We knew that Russians like to travel to the islands, but not so much

From the sabotage of the Nord Stream gas pipeline In 2022, underwater infrastructure has become an absolute priority for NATO security. that episode made evident both their vulnerability and the lack of legal tools to protect them. Now the Government of Spain has just published the Annual National Security Report 2025 where it makes it clear that submarine telecommunications cables are already one of the main strategic concerns. And the reason is specific: during 2025, the presence of Russian ships near the Canary Islands coasts increased five-fold.

The discovery. Without a doubt, what draws the most attention report the thing is In 2025, the presence of Russian ships near the Canary Islands coasts has increased fivefold. The Navy, through its Maritime Action Operations and Surveillance Center (COVAM), detects around 50 vessels of this type in state waters every week, mainly in the Canary Islands, the Alboran Sea and the Strait of Gibraltar.

It is what we know as the Russian “ghost fleet”: they do not sail under the Russian flag, but under flags of convenience with opaque insurance. AND Its official mission is to transport oil of Russian, Venezuelan and Iranian origin destined for Asia, thus avoiding international sanctions. The European Maritime Safety Agency has been tracking for years this phenomenon in their surveillance reports.

Why is it important. submarine cables move approximately 99% of internet traffic, which includes sensitive data, financial and military systems and Spain is a key node on the routes that connect Europe with America and Africa, as can be seen on Google Maps of submarine cables. In short, any damage to these infrastructures would have direct and immediate consequences.

The European Commission already contemplates this in its recent Plan of actionwhere it mentions everything from physical sabotage to cyberattacks and hybrid threats. The Baltic countries They have already alerted NATO of this type of fleet to cause GPS interference and damage cables and energy infrastructure. And that’s without talking about the environmental risk: the poor condition of many of these vessels makes an accidental spill likely in areas as sensitive as the Canary Islands.

Context. This intense activity is part of the Russian hybrid war strategy in Europe, hostile actions within the gray zone, a kind of stones in the shoe that remain below the threshold of the casus belli. Underwater infrastructures, due to their inherent vulnerability, are the perfect target.

The DSN report recognizes that Spain is not Russia’s main objective, but that the growing presence of this fleet in the western Mediterranean adds risks that cannot be ignored. In fact, there are already precedents such as cutting cables in the Baltic which show that the threat is real and not something theoretical.

Spain’s response. The Spanish state has reinforced surveillance through various systems. The most visible is the Integrated External Surveillance System (SIVE) of the Civil Guard, designed to detect and follow suspicious vessels in real time. Added to this are ocean patrols by the Navy and active coordination with the European Maritime Safety Agency. The Department of Homeland Security insists that Spain must maintain technological resilience and permanent vigilance to prevent an incident, accidental or provoked, from leading to a major crisis.

Yes, but. However, the report itself warns that current detection means are not accompanied by an equivalent response capacity. That is to say, there are not sufficient defense mechanisms, so the vulnerability continues to exist.

One of the reasons is in the legal framework: the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea limits greatly increases the ability of States to intercept or inspect foreign vessels in international waters without a specific legal reason. In short: Spain can monitor, but not act preventively. The EU Action Plan tries to close this gap, but for the moment the state lacks legal instruments against a threat that moves in that gray area between legality and sabotage.

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Cover | Photo of Thomas Dorgler in Unsplash