While everyone was looking at Hormuz, Russia has found a much bigger secret route. And drones do not stop arriving in Iran

During the Cold War, Western intelligence services came to suspect that some Soviet freighters that apparently transported grain or machinery were actually hiding military equipment and technology sensitive under false covers. The problem was that, once inside certain internal routes controlled by Moscow and its allies, tracking them became extraordinarily difficult even for the greatest naval powers on the planet. While the world watches Hormuz. For months, the Strait of Hormuz has become the perfect symbol of Western pressure on Iran: US aircraft carriers, oil tankers diverting routes, marine insurance fired and constant threats on one of the great energy bottlenecks on the planet. However, while all international attention was focused there, Russia and Iran have been consolidating a much less visible and probably much more uncomfortable route for Washington: the Caspian Sea. It The New York Times said the weekend. This enormous space of inland water in northern Iran, usually ignored in geopolitical analyses, is being transformed into a true strategic highway to move goods, drones, military components and technology away from the direct reach of the United States. The photo. The most revealing image came when Israel bombed the Iranian port of Bandar Anzali, in the heart of the Caspian, in one of the most significant attacks of its campaign against Iran. The target was not in the Persian Gulf or Hormuz, but hundreds of kilometers further north. It was a clear sign that real logistical warfare no longer revolves solely around the most famous strait on the planet. The route that keeps Iran alive. The importance of the Caspian for Tehran has grown spectacularly since the pressure on Hormuz intensified. Russian and Iranian ships now transport wheat, corn, sunflower oil, animal feed and all kinds of of essential supplies who previously arrived via more vulnerable routes. Four Iranian Caspian ports are working at full capacity to absorb this growing traffic, while Moscow has begun to redirect millions of tons of goods that previously crossed the Black Sea. It turns out that the true strategic core is not in the cereal. According to US officials, Russia is using that route to send drone components to Iran to help it rebuild part of the arsenal lost during the last fighting with Israel and the United States. The relationship is especially symbolic because for years It was Iran that supplied Russia with Shahed drones for the war in Ukraine. Now the flow has partially reversed: Moscow manufactures its own versions under license and returns technology, components and military expertise to Tehran using the Caspian as a protected corridor. A perfect sea to avoid sanctions. The great advantage of the Caspian for Russia and Iran is that it is an extraordinarily difficult to control from outside. Unlike the Persian Gulf, where the US naval presence dominates much of the maritime traffic, in the Caspian they can only operate the five coastal countries. The United States cannot intercept ships there or impose direct blockades. Furthermore, a large part of the ships sail with transponders offdisappearing from satellite tracking systems and feeding an increasingly opaque network of “ghost ships.” In fact, Western analysts describe the Caspian as the ideal place for discreet military transfers and sanctions evasion. Dark shipping traffic has skyrocketed since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and both Moscow and Tehran have perfected methods to hide real shipments, routes and operators. It is no coincidence that Ukraine attacked the Russian port of Olya in 2024, accusing it of being a logistics center for the transfer of Iranian drone components. Nor that Israel Bandar Anzali will hit. Everyone seems to have understood that a logistical rearguard is being built there that is much more resistant than it appears. Moscow’s strategic obsession. Plus: for the Kremlin, the Caspian is not just a temporary solution derived from sanctions or the war in Ukraine. Russia and Iran have two decades imagining a gigantic trade corridor that connects the Baltic with the Indian Ocean, crossing Russia, the Caspian and Iran to avoid routes controlled by the West. The project includes new portsrailway lines and renewal of aging fleets, although many of these plans remain on paper due to lack of resources and the geographical difficulties of the Caspian. Still, the war has accelerated the strategic logic behind that idea: creating an alternative system of commercial and military circulation outside the reach of Western sanctions. For Putin, furthermore, the balance is delicate. Needs to support Iran as a regional ally and military partner, but do so in an all-too-visible way could deteriorate even more so its relationship with Washington and with several Arab countries important for Russian energy trade. The Caspian offers precisely that: sufficient support, but far from the media and military focus that Hormuz dominates. America’s great blind spot. Much of the Western concern arises from a very uncomfortable feeling: for years, the Caspian hardly occupied any space in American strategic planning. Experts in Washington recognize that the region functions almost like a black hole diplomat divided between different military commands and bureaucratic departments. Thus, while the world observed aircraft carriers in the Persian Gulf or drones over Ukraine, Russia and Iran took advantage of an immense, opaque and difficult to monitor geographic space to weave a logistics network that connects both conflicts. The problem for the United States is not that the Caspian completely replaces Hormuz, because it cannot do so, especially in massive oil exports. The real problem is that even under extreme military pressure, sanctions and naval blockades, Iran continues to find ways to stay connectedrearm and receive outside support. And each drone, each component and each shipment that silently crosses the Caspian reinforces an increasingly evident idea: while everyone was looking at the Strait of Hormuz, Russia and Iran they were building an alternative route much more difficult to stop. Image | PexelsNASA In Xataka | We sensed that Iran’s attacks on the US had been important. In reality, they were devastating In Xataka | While the whole world looks at … Read more

Iran did to the US what Ukraine did to Russia in Operation Spiderweb

In the first weeks of the war, published reports on the damage inflicted by Iran to bases and radars of Washington in the Middle East. For example, attacks on 14 US military sites or air defense facilities were documented, or the bombing of a US base in Kuwaitthe first time in years that an enemy fighter jet hit a US base. However, it has now just become known that, in reality, it has been much worse. The war that the images began to reveal. For years, Western armies assumed that absolute control of the air and satellites was enough to hide damage, movements and weaknesses in the middle of a war… until recent conflicts began to demonstrate just the opposite. In Ukraine, simple commercial photographs Taken from space, they allowed Russian convoys to be followed, bombers to be located, and destroyed facilities to be detected long before governments acknowledged anything. To that mission he called it Spiderweb. It so happens that the same thing is happening now in the Middle East. What began as a campaign presented by Washington as a punishment operation against Iran has ended up leaving an image much more uncomfortable: that satellite photographs are showing a level of destruction on US facilities much higher than publicly admitted. The uncomfortable discovery. Latest Washington Post analysis More than a hundred satellite images have revealed that Iran hit at least 228 military structures or equipment Americans distributed throughout bases in the Middle East, a figure much higher than that officially recognized. The impacts hit hangars, barracks, fuel tanks, Patriot systems, THAAD radarscommunications centers, electrical installations and even strategic aircraft, making it clear that Tehran was not launching symbolic or indiscriminate attacks. The most delicate thing for the United States is that many of these images initially came from Iranian media and were subsequently verified through European systems and other independent commercial sources. In other words, the initial narrative of limited attacks began to collapse when the images began to show something much more serious: that Iran had achieved penetrate advanced defenses and hit critical American infrastructure in numerous countries at the same time. Damage to Camp Arifjan in Kuwait visible on March 4 Iran found the weak point of the bases. Wapo counted that one of the most striking aspects of the attacks is the precision with which they were executed. Military analysts highlighted the absence of random craters and the concentration of impacts on specific targets, a sign that Iran had very detailed prior intelligence on US facilities. The attacks were not limited to military runways or depots traditional facilities, they also hit gymnasiums, lodgings, mess halls, and staff buildings, reflecting a deliberate attempt to increase human casualties and force the United States to empty entire bases (as, in fact, that’s how it happened). Because several facilities ended up being considered too dangerous to operate normally, causing partial evacuations and the transfer of troops beyond Iranian reach. Some bases in Kuwait and Bahrain, used to launch attacks against Iran or deploy HIMARS systems, were especially punishedfueling the feeling that Tehran had managed to quickly identify which platforms were directly participating in the campaign. Nine fuel tanks at the Ali al-Salem air base in Kuwait were damaged Drones changed everything. Much of this battlefield transformation is directly related to a lesson learned in Ukraine: cheap and unidirectional attack drones are eroding the traditional advantage of great powers. American experts recognize that the Pentagon did not adapt its bases quickly enough to this new threat, despite spending years observing how relatively simple drones destroyed armored vehicles, radars or critical infrastructure in other conflicts. Although many Iranian drones carried reduced explosive charges, they were extremely difficult to intercept and they could attack stationary targets with enormous precision. This forced the consumption of gigantic quantities of Patriot and THAAD interceptors, dangerously reducing American and allied reserves in just a few weeks. The result was paradoxical: the most advanced military power in the world began to be forced to play defense around its own bases, while Iran found relatively cheap ways to overwhelm multibillion-dollar anti-aircraft systems. The enormous hidden wear. While Washington publicly insisted that the damage did not significantly alter the military campaign, the images they showed a more complex reality. Some key facilities were damaged considered “extensive” even by American officials, and part of the regional command had to be relocated out of the Middle East. As we said, the headquarters of the Fifth Fleet in Bahrain was one of the most affected areasto the point of moving functions to Florida, while the internal debate grows over whether certain bases will operate as before. Worrying signs also emerged on structural failures: Strategic aircraft repeatedly parked in vulnerable positions, insufficiently protected tactical centers, and a shortage of hardened shelters for critical personnel and equipment. All of this fueled one conclusion: that the United States had underestimated both Iranian resilience and the speed with which modern wars are making transparent facilities that previously seemed untouchable. The true strategic signal that this war leaves. Beyond the specific damage, what really worries strategists and military personnel is the change of perception left by satellite images. For decades, the presence of US bases throughout the Middle East functioned as a symbol of absolute control and immediate response capacity, but now those same facilities appear exposedvulnerable and permanently observed from the air and from space. If you will, the conflict has left a feeling that is difficult to ignore: that Iran may not be able to defeat the United States militarily in a conventional confrontation, but it can. inflict enough damageattrition and political pressure to profoundly alter the US strategic calculation in the region. And that idea that began with Spiderweb operation in Ukrainemultiplied by hundreds of photographs of destroyed hangars, hit radars and partially emptied bases, may end up being one of the most important consequences of the entire war. Image | Iran media, Planet In Xataka | Türkiye has taken a look at the … Read more

In three days, Russia celebrates its Victory Day. And Ukraine has a surprise prepared 1,500 kilometers away

In May 1987, a young 19-year-old German pilot named Mathias Rust He managed to cross a good part of Soviet airspace with a small civilian plane and land next to Red Square. without being stopped. The episode caused enormous humiliation for the USSR because it showed that even the heart of Moscow could be reached in ways that no one expected. Countdown to Putin’s big parade. Russia prepares for May 9, the most symbolic day of its entire political and military calendar, while Ukraine intensifies a campaign of attacks that seems designed precisely to ruin that sense of control and security. The Kremlin has even announced a unilateral truce for the days of the parade, but kyiv has responded by making it clear that it does not intend to coordinate anything with Moscow and remembering that Russia cannot quietly celebrate Victory Day “without the good will of Ukraine.” The situation is especially uncomfortable for Putin because, for the first time in many years, Moscow faces this date with the feeling that even its capital can become a target. Moscow no longer seems like a completely safe place. The recent attack against a skyscraper luxury hotel located a few kilometers from the Kremlin has been much more than a simple symbolic coup. Ukraine has been trying to bother to Moscow ahead of the May 9 parade, but this time the message comes in a different context: Russia has reduced the size of the event, eliminated some of the heavy military deployment and greatly reinforced the defenses around the capital for fear of new drones. Meanwhile, Zelensky has hinted directly that Moscow fears seeing drones flying over Red Square during the parade, something unthinkable just a few years ago and extremely delicate for a celebration designed precisely to project power and control. The big news is the distance. The most important change in this phase of the war is happening far beyond Moscow. Ukraine is managing to attack industrial cities and military bases located more than 1,500 kilometers from the front, reaching regions of the Urals that for decades were considered a safe rear even in Soviet times. Cities like Yekaterinburg, Chelyabinsk or Perm begin to experience airport closuresinternet restrictions and attacks against refineriesmilitary installations or industrial infrastructures. The psychological impact is enormous because many of these areas experienced the war as something distant until just a few months ago. New missiles and drones are changing the rules. The appearance of the transonic missile F-5 Flamingo reflects the extent to which Ukraine is transforming its deep strike capability. kyiv claims to have used this system to destroy a factory Russian military about 1,500 kilometers away, a facility linked to components for missiles, aviation and naval systems. Beyond the specific damage, what is important is the trend: Ukraine no longer depends solely on improvised drones or isolated attacks, but is beginning to build a sustained capacity to hit strategic infrastructure deep inside Russia. The jam-resistant navigation systems, extreme range and possible integration of Western technology clearly show that kyiv is trying to make Russian territorial depth much less useful than it was at the start of the war. The Soviet rearguard in doubt. Plus: there is a huge historical burden in the places that Ukraine is attacking. During the Second World War, much of the Soviet industry was moved to the Urals precisely because they were considered territories impossible to reach from Europe. Cities like Chelyabinsk became known as “Tankograd” because of the concentration of military factories far from the front. Now, eighty years later, Ukrainian drones and missiles are demonstrating that that strategic depth no longer guarantees security. What once required bombers and huge air campaigns can now be achieved with long-range drones and relatively cheap missiles capable of traversing thousands of kilometers. Avoid vulnerability on its most important day. Because he May 9 parade It is not just any ceremony for Russia. It is the great annual showcase of Russian military power, the event where the Kremlin connects the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany with Putin’s current political legitimacy. That is precisely why it is so sensitive that Ukraine is increasing pressure just before the event. Russia is shooting down hundreds of drones around Moscow and strengthening security of the capital while trying to avoid any image of chaos during a day observed by foreign leaders and broadcast throughout the country. The problem for the Kremlin is that Ukraine has already managed to install a most uncomfortable idea: even more than 1,500 kilometers from the front, there is no longer a complete sense of refuge, and that includes beyond the Urals. Image | Fire Point In Xataka | Today in “the war in Ukraine beyond all comprehension”: drone pilots are training with ‘Grand Theft Auto’ In Xataka | Ukraine has barely captured any North Korean soldiers. The reason is brutally simple: they prefer to immolate themselves

China is filling up with products from Russia. The problem is that many of these products come from China itself.

At the beginning of 2025, a more than notable event occurred in China. Apparently, trade tensions between Beijing and the EU had opened a new scenario for Russian livestock farmers. In other words, if Spain had made a fortune exporting pork to China, an unexpected enemy appeared on the horizon: Russia. It seems that the hype of Moscow goes much further than “its” pig, and in 2026 has been maintained. Russian Chinese stores. Yes, in recent years a situation has been occurring that no one saw coming: the proliferation of stores selling Russian products in cities throughout China, generating great interest among consumers. These establishments, easily recognizable by their signs in Cyrillic, traditional Russian music such as Kalinka and Katyusha, and/or the display of iconic products such as matryoshka dolls, offer a variety of products: from national sausages to chocolates, honey, vodka or durian confectionery. Thus, with slogans such as “hardcore products” and a blue and white aesthetic, the stores seek to evoke the essence of Moscow. However, as we will see, behind this facade many are more Chinese than they look. The figures. The boom has also coincided with an increase in commercial ties between China and Russia, driven by Western sanctions on Moscow after its invasion of Ukraine, the same ones that have led to Russian ranchers in the Asian nation. Not only that. Bilateral trade reached historic levels in 2022 and 2023and Chinese consumers responded enthusiastically, seeing these products as a way to show solidarity with Russia. According to data from the Qichacha business registry, In January 2025 there were 3,555 companies registered in China engaged in the trade of Russian productswith 696 and 894 new companies registered in 2023 and 2024, respectively. They are not Russian, they are Chinese. Of course, the boom also raised suspicions. In fact, the boom faced increasing scrutiny last year. Many consumers began to question the authenticity of the products offered. Sausages, for example, cannot be legally imported from Russiaand the durian, a tropical fruit, is not typical of Russian regions as far as we know. This led Chinese authorities to investigate some of these stores. For example in Fujian, where a Russian market was pointed out for promoting false health benefits and labeling domestic foods as imported. In Beijing, similar stores closed after several inspections that required proof of the authenticity of their products. In fact, in 2025 the Shanghai authorities announced investigations against seven of the 47 Russian themed stores of the city, accusing them of misleading customers regarding the origin of their products. Some were closedwhile others faced fines and the obligation to clearly label products…made in China. Finally, a Jiemian News investigation revealed that a large part of the food products in the so-called “Russian State Houses” (franchises with no connection to the Russian government) They were locally produced.. Factors of interest. The initial success of these markets and establishments can be attributed to several factors. On the one hand, consumers’ curiosity and desire to explore “exotic” productssomething that has surely played an important role. On the other hand, the geopolitical narrative surely also did its thing: the war in ukraine and tensions with the West caused some Chinese consumers to view consumption of Russian products as a gesture of political support. Furthermore, we must not forget that the increase in bilateral trade was facilitated by the exclusion of Russia from the Swift financial system in 2022forcing the country to become more dependent on the Chinese yuan. This made China Russia’s main trading partner, absorbing products such as oil, gas and food at reduced prices. With an expiration date? The big question. Despite the boom, analysts like Zhang Yi, of iiMedia Research, They believe that the fashion will be temporaryalthough in 2026 they remain patent. The demand for Russian products in the Asian nation is based, a priori, on this novelty and perceived scarcity. Among the causes of the decline are that consumers have lost interest or competition between stores increases, at which time the popularity of these markets will probably decrease. This, added to the increasing doubts about the authenticity of the products Following investigations and regulatory pressure, they could accelerate their decline. Be that as it may, and in the face of growing skepticism, in Shanghai Some stores have changed their names to “Chinese-Russian Mutual Trade Stores” to reflect the true origin of their products. In Beijing, at least one store closed after failing to present documentation proving the authenticity of their imports. Long-term perspectives. Although trade between China and Russia still strongexperts predict that exchange volume could stabilize at $200 billiona figure lower than recent records. In the long term, a change in geopolitical relations, such as the resolution of the conflict in Ukraine, could allow Russia to normalize its trade ties with Europe, thereby reducing its dependence on China. Of course, this last scenario now seems very far away. Be that as it may, the rise of markets for Russian products in China reflects how geopolitical dynamics can influence consumer habits, at least in part. Of course, its sustainability is most uncertain due to the combination of regulatory pressures, doubts about the authenticity of the products and the eventual loss of consumer interest. Just in case, to the Russians they will always have the pork. Image | Weibo In Xataka | The biggest change in war is no longer drones: it is that Russia, the US and China are removing the human from the button In Xataka | Russia and China already had an advantage over the US in the Arctic. After Greenland, it has multiplied A version of this topic was published in 2025. We have updated it with information from 2026

Now we know that the Iranian Air Force did to the US what Ukraine could not do to Russia with drones: an abysmal hole

During the Vietnam War, American commanders discovered that some of their most protected bases they could be hit unexpectedly due to coordinated attacks low costforcing to reinforce defenses that until then were considered sufficient and making it clear that, in war, the feeling of security is usually more fragile than it seems. The blow that no one expected. For decades, the US military architecture in the Middle East relied on in a network of bases designed to surround and contain Iran, a direct heir to the Cold War doctrine and designed to project power quickly. However, a report that came to light this weekend on NBC News has revealed a radical inversion of that logic in the war of 2026: what was supposed to be a shield has become a set of exposed objectives, hit in a coordinated manner by Iranian attacks that hit more than a hundred targets in several countries. We are talking about critical infrastructures such as runways, radars, hangars, command centers or defense systems were damaged or destroyed, and the impact was neither marginal nor symbolic, but structuralaffecting the very functioning of the US deployment in the region. The fence that ended up surrounded. The system of bases in Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, the Emirates or Saudi Arabia was designed to suffocate Iran, but its ability to attack key logistics nodes turned the equation around. How much? It appears that critical facilities were left disabled or evacuatedincluding the headquarters of the Fifth Fleet in Bahrainwhile multiple bases in Iraq and Kuwait had to be abandoned or rendered inoperative. The pressure was such that even the resupply became problematicleaving the American forces themselves in a position close to the siege they intended to impose. The encirclement strategy, which seemed unquestionable for decades, suddenly showed its fragility in the face of an adversary with saturation capacity through missiles, drones and aviation. The hole that changes war. What is most revealing is not only the extent of the damage, but what they represent for Washington: for the first time in years, a rival has managed to systematically drill US military infrastructure at multiple points at once. Iran not only hit bases, but achieved something that until now seemed beyond the reach of other recent conflicts: opening a deep and sustained hole in the defensive framework of the United States, affecting radarsair defenses and strategic assets. That ability to simultaneously degrade multiple layers of the system is reminiscent of what other actors have tried unsuccessfully in wars like the one in Ukraine, but here it translated in real effects on the ground, altering the operational balance and forcing us to rethink the assumed superiority. From control to operational chaos. The middle counted American that the intensity of the attacks and the speed with which they occurred generated a scenario of disorganization that overwhelmed the usual command and control mechanisms. Bases evacuatedemergency relocated personnel and even improvised situations what do we countsuch as the use of civil infrastructure, reflect the extent to which operational pressure broke the planned patterns. Plus: the inability to anticipate and managing the real scope of the attacks, added to the lack of clear communication about the damage, fueled the perception of an overwhelmed response to a type of more distributed warfaster and harder to contain. A cost beyond money. Although initial estimates speak of billions dollars in repairs (not counting advanced systems or unrecoverable equipment), the true impact possibly transcends the economic. What has been affected is the military deployment model itself: the idea that a network of advanced bases guarantees regional control. In other words, the war has shown that, faced with an adversary capable of to attack in depth with means relatively accessiblethis hitherto untouchable network may become a rather critical vulnerability. The result in the pavement American is not only a balance sheet of damages, but a strategic warning that forces us to give more than one turn to its scheme of how military power is projected in a world where distance is already does not protect the same. Image | x In Xataka | If the war resumes again, the US runs a risk unprecedented in the history of war: that the only one with missiles will be Iran. In Xataka | If the question is why the US attacked an Iranian ship with a weapon unprecedented in 40 years, we already know the answer: a “gift from China”

“Left click, right click”, this is how the AI ​​decides an attack in war. China, Russia and the US need fewer and fewer humans

A group of Google engineers signed an internal letter to protest against a project in which your own software was being used by the Pentagon, sparking an unprecedented debate within the company about how far the technology they had created should go. Since then, almost 10 years have passed, an “eternity” with the implementation of AI. The war accelerates… without humans. They counted last week in The New York Times that modern warfare is entering a phase in which human intervention is no longer the center of decision-making, but rather an almost symbolic step within processes dominated by algorithmswhere artificial intelligence systems identify targets, recommend attacks and generate complete plans in a matter of seconds. Programs like Project Maventoday developed by Palantir and integrated with models like Anthropic’sshow the extent to which the decision chain has been compressed: satellite images, drone data and intercepted signals are automatically processed to generate target lists and attack solutions, reducing human intervention to something as simple as selecting options on the screen, in the words of Pentagon officialsit is as simple as clicking “Left click, right click”. Powers in the same race. Because at the center of this transformation are the United States, China and Russia, competing to lead a new arms race based on autonomous systems capable of operating without direct intervention. In China, for example, the development of coordinated drone swarms by artificial intelligence and capable platforms to operate alongside fighters manned reflects a commitment to scale and automation. Meanwhile, in Russia they are betting on systems like the Lancet droneswhich evolve towards capabilitiesand autonomous selection of objectives. For its part, the United States is trying to close the gap by encouraging companies like Anduril to speed up production of autonomous drones, in a race where the speed of development is almost as important as the technology itself. The Chinese WZ-8 drone Ukraine as a turning point. How have we been countingthe war in Ukraine has been the turning point that has turned these technologies on real tools combat, demonstrating that relatively simple systems can evolve rapidly towards semi-autonomous capabilities and changing the balance on the battlefield. Adapted commercial drones, unmanned vessels and data analysis systems have allowed resist a superior adversary, while Russia has responded incorporating automation progressive in their own systems. As pointed out analyst Michael Horowitz, “the battlefield in Ukraine has served as a laboratory for the world,” accelerating a transition that is no longer experimental, but operational. Silicon Valley at war. Unlike previous arms races, the Times I remembered that the role does not fall solely on the States, but also in technology companies and start-ups that are redefining military development. Here are companies like Google that initially participated in projects like Maven before withdrawing due to internal pressures, while others like Palantir or Anduril have occupied that space with a more vision aligned with the defense. In China, the “civil-military fusion” model directly integrates to private companies in the development of military systems, while in the West attempts are made to replicate that dynamism with million-dollar investments and growing collaboration between Silicon Valley and the Pentagon. Algorithms against algorithms. The result is a form of war in which the confrontation is no longer only between armies, but between automated systems that operate at speeds impossible for humans, a scenario that we have counted where drones launch drones to take on other drones and sensor networks connect globally to execute real time attacks. Projects like the Chinese attempt to replicate networks similar to the Joint Fires Network American forces reflect this trend toward an interconnected war, one where a sensor at one point on the planet can trigger an attack on another without direct intervention. At this point, superiority no longer depends solely on the quality of weapons, but on the ability to integrate data, process it and act faster than the adversary. Uncontrolled speed. There is no doubt, this acceleration carries risks that worry even those who pushed these systems, as automation can trigger military responses before humans can intervene or fully understand the situation. Studies such as that of RAND Corporationworks that have shown scenarios in which autonomous systems inadvertently escalate conflicts, while experts warn of a possible “escalation spiral” driven by the decision speed of machines. As recognized General Jack Shanahan, promoter of Maven, the reality is that there is a danger of deploying “untested, insecure and poorly understood” systems in a context of competition where each actor fears being left behind. Less humans, more automation. Thus, the panorama that is drawn is that of a war every time more automatedwhere human intervention is progressively reduced and critical decisions are delegated in artificial intelligence systems capable of analyzing, deciding and acting in seconds, something very different which is do it “well”. From autonomous drones to target analysis platforms, through global combat networks, the trend seems clear, that of a war of the immediate future that will be decided less in offices and more in algorithmsin an unstable and certainly chilling balance, because we are talking about technological speed being on track to surpass the human capacity to control it in the middle of a war. Image | StockVault, Infinity 0 In Xataka | Russia is no longer surrendering to Ukrainian soldiers, but to machines: the rules of war are being redefined In Xataka | China was the power that launched drones. Now he has realized his danger with a decision: close the sky to them

Ukraine has turned Russia into a fearsome air force

In 1991, during the Gulf War, the United States discovered something uncomfortable: despite its total air superiority, it could not prevent Iraq from continuing to launch scud missiles from mobile platforms that appeared and disappeared in the desert. That frustration left a clear lesson For military strategists: in modern warfare, it is not enough to dominate the air, you must constantly adapt to an enemy that also learns. From questioned strength to real threat. During the first stages of the invasion of Ukraine, Russian aviation was perceived like a disappointment unable to achieve air superiority, which led many Western analysts to perhaps hastily underestimate it. However, with the passage of time, that vision has started to change disturbingly, especially in Europe, where aviation security experts have focused on something that is no longer an intuition: that the conflict has not weakened Russia, but rather the has forced to learn. Accumulated experience, system improvements and tactical adaptation have transformed a force that seemed limited into a much more dangerous and credible actor than it was before 2022. War as a laboratory. They remembered on Insider that, far from collapsing, Russian aviation has used Ukraine as a real training environment where pilots and crews have gained experience in high-intensity combat. Although it has lost aircraft, it has retained a large part of its qualified personnel and has compensated for those losses with sustained production of new aircraft, which has allowed it to maintain and even expand its fleet. This process has corrected one of its greatest historical weaknesses, the lack of flight hours, turning its pilots into more prepared fighters for complex scenarios. More reach, less risk. One of the most significant changes has been the evolution of his attack capacitywhich now increasingly relies on long-range weapons and systems that allow you to hit without directly exposing yourself. We are talking about advanced missiles, gliding bombs and remote attacks that have reduced the need to penetrate defended airspace, greatly complicating the enemy response. This way of fighting has not only proven to be effective in Ukraine, but also poses a worrying scenario. for future conflictswhere control of the air no longer depends solely on physically dominating it. Constant pressure from the air. They counted on ukrainian media that, in parallel, Russia has intensified its air campaign with massive and increasingly sophisticated use of drones and missiles, launching thousands of devices and perfecting saturation tactics to overwhelm defenses. Coordinated attacks, changes in flight patterns and the combination of different types of weapons have made it possible to maintain continuous pressure on infrastructure and the civilian population, generating not only material but also psychological wear. This strategy turns air into space permanent threatwhere the defense can never relax. A more complex threat. If you will, the result is a Russian air force that, although it still has structural limitations and does not match NATO in a direct confrontation, has become much scariest and most difficult to counteract. The combination of strengthened air defense, better coordination between systems and a more adaptive doctrine presents a scenario for its enemies in which achieving air superiority will be much more expensive and risky. In other words, a paradox has developed and is beginning to take hold, one where Ukraine has not only resisted Russian aviation, but, by forcing it to evolve, has contributed to turning it into a more sophisticated and persistent threat to the European military balance. Image | Alan Wilsonparfaits In Xataka | If fog was deadly in Ukraine’s winter, spring is offering Russia a key advantage: greenery In Xataka | Ukraine is close to what no one has achieved in a war: shooting down missiles for less than a million dollars

Ukraine has tested whether Russia was complying with the ceasefire with an optical illusion in the open field. The video is self-explanatory

during the call Christmas Truce In the First World War, enemy soldiers came out of their trenches, exchanged gifts and even played soccer games in no man’s land, in one of the most unusual episodes of the conflict. That scene, as brief as it was unexpected, showed to what extent war can change shape in a matter of hours. A ceasefire on paper. Russia had announced a ceasefire for Orthodox Easter with a strong symbolic and political component, seeking to project an image of negotiating will in the middle of war. However, on the ground the reality has been very different, with thousands of violations recorded in just 32 hours, including artillery attacks, assaults and a massive use of tactical drones. Although long-range attacks were reduced, information arriving from kyiv They point out that the intensity on the near front was maintained, reflecting a dynamic where pauses are used more as a narrative tool than as a true attempt to stop the fighting. The war of stories. Both Moscow and kyiv tried to position themselves as the party that respected the truce, in a conditioned diplomatic pulse also due to international pressure, especially from the United States. While Russia defended having complied with the ceasefire, Ukraine documented thousands of violations in a matter of hours, showing an obvious gap between the official discourse and what was happening on the battlefield. This duality reinforced the idea that truce announcements are part of a communication strategy as much as the war itself. The unexpected test: an optical illusion. In this context, Ukraine decided to go beyond the accusations and designed a direct test to check Russian behavior: evacuate apparently own soldiers, unarmed and wounded, complying with all the conditions of a ceasefire. It turns out that, in reality, it was Russian prisoners in disguise with neutral uniforms, used as a kind of “visual bait” to verify whether the agreements were respected. The scene functioned as a kind of terrifying optical illusion on the battlefield, where what looked like a legitimate evacuation hid a carefully prepared experiment. The video that dismantles the truce. The outcome was so fast as forceful: because a swarm of Russian drones attacked the evacuees, killing several of them without knowing that they were actually their own captured soldiers. The episode, recorded on video and broadcast Later on different social networks, he crudely exposed the fragility of the ceasefire and the inability (or lack of will) to respect it even in situations clearly protected by the rules of war. Beyond the tactical impact, the incident became in a visual test difficult to refute about what was really happening on the front. An episode that also leaves everyone in a bad light due to the crudeness of the visual piece. An impossible truce. If you also want, the set of events confirms that the ceasefire was, in practice, untenable in a conflict where both parties seek to maintain the military initiative while competing for the international narrative. For Russia, the test reveals the extent to which modern combat (based on the intensive use of drones, quick decisions and targets detected without full verification) can turn against him even in sensitive situations. For Ukraine, the test not only highlighted Russian non-compliance, but also showed the extent to which the battle has entered a phase where even humanitarian gestures can become in strategic tools. In this scenario, the truce was nothing more than a nominal pause in a war that continues to develop with the same intensity under a layer of unfulfilled promises. Image | x In Xataka | If fog was deadly in Ukraine’s winter, spring is offering Russia a key advantage: greenery In Xataka | Ukraine is close to what no one has achieved in a war: shooting down missiles for less than a million dollars

If fog was deadly in Ukraine’s winter, spring is offering Russia a key advantage: greenery

In modern conflicts, small changes in the environment can completely alter the balance of combat, even in the face of advanced technologies such as combat drones or sensors. Throughout history, factors such as climate, the ground or the vegetation have conditioned entire offensivesdeciding when and how to attack. In many cases, the difference between advancing or being exposed didn’t depend on a weapon, but on what was happening in the landscape. The same is happening in Ukraine. The cold as an invisible brake. It we count in several occasions. Last winter, the war in Ukraine was marked for a factor as silent as it is decisive: the visibility and conditions meteorological conditions that favored some over others, where the absence of vegetation and phenomena such as the fog and the cold They turned the battlefield into an exposed and lethal space for any offensive movement. In that environment, the drones dominated the air with ease, detecting practically any movement and converting each advance into an immediate risk. Russia, despite its superiority in resources, saw its momentum partially slowed while Ukraine took advantage of this scenario to stabilize the front and launch limited but effective counterattacks. Spring changes the script. With the arrival of spring, that balance begins to break because the terrain is no longer the same nor is the visibility. The vegetation, especially the lines of trees that run through the agricultural fields, introduces a concealment element which profoundly alters the dynamics of combat. So, I remembered this morning the new york times that what was previously an open space dominated by sensors and drones is transformed into a fragmented environment where movement is once again possible, even if in a limited and slower way. Trees as a tactical weapon. Tree lines, inherited from the soviet era to protect crops, they have become natural corridors for the advance, withdrawal and reorganization of troops, offering cover from constant aerial surveillance. In a conflict where large mechanized movements have lost effectiveness, the war is now being fought on foot and in small groupsand this vegetation cover reduces exposure and increases the chances of survival. Vegetation does not eliminate drone threatbut it does hinder their detection ability, enough to change the probabilities on the ground. The Russian advantage. They remembered in the Times that, although both sides benefit from this new coverage, Ukraine recognizes that the effect can favor Russia more due to its greater number of troops, which allows it to better take advantage of any concealment opportunity and advance with fewer relative losses. In areas such as around the Dnieper River, where vegetation has grown especially dense, Russian troops can concentrate and maneuver with a level of discretion that did not exist in winter. This change does not guarantee decisive advances, but it does increase the options for achieve tactical progress. War and the seasons. If you like, the evolution of the conflict confirms to what extent seasonal factors They continue to be decisive even in a dominated war by advanced technologywhere each season alters the rules of combat. If winter favored the defense by exposing the attacker, spring introduces a room for maneuver that Russia tries to exploit to regain initiative. Even so, the constant presence of drones maintains large areas of the front as spaces of high lethality, which limits the scope of any offensive and suggests that, despite the change in scenario, the war will continue to be slow, costly and still far from being resolved in the short term. Image | 7th Army Training Command In Xataka | If the question is where Russia’s missiles come from in the Ukrainian war, the answer is surprising: from cigarette filters In Xataka | Neither drones nor missiles nor AI, the war in Ukraine has turned a vehicle from 1950 into a key piece: the M113

The big problem with nuclear energy has always been its waste. Russia can now recycle them up to five times

A nuclear reactor operating for 60 years using a closed system of three circulating fuel loads, subjected to cleaning processes and specific recharges in each cycle. What until recently seemed like an unattainable technical utopia for the energy industry is the reality that Russia’s latest technological breakthrough points to. The historic Achilles heel of nuclear fission—radioactive waste—is about to take a radical turn to become an almost inexhaustible resource. The magnitude of the test. The press release of Atom Media explains that Unit 1 of the Balakovo nuclear power plant (operated by Rosatom’s energy division) has just made history. They have successfully removed the last three lead test assemblies from an innovative fuel dubbed REMIX. These groups have completed three operating cycles of 18 months each. We are talking about 54 months performing at maximum capacity in a Russian commercial reactor type VVER-1000, thus exhausting its standard useful life. This puts the finishing touch to a demanding pilot program which started at the end of 2021 when the first six experimental rods were introduced into the reactor core. The resounding success. The most impressive thing about this milestone is not just that the fuel works, but where it works. Unlike other experiments designed for new generation fast reactors, REMIX fuel can be used in light water thermal reactors already operating massively around the planet. And without the need to modify its design or add costly security measures. The rehearsal went flawlessly. Yuri Ryzhkov, deputy chief engineer of the Balakovo power plant, detailed: “After each cycle, the fuel rods and structural elements were inspected using the television camera of the refueling machine. No deviations were detected during operation; neutron, physical and service characteristics remained within the design limits.” The science behind REMIX. But what exactly is this material? REMIX comes from Regenerated Mixture (Regenerated Mixture). Instead of using the usual natural enriched uranium, Russian scientists have created a matrix pellet that mixes regenerated uranium and plutonium (both recovered from already spent and reprocessed nuclear fuel), seasoned with some fresh enriched uranium. The technical key to the process is in the proportion: it maintains a very low level of plutonium, up to 1.5%. Thanks to this exact formulation, its neutron spectrum is practically identical to that of standard fuel. For practical purposes, the reactor core behaves the same and does not even “notice” the difference. The cleaning process. It is the circular economy taken to the atomic extreme. The magazine World Nuclear Newyes explains that this recycling cycle can be repeated up to five times. With each pass, the industry reprocesses the material to separate the useful uranium and plutonium from the fission products, which constitute the true radioactive waste. This useless waste is extracted and vitrified (encapsulated in glass) to be permanently and safely buried in geological deposits, while the useful fuel mixture is reintroduced into the reactor. The vision of the balanced cycle. Now it’s time for the laboratory and certification phase, where the irradiated material, now resting in cooling pools, will travel to the Atomic Reactor Research Institute in Dimitrovgrad for exhaustive analysis. Alexander Ugryumov, Vice President of R&D at TVEL (Rosatom’s fuel subsidiary), He announced that after these studies They will be able to bring the product to the market. The next evolutionary step will be to test mixtures with depleted uranium and up to 5% plutonium. All this is part of what Rosatom has called the “Balanced Nuclear Fuel Cycle” (NFC). The goal is to drastically reduce the volume and danger of radioactive waste, solving the historic problem of long-term storage for future generations and guaranteeing a truly sustainable production system. An impact on a global scale. Although the technical success is undeniable and the operational milestone in a commercial reactor is demonstrated, the mass adoption of this technology on a global level will largely depend on the commercialization costs and the economic viability of large-scale reprocessing; factors that the industry must demonstrate after the current qualification phase. However, if Rosatom manages to market REMIX at competitive prices, the global energy situation could take an unprecedented turn. We are not talking about a niche experiment. The data provided by Atom Media illustrate this magnitude: TVEL currently supplies fuel to more than 70 power reactors in 15 countries. Today, one in six reactors in the world operates with its technology. Moving from a linear “use and bury” industry to a closed loop where nuclear resources have multiple lives would not only dramatically expand the planet’s energy reserves, but could forever redefine the ecological viability of nuclear energy. Image | atom Xataka | The US has to make a crucial decision in Iran: exit without destroying its nuclear capabilities or a terrestrial “armaggedon”

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