fleet

China already knows how to keep a fleet of drones in the air indefinitely. The problem is that there are too many problems

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Wireless charging in everyday devices It is a resource that provides comfort. In other areas, wireless and remote charging implies a much more powerful advantage: supremacy over a rival. That is precisely what China is testing, how to maintain a drone fleet flying almost indefinitely thanks to a microwave charge injected from a ground system. And they are not the only ones. In short. A few days ago, Chinese scientists from Xidian University published a peer-reviewed article in the journal Aeronautical Science & Technology in which they presented a system microwave emitter that could send energy to an array of antennas installed on the top of a drone to charge the vehicle’s battery in mid-flight. The most important thing is that it works while the ground vehicle and the drone are moving, which eliminates the need for a stationary charge that would make no sense from a strategic point of view. Image of Xidian University How it works. For the system to work, and as we read in SCMPthe researchers integrated a GPS positioning system that allowed a drone and a ground vehicle to be aligned. On the ground there is the microwave emitter and the drone has a series of antennas at the bottom that collect the energy. In tests, the system kept fixed-wing drones in the air for up to 3.1 hours at an altitude of 15 meters. The great challenge was maintaining the alignment between the drone and the ground vehicle to maximize the load, but once the obstacle with the GPS system was overcome, the drone can stay in the air depending only on the vehicle’s fuel. On the other hand, we are approaching it from the point of view of indefinite autonomy, but such a system would also allow drones to have less battery (which, in the end, adds weight) and have more carrying capacity. The BIG asterisk. Defense analysts liken it to a “land-based aircraft carrier” in which an armored vehicle on the ground is both the command and power node, monitoring, charging and providing logistical support to the drones in a manner similar to that of a aircraft carrier It is the lifeline of manned fighters. However, the system has a huge problem: it is extremely inefficient. The Xidian team estimates that the efficiency of the microwave ‘cannon’ is between 3 and 5%. It’s… ridiculous, which means that the vast majority of the energy emitted is simply wasted. Why not a laser? It’s the big question. A laser system is more precise and has a longer range, which opens the doors to other types of missions. However, being a beam of light and not directly the energy that we launch, the laser is very sensitive to interference such as fog and dust. Also, think of the laser as a precision rifle and the microwave as a shotgun: any turbulence or bump in the road would affect the beam, but microwave energy has a wider range of action. China is not alone. Chinese analysts point out that it is a promising concept, but also something that is very far from being able to be applied to satisfy an immediate operational need. What it is, is one more step to find that way to get those drones that are appearing to be a very valuable element on the battlefield, as the wars in Ukraine and Iran, unfortunately, are demonstrating. The advance is important because Xidian has time working in the theoretical framework of the technology, but it is now that they have carried out a successful field test. Now, they are not alone, since the American agency DARPA is experimenting with radio frequency and laser to charge drones remotely, and in Germany, Rheinmetall is also developing wireless charging platforms for unmanned ground vehicles, although in this case, the drones are perched on a platform. In Xataka | Sending electricity without cables seemed like a thing of the future. DARPA has done it again, and the test has turned out better than expected

know where every naval fleet in the world is 24 hours a day

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For years, on the high seas, commanders trusted that dense clouds or a few well-calculated hours between satellite passes were enough to move undetected. The fragility of that trust was evident March 16, 1988when the American frigate USS Samuel B. Roberts collided with a mine in the Persian Gulf and was almost lost without anyone having seen the threat coming. That scene made it clear that at sea it is not always whoever shoots first who wins, but whoever knows exactly where to look… and when. The end of the invisible ocean. The great naval fleets have moved under an almost sacred premise: the sea is too vast, the weather is unpredictable and satellites were still supposed to be limited to guarantee constant surveillance. It turns out that this idea has just begun to break down tangibly after the chinese demonstration continuous tracking of a ship in motion from a geosynchronous orbit to almost 36,000 kilometers in height. What once depended on brief windows of observation can now be transformed into permanent surveillance, shaking one of the strategic pillars on which modern naval power has been built. Three satellites to see everything. The key to the leap announced by Beijing is not in deploying hundreds of satellites, but in change orbital logic: when placed in geosynchronous orbita single satellite can constantly observe the same region of the planet without interruptions. Not only that. With barely three platforms positioned over the large oceans, China could continuously cover the main sea routes and naval operation zones, achieving global surveillance 24 hours a day in any weather condition. There is no doubt, this introduces an idea that is difficult to ignore, because it is no longer about seeing more times, but rather about never stopping seeing, which brings closer the scenario in which any relevant fleet could be located and followed persistently. From detecting to fixing. Last month, China public a series of undated radar images to give an idea of ​​the power it has over our heads. The monitoring of Japanese tanker Towa Maru It was not only symbolic, but technical: the satellite radar system managed to maintain stable contact despite the waves, cloudiness and interference from the sea, and it did so with a margin of error small enough to be useful in a military environment. Although that precision alone does not allow a direct attack, it does fit perfectly into a broader architecture in which other sensors (drones, long-range radars or lower altitude satellites) refine the location in real time. In this context, weapons designed to attack ships at great distances could receive updated data constantly, drastically reducing the room for maneuver of the adversary fleets. South China Sea Washington in suspense. we have been counting. For years, the US Navy has exploited the gaps between satellite passes, weather conditions and the vastness of the ocean to conceal its movements. The appearance of a network capable of observing without interruptions threatens to eliminate that margin of operational invisibility, forcing us to rethink how aircraft carriers, submarines or logistical convoys are deployed. If every movement can be detected in advance, the strategic surprise is reduced and safety distances increase, which directly impacts the effectiveness of any intervention in sensitive areas. like Taiwan or the South China Sea. Resistant and difficult to destroy. Another key element is the very nature of these satellites: by operating in much higher orbits than traditional systems, they are considerably more difficult to neutralize with conventional anti-satellite weapons. Furthermore, by requiring only a few units to cover the planet, the system is cheaper to maintain and easier to protect or replace than large constellations in low orbit. A priori, this not only improves resilience in the event of conflict, but also complicates the plans of any adversary seeking to blind the space surveillance network. The software that listens in the noise. Beyond the hardware, the decisive leap seems to be in the algorithms capable of processing extremely weak signals after traveling tens of thousands of kilometers. Separating a ship’s echo from the chaotic noise of the ocean was, until now, a problem considered almost unsolvable at these distances, but the new approach allows identify minimal patterns amidst massive interference. This capability opens the door to even broader applications, from vehicle tracking to the detection of other military targets, and at least suggests that what has been seen so far could be just a first version of much more advanced systems. Master the orbit. In short, the strategic impact goes beyond the naval field and points to a deeper change where competition is no longer focused solely on controlling maritime routes, but on dominate orbital infrastructure which allows you to see before your rival. As many analysts point out, if this technology matures and is integrated with other intelligence and attack systems, the military balance could shift. towards those who control that permanent observation layer thousands of km away. In this scenario, the idea that it is enough a trio of satellites to monitor the movement of entire fleets ceases to be a hypothesis and becomes a clear warning for sailors of where modern warfare is headed. Image | Picryl, NASA In Xataka | China is making an “invisible ocean” of the planet: when it is finished it will steal the last advantage that the US had left In Xataka | China has just mounted the largest cannon in its history on the bow of a ship. And that can only point in one direction

two mine hunters and a fleet in the opposite direction are putting Iran in the face of Vietnam

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In the vietnam warthe United States came to deploy more than 500,000 soldiers in Southeast Asia and still failed to impose a clear victory. Decades later, that conflict remains the classic example of how an overwhelming military power can become trapped in a war that, on paper, seemed much simpler. The war begins to mutate. The war between the United States and Israel against Iran has entered a different phase because two strategic moves are happening at the same time and the satellites have clearly revealed their destinations. While the United States strengthens the region with marine units capable of rapidly deploying troops ashore, two major US ships ready to clear mines in the Gulf have appeared in Malaysiathousands of kilometers from Hormuz. There is no doubt, this combination is, to say the least, strange: if the immediate objective was to reopen the strait through a classic naval operation, those ships displaced from the East should be precisely there. The contrast suggests that Washington is beginning to assume that the problem it won’t solve itself from the sea and that the conflict can lead to a more complex and prolonged phase. Hormuz: the perfect bottleneck. The strait favors especially Iran because it turns an American technological advantage into a logistical problem. It is a passage, pardon the redundancy, narrow, surrounded by a hostile coast and saturated with underwater noise, which makes it difficult to detect mines and defend ships. As we count last week, Iran can combine speedboats, drones, mobile missiles and mines of different types to sow uncertainty with cheap means. The suspicion of a minefield is enough to paralyze navigation, trigger maritime insurance and force Washington to spend enormous resources on escorts and surveillance. The asymmetry of the mines. naval mines they explain much of the problem. Placing them is relatively simple and cheap: they can be launched from small boats, submarines or even civilian ships. However, removing them It’s much more difficult. Mine-clearing ships must move slowly, use sonar, drones and helicopters, and examine the seabed in great detail. Plus: during this process they are vulnerable to attacks from the coast. That’s why even a few devices can block an entire strait and force the world’s most powerful navy to act with extreme caution. The USS Canberra somewhere in the Middle East in 2025 Where are the minesweepers? In that context, the absence of the LCS Americans prepared for countermines is especially striking. He USS Tulsa and the USS Santa Barbara They were deployed in Bahrain precisely to replace the old Avenger minehunters retired from the Gulf. But satellite images recent ones place them on the other side of the world, in Malaysia. This means that two-thirds of the ships destined for that mission are no longer in the area where they are most needed. The decision may have tactical explanationssuch as preventing them from being exposed to Iranian attacks in port, but the result is more or less clear: the American ability to clear mines in Hormuz is now much more limited. The limits of the naval solution. Even if such ships were present, clearing the strait would not be quick, of course. They counted the TWZ analysts that the new LCS are not dedicated minehunters like the old Avenger, but rather multipurpose platforms that depend on drones, helicopters and remote sensors to locate each device. In other words, the process aims to slow and requires air protection constant. In the middle of war, with missiles and drones flying from the Iranian coastthe operation becomes even more risky and almost suicidal. That is why many analysts warn that reopening Hormuz only from the sea could lead to weeks or months. Uss Tripoli The marines arrive. This is where the other big piece of the board comes in. The United States is sending a Marine Expeditionary Unitthat is, a rapid response force of about 2,200 marines embarked on amphibious ships with helicopters, F-35B and landing vehicles. These units are designed for assault operationsraids and temporary terrain control. In the case of Hormuz, and although everything is a hypothesis, its mission could include attack nearby islands into the strait, destroy missile launchers or neutralize bases from which mines are placed. School or attack. This change implies, a priori, a conceptual shift. Instead of just escorting oil tankers and clearing mines, the United States could try to eliminate threats on land. That would mean attacks on strategic islands, military depots or launching positions off the Iranian coast. Under that scenario, amphibious operations would allow open temporary windows security for navigation, but they would also introduce US troops into a hostile environment where the enemy can respond with missiles, drones or maritime guerrillas. Marine Expeditionary Unit on the move in the Pacific The risk of escalation. The problem with this type of operation is that tend to expand. The main reason? An incursion on an island requires protecting the deployed troops. Not only that. Then you have to maintain control of the place, reinforce defenses and secure supply lines. And if Iran reoccupies the area once the marines withdraw, the cycle begins again. This is how operations intended as quick hits can be transformed into prolonged missions. The mirror of Vietnam. May the main countermine warships have fled thousands of kilometers from Hormuz while marines arrive does not suggest a simple maritime reopening operation, but rather the possibility that Washington begins to assume that the real problem is no longer just in the water, but on the coastin the islands and in the Iranian capacity to reappear again and again with mobile, dispersed and cheap means. And that brings the war closer, saving all historical distances, to a very logical similar to vietnam. Not because Iran is going to reproduce that conflict exactly, but because the central risk is the same: a technologically superior superpower enters with objectives that seem limited and rational, discovers that the terrain forces it to expand the mission, and ends up trapped in a … Read more

This is the most modern icebreaker in the Russian fleet

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For centuries, Arctic ice has been a physical barrier to navigation. It is not just about extreme temperatures or rough seas, but about plates capable of closing entire routes for a good part of the year. In this scenario, clearing the way for ships does not depend solely on maps or satellites, but on very specific machinery: the icebreakers. According to CSISRussia has the largest fleet of icebreakers in the world, nuclear and non-nuclear, and that capacity has become a tool that combines logistics, economics and state presence in one of the most disputed regions on the planet. One of the most recent examples of that bet is the nuclear icebreaker “Yakutiya“. This ship is part of project 22220, a series designed to support annual navigation in the Russian Arctic and facilitate transit along the Northern Sea Route. Built at the Baltic Shipyard in Saint Petersburg and operated by AtomflotRosatom’s icebreaker division, the “Yakutiya” is part of a generation of ships that Russia considers key to maintaining maritime activity in its Arctic waters. A boat designed to navigate the most difficult routes on the planet World Nuclear News reported on October 10, 2024 that the first of its two RITM-200 reactors had reached the minimum controlled power level after fuel loading and corresponding verifications. By December 2024, the vessel had completed the builder’s pre-delivery sea trials. Already in April 2025, the “Yakutiya” was sailing towards its home port in Murmansk and, according to The Barents Observerwas expected to continue into the Kara Sea to support operations in the Western Arctic. Beyond its construction chronology, what defines the “Yakutiya” are its technical capabilities. According to Rosatom data, the ship measures 173.3 meters in length and 34 meters in width, with 33 meters at the waterline, dimensions that allow it to open channels wide enough for large ships. Its displacement is around 33,000 tons. In open water conditions, it can reach a speed close to 22 knots, about 40 km/h. The most determining characteristic is its ability to break ice up to three meters thick. Rosatom explains, Furthermore, these ships are defined as universal nuclear icebreakers. They are designed to operate both in the open sea and in shallow areas of the arcticincluding the mouths of Siberian rivers. This combination significantly expands its field of action within the network of Arctic routes, where ice and depth conditions can change significantly depending on the region. In addition, icebreakers of this class can escort large commercial vessels, including oil tankers and liquefied natural gas carriers. Each unit is designed to operate for decades, with an estimated useful life of at least 40 years and a crew of approximately 75 people. To understand why Russia invests in ships like the “Yakutiya” you have to look at the map of the Arctic. The Northern Sea Route runs along the northern coast of Russia and connects the Bering Strait with the Kara Strait (Kara Gate), according to CSIS. The same analysis indicates that Moscow considers this sea route a pillar of its economic and security strategy in the region, since it facilitates the transportation of resources and reinforces its presence in an increasingly disputed area. In this framework, the advantage of scale in icebreakers makes it easier to maintain maritime transit in extreme conditions and sustain commercial and state activities in the region. The “Yakutiya” is one more piece within that commitment to the Arctic. What remains to be seen is to what extent Russia will be able to continue expanding and modernizing this fleet in a complex international context and with an industry subject to external pressures. Images | Rosatom | Atomflot In Xataka | As the US approached, the satellites have captured a shadow: Iran has resurrected a Russian Frankenstein for what is to come

Spain agreed with Germany and France to bypass the US. And it will end with a fleet of F-35s because of a French name

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Since the end of the Cold War, Europe has tried several times to build large joint military programs capable of rivaling those of the United States, almost always clashing with national interests, different industrial cultures and, of course, technological egos that are difficult to fit into. Each generation of fighters has promised more integration and less external dependence. Few have managed to fulfill it, and now it was not going to be less. The surprise that was not. He FCAS was born as a high-caliber strategic ambition: France, Germany and Spain agreed to promote a new generation combat air system to get ahead of the United States and reduce European dependence of American fighters, with the ubiquitous F-35 in all pools. It was an explicit attempt to surprise technological, industrial and political in front of Washington. Today, that project more than 100,000 million of euros staggers to the point of threatening the opposite result: that Europe will continue buying F-35s and that Spain will end up reinforcing a US fleet just when it had opted for its own alternative. Dassault, the constant. Here comes an actor with a name of his own who has turned everything upside down. The main blockade does not come from Berlin or Madrid, but from a historical constant in the French military industry: Dassault Aviation. The Financial Times recalled this morning that the company, controlled by the Dassault family for generations, has demonstrated time and time again that its priority is maintain absolute control of the design and production of French fighters. He already did it in the eighties abandoning the Eurofighterand today he repeats the pattern at the FCAS, refusing to give up technical leadership or accept a shared governance with Airbus. Dassault Rafale A project broken from within. Furthermore, the FCAS was designed as an integrated system: a manned fighter, drone swarms, advanced weapons and communication networks, with Dassault leading the aircraft and Airbus the rest. That balance was blown up when disputes began on specifications, distribution of work and industrial control. France wanted a plane lighter and navalizableGermany another heavier and more versatile one. The technical differences masked a possibly deeper clash: who is really in charge at the heart of the system. France does not rule as much as it seems. Here another crux appears to understand the mess: although the French State is Dassault’s main client and controls exports, its real capacity to impose decisions is limited. Yes, the company has survived nationalization attempts, political pressures and merger projects for decades, always prioritizing independence and control. Hence, presidents have passed and ministers have changed, but Dassault remains the same. President Emmanuel Macron has tried rescue the FCAS in multiple diplomatic rounds, but his room for maneuver has narrowed as he nears the end of his term. Spain, trapped in collateral damage. The Spanish nation entered the FCAS as a partner convinced that the project would allow it break the dependency technology of the United States. That agreement with Germany and France meant resigning in the short term to the American F-35 in exchange for their own European future. If now the FCAS ends up failing as it seems and Spain ends up resorting again to American fighters, the irony is bitter: because the fault would not be in Washington, but in “home” of an ally. The outcome that no one wanted to admit. As we counted yesterdaywith the project running aground, Germany is already slipping that it could go on your own or look for other partners, while France protects to their national champion. From that perspective, the FCAS has become the closest thing to a failed test of European credibility in common defense. For Spain, the risk is now double: losing years betting on a blocked program of billions of euros and being forced to knock on Washington’s door again, although now with less political margin and worse conditions. He surprise European will have to wait and for now it is diluted, and the old Atlantic balance is imposed again, this time not due to lack of ambition, but because of excess control. Image | José Luis Celada Euba In Xataka | Spain, France and Germany could not depend on the “button” of the F-35. So the future European fighter aims for something else In Xataka | If the question is where is the 100 billion European fighter, the answer is simple: stuck on a dead-end runway

The ships of the oil “ghost fleet” turn off their GPS to avoid being detected. Malaysia is going to hunt them with drones

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In the crystal clear waters of Southeast Asia, where the Strait of Malacca meets the South China Sea, a war is being fought that does not appear in conventional military reports. There are no trenches, but there are rusty helmets that turn off their GPS signal to disappear from international radars. This is the kingdom of the “ghost fleet”, an ecosystem of lawless ships that, according to the latest researchhas found its safe harbor in Malaysia, doubling its activity in just twelve months. However, the time for impunity appears to be running out: from the use of artificial intelligence to the deployment of naval drones, technology is beginning to illuminate the darkest corners of the ocean. The black market boom. The situation on the east coast of Malaysia has ceased to be an open secret and has become a global security problem. According to the specialized media Seatrade Maritime“ship-to-ship” (STS) oil transfers have recently doubled, going from just seven weekly operations to peaks of fifteen in just one year. This increase responds to an infrastructure designed to circumvent the sanctions imposed on Russia, Iran and Venezuela, using Malaysian waters as a gigantic clandestine service station before the crude oil continues on its way, mainly to China. Analyst Charlie Brown, of the organization UANIhas managed to capture a disturbing reality through satellite images and direct photos. In mid-January 2026, some 60 vessels linked to Iranian oil and another 30 with Russian and Venezuelan cargoes were waiting at anchor in Malaysia’s Exclusive Economic Zone. These ships not only operate outside the law, but they do so under deplorable technical conditions. Images distributed by UANI show tankers with false names broadbrushed on their hulls and flags of convenience hidden under tarps to deceive authorities. The metamorphosis of the threat. What began as a purely economic strategy to keep Moscow’s revenue flowing has mutated into something far more dangerous for European security. As the chronicles of my colleague Miguel Jorge relate in XatakaRussia has converted part of this fleet into covert hybrid warfare platforms. It’s not just about moving barrels; Now these ships incorporate “technicians” who, under a civilian guise, are usually special forces veterans or mercenaries linked to the Wagner group. These agents wield authority that often exceeds that of the ship’s captain and have been accused of photographing military installations and monitoring underwater cables in EU and NATO waters. An example of this tension was experienced with the oil tanker Boracaywhich after embarking Russian technicians in the Baltic, was intercepted by the French navy off Brittany after suspicious drones were detected flying over critical infrastructure in Copenhagen. The ghost fleet is today, in essence, an extension of the Kremlin’s security apparatus sailing with impunity under the flags of countries like Gabon or Gambia. A new fragmented energy order. From the academic level, the Elcano Royal Institute’s analysis highlights that this phenomenon is the symptom of a “deglobalization” of the gas and oil market. In your reportresearcher Gonzalo Escribano explains that international value chains, previously based on efficiency and transparency, are being replaced by “geoeconometrically armored” circuits. Europe finds itself at a crossroads: although it seeks to disassociate itself from Russian energy, the persistence of these black markets complicates strategic autonomy. This fragmentation has even reached the LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas) market. According to Bloombergsanctioned Russian gas transfers have been documented in Malaysian waters, a technically much more complex operation than crude oil. The ship Pearlmanaged by an opaque company based in a Dubai hotel, is the face of this new network that desperately seeks buyers in Asia for the gas that Europe no longer wants. The technological response: AI and drones to the rescue. Faced with a fleet that “turns off” the real world by hacking GPS signals (spoofing) and the shutdown of transponders, the response is being purely technological. The middle CNBC highlights thatof the ships loaded with Iranian crude in 2025, 96% made dark transfers and 77% falsified their location. To combat this “blackout”, Ukraine has shown the way with an innovation that has made conventional fleets obsolete: the use of artificial intelligence in naval drones. The drones Be Baby have multiplied its capabilities thanks to AI, allowing precision attacks from thousands of kilometers away. In a recent operation near the Turkish coast, these drones hit Russian ghost fleet tankers, specifically targeting their rudders and propulsion systems. The objective is not to sink them, which would cause an ecological disaster of catastrophic dimensions, but to render them useless and turn them into an unbearable economic burden for those who operate them. This “precision offensive” is forcing insurers and shipping companies to reconsider the risk of collaborating with Moscow, raising the costs of war for the Kremlin. The dilemma of safety and the environment. The proliferation of elderly ships, without liability insurance and with dubious maintenance, is an environmental time bomb. Lars Barstad, CEO of the operator Frontline, warned in the Financial Times that organizations such as the International Maritime Organization (IMO) appear to be “sleeping at the wheel”. Barstad notes that it is only a matter of time before a major disaster occurs, as these ships operate outside of any regulatory framework. Meanwhile, diplomatic pressure increases. The US has begun a campaign of aggressive seizures, such as that of the ship Sailor (before Bella 1), which was boarded by the US Coast Guard in North Atlantic waters after a chase from the Caribbean. This “gunboat diplomacy” of the 21st century, analyzed by the Atlantic Councilposes immense legal challenges: once a steel giant full of crude oil is seized, the maintenance and storage costs are astronomical. The end of the shadow. The current geopolitical dashboard report shows that Malaysia, Spain or the waters of the Caribbean are just scenes of a larger battle for visibility. The ghost fleet survives in the shadow of legal ambiguity, but the advance of artificial intelligence and constant satellite monitoring are tightening the fence. As the analysis concludes from my partnerthis is not a frontal … Read more

The Canary Islands and Galicia have set off the Navy’s alarm bells. Russia’s ghost fleet has arrived in Spain with warships

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Since the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and, above all, after the invasion large-scale ukrainian In 2022, Russia has been perfecting a form of confrontation that avoids direct clashes and moves in the shadows of international law: hybrid war. Sabotage, energy pressure, disinformation and opaque commercial fleets have become tools as strategic as tanks or missiles, and among them the called “ghost fleet”. Now everything indicates that they have found a new route: Spain. The “fleet” arrives from the south. At the end of January 2026, a Russian tanker sanctioned by the European Union was left adrift off the coast of Almería and was escorted by Spanish Maritime Rescue to a port in Morocco without being detained. He did it despite transporting more than 425,000 barrels of refined products of Russian origin. The episode, starring a ship integrated the ghost fleet (old ships, with frequent changes of name and flag and opaque structures of ownership) showed how Spain has become a key point of passage and incident management of a system designed to circumvent Western sanctions. Something happens. In the heart of the western Mediterranean, the Russian hybrid war was beginning to materialize not with missiles, but with timely breakdowns, gray areas of maritime law and routes connecting Russian ports with North Africa under the attentive, but limited, action of the European authorities. Morocco as a hinge, the Canary Islands as an entrance. A few days later, the arrival in Las Palmas de Gran Canaria of a oil tanker from Tangier set off alarms about a possible indirect entry of Russian fuel into Spain, using Morocco as an intermediate platform. Maritime security experts stressed that it was not an illegal operation in itself, but it was an unusual route which fits with the patterns of the ghost fleet, given that Morocco lacks sufficient refining capacity and has become a common destination for oil tankers linked to Russia. The Severomorsk Destroyer in 2023 The crux. The key, they insisted, is in the loading documentation, because the origin of the product remains Russian even if there are intermediate stops. In this context, the Canary Islands appear as a vulnerable link: a lightly guarded Exclusive Economic Zone, located in the transit axis of opaque oil tankers, which reinforces the idea that Spain offers the perfect combination of geography, infrastructure and control loopholes for this new phase of the Russian economic war. Silent pressure. Finally, and in parallel to these commercial and logistical movements, the most classic dimension of Russian naval power has ended up becoming visible in Spanish waters, forcing the Navy Spanish to intensify its surveillance operations. Within a week, Spanish units have followed the transit of several Russian vessels (including the destroyer Severomorsk and a mixed military-merchant convoy) from the Strait of Gibraltar to the Atlantic, with monitoring relays off the Galician coast and constant coordination with the command centers. Hybrid war. These missions, framed in the permanent surveillance of waters of national interest, show that the phenomenon is by no means isolated: while the ghost fleet operates on the economic and logistical level, the Russian naval presence reinforces the strategic pressure about key runners such as the Alboran Sea, Gibraltar and the Atlantic coast. Spain, the perfect route. The sum of these episodes draws a coherent pattern: the russia hybrid war has left the Baltic and the North Sea to settle in the Mediterranean and the eastern Atlantic, and Spain has become one of your most effective routes. It seems clear that all those breakdowns managed without detention, indirect discharges via Morocco, fuels of dubious traceability entering through the Canary Islands and Russian military ships crossing runners strategic are part of the same logic of attrition, ambiguity and saturation that we had already seen in other parts of Europe. And as in those cases, it is not a frontal attack, but rather a constant pressure that exploits the gray areas of trade, energy and maritime security, now placing Spain at the center of a board where war is not declared, it is navigated. Image | US Navy, Mil.ru In Xataka | Russia’s ghost fleet has changed its business model. Oil has given way to a much bigger target: Europe In Xataka | For years Europe has wondered how to stop the Russian ghost fleet. Ukraine just showed you the way: with AI

In 1919 the Germans decided to sink their entire fleet in the North Sea. The steel from those ships ended up in space

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At 11:20 in the morning of June 21, 1919, Admiral von Reuter’s ship began to signal to the rest of the German ships in Scapa Flow Bay, England. The taps and water intakes were opened, the pipes were destroyed, the portholes were dismantled: no one noticed anything. Until around midday, the Friederich Der Grosse began to list to starboard. It was already late, the German flag was flying from the 74 masts. Scapa Flow. The image tells the story of Scapa Flowthe sinking of the German fleet immediately after World War I. While the Allies negotiated the terms of the Armistice with Germany, the fleet was held captive and stationed off the British coast. Von Reuter feared that the Allies would divide up the ships, so he decided to sink it completely, at any cost. The British naval ships that were on maneuvers arrived at 2:30 p.m. and were only able to save one ship. The last to sink was the battlecruiser Hindenburg. Nine Germans were killed, 16 were wounded, 1,774 were detained. 52 ships were sunk on June 21 at Scapa Flow. But they are no longer there: they are on the Moon, Jupiter and beyond the orbit of Pluto. steel is steel. A tough guy, with bad temper and few words. But in 1945 (or a little before), everything changed. We didn’t realize it at first, but we quickly discovered that although all steels are equal, there are some steels that are more equal than others. I’m not going around the bush: what happened in ’45 was the atomic bomb, the device of the Devil that made us change geological era. The problem. Since the first atomic bombs exploded on the Earth’s surface, the air contains traces of radioactive elements. They are there, dissolved in it, but the amount is so small that they are harmless. Unless for some strange reason you have to blow in enormous amounts of air in the manufacturing process of some material. It’s almost useless to us. That is, all steel manufactured after the explosion of the first atomic bomb is radioactive. Very little, almost nothing. But enough so that some medical, physical or astronomical instruments do not work correctly. For example, radioactivity monitoring systems used by spacecraft. He tells it David Bodanis in “E = mc². Biography of the most famous equation in the world“, a book that, although it has become somewhat outdated, is still a delight. You may have heard the story, but it is a good story. Steel = expensive. In the book, Bodanis explains that, faced with this problem, uncontaminated steel became very expensive. Above all, because before ’45 we did not make steel in quantities so industrial as now. I imagine dozens of NASA engineers rummaging through their family’s cutlery so they can send reliable machines into space. Until someone remembered Kaiser Wilhelm’s ships. The peculiarity of Scapa Flow. There are sunken ships in many places, but there are not many shallow inlets with 52 sunken ships in their waters. Not all of them were there, but a few were enough for us to manufacture the equipment that the Apollo mission left on the lunar surface, that which the Galileo probe took to Jupiter, and that which the Pioneer probe is taking even further. The evil, the sea. In Xataka | Quantum find in Cambridge points to solar ‘Holy Grail’: single-material solar panels In Xataka | The Atacama salt flat is the key on which the electric car industry pivots. And it’s starting to dry

Russia’s ghost fleet has changed its business model. Oil has given way to a much bigger target: Europe

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Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia has not only built a vast fleet of tankers to avoid Western sanctions and continue exporting crude oil from the Baltic and the Black Sea, but has turned that logistical infrastructure into something much more ambitious. How much? The size of an old continent. The fleet in the shadows. According to Western and Ukrainian intelligence sources cited by CNN, Part of this so-called shadow fleet is being used as a covert platform for espionage and hybrid operations in European waters. We are talking about hundreds of ships that routinely sail near the coasts of EU and NATO countries, generating income of hundreds of millions of dollars for Moscow while, at the same time, expanding the radius of action of its security services away from Russian territory. “Civilian” crews with a detail. The pattern detected by the intelligence services is revealing. Many of these tankers, registered under flags of convenience and with mostly Asian or African crews, incorporate just before setting sail to one or two Russian citizens additional. The crew lists show as simple “technicians”but his background tells another story: former police officers, members of special units of the Ministry of the Interior, veterans of the Russian army or former mercenaries linked to Wagner. They are often the only Russians on board and, according to testimonies of Danish maritime pilots and European observers, exercise an authority that goes beyond the civilian chain of command, even imposing itself over the ship’s captain. Moran Security and privatization. Many of these men would be linked to Moran Security Groupa private Russian company with deep ties to the FSB, GRU, and the Kremlin’s military contractor ecosystem. Moran was sanctioned by the United States Treasury in 2024 for providing armed security services to Russian state companies, and his history connects directly with Wagner and with operations in scenarios such as Syria or Somalia. Its corporate structure (with registrations in Moscow and in opaque jurisdictions such as Belize) and its professional profile, explicitly oriented to recruit veterans of special forces, fit perfectly into the logic of hybrid warfare: formally private actors that allow the Russian state to operate with a high degree of plausible deniability. Espionage and internal control. The functions of these “technicians” would not be limited to protecting the cargo. Ukrainian and Western sources maintain that also supervise captains non-Russian vessels to ensure that the ships are acting in the interests of the Kremlin and that, in at least one documented case, took photographs of European military installations from one of these tankers. Furthermore, although details are scarce, intelligence services suggest that some of these men have participated in acts of sabotage. These would not be direct confrontations, but rather low-profile actions designed to collect information, generate uncertainty and strain the limits of the Western response. The Boracay case. He Boracay tanker illustrates this dynamic well. Sanctioned, with frequent changes of name and flag, two Russian citizens embarked in September in the port of Primorsk, near Saint Petersburg. Both were listed as technicians and were the only Russians among a crew of Chinese, Burmese and Bangladeshis. Coincidence or not, his crossing through Danish waters overlapped with a wave of sightings of drones near the Copenhagen airport and Danish military bases. Days later, the ship was boarded by the French navy against Brittany for irregularities in their documentation. No drones were found on board, but the presence of the two Russians came to light and they were discreetly questioned. For some analyststemporal correlation proves nothing, but for others It fits too well with the pattern of trial and error in the “gray zone.” Drones, sensors and something new. Beyond Boracay, Swedish and Danish authorities have detected on other ships in the shadow fleet antennas and masts not usually found on civilian merchant ships, as well as hostile behavior towards inspectors and an obsession with photographing critical infrastructure. In an environment like the Baltic, a strategic bottleneck surrounded by NATO countries, any anomalous activity becomes a disproportionate weight. For European security services, these ships are ideal mobile platforms: seemingly legal, difficult to intercept without diplomatic escalation and capable of approaching ports, cables, bases and airports without raising immediate alarms. Hybrid warfare at sea. All this fits with a broader strategy that senior intelligence officials, such as the new head of British MI6describe as constant testing “below the threshold of war.” Drones near airports, aggressive activity at sea, discreet sabotage and covert espionage are part of the same repertoire. The shadow fleet is not only an economic instrument to circumvent sanctions, but an extension of the Russian security apparatus, capable of operating in a space where Western legal and military responses are slow and politically sensitive. The European dilemma. Europe thus faces an uncomfortable decision. Intercepting ships without insurance, with dubious documentation or with armed personnel on board could stop these practices, but it also carries the risk of a direct russian reaction. As summarized on CNN a veteran Danish maritime pilot, no small country wants to be the first to make the move. The answer, if it comes, will have to be collective. Meanwhile, the shadow fleet continues growing and sailingdemonstrating that for the Kremlin the war is not only being fought in Ukraine, but also in the seas surrounding Europe, silently and in civilian uniform. Image | kees torn, Greg Bishop In Xataka | For years Europe has wondered how to stop the Russian ghost fleet. Ukraine just showed you the way: with AI In Xataka | A ghost fleet has mapped the entire underwater structure of the EU. The question is what Moscow is going to do with that information.

The United States has turned Trinidad and Tobago into the war container it was missing. Venezuela has responded like Russia: an invisible fleet

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The conflict between the United States and Venezuela has entered a phase in which the silent accumulation media outweighs official statements. If you will, the Caribbean once again functions as a strategic belt from which Washington projects pressure without the need to declare an open war. Under the formal argument of the fight against drug trafficking, the White House has been weaving a support network logistics, radars, airstrips, ports and resupply spaces in an arc at a time bigger of “allies”. The Venezuela’s response We already saw it in Russia. The map of countries. That “arc” of allies Washington runs from the Dominican Republic to Trinidad and Tobago, passing through Aruba, Curaçao, Bonaire, Grenada, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. The deployment includes destroyers, nuclear submarines, amphibious ships, aircraft carriers, state-of-the-art fighters, drones and thousands of troops, not enough for a land invasion, but enough to control air and maritime space, monitor critical routes and sustain missile attacks if it is decided to escalate. It is a prepositioning strategy classic: being everywhere without publicly assuming that something else is in the works. Trinidad and Tobago, the most sensitive link. Within that architecture, Trinidad and Tobago emerges as the most delicate piece of the board. Its extreme proximity to the Venezuelan coast turns any gesture into a political and military message. The new government has authorized the use of its airports by US military aircraft, has received warships and marine units, has allowed joint exercises and has accepted the installation of an AN/TPS-80 G/ATOR radar capable of detecting aircraft, drones and missiles. Everything is presented as logistical and defensive cooperationbut it fits almost literally with the US National Security Strategy of 2025, which calls for a toughened version of the Monroe Doctrine to reaffirm the preeminence of the United States in the Western Hemisphere and prevent external actors from controlling strategic assets. Trinidad and Tobago insist in that it will not be a platform for offensive attacks except direct aggression, but its role as node of surveillance, resupply and intelligence places it at the center of any scenario of sustained pressure on Caracas. A blockage that is not. The announced threat by Trump of a “total and complete” interdiction of sanctioned oil tankers entering or leaving Venezuela fits into that model of gradual pressure. It is not about closing ports with a formal declaration of war, but about taking advantage of naval and air superiority, supported by friendly infrastructure, to intercept, seize or deter the ships that support the main source of income for the Nicolás Maduro regime. The recent seizure of an oil tanker loaded with nearly two million barrels and the warning that further action could follow shows the extent to which Washington is willing to take pressure beyond the symbolic, taking the risk of controlled incidents in international waters. The Venezuelan response. Faced with this siege, Caracas has reacted by raising the profile of its challenge. The order to escort ships that transport oil products and derivatives to Asia is a calculated move: it seeks to demonstrate that the Venezuelan State does not renounce its right to free navigation and that it is willing to involve to his Navy to keep exports open. It is also a response that increases the risk of confrontationbut that sends an internal and external message of resistance. Oil continues to be the financial pillar of the regime, and losing it would be equivalent to accepting total economic asphyxiation. The ghost fleets. Beyond the visible escort, the true backbone of the Venezuelan strategy is the ghost fleeta tactic practically copied from the used by Russia after Western sanctions. Old oil tankers, many with more than twenty or thirty years of service, change name and flagsteal the identities of already dismantled ships, sail under flags of convenience, turn off or manipulate their identification systems and carry out crude oil transfers on the high seas to hide the origin of the cargo. The result is an opaque trade that allows you to sell oil with large discounts to buyers willing to take risks, while the traceability required by sanctions is diluted. It is not a marginal phenomenon: a significant part of the world’s oil tanker fleet already operates in this gray ecosystem, transporting Venezuelan, Russian or Iranian crude. Sanctions that do not suffocate, they deform. The BBC reported that the data show that, although far from the historical levels of the end of the 20th century, Venezuelan exports have recovered notably compared to the collapse of 2019. This indicates that the sanctions have not paralyzed the flow, but rather have displaced it towards more opaque and risky circuits. As in the Russian caseeconomic punishment does not eliminate trade, it makes it more expensive, makes it less transparent and reinforces dependence on informal networks and actors willing to move illegally. The Caribbean as a conflict. With US aircraft carriers patrolling the Caribbean, radars deployed in islands near Venezuela and escorted or invisible tankers sailing to Asiathe conflict is located in a dangerous intermediate zone between economic pressure and military confrontation. The United States bets on the ccontrol of space and logistics regional via of discreet allieswhile Venezuela responds with the same manual that has allowed other sanctioned countries to survive: ghost fleets, aggressive discounts and specific shows of force. The Caribbean, for decades associated with tourism and trade, is thus once again a scene of high geopolitical tension where each radar installed and each oil tanker intercepted brings the risk of a clash that no one admits they want, but for which both sides seem to prepare, a little closer. Image: US Navy In Xataka | The situation between the US and Venezuela only needs one incident to escalate into something more: that incident is already here In Xataka | In full tension with the US, Venezuela has presented its drone simulator: it is equal to a three-euro Steam game

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