cost about $20,000 per unit, have proven capable of saturating air defense systems that cost hundreds of times more. Relatively affordable quadcopter drones have destroyed multi-million euro tanks and armored vehicles. Defense budgets in 2025. The US already spent 921 billion dollars last year, this year it wants to spend 50% more. Everything goes very fast. The speed of tactical adaptation on the Ukrainian front has been so high that innovations and tactics that work in January may be obsolete by March. Not because someone has invented something better, but because the adversary has found a way to counter those strategies. The Pentagon has reached an unusual conclusion: the traditional model of weapons acquisition that operated in cycles of years or even decades is structurally incompatible with the speed at which current war conflicts are developing. The irony of the Shahed. Among the most striking details of the budget is the confirmation that the American army has adapted the technology of the Iranian Shahed dronewhich is the same one that has been attacking cities and energy infrastructures in Ukraine for years. The US has done reverse engineering of your adversary’s design to incorporate it into your own arsenal. This clearly illustrates the current war reality: the origin of the technology does not matter, but its effectiveness. Risks. This tension between “we have to spend more” and the speed at which it is necessary to adapt to this reality poses an enormous risk. Buy en masse what works today guarantees that solutions will be available tomorrow. The problem is that these solutions may be technically inferior to those that the adversary has developed in the meantime. The same thing happens if you decide not to buy anything until you have the perfect technology, because that means arriving late (or not arriving at all). It is a dilemma similar to that of technology companies and their investment in infrastructure: they have to buy solutions now that they know that they will end up being obsolete in the short or medium term. Final approval is missing. The US Congress will have to approve the budget, which introduces an important political variable. Beyond that, there is a fundamental question in those 54,000 million in this budget. If drone technology evolves in weeks, there is no money that will be able to buy that adaptability to the modern battlefield. And that even with this immense budget superiority cannot be guaranteed makes clear the sign of the times. In Xataka | The percentage of GDP that each country allocates to Defense, shown in this graph with an unavoidable protagonist

Ukraine has knocked down Russian shaheds from a hotel 500 kilometers away

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During a military test in the United States, a pilot managed to land a fighter plane without touching the controls and miles away, guiding it only through a remote connection as if it were a simulator. A decade has passed, and what then seemed like an almost experimental technological curiosity revealed a disturbing possibility: that one day the most critical decisions in a conflict could be made very far from where they actually occur. The war from the basement. Ukraine has introduced a silent but profound change on the battlefield: the possibility of fighting without being physically in it, operating drones from secure locations hundreds of kilometers from the target. counted in one piece the financial times that, from spaces as discreet as basements in kyiv, highly specialized operators control interceptors that no longer depend on short-range radio frequencies, but on secure internet connections that eliminate distance as a real limitation. This leap allows the same pilot to intervene in multiple scenarios without exposing himself to enemy fire, transforming the traditional logic of combat and reducing one of the greatest costs of war: direct human risk. The distance no longer matters. The unprecedented fact that a drone has been controlled from a hotel 500 km away to shoot down two Russian shahed drones is not a technological anecdote, but a clear sign of where the conflict is evolving. Until recently, pilots had to operate close to the front, making them priority targets. Now, that vulnerability is diluted. Modern warfare enters a phase in which the location of the operator becomes irrelevant (due to remoteness), and where the range is no longer determined by the vehicle, but the network that connects it. The invisible key. The Times told This leap is based on a combination of advanced connectivity and artificial intelligence that allows you to maintain control even in the most hostile environments, with interference or momentary signal loss. As? It seems that current systems not only transmit orders, they also interpret images, identify targets and correct trajectories in real time, reducing operator burden and increasing accuracy. In this context, connectivity (that kind of militarized “WiFi”) stops being a support and becomes the true core of the system that pulls the strings. From improvisation to mastery. Plus: what started as an emergency solution to the shortage of missiles has become anthe pillar of defense aerial in certain areas, spaces where drones already intercept most threats. The key is once again that low cost and ease of deployment that allow saturate airspace with multiple layers of protection, freeing up more expensive systems for critical missions. This model not only resists massive attacks, but quickly adapts to new threats. Hitting where it was impossible. At the same time, this developing technology is making it possible to bring war to the enemy rear with unprecedented precision. We are talking about drones with autonomous decision-making capacity that are attacking logistics routes (the surrounding area of ​​the city of Donetsk) and weakening key defensive systems, facilitating operations that were previously unfeasible, and the decrease in these defenses opens windows of opportunity for deeper, more frequent and effective attacks. A system without borders. It is the last of the legs to analyze, because the integration of air, land and naval platforms reinforces this entire transformation, creating a kind of distributed combat network where each element amplifies the scope of the whole. In fact, that’s why intercepting drones from the sea (this week they shot down a shahed for the first time from a naval platform) or coordinating attacks from multiple domains is no longer an exception, but the next step logical. In this scenario, war is no longer defined by geographical lines and begins to depend on networks, nodes and connections. Invisibility. If you also want and as a last note, these advances give a conflict model where physical distance loses all the relevance of yesteryear compared to the capacity for connection. In other words, a scenario that until recently was more typical of a science fiction movie is opening up, one where a few operators can manage multiple systems from locations as remote as a room or a basement 500 km away away from “the war”, and where the front dissolves to become an extended network. Image | National Police of Ukraine In Xataka | From printing drones to looking at lasers, 300 reports have revealed that Iran’s battle manual has one name: Ukraine In Xataka | A disturbing idea has begun to take hold in Europe: Ukraine has turned Russia into a fearsome air force

From printing drones to looking at lasers. 300 reports have revealed that Iran’s battle manual has one name: Ukraine

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Barely a year after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, groups of volunteers began to assemble drones fighting in improvised workshops using parts purchased online and open manuals, managing to put operating systems on the air in a matter of days. The scene, closer to a technological garage than a military factory, reflected the extent to which modern warfare was about to change without making almost noise. Ukraine as a war manual. I told it a few hours ago in exclusive to the Financial Times. The war in Ukraine has become a central reference for Iranian military thinking, to the point that much of its current doctrine is being built on what is happening there. That has now been known through more than 300 reports prepared in military centers that analyze everything from industrial production in conflict to tactical adaptation in the face of a superior enemy. This effort is not theoretical, but applied: there is great number of manualstraining and planning that have been updated to incorporate direct lessons from the battlefield in a process that reveals a clear idea, that the future of war is already written in Ukraine and that, possibly, those who do not study it will be late. From cheap drones to doctrine. One of the most decisive learnings we have been counting these years: the role of low cost dronescapable of changing the balance of forces with a completely different logic from the traditional one, where volume and price weigh as much as precision. Iran has understood that cheap systems, produced even with commercial components and accessible techniques such as 3D printing, can overwhelm advanced defenses and exploit structural weaknesses of technologically superior armies, replicating a model that has already proven effective in both Ukraine and in their own confrontations recent. The problem of the West. Not only that. The expansion of these drones has exposed a critical gap in Western defenses, designed to intercept expensive and sophisticated threatsbut not massive waves of cheap systems, which has generated an obvious economic imbalance. While a drone can cost tens of thousands of dollars, intercepting it is the opposite and can involve missiles in the equation. extremely more expensivecreating financial and logistical wear and tear that has already become visible in recent conflicts, where spending skyrockets and arsenals begin to become dangerously strained. Beyond the present: AI and emerging weapons. Featured in an interactive special The New York Times that, however, Iranian learning has not stopped in the immediate present, but rather projects the conflict into the future, incorporating into its planning technologies such as artificial intelligence, cyber warfare or even emerging systems such as directed energy weapons. The own internal analysis They point to the need to integrate these advances in decision making, weapons guidance and combat management, in a transition that seeks not only to adapt, but to anticipate the next phase of the technological conflict. An evolving doctrine. There is no doubt, this change is also doctrinal, with a commitment to more units agile, decentralized and capable to operate with greater autonomy, inspired by the way in which Ukraine has managed to resist and adapt to a more powerful adversary such as Russia. If you like, what the combination of operational flexibility and accessible technology is doing is redefining the concept of superiority military, moving it away from large platforms and towards distributed and resilient systems that can evolve quickly, and there the massive use of FPV drones appears with its own name. From Ukraine to Iran. Ultimately, all of this results in a profound transformation in the way in which Iran conceives warone where Ukraine acts as a real reference manual of battle that guides from the manufacture of cheap drones to the ambition of integrating artificial intelligence and more advanced systems such as lasers. From that perspective, it is not just about copying each Ukrainian step, but about adapting, scaling and combining solutions to build our own strategy that turns kyiv’s experience into future advantage, in a scenario where we are already seeing that rapid innovation and low cost can outweigh the most sophisticated technology from the United States. Image | RawPixelWild Hornets In Xataka | China was the power that launched drones. Now he has realized his danger with a decision: close the sky to them In Xataka | While everyone was looking at the Middle East, North Korea has had time to do what Iran has not been able to: go nuclear.

Ukraine has turned Russia into a fearsome air force

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In 1991, during the Gulf War, the United States discovered something uncomfortable: despite its total air superiority, it could not prevent Iraq from continuing to launch scud missiles from mobile platforms that appeared and disappeared in the desert. That frustration left a clear lesson For military strategists: in modern warfare, it is not enough to dominate the air, you must constantly adapt to an enemy that also learns. From questioned strength to real threat. During the first stages of the invasion of Ukraine, Russian aviation was perceived like a disappointment unable to achieve air superiority, which led many Western analysts to perhaps hastily underestimate it. However, with the passage of time, that vision has started to change disturbingly, especially in Europe, where aviation security experts have focused on something that is no longer an intuition: that the conflict has not weakened Russia, but rather the has forced to learn. Accumulated experience, system improvements and tactical adaptation have transformed a force that seemed limited into a much more dangerous and credible actor than it was before 2022. War as a laboratory. They remembered on Insider that, far from collapsing, Russian aviation has used Ukraine as a real training environment where pilots and crews have gained experience in high-intensity combat. Although it has lost aircraft, it has retained a large part of its qualified personnel and has compensated for those losses with sustained production of new aircraft, which has allowed it to maintain and even expand its fleet. This process has corrected one of its greatest historical weaknesses, the lack of flight hours, turning its pilots into more prepared fighters for complex scenarios. More reach, less risk. One of the most significant changes has been the evolution of his attack capacitywhich now increasingly relies on long-range weapons and systems that allow you to hit without directly exposing yourself. We are talking about advanced missiles, gliding bombs and remote attacks that have reduced the need to penetrate defended airspace, greatly complicating the enemy response. This way of fighting has not only proven to be effective in Ukraine, but also poses a worrying scenario. for future conflictswhere control of the air no longer depends solely on physically dominating it. Constant pressure from the air. They counted on ukrainian media that, in parallel, Russia has intensified its air campaign with massive and increasingly sophisticated use of drones and missiles, launching thousands of devices and perfecting saturation tactics to overwhelm defenses. Coordinated attacks, changes in flight patterns and the combination of different types of weapons have made it possible to maintain continuous pressure on infrastructure and the civilian population, generating not only material but also psychological wear. This strategy turns air into space permanent threatwhere the defense can never relax. A more complex threat. If you will, the result is a Russian air force that, although it still has structural limitations and does not match NATO in a direct confrontation, has become much scariest and most difficult to counteract. The combination of strengthened air defense, better coordination between systems and a more adaptive doctrine presents a scenario for its enemies in which achieving air superiority will be much more expensive and risky. In other words, a paradox has developed and is beginning to take hold, one where Ukraine has not only resisted Russian aviation, but, by forcing it to evolve, has contributed to turning it into a more sophisticated and persistent threat to the European military balance. Image | Alan Wilsonparfaits In Xataka | If fog was deadly in Ukraine’s winter, spring is offering Russia a key advantage: greenery In Xataka | Ukraine is close to what no one has achieved in a war: shooting down missiles for less than a million dollars

Ukraine has tested whether Russia was complying with the ceasefire with an optical illusion in the open field. The video is self-explanatory

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during the call Christmas Truce In the First World War, enemy soldiers came out of their trenches, exchanged gifts and even played soccer games in no man’s land, in one of the most unusual episodes of the conflict. That scene, as brief as it was unexpected, showed to what extent war can change shape in a matter of hours. A ceasefire on paper. Russia had announced a ceasefire for Orthodox Easter with a strong symbolic and political component, seeking to project an image of negotiating will in the middle of war. However, on the ground the reality has been very different, with thousands of violations recorded in just 32 hours, including artillery attacks, assaults and a massive use of tactical drones. Although long-range attacks were reduced, information arriving from kyiv They point out that the intensity on the near front was maintained, reflecting a dynamic where pauses are used more as a narrative tool than as a true attempt to stop the fighting. The war of stories. Both Moscow and kyiv tried to position themselves as the party that respected the truce, in a conditioned diplomatic pulse also due to international pressure, especially from the United States. While Russia defended having complied with the ceasefire, Ukraine documented thousands of violations in a matter of hours, showing an obvious gap between the official discourse and what was happening on the battlefield. This duality reinforced the idea that truce announcements are part of a communication strategy as much as the war itself. The unexpected test: an optical illusion. In this context, Ukraine decided to go beyond the accusations and designed a direct test to check Russian behavior: evacuate apparently own soldiers, unarmed and wounded, complying with all the conditions of a ceasefire. It turns out that, in reality, it was Russian prisoners in disguise with neutral uniforms, used as a kind of “visual bait” to verify whether the agreements were respected. The scene functioned as a kind of terrifying optical illusion on the battlefield, where what looked like a legitimate evacuation hid a carefully prepared experiment. The video that dismantles the truce. The outcome was so fast as forceful: because a swarm of Russian drones attacked the evacuees, killing several of them without knowing that they were actually their own captured soldiers. The episode, recorded on video and broadcast Later on different social networks, he crudely exposed the fragility of the ceasefire and the inability (or lack of will) to respect it even in situations clearly protected by the rules of war. Beyond the tactical impact, the incident became in a visual test difficult to refute about what was really happening on the front. An episode that also leaves everyone in a bad light due to the crudeness of the visual piece. An impossible truce. If you also want, the set of events confirms that the ceasefire was, in practice, untenable in a conflict where both parties seek to maintain the military initiative while competing for the international narrative. For Russia, the test reveals the extent to which modern combat (based on the intensive use of drones, quick decisions and targets detected without full verification) can turn against him even in sensitive situations. For Ukraine, the test not only highlighted Russian non-compliance, but also showed the extent to which the battle has entered a phase where even humanitarian gestures can become in strategic tools. In this scenario, the truce was nothing more than a nominal pause in a war that continues to develop with the same intensity under a layer of unfulfilled promises. Image | x In Xataka | If fog was deadly in Ukraine’s winter, spring is offering Russia a key advantage: greenery In Xataka | Ukraine is close to what no one has achieved in a war: shooting down missiles for less than a million dollars

If you thought the crisis in Hormuz was enough, the war in Ukraine has triggered another maritime drama in Europe: the Gulf of Finland

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About five years ago, the container ship Ever Given became stuck in the Suez Canal for six daysblocking one of the most important commercial arteries in the world and leaving hundreds of ships trapped waiting. That incident, caused by a failed maneuver and adverse wind conditions, was enough to disrupt global supply chains in a matter of hours. A new seafront. As global attention focuses on the Strait of Hormuz, the war in Ukraine has opened another critical scenario much closer to Europe: the Gulf of Finlanda small but key space for Russian energy exports. There, far from spectacular drones or large fleets, the conflict manifests itself in a more silent way but just as revealingwith ships detained, routes blocked and growing tension between actors trying to avoid a direct escalation. This new focus demonstrates that the war is not only being fought on the land front, but also in the nerve centers of maritime trade. Ukraine attacks and a collapse. The situation has its origins in a clear kyiv strategy: to hit key russian ports to export oil, such as Ust-Luga and Primorsk, where it comes a fundamental part of the income that finances the war. The attacks have drastically reduced the operational capacity of these facilities, leaving dwhole days without activity and causing an immediate chain effect. The result: a unprecedented maritime traffic jamwith dozens of oil tankers (many of them linked to the so-called “floats in the shadows” Russian) accumulating waiting to be able to load. A system on the limit. They remembered this week in Political that this traffic jam in the Gulf of Finland is not just a striking image, but a symptom of something deeper: an energy and logistics system that begins to fracture under the pressure of war. Unlike conventional vessels, these tankers cannot be easily redirected to other ports due to the risk of being detained or sanctioned, which forced to remain anchored for days or weeks. As a result, there is an unusual concentration of aging and, in many cases, unsafe ships in European waters that were not prepared to absorb that volume. Europe trapped between control and escalation. Under this scenario, countries like Estonia and Finland They are in a particularly delicate position, since, despite being within the NATO framework, they have chosen not to intervene directly against these ships. The reason is clear: any attempt to stop or board an oil tanker could trigger a Russian military responseas already happened when a Russian fighter intervened to protect one of these ships. Since then, Moscow has reinforced its naval presence in the area, making it clear that it considers these strategic routes a red line. The Mirror of Hormuz. There is no doubt, what happens in the Gulf of Finland connects directly with the crisis in Hormuz: In both cases, the war moves towards maritime straits where traffic control becomes a strategic tool. The difference is that there is no formal block here, but an indirect disruption which generates similar effects, with stopped ships, tense routes and altered markets. In both scenarios, it is enough to interfere enough to collapse the system, and also without the need for a total shutdown. A war that spreads across the map. If you like, the result is a conflict that is no longer limited to Ukraine either to the Middle Eastbut it extends to the critical nodes of global trade, affecting Europe directly. The Gulf of Finland has thus become in another hot spot where energy, legal and military interests intersect, with an extremely fragile and volatile balance. And what seemed like a localized war is proving to have a much greater scope, generating new sources of tension that, like in Hormuz, can escalate quickly. without prior notice. Image | LAC, NormanEinstein In Xataka | If fog was deadly in Ukraine’s winter, spring is offering Russia a key advantage: greenery In Xataka | Ukraine is close to what no one has achieved in a war: shooting down missiles for less than a million dollars

Neither drones nor missiles nor AI, the war in Ukraine has turned a vehicle from 1950 into a key piece: the M113

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Some of the most produced military vehicles in history exceed 80,000 units manufactured and remain in service in dozens of countries decades after their design. In many cases, their longevity is not due to their power, but to something much simpler: that they simply work, are easy to repair, and never completely disappear. An unexpected veteran. While the algorithms and drones freelancers starred on all the covers of war innovationsin recent times the war in Ukraine has turned in key piece to a vehicle from the 1950s as it was the M113and that says much more about the conflict than any next-generation system. On a battlefield dominated by advanced technology, this armored transport has resurfaced not because it is the most powerful, but because it fits better than anyone else in a war of attrition where the important thing is not sophistication, but the ability to resist, move and continue operating day after day. Simple wins. The M113 was designed for another timebut its qualities (mobility, mechanical simplicity and ease of production) make it have converted surprisingly effective in Ukraine. The reason: in an environment saturated with drones and artillery, where any vehicle can be destroyed in seconds, the key is not so much to survive everything as to be able to be repaired quickly and return to the front. Its ability to operate off-road, transport troops or even drones and adapt with improvised protections makes it a versatile tool in a conflict where conditions are constantly changing. Drones and the rules. The truth is that the proliferation of drones has reduced the usefulness of many traditional systems, including heavy tanks, forcing both sides to rethink how they move and fight. In this context, the M113 does not stand out for its weapons, but for its logistical function: carry soldiers, equipment or drones to forward positions. War, from that perspective, is no longer decided so much by direct fire, but by who manages to best position their resources in an environment monitored from the air, and there this vehicle fits perfectly. Russian “Giga Turtle” captured by Ukrainians Meanwhile, Russia adapts in its own way. On the other side of the front, in recent weeks Russia has attempted to respond with radically different solutions, such as the return of called “giga turtle”in essence, over-armored versions of tanks designed to resist drone attacks. Huge and slow, these machines prioritize protection over mobility, making them easier targets despite their toughness. His reappearance reflects the same conclusion that has been imposed on the battlefield: vehicles are still necessary, but they must adapt to a constant threat from the air. War of attrition and quantity. Ultimately, the success of the M113 It also has to do with something much more basic: that there is a glarge amount of stock available for these models. Thousands of units produced over decades allow Ukraine to quickly replace losses in a war where attrition is brutal. In other words, compared to more expensive and scarce modern systems, this vehicle offers something essential for the fight: continuity. In an extremely slow conflict that is already measured in years, it is not whoever has the most advanced weapon who wins, but whoever can continue fighting the longest. The real change is conceptual. If you like, all this points to a deeper conclusion: the war in Ukraine is not necessarily rewarding the newest, but rather the most useful in an extreme context. AND the M113 symbolizes this change like few others, where cutting-edge technology coexists with solutions from another era that they still work because they respond better to the real needs of combat. In a scenario dominated by drones, sensors and constant fire, the key is not so much to reinvent warfare, but to adapt to it, even if that means returning to vehicles designed more than half a century ago. Image | Armed Forces In Xataka | While everyone was looking at Iran, a drone has made a hole so big that it seems impossible to cover it: the one in the roof of Chernobyl In Xataka | Russia is building its largest warship in the Black Sea. You know it, we know it and the Ukrainian drones know it

If you think that renovating your house is urgent, think about this building in Ukraine. Its hole is so big that it is a danger for Europe

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He Chernobyl accident released so much radiation that some areas they remain uninhabitable almost four decades later. In fact, the plant continues to house materials capable of remaining dangerous for thousands of years. Therefore, keeping them under control is one of the greatest engineering challenges ever faced in Europe. A challenge that a drone has put to the test. It was to last a century. The story we tell it a few months ago. The gigantic steel arch built over Chernobyl reactor 4 was conceived as a definitive solution to contain the worst nuclear accident in history for at least a hundred years, a colossal structure designed to isolate the ancient “sarcophagus” and buy humanity time. More than 100 meters high and capable of housing entire monuments inside, this system had to resist extreme conditions and allow the safe decommissioning of the reactor, encapsulating hundreds of tons of radioactive material that remain active decades after the disaster. The impact that changed everything. But everything changed in February 2025when a drone attack in the middle of the night pierced that shell seemingly invulnerable, opening a breach in the structure and exposing a system that was never designed to operate in a war environment. Although there were no immediate leaks or casualties, the damage compromised critical functionsespecially ventilation that controls humidity and prevents corrosion, introducing a silent but growing risk that could degrade the structure in a few years. What is still hidden under the steel. Under the damaged arch remains an environment extremely unstable: remains of the reactor, tons of nuclear fuel and melts of highly radioactive materials that continue to react slowly. The old “sarcophagus,” hastily built in 1986, was never structurally reliableand is actually completely dependent on the new cover to maintain the insulation. In other words, if that balance fails, the risk is not immediate, but potentially devastating, with the possibility of release radioactive dust that the wind could disperse throughout Europe. A “reform” as expensive as it is complex. System restore will not be neither quick nor easysince it involves working in conditions of high radiation, with strict limitations on time and exposure for operators. Temporary solutions barely contain the most urgent damage, while full restoration will require rebuilding highly specialized internal layers within a structure designed as a technical “sandwich”. We are talking about an estimated cost that exceeds 500 million of euros, a figure that reflects both the technical complexity and the hostile environment in which repairs must be carried out. The war enters Europe’s greatest nuclear risk. If you like, the incident it is not isolatedbut part of a context in which nuclear infrastructure have become exposed elements within an active conflict. Paradoxically, the Chernobyl exclusion zone that we had to protect from any danger has been the scene of military operationstroop movements and constant overflights of missiles and drones, which multiplies the risk of new impacts, whether accidental or intentional. In that scenario, even a technical failure or trajectory error could trigger consequences continental in scope. A reminder of what never ended. They remembered in a special from the Financial Times this week that, decades after the accident, Chernobyl remains the same latent threat, one that requires constant vigilance and international cooperation, and the drone impact has revealed the fragility of the systems designed to contain it. The infrastructure that was to definitively close the disastrous episode of 1986 now faces a new type of risk, thus demonstrating that nuclear safety depends not only on engineering, but also of geopolitical stabilitya (and common sense). In that delicate balance, each crack is not just a structural failure, but a warning about the limits of our ability to control the consequences of our own creations. Image | EBRD In Xataka | Drones in Ukraine have mutated into a system reminiscent of the Alien universe: an exoskeleton turns troops into super soldiers In Xataka | Iran is exploiting the US’s weak point: it is not its F-35s or its Patriot missiles, it is the bill every time they take off

from 164 euros in Ukraine to 4,789 euros in Switzerland

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There is something that draws powerful attention when placed on the same map he minimum wage in all European countries: the difference between one and the other is not a crack, it is an abyss. Two workers on the same continent and working the same day can finish the month with a payroll that doesn’t even look like it. The data of Eurostat on the minimum wage in 2026 confirm this. The portal Visual Capitalist has collected this data and has represented it on a map in which the Minimum Interprofessional Wage of each country in Europe can be compared at a glance, recording the salary (and economic) variety of the continent. What is the minimum wage and why does it matter? He minimum wage It is the lowest remuneration established by law that an employer can legally pay to its workers. In this way, employees are guaranteed a decent standard of living and avoid situations of labor exploitation. According to the European Labor Authority (EURES), this minimum wage also contributes to reducing inequality economic and contributes to internal consumption across countries, as lower-paid workers tend to spend a higher proportion of their income. Not all countries establish this minimum wage the same. Austria, Denmark, Finland, Italy and Sweden do not have a legal minimum wage and leave this negotiation in the hands of unions and companies through collective agreements. Swiss It also does not have a federal threshold and each canton negotiates its own minimum wage. For example, the minimum wage in Geneva in 2024 was 24.59 francs per hour, which is about 4,640 euros per month, but rent in Geneva ranges between 1,580 and 2,630 euros and compulsory health insurance exceeds 370 euros per adult. This means that a considerable part of the salary disappears into fixed expenses, while in other European countries covering these fixed costs would be much more affordable. Comparing minimum wage figures between countries without taking into account the cost of living can lead to misleading conclusions. A salary of 1,139 euros in Poland is equivalent, in terms of purchasing power, to more than 1,800 euros in countries with a higher cost of living such as Germany or France. Those who earn the most: Western Europe at the forefront Within the scope of the European Union, Luxembourg leads the table with a minimum wage of 2,704 euros per month, followed by Ireland with 2,391 euros, Germany with 2,343 euros and the Netherlands with an SMI of 2,295 euros. If we look at the continental neighbors that are not part of the EU, the minimum wage in the United Kingdom is applied by age ranges, so those over 21 years of age earn 12.71 pounds per hour (the equivalent of about 15.20 euros). This implies that their minimum salary would be about 2,279 euros per month for a standard working day of 37.5 hours per week. Eastern Europe below average The lower minimum wages They occur in the eastern half of Europe, with Bulgaria as the EU country with the lowest SMI with 551 euros per month, followed by Hungary with 727 euros, Latvia with an SMI of 740 euros and Romania with 797 euros. The difference between Luxembourg and Bulgaria is abysmal, with a wage gap between the two countries that exceeds 2,150 euros, in two countries with the same currency and the same single market. Outside the community bloc, Ukraine sets the continent’s record with just 164 euros per month according to the data from Eurostat, which means that a minimum wage worker in Luxembourg earns more than 16 times more per month than one in Ukraine. Spain: the SMI as a thermometer of low salaries In Spain, the last increase in the SMI was applied in February 2026, leaving it with a gross salary of 1,221 euros per month in 14 payments (1,424.50 euros gross in 12 payments). That salary places Spain in tenth place of the table, just behind the 1,802 euros of France and ahead of the 1,278 euros of Slovenia. Spain has been one of the countries that has increased this minimum wage the most, going from 735 euros in 2018 to the 1,381 euros it had in 2025, as shown in Eurostat statistics. The underlying problem in Spain is that the SMI has become the most common salaryso far from being an exceptional floor for less qualified jobs, it acts as the usual salary for entire sectors. Salary statistics reflect that the latest increases in the SMI have served to push upwards the lowest salariescreating a salary pyramid with an excessively wide base and some intermediate sections that they have not risen at the same rate. In Xataka | Finding a job had always been a good way to escape poverty: in Spain it is no longer true Image | VisualCapitalist

Satellite images have revealed the location of Russia’s largest warship, and that means Ukraine can see it too

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During the Second World War there was a announcement to sailors of future conflicts: some of the largest ships ever built were destroyed without having barely entered combat, becoming symbols of how vulnerable even the most advanced weaponry can be. Decades later, with the advent of commercial satellites and precision weapons, that exposure is even greater. Few doubts from space. The latest images satellites show a reality that is difficult to ignore: Russia is about to complete his largest warship in the Black Sea. The superstructure is practically complete, the flight deck is now fully identifiable and the work is advancing towards its final phase with key elements almost ready. However, this same monitoring from space also reveals the another side of the projectsince the ship remains motionless in a shipyard located within the reach of the ukrainian attack systemsmaking each advancement a race against time where finishing it is only half the challenge. Global ambition. He Ivan Rogov represents much more than a new ship for the Russian fleet, since it is conceived as a projection platform of force capable of operating far from its coasts and sustaining complex operations. With the capacity to transport hundreds of marines, military vehicles and an air wing of attack and transport helicopters, the ship fits into the category of large amphibious ships used by Western powers. Its size, greater than 200 meters, would make it in the greatest asset of the Russian fleet in the Black Sea, which reinforces its not only military, but also symbolic value within Moscow’s strategy. Born from failure. The existence by Ivan Rogov is directly linked to an earlier strategic setback, when Russia attempted to acquire Mistral-class amphibious ships from France and the deal was canceled after the annexation of Crimea in 2014. From then on, Moscow was forced to develop your own designgiving rise to project 23900which combines its own technology with knowledge partially acquired during that failed contract. This context explains why the ship has a special weight within Russian military planning, since it symbolizes both the need for industrial autonomy and the ability to move forward despite sanctions and technological limitations. Protected, but not untouchable. The ship is being built in the Zaliv shipyardin Crimea, a facility that Russia has reinforced with multiple layers of protection to reduce the risk of attacks. Physical barriers, networks against naval drones and security measures have been deployed at the access to the dam, in addition to indirectly benefiting from the air defense that protects nearby strategic infrastructures such as the Kerch bridge. However, these measures do not guarantee invulnerability, since Ukraine has shown repeatedly its ability to attack targets in depth and degrade defensive systems, keeping the shipyard within a risk zone constant. Investment under threat. Russia has maintained the project despite economic difficulties, sanctions and pressure derived from the war, which implies a huge investment of around of 1,200 million of dollars and a sustained commitment of industrial resources. This effort reflects the strategic importance that Moscow attributes to the ship, but also increases the associated risk, since the loss of the Ivan Rogov would mean not only a military setback, but also a economic and reputational blow significant. In other words, the project has become a high-risk bet for Russia where success or failure will have an impact that goes beyond the ship itself. The real change. Beyond of the specific destination of the warship, what the case reveals is a deeper change in the nature of modern warfare, one where the military industry ceases to be a safe space in the rear and becomes on a direct target. In that sense, Ukraine does not need to confront an entire fleet to weaken Russia, but can instead focus at critical points such as shipyards, energy infrastructure or supply chains, affecting production capacity before systems even enter combat. In short, the displacement of the conflict towards the industrial base alters traditional rules and demonstrates that, in the current context, a weapon can be destroyed long before it has the opportunity to be used. Image | x In Xataka | With the arrival of good weather in Ukraine, Russia thought it was a good idea to bring out its hidden tanks. It wasn’t at all In Xataka | An exoskeleton worthy of ‘Alien’ or ‘Death Stranding’: the war in Ukraine is bringing the future sooner than expected

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