Russias

As we look to the Middle East, the Arctic has become the hiding place for Russia’s biggest challenge to NATO: Borei and Yasen

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One of the greatest fears of Western navies was not a direct attack, but something much more disturbing: not knowing where the opponent was. That feeling became especially evident when, in the middle of the Cold War, a Soviet submarine managed follow a naval group American for days without being detected, demonstrating that in certain scenarios the true power is not in striking first, but in remaining invisible long enough. It is not seen, but it does not stop. They had an extensive report in Bloomberg that, hundreds of meters under a mountain in northern Norway, NATO relentlessly monitors a dashboard that does not appear in the daily headlines, but has never stopped being active. While global attention focuses and rightly so most visible conflictsin the depths of the North Atlantic there is a constant competition to detect, follow and keep track of the adversary’s most sensitive assets. It is, if you will, a silent, technical and permanent surveillance, one where the margin of error is minimal and where the absence of news does not mean, by any means, absence of activity. The Arctic as a strategic epicenter. As we said, although the political and media focus has irremediably shifted to the Middle Eastthe real pulse between Russia and NATO is moving further and further towards the arcticthousands of meters under the sea in an environment that combines isolation, depth and extreme conditions that make any monitoring difficult. This region, which for years was seen as peripheral, has regained its centrality for the opening of new routes, resources and, above all, for its military value as a transit and concealment space. In this scenario, ice and geography, more than obstacles, are natural allies for those who know how to take advantage of them. AND Moscow has the advantage. Welcome ceremony for the Borei K550 class nuclear submarine “Alexander Nevsky” at the permanent base in Vilyuchinsk Borei and Yasen: the Russian challenge. The heart of this strategy is the new generation submarines deployed by Vladimir Putin, especially the classes Borei and Yasendesigned to operate for long periods without being detected and capable of carrying strategic weapons. While they don’t always match their Western counterparts in stealth, they remembered in Bloomberg They compensate with tactics adapted to the Arctic environment, such as operating under the ice sheet or protected by other units, which greatly complicates their location. Perhaps for this reason, for NATO the greatest risk is not their presence, but rather the moment in which they are no longer under control. K-560 Severodvinsk A constant chase. It we have counted before. For decades, the key point to detect these submarines was the well-known GIUK runnerbetween Greenland, Iceland and the United Kingdom, but technological and operational advances have pushed this hunting species towards higher latitudes. Now, the objective is to intercept them before they abandon the relatively shallow waters of the Barents Sea and enter areas where they can disappear more easily. This evolution has forced to strengthen cooperation between allies now deploy surveillance systems increasingly sophisticated. Europe in the shadows. It happens that, in the face of uncertainty Regarding the long-term commitment of the United States, European countries are increasing their involvement in this surveillance, with Norway as a centerpiece and partners such as the United Kingdom, Germany or Canada, strengthening capacities and coordination. The result of this has been translated in new acquisitionsjoint exercises and advanced deployments, all movements that reflect a transition in which Europe tries to assume more responsibility for its own defense, especially in an environment as critical as the Arctic. A new Cold War under the ice. Yes, because the result brings us closer to a scenario that increasingly reminds us of the (il)logic of the Cold War, but this time with the difference that now there are much more advanced tools and a geopolitical context. completely different. The russian northern fleetmodernized and prioritized within its military structure, represents one of the Kremlin’s main deterrence capabilities, especially as its conventional forces show weaknesses on other fronts. And in that unstable balance, the Arctic seems to consolidate itself as a lucky “perfect hiding place”a place where Russia’s greatest challenge to NATO is not announced, it is simply happening under the cold sheet of ice. Image | NDUP, Mil.ru In Xataka | A nuclear giant designed to make way in the Arctic: this is the most modern icebreaker in the Russian fleet In Xataka | Russia and China already had an advantage over the US in the Arctic. After Greenland, it has multiplied

Europe fled from Russia’s gas to fall into the arms of the United States. The Third Gulf War proves that it was a trap

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Behind troop movements and sea blockades for the Third Gulf Warthere is a much quieter script twist that is shaking the foundations of the continental economy: false European security. A problem that comes from the other side of the pond. After the energy crisis due to the Ukrainian War (still valid), Europe thought it had solved its great energy vulnerability by changing the gas that arrived through Russian gas pipelines for liquefied natural gas (LNG) that crossed the Atlantic in ships from the United States. The idea of ​​the European Union was to bet its imports on Washington to diversify sources and avoid future geopolitical blackmail. However, the American lifeline has turned out to be punctured. With the global market in maximum tension due to the war in Iran, the US is not guaranteeing European supply and makes gas subject to trade wars and political whims. The real Achilles heel. Europe now depends on the United States for two-thirds of its LNG imports, according to the center for economic studies Bruegel. As global supply falls due to the conflict, Asian buyers — who traditionally sourced from the Gulf — are competing aggressively for flexible gas ships. The result is a bidding war to the highest bidder: according to Bruegelseveral shipments of American LNG have already been diverted from Europe to Asia in the midst of the conflict. At the diplomatic and commercial level, the situation with our “savior partner” is enormously unstable. In the midst of this crisis, Donald Trump has come to criticize European allies, urging them on social networks to “get their own oil,” according to Bloomberg. As if that were not enough, political friction over the conditions of the trade agreement between the EU and the US has caused senior US officials to threaten retaliation, casting serious doubts on Washington’s previous commitment to sell $750 billion in energy products (including its precious LNG) to the European bloc. The price of the “green illusion”. The impact of this imbalance is being brutal for European pockets. According to the Financial Times Based on data provided by the European Commission itself, the bill for EU fossil fuel imports has increased by 14 billion euros in just 30 days of conflict. Gas prices have experienced a rise of 70%, while oil prices have become more expensive by 60%. This puts in front of the mirror what in Euractiv have baptized as “the green illusion” of Europe: a glaring structural failure in the energy transition. Despite having invested nearly one trillion euros in renewable energy, the European Union’s energy dependence on imports remains at 60%, practically the same figure as in 2004. An ineffective design. The reason for this price contagion lies in the very design of the European electricity market. By operating with a marginalist system, the most expensive technology (usually gas) is the one that sets the price of electricity for everyone, as explained in Strategic Energy. In countries heavily dependent on gas to generate electricity, such as Italy, gas sets the price 89% of the time, exposing citizens directly to international volatility. However, there is hope if you do your homework. In Spain, the enormous growth of wind and solar energy has caused the gas only mark the price of electricity 15% of the hours, much better shielding the country against these external shocks. In fact, it’s not all bad news: solar electricity generation has saved the EU from spending 2 billion euros in fossil fuel imports only in the first 20 days of March. And now what? It doesn’t look like we’ll get a break anytime soon. The crisis will not be brief, as the European Commissioner for Energy, Dan Jørgensen, has strongly warned. who has made it clear thateven if peace were declared tomorrow, prices would not return to normal in the foreseeable future. The European Commission is already finalizing a “toolbox” with emergency measures that will suddenly return us to the scenarios of 2022. On the table in Brussels is the possibility of recovering taxes on extraordinary profits that fell from the sky (windfall tax) for energy companies. Drastic measures in sight. Brussels also foresees drastic measures to contain demand based in the well-known 10-point plan of the International Energy Agency. This would translate into recommendations to Member States to encourage teleworking, reduce speed limits on motorways and promote both public transport and car sharing. At the strategic level, to stop the bleeding in LNG prices and prevent the US from playing against Europe with Asia over shipments, the think tank Bruegel proposes a radical solution: that the EU act as a bloc and coordinate its gas purchases directly with large importers such as Japan and South Korea to avoid a bidding war. The invisible problem. To understand the complete picture, we must talk about the great bottleneck that almost no one talks about: concrete and copper. European renewable deployment is colliding with a lack of capacity in electricity networks. According to a report from the climate think tank Emberat least 120 GW of planned renewable energy projects in Europe are at risk simply because the grid cannot support them. The logjam is monumental, with almost 700 GW of renewable projects stuck in connection queues awaiting permits across European countries reporting this data. And this is not just a problem of the macro plants of large corporations; It directly affects the average citizen. According to calculations in the same report, 1.5 million European homes could face delays in being able to connect the solar panels on their roofs due to obsolete distribution networks that do not have the capacity to take on the energy. A chronic gap. The underlying problem is a chronic gap in the system itself. As pointed out EuractivEurope has changed how it generates its electricity, but it has not electrified its real economy. Cars continue to burn oil, heavy industry continues to use fossil gas and the general electrification of the economy has been stagnant for ten years. Europe has spent … Read more

Satellite images have revealed the location of Russia’s largest warship, and that means Ukraine can see it too

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During the Second World War there was a announcement to sailors of future conflicts: some of the largest ships ever built were destroyed without having barely entered combat, becoming symbols of how vulnerable even the most advanced weaponry can be. Decades later, with the advent of commercial satellites and precision weapons, that exposure is even greater. Few doubts from space. The latest images satellites show a reality that is difficult to ignore: Russia is about to complete his largest warship in the Black Sea. The superstructure is practically complete, the flight deck is now fully identifiable and the work is advancing towards its final phase with key elements almost ready. However, this same monitoring from space also reveals the another side of the projectsince the ship remains motionless in a shipyard located within the reach of the ukrainian attack systemsmaking each advancement a race against time where finishing it is only half the challenge. Global ambition. He Ivan Rogov represents much more than a new ship for the Russian fleet, since it is conceived as a projection platform of force capable of operating far from its coasts and sustaining complex operations. With the capacity to transport hundreds of marines, military vehicles and an air wing of attack and transport helicopters, the ship fits into the category of large amphibious ships used by Western powers. Its size, greater than 200 meters, would make it in the greatest asset of the Russian fleet in the Black Sea, which reinforces its not only military, but also symbolic value within Moscow’s strategy. Born from failure. The existence by Ivan Rogov is directly linked to an earlier strategic setback, when Russia attempted to acquire Mistral-class amphibious ships from France and the deal was canceled after the annexation of Crimea in 2014. From then on, Moscow was forced to develop your own designgiving rise to project 23900which combines its own technology with knowledge partially acquired during that failed contract. This context explains why the ship has a special weight within Russian military planning, since it symbolizes both the need for industrial autonomy and the ability to move forward despite sanctions and technological limitations. Protected, but not untouchable. The ship is being built in the Zaliv shipyardin Crimea, a facility that Russia has reinforced with multiple layers of protection to reduce the risk of attacks. Physical barriers, networks against naval drones and security measures have been deployed at the access to the dam, in addition to indirectly benefiting from the air defense that protects nearby strategic infrastructures such as the Kerch bridge. However, these measures do not guarantee invulnerability, since Ukraine has shown repeatedly its ability to attack targets in depth and degrade defensive systems, keeping the shipyard within a risk zone constant. Investment under threat. Russia has maintained the project despite economic difficulties, sanctions and pressure derived from the war, which implies a huge investment of around of 1,200 million of dollars and a sustained commitment of industrial resources. This effort reflects the strategic importance that Moscow attributes to the ship, but also increases the associated risk, since the loss of the Ivan Rogov would mean not only a military setback, but also a economic and reputational blow significant. In other words, the project has become a high-risk bet for Russia where success or failure will have an impact that goes beyond the ship itself. The real change. Beyond of the specific destination of the warship, what the case reveals is a deeper change in the nature of modern warfare, one where the military industry ceases to be a safe space in the rear and becomes on a direct target. In that sense, Ukraine does not need to confront an entire fleet to weaken Russia, but can instead focus at critical points such as shipyards, energy infrastructure or supply chains, affecting production capacity before systems even enter combat. In short, the displacement of the conflict towards the industrial base alters traditional rules and demonstrates that, in the current context, a weapon can be destroyed long before it has the opportunity to be used. Image | x In Xataka | With the arrival of good weather in Ukraine, Russia thought it was a good idea to bring out its hidden tanks. It wasn’t at all In Xataka | An exoskeleton worthy of ‘Alien’ or ‘Death Stranding’: the war in Ukraine is bringing the future sooner than expected

The US is suffocating Cuba energetically. Russia’s response is to send two megaships loaded with oil

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The island of Cuba woke up this week plunged into darkness. A total collapse of the national electrical grid last Monday left the country paralyzedinterrupting surgeries in hospitals, food rotting in refrigerators due to lack of refrigeration and forcing airlines to suspend their flights. This massive blackout is the sixth that the Caribbean nation has suffered in the last 18 months, an unequivocal symptom of a humanitarian and energy crisis that has hit rock bottom. Where does it start. The origin of this asphyxiation dates back to the beginning of the year. The capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro in january by US forces cut off the supply of oil that Venezuela, its main benefactor, sent to the island. Since then, Donald Trump’s government has intensified the energy blockade. However, in the midst of this strangulation, an old ally has decided to make a move on the board: Russia. The voyage of the lifeboats. Cuba only produces around 40% of the oil it needs for its national demand, historically depending on imports. according to the data provided The Maritime Executive. The island has not received “a single drop” of large-scale fuel since January 9, the date on which the Mexican ship docked Ocean Mariner with 86,000 barrels. Mexico canceled subsequent shipments after giving in to pressure and threats of tariffs from the Trump administration. Now, all eyes are on two boats: seahorse: This Hong Kong-flagged vessel is carrying 200,000 barrels of diesel (or about 27,000 tons of Russian gas, according to maritime intelligence firm TankerTrackers cited by him Financial Times). After being detained for three weeks in the Atlantic, it resumed its march at a speed of 9.9 knots and is expected to reach the western Cuban coast between this weekend and Monday, March 23. Anatoly Kolodkin: Flying the Russian flag and owned by the state company Sovcomflot (sanctioned by the US, the EU and the United Kingdom), this colossus set sail from the Russian port of Primorsk on March 8. According to statements from the Kpler firm collected by Guardianis loaded with about 730,000 barrels of crude oil from the Urals. Its arrival is estimated for April 4, although other sources place it earlier. A fight between the Kremlin and the White House. The arrival of these ships is much more than a commercial transaction; It is a declaration of intent. According to ReutersUS President Donald Trump has raised the tone drastically, telling reporters that he hopes to have “the honor of taking Cuba” and that he can do “whatever he wants” with a nation he considers “very weakened.” Washington’s goal according to New York Timesis to force the departure of the Cuban president, Miguel Díaz-Canel. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has also demanded regime change. Moscow’s response has not been long in coming. Without directly mentioning Trump, the Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement reaffirming its “unbreakable solidarity” with the “government and brotherly people of Cuba,” condemning attempts at “crude interference” and intimidation on what they called the “Island of Freedom.” as detailed Reuters. However, in practical terms, the relief for Cubans will be short-lived. Jorge Piñón, researcher at the Energy Institute of the University of Texas interviewed by The Countrywarns that diesel seahorse—vital for generating sets, transportation and agriculture—will only be able to satisfy national consumption for 10 days. “We must remember that inventories are empty,” emphasizes Piñón. Cuba had already reached its “zero hour.” Military tension and desperate measures. The Caribbean board is red hot. Adding to the diplomatic tension is the military presence. According to The Country, Two US-flagged vessels, one of them identified as part of the Coast Guard (USCGC), were recently prowling near the coast of Holguín, in eastern Cuba. Asphyxiated by the blockade, the Díaz-Canel government has resorted to unprecedented measures. Havana has allowed for the first time that small private companies import their own fuel. Simultaneously, the regime has invited Cuban exiles to invest and own businesses on the island, while the official newspaper Granma desperately promotes the installation of solar panels, calling them “the light and energy that cannot be blocked.” The countdown. While the ships seahorse and Anatoly Kolodkin shorten the nautical distance to the port of Matanzas, the outcome of this crisis remains uncertain. The secret negotiations between Havana and the US administration to ease the blockade, confirmed last week, hang by a thread in the face of the aggressive rhetoric of the White House. For now, the Cuban government is entrenching itself. As published by President Díaz-Canel on social networkCuba will not give in to those who plan to “take over the country, its resources and its assets.” Any external aggressor, the president warned, will encounter “unassailable resistance.” It is a scenario that inevitably awakens the ghosts of the Cold War: the United States tightening the siege and Moscow sending an energy lifeline to its historic ally. Meanwhile, eleven million Cubans look at the sea, waiting for those ships to bring just over 10 days of light. Image | Unsplash Xataka | Cuba faces an unprecedented situation in the 21st century: that no plane enters or leaves the country due to lack of fuel

hunt down Russia’s most ruthless group without a single shot

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Since the start of the full-scale invasion, the war in Ukraine has been a succession of adaptations forced, where each side has had to learn faster than the other to survive. What began as a bet on speed and political collapse led to a long conflicttechnical and increasingly ruthless, one in which the rules have changed as many times as the weapons on the field. From wear to operational calculation. After almost four years of war, Ukraine has begun to accept that inflicting massive casualties like explained recently A minister, by himself, does not change the logic of the conflict. Russia has shown that it can absorb huge losses without modifying its strategy, while using drones and deep strikes to erode the Ukrainian rear, cut off supplies and psychologically break the troops holding the front. This context has forced a rethinking from kyiv: the battlefield is no longer decided only on the line of contact, but in what happens dozens of kilometers behind, where commanders, drone operators and logistics routes support the Russian advance in slow motion. The war of the rearguard. In open regions like Zaporizhzhia, the difference between resisting and giving ground comes down to the ability to deny the enemy freedom of movement in the rear. Russia has converted medium-range drones in your key weaponattacking Ukrainian roads, convoys and equipment before they even enter combat. Ukraine, on the other hand, has depended for too long of death zones close to the front, betting on annihilating Russian infantry when it is too late to stop the general pressure. More and more Ukrainian commanders assume that, if it is not hit before to the system that fuels the assaults, war becomes a race of attrition impossible to win. The window of opportunity. This change of mentality coincides with a series of blows that have disorganized the Russian army. Disconnection of terminals key communications and internal decisions that have limited its own coordination channels have created a temporary vacuum in enemy command and control. Ukraine has read that weakness not as an occasion to launch local attacks, but as a strategic opportunity rare: for the first time in months, a large Russian formation appears exposed, dependent on fragile lines of communication and struggling to coordinate its defense in depth. And not just any one. The hunt for an army, not adding corpses. The plan that begins to take shape It goes far beyond “kill more or how many more.” The objective now is to encircle, isolate and destroy a specific and hitherto implacable formation of the Russian army, depriving it of reinforcements, ammunition and effective command until it becomes a a burden for Moscow instead of an offensive instrument. Where? In the southeast of Ukraine, where movements indicate that kyiv tries to wrap to the 36th Russian Navybut not through a great armored advance, but with a constant pressure on their flanks, selective attacks on key nodes and a systematic denial of their rear. In other words, it is not a spectacular offensive, because the least important thing is the shots, but rather a prolonged and methodical hunt. A risky but necessary position. There is no doubt, the shift involves risks more than obvious: for example, it demands more intelligence, more medium-range drones and even complex coordination at a time when Ukraine remains very limited by resources and irregular external support. But it also reflects a harsh and realistic conclusion: as long as Russia can rotate units and replenish men, the casualty accounting does not decide the war. Only the destruction of formations entire, unable to withdraw or reorganize, may alter the operational balance and, with it, Ukraine’s position both on the front and in any future negotiations. In that sense, what is underway is not just another offensive, but an attempt to change the rules of the game on the ground. Image | RawPixel In Xataka | An unprecedented experiment is happening in Ukraine: bombs have turned dogs into other animals In Xataka | Europe has been wondering for years “what Russia will do when the war in Ukraine is over.” The answers are not optimistic

A report has set off alarm bells in Europe. Russia’s shell production is meaningless for a single war

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When Russia crossed the Ukrainian border in 2022, Europe reacted as it had not done since the end of the Cold War: massive sanctions, accelerated rearmament and a political unity forced by urgency. During these years, the European debate revolved around a seemingly simple question about kyiv’s resistance, as the conflict lengthened, became normalized, and ceased to be a “temporary” war. Now, with the front stagnant and the calendar moving forward, in the European capitals it is beginning to prevail another concern. What will Russia do when this war is no longer the center of the board? It’s not just the front. Yes, as the conflict in Ukraine approaches its fourth anniversary, it is beginning to take hold in Europe a different reading And more disturbing: Russia is not acting like a country trapped in a war of attrition, but rather like a power that uses the conflict as, perhaps, a preparatory phase. In the last few hours, a piece of information has appeared on the old continent: the massive increase in its military production suggests that Moscow is not only thinking about supporting the current front, but about setting up a later strategic scenarioin which having reserves, industrial capacity and room for maneuver will be as important as any territorial advance achieved in Ukraine. The figure that triggers the alarms. The data that most worries the European intelligence services is the Russian production of ammunition, which has exceeded the seven million projectiles annually, a figure 17 times higher to that of the first stages of the invasion. According to the Estonian intelligence service Välisluureamet, this jump is not explained by a simple intensification of combat, mainly because it makes no sense, but by the construction of new industrial plants and the will to rebuild strategic reserves in the long term. For Europe, the implicit message is clear: no one manufactures at that rate if they are only thinking about surviving the current conflict. Resist and prepare. This rearmament occurs despite the Russian economic deterioration, enormous human cost of the war and the increasing difficulties for recruit soldiersreinforcing the idea that the Kremlin prioritizes material accumulation over internal well-being. The support of North Korea, which has come to supply a substantial part of the ammunition used in Ukraine, has allowed Moscow to gain time and rebuild arsenals. For Estonia, maintaining these reserve levels is a central element of planning possible future conflictsnot simple insurance for the ongoing war. The north enters the radar. we have been counting in recent months. That fear of what comes next is not limited to the eastern flank. Now Norway has warned openly that a Russian move to protect its nuclear assets in the Arctic, concentrated on the Kola Peninsula, a short distance from its border, cannot be ruled out. This is not a classic ambition of conquest, but rather an aggressive defensive logic: ensuring the ability second nuclear attack in case of an escalation with NATO. The Ukrainian War has forced Nordic countries to plan for scenarios that a few years ago would have seemed unlikely. Tactical peace for strategy. The Guardian said this morning that, while increasing its military capacity, Russia deploys calculated diplomacy that seeks to buy time and divide the West. Estonian intelligence describes opening gestures toward the United States and negotiating rhetoric as a maneuver to reduce pressures, exploit cracks between Washington and Europe and consolidate positions without giving up the underlying objectives. In parallel, Moscow intensifies influence operations and hybrid warfareaware that the Ukrainian post-war can be as decisive as the war itself. The disturbing scene. In short, the combination of mass production of ammunition, possible nuclear planning, hybrid pressure and instrumental diplomacy seem to paint a panorama most uncomfortable for Europe: one where even when the weapons end fading in Ukraine, Russia will remain an actor ready to act. From that perspective, it is not only the end of a war that is worrying European capitals, but the beginning of a stage in which Moscow, industrially reinforced, could decide when and where to tighten the chess again. Hence, what comes after Ukraine is precisely what generates the most fear. Image | Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, Vitaly V. Kuzmin In Xataka | The question is no longer whether Europe “is at war”: the question is whether it is willing to defend itself In Xataka | First it was Finland, now the US has confirmed it: when the war in Ukraine ends, Russia has a plan for Europe

the “eyes” to anticipate Russia’s drones

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Since the beginning of the Russian invasion, Ukraine has had to fight a parallel battle far from the front: to convince his allies of what weapons he needed, when and how far that aid could go without cross sensitive political lines. Between delays, partial vetoes and fears of escalation, air defense became one of the most critical bottlenecks for months, leaving kyiv exposed to campaigns missiles and drones while the international response moved more slowly than the war. A radar that changes the calculation. Therefore, the arrival in Ukraine of the Spanish radar LTR-25 launcher represents a qualitative leap in its air defense, by incorporating a long-range detection capacity capable of identifying threats to more than 450 kilometers. From drones and cruise missiles to ballistic systems and stealth aircraft, radar will help in a conflict where Russia has made massive and combined air strike one of its main instruments of attrition. The system, developed by Indra, is neither a prototype nor a future promise, but rather a technology already validated by NATO on its eastern flank, designed to operate in environments saturated with interference and electronic warfare and to integrate without friction with the Western batteries that protect the Ukrainian sky. The unexpected ally. Another reading of the movement is clear. Ukraine has just received from Spain what it had been taking for months claiming the United States: a true long range defense that allows us to see Russian attacks coming early enough to organize an effective response. While Washington has been reticent to give up certain sensors and strategic capabilities, Madrid has taken a step that changes the Ukrainian defensive depth, offering not only interceptors, but the necessary “eyes” to anticipate and coordinate defense against waves of missiles and drones that seek to saturate the system. In that sense, the LTR-25 is not just another radar, but a critical piece that extends reaction time and reduces Ukraine’s structural vulnerability to Moscow. Technology proven in the most demanding environment. The LTR-25 radar operates in L-band with phased array architecture and digital beam forming. In other words, it has characteristics that allow it track hundreds of targets simultaneously with great precision even under electronic attack, a key capability to detect low radar signature targets such as Shahed drones or cruise missiles. Your mobility tactics and philosophy “turn on, detect and move” reinforce its survival on a front where Russia tries to hunt radars and command systems, and its integration with command networks and NATO control makes it a force multiplier for systems such as Patriot, SAMP/T, IRIS-T or NASAMS already deployed in Ukraine. Silent revolution of Spanish industry. For decades, Spain maintained a low profile in defensebut in the meantime it was building an advanced technological base that today emerges strongly on the European stage. Here one name rises above the rest. Indra, with one of the largest radar factories on the continent, has supplied systems to countries like franceGermany or the United Kingdom, and now translates that knowledge into a real conflict that acts as possibly the toughest testbed imaginable. Hence this delivery symbolizes a profound change: from discreet partner to strategic provider of critical capabilities in high-intensity warfare. Beyond the gesture. If you also want, the delivery of the LTR-25 It is part of a much broader shift in Spanish policy towards Ukraine, one backed by an unprecedented military and financial support package and staged at the highest level by Spanish President Pedro Sánchez alongside his Ukrainian counterpart, Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Beyond symbolism, the contract with Indra opens the door to future deliveries if the system proves effective, consolidating industrial cooperation that reflects a broader European trend: technological alliances of all colors that, pushed by war, evolve towards full and lasting defense associations. Image | Indra, RawPixel In Xataka | Russia has activated the “dandelion” armor: the scarier the tank, the more confused Ukraine’s drones are In Xataka | Russia has activated the “dandelion” armor: the scarier the tank, the more confused Ukraine’s drones are

The Canary Islands and Galicia have set off the Navy’s alarm bells. Russia’s ghost fleet has arrived in Spain with warships

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Since the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and, above all, after the invasion large-scale ukrainian In 2022, Russia has been perfecting a form of confrontation that avoids direct clashes and moves in the shadows of international law: hybrid war. Sabotage, energy pressure, disinformation and opaque commercial fleets have become tools as strategic as tanks or missiles, and among them the called “ghost fleet”. Now everything indicates that they have found a new route: Spain. The “fleet” arrives from the south. At the end of January 2026, a Russian tanker sanctioned by the European Union was left adrift off the coast of Almería and was escorted by Spanish Maritime Rescue to a port in Morocco without being detained. He did it despite transporting more than 425,000 barrels of refined products of Russian origin. The episode, starring a ship integrated the ghost fleet (old ships, with frequent changes of name and flag and opaque structures of ownership) showed how Spain has become a key point of passage and incident management of a system designed to circumvent Western sanctions. Something happens. In the heart of the western Mediterranean, the Russian hybrid war was beginning to materialize not with missiles, but with timely breakdowns, gray areas of maritime law and routes connecting Russian ports with North Africa under the attentive, but limited, action of the European authorities. Morocco as a hinge, the Canary Islands as an entrance. A few days later, the arrival in Las Palmas de Gran Canaria of a oil tanker from Tangier set off alarms about a possible indirect entry of Russian fuel into Spain, using Morocco as an intermediate platform. Maritime security experts stressed that it was not an illegal operation in itself, but it was an unusual route which fits with the patterns of the ghost fleet, given that Morocco lacks sufficient refining capacity and has become a common destination for oil tankers linked to Russia. The Severomorsk Destroyer in 2023 The crux. The key, they insisted, is in the loading documentation, because the origin of the product remains Russian even if there are intermediate stops. In this context, the Canary Islands appear as a vulnerable link: a lightly guarded Exclusive Economic Zone, located in the transit axis of opaque oil tankers, which reinforces the idea that Spain offers the perfect combination of geography, infrastructure and control loopholes for this new phase of the Russian economic war. Silent pressure. Finally, and in parallel to these commercial and logistical movements, the most classic dimension of Russian naval power has ended up becoming visible in Spanish waters, forcing the Navy Spanish to intensify its surveillance operations. Within a week, Spanish units have followed the transit of several Russian vessels (including the destroyer Severomorsk and a mixed military-merchant convoy) from the Strait of Gibraltar to the Atlantic, with monitoring relays off the Galician coast and constant coordination with the command centers. Hybrid war. These missions, framed in the permanent surveillance of waters of national interest, show that the phenomenon is by no means isolated: while the ghost fleet operates on the economic and logistical level, the Russian naval presence reinforces the strategic pressure about key runners such as the Alboran Sea, Gibraltar and the Atlantic coast. Spain, the perfect route. The sum of these episodes draws a coherent pattern: the russia hybrid war has left the Baltic and the North Sea to settle in the Mediterranean and the eastern Atlantic, and Spain has become one of your most effective routes. It seems clear that all those breakdowns managed without detention, indirect discharges via Morocco, fuels of dubious traceability entering through the Canary Islands and Russian military ships crossing runners strategic are part of the same logic of attrition, ambiguity and saturation that we had already seen in other parts of Europe. And as in those cases, it is not a frontal attack, but rather a constant pressure that exploits the gray areas of trade, energy and maritime security, now placing Spain at the center of a board where war is not declared, it is navigated. Image | US Navy, Mil.ru In Xataka | Russia’s ghost fleet has changed its business model. Oil has given way to a much bigger target: Europe In Xataka | For years Europe has wondered how to stop the Russian ghost fleet. Ukraine just showed you the way: with AI

Russia’s elite GRU moves its war against Ukraine’s power grid to Polish soil

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Winter in Eastern Europe is not just a season; It’s a damage multiplier. As my colleague Miguel Jorge described wellwhat is emerging in the region is a ruthless reality dubbed “thermal terror.” In this scenario, extreme cold becomes a weapon of war designed to make civil infrastructure – heating, electricity, water – the cruelest target. The ultimate goal is not only to destroy military capacity, but to make daily life physically unviable. Under this logic of making daily life unviable to wear down the population, the Kremlin’s most feared cyberespionage group has decided to cross a dangerous border. 500,000 homes in the spotlight. As Poland prepared for the holidays, its security systems detected what Energy Minister Milosz Motyka called the “strongest attack against Polish energy infrastructure in years,” as reported by Reuters. The sabotage occurred on December 29 and 30 and was surgical. The targets were not chosen at random, but instead targeted two cogeneration plants and systems that connect renewable energy facilities — such as wind farms — to power grid operators. In other words, directly to the key nodes so that energy reaches homes. local media they collected the statements from Prime Minister Donald Tusk, who put figures at risk: if the attack had been successful, half a million people would have been left without heat in the middle of winter. Fortunately, as detailed in the press release of the Polish Governmentthe defenses worked. “At no time was critical infrastructure threatened,” said Tusk, although the incident has been treated with the utmost seriousness, mobilizing the special services to their full capacity. Sandworm’s signature. The attack took on an international dimension when the cybersecurity firm ESET announced the discovery of the weapon used: a destructive malware called DynoWiper. As reported by TechCrunchESET attributed this operation with “medium confidence” to the Sandworm groupan elite unit within the Russian military intelligence agency (GRU). The choice of dates does not seem coincidental. As investigative journalist Kim Zetter points outthis attempted blackout in Poland came almost exactly ten years after the first Sandworm cyberattack against Ukraine’s power grid in 2015, which left 230,000 homes in the dark. For experts, the use of a wiper on Polish soil is an unprecedented event, as it marks Russia’s move from simple espionage to destructive sabotage against a NATO member. Furthermore, this is not an isolated episode because since the beginning of the Ukrainian War, Poland has undergone a sustained increase of cyberattacks attributed to Russian actors. Nevertheless, according to the Ministry of Energy itselfthe December attempt was a turning point both in its intensity and in its objective: it was no longer about probing defenses, but rather about causing a real blackout. Anatomy of the attack. To understand the seriousness of the issue, it is necessary to break down the technology used. Unlike the ransomware commona wiper It is software designed exclusively to destroy. Your goal is not to ask for a ransom, but delete permanently information and leave equipment unusable. In this case, the attackers went directly to the ICS (Industrial Control Systems) systems since these systems are the ones that allow electric companies regulate the supply and monitor the network. So, Sandworm sought to break communication between renewable energy sources and distribution operators. When attacking these nodes, the technicians’ margin of action is minimal because the failures propagate in a chain. A conflict that expands. The Polish Prime Minister directly linked this attack to his country’s support for Ukraine. “We sell electricity there and, in critical situations, we receive it from them,” Tusk explained.. Attacking the Polish network is, by extension, attacking Ukraine’s energy rear. This Russian aggressiveness is not new for Western intelligence services. In fact, the United States government keeps a reward 10 million dollars for information about six GRU officers belonging to Sandworm, responsible for global attacks such as NotPetya, which caused losses of 1 billion dollars. According to Microsoft, Sandworm—whom they call Iridium— has launched nearly 40 destructive attacks against critical infrastructure since the beginning of the invasion of Ukraine, seeking to degrade not only military capacity, but the population’s trust in its leaders. From NATO’s point of view, attempted sabotage does not automatically activate collective defense mechanisms, but it does reinforce disturbing evidence: hybrid warfare makes it possible to strain the European system without formally crossing the red lines of an armed conflict. The next frontier is no longer territorial, but digital. Faced with the growing threat. The Polish Government is finalizing the Law on the National Cybersecurity System, a regulation that seeks the “autonomy and polonization” of security systems to reduce dependence on devices that facilitate foreign interference, according to official information. However, December’s failed sabotage is a reminder that in modern warfare, the front lines are on power plant servers. While in the trenches of Ukraine soldiers try to hide their thermal trace from drones, in cities like Warsaw or Krakow the battle is being fought so that the simple act of turning on the heating does not become an impossible luxury. For now, Poland has won this defensive battle, even achieving a historical record of energy production a few days after the attack. However, Sandworm’s shadow is still long. The hackers’ message is clear: “If we can’t turn off the light, at least we can scare you.” The war for control of the European switch has only just begun. Image | Unsplash and freepik Xataka | La Gomera has been suffering constant total blackouts for years. Now you have a solution: a cable that is unique in the world

Ukraine sensed that there was a superpower behind Russia’s kamikaze drones. The surprise is that there are actually two

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Many phases have passed since the Russian invasion in 2022 until today, but if one thing has become crystal clear, it is that the war in Ukraine has become a brutal laboratory where drones are the most decisive and fastest weapon to improve, to the point of concentrating a huge part of the recent losses and setting the pace of the war of attrition. In this scenario, Ukraine has been asking itself the same question for some time: how does Russia get so many drones? An industrial war. In the current scenario, the front is not only in Donetsk or Kharkiv, but also in industrial parks from Guangdong and Shenzhenwhere processors, cameras, motors, sensors and controllers are made that determine how much a drone flies, what it sees and how accurately it hits. The most disturbing thing here is not only the technological dependence, but the fact that this dependence is shared by both sideswhich turns the supply of parts into a kind of undercurrent that sustains the conflict even when sanctions seek to cut it off. The Geran-5. Now, Ukraine claims have identified a new Russian attack drone, the Geran-5which breaks with the classic “delta wing” type profile associated with the Iranian Shahed and adopts a shape more similar to a conventional aircraft, visually linking it Iranian Karrar and, by extension, to older designs inspired by American systems. The key is that it would be a more powerful and faster jet model, with an estimated speed up to 600 km/hand with tactical ambitions that go beyond the simple cheap “kamikaze drone”: it is attributed a range of about 900 km and an approximate war load of 90 kilos. Ukraine affirms that Russia is studying launching it from Su-25 aircraft to expand your radius of action, as well as explore configurations that include R-73 air-to-air missiles to complicate life for Ukrainian aviation. In other words, Russia is not only multiplying quantity, it is also testing a ladder of sophistication that mixes loitering munitions with concepts closer to a combat UAV. Geran-5 He Deja Vú. The central element, and the most politically controversial, is the list of foreign components that Ukraine claims to have found in the wreckage of the new Geran-5, including more than a dozen western and chinese electronic partswith at least nine attributed to American manufacturers and one identified like german. are mentioned critical components for navigation, communications and control, such as signal processors, clock generators and transceivers, that is, the type of electronics that does not “explode” by itself, but that turns a drone into a reliable, stable and reproducible system. For kyiv, this shows that Russia continues to avoid sanctions structurally, relying on gray markets and supply chains where real traceability is dissolved, and which has a huge machinery behind it headed by two superpowers (China and the US), along with the rest of Western “allies”. The underlying message is simple: modern war is not only won by manufacturing metal and explosives, also getting chipssensors and modules that are cheap, easy to transport and difficult to block without paralyzing global trade. Image provided by GUR showing the partial remains of a Geran-5 China as epicenter. The Financial Times said an almost absurd scene: Ukrainian businessmen visiting Chinese factories with schedules calculated to the second so as not to coincide with Russian buyers, entering through side doors and waiting in corridors, as if the conflict was managed with hotel logistics. The reason is that both armies they need the same parts and they go after the same suppliers because China dominates the material base of the commercial drone: not only does it produce a large part of the drones on the market, it also controls key elements such as cameras, sensors, controllers and propulsion, with costs much lower than Western equivalents. The result is that innovation leaks on both sides almost at the same time: if Ukraine sees a new transmitter on Russian drones, it locates the Chinese manufacturer and tries to buy it. If Ukraine asks for a specific upgrade, you may find that a week later that same supplier offers it to Russia as well. The war thus becomes a race of “components” more than doctrines, and China goes from being a “neutral” country to being the place where it is decided how quickly the conflict evolves. The supply chain. Beijing maintains the public line of neutrality and affirms that it does not supply lethal weapons, that it strictly controls dual-use goods and that its position is “objective and fair.” However, as we have said, the reality It’s different: Even if controls are in place, the system is filled with middlemen, shell companies, opaque routes and deliberate ambiguity about the end user. A market where some exhibitors show platforms with simulated weaponswhere military buyers mix with civilian fairs. In parallel, there is an imbalance of power: Russia, with more resources and priority state, can pay more, buy earlier and secure quotas, leaving Ukraine waiting or forcing it to improvise at the front due to lack of parts. Neutrality, in practice, is not just about prohibiting, but about who can best circumvent the restrictions. How to avoid restrictions. The real circumvention ecosystem works with shipments via indirect routestransportation through third countries, trucks crossing Central Asia with limited controls, and a logistics market specialized in “sensitive merchandise” that continues to operate because the economic incentive is enormous. Plus: the role of regional financial clearing platforms, which facilitate payments for sanctioned productsand the ability to create intermediate entities even in European countries to disguise operations. If you like, sanctions, as they work, introduce friction, but not rupture: they make it more expensive, slow down, force people to hide better, but they do not cut off the flow of chips, motors or cameras. And in a war where an FPV drone can be as decisive as an armoredthat logistical continuity is equivalent to operational continuity on the battlefield. Ukrainian dependency. Ukraine has made a lot of progress in … Read more

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