The United States promised to be very happy manufacturing its own chips. Nvidia just spent 150 billion in Taiwan

Houston, we have a problem. A couple of days ago the CEO of Nvidia stood on the stage at Computex in Taipei and said an inconvenient truth for the United States: “Taiwan is the epicenter of the AI ​​revolution. This is where chips and packaging are made. This is where systems are created. This is where AI supercomputers were created.” The setting was Computex 2026, Asia’s biggest tech event, and it wasn’t a compliment to the host, it’s a real depiction of how the industry works. It may sound paradoxical for an American company and at a time when The United States wants to reindustrialize with chipsbut he needs it. It is a structural issue. The harsh reality of profitability. Nvidia plans spend 150,000 million dollars a year in Taiwan, much more than the 100,000 million they spend now and with an abysmal difference compared to the 10,000 and 15,000 million five years ago. If it sounds silly, it’s because it is, but so is its billing: in the first fiscal quarter of 2026 billed 81.6 billion dollars, 85% more than the previous year in that same period. Also its benefit it’s already going off the charts: 58.3 billion, more than triple compared to the same period last year. That this money goes to Taiwan and not to the United States is due to technical and objective issues: Taiwan produces 90% of the most advanced chips in the world, according to a study by the Stimson Center. Of that Taiwanese production, TSMC controls 70% and is going to invest between 52,000 and 56,000 million this year. Bottom line: If Nvidia wants cutting-edge manufacturing capability, it has to be there. Why is it important. The best way to see it is to put Vera Rubin on the table, who In Huang’s words it is “probably the biggest product launch in Taiwan’s history.” Each system contains about two million parts and is assembled with 150 suppliers, almost all Taiwanese. This mechanism is not assembled by decree or in a legislature: it requires years and putting billions of dollars on the table. There is no factory in Arizona that can do something like this at least until 2030. Constellation will be Nvidia’s new headquarters in Taipei and will come to stay permanently: 4,000 engineering professionals will work in that center that according to Huang It will be operational by 2030. It is no longer that it buys in Taiwan, it is that the most valuable semiconductor company in the world is building the heart of its R&D in that core, an island 10,000 kilometers from the United States. A splash of cold water on Trump’s aspirations. Context. In January 2026, Taiwanese companies they committed to invest $250 billion in semiconductors and AI in the United States, as part of a trade agreement with Washington. Because Taiwan and the US are a symbiosis: each needs the other to maintain its position in the race for AI. The investment of a private company like Nvidia is another expression of this pact. In fact, Nvidia is not the only one: AMD is doing exactly the same: associate with Taiwanese manufacturers such as ASE, SPIL and Wiwynn with their Helios AI platform on the horizon (expected for the second half of 2026). That the two largest AI chip designers in the world strengthen ties with Taiwan is confirmation that the island’s industry is strategically necessary for the entire industry, not a particular bet by one firm. The elephant in the room: China. China’s role in this story is twofold: it is a threat and also a client. According to Reutersin 2026 Chinese companies have placed orders for more than two million units of the H200. Trade restrictions have made the operation difficult, but they have not been able to prevent it. One of the last cases point upon the arrival of a shipment of Nvidia AI chips to China via Japan. Nvidia lives in a contradiction from which it cannot escape: Its supply chain is on an island that China considers its own. China, which is its largest potential market, is blocked. Washington prohibits him from selling to Beijing while asking for independence from Taipei. And judging by his statements, Jensen Huang has bet everything on continuing to walk that wire. Yes, but. The Nvidia CEO forgot one problem in his speech: Taiwan makes the overwhelming majority of the world’s most advanced chips, but TSMC’s diversification into Arizona, Japan and Germany will not be ready before 2028 at best. That is to say, there are almost four years ahead in which Nvidia depends totally on Taiwan, a country that matters 97% of your energy. Furthermore, the atmosphere in the Strait of the same name is increasingly heated. Concentrating the production of its most critical component in a geographically hot spot is dangerous to say the least: if something explodes, there is no plan B. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has reminded us of this the hard way. In Xataka | Huawei has found a way to counteract US sanctions: overcoming Moore’s Law In Xataka | US companies have always had a hard time making a lot of money in China. One industry is the exception: chips Cover | freepik and Jimmy Liao

Argentina and Taiwan have hundreds of Chinese fishing boats in front of them. And no one has cast their nets into the sea to fish

In January 2026, a NASA satellite captured off the Argentine coast a strange image: a huge luminous spot floating in the middle of the South Atlantic, so bright that it looked like a city that had suddenly appeared on the ocean. From the ground nothing could be seen, but from space, however, it was impossible to ignore it. The new floating wall. Last February we count what was seen through satellites, and since then it has not stopped repeating itself. For years, the world assumed that Chinese fishing boats were just that: boats dedicated to fishing. In 2026 that perception is changing rapidly. From the South China Sea to the South Atlantic, different governments are observing the same phenomenon: enormous chinese civil fleets remaining for weeks in strategic areas without clear fishing activity. To be more exact, Argentina and Taiwan, separated by half a planet, now face a surprisingly similar situation: hundreds of Chinese vessels off their coasts whose function seems to go far beyond catching fish. What is disturbing is not only their presence, but the growing suspicion that Beijing is using apparently civilian ships like tools permanent geopolitical pressure and maritime surveillance. Get paid to occupy the sea. I counted last April the ABC chain that investigations into the so-called Chinese “maritime militia” have shown the extent to which Beijing has professionalized this strategy. In the South China Sea, many ships receive state subsidies simply by staying in certain disputed areas. The crews spend entire days at anchor, with hardly any fishing activity, while they help consolidate the Chinese presence around reefs, maritime routes or foreign military exercises such as Balikatan. For Western analysts, the goal is clear: physically saturate the sea with civilian vessels to intimidate rivals without the need to directly deploy traditional military units. Taiwan discovers that anyone can be a problem. The pressure on Taiwan has made this tactic much more visible. This same month of May, Taipei expelled to the Chinese scientific vessel Tongji after detecting suspicious operations near the island. Officially he was carrying out oceanographic studies, but Taiwanese authorities suspect that collected strategic information on the seabed and nearby waters. The incident reflected the great problem what Taiwan faces: It is already difficult to distinguish between civil ships, scientific ships, coast guard ships or military support platforms. That is why the island has even begun to adapt its coast guard patrol vessels to carry anti-ship missiles and act as part of national defense in the event of conflict. Argentina sees the same pattern. Also in May, Reuters reported an extensive report. Thousands of kilometers from Asia, Argentina has been observing another enormous concentration of Chinese ships in front of its waters for years. Every season, about 200 fishing boats illuminate the South Atlantic during squid fishing, forming a gigantic floating city visible from space. Although they officially carry out legal fishing activity outside the Argentine EEZ, Washington and part of the Argentine defense apparatus suspect that many of these vessels could be gathering intelligencemapping the seabed or measuring local surveillance capacity. The context makes the issue especially sensitive for a reason: the area is close to the Strait of Magellan and the access to Antarctica, two strategic areas of enormous geopolitical value. Master the sea without shooting. For its part, China denies that there is any military use of these fleets and maintains that their ships act according to the law international. However, it is becoming evident to many countries that Beijing has found a very effective way to expand its maritime influence without resorting to open war. In other words, the real change does not seem to be in the Chinese destroyers or aircraft carriers, but in the ability to bind a huge number of civilian ships in the ocean until the border between fishing, surveillance or strategic intimidation becomes unrecognizable. Meanwhile, Argentina and Taiwan are already seeing the same reality: one where there are hundreds of Chinese boats off its coast, and with each passing day it seems more strange that everyone has gone there so as not to cast their fishing nets. Image | CSIS/AMTI/Vantor In Xataka | Satellite images leave no doubt: China has concentrated thousands of fishing boats off Japan In Xataka | China’s best weapon doesn’t fire a single bullet: 300km ‘moving wall’ to close sea routes instantly

The big question behind the US visit to Beijing is not Taiwan. They are two Chinese SUVs with roofs that have fired the imagination

The scene took place in 2018, during a military parade in Moscow. So several Western analysts spent hours trying to identify a strange russian truck covered by tarps and antennas of which no one offered explanations. Years later it was learned that it was part of one of the systems electronic warfare most advanced in the Kremlin. Since then, every rare vehicle that appears near a world leader has ceased to seem like a simple logistical eccentricity. Two SUVs and an uncomfortable question. For years, American presidential visits to Beijing revolved around the same topics: Taiwan, trade, sanctions or the military balance in Asia. However, they had TWZ analysts that in Donald Trump’s recent visit there was a detail that ended up attracting much more attention among military analysts and technological observers: two Chinese Hongqi SUVs with huge modified roofs that seemed to hide some kind of special system. They were not particularly elegant or discreet. In fact, they seemed heavy and strange. That is precisely why they attracted so much attention. The feeling they left is that China wanted teach something without showing it really. The big question after the trip was no longer just what Washington and Beijing had talked about, but what the hell exactly those vehicles were hiding. Modern warfare and protecting the sky. The most repeated theory links to something that we have been countingand these roofs could house electronic warfare systems, advanced communications or even anti-drone capabilities. The idea makes sense because the presidential caravans begin to face a relatively new problem: cheap drones capable of threatening even extremely protected world leaders. Ukraine, the Middle East and the Red Sea have shown that it no longer takes a sophisticated missile to create a huge security problem. That’s it forcing to transform VIP convoys in small fortresses mobile electronics. The Hongqi seen in Beijing fit perfectly in that trend: lots of interior space, extra weight and modifications probably designed to transport complex equipment rather than people. Caravan converted into a command center. The interesting thing is that those SUVs were not an isolated anomaly. The caravan also included Modified Suburbans, Lincoln Navigators, and Ford vans with antennas, sensors, and special roof structures. Everything suggested a mobile architecture of communications, surveillance and electronic interference much more sophisticated than usual. In practice, presidential convoys are beginning to look less like simple armored columns and more to command centers capable of operating in environments saturated with drones, electronic signals and autonomous threats. Not only that. Analysts recalled that China also used Hongqi vehicles, a brand very historically linked to Chinese political power, reinforces another important idea: Beijing wants to demonstrate that it can develop this type of strategic capabilities with its own national platforms. The new competition between powers. For a long time, the rivalry between China and the United States was measured with aircraft carriers, stealth fighters or hypersonic missiles. Now it’s starting to appear another competition quieter: who masters electronic and anti-drone protection in real scenarios. The recent wars have shown that nearby airspace has become extremely dangerous even far from the front. This requires protecting infrastructure, convoys and political leaders in completely new ways. In this context, a jamming system can be as important as traditional shielding. Beijing’s SUVs reflect precisely this change in mentality. Deliberately ambiguous message. Of course also, perhaps the most important thing is that no one really knows what those vehicles were transporting. And that uncertainty is probably part of the message. In today’s technological competition, projecting unknown capabilities is also a form of deterrence. The huge Hongqi roofs they seem designed to provoke questions rather than offer answers. Be that as it may, his appearance on a high-level presidential visit leaves a clear conclusion: while much of the world continues to look at Taiwan, Ukraine or Iran, China seems determined to teach discreetly something else. That the next great military revolution could not be in large visible platforms, but in mobile, discreet electronic systems prepared for a war dominated by drones. Now that Russia is about to fall in Beijing, it will be time to see if they show those SUVs again. Image | x In Xataka | Something is happening over the skies of Chile: the US and China are fighting their particular “cold war” in silence In Xataka | The US’s problem in the AI ​​and humanoid race is not China: it is all of Asia and it is greatly disadvantaged

China is manufacturing missiles at an unprecedented speed. And the final objective is not Taiwan, it is another island 3,000 km away

In the early 2000s, many Chinese technology companies they became famous manufacturing thermal cameras, fiber optics or cheap electronic components for the civilian market. Two decades later, several of those same companies appear linked to one of the most ambitious military programs on the planet. Xi’s missile factory. Reuters counted in an extensive report that China is manufacturing missiles at a speed that is beginning to transform entire sectors of its economy. What for years was a relatively opaque military ecosystem is becoming a gigantic industrial chain where dozens of private and state companies are skyrocketing income thanks to the accelerated rearmament promoted by Xi Jinping. The most revealing data is not only the increase in chinese arsenalbut the number of companies that already partially make a living from it: manufacturers of infrared sensors, fiber optics, stealth coatings, 3D printed metals or specialized electronic systems are registering record profits while much of the Chinese economy is going through much more serious difficulties. Beijing has achieved something that few countries have achieved on this scale: merge civil and military industry to the point of converting missile development into a strategic economic engine. The real target is further away than Taiwan. The island constantly appears as the center of any possible conflict in Asia-Pacific, but depending on the mediumthe Chinese missile deployment points to something broader. Beijing not only wants the ability to invade or blockade the island, it wants to prevent the United States from being able to intervene effectively. And there appears the true strategic objective located about 3,000 kilometers away: guam. As we have counted At other times, the island functions as one of the main US military nodes in the Western Pacific, a huge air, naval and logistics platform from which Washington could sustain operations around Taiwan. That is why China has been developing systems specifically designed to threaten it for years, like the DF-26known precisely as “Guam Express”. Chinese military logic is relatively simple: If it manages to put Guam at risk, it greatly complicates the US ability to project power near its coasts and breaks one of Washington’s great strategic advantages in the region. Economy oriented to manufacturing war. Plus: Xi’s program does not depend solely from state giants such as China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation or China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation. The most striking thing is how civil companies seemingly normal have ended up integrated into the Chinese military ecosystem. Some began manufacturing thermal sensors to detect fever during the SARS epidemic and today produce components for missiles and military drones. Others develop fiber optics for precision navigation or stealthy materials capable of reducing radar detection of aircraft and projectiles. The result is an industrial structure that is extremely difficult to isolate through sanctions, because many of these companies operate simultaneously in civilian and military markets. The United States has been trying to limit Chinese access to advanced chips and sensitive technologies, but Beijing has responded by expanding an increasingly extensive and autonomous national network of suppliers. The effect of the war on Iran. The war between the United States and Iran has further reinforced this arms race. While Washington consumes part of its missile and ammunition reserves In the Middle East, China is carefully observing how modern wars are becoming conflicts of industrial attrition where the ability to manufacture and replenish weapons quickly begins to be as important as the individual technological quality of each system. That is where Beijing believes it has an advantage. The reason? China already has of thousands of missiles ballistic and cruise able to cover much of the Indo-Pacific, and the expansion rate it’s still huge despite the purges internal affairs within the Chinese Army and the investigation of senior commanders for corruption. In some ways, Xi seems to be preparing the country for a prolonged scenario of military competition where whoever manages to keep production lines open the longest will survive. The new global race. All of this is happening while much of the planet simultaneously accelerates its rearmament. France, South Korea, USA either Japan are increasing production and military spending, but the Chinese case stands out for its industrial dimension and by the speed at which it evolves. Beijing not only increases the number of missiles, it also develops new hypersonic generationsexpands its nuclear arsenal and tests systems capable of threatening aircraft carriers, air bases and targets thousands of kilometers away. The big concern in Washington is that China is approaching a point where it can sustain a conflict long thanks to a combination of mass production, relatively low costs and enormous integration between civil companies and defense. That is why the growth of the missile program China is beginning to be interpreted less as simple regional rearmament and more as the silent construction of an economy prepared to compete militarily with the United States on a global scale. Image | CCTV In Xataka | The YJ-20 has just entered the scene at the most delicate moment: China has launched its hypersonic missile against the US and Japan In Xataka | China is beating the US with a simple strategy: manufacturing hypersonic missiles at the price of a Tesla

More advanced chip factories are being built in China and Taiwan than anywhere else. It’s only good for them

According to SEMI, an international organization that looks after the interests of the electronics and integrated circuit industries, only six of the 64 new factories of semiconductors that are going to come into operation in Asia before 2029 will reside in Southeast Asia. The remaining 58 They will be located in China and Taiwan. These two countries have compelling reasons to strengthen its chip industry and develop its integrated circuit production capacity. It is essential for China to set up new plants equipped with cutting-edge photolithography equipment. And that is precisely what SMIC, Hua Hong Semiconductor and other Chinese chipmakers are doing. Currently this nation is limited by the difficulty of going beyond 7 nm without being able to use the extreme ultraviolet lithography (VVE) of ASML. Even so, Huali Microelectronics, the division of Hua Hong Semiconductor specialized in manufacturing chips for third parties, is preparing to start the production of 7nm integrated circuits at its Shanghai plant. Taiwan also needs to expand its semiconductor industry, although its motives are very different from China’s. The two largest Taiwanese integrated circuit manufacturers, TSMC and UMCthey need to develop more cutting-edge plants in order to satisfy the growing needs of their customers. TSMC’s 2 and 3 nm nodes in particular cannot cope, so it is essential for this company to expand its production capacity in the midst of the boom in data centers for data applications. artificial intelligence (AI). SEMI is concerned about the vulnerabilities of the chip industry Ajit Manocha, the executive director of SEMI, assures that “we want to see more centers emerge in related countries. We want more plants to be established to reduce the risk derived from vulnerabilities.” What worries the spokesperson of this organization is that the geopolitical tensions maintained by the US, China and Taiwan end up threatening the integrated circuit factories that reside in these last two countries. TSMC’s in Taiwan are especially sensitive to a possible conflict with China due to the undoubted strategic importance that they have not only for Taiwan, but also for the US and its allies. Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam and Thailand are candidates to host new cutting-edge chip plants Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam and Thailand are strong candidates to host new cutting-edge chip manufacturing plants. In fact, Several centers already reside in Malaysia Intel’s advanced packaging and verification software. However, Manocha You are also concerned about other types of vulnerabilities. The most critical of all is the shortage of critical minerals, as well as bromine and helium, two fundamental gases in chip manufacturing processes. What is happening with helium in particular is very worrying. This gas is a byproduct of natural gas processing, and its price skyrocketed in March shortly after the war that the US, Israel and Iran have been fighting since then began because Qatar was forced to stop production of liquefied natural gas. In the current unstable scenario, SEMI argues that Southeast Asian countries should aim to build more semiconductor manufacturing plants over the next decade to help the sector diversify and reduce supply risks. Image | TSMC More information | Reuters In Xataka | The US’s problem in the AI ​​and humanoid race is not China: it is all of Asia and it is greatly disadvantaged

To achieve the milestone of building the largest drone industry without China, Ukraine has found an explosive ally: Taiwan

In the midst of the Cold War, several Western engineers they were surprised upon discovering that some of the most reliable small electronic components on the world market came from an island that barely made the big geopolitical headlines. Decades later, that silent specialization in manufacturing tiny and apparently invisible parts would end up becoming one of the industrial capabilities most coveted on the planet. The war that changed an industry. For decades, Taiwan was known primarily for making chipselectronic components and invisible parts that ended up inside telephones, computers or servers spread all over the planet, but modern wars are beginning to push that industrial capacity towards another, much more explosive terrain. The Guardian said that what is happening between Ukraine and Taiwan reflects a quiet change that barely existed a few years ago: the creation of a new technological alliance born directly from drone warfrom Chinese pressure and the desperate need to produce millions of cheap, autonomous and combat-ready systems. Ukraine wants to break its dependence on China. The war forced Ukraine to build at full speed a gigantic industry of drones capable of feeding a front that consumes absurd quantities of devices every month. The problem is that much of the global supply chain remains dominated by China: Motors, batteries, navigation systems, electronic components and rare earths continue to depend heavily on Chinese manufacturers. As we said, kyiv began to consider this dependence as a strategic risk When suspicions grew about indirect support from Beijing to Russia and fears grew of possible export restrictions. There Taiwan began to appear as an alternative unexpectedly important. His huge experience in semiconductors, microelectronics, electronic integration and advanced technological production made it one of the few places capable of supplying critical parts without being completely dependent on the West or trapped under direct Chinese control. For Ukraine, finding industrial partners outside of China stopped being a commercial issue and became literally a matter of survival. And Taiwan found Ukraine. While Ukraine seeks to produce millions of drones, gradually moving away from China, Taiwan observes the conflict with another concern: the possibility of one day confronting Beijing on its own territory. That coincidence of threats is creating a relationship ever deeper between both worlds. In fact, The New York Times said what Taiwanese engineers They send drones to Ukraine to be tested directly in combat, American companies transfer designs born on the Ukrainian front to Taiwanese production and former Taiwanese soldiers who today fight in Ukraine return home telling how modern war really works. Many Taiwanese militaries are beginning to discover that traditional doctrines are completely outweighed by swarms of FPV drones, unmanned maritime systems or cheap ground robots capable of destroying multimillion-dollar vehicles. Ukraine is thus becoming a kind of university improvised military for Taiwan, one where the lessons do not come from simulations but from a real front where every mistake costs lives. The new military industry no longer resembles the old one. One of the most profound changes of this war is that military production no longer depends solely on gigantic state factories or large traditional contractors. Ukraine has developed more than one hundreds of local manufacturers of components while constantly adapting its systems to specific front-line needs. Ukrainian companies modify drones, software and guidance systems at a much higher speed to the Western classical industry. Taiwan fits perfectly in that transformation because it has exactly what Ukraine needs to accelerate that production: advanced electronics, specialized chips and flexible industrial capacity. Several Taiwanese companies already operate from Poland or Lithuania to indirectly supply kyiv, while Taiwanese drone exports to Europe have skyrocketed massively. In parallel, American companies are using Ukraine and Taiwan like two extremes of the same industrial chain: Ukraine provides combat experience and accelerated development, and Taiwan provides technological capacity and scalable manufacturing. The obsession with building drones outside of China. Both Ukraine and Taiwan share another priority that is becoming almost an industrial doctrine: building supply chains at the expense of Beijing. The problem is much more complicated than it seems because even many components manufactured outside China still use materials, batteries or magnets that depend from Chinese suppliers. Even so, both territories try gradually reduce that exhibition. Taiwan wants to build a drone industry completely disengaged from China by 2027 and increase its own production of rare earth magnets, while Ukraine continues to shift production within its borders. There is no doubt, the challenge is gigantic because Chinese products continue to be much cheaper and more abundant, but strategic logic is beginning to outweigh the economic cost. In the middle of a war, the priority shifts from buying the cheapest to ensuring the supply chain continues to function when the next crisis hits. Building something bigger than drones. If you also want, the most important thing in this relationship may not only be the production of drones, but the emergence of a new technological and military axis informal between two territories that live under permanent threat from much larger neighbors. Ukraine contributes real experience of war, proven tactics and a brutal speed of innovation under extreme pressure. Taiwan contributes industrial capacitysemiconductors and access to critical technologies that the West does not produce quickly enough. The result is beginning to look like something much more ambitious: an entire international network of distributed military production where private companies, engineers, volunteers and manufacturers work beyond official diplomatic limitations. Even the Ukrainian government recognize as drone factories based on Ukrainian designs are popping up outside its borders, including one in Taiwan. One more thing. Ultimately, what the war is accelerating is an idea that a few years ago would have seemed improbable: that to build the largest drone industry on the planet outside chinaUkraine has ended up finding one of its most valuable and strategic allies in Taiwan. Image | x, Trydence In Xataka | Today in “the war in Ukraine beyond all comprehension”: drone pilots are training with ‘Grand Theft Auto’ In Xataka | Ukraine has barely … Read more

China has closed a huge chunk of sky for 40 days. And all we know is that space is bigger than Taiwan

In aviation, advisories restricting the use of airspace usually last just a few days and are linked to very specific operations, while areas without altitude limits are reserved on rare occasions due to its impact on air traffic. In strategic regions of the planet, any prolonged alteration in these patterns is often interpreted as more than a simple technical measure. It just happened in China. An unprecedented air closure. China has closed for 40 days (from March 27 to May 6) a huge maritime airspace without offering any clear explanation, delimiting areas through aeronautical warnings which are normally used for short exercises but in this case they are unusually prolonged. To give us an idea, the extension of that space exceeds the size of Taiwan, which makes the measure difficult to fit within operational normality. The official silence and the scale of the movement suggest a deliberate decision that goes beyond simple air traffic management. What these notices really mean. The NOTAM (Notice to Air Missions) are designed to warn of risks or temporary restrictions, but their usual use is far from the current scenario, since they usually last a few days and are linked to specific, clearly identified maneuvers. Therefore, the combination of an extraordinary duration and the absence of explanations points more to a position of sustained activity more than a specific exercise. A priori, this implies that airspace control is being used as an active tool within a broader strategy. A key space on the regional board. counted the wall street journal A few hours ago, the affected areas extended from the Yellow Sea to the East China Sea, covering areas in front of South Korea and Japan and being located in strategic corridors for any military operation in the region. Although they are far from Taiwan (several hundred km), their location does not seem coincidental and fits with scenarios where the air route control would be decisive. The scale of the reserved area reinforces the idea that this is not a limited trial, but something with deeper operational implications. Signs in the midst of a tense context. The closure also coincides with a moment of high tension in the Indo-Pacific, with military movements in Japan, pressure about Taiwan and diplomatic activity relevant in parallel. Not only that. It also occurs after a striking pause on Chinese military flights near Taiwan, followed of its resumptionsuggesting a recalibration of activity. In this context, the measure can be interpreted as a way to send strategic messages without the need for explicit statements. Ambiguity as a strategy. In short, and although there are precedents for similar airspace reservations, they had never been so long nor so widewhich marks a clear difference compared to previous practices. If you like, this ambiguity also allows China to maintain operational flexibility, test scenarios and, ultimately, generate uncertainty among its rivals without publicly committing. The result is a signal that is difficult to interpret, one that, possibly or precisely because of this, multiply your impact strategic. Image | LG Images In Xataka | In silence, China is making giant strides in a race that until now it was not leading: space. In Xataka | The US opted for the quality of the F-35 rather than quantity. China opted for the opposite and it is already a problem

Samsung is tired of being second in the chip race. Now they are preparing to dethrone the titan of Taiwan

When we talk about artificial intelligence, there are several proper names that star in the conversation. NVIDIA has become the foundation and cement of AI thanks both to their products as, above all, your money. But it’s impossible to leave Samsung out of the equation. Your HBM4 memories They are the ones that will allow NVIDIA and AMD manufacture their platforms new generation, but South Koreans do not want to stop there. They seek to be the largest advanced factory in the world and have launched a plan to wipe TSMC where it hurts the most. In the expansion throughout the United States. An x8 thanks to AI. 2025 was a transition year for Samsung. While its great rival in the memoir segment –SK Hynix– dominated the HBM chip marketSamsung is preparing to make the leap with HBM4 chips. This is the new generation of high-bandwidth memory designed to power the new AI platforms from both NVIDIA and Samsung. The effort paid off by overtaking SK and becoming the supplier of the two giants, and it is something that is already materializing. At least in estimates profit, of course. Now the company forecast profits of about 38 billion dollars for the first quarter of the year, something that destroys the profits of the same period last year, being eight times more. Texas. The company does not stop manufacturing the new HBM4 memory, but even so it cannot satisfy the enormous demand of its customers and there are already those who expect that the prices of these chips will increase by more than 50%. To meet demand, Samsung is moving, and The United States is key in its ambitious expansion. The South Korean company seeks to invest 37,000 million dollars in US soil, and 17,000 million of them they will stop to the Taylor, Texas plant. According to Korea Heraldthe company is finalizing hiring for this semiconductor plant where they hope to produce cutting-edge 2-nanometer chips. It is estimated that 1,500 people will be directly employed and the idea is to produce transistors with gate-all-around architecture. TSMC in the spotlight. Recent reports indicate that Samsung has already begun producing test units of chips in that lithography with the aim of beginning mass production by 2027. But this expansion is not only occurring in the United States. At the Pyeongtaek Campus, Samsung’s operations center, building a new factory for which Samsung has just ordered 20 EUV lithography machines valued at almost $8 billion. As it could not be otherwise, they are from ASML and it is estimated that the plant will have 70 units in total to support the production of HBM4 memory chips. And these two movements have one goal in mind: to dethrone the queen of semiconductors. Currently, TSMC takes the lead with NVIDIA and Apple as its best clientsbut Samsung is another industry giant that may not take the global throne, but is aiming for something more concrete: to be the one who leads the way in the United States. Both Samsung and TSMC are in full expansion throughout the United States, but if Samsung manages to start mass manufacturing of 2nm chips by 2027, it would overtake TSMC -focused on 2/3nm chips– in that development of advanced chips in the United States. It is still a vital race, since Tesla, Apple, NVIDIA or AMD are trying to get chips manufactured in the US and thus meet the demands of Donald Trump’s government. Trojan horse. In the end, it’s a move that Samsung can only win from. On the one hand, expand its HBM4 chip capacity to power AI platforms that do not seem to stop increasing in the short term. On the other hand, continuing to settle on American soil where it maintains a battle with the Taiwanese giant. But, also, Samsung is one of the founding members of the EPIC program of Applied Materials together with SK Hynix. They are positioning themselves to be the big player in semiconductors both as a factory and when it comes to designing machines and processes that allow for shorter development times for cutting-edge chips. and all this foreign companies are doing it on US soil when what the current government wanted was for were American companies those who will take the lead. In fact, Samsung’s plans are so ambitious that they are already looking for master 1nm chip production by 2030. In Xataka | ASML has discovered a way to further improve its SVU machines. This is terrible news for China and the US.

Taiwan produces 90% of the world’s advanced chips. Its natural gas reserves last exactly 12 days

In global energy markets, alarm bells do not always ring loudly; Sometimes all you have to do is watch where the boats are sailing. While the West observes the already known Third Gulf War With a mixture of horror and remoteness, Asia is suffering the direct impact. The colossal Ras Laffan facility in Qatar—which processes about a fifth of global liquefied natural gas (LNG)— has suffered damage by 17% of its infrastructure after the Iranian attacks. 12 days. At the exact center of the geopolitical target is Taiwan. The island has a practical monopoly on the world’s most advanced chips, but its “silicon shield” hangs by an extremely fragile logistical thread: an energy supply chain whose legal security threshold requires a minimum of just 11 to 12 days of natural gas reserves. The fatal panorama in Asia. Asia is on the front line of this fuel crisis as it buys more than 80% of the crude oil that transits through the blocked Strait of Hormuz. The nations of the region have had to quickly dust off the survival manuals of the COVID-19 era. Philippines has become the first country in declaring a state of “national energy emergency”, warning of an imminent danger and turning to coal to reduce costs. In South Korea, the government has asked its citizens Take shorter showers, use public transportation, and avoid charging your phones at night. Sri Lanka declared on Wednesdays as a holiday to save fuel, and in Thailand, officials have received the order to take off their suits, use the stairs and telework. china from chill. However, the contrast with China it’s abysmal. While its neighbors panic, the Asian giant observes the chaos coldly. Five years ago, Xi Jinping ordered to secure the country’s “energy rice bowl.” Today, thanks to a massive accumulation of sanctioned crude oil (bought cheaply from Russia or Iran), the shielding of renewables and a vehicle park where electric cars are the majority, China has built an invisible Great Wall that isolates it from fossil volatility. A trade war against the clock. This hydrocarbon drought not only turns off the lights, but paralyzes the industry. According to Commonwealth Magazinethe petrochemical and plastics sector has been the first major victim. The giant Formosa Petrochemical has had to issue force majeure notices after running out of raw materials, and prices of key materials such as ABS (used in car parts) have soared by up to 50%. At a logistical level, a trade war has broken out ruthless battle between Europe and Asia to seize the few available LNG shipments. Spot prices in Asia have doubled, and ships originally sailing to Spain or France are diverting their course to the Pacific in the face of more lucrative offers. In this Darwinian scenario, South Asia is acting as the global “shock absorber”: price-sensitive countries, such as Pakistan or Bangladesh, cannot compete and are forced to destroy demand or paralyze industries, leaving gas available for the giants that can afford it. To mitigate the blow on their own streets, governments like Japan They plan to inject billions in subsidies, while Taiwan has committed to absorb 60% of the increase in crude oil prices. Taiwan’s “Achilles heel” and the check on chips. If there is a critical point in this crisis, It is the island of Taiwan. In 2025, Taiwan relied on imports to meet 95% of its energy needs, including more than 99% of its oil and natural gas demand. Before the war, it received more than 38% of its annual natural gas supply and approximately 70% of its crude oil from the Middle East. The structural problem is time. While nations like South Korea have the capacity to store gas for 52 days and Japan for three weeks, Taiwan is walking on the wire. As pointed out Bloombergis an almost non-existent room for maneuver for an island where electricity generation based on natural gas has expanded to almost 48%. An immediate buffer. To avoid collapse in the short term, the Taiwanese Ministry of Economy has acted quickly with a checkbook. Minister Kung Ming-hsin has confirmed that supply planning is already covered for March, April and May, and they have even secured half of their replacement agreements for the month of June. Away from the imminent blackout, the island’s reserves have managed to remain above the safety threshold of 12 days since the fighting broke out. However, this short-term patch does not turn off the alarms. The real danger lurks in the summer, when high temperatures historically trigger electricity demand. A prolonged blackout: global chaos. The semiconductor sector contributes around 20% of Taiwan’s GDP. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), which produces about 90% of the chips most advanced in the world (vital for AI and military technology), alone consumes approximately 9% of all electricity on the island. But gas is not the only missing input; Added to this is the disruption in the supply of secretive but vital raw materials such as bromine and helium (a third of which is processed in Qatar). The experts They warn that if the interruption of helium exceeds 14 days, the chip production lines will go into technical stoppage. With summer just around the corner and electricity demand about to skyrocket, the island operates at its limit. The pressure is so immense that the historically reluctant Taiwanese government is already openly debating the reactivation of nuclear energy, recognizing that the explosive growth in electricity demand linked to the development of Artificial Intelligence is changing all the rules of the energy game. The geopolitical board: opportunism and contradictions. Beijing has not been slow to intervene. Taking advantage of the panic, the Chinese government has thrown a poisoned lifeline. According to Chen Binhua, spokesperson for China’s Taiwan Affairs Office, collected in South China Morning Postthe Asian giant offered the island a stable, abundant and cheap energy supply in exchange for accepting “peaceful reunification.” Taipei’s response was blunt: Vice Minister of Economy, Ho Chin-tsang, rejected the offer, calling it “cognitive … Read more

The war in Iran has given China an unprecedented opportunity. And she has just been transferred to Taiwan so she can think twice

Taiwan is one of the most advanced economies in the world, yet it produces less than 5% of the energy it consumes. In just a few days, it can go from being a key center of global technology to depend completely of what happens thousands of kilometers from its coasts. And China has seen an opportunity. Energy as a geopolitical weapon. The war in the Middle East has triggered a chain reaction that goes far beyond the battlefield: with energy routes strained and the Strait of Hormuz turned into a global bottleneckcountries have set out to ensure supplies at any price. In this context of urgency, energy has ceased to be just an economic resource and has become a direct tool of political pressure, one capable of reconfiguring alliances, dependencies and strategic balances in a matter of weeks. The offer that changes the board. And it is precisely in that scenario where China has reformulated your proposal towards Taiwan with a much more pragmatic approach: instead of appealing so much to national identity, the offer is aimed at a concrete and urgent need, energy security. The idea? Beijing offers guaranteed access to stable, cheaper and less exposed resources to external crises in exchange for peaceful “reunification”presenting integration as a technical solution to a structural problem. The message leaves no room for doubt: under the umbrella of a “strong power,” the island could free yourself from uncertainty of global markets and their dependence on vulnerable maritime routes. Gas station in Taiwan A known vulnerability. The proposal is not coincidental, of course, but rather points directly to a critical weakness what was known: Taiwan almost all the energy matters that consumes and depends largely on supplies that pass through areas of high geopolitical risk. Beijing not only presents itself as an alternative supplier, but also suggests that this exposure can get worse if the conflict is prolonged, reinforcing the idea that the solution is to reduce this external dependence. At the same time, it proposes a future of energy integration (electrical networks, gas pipelines, interconnections) that would eliminate a large part of that vulnerability. Between seducing and pressuring. There is no doubt, this strategy of “energy persuasion” It does not replace the rest of the pressure tools that China has had active for a long time. It we have counted before, those military maneuvers around the island, the blockade drills and the constant presence of Chinese forces are part of an environment of sustained pressure that seeks to wear down without provoking open conflict. Under this scenario, the energy adds thus to a set of levers (military, economic and diplomatic) designed to progressively reduce Taiwan’s room for maneuver. Taiwanese rejection and calculation. Taiwan’s response remained to be known. Faced with the suggestive offer, the island has officially responded firmlyrefusing to exchange sovereignty for energy supply and defending that it has sufficient reserves and diversified sources, especially with the support of the United States. As analysts point out, beyond the technical feasibility of the Chinese proposal, the problem is more credibility: The Hong Kong experience has eroded confidence in the model of “one country, two systems”and for a large part of Taiwanese society accepting this agreement would mean beginning a process of gradual loss of autonomy. Long term play. This “no” from Taiwan has not been interpreted in Beijing as something resounding. Possibly, because deep down, the Beijing proposal reflects a much broader strategy: taking advantage of global crises to present itself as a provider of stability in the face of an increasingly volatile environment. There is, therefore, no urgency or immediate rush to force reunification, but rather an accumulation of advantages that, over time, make the option of integrating less costly than resisting. The war in the East has thus opened an unexpected window for that narrative, turning energy into a political argument first order and demonstrating that, in the new geopolitical situation, the control of resources can be as decisive as that of territories. Image | 總統府, Picryl In Xataka | The same day that the US sent its marines to Iran, Taiwan woke up with déjà vu: China has surrounded it with 26 planes and 7 warships In Xataka | US experts are clear about the year in which China will try its luck with Taiwan: the countdown has already begun

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