Russia

Russia and the US face to face

by

What started as an American operation apparently limited to imposing a naval blockade on sanctioned oil tankers off the coast of Venezuela has ended up becoming an episode of high strategic voltage in the North Atlantic. He assault has reached Europe, and Russia and Russia have appeared on the horizon. his ghost fleet. From the Caribbean to the Atlantic. What has happened is that Washington has boarded an oil tanker already reflagged by Russia while Moscow has sent naval assets, including a submarineto escort him. The case of the old Bella 1hastily renamed as Sailor and with a Russian flag painted with a broad brush in the middle of the chasesymbolizes the transition from an economic war and sanctions on the Latin American periphery to a direct, physical and potentially scalable clash between two nuclear powers in European waters. There is no simple rusty ship here, but a collision of red lines that until now had been carefully avoided. The ghost fleet comes out of the shadows. we have been counting. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Moscow, Tehran and Caracas have built a vast “ghost fleet” of more than a thousand aging tankerswith opaque ownership, non-existent insurance and false flags, designed to keep the flow of oil outside of Western sanctions. For years, the system relied on ambiguity and plausible deniability: registrations in administrative havens, shell companies in Dubai or Seychelles and flags of convenience that minimized political risk. The recent turn is radically different. Dozens of these ships have begun to raise the Russian flag directly, not out of discretion, but as a shield. It is a kind of flight forward: by declaring them Russian, the Kremlin raises the cost of any interdiction, transforming a legal problem into a strategic one. The perfect example. He Sailor is he most extreme example of that mutation. Pursued by the US Coast Guard from the Caribbean, he refused a boarding, fled into the Atlantic, changed his identity and received a Russian registration without formal inspections. With this, Moscow sought something very specific: deter Washington by raising the implicit question of whether the United States was willing to forcibly board a Russian-flagged ship on the high seas. The answer has left no room for doubt. The televised approach. The American operation was anything but improvised, with a video of the assault who has turned the helm. For weeks, the tanker was followed by a Coast Guard cutter while aerial assets were deployed in the United Kingdom, including special forces and surveillance platforms. The final boarding in waters between Iceland and Scotland It involved US military personnel and occurred despite the nearby presence of Russian naval units. According to Moscowit was a violation of international law. According to Washingtonthe ship had previously been stateless, was under a judicial seizure order and was part of an illicit transportation network of Iranian and Venezuelan oil. Munro following the tanker Bella 1 Repercussions. The crucial detail is not legal, but political. Russia had formally requested that the United States cease the persecution and, at send a submarine and other assets, introduced an element of direct military deterrence. The United States, by moving forward, de facto accepted a risk it had so far avoided: an incident between Russian and American forces outside the Ukrainian theater and without the usual diplomatic buffers. The disturbing change of scenery. Previously, the US tightening against the ghost fleet was concentrated in the Caribbean and around Venezuela, especially after Maduro’s captureconverted by Trump into a show of force and the pillar of a strategy to control Venezuelan oil. In that context, boarding oil tankers with a dubious flag off the Latin American coast implied limited risks: Guyana or fictitious records were not going to respond militarily. The jump to the North Atlantic changes everything. He Sailor was not intercepted near Venezuela, but on routes close to Europe, with the UK operational support and under the watchful eye of NATO allies. The scene, therefore, is no longer the American “backyard,” but rather a space where any miscalculation has direct implications for European security. Suddenly, sanctions enforcement overlaps with nuclear deterrence. Moment of the assault on the oil tanker The nuclear factor. No one needs to mention weapons for are present. Russia is a nuclear power that bases much of its doctrine on controlled escalation and ambiguity, and the United States perfectly understands the implicit message when Moscow escorts an oil tanker with a submarine. The Marinera incident demonstrates the extent to which the sanctions war has reached a dangerous threshold: it is no longer just about money or oil, but about strategic credibility. Each boarding of a ship re-flagged by Russia poses an uncomfortable question: How far is Moscow willing to protect its ghost fleet without crossing a line that provokes a direct response? And at the same time, how many times can Washington repeat an operation like this before the Kremlin feels the need to respond so as not to appear weak? In a stressful environment, an accidental collision or misunderstanding can escalate quickly. Europe and the crossroads. The seizure of Sailor occurs while Europe debate what to do with these oil tankers, increasingly associated not only with evasion of sanctions, but to sabotagedamage to submarine cables and serious environmental risks. Countries like Finland and France have already used special forces to board suspicious ships. However, the American case introduces a disturbing precedent: what is legal is not always prudent. If great powers normalize the use of force on the high seas against strategically reflagged ships, other less responsible actors may imitate the behavior. An old ship as a symbol. He Sailor It did not carry oil, nor is there conclusive evidence that it transported weapons. Its value is different: as a symbol. It represents the transition of the russian hybrid war from the shadow to open confrontationand shows that the United States is willing to push the pressure beyond the margins comfortable of the Caribbean. “Venezuela” is no longer a … Read more

The gold of the 21st century is not in Venezuela. China and Russia know it, and that is why the US wants Greenland no matter what.

by

As if it were a Deja Vú2026 has exactly begun same as 2025: with Trump’s insistence on take over Greenland. It happens that it no longer seems like an isolated whim or a rhetorical eccentricity, but rather the convergence of a personal drive, a strategic opportunity perceived as easy, and a high-impact geopolitical calculation. Venezuela It has served to light the fuse. Greenland as an obsession. After the capture of MaduroTrump confirmed once again that the use of force abroad lacks the legal and judicial brakes that do constrain his domestic action, and that, in the face of clearly outmatched adversaries or allies, the reality is imposed on international law without too many immediate consequences. Greenland then appears (again) as the perfect prize: a huge, sparsely populated territory, defended by an ally incapable of military resistance and located in an area where Washington can dress territorial ambition in the language of “national security”. The reiteration of the message, the appointment of a specific envoy and the public statements that normalize even the military option indicate that this is not a joke or simple diplomatic pressure, but rather an obsession that grows as Trump’s internal political margin narrows. The founding paradox of NATO. The central problem is that Greenland belongs to the Kingdom of Denmarka full member of NATO, and any US action against it would place the Alliance before a paradox for which it was not designed. He Article 5, designed to deter external enemies, does not see clearly What happens when the aggressor is the hegemonic member. As has warned Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen, in that scenario “everything would stop”: NATO could continue to exist formally, but its credibility would be destroyed. No one would come to the defense of Greenland against the United States, not only due to a lack of political will, but also due to the absolute material asymmetry between Washington and the rest of the allies. The implicit message is thunder for Europe: security guarantees are no longer automatic, and force is once again in place above the treatyan outcome that directly benefits Russia at the moment of greatest tension since the end of the Cold War. Critical minerals. The economic and technological argument is supported in mineral wealth that lies under the Greenland ice, the result of an ancient geology that concentrates rare earths and other essential critical minerals for the energy transition. From the 19th century to today, different actors have tried exploit that potential, from Ivittuut cryolite during World War II to contemporary rare earth projects. However, the enthusiasm collides with a stubborn reality: extracting these resources is extraordinarily expensive, slow and risky. The almost total lack of infrastructure, the dependence on maritime or air transport, the complexity of processing (with minerals often associated with uranium) and restrictive environmental legislation mean that only a minimal fraction of exploration projects become operational mines, usually after more than a decade of investment. Extra ball. Furthermore, the memory of the environmental damage caused by past exploitations, whose effects are still detectable half a century later in extremely fragile ecosystems, explains why Greenlandic society only contemplates mining. like an opportunity if you actively participate in decision-making and project ownership. The loot exists, but it is neither immediate nor easy, and it certainly does not seem to be able to justify the American strategic urgency on its own. Hybrid war. The backdrop is a northern Europe increasingly militarizedwhere incidents against submarine cables, gas pipelines and critical infrastructure in the Baltic have normalized the idea of a permanent hybrid war. In this context, Washington observes how Moscow and Beijing test pressure tactics below the threshold of open conflict, while legal and judicial responses appear slow or ineffective. The explicit willingness of the United States to include military option for Greenland fits into that fait accompli logic: securing key positions before the strategic environment deteriorates further. It is not just about denying advantages to rivals, but about getting ahead of a scenario in which infrastructure, logistics and control of physical nodes are worth more than declarations of principles. The navigable Arctic and a port. Here a possible decisive derivative emerges. Science has been warning for some time a stage where the Arctic is heading, on a horizon of decades, to be navigable for most of the year. The sustained retreat of sea ice is transforming routes that were once seasonal into viable commercial corridorsdrastically reducing the distances between Asia, Europe and North America. Today, they capitalize on that advantage especially Russiawith the Northern Maritime Route, and Chinawhich presents itself as a “near-Arctic power” and invests in ports, icebreakers and logistics agreements. For the United States, which is late to this board, Greenland represents the perfect shortcut: an enclave located between the Atlantic and the Arctic, capable of hosting deep-water ports, air bases and logistics nodes from which to offset the Russian-Chinese advantage. Seen this way, more than a mine, Greenland is a port ahead of the world to come, a piece from which to influence the global trade of the 21st century and the control of routes that, for the first time in modern history, cease to be be closed by ice. A small island, a global change. If you will, the final paradox is that all this pulse revolves around a tiny territory of less than 60,000 inhabitantsone mostly opposed to integrating into the United States and in favor, at best, of a slow and cautious independence. However, its symbolic and strategic value is disproportionate. Greenland condenses the transition to a world where melting ice reconfigures maps, critical minerals redefine dependencies, and alliances are strained to the limit. For Trump, it is a source of political impact, potential money and demolition of the old order. For Europe, possibly proof that geography prevails again to the law. And for the international system, the warning that the Arctic is no longer a remote edge of the planet, but one of its new centers of gravity. Image | The … Read more

Europe believes it has won the gas war against Russia, but it has forgotten one small detail: infrastructure

by

Europe has made a historic decision: 2027 will be the year in which the last trace of Russian gas disappear from the energy system of the continent. However, between the offices in Brussels and the reality of homes there is a chasm that is not measured in cubic meters, but in months of construction. The continent’s security no longer depends on diplomacy with the Kremlin, but on the speed at which terminals can be erected, tubes connected and ships deployed. The new European sovereignty is in the hands of the engineers. A system to build. As analyst Giacomo Prandelli explainsthe focus of the Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) market has been on the price, but the real crisis is infrastructure. Europe is in a frantic race to replace Russian gas, but much of the necessary capacity is still under construction or in the planning phase. This has created a golden opportunity for a very select group of companies that own the physical assets. According to Prandelli, there are vital European companies that still go unnoticed. He gives as an example a firm valued at 662 million euros that operates “at a bargain price”: Their profits are very high compared to their stock market value and, most importantly, they already have government contracts secured until 2030. They are, basically, the owners of the “plugs” that Europe is forced to go through. The reasons for structural change. The reason for this urgency is an irreversible “divorce”. According to data collected by OilPriceRussian exports by gas pipeline to Europe have fallen by 44% in 2025, reaching lows in the 1970s. The definitive closure of the Ukrainian route this December leaves the continent without its historic arteries. The reasons for this new reality are three: US dependence: US gas It already represents 56% of LNG imports in Europe. The July 2025 agreementby which the EU will buy 750 billion dollars in energy from the US, has reconfigured the global board. The physical rigidity of the system: Although there is plenty of gas in the global market, European regasification plants (especially in the Netherlands) have operated at the limit of their technical capacity. Spain has the gas, but cannot send it to the rest of Europe: its pipelines with France they only allow export 8,500 million m³ per year. The problem is not the lack of fuel, it is the “funnel” of the pipes. Gas as an eternal backup: A report from McKinsey & Company issues an uncomfortable warning: Gas demand will grow by 26% until 2050. Europe needs gas to stabilize its electricity grid when renewables fail. The energy transition, far from eliminating gas, has turned it into a “permanent strategic pillar.” The Black Sea axis and the ghost fleet. However, the European wall has cracks. Hungary and Slovakia they keep injecting money to the Kremlin via the Druzhba pipeline and the TurkStream route. While Brussels asks for disconnection, Budapest and Bratislava build new connections towards the Black Sea, claiming that the cut would be “economic suicide.” Added to this is the fear of the “ghost fleet.” Brussels fears that Russian gas will repeat the oil scriptan opaque market of ships that change flag and documentation to hide the origin of the gas. To avoid this, the EU has imposed fines of up to 3.5% of global turnover and certificate of origin systems, but the crude oil precedent shows that, when Europe closes a door, the market usually opens a clandestine window. Europe’s floating lifebuoy. Given the slowness of concrete, a technical solution arises. According to Professor Alexandre Munspoints towards FSRUs (Floating Storage and Regasification Units). These ships are mobile regasification plants that use the heat of the sea to process the gas. According to Muns, their advantages are the speed of deployment and the cost since they can be rented for about $155,000 per day. Giants such as Excelerate Energy or Höegh LNG are those that today allow the EU to keep the pulse. Without these ships, the gas crossing the Atlantic simply would have nowhere to enter the continent. The tyranny of the calendar. Europe closes 2025 with deceptive calm. As reported by El Economistaprices have fallen to four-year lows (€27/MWh) thanks to a mild winter and the constant flow of ships. But, as the president of Sedigas, Joan Batalla, warns, this stability is “conditional.” Any extreme cold snap or technical failure in a saturated terminal could skyrocket prices again, because the network operates without margin for error. Europe’s autonomy is no longer negotiated in Moscow; It is built in the ports of Germany, in the interconnections of the Pyrenees and in the FSRU shipyards. The success of the 2027 plan will not depend on politicians’ promises, but on cranes and welders finishing their work before the climate changes the rules of the game. Image | freepik Xataka | The European Union has finally made the decision that has terrified it for so many years: stop importing Russian gas

While Silicon Valley dreams of servers in orbit, Russia prepares a nuclear reactor on lunar soil

by

Until recently, the space race was about seeing who could get there first. Today, the question is different: who will be able to turn on the light on the Moon? While companies like Google or Nvidia imagine satellites loaded with computers for their Artificial Intelligence, Russia has hit the table with a much more earthly (or lunar) plan: installing a small nuclear power plant on the surface of our satellite. A reactor by 2036. The Russian space corporation, Roscosmos, has signed a state contract with the aerospace company NPO Lavochkin to develop a lunar nuclear power plant. According to Reutersthe deadline marked in the contract is 2036. However, the political times are much more aggressive: Yury Borisov, head of Roscosmos, has placed the real operational window between 2033 and 2035. Although official statements sometimes avoid the word “nuclear” directly, project participants dispel any doubts, the Kurchatov Institute (a leader in nuclear research in Russia) and Rosatom (the state atomic flagship company) are in charge. As the Interfax media points outthe objective is to power the infrastructure of the International Lunar Research Station (ILRS), a joint project with China that seeks to move from “round trip” missions to a permanent human presence. But why what nuclear? A colony on the Moon faces nights that last 14 Earth days. During that time, the frigid temperatures and lack of light make the solar panels useless to keep astronauts alive or power life support systems. Mikhail Kovalchuk, head of the Kurchatov Institute, he explained in an interview with the Russian agency TASS that Russia must “run forward.” According to this medium, the country seeks to consolidate its leadership through the “Atomic Project 2.0”, which includes new generation reactors and closed cycle systems. It’s not just about science; Russia admits that partners like China and India have learned a lot from them and are now direct competitors. Eyes in the sky: preparing the ground. For the Russian reactor to reach the Moon, Moscow is already preparing the logistics. According to another TASS statementRussia plans to launch 52 satellites from the Vostochny cosmodrome. Among them, the Aist-2T stands out, capable of creating 3D models of the lunar terrain and monitoring emergency situations. It is the necessary infrastructure so that the “lunar atom” does not suffer the same fate as the failed Luna-25 probe in 2023. The Moscow-Beijing axis: a long-range alliance. This deployment is not a solitary effort. As Interfax detailsRussia and China formalized their ambition in May 2024 with a memorandum of cooperation for the joint construction of this nuclear plant. They are not starting from scratch: both countries presented a roadmap in 2021 that includes five joint missions to deploy modules in lunar orbit and surface. While Russia brings its historical advantage in space nuclear facilities, China provides the scientific capacity and resources for the ILRS Station to be permanently inhabited from 2030. The board of the new Cold War. Washington has not stood idly by in the face of the Russian-Chinese alliance. NASA has received a clear directive from the current administration, in which they state that They need a reactor on the Moon by 2030. “We are in a race with China,” said Sean Duffy, Secretary of Transportation and who has led this directive. The background of this urgency is not only prestige, but the control of strategic resources. The Moon is the great deposit of Helium-3, an extremely rare isotope that is emerging as the “fuel of the future” for nuclear fusion. The White House’s fear is that if the alliance between Russia and China comes sooner, they will be able to declare “exclusion zones,” blocking access to this isotope and other essential metals for the technology industry. Faced with this threat, the US has increased the power of its nuclear project from the original 40 kW to a minimum power of 100 kW. Infrastructure over prestige. The space race of the 21st century has ceased to be a question of prestige and has become a question of infrastructure. While Big Tech tries to solve its energy limits with promises of servers in orbitRussia and China have opted for the pragmatism of the reactor on solid, but lunar, soil. Image| freepik Xataka | The race to bring data centers to space promises a lot. Physics says otherwise

When the war in Ukraine ends, Russia has a plan for Europe

by

A week ago and in the midst of the peace negotiations that the United States has tried to lead between Russia and Ukraine, the president of Finland issued a warning to the old continent. If peace comes to Eastern Europe, it will be the end of the war, but also, possibly, the beginning of another. Now it has been Washington’s intelligence that seems to be on the same line. The ultimate goal. counted this week Reuters that US intelligence reports have been conveying a less than reassuring message for more than two years: Putin’s objectives in Ukraine have not been moderated or reduced, despite military attrition, economic sanctions and ongoing diplomatic talks. Since the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022, the assessment of US agencies has been that the Kremlin aims to subdue all of Ukraine and, beyond that, to restore a sphere of influence over territories that were part of the former Soviet bloc, including countries that today they are part of NATO. This reading is neither punctual nor cyclical, but rather a line of analysis sustained over time that agrees widely with the conclusions of the European intelligence services and with the strategic perception of countries especially exposed as Poland or the Baltic Stateswhich are considered the next potential targets if Moscow manages to consolidate its position in Ukraine. Between intelligence and speech. This diagnosis collides head-on with the narrative promoted by Trump and his negotiating team, who maintain that Putin wants to end the conflict and that a peace agreement would be closer than ever. For intelligence analysts, that view ignores both the Russian leader’s own public statements and the logic of your actions military and political. From Washington it is emphasized that Putin has denied repeatedly be a threat to Europe, but the facts (the annexation of territories, sustained military pressure and the refusal to renounce maximalist demands) contradict that discourse. Even voices within the US Congress, such as that of the Democratic congressman Mike Quigleya member of the House Intelligence Committee, have insisted that the conviction that Russia “wants more” is shared by allies key in Europe and is based on solid information, not assumptions. Territorial control. On the ground, Russia controls approximately 20% of Ukrainian territory. This domain includes almost all of the provinces of Luhansk and Donetsk, the industrial heart of Donbas, large areas of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson, and the Crimean peninsula, a strategic enclave in the Black Sea. Putin does not present these conquests as provisional or negotiable: he has formally declared that Crimea and the four occupied provinces belong to Russiaa statement that sets a clear red line for any negotiation. This position turns the territorial debate into the main obstacle of diplomatic contacts, since accepting these demands would mean, de facto, legitimizing a war of annexation and setting a dangerous precedent for the post-Cold War European order. Pressure on kyiv. In this context, Washington’s pressure on kyiv has been increasing. According to sources familiar with the talks, the US proposal would include Ukraine withdraw your forces of the areas of Donetsk that it still controls, as part of a peace agreement. For Volodymyr Zelenskiy and the majority of Ukrainian society, this concession is unacceptable. Not only would it imply ceding sovereign territory under military coercion, but it would call into question future viability of the Ukrainian State and its ability to defend itself from new aggression. kyiv insists that any agreement that does not include real and credible security guarantees would be equivalent to freeze the conflict on terms favorable to Moscow, leaving the door open to a resumption of the war when Russia feels stronger. Security: the great debate. The negotiations led by Trump’s entourage, with figures such as Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff, have advanced in defining a package of security guarantees backed by the United States and generally accepted by Ukraine and several European countries. These guarantees would contemplate the deployment of a security force mainly European in neighboring countries and in areas of Ukraine far from the front, with the aim of deterring and responding to future Russian aggression. The scheme would also include a limit on the size of the Ukrainian army, set at around the 800,000 troopsalthough Moscow is pushing to reduce it further, a demand to which some American negotiators are open. To this would be added intelligence support by the United States, air patrols backed by Washington and the ratification of the agreement by the US Senate, which in theory would give the commitment greater political solidity. Mistrust and Russian mystery. Despite these advances, Zelenskiy has publicly expressed your doubts about the real effectiveness of those guarantees, wondering what would prevent Russia from attacking again in practice. Uncertainty worsens because Putin has rejected the presence of foreign troops in Ukraine, even as part of a peace agreement. In parallel, the Russian leader has not offered signs of flexibility: although he declares himself willing to talk about peace, he insists that his conditions must be met and boasts of the territorial advances achieved by his forces, which he estimates at about 6,000 square kilometers in the last year. The lack of a clear response from Washington to these demands fuels the perception that Moscow could be using the talks as a tactical tool to buy time and consolidate positions. Strategic risk. From the Office of the Director of National Intelligence has qualified that Russia, in its current state, lacks the military capacity to conquer all of Ukraine or to launch a full-scale offensive against Europe. However, the reports themselves emphasize that the lack of immediate capacity does not equate to a strategic renunciation. Putin’s political intention, according to US intelligence, remains being expansiveand their calculation seems oriented toward a long war, in which the attrition of Ukraine and the political fatigue of the West work in their favor. That combination of unbroken ambition and strategic patience is what explains the caution (also, if you will, skepticism) of the intelligence services regarding … Read more

Ukraine has asked Russia if they stop for Christmas like in the First World War. The answer could not have been more Russian

by

The inevitable reference when talking about a Christmas break in the middle of a conflict is the spontaneous truce December 1914in the first months of the First World War. On several sectors of the Western Front, British and German soldiers left the trenches, exchanged cigarettes, sang Christmas carols and even played football in no man’s land. Ukraine has remembered it, but it is going to be complicated. The first time. On that occasion of the First World War, the truce was not ordered by the commanders nor was it part of a political negotiation: came from belowof human exhaustion in the face of a war that had not yet shown all its industrial brutality. Precisely for this reason it was never repeated. The high command considered it dangerous, subversive and incompatible with a modern total war. Since then, Christmas has been used many times as a rhetorical symbol of peace, but almost never as an actual interruption of fighting. The Ukrainian proposal. In this historical context full of symbolism, Ukraine has raised the possibility of a ceasefire during Christmas, an idea carefully formulated so as not to appear as a disguised surrender. Zelensky has spoken of a specific pauseespecially linked to attacks against energy infrastructure, at a critical time of winter and with the civilian population as the main collateral victim. At the same time, kyiv is preparing a new package of peace proposals backed by European partners and channeled through the United States, with the expectation that Washington will offer top-level security guarantees if Moscow rejects the plan. Zelensky, however, has shown caution and has lowered any expectations of a quick deal, publicly assuming that Russia may choose to continue the war and that, in that case, Ukraine will ask for more sanctions and more weapons. Officers and men of the 26th Division Ammunition Train playing football at Salonica, Greece, on Christmas Day 1915 The Russian response. The Kremlin’s reaction to the “Christmas break” has been immediate and bluntalmost ritual in its formulation. Dmitri Peskov has discarded any temporary ceasefire, including a Christmas truce, with an argument that Moscow has been repeating for months: a pause would only serve for Ukraine to regroup, rearm and prolong the conflict. In official Russian language, the word “truce” is presented like a trapwhile the word “peace” is reserved for a scenario in which Russia has achieved all your strategic objectives. According to Peskov, Moscow is not ready to replace a comprehensive negotiation (in their own terms) for “momentary and non-viable” solutions. The logic is clear and brutal: either the Russian framework of political and territorial victory is accepted, or the war continues without sentimental interruptions. Territory, guarantees and red lines. Behind the exchange of statements lies the real core of the conflict. Russia demands that Ukraine rspread to wide areas of its territory, accept permanent limits on its armed forces and rule out any future accession to NATO. Ukraine, for its part, rejects hand over the Donbaseven under ambiguous formulas such as a supposed demilitarized “free economic zone,” and remembers that it was already betrayed once when it renounced its nuclear arsenal in 1994 in exchange for security guarantees that did not prevent the invasion. Polls show that a clear majority of Ukrainian society opposes withdrawing from the east and is willing to continue fighting, a domestic factor that greatly limits Zelensky’s political margin even as international pressure increases. Christmas without miracles. The proposal for a Christmas break actually exposes the abysmal distance between the war that we evoke in historical memory and the war that is being fought today. In 1914an improvised truce was possible because the soldiers still saw each other as human beings confronted by accident. In 2025, the war in Ukraine is a conflict of objectives strategic, existential red lines and cold calculation of power, where each day of pause is measured in kilometers of front, ammunition reserves and operational advantages. The Russian response dry and distrustfulis not only “very Russian”: it is confirmation that, in this war, Christmas has no capacity to suspend the logic of the conflict. Unlike more than a century agothere is no room for carols between the trenches, only for official statements that remind that, for Moscow, peace does not begin with a truce, but with the political defeat of the adversary. Image | RawPixel, WikiCommons, Ariel Varges In Xataka | 24 hours later, satellite images leave no doubt: a Ukrainian underwater drone has changed the future of wars In Xataka | Drums of peace sound in Ukraine. And that should be a good thing for Europe… unless Finland is right

Europe has finally approved how to help Ukraine. The great paradox is that the most unexpected vote has been imposed: that of Russia

by

Europe has finally closed an agreement to guarantee financing for Ukraine for the next two years through a loan of 90,000 million of euros backed by the common budget of the Union, a decision taken after more than 16 hours of negotiations in Brussels and under explicit pressure to avoid a financial collapse of kyiv at the beginning of 2026. In the background, a crystal clear idea: Russia has imposed its “vote”. The lifeguard and a pulse. The pact comes at a particularly delicate moment, with the United States and Russia advancing conversations parallels about a possible end to the war and with Trump publicly urging Ukraine to accept a quick agreement. For European leaders, the loan is not just an economic instrument, but a way to reaffirm that the EU wants and needs to have its own voice in any outcome of the most serious conflict experienced on the continent in the last eight decades. The political message is clear: Europe cannot stand by while others decide the future of Ukraine and, by extension, its own security. The failure of the ideal plan. For months, Brussels’ preferred option was to use the fences of 210,000 million euros in Russian sovereign assets frozen in Europe as collateral for a large “reparations” loan for Ukraine, a formula that made it possible to finance the war effort and the functioning of the Ukrainian state without directly resorting to European taxpayers’ money. The idea was powerful, both economically as symbolically: that Russia would pay, at least indirectly, for the destruction caused by its invasion. However, the plan fell apart at the last moment, a victim of the legal, financial and political risks involved in touching that capital, above all and as we told yesterdayfor a handful of countries. Russia, in fact, has already initiated legal action denouncing an illegal confiscation, and fear of economic or judicial reprisals grew as the decisive summit approached. Bucha and the passing of the war A pragmatic agreement. Faced with the impossibility of closing ranks around the use of frozen assets, France and Italy led a more pragmatic alternative: use the common EU budget to issue debt on the markets and channel the funds to Ukraine. The result is a two year loan which guarantees immediate liquidity to kyiv, although it is more expensive and less scalable than the original option. To achieve consensus, a complex political architecture was also accepted: Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic will not assume obligations direct financial measures, a key condition to avoid an internal blockage. Still, the agreement was presented as a minimal but necessary victory. Ukraine gets the money it needs to survive and Europe avoids a picture of total paralysis at a critical moment. The resilience narrative. From kyiv, Zelenskiy celebrated the agreement as a real reinforcement of Ukrainian resilience, underscoring both the arrival of funds and the fact that Russian assets remain tied up. For the Ukrainian president, the combination it is essential: short-term financial security and sustained strategic pressure on Moscow. Zelenskiy had defended the use of frozen assets until the last moment, appealing to moral, legal and historical justice criteria, but he accepted the compromise. like a lesser evil facing the existential risk of running out of resources. The EU, for its part, insists that Ukraine will only have to repay the loan when Russia pays reparationsa formula that keeps the narrative of Russian responsibility alive without yet crossing the line of direct confiscation. Belgium and type C accounts. It we explained yesterday. In the background of the agreement there was a key actor: Belgium. Most of the Russian money frozen in Europe is there, guarded through critical financial infrastructure like Euroclear and linked to mechanisms such as called type C accountsdesigned precisely to immobilize assets without transferring ownership. Brussels demanded “unlimited” guarantees against possible Russian demands and retaliation, a level of protection that the rest of the partners were not willing to assume. The final result, although presented as a European commitment, essentially coincides with what was best for Moscow: that its sovereign capital not be confiscated or used as direct collateral. Russia loses access to the money, but retains the fundamental principle that these funds remain formally its own, avoiding a far-reaching legal precedent. If you also want, indirectly, Europe has chosen the safest path for itself and, at the same time, the least disruptive for the Kremlin. Europe and its limitations. So things are, the agreement leaves an ambivalent feeling. On the one hand, it shows that the EU is capable of mobilizing massive resources to support Ukraine and prevent its financial collapse in the middle of the war. On the other hand, it exposes again structural limitations of the European project when it comes to quick and risky decisions in foreign policy and security. The plan based on Russian assets promised to be more forceful and transformative, and the loan backed by the common budget is more conservativeslower and more politically comfortable. In a context in which Washington presses for an agreement and Russia hopes to buy time, Europe has chosen legal stability and internal cohesion over a direct financial confrontation with Moscow. Ukraine thus receives the oxygen it needs. The strategic pulse, however, is far from resolved. Image | RawPixel In Xataka | Ukraine’s biggest problem is not Russia. There are three European countries trapped in a perverse mechanism: type C accounts In Xataka | A Soviet missile is destroying Ukraine’s helicopters. The paradox is that it is not from Russia: it comes from the West

Ukraine’s biggest problem is not Russia. There are three European countries trapped in a perverse mechanism: type C accounts

by

Europe faces a decision that goes far beyond an accounting discussion and that defines its strategic credibility: what to do with the more than 210,000 million of euros of Russian assets frozen since the beginning of the invasion of Ukraine. The problem is twofold, because it is not just about figures, but about what comes after activating the operation. The European crossroads. Yes, because the question is not only whether that money should be used to support kyiv at a critical moment, but whether the European Union is capable to take the risks political, legal and economic implications of doing so. As Washington presses for a quick exit to the conflict and reduces its financial support, Brussels finds itself caught between the urgency of avoiding a Ukrainian defeat and the fear of unleashing a russian retaliation that directly hits several of its Member States. Putin clearly. Statements this week by Vladimir Putinloaded with contempt for European elites and confidence in a protracted war, are not simple rhetoric. Moscow makes it clear that it is not contemplating real concessions and that it considers the use of its frozen assets as theft that demands a response. That response would not be symbolic, but surgical: selective seizures, accelerated nationalizations, endless litigation and the use of the Russian financial system as a weapon. The message, a priori, is unequivocal: if Europe crosses the line, Russia will not only punish Ukraine on the battlefield, but also European countries that still have exposed economic interests within their territory. The real blockage. I remembered this morning the financial times he crux of the whole situation. Although the debate is presented as a struggle between hawks and cautions, the real blockage comes from a handful of countries specific, with Belgium, Italy and Austria at the head. It is not a question of ideology, but of direct vulnerability. Belgium hosts Euroclear, the warehouse that guards most of the frozen Russian assets, and fears becoming the first target of retaliation judicial and economic. Italy and Austria, for their part, maintain banks and companies with billions trapped in Russia, benefits included, which they cannot repatriate. For these countries, authorizing the use of Russian money is not an abstract foreign policy decision, but rather an immediate risk to their financial and corporate systems. Type C accounts: the ace of Moscow. At the center of this fear are the calls type C accountsthe mechanism created by Moscow to withhold dividends, interest and assets from Western companies. That money, formally owned by European and American companies, is under Russian control and can be frozen, redistributed or directly transferred to the state budget with a simple decree. For the Kremlin, these accounts are a retaliation tool fast and effective, far superior in agility to slow Western judicial processes. For Europe, they are an invisible chain that binds entire governments when making strategic decisions, because any false step can translate into lost billions and internal political crises. Germany pushes, Europe hesitates. Germany has become the main political engine of the plan to use Russian assets, convinced that without that money there is no realistic way to support Ukraine for another two years without skyrocketing the European debt or depending on impossible unanimity. Berlin insists that the risk must be shared among everyone and that failure to act would send a devastating sign: Europe is not capable of defending its own security. However, this logic collides with the reality of countries that feel that the risk is not distributed, but rather concentrated in their national balance sheetsits banks and its courts. A (bad) peace as a threat. This financial blockade occurs in an even more disturbing context: European fear to an imposed peace on terms favorable to Russia. For many capitals, an agreement that consolidates Moscow’s territorial gains would not only leave Ukraine defenseless, but would force Europe to prepare for a scenario direct confrontation in the medium term, with longer borders, a strengthened Russian army and a weakened European deterrent. In this framework, the frozen Russian money stops being a tactical lever and becomes a strategic investment: either it is used now to support Ukraine, or it is paid for later in the form of massive rearmament and risk of war. The final dilemma. In short, the European Union has frozen Russian assets to prevent them from returning to Moscow without reparations, but now it must decide whether it dares to give the next step. Without that money, Ukraine could run out of liquidity in a matter of months, losing all negotiating power and forcing a deal from weakness. With him, Europe is exposed to reprisals, litigation and immediate economic losses, concentrated in a few countries that are currently holding back the decision. The crossroads are clear: assume the political and financial cost now, or accept that the fear of type C accounts determine European security policy. Not only the future of Ukraine is at stake in that election, but also Europe’s ability to act as a coherent geopolitical actor when your own interests are at risk. Image | RawPixel In Xataka | A missile has been bombarding Ukraine’s defenses for weeks. What no one could imagine is that he is not Russian: he is from the West In Xataka | A day later the satellites leave no doubt: Russia fortified a bridge, and a Ukrainian drone made science fiction a reality

The United States has turned Trinidad and Tobago into the war container it was missing. Venezuela has responded like Russia: an invisible fleet

by

The conflict between the United States and Venezuela has entered a phase in which the silent accumulation media outweighs official statements. If you will, the Caribbean once again functions as a strategic belt from which Washington projects pressure without the need to declare an open war. Under the formal argument of the fight against drug trafficking, the White House has been weaving a support network logistics, radars, airstrips, ports and resupply spaces in an arc at a time bigger of “allies”. The Venezuela’s response We already saw it in Russia. The map of countries. That “arc” of allies Washington runs from the Dominican Republic to Trinidad and Tobago, passing through Aruba, Curaçao, Bonaire, Grenada, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. The deployment includes destroyers, nuclear submarines, amphibious ships, aircraft carriers, state-of-the-art fighters, drones and thousands of troops, not enough for a land invasion, but enough to control air and maritime space, monitor critical routes and sustain missile attacks if it is decided to escalate. It is a prepositioning strategy classic: being everywhere without publicly assuming that something else is in the works. Trinidad and Tobago, the most sensitive link. Within that architecture, Trinidad and Tobago emerges as the most delicate piece of the board. Its extreme proximity to the Venezuelan coast turns any gesture into a political and military message. The new government has authorized the use of its airports by US military aircraft, has received warships and marine units, has allowed joint exercises and has accepted the installation of an AN/TPS-80 G/ATOR radar capable of detecting aircraft, drones and missiles. Everything is presented as logistical and defensive cooperationbut it fits almost literally with the US National Security Strategy of 2025, which calls for a toughened version of the Monroe Doctrine to reaffirm the preeminence of the United States in the Western Hemisphere and prevent external actors from controlling strategic assets. Trinidad and Tobago insist in that it will not be a platform for offensive attacks except direct aggression, but its role as node of surveillance, resupply and intelligence places it at the center of any scenario of sustained pressure on Caracas. A blockage that is not. The announced threat by Trump of a “total and complete” interdiction of sanctioned oil tankers entering or leaving Venezuela fits into that model of gradual pressure. It is not about closing ports with a formal declaration of war, but about taking advantage of naval and air superiority, supported by friendly infrastructure, to intercept, seize or deter the ships that support the main source of income for the Nicolás Maduro regime. The recent seizure of an oil tanker loaded with nearly two million barrels and the warning that further action could follow shows the extent to which Washington is willing to take pressure beyond the symbolic, taking the risk of controlled incidents in international waters. The Venezuelan response. Faced with this siege, Caracas has reacted by raising the profile of its challenge. The order to escort ships that transport oil products and derivatives to Asia is a calculated move: it seeks to demonstrate that the Venezuelan State does not renounce its right to free navigation and that it is willing to involve to his Navy to keep exports open. It is also a response that increases the risk of confrontationbut that sends an internal and external message of resistance. Oil continues to be the financial pillar of the regime, and losing it would be equivalent to accepting total economic asphyxiation. The ghost fleets. Beyond the visible escort, the true backbone of the Venezuelan strategy is the ghost fleeta tactic practically copied from the used by Russia after Western sanctions. Old oil tankers, many with more than twenty or thirty years of service, change name and flagsteal the identities of already dismantled ships, sail under flags of convenience, turn off or manipulate their identification systems and carry out crude oil transfers on the high seas to hide the origin of the cargo. The result is an opaque trade that allows you to sell oil with large discounts to buyers willing to take risks, while the traceability required by sanctions is diluted. It is not a marginal phenomenon: a significant part of the world’s oil tanker fleet already operates in this gray ecosystem, transporting Venezuelan, Russian or Iranian crude. Sanctions that do not suffocate, they deform. The BBC reported that the data show that, although far from the historical levels of the end of the 20th century, Venezuelan exports have recovered notably compared to the collapse of 2019. This indicates that the sanctions have not paralyzed the flow, but rather have displaced it towards more opaque and risky circuits. As in the Russian caseeconomic punishment does not eliminate trade, it makes it more expensive, makes it less transparent and reinforces dependence on informal networks and actors willing to move illegally. The Caribbean as a conflict. With US aircraft carriers patrolling the Caribbean, radars deployed in islands near Venezuela and escorted or invisible tankers sailing to Asiathe conflict is located in a dangerous intermediate zone between economic pressure and military confrontation. The United States bets on the ccontrol of space and logistics regional via of discreet allieswhile Venezuela responds with the same manual that has allowed other sanctioned countries to survive: ghost fleets, aggressive discounts and specific shows of force. The Caribbean, for decades associated with tourism and trade, is thus once again a scene of high geopolitical tension where each radar installed and each oil tanker intercepted brings the risk of a clash that no one admits they want, but for which both sides seem to prepare, a little closer. Image: US Navy In Xataka | The situation between the US and Venezuela only needs one incident to escalate into something more: that incident is already here In Xataka | In full tension with the US, Venezuela has presented its drone simulator: it is equal to a three-euro Steam game

the reason is due to Russia and a new military corridor

by

For years, the Finnish Arctic Circle has been reinvented as a theme park permanent winter, reindeer and northern lights, converted in global destination for those looking for an eternal Christmas and an experience carefully designed around the myth of Santa Claus. But there are always more surprises in Santa’s house, and an element that no one expected has just arrived in Finnish Lapland and that changes everything: Europe rearming itself. Santa and war. Rovaniemiinternationally promoted as the official home of Santa Claus, has been one of the great icons of the world for years. european arctic tourisma place where Christmas has become in permanent industry and where the experience is carefully designed for visitors from all over the world. However, this winter season the city is experiencing a silent but profound transformation: along with sledding, reindeer safaris and festive lights, the capital of Finnish Lapland has been filled with NATO soldiers who train for a scenario that until recently seemed unthinkable. Thousands of allied soldiers have recently passed through the area to maneuvers in Rovajärvithe largest training camp in Western Europe, located just 88 km from the Russian border, making Rovaniemi a a key point of the new security architecture of northern Europe. The longest and most sensitive border. The reason for this deployment is geographical and strategic. Finland shares almost 1,500 km of border with Russiaone of the largest and most complex in the entire Atlantic Alliance, and more than a quarter of it runs through the sparsely populated Lapland. Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Finnish intelligence services and military commanders have warned that Moscow is strengthening its infrastructure and its presence on the other side of the border, especially around the Kola Peninsula, a key enclave due to its enormous concentration of nuclear capabilities. The forecast in Helsinki is that, once the war in Ukraine ends, Russia can redeploy troops towards the north and adopt a much more robust stance towards Finland, structurally raising the level of tension in the region. NATO umbrella. Finland does not start from scratch in this defensive logic. His history and their relationship with Russia have marked for decades a culture of constant preparation, with national defense integrated into the Constitution itself and a conscription system widely accepted by society. However, the entry into NATO in 2023 It has meant a qualitative change: the country has gone from a defense designed in a national key to being part of a collective system that requires interoperability, allied presence and joint planning. This shift has translated into international cooperation much more intensethe opening of a new Allied command at Mikkeli and the designation of Rovaniemi as a future base of the Forward Land Forces, the Swedish-led battle group intended to reinforce the Alliance’s eastern flank. Military exercises in the Arctic. It we have counted before. While the tourists fill the Santa Claus Village and cameras capture idyllic scenes of snow and lights, a few kilometers away carry out military exercises of great technical and logistical complexity. Maneuvers like Lapland Steel 25held after other large multinational exercises, bring together Finnish, Swedish and British troops who train in extreme conditions, combining armor, helicopters, infantry and movement on skis in frozen forests and deep snow. Although a specific scenario is not officially tested, the maps and orientation of the exercises clearly reflect the type of threat that is in mind, making visible direct connection between the seemingly remote environment of the Arctic and high-intensity conventional warfare. A mentalized population. For many young Finns who serve in the military, in many cases voluntarily, the possibility of conflict is no longer an option. a distant abstraction. counted on a report in the Guardian that soldiers and conscripts assume extreme physical effort, endless marches and the weight of equipment as part of a collective responsibility, convinced that preparation is the best guarantee against uncertainty. The commanders describe the current situation as a new cold war, marked by the melting of the Arctic, the opening of new routes and natural resources and the rrenewed interest from Russia to ensure both its strategic deterrence and its economic assets in the north, in a context of prolonged and structural competition. Deterrence as a political message. The intensification of joint exercises and coordination between Finland, Sweden and Norway seeks more than just improving military capabilities: it seeks to send a clear political signal of cohesion, commitment and responsiveness. The bet is to avoid conflict precisely by demonstrating that any aggression would have a high cost and a collective response. In that delicate balance, Rovaniemi has become a powerful symbol of today’s Europe: a place where the imagery of peace, childhood and Christmas now coexists with bunkers, military aircraft and strategic planning, remembering that even in the extreme north of the continent, security has ceased to be a backdrop and has become a central priority. Image | Matias CalloneRawPixel, Tom Corser, BORN In Xataka | In the midst of rearmament, Europe has realized an unimportant detail: it does not have enough bullets In Xataka | France and Germany have just approved an unprecedented rearmament against the Russian threat: one hundreds of kilometers from Earth

Log In

Forgot password?

Forgot password?

Enter your account data and we will send you a link to reset your password.

Your password reset link appears to be invalid or expired.

Log in

Privacy Policy

Add to Collection

No Collections

Here you'll find all collections you've created before.