trap

We thought that solar parks were a death trap for birds. 19,000 hours of video and an AI have just dismantled the myth

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During the last decade, the story of the energy transition has carried a shadow of suspicion. The visual image of a sea of ​​glass and silicon, dark and geometric, made us believe that the installation of large solar parks was equivalent to sterilizing the earth. We imagined a devastated ecosystem, an industrial desert where the hum of transformers chased away any trace of fauna. It seemed the inevitable price to pay for decarbonizing our economy. However, when science has decided to turn off the noise of public debate and turn on the cameras to observe what really happens under those plates, the result has broken all schemes. The AI ​​that watched the sky. One of the deepest fears was the theory that solar panels acted as a lethal mirage for birds. To clear up this mystery, an exhaustive study published in the scientific journal Diversity has resorted to the latest technology. A team of scientists installed high-definition cameras at five photovoltaic plants in the United States (spread across the desert Southwest, Midwest and Northeast) and collected more than 19,000 hours of daytime recordings over several years. Given the human impossibility of reviewing such a quantity of footage, the researchers developed an Artificial Intelligence model (MODT) designed specifically to detect and track moving objects. After filtering more than 4,000 hours of video, AI and human reviewers identified 68,646 bird appearances. An unprecedented find. Not a single bird collision with solar infrastructure was confirmed in all the observations analyzed. Far from colliding or being disoriented by the supposed “lake effect” of the panels, the images showed that the birds integrate the solar plant into their daily lives: they fly over it (an activity that accounted for around 54% of the observations), cross it underneath, look for food on the ground, preen and even nest in the metal structures themselves. More life inside than outside. Crossing the Atlantic, scientific evidence supports this coexistence. According to a study published in AgricultureEcosystems & Environmentcarried out by researchers in Poland, small-scale solar farms located in agricultural environments significantly increase birdlife diversity. After analyzing 43 photovoltaic parks and comparing them with 43 neighboring control areas, Polish experts documented that the vast majority of species improved their presence. Except for the meadowlark, which showed a negative reaction, species typically threatened in rural areas such as the wildcatcher or the northern stonechat appeared in much larger numbers within the park. As the study explains, the facilities provide them with safe breeding areas, tall grass (which is mowed late or left to grow) and fences perfect for perching, singing and monitoring their prey. This reality is identical in our country. As we recently explained in Xataka, Spanish photovoltaic enclosures are acting as authentic sanctuaries. The data collected by the Spanish Photovoltaic Union (UNEF) and audited by the environmental consulting firm EMAT in 2025 show an irrefutable pattern. In Minglanilla (Cuenca), 32 species of birds were found inside the solar plant compared to 19 in the external agricultural area. In Revilla Vallejera (Burgos) the balance was 39 versus 34, and in Trujillo (Cáceres), 31 versus 25. Furthermore, these enclosures not only house common birds, but have become home to protected or seriously declining species such as the curlew, the little bustard or the lesser kestrel. What is the secret of this explosion of life? The answer requires changing perspective. These parks are not being installed on virgin forests, but on fields that have been subjected to intensive agriculture for decades. According to Martín Behardirector of Studies and Environment at UNEF, by building a solar park a de facto “ecological exclusion zone” is created where tractors, pesticides and herbicides disappear. Human silence attracts weeds; weeds to insects; insects to small birds, and these to large birds of prey. The key: active management. If energy companies limit themselves to fumigating the land or sweeping the brushcutter to leave the ground bare for convenience, the park will effectively be an inert desert. For flora and fauna to return, will and active management are required: using native seeds, leaving wild ecological strips on the margins, allowing extensive grazing for natural control of forage and avoiding agrotoxins at all costs. The data has spoken. We had been fearing for years that solar panels would destroy life in the countryside. It turns out that, managed with rigor and sensitivity, they have the exact power to do just the opposite: heal the ecological wounds of centuries of agricultural exploitation and give nature a voice. Image | AnkerSolix Xataka | The largest study to date on solar panels and their effect on the field debunks several persistent myths

The Strait of Hormuz has become a death trap. The Arab Emirates’ solution is a pharaonic oil “bypass” through the desert

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The new energy order is not debated in suit and tie summits, but is rising against the clock under the scorching sun of the Arabian Peninsula. Suffocated by the Third Gulf War, the United Arab Emirates has hit the table: it refuses to leave the survival of its trade routes in the hands of chance, war or its neighbors. The strategy is clear: if the strait is a minefield, they will build a rear exit. The news that has shaken the foundations of oil logistics came to light through official channels. According to a statement from the company itself ADNOC (the Emirati state oil company), His Highness Sheikh Khaled bin Mohamed bin Zayed has chaired a key meeting in which he has ordered an urgent directive: to accelerate the construction of the new “West-East Pipeline” project. But what infrastructure are we talking about exactly? As energy analyst Javier Blas points outthe key to this movement is that the Emirates is laying out a second oil pipeline expressly designed to turn its back on the Strait of Hormuz. The date marked on the calendar is 2027. When they open the tap, this new infrastructure will double the volume of crude oil that the country takes out to the world through the port of Fujairah (in the Gulf of Oman). In practical figures, this represents a gigantic leap: they will go from the 1.5 million barrels a day that they move right now, to injecting between 3 and 3.5 million. It is not a project improvised in the last week. As analyst Bachar El-Halabi points outwork on this project began quietly in early 2024, long before the war in Iran paralyzed the region. However, the conflict has acted as the definitive “catalyst.” The war did not inspire the pipeline, but it has injected it with urgency. The logistical “antidote” As was discussed in the middle Amwaj Mediathe Iran war has starkly exhibited the tremendous vulnerability of maritime bottlenecks (chokepoints). The near-total shutdown of Hormuz has caused the worst supply disruption in history, removing 12% of the world’s oil from the market. In this context, the West-East pipeline stands as a lifeline. This Emirati infrastructure, added to the gigantic oil pipeline East-West (or Petroline) of 1,200 kilometers that Saudi Arabia has reactivated towards the Red Sea, form a true logistical “antidote.” They are escape routes that neutralize Tehran’s blackmail, allowing crude oil to go out into the world without entering the range of missiles and blockades in the Persian Gulf. They are, in the words of experts, “buying invaluable time” for the West. To understand the privilege of having this infrastructure, just look at the neighboring country: the situation in Iraq exposes the other side of the coin. Lacking alternative outlets to the sea and completely dependent on Hormuz, Iraq has been left without physical space to store its own oil. As a result, Baghdad has been forced to shut down 70% of production in its prolific southern fields and beg the Kurdistan region to let them use an old, patched-up pipeline to Turkey that barely manages to export 250,000 barrels a day. Iraq is a hostage to its own geography; The Emirates, on the other hand, are buying their freedom with steel and engineering. A free (and flooded) market by 2027 All this new logistical muscle takes on its true meaning when it intersects with another historic decision: the Emirates’ slamming of the door on OPEC+. Emirates has formally left the organizationarguing the defense of their “national interest.” After almost six decades, the country has decided that its national interests no longer fit into the cartel’s quotas. The UAE had been accumulating commercial frustration for years because OPEC forced them to limit their pumping to 3.2 million barrels per day, despite the fact that the country has invested aggressively to reach a production capacity of 5 million barrels by 2027, the same year in which its new megagas pipeline to Fujairah will be ready. But as various international media explain, this divorce is not just about money. Abu Dhabi feels betrayed. The Emirates have had to absorb much of the impact of Iranian missiles and drones alone, feeling that their Arab “brothers” and the Gulf Cooperation Council were turning their backs on them. Therefore, the consequences of this schism will be tectonic. The cartel has seen its global market share plummet to 26%. When the Strait of Hormuz reopens and the West-East pipeline operates at full capacity, the Emirates will flood the market under its own rules, leaving a lone Saudi Arabia to bear the brutal cost of trying to stabilize prices in a world of extreme volatility. The cold war for the future The Emirati order, in fact, is directly addressed to Riyadh. In the silent cold war it is waging with Saudi Arabia for regional hegemony, the Emirates refuses to be a supporting actor in the face of Prince Mohamed bin Salman’s monolithic “Vision 2030.” As explained Middle East Economythe UAE can afford to leave OPEC and endure a downward pulse in prices because its break-even Fiscal is around a comfortable $45 per barrel, compared to the much greater needs of its neighbors. Thanks to diversification, the Emirates today generates 25% of its electricity with the Barakah nuclear power plant and has immense solar parks, allowing itself to use today’s petrodollars to finance hydrogen and the technology of tomorrow. However, this apparent invulnerability has a terrifying blind spot. Military analysts warn that, in the era of hybrid warfare, a steel pipe is of little use if a $500 drone can paralyze the region. The Third Gulf War already demonstrated this fragility when a drone reached the gigantic Emirati Ruwais refinery. Added to this is the panic unleashed when pro-Iranian militias explicitly threatened vital infrastructure such as the Barakah nuclear power plant. The Emirates is building its financial and logistical freedom, yes, but it is doing so through a minefield. The new West-East pipeline is ultimately much more than a … Read more

It was a triple trap designed by North Korean hackers

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A Spanish blockchain developer was almost a victim of one of the cyber espionage operations more sophisticated ones circulating right now. The bait they used was something as innocent as a job offer sent via LinkedIn. Which It seemed like a professional opportunity. It was actually a trap designed by one of the hacker groups most dangerous north koreans and best financed in the world. The case was analyzed by Claudio Chifafounder of cybersecurity company DLTCodeand coincides with another attack documented a few weeks before vs. Chris PapathanasiouCEO of security firm AllSecure. Two almost identical attacks, two different countries, the same perpetrator: the Lazarus groupthe unit of government digital operations from North Korea. The job offer had a cat in the bag In the Spanish case, the contact came in the form of something as common in the LinkedIn environment as a job offer as a strategic advisor in a decentralized video game project with 100% remote work and flexible hours. After a brief conversation, the supposed recruiter sent a link to advance the hiring process by calling the candidate for a 45-minute video call. After that initial conversation, the bait that would have completed the trap came into play: downloading a repository and opening it in Visual Studio Code to review it. In the case of Papathanasiou, the modus operandi was virtually identical: A LinkedIn profile offered him a job at a company it described as “a rapidly growing team developing the first decentralized AI operating system,” also with a Calendly link (a meeting scheduling tool) to schedule the call. During the video call, the supposed selection manager briefly used the camerashowing a face that matched the LinkedIn profile which he was using as a cover, although the voice did not fit with public videos of that person that Papathanasiou later found. “I started recording mid-conversation once I became suspicious,” said Papathanasiou, who suspects the attackers used surveillance technology. deepfake for impersonate the identity of your interlocutor. Claudio Chifa, on the other hand, became suspicious due to the sum of small details that did not quite fit with the project they were offering him: “The interlocutor’s accent had nothing to do with Portugal, the instructions in the GitHub repository were clearly generated with some AI, which also made me doubt the quality of the project. But, above all, it was the insistence on releasing the code on my machine for an advisory position,” the cybersecurity expert stressed. Three traps in one shot Both the repository analyzed by Chifa and DLTCode and the one investigated by AllSecure hid three independent infection mechanismsdesigned to be activated simultaneously when the folder was opened, so that, if one failed, the other two acted as a backup, completing the job. The first took advantage of a feature in Visual Studio Code that allows you to configure automatic tasks when opening a project. The malicious command was executed in a hidden window, leaving no trace visible to the user, and could adapt to the victim’s operating system (Mac, Linux or Windows). The second mechanism operated during the usual project installation process using npm (the package manager or component installation tool used by JavaScript programmers). At that time, the attacker’s server automatically received all the credentials stored in the system, including keys from services such as AWS, Stripe or OpenAI, and took full control of the computer. The third front of attack was linked to the previous two, so that it was enough to open the folder for all three will be fired at the same time and take their respective positions. “The smartest thing about this attack is that it does not depend on the victim do anything extraordinary. They don’t ask you to run an .exe, they don’t ask you to deactivate the antivirus, they don’t ask you to do anything that activates your alarms. They ask you to open a folder in your code editor. Something that a developer does fifty times a day,” highlights Chifa. Designed to leave no trace The history of the repository analyzed by DLTCode reveals that the operation has been active since September 2025, with eleven control servers from which the attackers manage malware remotely rotated throughout that period. When AllSecure attempted to analyze its attack from AWS servers, Lazarus operators detected that the source IP belonged to a data center and immediately severed the connection. That doesn’t give you an idea of ​​the level of active surveillance this group has over its own infrastructure. The final objective of both attacks was the same: steal cryptocurrency walletsbrowser passwords, SSH keys (remote server access codes) and any stored credentials in the system that may be useful to them in the future. The FBI esteem that the Lazarus group has accumulated more than $1.5 billion stolen in cryptocurrencies through campaigns of this type. How to defend yourself against these types of attacks What saved Chifa from falling into Lazarus’s trap was stop to analyze the code before executing it. Something about the meeting didn’t add up to him and he decided to investigate first. Papathanasiou did the same and, under suspicion, created an isolated virtual environment and analyzed the repository from there instead of opening it directly on his computer. For programmers and software engineers, who have become the main target of these cybercriminals, experts recommend disabling automatic task execution in Visual Studio Code, always inspect the configuration and installation files of any project received externally, and never run code of unknown origin outside of an isolated environment. “The most important precaution is to distrust any selection process that asks you to run code during the first contacts. No legitimate company needs you to open a local repository on the first call. If someone contacts you on LinkedIn with an extraordinary project and a few days later they are asking you to download code, that is the time to stop,” warns the founder of DLTCode. If you suspect an attempt to attack in Spainboth the National Cybersecurity Institute (INCIBE) … Read more

They believed they had found jobs in large companies. In reality they were being deceived: this is how the trap works

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Looking for a job is already hard enough without having to be suspicious of every message that arrives in your inbox. And yet, that is exactly what the campaign that has warned about proposes. NordVPN: a trap set up to look like a real opportunity. We are not talking about a clumsy email or a sloppy website, but rather something much more refined, with names like Meta, Disney, Coca-Cola or Spotify as a claim. That’s the key to everything: they play with the illusion of those who believe they may be on the verge of an interview or a new job, when in reality they are entering into a fraud. The investigation alerts of a campaign of phishing specifically aimed at job seekers. The attackers have set up an attack chain in several phases that impersonates large brands and seeks to take the victim to a very specific point: a false login screen with which they intend to keep their Facebook credentials. Let’s see in detail the strategy of these cybercriminals. The mechanics behind fraud that imitates real selection processes It all starts with cold recruitment emails, carefully written and with a professional tone that seeks to resemble real human resources communications. It is not a minor detail that some of these shipments are made through legitimate services such as Google AppSheetbecause not only can that help you avoid spam filters, it also helps make the scene more believable to the person on the other end. The trap, at least at the beginning, is not presented in a crude way, but with a very careful appearance. From there, one of the most peculiar pieces of the entire chain appears: the so-called “HUB” domains. According to the investigation, these are pages that do not show their most sensitive content to anyone who enters directly. If a security analyst or an automated system visits that domain without coming from the specific link included in the email, what they find is a generic website, with hardly any visible activity. The truly important part is only activated when the visit arrives from that specific reference, which acts as a key and reveals the next step of the deception. The next move of the campaign is to give the victim exactly what they expect to see after a convincing recruitment email: a website that looks like a job portal. The research explains that, after that first access, the user lands on a intermediate domain which simulates a legitimate job offer portal and where you can consult positions that seem real and associated with the company whose identity they are impersonating. The more the scene resembles a normal job search, the easier it is for the person to interpret everything that comes after as a logical part of the same process. Campaign replicates legitimate job pages and uses Facebook login as hook The decisive moment comes when the victim clicks on “Request” or “Send request”. That click does not open a job form or a next phase of the supposed selection process, but rather a phishing page that asks you to log in with Facebook to continue. That’s where the trap stops insinuating itself and begins to execute its true purpose. All of the above was designed to lead to that exact point, one in which the request may seem like another simple verification within the application, when in reality what is being delivered are the account credentials. The supposed job opportunity was nothing more than the decoration of an operation with a much more specific purpose. According to the research, the final objective is steal Facebook credentials and thus obtain access to the victim’s account, with the possibility of also compromising other services connected to it. That’s why it’s a good idea to stick with a practical idea: before entering any credential, you should check the URL carefully, check that you are on the official domain, and be wary of any strange login. Images | Xataka with Grok | NordVPN In Xataka | AI is crucial for the US military. So he’s naming OpenAI and Palantir leaders as lieutenant generals

The world became obsessed with pistachios because of Dubai chocolate. Now the war has turned it into a trap

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The last few years have been anything but quiet for the pistachio industry. First ‘Dubai chocolate’ fever Its demand skyrocketed, straining supply chains and skyrocketing prices. Now the Iran conflict has struck a blow to its market, causing an earthquake whose consequences are still difficult to predict. For now there are already analysts warning that the fruit is beginning to be priced at highs that have not been seen for almost a decade. The big question is… And now what? What has happened? That the pistachio market is showing signs that it does not remain immune to the Middle East conflict, something that is otherwise expected if we take into account that Iran is one of the large world producers of this dried fruit. The alarm signal was raised by Bloomberg, which on Monday warned that the conflict is already affecting the price of pistachios in the markets. Their analysis is based on measurements from Expana Markets, a British firm specialized in the agri-food sector, which assures that in March the pound of pistachios reached $4.57the highest value since May 2018. Is it important? Yes. The pistachio market is very broad, it moves billions and it is supplied from more suppliers than Iran, so Expana’s data should be taken as a clue. Even so, they are interesting for their context. The pistachio had already experienced a price increase in recent years, driven by its popularization in the the drinks and food in general and especially for the enormous success of Dubai chocolate, a sweet made with cocoa and pistachios. After TikTok was filled with viral videos about its tablets, the price of grain skyrocketed: Bloomberg estimates that between the end of 2023 and 2025, Expana’s reference value for the US rose 30%. Are there more indicators? Yes. In Spain we have the platform data Pistachio Prowhich shows the increase in prices that the different varieties of grain have experienced in recent years in the Lonja de Albacete. A few months ago, in fact, the website informed that the price of Kerman-type grain had reached a “historical record” in both conventional and organic grains. Globally, a year ago Financial Times I already warned that Dubai chocolate was straining global pistachio supplies, driving up prices. Does the war in Iran have that much influence now? Yes. And for several reasons. The main one is that Iran does not occupy just any place on the world pistachio map. Although his weight is nowhere near what it was a few decades ago, when he hoarded good part of global production, the Islamic Republic continues to be the second largest breadwinner on the planet, only behind the United States. USDA estimates in fact indicated that during the 2025/2026 season its production would be around 200,000 metric tons, 18% of world production. They are 80,000 tons more than the third country by volume, Türkiye, and 160,000 tons more than the contribution of the entire EU. Some analysts it’s been several weeks warning that Iranian crops may be affected by the impact of the war on energy and water supplies for irrigation, in addition to problems with infrastructure. This is without, of course, taking into account the blow that the conflict has dealt to maritime traffic and the entire logistics chain. Some voices even have slipped in which the Iranian pistachio industry has been directly punished by the bombings. Are there more factors? The answer is once again affirmative. The war has tightened the rope, but the reality is that the pistachio trade was not going through its best moment in Iran. The industry has not been immune to the sanctions and geopolitical tensions that preceded the attack launched by the US and Israel on February 28. Neither, remember Bloombergto the repression with which Tehran responded to the protests internal. Even the harvest would have been lower than expected. All these factors also impact the supply of the fruit. “Pistachios are undoubtedly sensitive to disruptions in the Middle East, given the region’s role as a producer, transit hub and destination,” warns Nick Moss of Expana Markets. Tehran is also a key supplier of pistachio to the gigantic Indian market, which has now seen its supply chains affected, like other nations. “The war has led shipping companies to cancel all new reservations from March 2 for shipments destined for the Middle East,” duck Gyana Ranjan Das, from Grown Point. Does it only affect Iran? At all. If the war in Ukraine in 2022 and that in Iran now demonstrated anything, it is that the effect of bombs and drones is still felt in the countries where the battles are fought, but the disruptions they generate extend to markets and economies around the world. Iranian farmers are not the only ones affected by the conflict. The Strait of Hormuz is key to global shipping oil and ureaso its blockage directly affects the supply (and therefore the costs) of two essential inputs for farmers: fuel and fertilizer. Although there are those who believe that US producers will be the big beneficiaries, in recent weeks media such as Associated Press (AP) or Los Angeles Times They have interviewed California farmers who acknowledge that they have also been harmed by the conflict. one of them assured have merchandise worth five million dollars blocked on ships, fruits that under normal conditions would have already arrived in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. An expectant market. Surely that is the adjective that best defines the current state of the world pistachio market. Expectant. And not only because the second largest producer on the planet is at the center of a conflict that is currently hanging on a very delicate truce. After years marked by increased demand, the sector faces a potential increase in costs, a rise in prices, a decrease in supply and a strangulation of trade. “Even for buyers who do not normally source directly or indirectly from Iran, these supply restrictions could lead to increased competition for stock available elsewhere,” … Read more

the funnel is a fatal trap knocking down only two ships

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In 1988, during the call Operation Praying MantisIn a single day, the United States launched the largest naval offensive since World War II in the Persian Gulf, destroying a large part of the Iranian fleet after a mine hit an American frigate. That episode, which seemed to close a chapter, ended up marking the beginning of a completely different form of understand war at sea. A lock to strangle… or expose yourself. The United States has opted for one of the most aggressive tools available: block traffic to and from Iranian ports in the Strait of Hormuz to suffocate its economy, deploying a combination of aircraft carriers, destroyers, special forces and air support with the ability to intercept, board and detain oil tankers. The operation, however, does not consist of simply turning off a tap, but rather of monitoring and controlling a maritime funnel extremely narrow and saturatedwhere each movement forces high-value assets to move closer to the Iranian coast. This proximity, necessary to make the blockade effective, turns each maneuver into constant exposure to attacks, raising the potential cost of the operation from the first moment. The military paradox. A key point appears here, because, although the United States has devastated the Iranian conventional navy, sinking frigates, corvettes and large units, the true instrument of control of Hormuz still stands: the asymmetric fleet of the Revolutionary Guard. Talk later of more than 60% of their speedboats that remain operational, hidden in underground bases and specifically designed to operate in confined waters, launch lightning attacks, lay mines or harass commercial ships. In fact, this structure has not only survived, but has proven itself effectively. drastically reducing maritime traffic, making it clear that traditional naval power is not the decisive factor in this scenario. The strait turned into a weapon. This morning they counted the TWZ analysts that there is a wave of US minesweepers currently moving from Japan to the Middle East. The move is easy to understand, since Iran has transformed the strait in a hostile environment where any technological superiority loses part of its advantage in the face of saturation and difficulty of detection. Naval mines, explosive drones, ground-launched missiles and small fast vessels create a distributed threat network that does not need to sink large vessels to be effective. It is enough to generate uncertainty and constant risk to paralyze trafficmake insurance more expensive and deter shipping companies, as has already been seen with dozens of attacks and the drop in the number of daily crossings to minimum levels. Strategic funnel: control or get trapped. Because the US plan to “bottle” Iran on both sides of the Strait involves deploying forces in the Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf to cut entrances and exits, but that same geometry makes the operation in a potential trap. As? A priori, the forces must operate within a corridor barely 30 km wide, under direct range of coastal missiles and surrounded by low-cost but high-impact threats. In this context, control of space does not eliminate risk, but it concentrates itforcing ships to remain within an area where the adversary has designed its way of fighting for decades. The critical point. Under that scenario, the logic of the confrontation favors Iran in one key respect, because it does not actually need to defeat the US navy as a whole, only to inflict limited losses, but symbolically devastating. Hence, as the retired admiral of the United States Navy, James Stavridis, explained, to CNNthe sinking or disabling of one or two Washington destroyers, or the damage to a single aircraft carrier, would not change the global military balance, but it would have an impact unprecedented political and strategicquestioning the entire operation in itself. In essence, a simple explanation: in an environment where attacks can come in the form of swarms of drones or relatively cheap missiles, the cost-benefit leans dangerously against whoever deploys the most valuable assets. Time, economy and global pressure. Not only that. While the blockade seeks to cut off Iranian income, its collateral effects are already hitting the global system: rise in oil prices above $100, tensions in fuel supplies, impact on aviation, fertilizers and industrial chains. Iran is precisely playing with this wear and tear, aware that prolonging the crisis increases the pressure on the United States and its allies, both economically and politically. In this scenario, every day that the strait remains altered reinforces the Iranian negotiating position, turning the blockade into a double-edged sword. Decades waiting for the battle. If you will, the latest analysis of the situation in Hormuz is perhaps the most disturbing for Washington’s interests. Far from being a surprise, the scenario fits exactly with the doctrine that Iran developed after the destruction of his fleet in the eighties: avoid conventional combat and dominate critical points through asymmetric warfare. The Strait of Hormuz is not just a strategic passage, but a battlefield custom designedone where the combination of geography, preparation and tools allows Tehran compensate for their inferiority in the face of an extremely superior naval power. Therefore, more than a decisive move, the US blockade opens the door to a confrontation on the ground where Iran it feels more comfortable and where the risk of an unpredictable escalation is maximum if Tehran is able to knock down a couple of “chips.” Image | Iran State Media In Xataka | The problem in Hormuz is not that it is closed: it is that Iran has “lost the keys” and without them the balance is broken In Xataka | The most buoyant market right now is selling streaming and satellite images of US movements to Iran.

Europe fled from Russia’s gas to fall into the arms of the United States. The Third Gulf War proves that it was a trap

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Behind troop movements and sea blockades for the Third Gulf Warthere is a much quieter script twist that is shaking the foundations of the continental economy: false European security. A problem that comes from the other side of the pond. After the energy crisis due to the Ukrainian War (still valid), Europe thought it had solved its great energy vulnerability by changing the gas that arrived through Russian gas pipelines for liquefied natural gas (LNG) that crossed the Atlantic in ships from the United States. The idea of ​​the European Union was to bet its imports on Washington to diversify sources and avoid future geopolitical blackmail. However, the American lifeline has turned out to be punctured. With the global market in maximum tension due to the war in Iran, the US is not guaranteeing European supply and makes gas subject to trade wars and political whims. The real Achilles heel. Europe now depends on the United States for two-thirds of its LNG imports, according to the center for economic studies Bruegel. As global supply falls due to the conflict, Asian buyers — who traditionally sourced from the Gulf — are competing aggressively for flexible gas ships. The result is a bidding war to the highest bidder: according to Bruegelseveral shipments of American LNG have already been diverted from Europe to Asia in the midst of the conflict. At the diplomatic and commercial level, the situation with our “savior partner” is enormously unstable. In the midst of this crisis, Donald Trump has come to criticize European allies, urging them on social networks to “get their own oil,” according to Bloomberg. As if that were not enough, political friction over the conditions of the trade agreement between the EU and the US has caused senior US officials to threaten retaliation, casting serious doubts on Washington’s previous commitment to sell $750 billion in energy products (including its precious LNG) to the European bloc. The price of the “green illusion”. The impact of this imbalance is being brutal for European pockets. According to the Financial Times Based on data provided by the European Commission itself, the bill for EU fossil fuel imports has increased by 14 billion euros in just 30 days of conflict. Gas prices have experienced a rise of 70%, while oil prices have become more expensive by 60%. This puts in front of the mirror what in Euractiv have baptized as “the green illusion” of Europe: a glaring structural failure in the energy transition. Despite having invested nearly one trillion euros in renewable energy, the European Union’s energy dependence on imports remains at 60%, practically the same figure as in 2004. An ineffective design. The reason for this price contagion lies in the very design of the European electricity market. By operating with a marginalist system, the most expensive technology (usually gas) is the one that sets the price of electricity for everyone, as explained in Strategic Energy. In countries heavily dependent on gas to generate electricity, such as Italy, gas sets the price 89% of the time, exposing citizens directly to international volatility. However, there is hope if you do your homework. In Spain, the enormous growth of wind and solar energy has caused the gas only mark the price of electricity 15% of the hours, much better shielding the country against these external shocks. In fact, it’s not all bad news: solar electricity generation has saved the EU from spending 2 billion euros in fossil fuel imports only in the first 20 days of March. And now what? It doesn’t look like we’ll get a break anytime soon. The crisis will not be brief, as the European Commissioner for Energy, Dan Jørgensen, has strongly warned. who has made it clear thateven if peace were declared tomorrow, prices would not return to normal in the foreseeable future. The European Commission is already finalizing a “toolbox” with emergency measures that will suddenly return us to the scenarios of 2022. On the table in Brussels is the possibility of recovering taxes on extraordinary profits that fell from the sky (windfall tax) for energy companies. Drastic measures in sight. Brussels also foresees drastic measures to contain demand based in the well-known 10-point plan of the International Energy Agency. This would translate into recommendations to Member States to encourage teleworking, reduce speed limits on motorways and promote both public transport and car sharing. At the strategic level, to stop the bleeding in LNG prices and prevent the US from playing against Europe with Asia over shipments, the think tank Bruegel proposes a radical solution: that the EU act as a bloc and coordinate its gas purchases directly with large importers such as Japan and South Korea to avoid a bidding war. The invisible problem. To understand the complete picture, we must talk about the great bottleneck that almost no one talks about: concrete and copper. European renewable deployment is colliding with a lack of capacity in electricity networks. According to a report from the climate think tank Emberat least 120 GW of planned renewable energy projects in Europe are at risk simply because the grid cannot support them. The logjam is monumental, with almost 700 GW of renewable projects stuck in connection queues awaiting permits across European countries reporting this data. And this is not just a problem of the macro plants of large corporations; It directly affects the average citizen. According to calculations in the same report, 1.5 million European homes could face delays in being able to connect the solar panels on their roofs due to obsolete distribution networks that do not have the capacity to take on the energy. A chronic gap. The underlying problem is a chronic gap in the system itself. As pointed out EuractivEurope has changed how it generates its electricity, but it has not electrified its real economy. Cars continue to burn oil, heavy industry continues to use fossil gas and the general electrification of the economy has been stagnant for ten years. Europe has spent … Read more

Iran has spent decades excavating its “missile cities.” Satellite images have just revealed that they are a death trap

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For years, Iran has shown the world tunnel videos endless tunnels dug under mountains, with military trucks circulating between missiles lined up as if they were cars in an underground subway. It was understood that many of these facilities extend kilometers underground and are part of one of the military fortification programs. most ambitious in the Middle East. What almost no one knew until now is to what extent this gigantic hidden labyrinth could become a key piece of the current conflict. The cities, but with missiles. Yes, for decades, Iran has excavated an extensive underground base network known as “missile cities”, complexes hidden under mountains and hills intended to protect its enormous ballistic arsenal against air attacks and guarantee the regime’s retaliation capacity even in the event of open war. There are numerous videos Officials released in recent years where we could see long tunnels illuminated by artificial lights, windowless corridors and convoys of trucks loaded with missiles ready to move to the surface, an entire military architecture designed to hide thousands of short and medium range projectiles away from spy satellites and enemy bombers. Some installations even incorporate silos dug into the rock or mechanical systems on rails to move missiles within underground galleries, a perfectly assembled choreography reflecting a strategic project conceived to ensure arsenal survival Iranian in a protracted conflict. The images that reveal the paradox. However, the war has begun to show the unexpected reverse of that strategy. Recent images from space have revealed Smoldering remains of destroyed launchers and missiles near the entrances to several underground complexes, a sign that systems hidden underground are becoming extremely vulnerable at the moment when they must go outside to shoot. It makes sense. American and Israeli surveillance planes, armed drones and fighters They patrol constantly over the areas where these facilities are located, observing the entrances to the tunnels and attacking the launchers as soon as they appear on nearby roads or canyons. In other words, what for years was a system designed to hide mobile weapons It thus becomes a relatively predictable pattern: tunnel entrances, exit roads and deployment areas that can be monitored from the air and destroyed as soon as activity is detected. From strategic refuge to death trap. They remembered in the wall street journal A few hours ago this change has revealed a structural problem in the very concept of missile cities. Underground complexes are very difficult to destroy from the air, but they are also fixed installations whose location is known by Western intelligence services. In practice, this means that much of the arsenal remains stored in specific places while enemy planes continually fly over the airspace, waiting for the moment when the launchers come out to act. Many military analysts summarize the dilemma in a simple way: What was previously a mobile and difficult to locate system is now concentrated in fixed points, which facilitates its surveillance and reduces its capacity for surprise. Commercial satellite images themselves show destroyed launchers As soon as they left the mouths of the tunnels, fires were caused by leaked fuel and access to facilities bombed with heavy ammunition. Missile base north of Tabriz in Iran. The image on the left belongs to February 23, the one on the right from March 1 after the first attacks The air offensive against underground infrastructure. As the first week of war approaches, the military campaign has begun to focus increasingly on these infrastructures. They told Reuters that the first phase of the attacks focused on destroying visible launchers and surface systems capable of firing at Israel or US bases in the region, while the second stage aims straight to the bunkers and buried warehouses where missiles and equipment are stored. Israeli aviation, with American support, has attacked hundreds of positions and has managed to drastically reduce the number of launches, while an almost constant air offensive that hits targets continues. both in Iran and Lebanon during the same missions. The stated objective is to progressively degrade Iran’s ability to launch ballistic missiles and drones until it is completely neutralized. Missile base north of Kermanshah in Iran. The image on the left belongs to February 28, on the right it belongs to March 3 A gigantic arsenal underground. The actual scope of these facilities remains difficult to determine. There are military estimates that place the Iranian arsenal before the war between about 2,500 and up to 6,000 missilesstored in different facilities throughout the country, many of them excavated under mountains or in remote areas of the territory. Despite the attacks, Iran has managed to launch more than 500 missiles against Israel, US bases and targets in the Gulf since the start of the conflict, although many have been intercepted and the pace of salvos has decreased rapidly. That drop suggests that attacks on launchers and storage centers are beginning to erode the country’s ability to respond. The strategic dilemma. The result is a strategic paradox that is just beginning to become visible. Missile cities were designed to protect the core of Iranian military power and ensure its ability to retaliate, but in a scenario where the enemy dominate the air and watch constantly the entrances to these complexes can become choke points for the arsenal itself. Iran has spent decades excavating these underground bases with the intention of making its missiles invisible. But satellite images of the war are showing something very different: that this labyrinth of tunnels, designed as a shelter, can become one of its greatest vulnerabilities when the launchers are forced to surface under the look constant flow of planes, drones and satellites. Image | X, Planet Labs In Xataka | We had seen everything in Ukraine, but this is new: neither drones nor missiles, bulldozers have reached the front In Xataka | You’ve probably never heard of urea. The missiles in Iran are destroying their production, and that will affect your food

Michel Foucault was convinced that “visibility is a trap.” And without knowing it I was talking about our lives with AI

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I never thought I’d write this, but I’ve been thinking about it for days. Michel Foucault more than I would like. And a back pain is to blame. It was a couple of weeks ago, it was one in the morning and the house had been quiet for a while. That’s where the puncture came. I could have woken up my wife who was 30 centimeters away and, well, she is a doctor; I could have searched on Google; I could have even asked on an Internet forum. And yet, I opened ChatGPT, asked what was bothering me, and shortly after turned off my phone to go to sleep. And I fell asleep right away. But a few days ago, this analysis by Javier Lacort about ChatGPT Health It left me thinking. Not because AI was fully entering the world of health and “medical advice” (something that, on the other hand, I knew firsthand); but because of something that was commented on in it: that “we prefer to ask a chatbot have to wait three weeks for an appointment or have to bother a friend at eleven at night. It hurt a little. There was something interesting there. Eleven at night; one in the morning “The ChatGPT Competition”, Lacort continued“it’s not so much with the doctors as with the emotional support network that we used to have. We asked our mother, our partner, the friend who studied nursing.” But for some time now, “upsetting someone has become emotionally costly.” That last phrase is devastating because it contains the key to something that goes far beyond chatbots with medical uses. Something that goes through Millennials’ problems with calls, with the fishmongers, with sex or with any interaction that is not mediated by a screen: the deep cultural aversion that the modern world has generated to ‘social friction’. And it is curious because, although only in recent years do we see the most striking consequencessociology and cultural analysis have been pointing out what was happening for decades. We have Norbert Elias, for example, who I was convinced that (as part of the prolongation of the civilizing process) the thresholds of shame and discomfort are shifting. What fifty years ago was perfectly normal—calling without warning, asking a favor from an acquaintance, interrupting someone with a question—today borders on the intrusive. What’s more, today we have internalized it. Sennet spoke of the decline of the public sphere (we know how to handle ourselves in privacy and in public transactions, but not in the middle ground); the sociology of emotionstalks about the success of therapeutic lexicon and how that has changed the way we relate; Hartmut Rosa cblame social accelerationprecariousness and lack of time, the loss of effectiveness of reciprocity networks. That is to say, we have many theorists thinking about the same thing: that we are a new type of subject. A subject who has internalized the rules, who manages himself, who evaluates his relationships in terms of emotional cost-benefit and who, above all, experiences direct reciprocity as something frictional, uncomfortable and potentially invasive. And, just then, chatbots appear. I’m not talking about the technology behind it, nor its ultimate nature: I’m talking about the same historical process that has created subjects like this, has created something that “listens to them”, that “is empathetic”, that does not judge them and that helps them as and when it can. Honestly, it would be strange not to throw ourselves into his arms. Can Foucault help us understand all this? Google DeepMind That’s where, I’m afraid, Foucault becomes interesting. In his courses at the Collège de France from the late 70sthe French philosopher explored a whole series of different dimensions of power that, although not obvious, were inseparable from the Modern State. In the past, the State was mainly about controlling borders and collecting some money. But not anymore: now the State manages populations (what it called ‘biopolitics‘ and includes things such as vaccination programs or birth policies) and, at the same time, deals with each subject in its particularity (the so-called ‘pastoral power‘ who through family doctors, social workers, school counselors or psychologists listen to us, advise us and “lead us”). He called the combination ‘governmentality‘: a power that (excuse the ‘expletives’) is at the same time totalizing and individualizing. And those, totalizing and individualizing, are features that seem half-made of technological solutions such as ChatGPT Health. A chatbot that, on the one hand, advises users about their problems, listens without judging, guides us in micro-decisions and knows us (or ‘pretends to know us’) in our particularity; and, on the other, it performs triage, implements protocols, normalizes thresholds, generates aggregate data and, in a short time, will integrate with insurers and health systems. Pastoral and biopolitical, at the same time. And with an incredible infiltration capacity. The difference, and this Foucault could not foresee, is that now this power does not depend on the State, but on a corporation. What was previously a community or ecclesiastical function, then partially state, is now outsourced to private, for-profit infrastructures. It is a privatization of power. The tentacles of the State In the previous section I said that “Foucault could not foresee it”, but I think that is not accurate. It is true that when this thinker theorized about “pastoral power” or “biopolitics,” he was thinking about public officials operating in state institutions. But the wickers were there. After all, Foucault himself, in his last courses (especially in ‘Birth of biopolitics‘, dedicated to analyze ‘neoliberalism’ as arts of government), described a decisive mutation of our time: the State no longer thinks of itself as a provider of services but as a guarantor of the conditions for the market to function. The functions that were previously assumed directly (educate, heal, advise, care) can be outsourced to private agents. In this sense, chatbots are neither an accident nor a distortion; are the logical culmination of the historical process of the development of modern power. From a very specific formulation of … Read more

Ukraine’s latest tactic is an explosive turn for the war. It’s called “letting in,” and the Russians are falling into the trap.

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Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the front has been mutating with all kinds of tactics who sought to wear down the enemy. The arrival of drones everything has changedbut the strategies and ingenuity In the use of artillery they have remained a fundamental asset for the advance or defense of the front. For this reason, Ukraine’s latest strategy has disconcerted the Russians. When they reach the bunkers there is no one, and then the surprise comes. Win by letting in. Ukraine is applying a more flexible and lethal defense consisting in “pre-register” their artillery on their own front-line positions, so that when the Russians assault and capture them, they literally enter an already calibrated point to be destroyed: the fort falls, the enemy concentrates, and then comes the massive punishment that turns Russian success into a death trap. After that blow, a Ukrainian assault branch recover the points again devastated, closing a cycle that maximizes ranged damage and reduces the exposure of own infantry, something key in a context of growing shortage of trained soldiers. This logic, denounced even by pro-Russian voices as the strategy of “letting in” is actually a way of imposing the pace: it is not about always preventing them from advancing, but about making each advance expensive, slow and bloody. The “death zone” as doctrine. The tactic works because the battlefield has become in a “kill zone” permanent where the defender attempts to maintain a deadly gap between the leading edge and the rear: artillery is placed further back, out of the usual range of rival drones, and forward positions are fortified to attract attackswaiting for the enemy to enter to destroy them right there with fire and drones. The drone operators They not only strike at the front, they also hunt for supply and reinforcement routes, and any activity near “newly taken” positions becomes visible and attackable. Added to this is the constant mining (including remote) and the use of “ambushers” in the few possible logistical axes, so that the attacker not only pays to capture, but also pays twice as much to try to consolidate. The “let in” tactic after pre-registering a position The decisive blow. The most surprising point about this approach is that the defender does not seek so much to “hold every meter” as to prevent the attacker deploy your second step– When the advancing force attempts to bring in specialized reinforcements (e.g. drone operators to hold the ground), the defender launches fast local offensiveseven if they cost material, to keep the death zone intact and keep the enemy trapped in a space where they cannot settle. Thus, the advance exists on paper or in the drone image, but it becomes tactically sterile: you capture something and, before transforming it into a usable position, it becomes a slaughterhouse, like is described in sectors like Kupiansk. It is a war where “letting in” is not an extra: it is the moment in which the enemy advance stops being progress and becomes a loss. The psychological and moral consequence. These types of dynamics are eroding the offensive will because it forces us to choose between kilometers and livesespecially the “faces” of competent soldiers who know how to move in that death zone: It’s not just that advancement costs, it’s that it costs exactly the most valuable thing. From this arises a dilemma on the front itself: advancing in a big way without preparation means burn trained unitsbut advancing “minimally” or little to be able to report presence saves resources… at the cost of generating absurd situations where you can no longer request fire on positions that officially “they are yours”although in reality they are being crushed or disputed. In this framework, the information war of territorial control is mixed with real survival, and “progress” becomes a very diffuse decision. The technological revolution to the rescue. we have been counting. The bottom line is that Ukraine is at the center of a military transformation: soldiers are the most expensive and difficult resource to replace, while unmanned systems have passed to dominate the combatexpanding on an industrial scale, lowering costs and multiplying impact. The front is increasingly managed from the rear or bunkers with operators controlling the space, and attempts at “classic” breaches become almost suicidal: the key is no longer to launch columns, but to disperse, camouflage and gradually push the death zone back. As the war evolves into swarms, AI coordination and persistent attacks, the advantage is not having the most expensive weapon, but having thousands of cheap weaponsreliable communications networks and the ability to update systems non-stop. The coming war. Thus, the strategic decision moves to logistics and industry: cut off land routes, protect supplies, attack factorieslogistics centers and hidden commands, and do so with reusable media and unmanned is increasingly determining. Victories depend on producing drones en massesecure components, sustain communications Starlink type and dominate the cybernetic layer that can blind, uncoordinate or paralyze an entire front. That is why the strategy to “let in” It does not seem like an isolated trick, but rather a direct consequence of the new battlefield: if the first to enter dies, the one who waits and finishes with precision (with drones, mines, artillery and digital coordination) keeps the initiative even if it seems that is receding. Image | US Army Europe In Xataka | The video of the Russian soldier in Ukraine who ignores the bomb that just exploded on him has only two explanations. And one is science fiction In Xataka | The war in Ukraine has a new level of brutality. Russia calls it a “can opener” and turns recruits into detonators

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