Russians

that of “50,000 Russians a month” or giving Moscow what it wants

by

Throughout history, the cold has acted as a silent weapon that has changed the course of entire wars: in 1812, the Russian winter destroyed Napoleon’s army during their retreat from Moscow, causing more casualties than many battles. In the Winter War From 1939-1940, Finland used extreme temperatures and frozen terrain to hold back a vastly superior Soviet Union force, and in World War II, the winter of 1941 paralyzed the German troops at the gates of Moscow. In all cases, the cold accelerated defeats, collapsed logistics and forced decisions that were not in the original plan. Something similar is starting to happen in Ukraine. The cold as an accelerator of war. Winter has turned war into a race against time because extreme temperatures amplify the impact of each Russian attack against energy infrastructureforcing entire cities to live without heat, electricity or water for days or weeks. With minimal close to −20 °C In many enclaves, each damaged power plant, each destroyed substation or each prolonged blackout is no longer just a technical problem but is a military and political factor that shortens the margins of resistance and pushes us to make decisions that are increasingly harsh and unthinkable until recently. Energy as a goal. Since winter began in the war, Moscow has had clear your objective. Russia has systematically hit power plants, thermal plants and distribution networks again, knowing that the damage is cumulative and that repairing under constant bombing is almost as expensive as rebuilding. Ukraine, for its part, has avoided a total collapse of the system thanks to quick repairs, generators and management increasingly flexiblebut the price is enormous: buildings without heat for weeks, networks saturated when the power returns and an exhausted population that lives pending of blackout and shelter schedules improvised. Kamikaze logic. In this context, an unprecedented idea appears strongly, kyiv’s most extreme bet: to accelerate the war by attrition until it becomes unbearable for Moscow. The government has explained that the idea of ​​causing up to 50,000 Russian casualties per month It is not proposed as a slogan, but as an explicit attrition strategy to force a negotiation based on the opponent’s weakness. If you will, it is a flight forward that assumes that, if the war cannot be slowed down and winter multiplies the suffering, the only way out is to drastically raise the human cost for Russiaeven knowing that Ukraine will also pay a very high price. The limits of the war of attrition. This strategy clashes with clear structural problems: lack of infantry, shortage of drone operators and a technological competition in which Russia has cut advantagesespecially in electronic warfare and fiber optic drones. As many analysts point out, prioritizing the constant elimination of enemy soldiers can give tactical results, but it does not always solve the key problem of operating depththat is, the Russian ability to continue moving troops, ammunition and drones from the rear while the front remains stable. The invisible front. In Insider told that the cutting off of Russian access to satellite communications systems via Starlink has shown the extent to which modern warfare depends on connectivity. The interruption has generated specific disorganization in Russian units and has been celebrated in Ukraine as a key advantage, although it has also affected its own and civilian users, demonstrating that each technological gain is very fragile and requires constant management. In the middle of winter, any added failure in communications or coordination translates directly into more casualties and more chaos. The unthinkable idea. As military and climate pressure accumulates wildly, I told a few days ago the new york times that a growing part of Ukrainian society start to contemplate through surveys what was previously little more than a taboo: accepting territorial concessions in exchange for firm security guarantees. It is not yet a majority, nor even a decision made by the leadership, but the simple fact that it is being discussed reflects the extent to which the cold, blackouts and a war with no clear end are forcing a profound rethinking about what it means to win or simply survive. A dilemma pushed by winter. What seems abundantly clear is that the scheme that emerges is hard and lacking in epic some: winter is literally freezing the population Ukrainian, and its effect is accelerating the war and narrowing the options. Thus, Ukraine seems pushed to choose between maximally intensifying the kamikaze logic of the “50,000 Russians a month” to force a quick outcome or accept territorial concessions to stop the destruction before another winter just as bad or even worse. The cold does not decide on its own, there is no doubt, but it does act as the factor that has turned an already long and exhausting war into an urgent decision. Image | armyinform.com.ua, 7th Army Training Command In Xataka | “A human safari”: going outside in a Ukrainian city is now equivalent to being a shooting target for drones In Xataka | The war in Ukraine has become something absurd: there are drones shooting at Russian soldiers dressed as “penguins”

Three Russians surrender on camera. A normal scene from wars, but science fiction in Ukraine because of the “soldier” who points guns at them

by

From dug trenches rush to heaven buzzing without restthe war in Ukraine has become a testing ground where the classic rules of combat have long since lost the battle. Every month scenes appear that would have seemed impossible just a few years ago and that force us to rethink what it means today to fight, resist or survive in a front dominated by unexpected technologies. The last example shows a surrender. The first time before a machine. Three Russian soldiers emerge from a building, one of them bloody, raise their hands and obey orders while a camera records everything. The scene would be routine in any war conflict in history, but in Ukraine it marks a breaking point: The one who points the gun at them is not an infant, but an armed robot. It’s not the first time we see such a surrenderbut it is the first to be documented on video and in front of an unmanned land vehicle, a scenario that symbolizes the extent to which the line between science fiction and real combat has been definitively erased in this conflict. From marginal experiment to centerpiece. It we have counted before. Ukrainian ground robots, known as robotic ground complexes, began the war as imported rarities and today are an industrial and military mainstay of their own. 99% of UGVs in use They are already manufactured in Ukrainewith more than 200 different models produced by dozens of local companies in ultra-fast design cycles, fine-tuned directly with feedback from the front. Small, cheap and assembled from commercial components, these robots have moved from transportation and evacuation to carry heavy machine gunslead assaults, hold defensive positions for weeks, and now, accept prisoners without any human soldiers having to expose themselves. Machines that do not bleed. The tactical value of these systems goes beyond firepower. Accepting a surrender with a robot eliminates the risk of ambushes, false capitulations or instant decisions between life and death, a recurring problem on the Ukrainian front. At the same time, the psychological impact It’s huge: fighting an enemy who doesn’t feel paindoes not die and can be replaced quickly erodes morale and makes the option of surrender more rational. Hence the image of confused soldierss surrendering to a machine summarizes that moral and human imbalance. Some of the varieties of Ukrainian ground drones The sky as a weapon. This qualitative leap on the ground fits with an even more overwhelming reality in the air. According to Zelenskymore than 80% of effective strikes against Russian forces are already carried out with drones, the vast majority manufactured locally. In 2025, Ukraine claims to have attacked about 820,000 targets with these systems, recording each impact on video within a points system that rewards units for each confirmed casualty and accelerates the acquisition of new material. In other words, war has become a closed loop of sensors, cameras, algorithms and rewards. An unprecedented cost. Almost four years after the invasion, Russia’s human toll in Ukraine reaches unprecedented figures since World War II: around 1.2 million soldiers dead, wounded or missing, according to the latest report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies. This massive attrition contrasts with very limited territorial advances, barely 12% more territory controlled since 2022, with daily progress that in some sectors is measured in meters and is even lower than that recorded in battles of the First World War. The Ukrainian defense-in-depth strategy, combining trenches, mines, obstacles, artillery and drones, has tipped the balance of casualties by a proportion clearly unfavorable for Moscow and questions the idea of ​​an inevitable Russian victory. The Russian rearguard. The impact of the conflict goes far beyond the front and is degrading Russia’s economic and strategic capacity, the same as the SCIS report already described as a second or third order power. The combination of inflation, labor shortages, industrial weakness and technological stagnation has left growth stunted and a committed futurewhile human losses exceed the recruitment and replacement capacity. In fact, compared to past conflicts, the figures are devastating. The war future. In short, between swarms of FPV drones, armed ground robots and electronic warfare systems, the war in Ukraine has advanced decades of military development in just a few years, while much more expensive and slow Western programs they stalled or were canceled. Therefore, the filmed surrender facing a robot is not an isolated anecdote, but a sign that modern combat no longer revolves only around the human soldier, but rather cheap, disposable and omnipresent machines. In Ukraine, the war of the future is no longer being imagined: it is being recorded in the first person. Image | UKRAINE MOD In Xataka | “They are under our feet”: Ukraine has entered an inexplicable phase, that of its drones attacking Russians at absurd distances In Xataka | We had seen everything in Ukraine. Until Russia sent a soldier to the front that we had only seen in the movies

Ukraine has entered an inexplicable phase, that of its drones attacking Russians at absurd distances

by

In every modern war there has been a moment when technology brutally shortened the distance between the front and death. In fact, it already happened with the machine gun in 1914 or with the precision artillery at the end of the 20th century. In Ukraine, everything indicates that is going through now that same turning point, one in which the combat stops being deep and maneuverable and becomes immediate, constant and suffocating. Drones as a dominant weapon. The figures from the Ukrainian war have made it crystal clear that drones are no longer a complement, but the main cause of death and destruction, responsible for between 70% and 80% of casualties on both sides according to European intelligence services. This massive lethality has transformed the conflict into something very more dynamic at a tactical levelbut also more rigid strategically, because the omnipresence of drones makes it extremely difficult for either army to achieve a decisive break from the front. The result is a war of attrition in which each meter is paid dearly and where the balance increasingly depends on industrial, technological and foreign political support. War underfoot. In this context, Ukrainian drones are operating at distances that just a year ago would have seemed absurd, attacking Russian infantry at just over one kilometer from the frontliterally and as rthey knew the controls in Insider, “under the feet” of their own positions. The use of elite drone units to strike so close reflects the extreme pressure on defensive lines and the need to stop Russian assaults before they reach the trenches, one of the deadliest scenarios for Ukrainian soldiers. Low-level air warfare has thus become a direct extension of hand-to-hand combat, with drones acting as the last barrier before human contact. Kamikaze combat. It is a war, and the doctrinal ideal is still to destroy the enemy several kilometers away, when it concentrates or prepares to attack, but the reality of the front has pushed Ukraine to use its best operators in immediate deletion tasks. More and more combat drones are dedicated to attack infantry instead of high-value logistics or systems, a very clear sign that combat has become shortermore reactive and closer to sacrifice. This drift towards an almost kamikaze logic does not respond to a tactical preference, but to the urgent need to save positions and gain time. Russia adapts. At the same time and as we have countedRussia has been closing the gap in drone warfare from the end of 2024adapting quickly and betting on mass productionand the recruitment of technical talent. The plans to manufacture tens of thousands of drones per year and active search for students with technological profiles show that Moscow assumes that mastery of the air at very low altitude is key to sustaining its ground offensive. This adaptation explains why the front has become so lethal and compressed, with both sides forced to operate under a constant threat from the sky. A question of distance. As the 20th century progressed, military evolution was marked by the elongation of the battlefield: improvements in aviation, missiles and precision weapons They allowed the enemy to be hit further and further away, reducing the need for direct contact. However, the war in Ukraine is reversing that logicbecause drones, cheap and everywhere, have compressed combat to unimaginable distances. The result is another historical paradox: there has never been so much capacity to destroy at long range, but it has never been so dangerous to be so close to the frontwith flying machines that turn every advanced meter into an immediate risk. War blocked by technology. In short, the enormous effectiveness of drones is making war, if possible, a little bloodieralthough less decisive. The saturation of the battlefield with sensors and flying munitions punishes any movement and reduces strategic maneuver options, turning the conflict into a protracted fight where industrial resistance and western support They outweigh local tactical victories. In this scenario, Ukraine fights ever closer, ever faster and, most disturbing of all, increasingly with less margin of errorin a battle where the distance between living and dying is already measured in seconds and meters. Image | Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, National Police of Ukraine In Xataka | 1,418 days have passed since Russia invaded Ukraine: the war has already lasted longer than the Soviet fight against Hitler In Xataka | The latest camouflages of Russian troops confirm an open secret: the war in Ukraine is the most Looney Tunes in history

Ukraine’s latest tactic is an explosive turn for the war. It’s called “letting in,” and the Russians are falling into the trap.

by

Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the front has been mutating with all kinds of tactics who sought to wear down the enemy. The arrival of drones everything has changedbut the strategies and ingenuity In the use of artillery they have remained a fundamental asset for the advance or defense of the front. For this reason, Ukraine’s latest strategy has disconcerted the Russians. When they reach the bunkers there is no one, and then the surprise comes. Win by letting in. Ukraine is applying a more flexible and lethal defense consisting in “pre-register” their artillery on their own front-line positions, so that when the Russians assault and capture them, they literally enter an already calibrated point to be destroyed: the fort falls, the enemy concentrates, and then comes the massive punishment that turns Russian success into a death trap. After that blow, a Ukrainian assault branch recover the points again devastated, closing a cycle that maximizes ranged damage and reduces the exposure of own infantry, something key in a context of growing shortage of trained soldiers. This logic, denounced even by pro-Russian voices as the strategy of “letting in” is actually a way of imposing the pace: it is not about always preventing them from advancing, but about making each advance expensive, slow and bloody. The “death zone” as doctrine. The tactic works because the battlefield has become in a “kill zone” permanent where the defender attempts to maintain a deadly gap between the leading edge and the rear: artillery is placed further back, out of the usual range of rival drones, and forward positions are fortified to attract attackswaiting for the enemy to enter to destroy them right there with fire and drones. The drone operators They not only strike at the front, they also hunt for supply and reinforcement routes, and any activity near “newly taken” positions becomes visible and attackable. Added to this is the constant mining (including remote) and the use of “ambushers” in the few possible logistical axes, so that the attacker not only pays to capture, but also pays twice as much to try to consolidate. The “let in” tactic after pre-registering a position The decisive blow. The most surprising point about this approach is that the defender does not seek so much to “hold every meter” as to prevent the attacker deploy your second step– When the advancing force attempts to bring in specialized reinforcements (e.g. drone operators to hold the ground), the defender launches fast local offensiveseven if they cost material, to keep the death zone intact and keep the enemy trapped in a space where they cannot settle. Thus, the advance exists on paper or in the drone image, but it becomes tactically sterile: you capture something and, before transforming it into a usable position, it becomes a slaughterhouse, like is described in sectors like Kupiansk. It is a war where “letting in” is not an extra: it is the moment in which the enemy advance stops being progress and becomes a loss. The psychological and moral consequence. These types of dynamics are eroding the offensive will because it forces us to choose between kilometers and livesespecially the “faces” of competent soldiers who know how to move in that death zone: It’s not just that advancement costs, it’s that it costs exactly the most valuable thing. From this arises a dilemma on the front itself: advancing in a big way without preparation means burn trained unitsbut advancing “minimally” or little to be able to report presence saves resources… at the cost of generating absurd situations where you can no longer request fire on positions that officially “they are yours”although in reality they are being crushed or disputed. In this framework, the information war of territorial control is mixed with real survival, and “progress” becomes a very diffuse decision. The technological revolution to the rescue. we have been counting. The bottom line is that Ukraine is at the center of a military transformation: soldiers are the most expensive and difficult resource to replace, while unmanned systems have passed to dominate the combatexpanding on an industrial scale, lowering costs and multiplying impact. The front is increasingly managed from the rear or bunkers with operators controlling the space, and attempts at “classic” breaches become almost suicidal: the key is no longer to launch columns, but to disperse, camouflage and gradually push the death zone back. As the war evolves into swarms, AI coordination and persistent attacks, the advantage is not having the most expensive weapon, but having thousands of cheap weaponsreliable communications networks and the ability to update systems non-stop. The coming war. Thus, the strategic decision moves to logistics and industry: cut off land routes, protect supplies, attack factorieslogistics centers and hidden commands, and do so with reusable media and unmanned is increasingly determining. Victories depend on producing drones en massesecure components, sustain communications Starlink type and dominate the cybernetic layer that can blind, uncoordinate or paralyze an entire front. That is why the strategy to “let in” It does not seem like an isolated trick, but rather a direct consequence of the new battlefield: if the first to enter dies, the one who waits and finishes with precision (with drones, mines, artillery and digital coordination) keeps the initiative even if it seems that is receding. Image | US Army Europe In Xataka | The video of the Russian soldier in Ukraine who ignores the bomb that just exploded on him has only two explanations. And one is science fiction In Xataka | The war in Ukraine has a new level of brutality. Russia calls it a “can opener” and turns recruits into detonators

Ukraine has updated the nation’s bloodiest game. Eliminating Russians is now the closest thing to “ordering an Uber”

by

In the month of May, a unprecedented merger between military technology and video game logic. Ukraine had launched a reward system which awarded its soldiers points for killing Russian troops or destroying their vehicles, as long as these acts were verified by drone video recordings. That system, a kind from “Amazon military”has been updated with drones as protagonists. A real shooter. The now called “Army of Drones Bonus System” that has emerged in Ukraine presents itself on the surface as a incentive platform which includes the aesthetics and mechanics of video games (scores, ‘leaderboards’, online stores and rewards) but at its core is an operational transformation: an institutionalized scheme that quantifies casualties, observation successes and logistical achievements to translate them into real resources (drones, autonomous vehicles, electronic warfare systems) through the internal store call Brave1. Born a little over a year ago and accelerated in recent months until passing from 95 to 400 units participants, the system already exhibits strong effects on combat (according to official figures, 18,000 Russian casualties attributable to actions linked to the system in a single month) and has expanded its radius of action beyond the air attack to reconnaissance, artillery and logistics missions, incorporating into military practice notions of competition, internal market and performance metrics that were previously foreign to the art of war. Mechanics and logic. The program architecture works with clear and convertible rules– Each credited action (from eliminating an enemy combatant to capturing a prisoner to destroying a drone operator) awards points that can be exchanged for materiel in Brave1which creates a feedback loop where operational success is transformed into material capacity to continue fighting. The update of the score table (for example, doubling points for killing infantry or setting 120 points for capturing a prisoner) reveals the system’s ability to reorient incentives based on strategic priorities and political needs, and at the same time evidences a commodification of efficiency: life and death pass through a technical-economic threshold that converts lethal decisions into a cost-benefit function. This internal economy alters the microdecision of the combatant and resituates logistics and acquisition within the tactical space itself, with the Brave1 store acting as a war market that prioritizes allocation by competitive merit. Screenshot of the rewards system Automation and AI. The system is not limited to accounting, integrate tools technologies that change the very nature of target selection and engagement. Drones partially controlled by algorithms that suggest targets and correct the terminal phase of the trajectory represent a step towards lethal automation, while practices such as “Uber targeting” They demonstrate how consumerist and geospatial interfaces have been converted for war uses. Thus, marking a point on a map and triggering a remote impact is the operational translation of the everyday gesture. to request a transport. The video proof requirement To obtain points, it also generates a vast operational database that feeds institutional learning: what objectives were achieved, with what platform, from what distance and how the enemy defense behaved. That visual and metric file facilitates dissemination of techniques between units and accelerates innovation from below, with real effects on tactics and doctrine. Psychological effects. The Guardian said that, beyond the material and the technical, the system produces a kind of emotional breakdown: Senior officials recognize that the process of assigning a numerical value to human life has ended up turning violence into technical, “practical” and “emotionless” work. At the same time, gamification produces camaraderie effects and competition that, according to the commanders, are healthy and encourages discipline and learning between peers. However, this same dynamic can generate operational biases (prioritizing high-scoring objectives over tactically relevant objectives, or the temptation of operations with low effectiveness but high cumulative performance) that distort strategic coherence. Implications and extension. The Ukrainian experience shows that incentive principles can be transferred to other areas: artillery that receives points for valid hits, reconnaissance that earns rewards for identifying targets, and logistics that scores the use of autonomous vehicles instead of human convoys. This extension transforms the war ecosystem into a set of internal markets where tactical-technological innovation is quickly monetized and scaled, forcing planners a double urgency: exploit the immediate advantages of the system without losing strategic coherence and design ethical and operational countermeasures that prevent internal competition from fragmenting the priorities of the military effort. And ethics? It’s the big question. Ethically, the commodification of violence raises profound questions about responsibility, proportionality and war crimes: Who responds when a score induces an action that violates humanitarian law? The appropriation of AI for target selection also introduces the question of attribution of responsibility between human operators, algorithms and the chain of command. Strategically, converting equipment gain into the primary source of replenishment aims to create dependency loops that, in logistical wear and tear scenarios, discourage long-term wear and tear operations that are necessary in the short term for larger objectives. Score the violence. The “Army of Drones Bonus System” represents a mutation relevant to the way motivation, acquisition and innovation are organized in contemporary warfare: it incorporates market logicpoint economies and automation technologies that increase lethality and efficiency, while eroding moral frameworks and opening new vectors of risk. Its contribution is undeniable in terms of capacity and adaptation, but its expansion urgently claim a framework that does not yet exist at national or international level. In the background, a long doubt in this species Amazon military: that what is celebrated today as tactical innovation can tomorrow become a structural source of insecurity and lack of moral control on the battlefield. Image | Ministry of Defense Ukraine, Ministry of Defense of Ukraine In Xataka | An imperceptible hum is wreaking havoc in Ukraine. When it arrives there is no turning back: the Russians are already everywhere In Xataka | The Ukrainian army has been asked what it urgently needs. The answer was clear: no missiles or drones, just cars

the Russians are already everywhere

by

In war, surprise is possibly the most effective tactic for wearing down enemy defenses. In Ukraine we had seen everything, from helmets with antennas to surprise, even lures in the form of drones, optical illusions or even hide under the ground. The latest: Russia has found a way to appear among the Ukrainian forces “out of nowhere.” The wear. Ukraine has described a quiet but profound change in the Russian tactical pattern: it begins with a hum and small infiltration equipment who, hidden and guided by drones, slip between the lines to sow chaos rather than to gain visible territory. They are micro-units of a few men camouflaged, treated, according to Ukrainian forcesas expendable material, that break through uncovered points of a 1,300-kilometer front that is impossible to seal continuously with exhausted and scarce troops. Your mission is variable: capture positions and hold them until reinforcements, or degrade defense revealing Ukrainian drone nodes, or laying mines directly inside the positions. What was recently contingent is now becoming the norm, especially in Donetsk, where Ukrainian operators admit that the pressure of these incursions allows Moscow to go deeper through accumulation and saturation. Geometry of surprise. The value of infiltration lies not so much in the surface gained as in the friction that forces kyiv to redistribute forces to put out simultaneous fires. an officer told Insider how, not being able to cover a few kilometers of front, he came to have to contain intrusions in fourteen points at a time. It must be understood that drone guidance allows the Russian command reposition the infiltratorsdiscreetly accumulate them at one point and then activate an action that forces troop diversions. There are even cases of infiltrators without rifles, carrying just an anti-tank mine to detonate it inside a Ukrainian site. This logic makes the line blurred and forces kyiv to expend attention, cohesion and reserve, erosion as a product of the multiplication of these micro-threats. Asymmetric human cost. It happens that Ukrainian operators they point out that Russian losses on these stocks are enormous, although apparently irrelevant to Moscowwhich has a flow of men willing to die in specific assaults. Some infiltrators leave on foot for kilometers, hiding in trees or abandoned houses. Many die under artillery or drones, but saturation is what nuclear: “there are hundreds of Russians ready to die every day,” summarized an operator. By responding with drones, Ukraine in turn exposes launching positions that Russia locates to counterattack, closing a detection-fire loop. This same family of tactics (infiltration, probing, human waves) was already documented in the east of the country and replicated even with North Korean troops in Kursk, also used as a low-value shock mass. Historical precedents. All these Russian infiltrations described by Ukraine remind us of the logic of the German Stosstruppen from 1917-1918: avoid the strong front, look for joints, infiltrate micro-groups with the mission of opening local holes and forcing the enemy to disorganize its defense by reaction. The difference is the sensor ecosystem: then success depended on smoke, fog and surprise. Today, the surprise is rather algorithmic and systemic by drones that correct the human trajectory in real time. The urban assaults in the first chechen war (small, mobile shock groups, with tactical autonomy to pierce nodes) also resonate with the current pattern: they do not seek to conquer the map but rather to collapse the adversary’s response architecture by forcing repeated local oversaturation until the system breaks. Recent parallels. The USSR had already used reduced cells to degrade defenses in Afghanistan: minimum teams penetrating to hunt radars, commands or soft logistics before the major blow. In Syria (and later in Donbas itself 2014-2015) the Russian “assault probes” consisted in human probes “low value” to force the enemy to reveal fires, ATGM positions or drone nests. What you see today in Donetsk is more or less the industrialized evolution of that same idea under a shortage of Ukrainian personnel and saturation of Russian sensors. As then, the objective is not so much to “win” the infiltrated point but to force the enemy to expend ammunition, focus and mass, which in a long war context transfers the advantage to the actor with greater tolerance for attrition. Invisible micro-war. If you also want, here, more than technological innovation, It’s behavioral: The density and rhythm of micro-incursions, invisible until the last moment with the arrival of the drone’s buzz that indicates that the tactic has been activated, generate a gradual change in pressure that is not measured in kilometers gained but in the adversary’s ability to absorb tension and anxiety without collapsing. Thus, under the conditions of a protracted war and lack of personnel, any crack is exploitable, and under continuous surveillance, the cost of reacting reveals the enemy positions. It is, in the end, a war of small wounds that never close, where each infiltration does not seek to resolve the front, but rather to reopen it indefinitely. Image | picturedesk, Рюмин Александр, Picryl In Xataka | The Ukrainian army has been asked what it urgently needs. The answer was clear: no missiles or drones, just cars In Xataka | Russia’s biggest threat in Ukraine is not a drone or a missile: it is a film agency with 30 secret plants

Many Russians injured in Ukraine are not returning home. They are flying with the expenses paid to North Korea

by

During the last months, there have been times in the Ukraine War North Korean soldiers They have been the closest to ghost troops. Actually, and as usually happens in the contests, participants figures vary according to the sides, so we may never know the exact number of “shipments”. That said, and if there was any questions of The ties forged in the Cold War for both nationsin parallel, an unprecedented event is happening. Russian soldiers are not returning home, they are going to Pyongyang. From the battle front to Korea. From the beginning of the war in Ukraine, Thousands of Russian soldiers have returned home injured or with physical and psychological sequelae. Many of them have participated in state rehabilitation programs in sanatoriums distributed throughout Russia. However, an increasing number of military have had another destination. This group, secret until very recently, It has been sent to North Korea To receive medical care and rest, which marks a new chapter in the growing cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang. Recovery with expenses paid. In The Guardian had cases of soldiers like Aleksei (fictional name), who, after suffering a shrapnel wound in the leg, requested a stay in a state sanatorium. The man hoped to be sent to one of the traditional rehabilitation centers in the Black Sea or the Altái mountains, but in the absence of availability, his unit in the distant Russian East offered him an unexpected destination: North Korea. Aleksei, like others, approached a two -hour flight from Vladivostok to Pyongyang, followed by A trip to a sanatorium in Wonsanon the eastern coast of North Korea. There, he spent a week with two other dozen Russian soldiers, in an environment that, although he says that clean and well maintained, lacked the specialized medical care he expected. The “healer” role of North Korea. He Shipping Russian soldiers injured to North Korea has not been publicly promoted through the Russian government, images of visits have not been disseminated. However, in a recent interview, Russia’s ambassador to Pyongyang, Aleksandr Matsegora, confirmed that “hundreds of Russian soldiers” have been treated in Sanatorium and North Korean medical centers. Not just that. The diplomat stressed that Accommodation, food and care services were totally freeand that when Russia tried to compensate for North Korea for expenses, North Korean authorities felt “offended” and rejected any payment. An exchange that is part of that close military and political collaboration between the two countries that we have been countingand that has intensified since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Rest without treatment. Aleksei told the British environment that during his stay in Wonsan he had access to swimming pools, saunas and recreational activities such as ping-pong and card games. But as we said, he noticed several limitations. Namely: he did not receive the expected specialized medical treatment, the meals “were tasteless and had little meat”, it was forbidden to leave the enclosure at night or interact with the local population, and Alcohol was extremely difficult to get. Aspects that, As the New York Times pointed outthey contrast with the image of the traditional Russian sanitariums, who usually offer a combination of physical therapy, rehabilitation and rest in natural environments. Be that as it may, for Aleksei, The experience was “different from the expected”and you are not sure if I would accept to return in case of a new offer. The doubt and strategic background. Some analysts have suggested that these soldiers’ shipments could have a hidden purpose beyond the rehabilitation itself. Like what? He Institute for the Study of War (ISW), based in Washington, has indicated that the arrival of Russian troops with an experience of fighting North Korea It could be an opportunity to train and share tactics with the North Korean armyunder the appearance of rest and recovery. The possibility of greater cooperation in this area reinforces concerns about the growing military alignment between Moscow and Pyongyang. A summer camp for Russian children. It The New York Times had exclusive. In parallel to the arrival of Russian military in North Korea, Pyongyang has also begun to receive children of Russian soldiers who died in the war. Russian President Vladimir Putin first mentioned the initiative in June 2023thanking North Korean leader Kim Jong-un organizing a camp for these children in the Songdowon complex, near Wonsan. This center, which already received Russian visitors before the war, has now become a symbol of the bilateral relationship. In fact, the Russian media have widely covered these trips, Showing images of children posing in front of statues of North Korean leaders. The Times said that even a young participant described the experience as a “total digital detox”highlighting the strict discipline of North Korean children, who were marching in training and continued with military precision. In short, the presence of Russian soldiers in North Korea seems to symbolize that growing convergence between both nationsin a context of international isolation. As military and economic cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang intensifies, these exchanges could represent more than simple rehabilitation, consolidating a new geopolitical dynamic in the 21st century. Image | Office of the President of The Russian Federation In Xataka | Russia gave animals, artillery and raw to North Korea. His last gift places his army at another level: space In Xataka | Thousands of North Koreans came to fight with Russia. The question now is where they have gotten two weeks

Kalma is North Korea’s first real effort to become a vacation spot. For now only for Russians

by

In October we told a surreal story if it weren’t for the fact that it was completely true. North Korea had a plan in hand: to become a vacation enclave with all of the law. In essence, although with nuances: setting up your own Benidorm, inspired by Spain. For May of this year it was expected Wonsan-Kalma resort. The project is not only moving forward, there is already a scheduled date for the arrival of tourists, for now only from Russia. Inspired by Spain. As we count thenIn fact Wonsan-Kalma project started in 2014with the vision of transforming the Kalma peninsula into a luxury destination with hotels, restaurants and attractions, including even initial plans for an underwater hotel. The ambition of the project was reflected in 2017, when a delegation of 16 North Korean officials visited Spain to study tourism development models in places such as Marina d’Or and Terra Mítica, in Benidorm. The experiences acquired influenced the design of the complex, with emphasis on hotel infrastructure, leisure and complementary services, as Reuters reported at the time. The only “but”: that the North Korean region is known for another peculiaritya priori not very compatible with tourist success. They have apparently used the coastal region of Wonsan in the past to test ballistic missiles. In fact, in 2020 the South Korean General Staff warned that two projectiles had been launched from Wonsan itself, about 180 kilometers from Seoul. A megaproject under state control. According to the American expert on North Korea, Jacob Boglethe tourist complex will be the largest development of its kind in the country and possibly the largest in the world under a single state owner. Unlike Benidorm, which was developed over time with various private investments, the Wonsan project is or will be a single, centralized structure, operated exclusively by the government. In this regard, the complex will include facilities such as an aquarium and sports centers, but its tourism approach will be subject to traditional North Korean restrictions, where visitors must follow rigidly planned itineraries, usually in groups organized from factories, schools or state-owned enterprises. . Tourism as a means of earning foreign currency. We also told it a few months ago and it is the most important leg of this investment. Unlike other areas of the North Korean economy, the tourism sector is not subject to international sanctionswhich represents a key opportunity to obtain foreign currency. Hence, the North Korean leader, Kim Jong Un, has highlighted that the country has “rich and diverse tourist resources” that can be used to revitalize the regional economy and improve the living standards of the population. The main target markets for North Korean tourism, at least initially, seem clear: Russia and China, countries with which Pyongyang has strengthened political and economic ties in recent years. In fact, after the partial reopening of the borders in 2023, The first tourists to visit the country were Russiansand the state travel agency, Korean International Travel Company, has been promoting North Korea’s tourist attractions to Russian travelers. Now that bet has been reaffirmed. First packages: the Russian tourist. The news these days is that a Russian travel agency has started promoting the new tourist area of ​​Kalma with the idea that the first foreign tourists to visit the complex are Russians. The Vladivostok-based company Vostok Intur has announced three travel dates to the Wonsan-Kalma tourist resort, starting in July, according to a post on its Telegram channel. In this regard, the agency offers eight-day packageswith the first excursion scheduled for July 7-14, followed by two additional trips in August. The cost of the package: $1,400with additional expenses to be paid in Russian rubles and including: Accommodation for seven nights, with three meals a day. Round-trip flights to North Korea. Guided tours of Pyongyang at the end of the trip, as part of the experience. According to the agency, tourists will be able to enjoy an “ecologically clean” environment with entertainment options for all budgets and a gastronomic variety adapted to various tastes. A strategic opening. Thus, the announcement of the start of operations of the Kalma tourist area comes after a decade of construction, with official opening now planned for June 2025. In fact, Kim Jong-un, who personally inspected the complex with his daughter, has called the project a “big step” in the development of the country’s tourism industry, describing it as a “spectacular, beautiful and magnificent” place. First Russia, and then we’ll see. As we said, the interest in attracting Russian tourists to the Kalma area reinforces the growing relationship between Moscow and Pyongyangstrengthened by cooperation in strategic sectors following increased tension between Russia and the West due to the war in Ukraine. North Korea seems to be clear about and identified Russia as a priority market, given that, as we explained, tourism is not subject to these international sanctions and offers a safe way to obtain foreign currency. Challenges of North Korea, vacation enclave. There is no doubt, although tourism promotion through Russian agencies marks an important and decisive step for the exploitation of the Kalma complex, the project faces known challengessuch as mobility restrictions within the country, limited access to objective information or security issues for those who travel. Despite this, the nation trusts that the tourist area will serve as a key tool to promote regional development and improve the international perception of the country as a tourist destination. Let Benidorm tremble. Image | Clay Gilliland In Xataka | The idea of ​​North Korea in the midst of an international tourism boom: setting up its own Benidorm, inspired by Spain In Xataka | North Korea has a lifeline to avoid sanctions: fake hair

Log In

Forgot password?

Forgot password?

Enter your account data and we will send you a link to reset your password.

Your password reset link appears to be invalid or expired.

Log in

Privacy Policy

Add to Collection

No Collections

Here you'll find all collections you've created before.