knocking

In 1988, during the call Operation Praying MantisIn a single day, the United States launched the largest naval offensive since World War II in the Persian Gulf, destroying a large part of the Iranian fleet after a mine hit an American frigate. That episode, which seemed to close a chapter, ended up marking the beginning of a completely different form of understand war at sea. A lock to strangle… or expose yourself. The United States has opted for one of the most aggressive tools available: block traffic to and from Iranian ports in the Strait of Hormuz to suffocate its economy, deploying a combination of aircraft carriers, destroyers, special forces and air support with the ability to intercept, board and detain oil tankers. The operation, however, does not consist of simply turning off a tap, but rather of monitoring and controlling a maritime funnel extremely narrow and saturatedwhere each movement forces high-value assets to move closer to the Iranian coast. This proximity, necessary to make the blockade effective, turns each maneuver into constant exposure to attacks, raising the potential cost of the operation from the first moment. The military paradox. A key point appears here, because, although the United States has devastated the Iranian conventional navy, sinking frigates, corvettes and large units, the true instrument of control of Hormuz still stands: the asymmetric fleet of the Revolutionary Guard. Talk later of more than 60% of their speedboats that remain operational, hidden in underground bases and specifically designed to operate in confined waters, launch lightning attacks, lay mines or harass commercial ships. In fact, this structure has not only survived, but has proven itself effectively. drastically reducing maritime traffic, making it clear that traditional naval power is not the decisive factor in this scenario. The strait turned into a weapon. This morning they counted the TWZ analysts that there is a wave of US minesweepers currently moving from Japan to the Middle East. The move is easy to understand, since Iran has transformed the strait in a hostile environment where any technological superiority loses part of its advantage in the face of saturation and difficulty of detection. Naval mines, explosive drones, ground-launched missiles and small fast vessels create a distributed threat network that does not need to sink large vessels to be effective. It is enough to generate uncertainty and constant risk to paralyze trafficmake insurance more expensive and deter shipping companies, as has already been seen with dozens of attacks and the drop in the number of daily crossings to minimum levels. Strategic funnel: control or get trapped. Because the US plan to “bottle” Iran on both sides of the Strait involves deploying forces in the Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf to cut entrances and exits, but that same geometry makes the operation in a potential trap. As? A priori, the forces must operate within a corridor barely 30 km wide, under direct range of coastal missiles and surrounded by low-cost but high-impact threats. In this context, control of space does not eliminate risk, but it concentrates itforcing ships to remain within an area where the adversary has designed its way of fighting for decades. The critical point. Under that scenario, the logic of the confrontation favors Iran in one key respect, because it does not actually need to defeat the US navy as a whole, only to inflict limited losses, but symbolically devastating. Hence, as the retired admiral of the United States Navy, James Stavridis, explained, to CNNthe sinking or disabling of one or two Washington destroyers, or the damage to a single aircraft carrier, would not change the global military balance, but it would have an impact unprecedented political and strategicquestioning the entire operation in itself. In essence, a simple explanation: in an environment where attacks can come in the form of swarms of drones or relatively cheap missiles, the cost-benefit leans dangerously against whoever deploys the most valuable assets. Time, economy and global pressure. Not only that. While the blockade seeks to cut off Iranian income, its collateral effects are already hitting the global system: rise in oil prices above $100, tensions in fuel supplies, impact on aviation, fertilizers and industrial chains. Iran is precisely playing with this wear and tear, aware that prolonging the crisis increases the pressure on the United States and its allies, both economically and politically. In this scenario, every day that the strait remains altered reinforces the Iranian negotiating position, turning the blockade into a double-edged sword. Decades waiting for the battle. If you will, the latest analysis of the situation in Hormuz is perhaps the most disturbing for Washington’s interests. Far from being a surprise, the scenario fits exactly with the doctrine that Iran developed after the destruction of his fleet in the eighties: avoid conventional combat and dominate critical points through asymmetric warfare. The Strait of Hormuz is not just a strategic passage, but a battlefield custom designedone where the combination of geography, preparation and tools allows Tehran compensate for their inferiority in the face of an extremely superior naval power. Therefore, more than a decisive move, the US blockade opens the door to a confrontation on the ground where Iran it feels more comfortable and where the risk of an unpredictable escalation is maximum if Tehran is able to knock down a couple of “chips.” Image | Iran State Media In Xataka | The problem in Hormuz is not that it is closed: it is that Iran has “lost the keys” and without them the balance is broken In Xataka | The most buoyant market right now is selling streaming and satellite images of US movements to Iran.