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The US has had an idea to reassure Europe. Instead of soldiers, he is going to bring his nuclear weapons very close to Russia

June 2, 2026 by usatoday24

In 1983, tens of thousands of women surrounded a British air base to protest the deployment of American nuclear missiles. That mobilization, known in time as Greenham Commonbecame one of the major antinuclear symbols of the Cold War and showed the extent to which the location of these weapons could alter European politics. Less soldiers, more “nuclear”. Europe has been trying to figure out what it really means for months the strategic turn of the United States. The reduction of troops, the withdrawal of some military systems and the increasing priority given to the Indo-Pacific have fueled fears that Washington is progressively moving away from the continent. However, conversations within NATO point to a very different response than expected. Instead of reinforcing the conventional presence, the United States would be willing to expand the deployment of nuclear capabilities in Europe to demonstrate that its commitment to the defense of the continent remains intact. The idea is simple but powerful: if there are fewer American uniforms on the ground, the nuclear umbrella must remain visible and credibleeven “closer.” The closer the interest is to Russia. There is no doubt, the allies most interested in this possibility are precisely those who observe Russia from the first line. Poland has been leading for years the list of candidates to host US nuclear capabilities and some Baltic countries have also shown interest in participating in future deterrence formulas. The invasion of Ukraine and Putin’s continued references to its nuclear arsenal have profoundly changed the perception of security in Eastern Europe. I remembered the financial times that, for these countries, hosting aircraft capable of using US nuclear weapons would have enormous political and military value, since it would turn any threat against them into an issue directly linked to Washington’s strategic credibility. The legacy of the Cold War. The proposal does not involve creating a new system, but rather expanding a mechanism that has existed for decades. Currently Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Türkiye and the United Kingdom participate in the program nuclear delivery of NATO, through which they store American nuclear weapons under exclusive control of Washington and train their air forces to operate within that scheme. This model was born during the Cold War to guarantee that European allies could participate in the Alliance’s nuclear strategy without having to develop their own atomic weapons. More than half a century later, the formula is once again gaining prominence in a continent that watches with concern the deterioration of the relationship with Moscow. Europe seeks to replace some capabilities, but not others. European capitals have assumed that they will have to spend more in defense and rebuild conventional capabilities that for decades were delegated to the United States. From anti-missile systems to strategic transportation to military intelligence, much of the current conversation revolves around how to fill those gaps. However, there is one area that many governments they consider it impossible to replace in the short term: the American nuclear deterrent. Although France and the United Kingdom have their own arsenals, Washington’s umbrella continues to be perceived as the central element of the European security architecture and as the ultimate guarantee against any military escalation. The signal that Washington wants to send. They told in the Times that for now there is no final decision and the conversations remain highly confidential. Still, the mere fact that the possibility is on the table reveals how Western strategy toward Russia is changing. For years the US military presence in Europe was measured in bases, brigades and deployed troops. Now the discussion increasingly revolves around another type of message. While Washington concentrates resources in Asia and requires its allies to assume a greater share of the defensive effortthe signal it seeks to convey is that nuclear protection remains intact. In a way, the new formula to reassure Europe is not to bring more soldiers closer to the Russian borders, but to bring closer what for decades has served as a last guarantee of security: American nuclear weapons. Image | Air Force, SJOERD HILCKMANN In Xataka | Spain’s great fear is not an invasion: it is a slow hybrid war with Morocco against its two most vulnerable cities In Xataka | To become technologically “independent” from the US, the European Union already has a plan: four desperate measures

Russia is hiding its vehicles with paint

June 2, 2026 by usatoday24

The scene is a of the most remembered of the First World War. It happened when the British Navy began painting their ships with huge stripes and geometric shapes in 1917, when many thought they had gone crazy: instead of hiding them, they made them more visible. However, that idea ended up spreading to thousands of ships because it achieved something much more important than hiding them: making it difficult for the enemy to know where to aim. War is no longer just against humans. The evolution of drones in Ukraine is pushing the battlefield into increasingly strange. For centuries, camouflage had an obvious objective: to deceive enemy soldiers, observers or pilots. Now Russia is recovering the technique born in World War I for a completely different purpose. Your trucks Ural and KAMAZ are appearing covered by geometric patterns black and white, similar to used by ships that were trying to confuse German submarines, but this time the recipient of the deception is not a person looking through a periscope, but an algorithm trained to recognize vehicles from the air. When the enemy is an AI. The proliferation of Ukrainian drones equipped with artificial vision systems is changing the rules of the game. These devices already do not depend exclusively of a human operator to identify targets in real time, but they can learn to recognize, classify and track vehicles using image recognition algorithms. The Russian bet consists of visually alter the appearance of their trucks to the point that the software cannot identify them with enough confidence to authorize an attack. It is an unprecedented form of war: physically modifying the world to exploit the limitations of artificial intelligence. USS West Mahomet in dazzling camouflage, 1918 The new race between drones and countermeasures. The painting is only the latest chapter in a long chain of improvisations that emerged during the war. Before and as we have been saying, they arrived metal cages about the armored ones, the so-called “turtle tanks”the protective netsthe structures spiked and even the placed logs on vehicles as improvised armor. Covered Russian bombers also appeared with old tires and warships painted with special patterns to break their silhouette seen from above. All of these solutions respond to the same phenomenon: drones have become such a ubiquitous threat that any method capable of making its identification difficult deserves to be tested. Vehicles are no longer safe in the rear. The importance of these measures reflects the extent to which drones are expanding the scope of the war. Thanks to artificial intelligence, attack systems can autonomously search for targets in huge areas, distinguish active vehicles from destroyed ones and even operate in coordinated swarms. Thus, logistics trucks that could previously move relatively calmly away from the front can now be located and attacked dozens of kilometers away. The rear has become an extension of the battlefield and every moving vehicle is a possible target. A battle between programmers and painters. The big question is whether these paints will really work. Algorithms can be quickly retrained and learn to recognize new patterns, while sensors such as infrared could be seen less affected than conventional cameras. However, even temporary effectiveness would have value if it forces the adversary to devote time, resources, and computing power to solving the problem. That is perhaps the most striking conclusion of the latter and rocambolesca History: The drone war in Ukraine has reached a point where combats no longer only pit weapons against weapons, but also anti camouflage softwareengineers against engineers and algorithms against paint stains designed specifically to fool a machine. Image | X, Wikimedia In Xataka | Thousands of elderly Ukrainians are isolated at the front. An army of drones is coming to your rescue In Xataka | Ukraine has been left without thousands of drones: an error classified them as electric cars and the Treasury has fried them with taxes

is coming back from Russia and bombing its own soldiers

May 26, 2026 by usatoday24

In World War II, many armies reused captured enemy tanks simply painting over their own symbols and returning them to combat days later. Eight decades later, the war in Ukraine has regained that same logic… only now the weapons come flying back at night. The night witch changes owners. The Baba Yaga heavy drones had become one of the weapons most feared of the Ukrainian arsenal. Large, slow and capable of transporting mines, projectiles or supplies during night flights, these devices ended up generating such fear among Russian soldiers that they ended up baptizing them with the name of the Slavic folklore witch that stalks its victims in the dark. The problem for Ukraine is that that same psychological weapon is now beginning to return from the other side of the front. Russia is capturing, repairing and reusing quantities Baba Yaga crescents shot down to bombard Ukrainian positions with exactly the same tactics who for years terrorized their own troops. Drone warfare has thus entered a strange phase where weapons no longer only change hands: they also change identity. The problem with heavy drones. Unlike the small, cheap, disposable FPV drones that dominate much of the battlefield, the Baba Yaga are complex platforms and relatively difficult to manufacture. The reason? They need high lifting capacity, flight stability, sufficient autonomy and robust systems to resist electronic interference. Carrying heavy loads for miles requires huge batteries, powerful motors and strong structures capable of withstanding constant vibrations and partial damage. Ukraine managed to develop these systems thanks to a combination of ingenuity, adaptation of commercial technology and decentralized production outside the slow traditional military channels. Russia, on the other hand, has had much more trouble producing a large-scale operational equivalent despite multiple publicly announced projects. Russian electronic warfare finds an opportunity. The Baba Yaga reuse captured reveals the extent to which Russian electronic warfare remains one of its greatest strengths. Many of these drones are shot down not by sophisticated missiles, but by exploiting something much simpler: its repetitive patterns flight and its permanent radio links. Russian systems detect, track and saturate these signals until they cause the devices to lose control and crash relatively intact. Others are killed by conventional fire because, being large and slow, they are much more visible than the small FPVs. Russia has even deployed specialized equipment of snipers specifically dedicated to destroying these drones. The important detail is that damaging a rotor or a support arm is enough to render the device unusable without completely destroying its structure. From the battlefield to the improvised workshop. They counted in Forbes that the increasing number of recoverable drones has allowed Russia develop an ecosystem Surprisingly effective makeshift repair kit. Workshops operated by soldiers and volunteers disassemble captured Baba Yaga, replace damaged parts through 3D printing and install new systems compatible with Russian communication networks. What started as an emergency solution is gradually becoming a stable supply of drones heavy for Moscow. In a way, Ukraine is inadvertently providing some of the raw material that Russia needed to cover one of the most obvious shortcomings in its unmanned aerial arsenal. The phenomenon reminds us that in a prolonged war of attrition, each downed device can end up having a second life at the service of the enemy. The irony of night attacks. The broadcast images by Russian soldiers already show scenes that just a few years ago would have seemed absurd: Ukrainian Baba Yaga launching anti-tank mines, mortar shells and improvised bombs on kyiv positions. Some Russian commanders even talk about them using the same nickname that previously symbolized the night terror of Ukrainian troops. The irony is especially cruel because these drones were conceived precisely as a Ukrainian technological advantage over Russian industrial superiority. Now some are being employed for supply outposts Russians, attack Ukrainian trenches or support night assaults using thermal cameras identical to those used by kyiv. A new phase of drones. All of this reflects a profound change in the logic of modern technological warfare. For years it was assumed that the key was to design weapons more advanced than the enemy. In Ukraine it has been imposing for some time another reality: It also matters who can best recover, recycle and reuse the material destroyed on the battlefield. Russia has found a relatively cheap way to close part of the technological gap with Ukraine without waiting to develop equivalent platforms from scratch. This now forces kyiv to study unprecedented solutions such as anti-handling systems capable of automatically destroying critical components if the device falls intact into enemy hands or even introduce malicious software designed to sabotage Russian networks after the capture of the drone. Image | X, Armed Forces In Xataka | Russia has discovered a brutal way to strip the Ukrainian defense: force it to spend Patriots it cannot replace In Xataka | Russia has found something more important than drones in China: secret training for the war in Ukraine

Russia turned gliding bombs into Ukraine’s nightmare. 17 months later Ukraine is giving him his own medicine

May 21, 2026 by usatoday24

Two years ago Russia launched a FAB-3000 pump of three tons over Kharkov and the shock wave was so powerful that several local seismic sensors recorded it as if it were a small earthquake. Until then, Ukraine barely had a way to respond to a weapon capable of striking from tens of kilometers away. The nightmare that changed the war. For much of 2023 and 2024, Russian gliding bombs became one of the most devastating weapons of the entire war. Moscow discovered that it could transform old Soviet bombs into long-range munitions simply by adding relatively cheap wings and guidance systems. The result It was devastating: huge FABs of 250, 500 or 1,000 kilos launched from dozens of kilometers away, out of the reach of many Ukrainian anti-aircraft defenses, capable of destroying fortified positions, bridges, logistics centers or entire neighborhoods. For Ukraine, this became a problem almost impossible to solve. Shooting down each bomb was extremely difficult, attacking the launching planes forced them to get too close to the front and each new Russian kit multiplied the pressure on cities like Kharkiv, Sumy or Zaporizhia. Seventeen months searching for an answer. The appearance now of the first gliding bomb Ukrainian marks something much more important than the presentation of new ammunition. It represents the moment in which kyiv believes it has found your own answer to one of the weapons that have done the most damage during the last two years. Development reportedly began in December 2024 and has required 17 months of work until reaching the final tests and the first official order from the Ministry of Defense. The weapon, named like Vyrivniuvach (“Equalizer”), uses a 250-kilogram warhead and has been designed specifically for the real conditions of the Ukrainian war. It is not simply a question of copying a Western or Soviet model: Ukrainian engineers tried to build an adapted pump to a scenario where planes fly at low altitude to avoid radars, where anti-aircraft defenses cover enormous areas and where each weapon must be cheap, quick to manufacture and easy to integrate. The importance of manufacturing at home. The great advantage of this bomb is not only military, but also industrial and strategic. Until now Ukraine depended on Western kits like the JDAM-ER American or French Hammer to convert conventional bombs into long-range guided weapons. The problem is that these systems arrive in limited quantities, depend on external political decisions and often include restrictions on where they can be used. kyiv had been trying for months to escape that dependence by building its own war industry. The Vyrivniuvach fits perfectly into that logic: according to its developers it costs approximately three times less than a JDAM-ER, can be prepared in less than half an hour and is designed to be integrated into already operational platforms such as the Su-24, MiG-29, Su-27 and even Western F-16 or Mirage 2000. A Russian UMPK gliding bomb attached to a Su-34 An increasingly cheaper and more massive war. The evolution of gliding bombs also reflects a profound change in modern warfare. For years, cruise missiles seemed like the ultimate symbol of precision strike. Ukraine and Russia have proven otherwise: It is often more efficient to adapt old weapons with relatively simple kits and mass produce them. Russia understood this earlier and converted its FABs with UMPK modules into a true constant attrition machinery against the Ukrainian defenses. Ukraine has ended up following the same path. The logic is brutally practical: a gliding bomb does not need complex engines, can be launched from great distances, costs much less than an advanced missile and forces the enemy to expend much more expensive anti-aircraft interceptors or accept the impact. The problem of attacking from outside enemy range. They counted the TWZ analysts that what made Russian bombs especially dangerous was the possibility of launching them outside the radius of many Ukrainian defenses. Russian planes could get relatively close to the front, release their ammunition, and return without directly entering areas covered by Patriot or NASAMS. Ukraine now wants exactly that same ability. Your new bomb is designed to hit targets located “tens of kilometers” behind Russian lines, including fortifications, command posts or logistics centers. This allows you to attack without constantly exposing the pilots to the densest air defenses on the front. Furthermore, as it is a national system, kyiv can use it against any target it deems necessary without depending on external authorizations or political limitations imposed by Western allies. Ukraine’s industrial war. The Vyrivniuvach It also symbolizes the extent to which Ukraine has ceased to be simply a country that receives Western weapons and has become a power. of improvised military innovation out of necessity. In just two years, kyiv has developed long-range kamikaze drones, unmanned naval systems, new munitions and electronic warfare solutions built at high speed and at low cost. The glider bomb is part of that same transformation. Ukraine understood that it could not win a long war by relying solely on limited foreign arsenals or deliveries subject to political debates in Washington or Brussels. That’s why the message behind this new weapon is so important: Russia turned gliding bombs into one of the biggest symbols of Ukrainian vulnerability, but seventeen months later Ukraine seems to have managed to hit back using exactly the same weapon. industrial and military logic. Image | Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, Russian Ministry of Defense In Xataka | Satellite images reveal how much Russia fears Ukraine’s drones. 7,000 km away they are covering their nuclear missiles In Xataka | Once again, Ukraine has opened a missile launched by Russia. Once again, surprising manufacturers have been found

Satellite images reveal how much Russia fears Ukraine’s drones. 7,000 km away they are covering their nuclear missiles

May 20, 2026 by usatoday24

The British Navy discovered something truly absurd during naval tests in 1945: a single flock of birds could appear on the radar with a signature similar to that of enemy aircraft. Eight decades later, some of the most sophisticated military systems on the planet clash again to the same problem: Tiny, cheap threats that are difficult to distinguish before it is too late. The drone war against the Russian nuclear arsenal. They counted this week in Naval News that satellite images taken over the Russian submarine base of Rybachiy, on the Kamchatka Peninsula, reveal the extent to which drone warfare in Ukraine is altering Russian military logic even thousands of kilometers from the front. to some 7,400 kilometers of Ukrainetwo strategic nuclear submarines of the Borei class They have appeared completely covered with anti-drone nets while they remain docked in port. The scene is shocking because these submarines are part of the core of Russian nuclear deterrent: each one carries 16 Bulava ballistic missiles capable of launching intercontinental nuclear attacks. However, even that geographical distance no longer seems sufficient for Moscow to feel completely safe from possible surprise Ukrainian operations. From the Black Sea to the Pacific nuclear fleet. The evolution reflects how drones have ceased to be an exclusively tactical problem and have become a strategic threat. Russia had been installing for some time cages, nets and metal structures improvised on ships and patrol boats in the Black Sea to try to stop Ukrainian FPV attacks. Now that same logic has reached some of the most sensitive platforms in its entire military arsenal. The fear does not seem to focus so much on drones launched directly from Ukraine, something practically impossible at such a distance, but on covert operations similar to those that have already hit Russian targets very far from the front. The idea of small cheap drones reaching multi-million dollar strategic assets It has even begun to modify the protection of nuclear submarines. A small threat capable of altering the strategic balance. The nets observed on the Borei do not hide the submarines from satellites nor do they serve as conventional camouflage. Its function It’s purely defensive.: prevent light drones from approaching, landing on the deck or launching explosive charges at vulnerable points, especially on hatches and exposed systems while the submarines are on the surface. Russia had already installed similar protections on some Baltic and Arctic submarines, but on Rybachiy the coverage is much more extensive and envelops practically the entire vessel. There is no doubt, the image conveys a certainly powerful conclusion: the Kremlin already considers it plausible that cheap, improvised and difficult to detect attacks could threaten even part of its nuclear triad. The great psychological change of the war in Ukraine. Beyond the real effectiveness of these networks, the important detail is rather psychological and strategic. Ukraine has managed to get Russia to dedicate resources, time and defensive concern to bases located on the other end of the continent Eurasian. For decades, the logic of nuclear deterrence assumed that submarines hidden in remote bases were virtually untouchable except in an all-out war between great powers. And this is where drones have begun to erode that sense of immunity. The war in Ukraine is showing that a country with limited resources can force a nuclear superpower to cover with mesh improvised some of their most important systems for fear of unexpected attacks. When “nuclear” fears the cheapest. In short, the image of nuclear submarines protected with networks recalls the extent to which the Ukrainian conflict is transforming modern military rules. Platforms designed to survive atomic wars, operate under the ocean for months, and launch intercontinental missiles now also have to worry about cheap quadcopters, commercial explosives, and improvised attacks. Of course, Russia still maintains a huge nuclear and naval advantagebut the proliferation of drones is altering something much more difficult to measure than weapons: the feeling of (in)security. And when even the most remote nuclear bases begin to be armored against small drones, it means that the war in Ukraine has already changed the global perception of military vulnerability. Image | Vantor In Xataka | Once again, Ukraine has opened a missile launched by Russia. Once again, surprising manufacturers have been found In Xataka | Russia has been advancing at a snail’s pace in Ukraine for months. That’s about to change because of one season: summer.

Ukraine has opened the missile that devastated kyiv. They have found 100 reasons to be angry, and not exactly with Russia

May 18, 2026 by usatoday24

In 2014, after the downing of flight MH17 over eastern Ukraine, international investigators spent months reconstructing fragments metallic weapons scattered among fields and roads to identify the weapon responsible. One of the biggest surprises was not just the missile itself, but the enormous amount of information that they could reveal small pieces seemingly insignificant. Ukraine has been “surprised” for some time by what is inside Russian war technology, but the latest perhaps exceeds anything seen before. The 100 components that should not be there. It we have been counting with numerous intercepted drones and missiles by kyiv, but the latest “unboxing” has set off alarms. The reason? When the Ukrainian teams they began to analyze the remains of the Kh-101 missiles that had hit residential buildings in the capital, they hoped to find Russian technology, perhaps Chinese parts or improvised systems to avoid sanctions. What they found was much more uncomfortable for the West: more than one hundred components manufactured by American and European companies inside each missile. Chips, microelectronics and systems produced years after sanctions began, including from this same 2026continued to appear in some of the most advanced weapons in the Russian arsenal. For Ukraine, the discovery has ended up generating a particularly bitter sensation: the missiles that they devastate the cities Ukrainians continue to partially depend on technology designed and manufactured by the same countries that support kyiv militarily. The Kh-101 is mounted on pylons The great crack of sanctions. He Kh-101 case is revealing one of the biggest problems of modern technological warfare: sanctioning does not necessarily mean cut off the supply real. Russia continue accessing to Western microelectronics through re-exports, intermediaries, opaque distributors and commercial networks that are extremely difficult to control. Some pieces even arrive from china as clones or compatible copies of Western designs. The result is that Moscow has achieved maintain and expand its missile production despite economic isolation. Ukraine maintains that many of the components found were fOpened in 2024 and 2025years after the sanctions packages that were supposed to strangle Russian military capacity. The feeling in kyiv is that there is a huge difference between announcing restrictions and making them actually work. The missile that Russia does not stop perfecting. Yes, because the Kh-101 has become a of the central pieces of the Russian air campaign. Launched from strategic bombers and designed for long-range flights at low altitude, Moscow has multiplied its production since 2022 to levels far above those before the invasion. But also, Russia is continually modifying the missile to make it more difficult to intercept. Ukraine assures that the new versions incorporate anti-interference improvements, more sophisticated navigation systems, double charges reducing fuel and even fragmentation munitions with zirconium elements to increase damage. kyiv continues to intercept a good part of them, but each new development forces spend more resources defenses and demonstrates that Russia maintains sufficient industrial capacity to sustain a prolonged technological war. The Western Paradox. Also it we have been counting. The history of the Kh-101 reflects, one more timean extremely uncomfortable contradiction for Europe and the United States. As the West delivers anti-aircraft systems, intelligence and economic aid to Ukraine, part of the global technology industry it keeps leaking towards the Russian military machine. In practice, some Western companies may end up seeing their own chips end up inside the missiles which then force the use of expensive Patriot or NASAMS interceptors also financed by the West. That paradox explains much of the Ukrainian frustration. For kyiv, the problem is no longer just Russia, but the inability of global trade chains to prevent critical technology from ending up feeding the Kremlin’s military production. The industrial war of the 21st century. He analysis of the remains The attack on kyiv is also leaving a deeper conclusion about how modern wars work. No great power today manufactures advanced weapons completely isolated of the global market. Missiles, drones and guidance systems depend of an international network of microelectronics, software and components extremely difficult to control. Russia has shown that even under massive sanctions can still access much of that global technological infrastructure. And Ukraine has discovered something equally disturbing: that in the wars of the 21st century, open a missile enemy is no longer only useful for studying its military technology. It also serves to discover to what extent the connected world continues feeding indirectly the war he is trying to stop. Image | Office of the President of Ukraine, Russia MoD In Xataka | Russia has been advancing at a snail’s pace in Ukraine for months. That’s about to change because of one season: summer. In Xataka | The war in Ukraine has entered such a crazy phase that soldiers are shooting at their own drones

Russia has been advancing at a snail’s pace in Ukraine for months. That’s about to change because of one season: summer.

May 16, 2026 by usatoday24

During World War II, many commanders discovered that a simple station could completely alter the rhythm of a military campaign: on the eastern front, the arrival of spring turned roads and fields into seas of mud capable of immobilizing tanks for weeks, while summer suddenly reopened enormous corridors of advance for both armies. The war that no longer advances as before. I counted the weekend the new york times that for months, the Kremlin has tried to sell the idea that a Russian victory in Ukraine is only a matter of time, pressuring even Trump and Western negotiators with the argument that kyiv Donbas will end up losing inevitably. However, on the ground the reality is much less spectacular. Russia has been advancing at a snail’s pace practically all year, to the point that, maintaining the current pace, it would take decades to completely occupy the region whose surrender it demands to negotiate peace. The problem is that this apparent paralysis can be misleading. Both Ukrainian commanders and military analysts carry weeks warning that summer is slowly changing the conditions of the front: the dry terrain allows the use of motorcycles and light vehicles to recover, the vegetation offers coverage against drones and Russian infiltrations are beginning to gain effectiveness after extremely difficult months for Moscow. The front is a drone war. The great transformation of this phase of the war is that Russia can no longer advance as in previous conflicts. Massive assaults with armored columns have become too vulnerable in a field of battle saturated by dronessensors and constant surveillance. Every movement is exposed from the air and any concentration of troops can be quickly destroyed. That has forced Moscow to completely modify its tactics. Now small groups of soldiers predominate slowly infiltratingon foot or on motorcycles, trying to open gradual gaps within a huge “gray zone” where control of the territory is no longer clear for either side. In other words, the conflict is looking less and less like a conventional war and more like a technological competition permanent between drones, electronic warfare and improvised survival systems. Russia makes little progress, but continues to push. The big problem for Ukraine is that even these minimal advances remain generating constant wear. Russia has suffered huge human lossesrecruitment problems and technological difficulties, including communications restrictions and obstacles to coordinate your drones. However, the Kremlin appears to have accepted that a slow and costly war remains preferable to launching large, risky offensives that could end in failure. In places like Pokrovsk or Chasiv YarMoscow has been fighting for years without managing to definitively break the front, but it has not retreated decisively either. Their troops infiltrate little by little, occupy temporary positions and turn huge areas of Donbas into spaces impossible for either army to completely control. The sensation is that of heavy, slow and damaged machinery that still continues advancing meter by meter. Summer is coming. That’s where it comes into play the seasonal factor which worries kyiv so much. During the mud and cold, Ukrainian drones have been especially effective at detecting Russian movements over open terrain. But the arrival of summer changes part of those dynamics. Trees and vegetation make aerial surveillance difficult, dry routes allow faster movement, and small Russian units find more opportunities to infiltrate without being immediately detected. In fact, Ukrainian officials recognize that Russian operations are already showing signs of improvement and that offensive activity is intensifying along the front. This is not yet a large mechanized offensive like those at the beginning of the war, but something much more disturbing: a constant pressure and diffuse design designed to exploit any weakness accumulated after years of wear. Between wear and tear and negotiation. All this greatly complicates international negotiations. Putin needs keep the image of a Russia advancing towards victory to pressure Ukraine and convince the United States that time is on the Kremlin’s side. But the real data show an exhausted army, enormous human losses and a front that barely moves. At the same time, Ukraine also does not have a comfortable situation: suffers from personnel shortages, desertions and difficulties in sustaining such a technological and costly war indefinitely. That’s why summer worries so much on both sides. Not because it will produce an immediate definitive rupture, but because it may slightly alter the balance of a war that has been trapped for months in a kind of lethal stalemate. And in a conflict where every kilometer costs thousands of lives, even small changes in the terrain, vegetation or climate They can end up having enormous strategic consequences. Image | Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 7th Army Training Command In Xataka | While we all look at Iran, something is moving in the Arctic Circle: Russia is sending bombers with missiles In Xataka | To achieve the milestone of building the largest drone industry without China, Ukraine has found an explosive ally: Taiwan

In 1808, a Canarian engineer had to flee Spain and go into exile in Russia. And thus shaped modern St. Petersburg

May 16, 2026 by usatoday24

Between the winters of his native Puerto de la Cruz and those of Saint Petersburg there are a few degrees of difference; but neither that, nor the change in culture, language or landscapes turned back Agustín de Betancourt when in 1808 he decided to pack his bags and move to the Russia of the tsars. He had fallen into disgrace in the eyes of the almighty GodoyIn Spain he had nothing left but family and memories, he had been in Paris for some time and had influential friends, so… What could he lose? Nothing. And so it was. His steppe adventure would bring him significant profits; but above all to Russia itself. So much so that if you walk around Saint Petersburg you will find several statues in his memory. The country of the tsars, that of the Alexanders and Nicolaseswhich today we associate with pageantry and alambic constructions, would probably have been somewhat less brilliant if it had not been for the genius of Agustín de Betancourt, the inventor who during the early part of the 19th century gave shape to his particular “Russia made in the Canary Islands”. Especially in the capital, Saint Petersburg. From Augustine to Agustinovich The one of Agustín de Betancourt y Molina (1758-1824) is one more name in the long list of national geniuses from whom Spain—before and after him, for one reason or another—did not know how to take full advantage. It happened to Isaac Peral, Monica Sanchez, Angela Ruiz, Emilio Herrera…and Betancourt. In his case, yes, in a peculiar way. At the beginning of the 19th century, the situation of the Canarian engineer in Spain was enviable in its own way. He came from a good birth, he had made a career between Madrid, Paris and London, earning the trust of the counts of Floridablanca either Aranda and enjoyed a well-established prestige with his work on steam engines or the optical telegraph that I had designed with Claude Chappe. As, in addition to being a man of action, he was also a man of letters, Betancourt had also encouraged the creation of the School of Roads and Canals, inspired by the École des Ponts et Chaussées in Paris. Despite all this prestige and status, their situation at the dawn of the 19th century was not what one would call comfortable. In 1805 a report with his seal on the Genil River had earned him the distrust of none other than Manuel Godoy himselfstrong man in the kingdom of Charles IV. That circumstance and the scenario that was emerging internationally encouraged Betancourt to liquidate his properties in Spain and move first to Paris —where Napoleon came to tempt him—and then to Russia. There, in Saint Petersburg, he knew how to gain the favor of the best godfather imaginable: Tsar Alexander Iwho probably saw in the canary a more than valid genius for the development of his country. What Spain had missed would be used in the Russian empire. If the future was not tempting for Agustín in Madrid, perhaps it would be in Madrid. 3,000 kilometers from there. So he collected his belongings, settled his pending matters in France and embarked for Saint Petersburg. There they waited with open arms for Agustín “Agustinovich” Betancour. Persuaded perhaps by his prestige or the interviews with Agustín himself, the tsar He soon showed his confidence in the canary. One of his first orders was the modernization of the Tula cannon factory, a strategic cog in the military apparatus of the Russian Empire. Betancourt was not new to the task and he knew how to take advantage of his knowledge of the double-acting steam engine and the operation of the Yndrid factory to give a twist to the ancient Russian system. Happy The result must have convinced the tsar. Only in this way can we understand that throughout the following years Augustine was in charge of tasks of capital importance for Russia and accumulated greater and greater prestige. In a matter of a few years, the formerly feuding engineer Godoy He became a lieutenant general in the Russian army and general director of Communications. In Moscow he took on the task of building a new Equestrian Exercise Room and around the same time he was in charge of what may have been his greatest contribution—and the most profound—to Russian urban planning: projecting a new commercial precinct able to take over the fair that since the 16th century It was celebrated near the Makaevsky Monastery. Its old center had burned in 1816 and the Russian Government wanted to recover it… but with greater packaging and in a better place, more accessible and capable of achieving greater projection. The responsibility of deciding where and how and coming up with the overall design fell on the canary’s shoulders. The venue opened its doors in July 1822 with a huge fair that brought together more than 200,000 merchants and helped for years development of the Volga region and the wealth of the empire. That Betancourt did not do badly in his endeavor is demonstrated by the fact that upon his death the Russian merchants installed a plaque of gratitude on his grave. Two hundred years later the footprint of the Tenerife native in Nizhny Novgorod still deep. Although the Nizhni Novgorod complex is perhaps its greatest urban heritage, the city in which it was used most thoroughly and in which it left the greatest impact is Saint Petersburg. There, in the capital of the empire, he showed his talent in at least half a dozen capital works for the metropolis: the new paper currency factory, the dredging of the port, several bridges and St. Isaac’s Cathedral. As the Orotava Foundation remindsBetancourt assumed in March 1816 the task of setting up a new money paper factory in Goznak, on the banks of the Fontanka canal, and for two years he was in charge of supervising the works. His involvement was not limited to the building: he organized its areas and machinery, … Read more

Dubai has come to the same conclusion as Russia. To protect your oil from drones there is something better than missiles: giant cages

May 14, 2026 by usatoday24

In World War II, the British discovered something disconcerting when analyzing the German bombings on its industrial cities: many times it was not necessary to completely destroy a refinery or factory to paralyze it for weeks. It was enough to hit some few vulnerable points to cause fires, disruptions and a disproportionate economic effect. Eight decades later, that same logic once again dominates another war, only now the weapon that attempts to find those weak points fits in an operator’s backpack and costs a fraction of an anti-aircraft missile. Dubai is located in Ukraine. For years, the United Arab Emirates built its security around a very specific idea: cutting-edge technology, advanced anti-aircraft systems and one of the most sophisticated defensive architectures in the Middle East were enough to protect the country’s energy heart. The war with Iran has begun dismantle that trust. After enduring hundreds of missiles and more than 2,200 Iranian drones, Dubai and Abu Dhabi have reached an uncomfortable conclusion that Russia learned before in Ukraine: in the face of cheap, numerous and persistent drones, it is sometimes more effective to raise huge metal structures over oil deposits than spending multimillion-dollar interceptors trying to destroy every threat in the air. The images that appeared near Dubai International Airport show precisely that: those gigantic “cope cages” surrounding fuel tanks, a scene that until recently seemed exclusive to Russian refineries attacked by Ukrainian drones, or in the films of George Miller. The cheap drone war. The problem facing the Emirates has less to do with the individual sophistication of each drone than with the economic logic of the conflict. Iran has demonstrated that it can launch massive waves of Shahed-136-type UAVs and other relatively cheap attack munitions against extremely expensive infrastructure and difficult to replace. Even when air defenses work, the economic drain It’s starting to be absurd: Shooting down low-cost drones using advanced interceptor missiles turns defense into a financially unsustainable battle. That’s where these appear giant metal cages. They are not designed to stop ballistic missiles or complex attacks, but to create a physical separation that reduces the damage of suicide drones or improvised munitions before reaching fuel depots, pipelines or critical facilities. A brutally simple solution, and precisely for this reason it is beginning to spread. Russia led the way. Because what the Emirates is doing now has been going on for years. happening in Russia. Since Ukraine began hitting refineries, oil depots and military bases with long-range drones, Moscow began to cover facilities strategic with nets, metal mesh and improvised structures. What was initially derided as a desperate solution ended up evolving in a defensive system relatively common around vulnerable assets. The logic is simple: an FPV drone or a Shahed does not need to completely destroy a facility to cause a huge problem, it is enough a precise impact on a tank, a pipe or a critical point to cause fires, interruptions and million-dollar costs. The Emirates, despite having practically unlimited resources compared to Russia, is discovering exactly the same structural vulnerability. The difference is that now these cages appear next to the most futuristic skyscrapers and financial centers in the Gulf. Oil as a strategic objective. Iran has focused a good part of its attacks precisely on the Emirati energy heart. Facilities such as the Fujairah oil port or the Habshan gas plant have suffered damage that will take months to fully repair. That explains why the country has accelerated visible defensive measures even after the partial ceasefire between Washington and Tehran. Because the threat has not disappeared. In fact, one of the most disturbing aspects of the conflict is that the attacks continued even after the truce announcements, reinforcing the feeling that any critical infrastructure can become a target again with very little notice. In this context, protecting refineries and warehouses no longer depends only on radars or anti-missile batteries, it also implies physically harden facilities, assume partial impacts and prevent a relatively cheap drone from causing a national energy disaster. The Pentagon changes its mentality. The expansion of these improvised defenses also reflects a broader doctrinal shift within of the US military itself. For years, many officials in Washington considered inefficient invest large amounts of money in physically shielding bases, hangars or critical facilities from cheap drones. Ukraine, Russia and now the Middle East are completely changing that perception. Shortly before the war between Iran and the United States broke out, the Pentagon published new guidelines precisely recommending networks, cables and other passive physical defenses to protect strategic infrastructures. The reasoning is beginning to be difficult to ignore: in an era of massive and cheap dronesthe survival of multi-million dollar facilities may depend less on futuristic systems and more on simple, ugly and gigantic industrial solutions. Dubai, probably one of the most recognizable symbols of global technological modernity, has just assumed exactly that reality. Image | x In Xataka | Every time the US takes stock of Iran’s arsenal and capabilities, it realizes something: it has destroyed very little. In Xataka | Suddenly, a military outpost sprouted up in the Iraq desert: it was Israel in its bombing campaign of Iran

There is a “nuclear” gift from Russia to North Korea off the coast of Spain

May 12, 2026 by usatoday24

In the 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, many Western experts began to fear that Russian scientists and military technology would end arriving in North Korea through opaque means, silently fueling Pyongyang’s weapons programs. Since then, every strange move between Moscow and the North Korean regime has been observed with a mixture of concern, secrecy and suspicions that are difficult to prove. A collapse full of unknowns. counted this morning CNN in an extensive report that the sinking of the Russian freighter Ursa Major off the Spanish coast has ended up becoming one of the strangest and most opaque stories to emerge around the Ukrainian war, as well as one of the most delicate. Officiallythe ship suffered several explosions in December 2024 before sinking in the Mediterranean. However, from the first moment they began to accumulate details difficult to fit into the version of a simple maritime accident: a cargo absurdly described as “manhole covers”, a Russian military escort for much of the journey, strange maneuvers before the sinking, subsequent explosions on the wreck and a very unusual silence from both Moscow and the Spanish authorities. Little by little, the case began to look less like a conventional shipwreck and more a strategic operation that went wrong in the middle of an extremely sensitive geopolitical context. The suspicion that changes everything. The great suspicion arose when Spanish researchers and sources cited by CNN They began to point out that the Ursa Major could transport nuclear reactor components similar to those used in Russian submarines. The captain himself would have ended up admitting to Spanish investigators that those supposed “manhole covers” were actually linked pieces to two naval reactors, although he claimed not to know if they contained nuclear fuel. The most disturbing hypothesis is that the final destination was not Vladivostok, despite officially appearing on the route, but the North Korean port of Rason. That is where the story takes on a completely different dimension, because the sinking would no longer be just a maritime incident, but the possible interruption of a technology transfer extremely sensitive between Moscow and Pyongyang, just after North Korea sent thousands of soldiers to support Russia in the Ukrainian war. The WC-135 off Spain. The arrival of the WC-135 aircraft Americans was the detail that definitively set off all the alarms. These planes, known as “nuke sniffers,” are not just any aircraft: they are extremely specialized platforms designed to detect radioactive traces and analyze nuclear contamination in the atmosphere. Washington normally uses them to monitor nuclear tests, atomic accidents or sensitive activity in places like the Russian Arctic or Iran, in any case, not to routinely fly over the Mediterranean off Spain. that the United States will send twice These devices over the area where the Ursa Major rests immediately fueled the suspicion that he feared something much more serious than a simple shipwreck. Although there is no public confirmation of radioactive contamination, the simple deployment of these planes left a sensation that is very difficult to ignore: Russia could have had a nuclear “gift” destined for North Korea sunk in front of Europe. Let us remember that a few months later, Kim Yong Un showed the world his alleged nuclear submarine. Explosions, spy ships and an uncomfortable wreck. The sequence after the sinking made the story even stranger. According to the research quoted by CNNthe ship did not seem doomed to sink immediately after the first explosions. However, hours after Spanish rescue resources arrived, the Russian ship Ivan Gren It launched red flares over the area and new explosions were recorded, detected even by Spanish seismic systems. Days later it also appeared the Yantarofficially a Russian research ship but designated for years by NATO as spy platform submarine. He remained on the wreck for several days before to register more explosions underwater. All of this continued to fuel the theory that Moscow may have attempted to destroy sensitive evidence at the bottom of the Mediterranean, especially if the ship was carrying advanced military nuclear technology or compromised documentation related to North Korea. The theory of silent sabotage. Another of the most surprising aspects of the investigation is the possibility that the Ursa Major was attacked with an extremely unusual weapon. The Spanish authorities are handling the hypothesis of a small hole just 50 centimeters caused by a supercavitating torpedo Barracuda typea weapon capable of moving at very high speed by reducing the friction of water using a gas bubble. The disturbing thing about this type of torpedoes is that they can pierce a hull without necessarily generating a large audible explosion, something that would fit with the account of the Russian captain, who stated not having heard no impact as the ship began to lose speed. Other experts believe the use of limpet mines or attached charges to the helmet. In any case, the mere fact that sophisticated sabotage is contemplated in waters near Spain reveals to what extent the case has stopped looking like a conventional accident. The reflection of a new alliance. Beyond the concrete mystery of the Ursa Majorthe case reflects something even more important: the rapid rapprochement between Russia and North Korea. For years, Moscow avoided crossing certain lines related to the transfer of strategic military technology to Pyongyang. However, the war in Ukraine has changed many priorities. As we have been countingNorth Korea contributes ammunition, missiles and soldiers, and Russia could be returning the favor with technical knowledge much more sensitive. The images released months later of the sinking with Kim Jong Un showing the helmet of a supposed North Korean nuclear submarine fit closely with this possibility. If there really was an attempt to move Russian naval reactors to North Korea, the sinking of the Ursa Major could represent one of the most important (and most secret) episodes of the new military relationship between both countries. Whatever it is is still in the Mediterranean. To this day, the wreck remains at about 2,500 meters deep … Read more

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