missiles

that the only one with missiles is Iran

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For weeks, Allied commanders did not understand why their most advanced systems were unable to intercept all the projectiles falling on the cities. The surprise was enormous when they verified that, in full Gulf Warsome were enough few Scud missiles thrown irregularly to force deploy huge resources defensive forces and alter the pace of an entire military campaign. The mathematics of missiles. After weeks of war, the confrontation in the Middle East It has ceased to be just a question of military capacity and has become a problem of specific inventories, with figures that condition any future decision. CNN counted through the last CSIS analysis that the United States has already consumed about 45% of its Precision Strike Missileabout 50% of the THAAD interceptors and Patriot, in addition to approximately 30% of their Tomahawks and more than 20% of the JASSM. In other words, although these levels do not prevent continued operations in the short term, they do significantly reduce the ability to sustain another high-intensity conflict in parallel, especially against an adversary like Iran. It’s not shooting, it’s replacing. The replacement of these systems introduces a clear boundary: annual production barely reaches about 100 Tomahawk units and less 500 JASSM-ERwhile interceptors like SM-3 or SM-6 They have even lower rhythms. Even with contracts to expand production, the period to recover previous levels oscillates, according to the Pentagonbetween three and five years. In practice, this means that every current launch has a future strategic cost, because there is no quick way to replace it in the event of escalation. Iran maintains the volume. Faced with this wear and tear, analysts from the Pentagon itself have assured that Iran preserves thousands of missiles ballistic and cruise, although many require reconditioning or have failures resulting from hasty modifications. Plus: problems in aerodynamic stability, propellant wear or changes in guidance systems (such as the transition to BeiDou after GPS interference) have reduced accuracy in some cases. Even so, they said that the volume is still sufficient to maintain launch rates for weekswhich introduces a saturation factor that complicates any defense. David Sling Defenses to the limit. The impact of that pressure has already been seen in the intensive use of interceptorswith systems like David’s Sling o Arrow 3 operating near critical levels. In fact, several analysts said that, in some scenarios, the reserves would not allow a continuous defense to be sustained. beyond 72 to 96 hours without immediate replenishment. It is not a trivial fact and, in fact, it would change the logic of the conflict, because even with advanced systems, a prolonged defense depends directly on the interceptor availabilitynot only its effectiveness. Operational limitations if resumed. The data that handles Washington They talk about a scenario where, if the war were reactivated, the United States would have about 2,800 to 3,000 Tomahawk and little more than 400 long-range guided bombssupported by aircraft carriers and destroyers, but with clear restrictions after prior consumption. For example, the use of less advanced munitions like the JDAM would imply greater exposure of aircraft to enemy defenses. In addition, logistical factors such as fuel arise here (with reduced European reserves around 20%) that would limit the duration of an intensive air campaign. The strait as added pressure. In parallel, Iran is clearly demonstrating ability to challenge the blockade in the Strait of Hormuz, maintaining exports through oil tankers that avoid control by turning off transponders and indirect routes. Despite interceptions and diversions of more than 28 vessels, dozens of cargo ships and oil tankers they have managed to crosswhich shows that maritime control is not absolute and that Tehran retains room for economic and strategic maneuver. The great unknown. If you like, the result of all these factors is a scenario very different and disturbing for Washington, one where, after weeks mass consumptionthe United States enters a possible resumption with limited inventorieswhile Iran, despite its failures, continues to have sufficient volume to sustain throws. There is no doubt, that at least partially reverses the usual logic, because the risk for the United States is no longer just what it can launch, but what Iran can still continue launching day after day in a second part of the war where the dictates the missiles can change name. Image | National Museum of the US Navy, Naval Surface WarriorsUnited States Missile Defense Agency In Xataka | Europe has gotten down to work on one of its biggest geopolitical challenges: opening Hormuz without help from the US In Xataka | Iran has 300 internal reports where it models the war against the US. They are all based on the same thing: Ukraine

that in addition to cars, Ford and Cadillac manufacture missiles

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In 1942, the Willow Run Factory in Michigan, operated by Ford Motor Company, managed to assemble a B-24 bomber every 63 minutes, something unthinkable for an industry that until recently produced cars in series. That feat turned a civilian assembly line on a capable machine to sustain a war on a global scale. Now the drums of war are beating again in car factories around the planet. An economy that returns to war mode. The United States is beginning to recover an industrial logic that seemed buried since the mid-20th century: converting its civilian muscle into a direct extension of the military effort. He had exclusive the wall street journal that there are already Pentagon conversations with giants such as Ford Motor Company and General Motors that reflect more than just an increase in production, pointing to a transformation of the role of the industry in a context where conflicts in Ukraine and Iran are draining arsenals at an unexpected rate. The underlying idea is simple but powerful, and already we had seen in Germany in recent months: if wars consume faster than the traditional military industry can replenish, the board must be expanded and civilian manufacturers brought back. From cars to missiles. The Pentagon is not only looking for specific contracts, but the ability to redirect factories, engineers and logistics chains towards the production of ammunition, anti-drone systems or tactical vehicles. This movement implies that companies used to manufacturing cars or heavy machinery can become direct support of the war effort, something that breaks with decades of specialization in a handful of defense contractors. In practice, it is a recognition that modern warfare (especially that based on drones and high-consumption ammunition) requires industrial volumes that are more reminiscent of a war economy than the limited conflicts of recent decades. The precedent. The historical reference is inevitable: during World War II, the Detroit automobile factories stopped producing cars to make bombersaircraft engines and large-scale military vehicles. That total conversion transformed American industry in a war machine capable of supporting multiple fronts simultaneously. Today, although the context is different, the logic underlying current conversations is the same: take advantage of the scale, efficiency and flexibility of civilian industry to cover military needs that exceed the capacity of the specialized sector. Korea, Vietnam and the law that made it possible. After the Second World War, Washington did not completely abandon this capacity for industrial mobilization, but rather institutionalized it with the Defense Production Law 1950, a legal framework that allows the government to prioritize and direct production toward military needs. During the Korean War, companies such as Ford Motor Company created specific divisions for defense contracts, while General Motors and other companies adapted their lines to manufacture military vehicles, engines and supplies. This model was activated again in later conflicts such as Vietnam, although in a more partial way, consolidating a tool that allows the civil industry to be reactivated in moments of strategic pressure without reaching the total mobilization of the 1940s. A system that falls short. The background of this turn is an uncomfortable reality that could already be find in Iran: the US defense industrial base, as designed today, it’s not enough to sustain prolonged, high-intensity wars while supplying allies. The massive transfer of weapons to Ukraine since 2022 and the additional wear and tear derived from the conflict with Iran have highlighted this limitation. For this reason, the Pentagon proposes expand production beyond the usual contractors, directly asking large manufacturers what capacity they can contribute and what obstacles they encounter in integrating into that effort. The return to a logic of total war. If you like, without explicitly declaring it, Washington is recovering an idea that seemed typical of another era: that, at certain moments, the entire economy can become part of the front. From that perspective, it is not yet a total conversion as in the Second World War, but it is a change of mentality that brings civil industry to military effort much more directly. In that sense, current wars are not only redefining the battlefield, but also the role of factories, which are once again placed at the center of strategy as if history were slowly turning backwards. First it was Volkswagen in Germanyand now it’s your turn to Cadillac in the United States. Image | Picryl, Dave Parker In Xataka | Not only has the US just lost the “eye” that Hormuz watched, its nuclear aircraft carrier is in Africa for fear of being shot down In Xataka | The US did not make ends meet in Iran by launching thousands of missiles a month. So let’s move on to plan B: humans.

shoot down missiles for less than a million dollars

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A single advanced interceptor missile can cost more than dozens of drones of combined attack, and in Ukraine and Iran several have been launched to neutralize a single threat. This imbalance has led to situations where protecting a target becomes too much more expensive than attacking it. Therefore, in modern warfare, the key is no longer just who has the best weapons, but who can sustain their use without going bankrupt. The paradigm shift. For decades, intercepting a ballistic missile has been one of the most expensive operations in modern warfare, with systems like the patriot forcing the firing of two or three interceptors worth several million dollars each to ensure a kill. This model has worked in limited conflicts, but recent wars have shown its limits when the volume of threats grows massively. So much in Ukraine as in the Middle Eastair defense has become a cost battle where the attacker launches cheaply and the defender responds expensively. In that context, the idea of ​​shooting down missiles for less than a million dollars is not an incremental improvement, but a radical change in the rules of the game. Ukraine and logic. Since the 2022 invasion, Ukraine has developed a military industry based on economic efficiency, producing drones and missiles at a fraction of the cost of traditional Western systems. Companies like Fire Point They have transferred that philosophy to air defense, proposing a system capable of intercepting ballistic missiles at a much lower cost than the current one. The objective is quite clear: break the bottleneck of extremely expensive operators and systems, and allow a scalable defense in volume. This logic, moreover, comes directly from the battlefield, where survival depends on both effectiveness and cost per unit. The goal: below one million. The goal of intercepting a missile below the million dollar threshold It means attacking the core of the current strategic problem, where each defense costs more than the attack it tries to neutralize. Yes Ukraine achieve this milestone in 2027as indicated this week, would change the economic equation of air warfare, making it viable to respond to massive attacks without quickly depleting resources. Not only that. Even with somewhat lower success rates than systems like the Patriot, simply being able to launch more interceptors at a lower cost could make up that difference. In practice, it would mean that defense would cease to be a scarce resource and become something replicable on a large scale. The context: saturation and scarcity. Let us think that the war in Ukraine and the Iranian attacks in the Gulf have shown a common problem: the shortage of advanced systems and the impossibility of maintaining the rate of consumption. Patriot missiles They are limited, expensive and slow to produce, while threats (whether drones, missiles or swarms) can be manufactured and launched in large quantities. This imbalance has put powers with enormous military budgets in check, forcing them to prioritize objectives and accept vulnerabilities. In that scenario, a cheaper solution is not only desirable, but necessary to sustain any prolonged defense. The global implications. Here may be the real one crux of that announced advance. If Ukraine manages to develop this system, the impact would go far beyond the current front, generating a global demand between countries that cannot afford multi-billion dollar defense systems. This, a priori, would democratize access to air defense, allowing more actors to protect their space without depending exclusively on the United States or limited systems such as the European SAMP/T. Furthermore, it would alter the strategic balance, since it would reduce the effectiveness of attacks based on saturation and volume. In other words, it would make it much harder to win a war simply by launching more missiles. The new balance. Therefore, the real change is not only in the price, but in reversing the economic logic of the conflict, which indicates that defending is no longer more expensive than attacking. If that point is reach next yearmany current strategies would lose meaning, from the massive use of drones to saturation bombings. From that perspective, Ukraine would be on the verge of achieving something truly unprecedented in modern military history, redefining the relationship between cost and power in the war. And that, more than any specific weapon, aims to mark the future of conflicts. Image | Fire Point In Xataka | Ukraine is close to achieving a milestone that no one has achieved: building the largest drone industry without China’s help In Xataka | Thousands of cigarette butts are crossing into Russia without Ukraine being able to do anything. Their goal: to become missiles

cigarette filters that become missiles

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Every year there are million tons of cellulose derivatives around the world, and some of them share a characteristic little known to the general public: they can be used in both everyday products and high-energy industrial applications. The uncomfortable discovery. A research in Ukraine has found a whole plot that passes through the European industry and ends up arming Russia: that of cigarette filters that end up converted in Moscow missilesan invisible chain that connects civilian industries to the war front. Just like explain at workthe key is not in sophisticated pieces or prohibited technology, but in something much more everyday and difficult to control, a seemingly innocuous chemical material that crosses legal and commercial borders until it ends up integrated into weapons that hit cities. The disturbing thing here is not only the route, but how easy it is to hide it within global trade. The key: a civil component with a double life. At the center of everything is the cellulose acetatea derivative widely used in cigarette filters, but also essential in the manufacture of propellants and rocket fuels. Russia lacks capacity to produce it on a large scale with the necessary quality, which forces it to depend on imports even in the middle of the war. This apparently minor technical detail reveals a structural vulnerability: Without this compound, a good part of its arms industry (from cruise missiles to guided bombs or anti-aircraft systems) cannot be sustained. Cigarette Filter Cellulose Acetate The hidden chain. The material path is as complex as it is effective: European companies sell the product to intermediaries in the tobacco sector, a previous step by which they introduce it into Russia as civilian merchandise and, from there, other companies redirect it to the military industry. This fragmented system, where each actor fulfills a different function, dilutes responsibilities and makes it difficult track final destination. In fact, we already have a few months ago something similar happened with Chinese components for the construction of combat drones. The result is a multilevel network in which importers, distributors and front companies allow a legal product to end up in key facilities of the Russian military complex. The final point: from chemical factory to Kalibr missile. Everything seems to converge in facilities like the Perm gunpowder planta critical node in the production of missiles such as the Kalibr modelused on a recurring basis against Ukrainian infrastructure and cities. Internal investigation documents show that these centers explicitly depend on foreign materials due to the lack of national equivalents, confirming that the chain is not accidental, but rather necessary. Thus, tons of a product associated with everyday consumption end up being transformed in part of the system that drives high precision weapons. A systemic problem. Not only that. The case exposes a profound limitation (one more) of the international sanctions regime: banning military components is relatively simple, but controlling dual-use products integrated into global trade chains is much more difficult. Russia has been able to adaptusing third countries, trade networks and regulatory loopholes to keep supplies flowing. In this context, war ceases to be an isolated phenomenon and becomes intertwined with international tradewhere the border between the civil and the military becomes increasingly blurred. The final paradox. If you like, the most revealing thing is not that these materials reach Russia, but that keep doing it despite years of sanctions and surveillance. The dependence on foreign products persists, but so does the inability to block them completely, which again and again raises the same uncomfortable paradox: while attempts are made to isolate Moscow, part of the global economic system continues to indirectly feed its war machine. In that gray space, between legality, carelessness and deliberate design, is where it seems that another less visible but less visible battle is being fought. just as decisive. Image | Vitalykuzmin.net, Akroti In Xataka | Neither drones nor missiles nor AI, the war in Ukraine has turned a vehicle from 1950 into a key piece: the M113 In Xataka | While everyone was looking at Iran, a drone has made a hole so big that it seems impossible to cover it: the one in the roof of Chernobyl

Neither drones nor missiles nor AI, the war in Ukraine has turned a vehicle from 1950 into a key piece: the M113

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Some of the most produced military vehicles in history exceed 80,000 units manufactured and remain in service in dozens of countries decades after their design. In many cases, their longevity is not due to their power, but to something much simpler: that they simply work, are easy to repair, and never completely disappear. An unexpected veteran. While the algorithms and drones freelancers starred on all the covers of war innovationsin recent times the war in Ukraine has turned in key piece to a vehicle from the 1950s as it was the M113and that says much more about the conflict than any next-generation system. On a battlefield dominated by advanced technology, this armored transport has resurfaced not because it is the most powerful, but because it fits better than anyone else in a war of attrition where the important thing is not sophistication, but the ability to resist, move and continue operating day after day. Simple wins. The M113 was designed for another timebut its qualities (mobility, mechanical simplicity and ease of production) make it have converted surprisingly effective in Ukraine. The reason: in an environment saturated with drones and artillery, where any vehicle can be destroyed in seconds, the key is not so much to survive everything as to be able to be repaired quickly and return to the front. Its ability to operate off-road, transport troops or even drones and adapt with improvised protections makes it a versatile tool in a conflict where conditions are constantly changing. Drones and the rules. The truth is that the proliferation of drones has reduced the usefulness of many traditional systems, including heavy tanks, forcing both sides to rethink how they move and fight. In this context, the M113 does not stand out for its weapons, but for its logistical function: carry soldiers, equipment or drones to forward positions. War, from that perspective, is no longer decided so much by direct fire, but by who manages to best position their resources in an environment monitored from the air, and there this vehicle fits perfectly. Russian “Giga Turtle” captured by Ukrainians Meanwhile, Russia adapts in its own way. On the other side of the front, in recent weeks Russia has attempted to respond with radically different solutions, such as the return of called “giga turtle”in essence, over-armored versions of tanks designed to resist drone attacks. Huge and slow, these machines prioritize protection over mobility, making them easier targets despite their toughness. His reappearance reflects the same conclusion that has been imposed on the battlefield: vehicles are still necessary, but they must adapt to a constant threat from the air. War of attrition and quantity. Ultimately, the success of the M113 It also has to do with something much more basic: that there is a glarge amount of stock available for these models. Thousands of units produced over decades allow Ukraine to quickly replace losses in a war where attrition is brutal. In other words, compared to more expensive and scarce modern systems, this vehicle offers something essential for the fight: continuity. In an extremely slow conflict that is already measured in years, it is not whoever has the most advanced weapon who wins, but whoever can continue fighting the longest. The real change is conceptual. If you like, all this points to a deeper conclusion: the war in Ukraine is not necessarily rewarding the newest, but rather the most useful in an extreme context. AND the M113 symbolizes this change like few others, where cutting-edge technology coexists with solutions from another era that they still work because they respond better to the real needs of combat. In a scenario dominated by drones, sensors and constant fire, the key is not so much to reinvent warfare, but to adapt to it, even if that means returning to vehicles designed more than half a century ago. Image | Armed Forces In Xataka | While everyone was looking at Iran, a drone has made a hole so big that it seems impossible to cover it: the one in the roof of Chernobyl In Xataka | Russia is building its largest warship in the Black Sea. You know it, we know it and the Ukrainian drones know it

You’ve probably never heard of urea. The missiles in Iran are destroying their production, and that will affect your food

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At the beginning of the 20th century, the world feared it would run out of food because crops were not growing enough to feed a growing population. The solution came from chemistry: an industrial process capable of manufacturing artificial nutrients for plants and multiplying crops across the planet. Today, this invisible system supports much of what reaches our plates, but it also depends on a global chain. surprisingly fragile. The invisible substance that feeds us. We already said it in the headline, you may not know urea. However, this chemical compound is one of the silent pillars of modern agriculture. It is nitrogen fertilizer most used in the world and indirectly responsible for approximately half of global food production. Its function is simple but crucial: providing nitrogen to crops so they can grow quickly and produce larger harvests. To give us an idea, approximately half of global food production depends on synthetic fertilizers. nitrogen basedand urea is the most widespread of all. Without it, agricultural yields would fall abruptly, which would directly affect products as basic as wheat, corn or rice. The Gulf and fertilizers. It happens that a large part of this global agricultural system depends on a very specific region of the planet: the Persian Gulf. The Middle East is home to some of the largest plants of fertilizer production in the world and is also a key source of raw materials necessary to manufacture them, such as ammonia or sulfur. Furthermore, the Strait of Hormuz has become an essential artery for this trade. between one quarter and a third of the world’s traffic of raw materials for fertilizers passes through this maritime passage, along with approximately 35% of global urea exports and 45% of sulfur trade. A war that hits the food chain. The military escalation in Iran and the attacks around the Strait of Hormuz are starting to interrupt that delicate system. Maritime traffic through the area has been drastically reduced and several ships have been attacked, while industrial facilities in the Gulf have suffered direct damage. In Qatar, one of the largest fertilizer facilities in the world had to stop your production after a drone attack, while Iran has paralyzed its own ammonia production. Every missile in the Iran war is not only destroying its production, it brings us a little closer to a dystopian future scenario. Urea sample in the form of granules The domino effect of urea. When the supply of fertilizers such as urea is interrupted, the impact soon spreads to the food system. If farmers cannot apply enough fertilizer, the ccrops produce less. Some experts estimate that the lack of fertilizers could reduce harvests by up to 50% in the first affected agricultural cycle. This decline would quickly translate in price increases in basic foods. Bread could become more expensive in a matter of weeks, while derived products such as eggs, chicken or pork would do so months later, as the increase in the cost of animal feed is passed on to the entire food chain. Gas, the hidden ingredient. The manufacture of nitrogen fertilizers also depends on another key factor: natural gas. Between 60% and 80% of the cost of producing fertilizers comes from the gas used in the chemical process that transforms atmospheric nitrogen into compounds usable by plants. With the war driving up energy prices and damaging industrial infrastructure, the cost of production skyrockets even before fertilizers reach the market. In a few days, the international price of urea has risen more than 25%reaching levels close to 625 dollars per ton. Risk of global food crisis. I remembered the financial times that the situation also comes at a particularly delicate moment in the agricultural calendar. In much of the northern hemisphere, farmers are starting the season spring planting, when they buy and apply the fertilizers that will determine the year’s crops. If the Strait of Hormuz disruption lasts more than a few weeks, the impact could extend far beyond energy or maritime trade. Thus, what today seems like a localized geopolitical crisis could transform into something much deeper: a global food shock reminiscent of (or even surpassing) the one that occurred after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. In that scenario, the war in Iran would not only be fought with missiles and drones, but also in the fields of crops half the planet. Image | liz west, nara, LHcheM, eutrophication&hypoxia In Xataka | Iran is directing its attacks where it knows it hurts the West: energy and data centers In Xataka | In 2022, the gas crisis skyrocketed the price of electricity in Spain. In 2026 we have a “green shield” but also a serious problem

If the question is how much of Europe is within range of Iran’s missiles, the answer is simple: a fairly large

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In recent decades, the missile range It has become a silent measure of a country’s strategic power. Every few hundred kilometers added to their radius of action change not only technical maps, but also political calculations, alliances and perceptions of security. In this game of distances, Europe already it doesn’t appear that far away as before. From 1,300 to 3,000 km. It we count yesterday. Iran has built its deterrence on a missile family medium range (the Shahab-3, Sejjil, GhadrEmad or Khorramshahr) with ranges that start at 1,300 kilometers and are around 2,000–2,500 kilometers in most configurations, although certain variants of the Khorramshahr could approach 3,000 if they reduce payload. That threshold is what changes the European map, and the reason is very simple. With 2,000 kilometers, the eastern Mediterranean and southeastern Europe are clearly within the radiusand with 3,000, the arc of threat extends into the heart of the continent. The difference, therefore, is not technical, it is strategic. The eastern Mediterranean. Cyprus has been the clearest sign that the border is no longer theoretical. British bases of Akrotiri and Dhekeliaused as logistics and aerial projection nodes, are fully within range of both ballistic missiles and long-range drones such as the Shahed-136. In fact, Greece enters in the same arch, with Souda Bay in Crete within 2,300–2,400 kilometers from Iran. Athens, Sofia and Bucharest are among the capitals that fit comfortably within the 2,000 kilometer radius. Türkiye and Iraq: the exposed belt. Türkiye is located in the first critical strip. Incirlik, just over 1,000 kilometers from Tehran, is high value target for its role in allied architecture and its link to the nuclear sharing scheme. Kürecik, with its AN/TPY-2 radar, is the forward “eye” of the anti-missile shield and therefore a logical target in any prior suppression scenario. In Iraq, bases like Ain al-Asad or Erbil, in addition to the NATO mission in Baghdad, are not only within ballistic range, but also in the radius of drones and networks of militias supported by Tehran. Central Europe: the gray area. When the second and third arcs of the map are projected, cities appear like Budapest, Vienna or Bratislava on the periphery of the estimated range. Bucharest clearly enters the range of 2,000–2,500 kilometers, which places the base Aegis Ashore of Deveselu in a sensitive position within the maximum Iranian perimeter. If Khorramshahr really reached 3,000 kilometers, and that remains to be seen, the threat contour would touch cities like Berlin and Rome. Of course, just another hypothesis, but the pressure is expanding from the eastern flank towards the political center of Europe. The pieces of the shield and their limits. The Aegis Ashore system in Romaniathe one located in Poland and the Arleigh Burke destroyers in the Mediterranean they form the backbone of defense against Middle Eastern vectors. Germany, furthermore, has added the Arrow 3 system to reinforce its upper interception layer. However, any attack would have to fly over monitored airspace. like Türkiye, Iraq or Syriawhich adds operational complexity and interception windows. The shield exists, there is no doubt, but it does not eliminate the risk equation. Drones and saturation. Impossible to ignore it. Beyond ballistic missiles, Iran has turned attack drones into strategic multipliers. With ranges of up to 2,000–2,500 kilometers and costs much lower than missiles, they can be launched in waves to wear down defenses. Its previous use against British facilities in Cyprus demonstrates that the geographical barrier is no longer an automatic shield. The combination of expensive and cheap systems complicates defense. Underground and asymmetrical doctrine. As we count yesterday, the construction of “underground cities” to store and manufacture missiles is part of a strategy designed to compensate for the absence of a modern air force in Iran. Since 1979, sanctions pushed Tehran to invest in rockets, tunnels and technological alliances with other states, turning the missile into your main tool of deterrence. This asymmetric logic does not seek to equal the West in air and sea, but rather to impose cost and vulnerability from land. What changes strategically. As long as the effective range remains around 2,000 kilometers, the threat is mainly concentrated in the eastern Mediterranean and southeast Europe. If the actual ceiling is close to 3,000 km, the european political map enters the calculation. The difference between 2,400 and 3,000 kilometers is not a technical nuance, because it is the line that separates the periphery of the continental core. In that margin, a priori, the perception of risk for European capitals and the credibility of allied deterrence are at stake. Image | Mahdi Marizad, Defense Intelligence Agency, Mehr News Agency In Xataka | The arrival of the B-2s to Iran can only mean one thing: the search for the greatest threat to the United States has begun In Xataka | Iran has just attacked a base in Europe: the paradox of Spain is that it condemns the war, but the US does not need to ask to use its bases

14,000 Spaniards live in Dubai. Not everyone is fleeing from the Treasury, but everyone is equally terrified of the missiles

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The Iranian attacks against the Arab Emirates in retaliation for the US and Israeli offensive have trapped thousands of Spaniards in Dubai, including content creators and celebrities who denounced their situation on the networks. And under the missile fire, a paradox: the city that promised security and zero taxes has been suffering for two days from an attack that could have devastating economic consequences. Spaniards in Dubai. After the attack by the United States and Israel on Iran On February 28, the response consisted of a wave of retaliation with 137 missiles and 209 drones directed against the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain and other positions with a US military presence in the Gulf. The region’s airspace closed and tens of thousands of people were left without flights. Among them, Spaniards like Ofelia Hentschel, a MasterChef 9 contestant and content creator who released videos that, due to their content, quickly went viral. in them explained that, while on vacation in Dubai, he had begun to hear “bombs and tremors in the hotel” while sunbathing by the pool, and that air traffic was paralyzed. What made his case spread in an extraordinary way was that he claimed that the Spanish embassy “does not speak, does not answer”, while Italian and French citizens were receiving a response from their diplomatic representations. Frustration led her to the phrase “Stop paying taxes, because as you see they are of no use.” Ah, the irony. Hentschel is located in one of the favorite destinations of those have moved their tax residence outside of Spain precisely so as not to contribute to the taxes whose effect she now needed. This was not necessarily the case (Hentschel was awayis not a resident of the Emirates) but the phrase once again triggered a debate that already existed: that of the limits of reciprocity between the citizen who pays more taxes for having more income and the State. Less than 24 hours laternow calmer, Hentschel commented that she had been contacted by the embassy and that she felt “super supported by Spain.” More Spanish. Hentschel’s case was the most covered in the media, but not the only one. The Cordoba paddler Javi Garrido was in Dubai with his girlfriend and his coach, finalizing the preparation for the Gijón paddle tennis tournament. Garrido opted for a different tone than Hentschel, with a message of calm to his followers, where he spoke of the desire to return “as soon as possible.” His profile (elite athlete in the middle of preseason) points to another segment of the large group of Spaniards who at that time were in the Emirates for reasons that have nothing to do with tax evasion. It is also the case of Hugo KyotoSpanish who makes videos about investment and personal economy. Kyoto is closer to the profile that has been criticized: resident in Dubai, with content about money and investments and that the media noise identifies with those who settle there in search of tax advantages. Spanish expats. The Spanish community in the United Arab Emirates has grown steadily over the last decade. According to data from the Spanish Embassy in Abu Dhabi The Consular Registration Registry had 8,500 registered in 2024, although ambassador Íñigo de Palacio’s own estimates suggest that the real number could be closer to 14,000, given that around 38% of residents are not registered. Between 2022 and 2023, 404 new Spanish residents were registered, and between 2023 and 2024 that figure almost doubleduntil reaching 722. Among them, executives displaced by multinationals, engineers in infrastructure projects, airline and hospitality staff, and also a segment of content creators and digital entrepreneurs, undoubtedly the most in the media (and criticized). The real profile of the Spanish expat in Dubai is mostly work-related. In addition to that, the tax reality is more complex than simply transferring residence to the Emirates, which does not guarantee the end of tax obligations in Spain. The Double Taxation Agreement between both countries, signed in Abu Dhabi in 2006, establishes that only Emirati nationals can benefit from the status of tax residents in the UAE, and the tax authorities of the Emirates themselves They do not issue tax residence certificates for stays of less than twelve months. Influencers in danger. The attack has not exclusively affected Spaniards, and content creators from different nationalities They have reacted with a mixture of disbelief and terror to the attacks. The city that has been sold on numerous occasions as a synonym for safe luxury has shown this weekend in its skies the luminous trail of intercepted missiles. Dubai’s illusion of invulnerability has fractured in a few hours. Beyond the war. All this leads us to the fact that the logic of Iranian retaliation transcends the military. Tehran was targeting not only US military installations, but also the economic architecture of the region: the financial and logistical hubs of the Gulf that for three decades have functioned as a lever for the order that the US and Israel want to preserve. The attack on the Jebel Ali port, the Dubai international airport or the financial districts of Abu Dhabi are more than planned. They are not collateral damage. That’s why, with 88% of its GDP generated by expats, tourism, finance, aviation and maritime transport, a deterioration in the perception of security can produce a flight of these economic assets in the form of influencers and visitors. Dubai and Abu Dhabi had converted their security and stability on the basis of its attractiveness, and the Iranian missiles brought out such accurate tweets like that of investor TK Robinson in X: “I moved to Qatar to escape taxes; now I’m fleeing missiles.” Header | Darcey Beau in Unsplash

It has Taiwan in front of it and Japan is going to fill it with missiles

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At the westernmost tip of Japan there is a paradise place where, on clear days, you can see another territory from the coast. It is the same enclave where they live more native horses than school-age children. That isolated corner, for decades outside the big headlines, has begun to occupy an unexpected space in the strategic conversations of the Indo-Pacific. Also to become in a fort. A red line. That island has become the new red line against China. The reason? Japan will deploy missiles 100 km from Taiwan. In this way, Yonaguni, the westernmost point of the Japanese archipelago, has gone from being a remote enclave in just a few years. a centerpiece of the Indo-Pacific strategic board. Its location, at the end of the Nansei island chainplaces it right in the geographic arc that connects the East China Sea with the Western Pacific, the same corridor that worries Tokyo and Washington facing a possible conflict in the Taiwan Strait. The calendar changes. A few hours ago, Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi set for the first time a very specific horizon: before March 2031, a set of surface-to-air missile medium range, projectiles with 360 degree coverage capacity and the possibility of intercepting multiple targets simultaneously. The decision is not isolated, but is part of the strategic turn started in 2022 to reinforce defenses on the southwestern islands, shifting the historical focus from Russia to growing Chinese military activity in the East China Sea. The diplomatic context and Chinese pressure. The announcement also comes after months of deterioration between Tokyo and Beijingaggravated by the statements of Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi about the possible Japanese involvement if there was an attack on the island of Taiwan that represented an existential threat for the nation. China’s response It was devastatingresponding with trade restrictions, diplomatic pressure and a battery of military demonstrations that, how do we countincluded drone flights and an increased naval presence in the area, while maintaining its claim to Taiwan and its dispute with Japan through the Senkaku Islandsadministered by Tokyo but claimed by Beijing as Diaoyu. The internal transformation. Since 2016, the island has hosted a surveillance unit coastal with about 160 troops, to which electronic warfare capabilities and new military infrastructure will be added. In a community of barely 1,500 inhabitants, where depopulation has been a constant since the postwar period, the presence of military personnel and their families alters the structure demographic and economicgenerating a division between those who see militarization as an investment opportunity and those who fear that the enclave will become a priority objective in the event of conflict. From peripheral paradise to strategic bastion. From that perspective, the expansion of the base, the plans to improve the airport and port and the possible installation of advanced defense systems They consolidate Yonaguni as a key link in the Japanese deterrence architecture. What for decades was a marginal territory is now integrated into a defensive network designed to complicate any attempt to alter the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, sending a clear message about even where is it arranged Japan to arrive to protect what it considers its most sensitive front. The new map. If you will also, the Yonaguni decision reflects a broader transformation in Japanese defense policy, one underpinned by a historic increase of the military budget and the security treaty with the United States, which could drag Tokyo into a larger scale regional conflict. What is clear afterto official statement of Tokyo is that, on the new strategic map of the Indo-Pacific, the small island is no longer a lost point in the ocean: it is the place where Japan has decided mark your limit and where any future crisis could have its first warning signal. Image | GetArchivejpatokal In Xataka | The Japanese island of Yonaguni was known for its beauty and Bad Bunny. Now it is a military fortress because of Taiwan In Xataka | Satellite images leave no doubt: China has concentrated thousands of fishing boats off Japan, and its idea is not to fish

“We didn’t expect this.” A Ukrainian drone has revealed a Russian arsenal in a warehouse, and the surprise has been huge: the missiles are animals

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From the early stages of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, when tanks were advancing while logistics columns were bogged down and fuel was scarce, the war began to reveal an uncomfortable paradox: the more modern it became in the skies, more “medieval” It was done on the ground. In fact, in that space where drones, satellites and trenches coexist, the return of solutions from the past apparently overcome was an early sign that the conflict was going to be, above all, a test of resistance. The latest Ukrainian discovery has confirmed that the wear and tear is tremendous. The return of the war of attrition. The irony is that the war in Ukraine has been shedding any illusion of modernity to return, as the days go by, to brutal logic of wear, one in which the quantity and capacity to take losses They weigh more than any technological “game changer”, and where the Russian army, pressured by the massive consumption of material and men, is beginning to show obvious signs of logistical exhaustion. On the southern and eastern front, the shortage of armored vehicles and modern systems is no longer hidden with silence, but is manifest in improvised solutions reminiscent of conflicts from another era and centuries, while Moscow insists on maintaining constant pressure on Ukrainian defenses at any cost. Cavalry in the 21st century. This wear and tear became visible at the beginning of 2026 when Ukrainian units detected and neutralized Russian assaults carried out on horseback, a tactic that seemed banished from modern warfare but that reappeared in sectors such as Oleskiivka in response to lack of means conventional. We are talking about small assault groups that advanced mounted, supported by prior reconnaissance, in infiltration attempts that ended up being aborted by drones and fire defensive, leaving such an absurd image (and repeated) as revealing: many horses survived, but the soldiers did not, and the Russian army confirmed that it was willing to resort to any available resources to sustain its offensive. The drone and the impossible arsenal. Now, the scene What finally condensed this drift came several weeks later, when a Ukrainian drone sneaked through the destroyed roof of a hidden warehouse, several kilometers from the line of contact, with the usual expectation of finding ammunition, fuel or military vehicles. What happened gives an idea of ​​these four years of slow war that has worn down both sides. Instead of artillery and technology to advance, the camera showed something that looked like something out of a rural garage: aging civilian cars, motorcycles from another era, and saddled horses, an “arsenal” as unexpected as it is eloquent of the state of the war in many areas. The message. “We didn’t expect to see this. It was really unusual,” said the drone pilot. to the Insider mediumspeaking on condition that he only be identified by his callsign “Cosmos.” “We were hoping to find some armored vehicles,” he added. He video It went viral because it summarized in seconds the real state of Russian logistics, but also because it demonstrated that those animals were not an isolated anecdote, but part of a system that already uses cheap and expendable media to move and attack under the constant threat of drones. Russia and the logic of sacrifice. For the Ukrainian commanders, this discovery is neither trivial nor a simple curiosity, but rather proof of a way of waging war based on accepting massive losses of material and personnel, replacing armored by civilian cars and horses because they are easier to replace. This logic, which prioritizes the attrition of the enemy, even if the cost is enormous, explains why Moscow continues to advance slowly, launching assaults with many times obsolete or improvised in regions such as Donbas, even when the monthly casualty figures, according to NATOreach levels that are difficult to sustain. If you will, the drone that expected to find missiles and found animals ended up portraying, better than any report, a war that moves backwards while consuming everything at hand. Image | 82nd Air Assault Brigade, State Border Guard Service of Ukraine In Xataka | It is evident that Russia can absorb thousands and thousands of casualties. So Ukraine is already designing a much riskier plan In Xataka | An unprecedented experiment is happening in Ukraine: bombs have turned dogs into other animals

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