Ukraines

Russia turned gliding bombs into Ukraine’s nightmare. 17 months later Ukraine is giving him his own medicine

by

Two years ago Russia launched a FAB-3000 pump of three tons over Kharkov and the shock wave was so powerful that several local seismic sensors recorded it as if it were a small earthquake. Until then, Ukraine barely had a way to respond to a weapon capable of striking from tens of kilometers away. The nightmare that changed the war. For much of 2023 and 2024, Russian gliding bombs became one of the most devastating weapons of the entire war. Moscow discovered that it could transform old Soviet bombs into long-range munitions simply by adding relatively cheap wings and guidance systems. The result It was devastating: huge FABs of 250, 500 or 1,000 kilos launched from dozens of kilometers away, out of the reach of many Ukrainian anti-aircraft defenses, capable of destroying fortified positions, bridges, logistics centers or entire neighborhoods. For Ukraine, this became a problem almost impossible to solve. Shooting down each bomb was extremely difficult, attacking the launching planes forced them to get too close to the front and each new Russian kit multiplied the pressure on cities like Kharkiv, Sumy or Zaporizhia. Seventeen months searching for an answer. The appearance now of the first gliding bomb Ukrainian marks something much more important than the presentation of new ammunition. It represents the moment in which kyiv believes it has found your own answer to one of the weapons that have done the most damage during the last two years. Development reportedly began in December 2024 and has required 17 months of work until reaching the final tests and the first official order from the Ministry of Defense. The weapon, named like Vyrivniuvach (“Equalizer”), uses a 250-kilogram warhead and has been designed specifically for the real conditions of the Ukrainian war. It is not simply a question of copying a Western or Soviet model: Ukrainian engineers tried to build an adapted pump to a scenario where planes fly at low altitude to avoid radars, where anti-aircraft defenses cover enormous areas and where each weapon must be cheap, quick to manufacture and easy to integrate. The importance of manufacturing at home. The great advantage of this bomb is not only military, but also industrial and strategic. Until now Ukraine depended on Western kits like the JDAM-ER American or French Hammer to convert conventional bombs into long-range guided weapons. The problem is that these systems arrive in limited quantities, depend on external political decisions and often include restrictions on where they can be used. kyiv had been trying for months to escape that dependence by building its own war industry. The Vyrivniuvach fits perfectly into that logic: according to its developers it costs approximately three times less than a JDAM-ER, can be prepared in less than half an hour and is designed to be integrated into already operational platforms such as the Su-24, MiG-29, Su-27 and even Western F-16 or Mirage 2000. A Russian UMPK gliding bomb attached to a Su-34 An increasingly cheaper and more massive war. The evolution of gliding bombs also reflects a profound change in modern warfare. For years, cruise missiles seemed like the ultimate symbol of precision strike. Ukraine and Russia have proven otherwise: It is often more efficient to adapt old weapons with relatively simple kits and mass produce them. Russia understood this earlier and converted its FABs with UMPK modules into a true constant attrition machinery against the Ukrainian defenses. Ukraine has ended up following the same path. The logic is brutally practical: a gliding bomb does not need complex engines, can be launched from great distances, costs much less than an advanced missile and forces the enemy to expend much more expensive anti-aircraft interceptors or accept the impact. The problem of attacking from outside enemy range. They counted the TWZ analysts that what made Russian bombs especially dangerous was the possibility of launching them outside the radius of many Ukrainian defenses. Russian planes could get relatively close to the front, release their ammunition, and return without directly entering areas covered by Patriot or NASAMS. Ukraine now wants exactly that same ability. Your new bomb is designed to hit targets located “tens of kilometers” behind Russian lines, including fortifications, command posts or logistics centers. This allows you to attack without constantly exposing the pilots to the densest air defenses on the front. Furthermore, as it is a national system, kyiv can use it against any target it deems necessary without depending on external authorizations or political limitations imposed by Western allies. Ukraine’s industrial war. The Vyrivniuvach It also symbolizes the extent to which Ukraine has ceased to be simply a country that receives Western weapons and has become a power. of improvised military innovation out of necessity. In just two years, kyiv has developed long-range kamikaze drones, unmanned naval systems, new munitions and electronic warfare solutions built at high speed and at low cost. The glider bomb is part of that same transformation. Ukraine understood that it could not win a long war by relying solely on limited foreign arsenals or deliveries subject to political debates in Washington or Brussels. That’s why the message behind this new weapon is so important: Russia turned gliding bombs into one of the biggest symbols of Ukrainian vulnerability, but seventeen months later Ukraine seems to have managed to hit back using exactly the same weapon. industrial and military logic. Image | Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, Russian Ministry of Defense In Xataka | Satellite images reveal how much Russia fears Ukraine’s drones. 7,000 km away they are covering their nuclear missiles In Xataka | Once again, Ukraine has opened a missile launched by Russia. Once again, surprising manufacturers have been found

Satellite images reveal how much Russia fears Ukraine’s drones. 7,000 km away they are covering their nuclear missiles

by

The British Navy discovered something truly absurd during naval tests in 1945: a single flock of birds could appear on the radar with a signature similar to that of enemy aircraft. Eight decades later, some of the most sophisticated military systems on the planet clash again to the same problem: Tiny, cheap threats that are difficult to distinguish before it is too late. The drone war against the Russian nuclear arsenal. They counted this week in Naval News that satellite images taken over the Russian submarine base of Rybachiy, on the Kamchatka Peninsula, reveal the extent to which drone warfare in Ukraine is altering Russian military logic even thousands of kilometers from the front. to some 7,400 kilometers of Ukrainetwo strategic nuclear submarines of the Borei class They have appeared completely covered with anti-drone nets while they remain docked in port. The scene is shocking because these submarines are part of the core of Russian nuclear deterrent: each one carries 16 Bulava ballistic missiles capable of launching intercontinental nuclear attacks. However, even that geographical distance no longer seems sufficient for Moscow to feel completely safe from possible surprise Ukrainian operations. From the Black Sea to the Pacific nuclear fleet. The evolution reflects how drones have ceased to be an exclusively tactical problem and have become a strategic threat. Russia had been installing for some time cages, nets and metal structures improvised on ships and patrol boats in the Black Sea to try to stop Ukrainian FPV attacks. Now that same logic has reached some of the most sensitive platforms in its entire military arsenal. The fear does not seem to focus so much on drones launched directly from Ukraine, something practically impossible at such a distance, but on covert operations similar to those that have already hit Russian targets very far from the front. The idea of ​​small cheap drones reaching multi-million dollar strategic assets It has even begun to modify the protection of nuclear submarines. A small threat capable of altering the strategic balance. The nets observed on the Borei do not hide the submarines from satellites nor do they serve as conventional camouflage. Its function It’s purely defensive.: prevent light drones from approaching, landing on the deck or launching explosive charges at vulnerable points, especially on hatches and exposed systems while the submarines are on the surface. Russia had already installed similar protections on some Baltic and Arctic submarines, but on Rybachiy the coverage is much more extensive and envelops practically the entire vessel. There is no doubt, the image conveys a certainly powerful conclusion: the Kremlin already considers it plausible that cheap, improvised and difficult to detect attacks could threaten even part of its nuclear triad. The great psychological change of the war in Ukraine. Beyond the real effectiveness of these networks, the important detail is rather psychological and strategic. Ukraine has managed to get Russia to dedicate resources, time and defensive concern to bases located on the other end of the continent Eurasian. For decades, the logic of nuclear deterrence assumed that submarines hidden in remote bases were virtually untouchable except in an all-out war between great powers. And this is where drones have begun to erode that sense of immunity. The war in Ukraine is showing that a country with limited resources can force a nuclear superpower to cover with mesh improvised some of their most important systems for fear of unexpected attacks. When “nuclear” fears the cheapest. In short, the image of nuclear submarines protected with networks recalls the extent to which the Ukrainian conflict is transforming modern military rules. Platforms designed to survive atomic wars, operate under the ocean for months, and launch intercontinental missiles now also have to worry about cheap quadcopters, commercial explosives, and improvised attacks. Of course, Russia still maintains a huge nuclear and naval advantagebut the proliferation of drones is altering something much more difficult to measure than weapons: the feeling of (in)security. And when even the most remote nuclear bases begin to be armored against small drones, it means that the war in Ukraine has already changed the global perception of military vulnerability. Image | Vantor In Xataka | Once again, Ukraine has opened a missile launched by Russia. Once again, surprising manufacturers have been found In Xataka | Russia has been advancing at a snail’s pace in Ukraine for months. That’s about to change because of one season: summer.

If fog was deadly in Ukraine’s winter, spring is offering Russia a key advantage: greenery

by

In modern conflicts, small changes in the environment can completely alter the balance of combat, even in the face of advanced technologies such as combat drones or sensors. Throughout history, factors such as climate, the ground or the vegetation have conditioned entire offensivesdeciding when and how to attack. In many cases, the difference between advancing or being exposed didn’t depend on a weapon, but on what was happening in the landscape. The same is happening in Ukraine. The cold as an invisible brake. It we count in several occasions. Last winter, the war in Ukraine was marked for a factor as silent as it is decisive: the visibility and conditions meteorological conditions that favored some over others, where the absence of vegetation and phenomena such as the fog and the cold They turned the battlefield into an exposed and lethal space for any offensive movement. In that environment, the drones dominated the air with ease, detecting practically any movement and converting each advance into an immediate risk. Russia, despite its superiority in resources, saw its momentum partially slowed while Ukraine took advantage of this scenario to stabilize the front and launch limited but effective counterattacks. Spring changes the script. With the arrival of spring, that balance begins to break because the terrain is no longer the same nor is the visibility. The vegetation, especially the lines of trees that run through the agricultural fields, introduces a concealment element which profoundly alters the dynamics of combat. So, I remembered this morning the new york times that what was previously an open space dominated by sensors and drones is transformed into a fragmented environment where movement is once again possible, even if in a limited and slower way. Trees as a tactical weapon. Tree lines, inherited from the soviet era to protect crops, they have become natural corridors for the advance, withdrawal and reorganization of troops, offering cover from constant aerial surveillance. In a conflict where large mechanized movements have lost effectiveness, the war is now being fought on foot and in small groupsand this vegetation cover reduces exposure and increases the chances of survival. Vegetation does not eliminate drone threatbut it does hinder their detection ability, enough to change the probabilities on the ground. The Russian advantage. They remembered in the Times that, although both sides benefit from this new coverage, Ukraine recognizes that the effect can favor Russia more due to its greater number of troops, which allows it to better take advantage of any concealment opportunity and advance with fewer relative losses. In areas such as around the Dnieper River, where vegetation has grown especially dense, Russian troops can concentrate and maneuver with a level of discretion that did not exist in winter. This change does not guarantee decisive advances, but it does increase the options for achieve tactical progress. War and the seasons. If you like, the evolution of the conflict confirms to what extent seasonal factors They continue to be decisive even in a dominated war by advanced technologywhere each season alters the rules of combat. If winter favored the defense by exposing the attacker, spring introduces a room for maneuver that Russia tries to exploit to regain initiative. Even so, the constant presence of drones maintains large areas of the front as spaces of high lethality, which limits the scope of any offensive and suggests that, despite the change in scenario, the war will continue to be slow, costly and still far from being resolved in the short term. Image | 7th Army Training Command In Xataka | If the question is where Russia’s missiles come from in the Ukrainian war, the answer is surprising: from cigarette filters In Xataka | Neither drones nor missiles nor AI, the war in Ukraine has turned a vehicle from 1950 into a key piece: the M113

The US ignored Ukraine’s pleas to Russia, and now Iran has turned the US into Ukraine

by

In recent years, something curious has happened in the military world: the most influential drones on the battlefield are not the most advanced, but some of the cheapest. Small devices with triangular wings and simple engines, inspired by Iranian designs, have ended up starring thousands of attacks in several conflicts and forcing entire armies to rethink how to defend their skies. Paradoxically, stopping them usually costs much more than making them. And the United States has realized it late. The war that changed the battle. we have been counting. The Russian invasion of Ukraine inaugurated a new phase in modern warfare marked by the massive use of cheap drones capable of overwhelm the defenses traditional aerials. Since 2022, Russian forces have launched tens of thousands of Shahed drones (of Iranian origin) against Ukrainian cities and infrastructure, forcing kyiv to develop an improvised but increasingly sophisticated defense. This experience, acquired in extreme conditions and under constant bombing, has turned the country into the most advanced laboratory in the world to combat this type of weapons. What began as a desperate fight to protect their airspace ended generating new tacticselectronic warfare systems and interceptor drones specifically designed to destroy these low-cost loitering munitions. The weapon that changes the economy of war. The success of Shahed drones is based on brutally simple logic: its price. Each can cost between $20,000 and $50,000, a paltry figure compared to the systems designed to stop them. For years, Ukraine and other countries have been forced to use anti-aircraft missiles that can cost hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars to shoot down a single drone. This asymmetry turns each interception into an economic defeateven when the target is destroyed. To solve the problem, Ukraine began to develop cheaper solutions: interceptor drones that pursue and attack the Shahed, mobile teams with machine guns, electronic jamming systems and surveillance networks adapted to detect these devices before they reach their objectives. The great strategic paradox. Here appears one of the most striking ironies of the current conflict. For years, Ukraine asked for more help to defend against Iranian drone attacks used by Russia and developed specific technology to combat them in view of the fact that no one (or few) paid attention to them. Even now we know who came to offer that experience and those systems to the United States in meetings held at the White House, where he presented proposals to create anti-drone defense networks in the Middle East. That offer was ignored at that time. Ironies of fate, months later, after the start of the war with Iran and the launch of thousands of drones against American bases and allies, Washington has been forced to knock on kyiv’s door and ask for help. In a sense, the conflict has reversed the roles: The most powerful military power in the world is now facing the same dilemma that Ukraine has been trying to solve for years, defending its positions from swarms of cheap drones that force it to spend fortunes to be neutralized. The world calls kyiv. This accumulated experience has turned Ukraine into a unexpectedly valuable partner for countries now suffering similar attacks. Governments in the Middle East, Europe and the United States have begun to request advice, technology and training to defend themselves against Iranian drones. Zelensky himself confirmed that his government has received multiple requests to share knowledge on interceptors, electronic warfare and air defense tactics adapted to this type of threat. kyiv has responded sending experts and systems to some US bases in the region as it tries to balance that aid with its own defensive needs against Russia. From laboratory to export power. The war has also transformed the Ukrainian defense industrial sector. Local companies produce now thousands of interceptor drones every month and have developed models capable of pursuing and destroying Shahed at a fraction of the cost of traditional missiles. Some manufacturers claim to be able manufacture tens of thousands of monthly units, which has aroused enormous international interest. Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabiahave begun negotiations to acquire Ukrainian interceptors and technology, seeking more sustainable solutions than relying exclusively on extremely expensive Western anti-aircraft systems. A new global race: anti-drone defense. The rise of these technologies reflects a change unimaginable until recently in contemporary military logic. The great powers have discovered that systems designed to intercept ballistic missiles or fighter jets are not necessarily effective against swarms of cheap, mass-produced drones. In the Persian Gulf, Israel and the Arab states have had to spend large quantities of missiles Patriot, THAAD or Iron Dome to stop relatively cheap attacks. This dynamic has caused a global career to develop more economical solutions, from interceptor drones to automatic air defense systems capable of confronting massive threats. A global lesson. In short, what began as a regional war in Eastern Europe it’s over redefining the way many countries understand air defense. Ukraine, which for years fought almost alone against massive Iranian drone attacks operated by Russia, has unexpectedly become the world reference to combat this threat. The paradox is simple and obvious, because the technology and tactics developed by a country that was fighting to survive have become essential to protect some of the most advanced military powers on the planet. In the new drone war that extends from Europe to the Middle East, the experience accumulated in the skies over Ukraine has become one of the most valuable strategic assets of the moment. So much so that even has invested the papers with the United States. Image | ArmyInform, Lycksele-Nord, Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine In Xataka | The United Kingdom has opened the kamikaze drone that exploded at the European base. The surprise is capital: it is not from Iran, it is “made in Russia” In Xataka | Shahed drones are spreading terror in the Gulf. Ukraine has offered the solution and the price to pay has a name

Russia’s elite GRU moves its war against Ukraine’s power grid to Polish soil

by

Winter in Eastern Europe is not just a season; It’s a damage multiplier. As my colleague Miguel Jorge described wellwhat is emerging in the region is a ruthless reality dubbed “thermal terror.” In this scenario, extreme cold becomes a weapon of war designed to make civil infrastructure – heating, electricity, water – the cruelest target. The ultimate goal is not only to destroy military capacity, but to make daily life physically unviable. Under this logic of making daily life unviable to wear down the population, the Kremlin’s most feared cyberespionage group has decided to cross a dangerous border. 500,000 homes in the spotlight. As Poland prepared for the holidays, its security systems detected what Energy Minister Milosz Motyka called the “strongest attack against Polish energy infrastructure in years,” as reported by Reuters. The sabotage occurred on December 29 and 30 and was surgical. The targets were not chosen at random, but instead targeted two cogeneration plants and systems that connect renewable energy facilities — such as wind farms — to power grid operators. In other words, directly to the key nodes so that energy reaches homes. local media they collected the statements from Prime Minister Donald Tusk, who put figures at risk: if the attack had been successful, half a million people would have been left without heat in the middle of winter. Fortunately, as detailed in the press release of the Polish Governmentthe defenses worked. “At no time was critical infrastructure threatened,” said Tusk, although the incident has been treated with the utmost seriousness, mobilizing the special services to their full capacity. Sandworm’s signature. The attack took on an international dimension when the cybersecurity firm ESET announced the discovery of the weapon used: a destructive malware called DynoWiper. As reported by TechCrunchESET attributed this operation with “medium confidence” to the Sandworm groupan elite unit within the Russian military intelligence agency (GRU). The choice of dates does not seem coincidental. As investigative journalist Kim Zetter points outthis attempted blackout in Poland came almost exactly ten years after the first Sandworm cyberattack against Ukraine’s power grid in 2015, which left 230,000 homes in the dark. For experts, the use of a wiper on Polish soil is an unprecedented event, as it marks Russia’s move from simple espionage to destructive sabotage against a NATO member. Furthermore, this is not an isolated episode because since the beginning of the Ukrainian War, Poland has undergone a sustained increase of cyberattacks attributed to Russian actors. Nevertheless, according to the Ministry of Energy itselfthe December attempt was a turning point both in its intensity and in its objective: it was no longer about probing defenses, but rather about causing a real blackout. Anatomy of the attack. To understand the seriousness of the issue, it is necessary to break down the technology used. Unlike the ransomware commona wiper It is software designed exclusively to destroy. Your goal is not to ask for a ransom, but delete permanently information and leave equipment unusable. In this case, the attackers went directly to the ICS (Industrial Control Systems) systems since these systems are the ones that allow electric companies regulate the supply and monitor the network. So, Sandworm sought to break communication between renewable energy sources and distribution operators. When attacking these nodes, the technicians’ margin of action is minimal because the failures propagate in a chain. A conflict that expands. The Polish Prime Minister directly linked this attack to his country’s support for Ukraine. “We sell electricity there and, in critical situations, we receive it from them,” Tusk explained.. Attacking the Polish network is, by extension, attacking Ukraine’s energy rear. This Russian aggressiveness is not new for Western intelligence services. In fact, the United States government keeps a reward 10 million dollars for information about six GRU officers belonging to Sandworm, responsible for global attacks such as NotPetya, which caused losses of 1 billion dollars. According to Microsoft, Sandworm—whom they call Iridium— has launched nearly 40 destructive attacks against critical infrastructure since the beginning of the invasion of Ukraine, seeking to degrade not only military capacity, but the population’s trust in its leaders. From NATO’s point of view, attempted sabotage does not automatically activate collective defense mechanisms, but it does reinforce disturbing evidence: hybrid warfare makes it possible to strain the European system without formally crossing the red lines of an armed conflict. The next frontier is no longer territorial, but digital. Faced with the growing threat. The Polish Government is finalizing the Law on the National Cybersecurity System, a regulation that seeks the “autonomy and polonization” of security systems to reduce dependence on devices that facilitate foreign interference, according to official information. However, December’s failed sabotage is a reminder that in modern warfare, the front lines are on power plant servers. While in the trenches of Ukraine soldiers try to hide their thermal trace from drones, in cities like Warsaw or Krakow the battle is being fought so that the simple act of turning on the heating does not become an impossible luxury. For now, Poland has won this defensive battle, even achieving a historical record of energy production a few days after the attack. However, Sandworm’s shadow is still long. The hackers’ message is clear: “If we can’t turn off the light, at least we can scare you.” The war for control of the European switch has only just begun. Image | Unsplash and freepik Xataka | La Gomera has been suffering constant total blackouts for years. Now you have a solution: a cable that is unique in the world

Ukraine’s latest tactic is an explosive turn for the war. It’s called “letting in,” and the Russians are falling into the trap.

by

Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the front has been mutating with all kinds of tactics who sought to wear down the enemy. The arrival of drones everything has changedbut the strategies and ingenuity In the use of artillery they have remained a fundamental asset for the advance or defense of the front. For this reason, Ukraine’s latest strategy has disconcerted the Russians. When they reach the bunkers there is no one, and then the surprise comes. Win by letting in. Ukraine is applying a more flexible and lethal defense consisting in “pre-register” their artillery on their own front-line positions, so that when the Russians assault and capture them, they literally enter an already calibrated point to be destroyed: the fort falls, the enemy concentrates, and then comes the massive punishment that turns Russian success into a death trap. After that blow, a Ukrainian assault branch recover the points again devastated, closing a cycle that maximizes ranged damage and reduces the exposure of own infantry, something key in a context of growing shortage of trained soldiers. This logic, denounced even by pro-Russian voices as the strategy of “letting in” is actually a way of imposing the pace: it is not about always preventing them from advancing, but about making each advance expensive, slow and bloody. The “death zone” as doctrine. The tactic works because the battlefield has become in a “kill zone” permanent where the defender attempts to maintain a deadly gap between the leading edge and the rear: artillery is placed further back, out of the usual range of rival drones, and forward positions are fortified to attract attackswaiting for the enemy to enter to destroy them right there with fire and drones. The drone operators They not only strike at the front, they also hunt for supply and reinforcement routes, and any activity near “newly taken” positions becomes visible and attackable. Added to this is the constant mining (including remote) and the use of “ambushers” in the few possible logistical axes, so that the attacker not only pays to capture, but also pays twice as much to try to consolidate. The “let in” tactic after pre-registering a position The decisive blow. The most surprising point about this approach is that the defender does not seek so much to “hold every meter” as to prevent the attacker deploy your second step– When the advancing force attempts to bring in specialized reinforcements (e.g. drone operators to hold the ground), the defender launches fast local offensiveseven if they cost material, to keep the death zone intact and keep the enemy trapped in a space where they cannot settle. Thus, the advance exists on paper or in the drone image, but it becomes tactically sterile: you capture something and, before transforming it into a usable position, it becomes a slaughterhouse, like is described in sectors like Kupiansk. It is a war where “letting in” is not an extra: it is the moment in which the enemy advance stops being progress and becomes a loss. The psychological and moral consequence. These types of dynamics are eroding the offensive will because it forces us to choose between kilometers and livesespecially the “faces” of competent soldiers who know how to move in that death zone: It’s not just that advancement costs, it’s that it costs exactly the most valuable thing. From this arises a dilemma on the front itself: advancing in a big way without preparation means burn trained unitsbut advancing “minimally” or little to be able to report presence saves resources… at the cost of generating absurd situations where you can no longer request fire on positions that officially “they are yours”although in reality they are being crushed or disputed. In this framework, the information war of territorial control is mixed with real survival, and “progress” becomes a very diffuse decision. The technological revolution to the rescue. we have been counting. The bottom line is that Ukraine is at the center of a military transformation: soldiers are the most expensive and difficult resource to replace, while unmanned systems have passed to dominate the combatexpanding on an industrial scale, lowering costs and multiplying impact. The front is increasingly managed from the rear or bunkers with operators controlling the space, and attempts at “classic” breaches become almost suicidal: the key is no longer to launch columns, but to disperse, camouflage and gradually push the death zone back. As the war evolves into swarms, AI coordination and persistent attacks, the advantage is not having the most expensive weapon, but having thousands of cheap weaponsreliable communications networks and the ability to update systems non-stop. The coming war. Thus, the strategic decision moves to logistics and industry: cut off land routes, protect supplies, attack factorieslogistics centers and hidden commands, and do so with reusable media and unmanned is increasingly determining. Victories depend on producing drones en massesecure components, sustain communications Starlink type and dominate the cybernetic layer that can blind, uncoordinate or paralyze an entire front. That is why the strategy to “let in” It does not seem like an isolated trick, but rather a direct consequence of the new battlefield: if the first to enter dies, the one who waits and finishes with precision (with drones, mines, artillery and digital coordination) keeps the initiative even if it seems that is receding. Image | US Army Europe In Xataka | The video of the Russian soldier in Ukraine who ignores the bomb that just exploded on him has only two explanations. And one is science fiction In Xataka | The war in Ukraine has a new level of brutality. Russia calls it a “can opener” and turns recruits into detonators

Ukraine’s biggest problem is not Russia. There are three European countries trapped in a perverse mechanism: type C accounts

by

Europe faces a decision that goes far beyond an accounting discussion and that defines its strategic credibility: what to do with the more than 210,000 million of euros of Russian assets frozen since the beginning of the invasion of Ukraine. The problem is twofold, because it is not just about figures, but about what comes after activating the operation. The European crossroads. Yes, because the question is not only whether that money should be used to support kyiv at a critical moment, but whether the European Union is capable to take the risks political, legal and economic implications of doing so. As Washington presses for a quick exit to the conflict and reduces its financial support, Brussels finds itself caught between the urgency of avoiding a Ukrainian defeat and the fear of unleashing a russian retaliation that directly hits several of its Member States. Putin clearly. Statements this week by Vladimir Putinloaded with contempt for European elites and confidence in a protracted war, are not simple rhetoric. Moscow makes it clear that it is not contemplating real concessions and that it considers the use of its frozen assets as theft that demands a response. That response would not be symbolic, but surgical: selective seizures, accelerated nationalizations, endless litigation and the use of the Russian financial system as a weapon. The message, a priori, is unequivocal: if Europe crosses the line, Russia will not only punish Ukraine on the battlefield, but also European countries that still have exposed economic interests within their territory. The real blockage. I remembered this morning the financial times he crux of the whole situation. Although the debate is presented as a struggle between hawks and cautions, the real blockage comes from a handful of countries specific, with Belgium, Italy and Austria at the head. It is not a question of ideology, but of direct vulnerability. Belgium hosts Euroclear, the warehouse that guards most of the frozen Russian assets, and fears becoming the first target of retaliation judicial and economic. Italy and Austria, for their part, maintain banks and companies with billions trapped in Russia, benefits included, which they cannot repatriate. For these countries, authorizing the use of Russian money is not an abstract foreign policy decision, but rather an immediate risk to their financial and corporate systems. Type C accounts: the ace of Moscow. At the center of this fear are the calls type C accountsthe mechanism created by Moscow to withhold dividends, interest and assets from Western companies. That money, formally owned by European and American companies, is under Russian control and can be frozen, redistributed or directly transferred to the state budget with a simple decree. For the Kremlin, these accounts are a retaliation tool fast and effective, far superior in agility to slow Western judicial processes. For Europe, they are an invisible chain that binds entire governments when making strategic decisions, because any false step can translate into lost billions and internal political crises. Germany pushes, Europe hesitates. Germany has become the main political engine of the plan to use Russian assets, convinced that without that money there is no realistic way to support Ukraine for another two years without skyrocketing the European debt or depending on impossible unanimity. Berlin insists that the risk must be shared among everyone and that failure to act would send a devastating sign: Europe is not capable of defending its own security. However, this logic collides with the reality of countries that feel that the risk is not distributed, but rather concentrated in their national balance sheetsits banks and its courts. A (bad) peace as a threat. This financial blockade occurs in an even more disturbing context: European fear to an imposed peace on terms favorable to Russia. For many capitals, an agreement that consolidates Moscow’s territorial gains would not only leave Ukraine defenseless, but would force Europe to prepare for a scenario direct confrontation in the medium term, with longer borders, a strengthened Russian army and a weakened European deterrent. In this framework, the frozen Russian money stops being a tactical lever and becomes a strategic investment: either it is used now to support Ukraine, or it is paid for later in the form of massive rearmament and risk of war. The final dilemma. In short, the European Union has frozen Russian assets to prevent them from returning to Moscow without reparations, but now it must decide whether it dares to give the next step. Without that money, Ukraine could run out of liquidity in a matter of months, losing all negotiating power and forcing a deal from weakness. With him, Europe is exposed to reprisals, litigation and immediate economic losses, concentrated in a few countries that are currently holding back the decision. The crossroads are clear: assume the political and financial cost now, or accept that the fear of type C accounts determine European security policy. Not only the future of Ukraine is at stake in that election, but also Europe’s ability to act as a coherent geopolitical actor when your own interests are at risk. Image | RawPixel In Xataka | A missile has been bombarding Ukraine’s defenses for weeks. What no one could imagine is that he is not Russian: he is from the West In Xataka | A day later the satellites leave no doubt: Russia fortified a bridge, and a Ukrainian drone made science fiction a reality

Shahed drones were a piece of cake for Ukraine’s helicopters. Russia has just transformed them into its biggest nightmare

by

In it huge catalog of innovations improvised measures brought by the war in ukrainefew are as revealing as the decision that Russia has taken to address one of the main vulnerabilities of its drones. In essence, they have turned the Shahed-136 (symbol of its saturation strategy through cheap and disposable platforms) in a rudimentary anti-aircraft fighter. The mutation. What was born as a suicide drone with autonomy to travel hundreds of kilometers following pre-programmed routes has been transformed, in some variants, into a system piloted in real timeequipped with cameras, modems and now with the R-60 missilea veteran infrared-guided missile from the 1970s that, despite its compact size, retains the lethality of a weapon capable of cutting a helicopter in two with its load of continuous rods. The broadcast images by Ukrainian organizations and electronic warfare experts confirm the presence of the R-60 mounted on the Shahed’s noseand the interception of one of them by a Ukrainian Sting drone illustrates that Russia is experimenting with the idea of ​​​​transforming a disposable projectile in a reactive vectorcapable of confronting the devices that, until now, acted as unpunished hunters of these platforms. The new tactical ecosystem. The success of the Ukrainian helicopters in intercepting Shaheds (with devices sporting dozens of shoot-down marks and crews accredited with hundreds of downed drones) had turned these aircraft in key pieces of low-level air defense. The combination of moderate speed, predictable trajectory and total lack of situational awareness made the drone a almost static whitevulnerable to cannon blasts or volleys used at close range. But the introduction of the R-60 upsets that balance: although the platform remains clumsy, slow and limited in maneuver, the simple fact that some drones can carry missiles will force Ukrainian pilots to rethink their proximity to the target. Each interception stops being a procedure and becomes in an unknown about what version of the enemy they will encounter. Extra ball. Even if the actual kill capability of the armed Shahed is small (and the operational window for targeting with a short-range missile is narrow) the statistical nature of swarm warfare change the calculation: In thousands of launches, just getting into a good position will be enough to cause the loss of a valuable helicopter. Technical limitations. The R-60, known by NATO as Aphidwas designed for supersonic fighters, not slow drones intended as loitering munitions. Its integration into the Shahed poses obvious challenges: the operator must manually retarget the drone until it is pointed at the target, achieving an adequate angle to allow the infrared seeker to acquire the thermal signature and maintain alignment long enough to authorize the shot. He narrow field of vision of the missile, the Shahed’s low maneuverability and the possibility of helicopters using infrared flares reduce the chances of success. However, historical experience shows that even imperfect weaponry can achieve victories if the tactical environment favors it. Remains of an intercepted Shahed with the R-60 attached The precedent. If we go back we have the Predator armed american with Stingers in 2002 (failed but deterrent), which reveals that these configurations do not seek air superiority, but rather force the enemy to act with caution. Just as Ukrainian unmanned ships were armed with missiles To scare away the Russian helicopters that were harassing them, Russia adopts the same defensive-offensive logic: a single one of these armed drones, hidden among a swarm of externally identical devices, forces the adversary to increase distance, use more expensive means or modify its interception doctrine. Drones against drones. The Shahed armed with an R-60 is not, by itself, a transformative weapon. It is, however, as symptom of evolution continued unmanned combat. Russia has expanded the Shahed family into versions with real time controljet variants already produced in its own factories and possible improvements based on artificial intelligence for dynamic target identification. Ukraine, for its part, develops interceptors low-cost that allow us to shoot down Russian drones without risking manned aircraft or spending expensive missiles. Every innovation generates a countermeasure: if Ukraine popularizes cheap hunting drones, Russia studies equipping the Shaheds of tiny turrets or new sensors, and if these become reactive, Ukraine adapts its doctrines and strengthens its electronic warfare. The conflict has entered a phase where the value is not in the perfection of each platform, but in the ability to produceadapt and deploy thousands of them in an environment where the line between offensive and defensive becomes blurred. The most dangerous sky. It is the result of these advances. The introduction of Shahed-R-60 marks a turning point because it erodes one of the few stable advantages that Ukraine had maintained: the capacity of its helicopters to hunt drones with relative safety. Now each aircraft must consider the possibility, however remote, of facing a missile that was not foreseen in the original mission design. This not only complicates interceptions, but forces disperse risks and rethink routes, altitudes and speeds. The Ukrainian sky, already saturated with suicide drones, cruise missiles, loitering munitions and manned aircraft operating in densely contested airspace, add another variable to an operational equation in constant mutation. And it is likely that this is just the beginning: the integration of missiles is a first step towards drones that, in addition to attacking by saturation, can defend themselves or even escort other devices in combined waves. Image | Telegram, X In Xataka | There is tourism that flies en masse where tragedies have occurred. So the Low Costs are preparing to travel to Ukraine In Xataka | Ukraine’s problem with peace negotiations is simple: if it rejects them, Russia will get tougher in the next ones.

Russia has found an old ally from other wars to bring down Ukraine’s most impenetrable defense: snowfall

by

Winter has once again established itself as a decisive actor in the Ukrainian war. To the mud and fog A new enemy has been added to the Ukrainian defenses. Heavy snowfall and freezing rain are degrading the tool that has allowed kyiv to make up for its numerical inferiority for two years: the swarms of light, agile and deadly FPV drones that form the backbone of their “death zones” defensive. Winter as a weapon. The meteorology, which in other winters had shaped the strategy, this year is dismantling a defensive system which Ukraine had perfected into a nearly impenetrable barrier. Russia understood this before anyone else and launched large scale assaults taking advantage of the climate vulnerability of drones, opening gaps around Kharkiv, Huliaipole and especially Pokrovsk. For the first time in months, Moscow is advancing not because it has decisively improved its military, but because nature has given it a window that it is exploiting. with brutal determination. The unexpected weakness. It turns out that FPV drones, so effective in summer, are extremely fragile in winter. Their lack of inertia makes them victims of the wind, which pushes them and makes their trajectory falter with each gust, humidity and ice fog the cameras, snow reduces contrasts, fog blurs the depth of the visual field and the lenses become covered with drops that distort the image at the most critical moment. The pilot, who needs perfect vision to hit with surgical precision, encounters a blurry screenwithout references, unable to distinguish trenches, obstacles or even the final objective. The slightest loss of clarity turns an attack in a crash against the terrain or in an erratic missile. The result is devastating for the Ukrainian defensive strategy: when the drones do not fly, the death zones they cease to existRussian columns can advance under dark clouds and motorcycles and pickup trucks carrying troops take advantage of the fog to infiltrate towns like Pokrovsk, where urban fighting is already fierce. A dangerous opportunity. The adverse weather has created for Russia an opportunity that it has not enjoyed since the beginning of the war. With Ukrainian drones forced to remain on the ground, Russian forces have managed to maneuver with greater freedom of movement, something that drone warfare had made nearly impossible for months. They have crossed rivers in fog, entered towns with light vehicles without being detected and pushed through Ukrainian lines while the defense was reorganized while waiting for the weather to improve. Moscow’s advance, although limited in territorial terms, is having an impact psychological and tactical significant: it exposes the fragility of the Ukrainian defensive model when it is left without its star tool and shows that Moscow has learned to detect weather patterns to time attacks precisely. The November Fog already allowed its troops to deepen positions in Pokrovsk, a critical point whose control has become a symbol both for the Kremlin (which seeks to show progress to Washington) and for Kyiv, which is struggling to resist on a front where pressure is constant. Innovation against the clock. But the climate does not act in a unidirectional way. Just as quickly as drones became inoperable, atmospheric improvements allowed Ukraine to recover part of their kill zones and launch counterattacks with your FPV. The brigades, such as the 28th Mechanized, have taken advantage of the clear weather to hit Russian units newly deployed in Kostiantynivka, trapping them in exposed positions. This dynamic confirms that Ukraine is not defeated: is forced to adapt faster. Its industry, extremely flexible since 2022, is already developing a new generation of drones with more wind-resistant fuselages, low-light cameras, simplified thermal systems and control algorithms capable of stabilizing flight in adverse conditions. The arrival of these drones, scheduled for the coming months, will be key to reverse the advantage temporary that Russia has obtained. If Ukraine manages to deploy a winter-hardy FPV force, the balance on the front could tip again. The other winter war. While the drones fight in the white sky ahead, winter hits the cities otherwise: with blackouts of up to 16 hours, failed heating, stopped elevators and parents who go to the shelter with their children in their arms between explosions. The BBC told cases like that of Oksana, in her apartment in kyiv, who lives with a 2,000 euro battery that only extends normality by a few hours. Her daughter plays by candlelight and her husband works in the dark when bombing cuts off supplies. Millions of Ukrainians are preparing for what the authorities describe how “the worst winter in our history.” Moscow has intensified its attacks against transmission networks, not only to leave the population without electricity and heat, but to close bakeries, paralyze factories, stop transportation and suffocate the economy until causing social discouragement. According to the Ukrainian government itself, the Russian objective is not only to defeat the country militarily, but to destroy its internal cohesion. human wear and tear. After almost four years of war, fatigue has become widespread. He insomnia affects three times as many Ukrainians as people in countries at peace, and the nights are marked by sirens, Shahed drones and waves of missiles that have reached record numbers. Moral fatigue is mixed with the physical: the front is far away, but the war is in every hallway, in every staircase, in every unlit light bulb. And yet, surprisingly, the surveys show a rebound in optimism: more than half of Ukrainians believe in a better future, even if it is a fragile, oscillating one that depends on the evolution of blocked negotiations, the arrival of foreign aid or the result of a Russian offensive that is still far from a decisive victory. Frozen diplomacy. Plus: international negotiations are going through their most uncertain moment. A possible Trump-Putin summit is on pause. The EU is still discussing how to use 180,000 million on frozen Russian assets, and kyiv sees with concern how Washington sends mixed signals and how some European governments could change with elections less … Read more

not only its drones come from China, but also Ukraine’s latest army

by

In the month of October there was an anomaly for Ukrainian troops. Reconnaissance drones began to spot unknown figures among Moscow’s soldiers. It was known that there were north koreansbut a new front began to increase as the days went by: Cubans. Now, in an unpredictable turn of events, kyiv is being joined by a most unexpected group: Chinese. Why are there Chinese? The story was told in an extensive report by The Guardian newspaper. Although the contingent is still small, they speak of a few dozen, the very existence of Chinese fighting on the Ukrainian side is politically significant because contradicts the story that Beijing, as a social bloc, massively supports the invasion of Russia. Most of these volunteers did not set out as combatants from the beginning, but rather as observers or humanitarian volunteers: they arrived, saw direct damage to civilians, and concluded that simply donating or showing compassion was not enough. Cases like Tim’swho was scarred after seeing the bodies in the kyiv children’s hospital, and jumped into combat from the simple idea that his inaction would have been worse than the risk. There is no epic in his story: there is a feeling of moral urgency and the point of no return once the violence is seen in the first person. Disenchantment as a driving force. He explained the British media that these decisions are not only born from the war, but from a previous trajectory of personal wear within China: unemployment structural, feeling of vital stagnation, deterioration of freedoms and closure of civic space after the pandemic. Both Tim and Fan, another of the combatants, they express the same with different languages: to stay was to remain tied to a life that for them was not moving forward and that, as they saycould not be questioned publicly. War, paradoxically, offers them what they lacked: the ability to act, a real transformation of their own destiny and an environment where, although there is enormous physical risk, there is also room for personal decision. At least for them, it is more rational to risk their lives on a foreign front than to remain “frozen” in their country with no option to change. Public opinion. A investigation Tao Wang of Manchester Metropolitan University concluded that 80% of Chinese Respondents held pro-Russian views during the first year of the war and that “government-controlled media managed to influence public opinion in favor of Russia” as the war progressed. The volunteers they described an ecosystem where the pro-Kremlin narrative seemed the only one that circulated without cost, while sympathizing with Ukraine was seen as “deviation” and could bring social or legal consequences. That is why dissent seems like a rare bird: not because it does not exist, but because, according to the studyit is not safe to express it. Prudential asymmetry. Plus: the operating path is not symmetrical. There is a lot of pro-mercenary content for Russia that circulate in Chinese networks without brakes (video above), while finding instructions for enlisting in Ukraine requires bypassing censorship, using VPN and, as In the case of Fangetting to ask an AI where to start. Furthermore, the Guardian indicated that the risk to coming back is real: relatives questioned, possible ambiguous charges, surveillance. In other words, the State tolerates (and sometimes facilitates) the pro-Russian participationbut forces those who decide otherwise to go underground. This difference in cost explains why the pronuclear group with Ukraine is small, although it does not invalidate its relevance as a symptom. Limited military value. There is no doubt, militarily, these few dozen do not change the balance of the conflict. Symbolically, they confront part of the official discourse. They demonstrate that the legitimacy of the Beijing-Moscow alliance It is not socially homogeneous, or it is not always so, and that there is also a layer that rejects it when it has room to act. For Ukraine, its value possibly lies in proving that even in China there are citizens who consider the invasion unjustifiable and enough to risk their lives to stop it. What are they looking for? When the Guardian I asked them why take risks for a foreign country, the answers were not geopolitical but vital: the idea of ​​building a life in another environment, giving a different future to your children and/or demonstrating that your identity as Chinese is not automatically tied to the State or its foreign policy. In it Tim’s caseis also a message towards prejudices: nothing should be taken for granted about any society, much less just because the State is going in the opposite direction. Thus, the gesture of these unlikely recruits in the Ukrainian war once again demonstrates that the sides are invisible. If the Cubans went to Ukraine for an issue purely economicthe Chinese seem to do it for a much more vital issue. Image | LAC Chad Sharman, IToldYa In Xataka | Ukraine brought its drones closer to the Russian army. Their surprise is capital: the North Koreans are now Cubans with an irresistible promise In Xataka | In 2023, a pilot from Ukraine had an idea for Star Wars. Not only did it go well: his kamikaze plan has rewritten the war manual

Log In

Forgot password?

Forgot password?

Enter your account data and we will send you a link to reset your password.

Your password reset link appears to be invalid or expired.

Log in

Privacy Policy

Add to Collection

No Collections

Here you'll find all collections you've created before.