Ukraine

To achieve the milestone of building the largest drone industry without China, Ukraine has found an explosive ally: Taiwan

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In the midst of the Cold War, several Western engineers they were surprised upon discovering that some of the most reliable small electronic components on the world market came from an island that barely made the big geopolitical headlines. Decades later, that silent specialization in manufacturing tiny and apparently invisible parts would end up becoming one of the industrial capabilities most coveted on the planet. The war that changed an industry. For decades, Taiwan was known primarily for making chipselectronic components and invisible parts that ended up inside telephones, computers or servers spread all over the planet, but modern wars are beginning to push that industrial capacity towards another, much more explosive terrain. The Guardian said that what is happening between Ukraine and Taiwan reflects a quiet change that barely existed a few years ago: the creation of a new technological alliance born directly from drone warfrom Chinese pressure and the desperate need to produce millions of cheap, autonomous and combat-ready systems. Ukraine wants to break its dependence on China. The war forced Ukraine to build at full speed a gigantic industry of drones capable of feeding a front that consumes absurd quantities of devices every month. The problem is that much of the global supply chain remains dominated by China: Motors, batteries, navigation systems, electronic components and rare earths continue to depend heavily on Chinese manufacturers. As we said, kyiv began to consider this dependence as a strategic risk When suspicions grew about indirect support from Beijing to Russia and fears grew of possible export restrictions. There Taiwan began to appear as an alternative unexpectedly important. His huge experience in semiconductors, microelectronics, electronic integration and advanced technological production made it one of the few places capable of supplying critical parts without being completely dependent on the West or trapped under direct Chinese control. For Ukraine, finding industrial partners outside of China stopped being a commercial issue and became literally a matter of survival. And Taiwan found Ukraine. While Ukraine seeks to produce millions of drones, gradually moving away from China, Taiwan observes the conflict with another concern: the possibility of one day confronting Beijing on its own territory. That coincidence of threats is creating a relationship ever deeper between both worlds. In fact, The New York Times said what Taiwanese engineers They send drones to Ukraine to be tested directly in combat, American companies transfer designs born on the Ukrainian front to Taiwanese production and former Taiwanese soldiers who today fight in Ukraine return home telling how modern war really works. Many Taiwanese militaries are beginning to discover that traditional doctrines are completely outweighed by swarms of FPV drones, unmanned maritime systems or cheap ground robots capable of destroying multimillion-dollar vehicles. Ukraine is thus becoming a kind of university improvised military for Taiwan, one where the lessons do not come from simulations but from a real front where every mistake costs lives. The new military industry no longer resembles the old one. One of the most profound changes of this war is that military production no longer depends solely on gigantic state factories or large traditional contractors. Ukraine has developed more than one hundreds of local manufacturers of components while constantly adapting its systems to specific front-line needs. Ukrainian companies modify drones, software and guidance systems at a much higher speed to the Western classical industry. Taiwan fits perfectly in that transformation because it has exactly what Ukraine needs to accelerate that production: advanced electronics, specialized chips and flexible industrial capacity. Several Taiwanese companies already operate from Poland or Lithuania to indirectly supply kyiv, while Taiwanese drone exports to Europe have skyrocketed massively. In parallel, American companies are using Ukraine and Taiwan like two extremes of the same industrial chain: Ukraine provides combat experience and accelerated development, and Taiwan provides technological capacity and scalable manufacturing. The obsession with building drones outside of China. Both Ukraine and Taiwan share another priority that is becoming almost an industrial doctrine: building supply chains at the expense of Beijing. The problem is much more complicated than it seems because even many components manufactured outside China still use materials, batteries or magnets that depend from Chinese suppliers. Even so, both territories try gradually reduce that exhibition. Taiwan wants to build a drone industry completely disengaged from China by 2027 and increase its own production of rare earth magnets, while Ukraine continues to shift production within its borders. There is no doubt, the challenge is gigantic because Chinese products continue to be much cheaper and more abundant, but strategic logic is beginning to outweigh the economic cost. In the middle of a war, the priority shifts from buying the cheapest to ensuring the supply chain continues to function when the next crisis hits. Building something bigger than drones. If you also want, the most important thing in this relationship may not only be the production of drones, but the emergence of a new technological and military axis informal between two territories that live under permanent threat from much larger neighbors. Ukraine contributes real experience of war, proven tactics and a brutal speed of innovation under extreme pressure. Taiwan contributes industrial capacitysemiconductors and access to critical technologies that the West does not produce quickly enough. The result is beginning to look like something much more ambitious: an entire international network of distributed military production where private companies, engineers, volunteers and manufacturers work beyond official diplomatic limitations. Even the Ukrainian government recognize as drone factories based on Ukrainian designs are popping up outside its borders, including one in Taiwan. One more thing. Ultimately, what the war is accelerating is an idea that a few years ago would have seemed improbable: that to build the largest drone industry on the planet outside chinaUkraine has ended up finding one of its most valuable and strategic allies in Taiwan. Image | x, Trydence In Xataka | Today in “the war in Ukraine beyond all comprehension”: drone pilots are training with ‘Grand Theft Auto’ In Xataka | Ukraine has barely … Read more

Iran did to the US what Ukraine did to Russia in Operation Spiderweb

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In the first weeks of the war, published reports on the damage inflicted by Iran to bases and radars of Washington in the Middle East. For example, attacks on 14 US military sites or air defense facilities were documented, or the bombing of a US base in Kuwaitthe first time in years that an enemy fighter jet hit a US base. However, it has now just become known that, in reality, it has been much worse. The war that the images began to reveal. For years, Western armies assumed that absolute control of the air and satellites was enough to hide damage, movements and weaknesses in the middle of a war… until recent conflicts began to demonstrate just the opposite. In Ukraine, simple commercial photographs Taken from space, they allowed Russian convoys to be followed, bombers to be located, and destroyed facilities to be detected long before governments acknowledged anything. To that mission he called it Spiderweb. It so happens that the same thing is happening now in the Middle East. What began as a campaign presented by Washington as a punishment operation against Iran has ended up leaving an image much more uncomfortable: that satellite photographs are showing a level of destruction on US facilities much higher than publicly admitted. The uncomfortable discovery. Latest Washington Post analysis More than a hundred satellite images have revealed that Iran hit at least 228 military structures or equipment Americans distributed throughout bases in the Middle East, a figure much higher than that officially recognized. The impacts hit hangars, barracks, fuel tanks, Patriot systems, THAAD radarscommunications centers, electrical installations and even strategic aircraft, making it clear that Tehran was not launching symbolic or indiscriminate attacks. The most delicate thing for the United States is that many of these images initially came from Iranian media and were subsequently verified through European systems and other independent commercial sources. In other words, the initial narrative of limited attacks began to collapse when the images began to show something much more serious: that Iran had achieved penetrate advanced defenses and hit critical American infrastructure in numerous countries at the same time. Damage to Camp Arifjan in Kuwait visible on March 4 Iran found the weak point of the bases. Wapo counted that one of the most striking aspects of the attacks is the precision with which they were executed. Military analysts highlighted the absence of random craters and the concentration of impacts on specific targets, a sign that Iran had very detailed prior intelligence on US facilities. The attacks were not limited to military runways or depots traditional facilities, they also hit gymnasiums, lodgings, mess halls, and staff buildings, reflecting a deliberate attempt to increase human casualties and force the United States to empty entire bases (as, in fact, that’s how it happened). Because several facilities ended up being considered too dangerous to operate normally, causing partial evacuations and the transfer of troops beyond Iranian reach. Some bases in Kuwait and Bahrain, used to launch attacks against Iran or deploy HIMARS systems, were especially punishedfueling the feeling that Tehran had managed to quickly identify which platforms were directly participating in the campaign. Nine fuel tanks at the Ali al-Salem air base in Kuwait were damaged Drones changed everything. Much of this battlefield transformation is directly related to a lesson learned in Ukraine: cheap and unidirectional attack drones are eroding the traditional advantage of great powers. American experts recognize that the Pentagon did not adapt its bases quickly enough to this new threat, despite spending years observing how relatively simple drones destroyed armored vehicles, radars or critical infrastructure in other conflicts. Although many Iranian drones carried reduced explosive charges, they were extremely difficult to intercept and they could attack stationary targets with enormous precision. This forced the consumption of gigantic quantities of Patriot and THAAD interceptors, dangerously reducing American and allied reserves in just a few weeks. The result was paradoxical: the most advanced military power in the world began to be forced to play defense around its own bases, while Iran found relatively cheap ways to overwhelm multibillion-dollar anti-aircraft systems. The enormous hidden wear. While Washington publicly insisted that the damage did not significantly alter the military campaign, the images they showed a more complex reality. Some key facilities were damaged considered “extensive” even by American officials, and part of the regional command had to be relocated out of the Middle East. As we said, the headquarters of the Fifth Fleet in Bahrain was one of the most affected areasto the point of moving functions to Florida, while the internal debate grows over whether certain bases will operate as before. Worrying signs also emerged on structural failures: Strategic aircraft repeatedly parked in vulnerable positions, insufficiently protected tactical centers, and a shortage of hardened shelters for critical personnel and equipment. All of this fueled one conclusion: that the United States had underestimated both Iranian resilience and the speed with which modern wars are making transparent facilities that previously seemed untouchable. The true strategic signal that this war leaves. Beyond the specific damage, what really worries strategists and military personnel is the change of perception left by satellite images. For decades, the presence of US bases throughout the Middle East functioned as a symbol of absolute control and immediate response capacity, but now those same facilities appear exposedvulnerable and permanently observed from the air and from space. If you will, the conflict has left a feeling that is difficult to ignore: that Iran may not be able to defeat the United States militarily in a conventional confrontation, but it can. inflict enough damageattrition and political pressure to profoundly alter the US strategic calculation in the region. And that idea that began with Spiderweb operation in Ukrainemultiplied by hundreds of photographs of destroyed hangars, hit radars and partially emptied bases, may end up being one of the most important consequences of the entire war. Image | Iran media, Planet In Xataka | Türkiye has taken a look at the … Read more

In three days, Russia celebrates its Victory Day. And Ukraine has a surprise prepared 1,500 kilometers away

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In May 1987, a young 19-year-old German pilot named Mathias Rust He managed to cross a good part of Soviet airspace with a small civilian plane and land next to Red Square. without being stopped. The episode caused enormous humiliation for the USSR because it showed that even the heart of Moscow could be reached in ways that no one expected. Countdown to Putin’s big parade. Russia prepares for May 9, the most symbolic day of its entire political and military calendar, while Ukraine intensifies a campaign of attacks that seems designed precisely to ruin that sense of control and security. The Kremlin has even announced a unilateral truce for the days of the parade, but kyiv has responded by making it clear that it does not intend to coordinate anything with Moscow and remembering that Russia cannot quietly celebrate Victory Day “without the good will of Ukraine.” The situation is especially uncomfortable for Putin because, for the first time in many years, Moscow faces this date with the feeling that even its capital can become a target. Moscow no longer seems like a completely safe place. The recent attack against a skyscraper luxury hotel located a few kilometers from the Kremlin has been much more than a simple symbolic coup. Ukraine has been trying to bother to Moscow ahead of the May 9 parade, but this time the message comes in a different context: Russia has reduced the size of the event, eliminated some of the heavy military deployment and greatly reinforced the defenses around the capital for fear of new drones. Meanwhile, Zelensky has hinted directly that Moscow fears seeing drones flying over Red Square during the parade, something unthinkable just a few years ago and extremely delicate for a celebration designed precisely to project power and control. The big news is the distance. The most important change in this phase of the war is happening far beyond Moscow. Ukraine is managing to attack industrial cities and military bases located more than 1,500 kilometers from the front, reaching regions of the Urals that for decades were considered a safe rear even in Soviet times. Cities like Yekaterinburg, Chelyabinsk or Perm begin to experience airport closuresinternet restrictions and attacks against refineriesmilitary installations or industrial infrastructures. The psychological impact is enormous because many of these areas experienced the war as something distant until just a few months ago. New missiles and drones are changing the rules. The appearance of the transonic missile F-5 Flamingo reflects the extent to which Ukraine is transforming its deep strike capability. kyiv claims to have used this system to destroy a factory Russian military about 1,500 kilometers away, a facility linked to components for missiles, aviation and naval systems. Beyond the specific damage, what is important is the trend: Ukraine no longer depends solely on improvised drones or isolated attacks, but is beginning to build a sustained capacity to hit strategic infrastructure deep inside Russia. The jam-resistant navigation systems, extreme range and possible integration of Western technology clearly show that kyiv is trying to make Russian territorial depth much less useful than it was at the start of the war. The Soviet rearguard in doubt. Plus: there is a huge historical burden in the places that Ukraine is attacking. During the Second World War, much of the Soviet industry was moved to the Urals precisely because they were considered territories impossible to reach from Europe. Cities like Chelyabinsk became known as “Tankograd” because of the concentration of military factories far from the front. Now, eighty years later, Ukrainian drones and missiles are demonstrating that that strategic depth no longer guarantees security. What once required bombers and huge air campaigns can now be achieved with long-range drones and relatively cheap missiles capable of traversing thousands of kilometers. Avoid vulnerability on its most important day. Because he May 9 parade It is not just any ceremony for Russia. It is the great annual showcase of Russian military power, the event where the Kremlin connects the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany with Putin’s current political legitimacy. That is precisely why it is so sensitive that Ukraine is increasing pressure just before the event. Russia is shooting down hundreds of drones around Moscow and strengthening security of the capital while trying to avoid any image of chaos during a day observed by foreign leaders and broadcast throughout the country. The problem for the Kremlin is that Ukraine has already managed to install a most uncomfortable idea: even more than 1,500 kilometers from the front, there is no longer a complete sense of refuge, and that includes beyond the Urals. Image | Fire Point In Xataka | Today in “the war in Ukraine beyond all comprehension”: drone pilots are training with ‘Grand Theft Auto’ In Xataka | Ukraine has barely captured any North Korean soldiers. The reason is brutally simple: they prefer to immolate themselves

Ukraine is bringing its drones dangerously close to Moscow. And he is doing it with an unusual weapon: Grand Theft Auto V

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In 2002, during a US military exercise known like Millennium Challengea retired general managed to surprise to a technologically superior fleet using unconventional tactics and unexpected means, and did so to the point of virtually “sinking” several ships in a matter of minutes. That simulation left an uncomfortable conclusion For many strategists: in certain scenarios, it is not always whoever has the most means who wins, but whoever best understands how to adapt to new forms of combat. From video games to the real battlefield. The story They told Insider. Apparently, Ukraine has found a totally unexpected way to accelerate the training of drone pilots and perfect its field of action: video gamesand in particular in the environment achieved by Rockstar in Grand Theft Auto Vwhere operators perfect reflexes, coordination and decision-making in simulated scenarios. This practice does not replace military training, rather it complements it, and reveals the extent to which modern warfare is absorbing skills born outside the traditional sphereincorporating a generation accustomed to controls, screens and virtual environments. What begins as a simulation ends up moving to real operations where there is no margin for error, consolidating a combat model in which the line between game and war turns increasingly diffuse. Drones are approaching Moscow. In parallel to this training with GTAV, the range of the Ukrainian drones has been growing steadily until reaching areas ever closer to the political heart of Russia. They remembered in Forbes that deep attacks inside Russian territory, some a few kilometers away of the Kremlin, are breaking the perception of invulnerability that protected Moscow for years. The campaign does not seek only to destroy objectives, but to demonstrate penetration capacity and generate constant pressure that forces us to redistribute defenses and assume that the conflict is no longer far away, but increasingly closer. Victory Day under a new shadow. Yes, because the proximity of May 9, one of the most symbolic events For the Kremlin, it adds a particularly delicate dimension to this development. The parade is not only a military display, but a key piece in Russia’s narrative of power and control, and any alteration, even indirect, would have a disproportionate impact. The fact that it is being contemplated reduce its scale or modify Its format reflects the extent to which the drone threat has changed the strategic calculus, turning a celebration designed to project force into a potential point of vulnerability. A defense saturated and tested. The truth is that although Moscow remains one of the most protected spaces of the world, the accumulation of attacks is straining your systems defensive. Multiple layers of air defense, designed to intercept threats, now face a constant stream of drones seeking to overwhelm them, identify gaps, and wear them down over time. This approach does not depend on a single decisive blow, but on prolonged pressure that forces Russia to defend more and more points at the same time, progressively eroding its response capacity. Putin, more isolated and more protected. In fact, this week they explained in the Financial Times that, in this context, security around Vladimir Putin has visibly tightened, reflecting growing concern about possible attacks, including those carried out with drones. How much? Apparently, the president has reduced their movements, spend more time in bunkers and operate under stricter security protocols, while their environment is subjected to increasingly rigorous controls. This evolution not only responds to physical risks, but also to the need to preserve an image of control at a time when the conflict begins to feel closer to the center of power. The psychological war that accompanies technological warfare. Beyond the material impact, the Ukrainian drone campaign is having a increasing psychological effectboth in the political elite and in Russian society. Each raid that breaks through defenses reinforces the idea that no place is completely safe, weakening a narrative built on distance and control. If you want too, while drones continue to advance and pilots train even in virtual worlds like GTAVthe war enters a phase where the perception of risk it’s so important as the real damage, and where the pressure on Moscow increases just when it most needs to project stability. Image | Wiki In Xataka | Ukraine has just opened the last Russian missile and is still amazed: the real enemy has a “friendly” face In Xataka | Russia has named Ukraine’s most fearsome drone: they call it Zhduns and it doesn’t need to show itself, just wait

Now we know that the Iranian Air Force did to the US what Ukraine could not do to Russia with drones: an abysmal hole

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During the Vietnam War, American commanders discovered that some of their most protected bases they could be hit unexpectedly due to coordinated attacks low costforcing to reinforce defenses that until then were considered sufficient and making it clear that, in war, the feeling of security is usually more fragile than it seems. The blow that no one expected. For decades, the US military architecture in the Middle East relied on in a network of bases designed to surround and contain Iran, a direct heir to the Cold War doctrine and designed to project power quickly. However, a report that came to light this weekend on NBC News has revealed a radical inversion of that logic in the war of 2026: what was supposed to be a shield has become a set of exposed objectives, hit in a coordinated manner by Iranian attacks that hit more than a hundred targets in several countries. We are talking about critical infrastructures such as runways, radars, hangars, command centers or defense systems were damaged or destroyed, and the impact was neither marginal nor symbolic, but structuralaffecting the very functioning of the US deployment in the region. The fence that ended up surrounded. The system of bases in Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, the Emirates or Saudi Arabia was designed to suffocate Iran, but its ability to attack key logistics nodes turned the equation around. How much? It appears that critical facilities were left disabled or evacuatedincluding the headquarters of the Fifth Fleet in Bahrainwhile multiple bases in Iraq and Kuwait had to be abandoned or rendered inoperative. The pressure was such that even the resupply became problematicleaving the American forces themselves in a position close to the siege they intended to impose. The encirclement strategy, which seemed unquestionable for decades, suddenly showed its fragility in the face of an adversary with saturation capacity through missiles, drones and aviation. The hole that changes war. What is most revealing is not only the extent of the damage, but what they represent for Washington: for the first time in years, a rival has managed to systematically drill US military infrastructure at multiple points at once. Iran not only hit bases, but achieved something that until now seemed beyond the reach of other recent conflicts: opening a deep and sustained hole in the defensive framework of the United States, affecting radarsair defenses and strategic assets. That ability to simultaneously degrade multiple layers of the system is reminiscent of what other actors have tried unsuccessfully in wars like the one in Ukraine, but here it translated in real effects on the ground, altering the operational balance and forcing us to rethink the assumed superiority. From control to operational chaos. The middle counted American that the intensity of the attacks and the speed with which they occurred generated a scenario of disorganization that overwhelmed the usual command and control mechanisms. Bases evacuatedemergency relocated personnel and even improvised situations what do we countsuch as the use of civil infrastructure, reflect the extent to which operational pressure broke the planned patterns. Plus: the inability to anticipate and managing the real scope of the attacks, added to the lack of clear communication about the damage, fueled the perception of an overwhelmed response to a type of more distributed warfaster and harder to contain. A cost beyond money. Although initial estimates speak of billions dollars in repairs (not counting advanced systems or unrecoverable equipment), the true impact possibly transcends the economic. What has been affected is the military deployment model itself: the idea that a network of advanced bases guarantees regional control. In other words, the war has shown that, faced with an adversary capable of to attack in depth with means relatively accessiblethis hitherto untouchable network may become a rather critical vulnerability. The result in the pavement American is not only a balance sheet of damages, but a strategic warning that forces us to give more than one turn to its scheme of how military power is projected in a world where distance is already does not protect the same. Image | x In Xataka | If the war resumes again, the US runs a risk unprecedented in the history of war: that the only one with missiles will be Iran. In Xataka | If the question is why the US attacked an Iranian ship with a weapon unprecedented in 40 years, we already know the answer: a “gift from China”

The Pentagon wants to invest $54 billion in drones. It is more than the entire military budget of countries like Ukraine

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The defense budget that the Pentagon has presented for fiscal year 2027 amounts to $1.5 trillion. It is the largest year-on-year increase in military spending since World War II, but in that colossal figure there is another that deserves special attention. This is the $53.6 billion allocated exclusively to drones and autonomous warfare technologies. That amount alone exceeds the Ukraine’s full defense budget either of countries like South Korea or Italy. Spain is even further away. autonomous defense. The money for this specific program will be managed by the Defense Autonomous Warfare Group (DAWG), an agency created at the end of 2025. In the 2026 budget it received 226 million dollars, but in 2027 that figure would be multiplied almost by 240. The United States has realized the relevance that drones have gained in war conflicts and wants to be prepared for this new era of defense. Obsolete investment. The Pentagon itself recognized something striking: the vast majority of the money requested will be used to buy technology that already exists, not to develop future solutions. One of the top officials of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Lieutenant General Steven Whitney, admitted that technological evolution on the battlefield currently happens in weeks, not years. It’s like admitting that what you buy now may become obsolete almost immediately. Ukraine showed that change has changed. The urgency of this budget does not come from nowhere. The war in Ukraine has rewritten the rules of modern combat In such a way that there are many countries that are processing how to assume these changes. Iranian Shahed droneswhich cost about $20,000 per unit, have proven capable of saturating air defense systems that cost hundreds of times more. Relatively affordable quadcopter drones have destroyed multi-million euro tanks and armored vehicles. Defense budgets in 2025. The US already spent 921 billion dollars last year, this year it wants to spend 50% more. Everything goes very fast. The speed of tactical adaptation on the Ukrainian front has been so high that innovations and tactics that work in January may be obsolete by March. Not because someone has invented something better, but because the adversary has found a way to counter those strategies. The Pentagon has reached an unusual conclusion: the traditional model of weapons acquisition that operated in cycles of years or even decades is structurally incompatible with the speed at which current war conflicts are developing. The irony of the Shahed. Among the most striking details of the budget is the confirmation that the American army has adapted the technology of the Iranian Shahed dronewhich is the same one that has been attacking cities and energy infrastructures in Ukraine for years. The US has done reverse engineering of your adversary’s design to incorporate it into your own arsenal. This clearly illustrates the current war reality: the origin of the technology does not matter, but its effectiveness. Risks. This tension between “we have to spend more” and the speed at which it is necessary to adapt to this reality poses an enormous risk. Buy en masse what works today guarantees that solutions will be available tomorrow. The problem is that these solutions may be technically inferior to those that the adversary has developed in the meantime. The same thing happens if you decide not to buy anything until you have the perfect technology, because that means arriving late (or not arriving at all). It is a dilemma similar to that of technology companies and their investment in infrastructure: they have to buy solutions now that they know that they will end up being obsolete in the short or medium term. Final approval is missing. The US Congress will have to approve the budget, which introduces an important political variable. Beyond that, there is a fundamental question in those 54,000 million in this budget. If drone technology evolves in weeks, there is no money that will be able to buy that adaptability to the modern battlefield. And that even with this immense budget superiority cannot be guaranteed makes clear the sign of the times. In Xataka | The percentage of GDP that each country allocates to Defense, shown in this graph with an unavoidable protagonist

Ukraine has knocked down Russian shaheds from a hotel 500 kilometers away

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During a military test in the United States, a pilot managed to land a fighter plane without touching the controls and miles away, guiding it only through a remote connection as if it were a simulator. A decade has passed, and what then seemed like an almost experimental technological curiosity revealed a disturbing possibility: that one day the most critical decisions in a conflict could be made very far from where they actually occur. The war from the basement. Ukraine has introduced a silent but profound change on the battlefield: the possibility of fighting without being physically in it, operating drones from secure locations hundreds of kilometers from the target. counted in one piece the financial times that, from spaces as discreet as basements in kyiv, highly specialized operators control interceptors that no longer depend on short-range radio frequencies, but on secure internet connections that eliminate distance as a real limitation. This leap allows the same pilot to intervene in multiple scenarios without exposing himself to enemy fire, transforming the traditional logic of combat and reducing one of the greatest costs of war: direct human risk. The distance no longer matters. The unprecedented fact that a drone has been controlled from a hotel 500 km away to shoot down two Russian shahed drones is not a technological anecdote, but a clear sign of where the conflict is evolving. Until recently, pilots had to operate close to the front, making them priority targets. Now, that vulnerability is diluted. Modern warfare enters a phase in which the location of the operator becomes irrelevant (due to remoteness), and where the range is no longer determined by the vehicle, but the network that connects it. The invisible key. The Times told This leap is based on a combination of advanced connectivity and artificial intelligence that allows you to maintain control even in the most hostile environments, with interference or momentary signal loss. As? It seems that current systems not only transmit orders, they also interpret images, identify targets and correct trajectories in real time, reducing operator burden and increasing accuracy. In this context, connectivity (that kind of militarized “WiFi”) stops being a support and becomes the true core of the system that pulls the strings. From improvisation to mastery. Plus: what started as an emergency solution to the shortage of missiles has become anthe pillar of defense aerial in certain areas, spaces where drones already intercept most threats. The key is once again that low cost and ease of deployment that allow saturate airspace with multiple layers of protection, freeing up more expensive systems for critical missions. This model not only resists massive attacks, but quickly adapts to new threats. Hitting where it was impossible. At the same time, this developing technology is making it possible to bring war to the enemy rear with unprecedented precision. We are talking about drones with autonomous decision-making capacity that are attacking logistics routes (the surrounding area of ​​the city of Donetsk) and weakening key defensive systems, facilitating operations that were previously unfeasible, and the decrease in these defenses opens windows of opportunity for deeper, more frequent and effective attacks. A system without borders. It is the last of the legs to analyze, because the integration of air, land and naval platforms reinforces this entire transformation, creating a kind of distributed combat network where each element amplifies the scope of the whole. In fact, that’s why intercepting drones from the sea (this week they shot down a shahed for the first time from a naval platform) or coordinating attacks from multiple domains is no longer an exception, but the next step logical. In this scenario, war is no longer defined by geographical lines and begins to depend on networks, nodes and connections. Invisibility. If you also want and as a last note, these advances give a conflict model where physical distance loses all the relevance of yesteryear compared to the capacity for connection. In other words, a scenario that until recently was more typical of a science fiction movie is opening up, one where a few operators can manage multiple systems from locations as remote as a room or a basement 500 km away away from “the war”, and where the front dissolves to become an extended network. Image | National Police of Ukraine In Xataka | From printing drones to looking at lasers, 300 reports have revealed that Iran’s battle manual has one name: Ukraine In Xataka | A disturbing idea has begun to take hold in Europe: Ukraine has turned Russia into a fearsome air force

From printing drones to looking at lasers. 300 reports have revealed that Iran’s battle manual has one name: Ukraine

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Barely a year after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, groups of volunteers began to assemble drones fighting in improvised workshops using parts purchased online and open manuals, managing to put operating systems on the air in a matter of days. The scene, closer to a technological garage than a military factory, reflected the extent to which modern warfare was about to change without making almost noise. Ukraine as a war manual. I told it a few hours ago in exclusive to the Financial Times. The war in Ukraine has become a central reference for Iranian military thinking, to the point that much of its current doctrine is being built on what is happening there. That has now been known through more than 300 reports prepared in military centers that analyze everything from industrial production in conflict to tactical adaptation in the face of a superior enemy. This effort is not theoretical, but applied: there is great number of manualstraining and planning that have been updated to incorporate direct lessons from the battlefield in a process that reveals a clear idea, that the future of war is already written in Ukraine and that, possibly, those who do not study it will be late. From cheap drones to doctrine. One of the most decisive learnings we have been counting these years: the role of low cost dronescapable of changing the balance of forces with a completely different logic from the traditional one, where volume and price weigh as much as precision. Iran has understood that cheap systems, produced even with commercial components and accessible techniques such as 3D printing, can overwhelm advanced defenses and exploit structural weaknesses of technologically superior armies, replicating a model that has already proven effective in both Ukraine and in their own confrontations recent. The problem of the West. Not only that. The expansion of these drones has exposed a critical gap in Western defenses, designed to intercept expensive and sophisticated threatsbut not massive waves of cheap systems, which has generated an obvious economic imbalance. While a drone can cost tens of thousands of dollars, intercepting it is the opposite and can involve missiles in the equation. extremely more expensivecreating financial and logistical wear and tear that has already become visible in recent conflicts, where spending skyrockets and arsenals begin to become dangerously strained. Beyond the present: AI and emerging weapons. Featured in an interactive special The New York Times that, however, Iranian learning has not stopped in the immediate present, but rather projects the conflict into the future, incorporating into its planning technologies such as artificial intelligence, cyber warfare or even emerging systems such as directed energy weapons. The own internal analysis They point to the need to integrate these advances in decision making, weapons guidance and combat management, in a transition that seeks not only to adapt, but to anticipate the next phase of the technological conflict. An evolving doctrine. There is no doubt, this change is also doctrinal, with a commitment to more units agile, decentralized and capable to operate with greater autonomy, inspired by the way in which Ukraine has managed to resist and adapt to a more powerful adversary such as Russia. If you like, what the combination of operational flexibility and accessible technology is doing is redefining the concept of superiority military, moving it away from large platforms and towards distributed and resilient systems that can evolve quickly, and there the massive use of FPV drones appears with its own name. From Ukraine to Iran. Ultimately, all of this results in a profound transformation in the way in which Iran conceives warone where Ukraine acts as a real reference manual of battle that guides from the manufacture of cheap drones to the ambition of integrating artificial intelligence and more advanced systems such as lasers. From that perspective, it is not just about copying each Ukrainian step, but about adapting, scaling and combining solutions to build our own strategy that turns kyiv’s experience into future advantage, in a scenario where we are already seeing that rapid innovation and low cost can outweigh the most sophisticated technology from the United States. Image | RawPixelWild Hornets In Xataka | China was the power that launched drones. Now he has realized his danger with a decision: close the sky to them In Xataka | While everyone was looking at the Middle East, North Korea has had time to do what Iran has not been able to: go nuclear.

Ukraine has turned Russia into a fearsome air force

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In 1991, during the Gulf War, the United States discovered something uncomfortable: despite its total air superiority, it could not prevent Iraq from continuing to launch scud missiles from mobile platforms that appeared and disappeared in the desert. That frustration left a clear lesson For military strategists: in modern warfare, it is not enough to dominate the air, you must constantly adapt to an enemy that also learns. From questioned strength to real threat. During the first stages of the invasion of Ukraine, Russian aviation was perceived like a disappointment unable to achieve air superiority, which led many Western analysts to perhaps hastily underestimate it. However, with the passage of time, that vision has started to change disturbingly, especially in Europe, where aviation security experts have focused on something that is no longer an intuition: that the conflict has not weakened Russia, but rather the has forced to learn. Accumulated experience, system improvements and tactical adaptation have transformed a force that seemed limited into a much more dangerous and credible actor than it was before 2022. War as a laboratory. They remembered on Insider that, far from collapsing, Russian aviation has used Ukraine as a real training environment where pilots and crews have gained experience in high-intensity combat. Although it has lost aircraft, it has retained a large part of its qualified personnel and has compensated for those losses with sustained production of new aircraft, which has allowed it to maintain and even expand its fleet. This process has corrected one of its greatest historical weaknesses, the lack of flight hours, turning its pilots into more prepared fighters for complex scenarios. More reach, less risk. One of the most significant changes has been the evolution of his attack capacitywhich now increasingly relies on long-range weapons and systems that allow you to hit without directly exposing yourself. We are talking about advanced missiles, gliding bombs and remote attacks that have reduced the need to penetrate defended airspace, greatly complicating the enemy response. This way of fighting has not only proven to be effective in Ukraine, but also poses a worrying scenario. for future conflictswhere control of the air no longer depends solely on physically dominating it. Constant pressure from the air. They counted on ukrainian media that, in parallel, Russia has intensified its air campaign with massive and increasingly sophisticated use of drones and missiles, launching thousands of devices and perfecting saturation tactics to overwhelm defenses. Coordinated attacks, changes in flight patterns and the combination of different types of weapons have made it possible to maintain continuous pressure on infrastructure and the civilian population, generating not only material but also psychological wear. This strategy turns air into space permanent threatwhere the defense can never relax. A more complex threat. If you will, the result is a Russian air force that, although it still has structural limitations and does not match NATO in a direct confrontation, has become much scariest and most difficult to counteract. The combination of strengthened air defense, better coordination between systems and a more adaptive doctrine presents a scenario for its enemies in which achieving air superiority will be much more expensive and risky. In other words, a paradox has developed and is beginning to take hold, one where Ukraine has not only resisted Russian aviation, but, by forcing it to evolve, has contributed to turning it into a more sophisticated and persistent threat to the European military balance. Image | Alan Wilsonparfaits In Xataka | If fog was deadly in Ukraine’s winter, spring is offering Russia a key advantage: greenery In Xataka | Ukraine is close to what no one has achieved in a war: shooting down missiles for less than a million dollars

Ukraine has tested whether Russia was complying with the ceasefire with an optical illusion in the open field. The video is self-explanatory

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during the call Christmas Truce In the First World War, enemy soldiers came out of their trenches, exchanged gifts and even played soccer games in no man’s land, in one of the most unusual episodes of the conflict. That scene, as brief as it was unexpected, showed to what extent war can change shape in a matter of hours. A ceasefire on paper. Russia had announced a ceasefire for Orthodox Easter with a strong symbolic and political component, seeking to project an image of negotiating will in the middle of war. However, on the ground the reality has been very different, with thousands of violations recorded in just 32 hours, including artillery attacks, assaults and a massive use of tactical drones. Although long-range attacks were reduced, information arriving from kyiv They point out that the intensity on the near front was maintained, reflecting a dynamic where pauses are used more as a narrative tool than as a true attempt to stop the fighting. The war of stories. Both Moscow and kyiv tried to position themselves as the party that respected the truce, in a conditioned diplomatic pulse also due to international pressure, especially from the United States. While Russia defended having complied with the ceasefire, Ukraine documented thousands of violations in a matter of hours, showing an obvious gap between the official discourse and what was happening on the battlefield. This duality reinforced the idea that truce announcements are part of a communication strategy as much as the war itself. The unexpected test: an optical illusion. In this context, Ukraine decided to go beyond the accusations and designed a direct test to check Russian behavior: evacuate apparently own soldiers, unarmed and wounded, complying with all the conditions of a ceasefire. It turns out that, in reality, it was Russian prisoners in disguise with neutral uniforms, used as a kind of “visual bait” to verify whether the agreements were respected. The scene functioned as a kind of terrifying optical illusion on the battlefield, where what looked like a legitimate evacuation hid a carefully prepared experiment. The video that dismantles the truce. The outcome was so fast as forceful: because a swarm of Russian drones attacked the evacuees, killing several of them without knowing that they were actually their own captured soldiers. The episode, recorded on video and broadcast Later on different social networks, he crudely exposed the fragility of the ceasefire and the inability (or lack of will) to respect it even in situations clearly protected by the rules of war. Beyond the tactical impact, the incident became in a visual test difficult to refute about what was really happening on the front. An episode that also leaves everyone in a bad light due to the crudeness of the visual piece. An impossible truce. If you also want, the set of events confirms that the ceasefire was, in practice, untenable in a conflict where both parties seek to maintain the military initiative while competing for the international narrative. For Russia, the test reveals the extent to which modern combat (based on the intensive use of drones, quick decisions and targets detected without full verification) can turn against him even in sensitive situations. For Ukraine, the test not only highlighted Russian non-compliance, but also showed the extent to which the battle has entered a phase where even humanitarian gestures can become in strategic tools. In this scenario, the truce was nothing more than a nominal pause in a war that continues to develop with the same intensity under a layer of unfulfilled promises. Image | x In Xataka | If fog was deadly in Ukraine’s winter, spring is offering Russia a key advantage: greenery In Xataka | Ukraine is close to what no one has achieved in a war: shooting down missiles for less than a million dollars

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