Iran is going to need much more from China and Russia. The US has landed its fighter planes loaded with a weapon that changes everything: angry kittens

For most of the 20th century, air superiority has been decided by who flew higher, faster, or with more missiles. Today, the decisive factor does not have to be seen or heard, and sometimes even fits in a container under the fuselage. In modern conflicts, confuse the enemy for a few seconds it can be worth more than destroying it, and those seconds are usually start much earlier for the first plane to appear on the radar. Therefore, Iran may need much more than “aid” and agreements with China either Russia. A deployment that anticipates. While Washington and Tehran keep the diplomatic channel open, we have been counting that the Pentagon has been strengthening its presence in the Middle East for weeks with a movement of forces that includes fighters, bombers, submarines, aircraft carriers and land systems. The transfer of F-16CJ fighters specialized in air defense suppression is not a symbolic gesture. It is an operational signal that, if the negotiation ends up failing, the United States wants have the key ready to open the Iranian sky from the first minute. Wild Weasel: Enter first, shoot later. The F-16CJ are designed to an uncomfortable mission and certainly dangerous– Locate enemy radars, force them to turn on, and neutralize them before they can guide missiles against the attacking force. These aircraft are equipped with the system AN/ASQ-213 and anti-radiation missiles AGM-88 HARMand can physically destroy detection and command nodes. That said, its true advantage isn’t always in explosion. It is in the ability to disorganize the entire anti-aircraft architecture before it understands what is happening through a secret weapon. The “angry kittens”. Yes, because under the fuselage of these fighters travels the Angry Kitten podan advanced electronic warfare system that began as a tool to simulate threats in exercises and ended up evolving into a real operational capability. Let it be known, at least since 2017 It has been tested on multiple platforms and has become a test bed for cognitive electronic warfare, approaching the ideal of systems capable of quickly adapting to changing threat environments. Turning radar into a mirage. Thanks to technology from radio frequency digital memorythe Angry Kitten can detect, capture and manipulate enemy radar emissions to return altered signals. In other words, they don’t just block. What it does is create false targetsdistorts trajectories and sows doubts on the operator’s screen, thus reducing thereliability of information that supports the launch of interceptor missiles. Additionally, it can update jamming techniques very quickly and even adjust them during the mission, while the pilot concentrates on flying and fighting. They will face the invisible challenge. Tehran has reinforced its anti-aircraft batteries and seeks external support, trusting in missiles of chinese origin and in strategic alliances with Russia as a deterrent. However, that network relies on radars, data links and command centers that can be confused before a single interceptor leaves the launcher. Hence, Iran is going to need much more than Beijing’s missiles and the Moscow submarines. Because Washington has just landed in the East with fighter planes loaded with those angry kittens capable of disorganizing the defense from within and converting the apparent solidity of the shield into an electronic illusion. The war before the first impact. In short, everything indicates that, if a prolonged air campaignthe breakdown of the Iranian defensive overlap will not fall solely on stealth platforms. Most likely it will require methodical work of these F-16CJ opening corridors, degrading sensors and keeping pressure on the anti-aircraft network. In that scenario, the first phase would not be so much a rain of bombs. It would be more of an invisible battle for control of the spectrum, one where whoever dominates the signal dominates the sky. Image | John QuineUSAF In Xataka | As the US approached, the satellites have captured a shadow: Iran has resurrected a Russian Frankenstein for what is to come In Xataka | To sink a US aircraft carrier required a weapon that Iran did not have. The arrival of China has just changed everything

Russia set up a secret network to sell 90 billion in oil. It has fallen due to using the same mail server

In the geopolitical chess of international sanctions, where Western governments design complex legislation to suffocate Vladimir Putin’s war machine, sometimes checkmate comes not from a brilliant diplomatic maneuver, but from corporate stinginess. An entire global smuggling network, designed to the millimeter to be invisible to the eyes of Washington and Brussels, has fallen like a house of cards for not wanting to pay separate email bills. A simple saving in computer infrastructure has exposed a monumental flow of black money. a colossal IT blunder (a huge computer error) has brought to light a smuggling network that has moved at least $90 billion worth of Russian oil. As revealed by extensive research of the Finance Timesthis plot is mainly responsible for financing the Kremlin in its war against Ukraine. The British media has identified a network of 48 companies which, on paper, operated completely independently from different physical addresses. However, in practice, they acted in unison to disguise the origin of the crude oil, especially that of Rosneft, the Russian state-controlled oil company. The need to hide these exports became life or death for the Kremlin in October 2025, when the United States imposed direct sanctions to Rosneft and Lukoil. From that moment on, a previously unknown company called Redwood Global Supply was suddenly crowned as the largest exporter of Russian crude oil in the world. This firm, along with the rest of the network, is linked to a group of businessmen of Azerbaijani origin with privileged access to the leadership of Rosneft, led by figures such as Tahir Garayev and Etibar Eyyub. The independent Russian media The Moscow Times has been echoed of this discovery, highlighting a devastating fact: in November 2024, more than 80% of Rosneft’s maritime exports They moved through this network. Sergey Vakulenko, former head of strategy at Gazprom Neft and current researcher at the Carnegie Center, explained to this medium that using fifty shell companies is “an old trick from the 90s” to evade taxes, but he confesses his surprise at the fact that a single network has become so immensely crucial for a giant like Rosneft. The triumph of shadow intermediaries The existence of this network means, quite simply, that the Western sanctions system is full of holes and that Russia has managed to industrialize evasion. According to the investigationthe success of this $90 billion network was based on strict separation of roles to erase the money trail. The network used a group of shell companies exclusively to buy crude oil shipments in Russia, and another group of companies, totally different on paper, to sell them in key markets such as India or China. In this way, the initial buyer and the final seller almost never coincided in customs documents. Furthermore, in most cases, the crude oil was labeled under generic names such as “export mix”, which destroyed any possibility of tracing its origin or checking whether the price cap imposed by the G7 was being respected. As we already explained at the time in Xatakathis modus operandi It is not new and it relies on an architecture of evasion that has been brewing for years in places like the United Arab Emirates. Something very similar happened with the case of Christopher Eppinger, a young trader German that perfectly illustrates how this underworld works. As we detailed in our report, while Europe boasted of energy sovereignty, an army of new intermediaries moved to Dubai—a jurisdiction that does not apply sanctions to Moscow—to make gold. The network now discovered by the British media uses exactly the same tools that we already analyzed: the express creation of opaque companies, the use of the “ghost fleet” (aging ships that turn off their transponders when approaching to load Russian crude oil) and transfers of oil on the high seas to mix it and falsify its origin. The only difference is that the Rosneft network uncovered by the FT was operating on an unprecedented industrial scale… Until they made a rookie mistake on the internet. The rookie mistake This entire sophisticated international network collapsed due to an absurd detail that borders on comedy. He Finance Times discovered that these 48 multi-billion dollar companies shared a single private server for their emails: mx.phoenixtrading.ltd By pulling this digital thread, the journalists of the FT they managed to identify 442 web domains who shared administrative functions of back office on that same server. The next step was pure data mining: they compared the names of those domains with the customs records of Russia and India. Thus, they discovered that the domain foxton-fzco.com It corresponded to Foxton FZCO (based in Dubai), buyer of $5.6 billion in oil; and? advanalliance.ltd It was Advan Alliance, which sold 1.5 billion to India. The desire to create and destroy companies quickly to mislead sanctioners—according to The Moscow Timesthe average lifespan of these signatures is only six months—led the network to centralize your IT infrastructure to reduce costs. A saving that has cost them their anonymity. The show must go on In the short term, the strategy of those involved is denial and adaptation. How to collect Finance Timesboth Tahir Garayev and Etibar Eyyub have categorically denied their involvement in sanctions evasion, calling the accusations “baseless” (curiously, Eyyub sent his denial from an email address hosted on the compromised server). The original company that founded the network, Coral Energy (now 2Rivers), has also disengaged from operations. However, behind the scenes, the machinery is already looking for new avenues. A senior Russian energy executive, speaking on condition of anonymity, summed up the situation in the investigation starkly: “It creates additional costs and inconveniences. But at the end of the day, the show must go on.” The United Kingdom has already reacted to the investigation of the British media, sanctioning nearly 300 entities linked to this “dark web”, blocking Russian ships and banks. The fall of this immense $90 billion network shows that, in the 21st century, bank secrecy and flags of convenience are useless if the system administrator decides … Read more

If the US attacks Iran with drones, it will be in for a surprise. Russia shielded its sky with an explosive weapon: Verba

It we count last week. In the Middle East, crises rarely erupt overnight. First pieces move away from the spotlight, discreet commitments are signed and deployments multiply that seem routine. Only later, when everything falls into place, do you understand that the board had been preparing for something bigger for weeks. Now we know that Washington has not been the only one that has prepared. Agreement sealed in the shadows. counted this morning in an exclusive the financial times that Iran and Russia signed a secret contract of almost 500 million euros for delivery of 500 lVerba portable spears and 2,500 9M336 missiles. It would be Tehran’s most significant move to rebuild air defenses devastated after the 12 day war against Israel. The Iranian request came just days after its integrated network was seriously degraded by Israeli and American attacks, which allowed enemy aircraft to operate with superiority over large areas of the country. The agreement provides deliveries until 2029although the media explained that there are indications of early shipments, and it is complemented with night vision devices and other equipment that points to a phased but urgent reconstruction. What are Verba and why do they matter. The Verba system is a portable guided missile infrared designed to shoot down drones, cruise missiles and low-level aircraft such as helicopters, operated by small mobile teams that can deploy dispersed defenses without depending on fixed radars vulnerable to bombing. These are not heavy strategic systems like lthe S-300 or S-400but rather a flexible tactical layer that complicates helicopter operations and low-level flights. Its adoption is rapid, requires less integration and allows Iran to reinforce critical points at a relatively acceptable cost for Moscow, which can supply them without weakening substantially its own defense against Ukraine. Verba missile carrier A military alliance despite sanctions. Apparently the contract was negotiated between Rosoboronexport and the Iranian Ministry of Defense, with intermediaries already sanctioned by Washington, in a context of growing cooperation that includes Iranian drones employed by Russia in Ukraine and a bilateral treaty signed in 2025. Moscow thus demonstrates that it has no intention of abiding by Western sanctions or the arms embargo reactivated by European powers, while Tehran tries rebuild the relationship following the perception that Russia did not come to their aid during the latest conflict with Israel. The flow of cargo flights and the reception of attack helicopters Mi-28 reinforce the image of a active and sustained military association. The largest deployment since 2003. It we count last week. The agreement emerges in parallel to a massive accumulation of American air and naval power in the Middle East, with dozens of F-35, F-15 and A-10 fighters deployed at bases such as Muwaffaq Salti in Jordan and Prince Sultan in Saudi Arabia, in addition to two aircraft carrier groups led by the USS Abraham Lincoln and the USS Gerald R. Ford. In total, about 40,000 troops and a fleet comparable to the one before the 2003 invasion of Iraq support Donald Trump’s threats to impose a nuclear ultimatum on Tehran. Iran, for its part, warns that it would respond by attacking US bases in the region if hit. A reinforcement that changes the risk calculation. The new systems They will not turn Iran into a conventional rival comparable to the United States or Israel, of course, nor will they prevent sustained air campaigns if these are executed with technological superiority. However, they can raise cost and risk of specific operations, especially helicopter raids or low-altitude attacks, and prolong a possible conflict by making initial phases of aerial suppression difficult. In an environment where each shootdown would have a disproportionate political and strategic impact, the mere presence of hundreds of mobile launchers introduces a tactical deterrence variable. A preparation race. What does seem quite clear is that the combination Iranian rearmament and American deployment draws a scenario of maximum tension in which diplomacy and force advance in parallel. Tehran seeks to buy time, rebuild defensive layers and negotiate from a less vulnerable position. Washington tries to pressure with a demonstration of power without recent precedents in the region. What happens in the coming weeks will not only determine whether there is an attack or an agreement, but also whether the Russian-Iranian alliance is consolidated as a military axis capable of openly challenging the sanctions regime and reconfiguring the strategic balance of the Middle East. Image | ТАСС In Xataka | It is so small that it can barely be seen from space, but this secret island is the main problem for the US to attack Iran In Xataka | If the most advanced US nuclear aircraft carrier maintains its speed it will reach its destination on Sunday: a bad omen for Iran

Russia has a tank so ugly it seemed like a joke. And the most surprising thing is that Ukrainian drones don’t know what to do

Since the first months of the invasion, the war in Ukraine has become in a laboratory military “tuning” in real time: armored civilian trucks with steel doors, cars with improvised cages against anti-tank missiles, artillery protected with logs or bars welded in haste. As in other long conflicts, when technology does not arrive or is not sufficient, armies resort to bungle creative. From this ecosystem of ugly, urgent and desperate solutions is born the story of the strangest tank of this war… and also one of the most disconcerting for its enemies. Strange but armored. It we have counted other times. On the Ukrainian battlefield, Russia has led improvisation to an extreme almost cartoonish, deploying tanks covered in cagesspikes, cables, rods and metal layers that have earned them nicknames such as “turtle”, “hedgehog”, “furry” or, now, “dandelion”. At first glance they seem like a joke or a symptom of industrial decay, grotesque artifacts closer to scrap than to modern military engineering, but their proliferation responds to a brutal reality: Ukraine’s FPV drones have made classic armor insufficient, forcing Russia to add outer layers whose sole objective is to gain centimeters, time and confusion against attacks that were previously lethal. Origin and evolution. These protective screens, popularly known like “cope cages”began to be seen months ago, when the proliferation of drones transformed land warfare. Initially they were installed only on battle tanks and armored vehicles, but soon they spread to a wide range of systems. Your designs vary greatly: Some structures are crude and heavy, others are better planned, incorporating metal cages, steel plates, chains, spikes, camouflage nets and even reactive armor to reinforce the most vulnerable areas. In the Russian case, some tanks have become completely coveredwhich has earned them the nickname “turtle tanks” due to its resemblance to the shell of these animals. The simple principle that unsettles drones. The logic behind these designs is so rudimentary as effective– If the drone explodes before hitting the main hull, the shock wave loses much of its destructive power. In that sense, the “latest” model, the “dandelion tank”, with branched metal rods and tensioned meshes, works as a three-dimensional barrier that detonates the FPV from a distance, while there are already versions with cables, chains or spikes that seek the same effect from different angles. There has even appeared a sort of brush cutter tank Russian. Every extra centimeter between the explosive charge and the armor increases the chances of survival, and in a front saturated with cheap drones, that minimal advantage can make the difference between a disabled vehicle and one that continues fighting. In fact, this Russian anti-FPV system has migrated to its UGVs. In a video Seen on networks, the Russians claim that this “Courier” UGV survived the attack by a Ukrainian FPV and was recovered, although remembering that the additional weight of the cables will reduce the capacity vehicle loading. From the initial mockery to the silent cup. Yes, because what began as an object of ridicule among Ukrainian soldiers laughing at the welded cages and absurd profiles, has ended in imitation. The Ukrainian forces themselves have begun to equip some of their vehicles with similar protections, and the concept has even spread to NATO armies, with Western French vehicles. testing solutions inspired by these “dandelions”. The implicit message is, above all, uncomfortable: it may be ugly, crude and inelegant, but in real war is working better that many sophisticated solutions that have not yet come to the forefront. Hidden costs and obvious limits. There is no doubt, like so many other extravagant designs in the Ukrainian war, these improvised capes are not a panacea. They add weight, raise the profile of the vehicle, reduce mobility and they offer no real protection facing precise artillery or attacks from below, a tactic increasingly exploited by Ukrainian drones. Furthermore, and here the modus operandi of war, the more time passes, the more operators learn of FPV to identify gaps, adapt trajectories or use new techniques to avoid these metal shields. They are temporary defenses, effective but doomed to lose ground as the adversary figures out how to break them. An absurd race that defines modern warfare. Still, the central fact remains: Russia has created tanks so strange that they seemed like a jokeand for a time they have achieved something unthinkable, leaving enemy drones without a clear answer. In a war of attrition, cheap and experimental, where every day they look for emergency solutionsthese grotesque layers symbolize the current conflict better than any doctrine: a constant race of trial and error, in which even the most absurd can become, even for a moment, the best defense available. Image | Telegram In Xataka | The cold is so savage that Ukraine has activated the most kamikaze option: the “50,000 Russians per month” or giving Moscow what it wants In Xataka | “A human safari”: going outside in a Ukrainian city is now equivalent to being a shooting target for drones

imitate Russia in the Arctic

While millions of tourists enjoy a privileged climate in Gran Canaria, the infrastructure that supports the island operates on the verge of collapse. The island’s electrical system, isolated and without connection to the mainland, operates with minimum safety margins, dangerously approaching what technicians call “energy zero”: a total blackout. The threat is not theoretical. The neighboring island of La Gomera had a blackout a couple of weeks ago due to the destabilization of the El Palmar thermal power plant, but the inhabitants still remember 2023 in which they spent 37 hours in the dark. Faced with a structural power deficit and a demand that is close to 550 megawatts (MW) at peak times, a technical proposal has emerged that breaks all taboos in Spain: bringing floating nuclear reactors to the Port of La Luz to guarantee electricity and water to the island. Urgency and the fossil “patch.” The energy situation of Gran Canaria is critical. It is estimated that the island has a firm power deficit—safe energy that does not depend on whether it is sunny or windy—of between 120 and 140 MW. Current thermal power plants, based on fuel oil and gas, are aging and the network lacks robust support. To avoid the blackout, the Government of the Canary Islands has chosen a solution emergency: hire a powership of 125 MW. It is a thermal power plant installed on a ship (Shark class) that will dock in the port of Las Palmas to burn fossil fuels and cover that gap. The study that supports it. It is in this context where the Peter Huber Center of the University of the Hespérides emerges. Through a study signed by experts Manuel Fernández Ordóñez and Daniel Fernández Méndez, direct criticism is launched at the current management: he powership It is a “patch” that perpetuates pollution, increases CO2 emissions in a dense urban environment and maintains dependence on imported fossil fuels. Their alternative is radically different: betting on floating nuclear reactors. According to the authors“we are not talking about an experimental technology, but rather an evolution of light water reactors that have been operating safely for decades on military ships and icebreakers.” The glass ceiling of renewables. Here lies the technical core of the debate. If the Canary Islands have plenty of sun and wind, why consider nuclear energy? The answer lies in network stability. Despite the efforts, the contribution of renewables to the energy mix of the Canary Islands has been stagnant at around 20% for four years. Although 2024 aimed for a clean production recordthe technical reality is stubborn: the island electrical grid, being small and isolated, needs an “inertia” that wind and solar energy cannot provide on their own. Without a firm power base, when renewables rise a lot, the system becomes unstable and energy must be dumped to avoid failures. Currently, the big bet to solve this It is Chira Falls: a reversible hydroelectric plant that will function as a 200 MW “megabattery.” This pharaonic work, scheduled to be operational by 2027, will pump water to store excess renewable energy and release it when necessary. However, the Hesperides University study argues that, even with storage, the system still needs a constant generating “backbone” that does not emit CO2. They argue that a 100 MW reactor would provide that fixed power and the auxiliary services (frequency and voltage control) necessary so that, paradoxically, more renewables can be installed without the risk of pulling down the grid. As Manuel Fernández explained in an interview: “The only reliable alternative to fossil fuels in the Canary Islands is nuclear.” Much more than electricity. The proposal goes beyond turning on light bulbs; It strikes a chord with survival on the islands: water. The water-energy nexus The Canary Islands are one of the places in the world most dependent on desalination. More than 70% of the water for human consumption comes from the sea, and these desalination plants devour between 10% and 12% of all the electricity generated on the islands. “The water security of Gran Canaria is strongly coupled to its electrical security,” the study says. While experimental pilots are tested like the DesaLIFE projectwhich seeks to desalinate using wave energy to supply some 15,000 people, the nuclear option presents a brute force solution. A reactor generates electricity and an immense amount of waste heat. According to the report1 MW of electricity can desalinate between 4,000 and 6,000 cubic meters of water per day. A single 70 MW nuclear ship, partially dedicated to this task, could cover a gigantic fraction of the water demand of all of Gran Canaria. The Russian mirror in the Arctic. The proposal is not based on futuristic plans, but on a tangible reality that operates today: Akademik Lomonosov. It is the first modern commercial floating nuclear power plant. It has been docked in Pevek (Russia) since 2020, supplying electricity and heating in extreme weather conditions. Its technology is two KLT-40S reactors (derived from icebreakers) that generate 70 MW. In 2024, it reached an operating factor of more than 94%. Russia is already working on the next generation (RITM-200M), which will offer about 100 MW with a useful life of 60 years. Regarding the logistics of powership fossil, which requires the constant docking of tankers with fuel, a floating reactor is recharged every 3 or 4 years. This would shield the island from the volatility of oil prices. The small print. To understand real viability, you have to look at the global context. Although Russia now leads the market and uses it as a geopolitical tool, the US was a pioneer in operating the nuclear ship Sturgis in the Panama Canal between 1968 and 1976. Today, Western companies such as Westinghouse or Seaborg are trying to regain ground against Chinese (ACP100S) and Russian designs. The “B side” is social rejection. Greenpeace has come to qualify these projects like “Chernobyl on ice”. The study defends security through “defense in depth” design (double hull, passive systems). However, analysts warn of specific … Read more

that Russia has been knowing all its steps from space for years

After the Cold War, space was conceived by Europe more like an extension of scientific cooperation and the civil market than as a domain of strategic confrontation. Thus satellites designed for television, meteorology or navigation were deployed at a time when the main concern was technical reliability and cost, not the deliberate hostility of other States. While Washington and Moscow kept alive military logic inherited and China began to build its own, Europe was establishing a functional, open and trust-dependent spatial architecture. The latest finding reveals a “big” underlying error. Hybrid warfare reaches orbit. Yes, for years, Europe assumed that space was a technical and relatively stable domain, ultimately protected by its civil and cooperative character. It so happens that recent Russian satellite activity has broken that illusion. As? In parallel with sabotage of submarine cables and other covert operations, Moscow appears to have moved its hybrid war to space, taking advantage a critical blind spot: Many European satellites were launched decades ago without modern encryption systems or advanced protection. This vulnerability, ignored for years, has turned the geostationary orbit into a new silent front where missiles are not needed to inflict strategic damage. Luch-1 and Luch-2. There is much more, since the Financial Times discovered exclusively this morning that Western authorities have been monitoring the movements of two Russian space vehicles for some time, Luch-1 and Luch-2which have performed unusual maneuvers, getting dangerously close to key European satellites and staying next to them for weeks. Since its launch in 2023, Luch-2 has approached at least 17 satellites that provide essential services to Europe, Africa and the Middle East, a pattern that, according to analystsleaves no doubt about its purpose. These approaches are not accidental: they seek to position themselves within the narrow cone of data transmission between ground stations and satellites, an ideal position to intercept signals and study their internal workings. The critical failure. The most disturbing revelation is that some of the most sensitive information circulating through these systems, including the command links that allow orbit adjustment, it is not encrypted. Put another way, that means Russia could not only have spied on civil and government communications, but also recorded enough technical data to imitate legitimate operators from land. With that knowledge, for example, a hostile actor could send fake orders to alter the orientation of a satellite, take it out of service, misalign it or even force its fall or uncontrolled drift, without the need to physically destroy it and without leaving a clear attack signature. A strategic Achilles heel. Although the Luch satellites They do not seem to have the direct ability to interfere with or destroy other devices, their value lies in the accumulated knowledge: how European satellites are used, who operates them and from where. This intelligence allows us to prepare more discreet attacks, such as Selective interference or cyber attacks coordinated from the ground, and reinforces the idea that spatial networks are the true Achilles heel of modern societies. As Russia expands its reconnaissance program with new maneuverable satellites and Europe begins to come to terms with the magnitude of the problem, the message is clear: hybrid war It is no longer fought only at sea or on dry land, but also 35,000 kilometers above our heads, the point where Europe has just discovered that had been exposed for years. Image | woodleywonderworks In Xataka | A space war looms over our heads and Europe is the power that invests the least in defense technology In Xataka | Poland and Spain are the European countries that have increased their contribution to space the most. For very different reasons

monitor every move of Russia and China in the Arctic

First World War II and then the Cold War turned Greenland into a magnificent surveillance platform belonging to Denmark but granting the United States a VIP pass that it now wants to switch to annexation. Because that piece of frozen land (less and less) has rare earthsbut the most attractive thing has always been its strategic location. Old radars are not enough. The melting of Greenland has opened new sea routes that Russia and China have welcomed with open arms. the advantages it offers compared to traditional routes. Of the 15 military bases that the US had in Greenland in 1945, now only one remains: the Pituffik Air Base or Thule. And a problem: outdated and insufficient systems to monitor what happens there, such as acknowledged the Pentagon first and the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies after. So they have gotten to work to solve it: the United States Department of Defense agency responsible for the development of cutting-edge technologies for military use (DARPA) has requested a new technology collected in Frosty. This program aims to develop new radars that operate reliably in the harsh Arctic environment. DARPA is seeking proposals capable of detecting aerial targets at least 75 kilometers away with a detection probability greater than 90%. The coveted new polar “silk road”. The launch of this new radar is important because it would mean having a real lookout in the Arctic and on the new route that has appeared so that the great world powers can gain commercial and military advantage. China has already made clear what do you want be a “great polar power”“. The immediate advantage is reduce shipping times to Europe from up to 50 days to less than half (on its route through Suez). This recent academic article In its security report, the United States Coast Guard reviews other possible risks such as the expansion of its fishing grounds, access to natural resources for scientific cooperation and mentions the existence of its advanced fleet of modern icebreakers and Chinese submarines capable of operating under the ice. Spoiler: With current technology, they are difficult to detect from the surface. For Russia, the new passage route that is being opened is a threat to the current North Sea route, which operates under its jurisdiction. Furthermore, Greenland is part of the GIUK bottleneck (shared with the United Kingdom and Iceland) that its northern fleet must pass through to reach the open waters of the Atlantic, at the gates of the United States. We are talking about nuclear submarines as advanced as the Borei-A class and the Yasen-M. Also at stake is the sovereignty of the Lomonosov Ridge, an underwater mountain range that links it to Greenland, which could eventually give it exclusive rights to vast hydrocarbon reserves. And that’s without talking about the massive rare earth deposits The technical challenge of being so far north. The northern lights are very beautiful, but they generate a huge amount of electromagnetic noise when they occur. Since the Earth’s magnetic field lines also converge at the North Pole, the ionosphere is unstablegenerating scintillation that corrupts the GPS signal and absorption in the polar cap. In short, conventional radars not only fall short, but sometimes also go blind. The DARPA wish list. What the US agency wants It is essentially transforming the electromagnetic chaos of the Arctic into a detection tool with a brain in the form of processing software with advanced algorithms that dynamically “filter” interference from geomagnetic storms to isolate potential threats. Furthermore, it would not be a single giant antenna, but rather a mesh of small mobile nodes that share data to triangulate targets. These are the radars you request: A passive environmental noise radar that does not simply emit a signal and wait for the bounce, but uses natural radio frequency noise from the environment to detect objects. That is, it does not treat noise as an interference, but as a source. If a ship passes through that noise, it generates a disturbance that can be detected. Radars Over-the-Horizon that, unlike line-of-sight ones, which travel in a straight line and collide with the curvature of the Earth, these are capable of bouncing waves off the ionosphere to be able to detect objects beyond the Earth’s curvature. They are indicated to detect maritime vessels or aircraft flying at low altitude, thus evading conventional radars. An externally illuminated radar with high-power transmitters located at great distances as power sources, like Alaska’s HAARPwhich allows objects to be illuminated indirectly. For when. As mark your roadmapthe receipt of industry proposals for the tender ended on January 30 and the next 18 months will focus on algorithm development, offline implementation and laboratory testing. Between 2027 and 2028, the integration of the software into real hardware would take place, with field tests in Point Barrow and Poker Flat, Alaska. Therefore, to see this new and ambitious radar network in action we will have to wait until 2028. In Xataka | Russia and China already had an advantage over the US in the Arctic. After Greenland, it has multiplied In Xataka | Now that Europe has sent its troops to Greenland, a question emerges that no one wants to ask: what happens if the US invades it? Cover | JoAnne Castagna / US Army Corps of Engineers (Public domain)

the refinery that supplies 90% of its fuel is owned by Russia

If you travel north of Berlin, in Schwedt you come across a landscape of chimneys and rusty metal that seems stuck in the sixties. It was there that communist Germany and the former USSR sealed their energy alliance, and the amazing thing is that this heritage continues to fuel the Berliners’ tank today. Although the official rhetoric speaks of a total break with the Kremlin due to the invasion of Ukraine, the reality at the PCK plant is different: the majority of the property remains in Russian hands, a Soviet vestige that Germany has not yet dared to completely expropriate. It literally depends on the operation of PCK Schwedt that Berlin does not stop. The plant pumps 90% of the gasoline and kerosene consumed by the capital and the state of Brandenburg; It is the energetic heart that powers everything from domestic heating to airplanes at the international airport. As pointed out by an analysis of Financial Timesany stoppage in their machines – no matter how brief – would cause an immediate strangulation. It is not just a question of figures, but a real threat to the daily lives of millions of people that the energy sector monitors closely. A trapped refinery The PCK situation is a direct result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Following the start of the war, Germany decided to withdraw to the Russian state oil company Rosneft operational control of the refinery, placing it under state trusteeship. The measure was adopted under the Energiesicherungsgesetz (Energy Security Law) with the explicit objective of guaranteeing supply and avoiding an operational collapse of critical infrastructures, as explained by the German Government itself. The guardianship affects the subsidiaries Rosneft Deutschland and RN Refining & Marketing, through which the Russian group controls stakes in three German refineries: PCK Schwedt, MiRo (Karlsruhe) and Bayernoil (Bavaria). On the whole, according to OSW datathese assets represent about 12% of Germany’s total refining capacity, making Rosneft one of the main players in the sector in the country. However, Berlin avoided expropriation of the shares. Rosneft retains 54% of PCK, a decision made out of fear of Kremlin retaliation against German companies in Russia and the risk of international litigation. as explained in the Financial Times. Since then, the German Executive has been forced to renew the guardianship regime every six months by parliamentary vote. The State runs the plant, but cannot sell it freely, nor invest on a large scale in its modernization, nor offer stable legal guarantees to banks and suppliers, a legal limbo. which analysts consider unsustainable in the long term. However, the fragility of this balance was revealed in 2025, when the United States imposed new sanctions on Rosneft as part of its policy of pressure on Moscow. The measure, adopted without prior coordination with Berlin, had immediate effects: banks blocked payments, suppliers suspended contracts and the refinery was on the brink of insolvency. as reconstructed Financial Times. To avoid a collapse of supply in the German capital, Washington granted a temporary exemption of six months, which allows PCK to continue operating until April 29, 2026. At the same time, he made it clear that Germany must once and for all resolve the issue of ownership of Rosneft assets on its territory. Since then, Berlin has been negotiating against the clock with the US administration to achieve a new extension or design a legal framework that avoids future sanctions. Among the options studied is the conversion of the current guardianship into a public law trustlinked to the sanctions regime of the European Union. The goal is to demonstrate that Rosneft lacks effective control over the refinery without resorting to formal expropriation. A key piece of the German energy system Schwedt’s case is not anecdotal. A forced closure would force fuel to be transported to Berlin by thousands of trucks a day, coming from other regions of Germany, a scenario that industry sources describe as logistically chaotic and economically unfeasible. In an economy already hit by high energy prices, the industrial slowdown and the costs of the energy transition, the impact would be immediate. Furthermore, PCK is the main economic engine of Schwedt, a city of about 33,000 inhabitants in the northeast of the country. It directly and indirectly employs thousands of people and is perceived by the local population as a matter of survival. “All buses, all police cars, all rescue services run on PCK fuel,” he explained. to Financial Times the social democratic mayor Annekathrin Hoppe. But the question everyone will be asking: How is it possible that Germany still has a Russian refinery? The answer is in history. PCK Schwedt built in the sixtieswhen the then German Democratic Republic was integrated into the Soviet bloc. The refinery was designed to process Russian crude oil transported through the Druzhba – “friendship” in Russian – pipeline. a pipeline of more than 4,000 kilometers designed to seal energy interdependence between Moscow and Eastern Europe during the Cold War. For six decades, the system operated without interruption. Even after German reunification and the fall of the Soviet Union, the flow of Russian crude oil continued, reinforcing a dependence that today weighs like an uncomfortable legacy. Unlike gas—where Germany nationalized strategic assets like Gazprom Germania, today renamed SEFE—, in oil, Berlin chose not to cross the line of expropriation. Breaking that bond has proven more difficult than expected. Although PCK no longer processes Russian oil and sources mainly Kazakh crude and marine supplies through Poland and Germany, the transition has been more expensive and technically complex. As explained by the public channel Tagesschaualternative supply is largely dependent on the ports of Rostock and Gdansk, and doubts remain as to whether these routes allow sufficient plant load to be maintained. Possible exits: sale, expropriation or permanent patch Given the expiration of the US exemption, Germany is considering three main scenarios. The first is for Rosneft to voluntarily sell its stake. In recent years there have been conversations with the Qatar Investment Authority, … Read more

A group of Spanish pilots wait in front of Russia for an alarm that will sound 500 times in 2025. They only have 15 minutes to launch their fighters

A few minutes from Russian airspace, a handful of Spanish pilots live in the most tense routine that exists in peacetime: be ready to take off at any moment from an icy base from the Balticone where the sky is watched as if each blip on the radar could be the start of something bigger. Fifteen minutes. At Šiauliai, a Lithuanian air base that functions as first line of surveillance over the Baltic, the routine can be broken at any second with a siren and a countdown. When the alert goes off (in 2025 alone it did so up to 500 times), the Spanish pilots of the 15th Wing They put on their equipment, get into the vans and run towards the hangars with a single objective: to be in the air in less than fifteen minutes. It is a millimetric mechanic, repeated so many times in training that becomes automaticbecause the mission does not wait for anyone and because in that area an unidentified plane, without a transponder or without communication, can be the beginning of a serious incident. The shadow of an enemy. The function of these quick exits, called “scrambles”is to intercept and escort suspicious aircraft until they leave Allied space or their intentions become clear, and in the Baltic they are almost an everyday language. The route is especially sensitive because it connects Russia with the militarized enclave of Kaliningradand there intersect fighters, surveillance planes and traffic that sometimes fly without a flight plan or without the expected signals. The result is constant tension: some days there are several outings and other weeks everything seems calm, but the feeling is always the same, that the next warning can come when you are resting or half asleep. 15th Wing Fighter Mission since 2004. NATO started this baltic air police in 2004 to protect the space of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, and since then the countries have taken turns in rotation four months so that the umbrella is permanent. Over time, the deployment was expanded to other bases in the region, first after the first Russian invasion of Ukraine and later with further expansion, because the Eastern Front ceased to be a theoretical concept. In recent months, furthermore, the incursions became more disturbing due to a new detail: not only manned aircraft appeared, but also drones that crossed borders and forced us to react quickly. Spain and the fighters. The Spanish contingent arrived in December with more than 200 troops and eleven EF-18Ma modernized version of the Hornet that Spain operates and maintains ready to fly day or night. The planes are armed with air-to-air missiles and the pilots train with night vision goggles, because surveillance does not stop when the sun goes down. Behind each exit there is a system that monitors the sky relentlessly, control centers that detect traces on the radar and a decision chain that, when activated, turns the entire base into a fast, silent and perfectly rehearsed choreography. Drones change the script. The big twist is that now the problem is not only the classic military plane that approaches without identifying itself, but the emergence of cheap dronesslow, low and erratic, more difficult to classify and more complicated to stop with means designed for another era. It we have counted. In September last year, a wave of Russian drones penetrated Polish airspace during an attack on Ukraine, and then there were similar episodess that forced the activation of fighter jets in countries like Romania. In parallel, small unidentified drones began to be seen near airports, bases and sensitive facilities throughout Europe, fueling the feeling of vulnerability and suspect that someone is measuring response times and blind spots. Crow, the anti-drone. For this reason, in this deployment the 15th Wing arrived with a historical novelty for them: the Indra Crow systeman anti-drone defense that adds a different layer of protection to the base and its surroundings. Crow combines radars, cameras and sensors to detect small aircraft and, once located, attempts to take them down using signal jamming, that is, electronic warfare from fixed or mobile positions. Its range not only protects planes and runways, it also covers the nearby city, because the real goal is to shield critical infrastructure and reduce the risk of a cheap drone causing disproportionate damage. The cost dilemma. Behind this adaptation is a problem that NATO is being forced to solve at full speed: intercepting cheap drones with weapons designed to shoot down fighters is an unsustainable equation. Firing expensive missiles from a fighter jet to take down a small aircraft may work, but it turns every defense in a waste and opens the door to volume saturation. That is why procedures and tactics are being reviewed, looking for cheaper and more specific systems, and assuming that the fighter will no longer always be the best tool to put out the fire. The strategic signal. The arrival of fighters with anti-drone protection It reflects a Europe that begins to fortify the sky as if war were already knocking at the door, although it has not yet fully crossed. In the Baltic, each rotation is a political and military message: there is presence, there is a response and there is an intention to fill gaps that did not exist before. Thus, what was previously an almost routine escort and identification mission is becoming a comprehensive defense exercise against hybrid threatswhere the enemy can be a large plane, a tiny drone or a provocation designed solely to check if, when the alarm sounds, there is really someone capable of taking off in those fifteen minutes. Image | Pexels, Pavel Vanka In Xataka | There are “invisible” Russian submarines happily sailing through the Baltic and that has led Europe to unprecedented measures In Xataka | A Russian submarine has appeared off the coast of France. And Europe’s reaction has been surprising: have a laugh

Russia has turned Ukraine into a scene from Minority Report. He has sent a “soldier” named Svod to anticipate the future

At the doors of fourth year of warRussia still has not found a consistent formula to break the Ukrainian defenses, despite having more troops, a much more stable flow of material and a wide repertoire of advanced technologies that, on paper, should have tilted the battlefield. If the war in Eastern Europe was already a unprecedented laboratory of war technologies, Moscow has taken the most unprecedented step of all. The problem that Russia is trying to solve. They counted in Forbes that, among the many causes of this below-expectation performance, there is one especially painful: the inability of many Russian officers on the front line to take quick tactical decisions and sustainable over time, precisely those that decide the outcome of local clashes that, accumulated, determine an entire offensive. This deficit does not arise from nothing, but from the combination of a military culture rigidly hierarchicaldesigned to execute orders rather than improvise, and from a generation of extremely young commanders with limited experience, pushed to lead units in a type of combat that mercilessly punishes hesitation and rewards immediate adaptation. The “soldier” Svod. The announced answer is Svod, a digital tool AI decision support system conceived as a tactical situational awareness system for front-deployed officers. Its function, according to the description of the Russian Ministry of Defensewould be to gather and merge in the same information space multiple sources of intelligence, from satellite data and aerial images to reconnaissance reports and open source material, to convert that chaos of signals into a common usable image. From there, the system I would apply advanced processing and models assisted by artificial intelligence to analyze what comes in, project operational scenarios plausible futures and guide the command towards the most convenient course of action. The underlying intention is not hidden: to accelerate the decision cycle, reduce friction between “what is happening” and “what is ordered”, and guide managers towards rmost effective answers in an environment where every minute lost translates into casualties, burned material and wasted tactical opportunities. Software connected to what already exists. Svod does not present itself as a device magical that a soldier hangs on his chest, but rather like a software architecture that is integrates into networks and media now available. It works as a layer that merges data and displays it to commanders on computers or tablets, with secure communications and decision support tools. The important thing is the effect it produces: converting a crowded battlefield of signs into something that looks legible, and that the tactical command has concrete guidance when the environment changes faster than the upper echelons can keep up. Deployment and focus. Furthermore, the plan wants to be implemented at full speed: after various operational tests in December 2025, it is expected to begin deploying it in April 2026 and extend it widely by September. In fact, the first units to receive it would be involved in the Pokrovsk axiswhere Russia concentrates part of its offensive effort. That portrays it as an immediate solution to correct command and control failuresnot as a quiet modernization ten years from now, and explains why it is prioritized where wear is maximum and the margin of error is minimum. A perverse incentive. In an army like the Russian one that rewards obedience and punishes improvisation, a local commander may be forced to attack even if he knows it is a bad idea. With constant pressure, some they execute and accumulate casualtiesothers seek to survive within the system by simulating results, sending small groups to mark their presence and using drones to appear successful. In this context, Svod intends to push more coherent decisions with the real situation, giving a shared and more immediate vision to the front without touching the core of the model: continuing to command from above, but with a tool that reduces “surprises” and imbalances. Minority Report in military version. There is no doubt, the bet has something of a futuristic scene that we had already seen in the cinema: just like works as Minority Report that had played with the idea of ​​algorithms that anticipate the future, Russia seeks to anticipate what is going to happen before it happens, with that “soldier” called Svod that calculates, projects and recommends. The promise is very easy to understand: if the system sees better and faster, it will be able to anticipate where the weak point is, when to press and when to readjust the attack. It is a way of turning combat into a prediction problemwhere human intuition and improvisation are replaced by a living map that attempts to order chaos. What it can contribute. If it works well, Svod could improve identification of objectivescoordination and detection of gaps in the Ukrainian defense, as well as other similar tools have proven valuable in other armies. The problem, most likely, is that its effectiveness will clash with the reality of the front: electronic warfare, degraded communications, incomplete data, and models that fail when the enemy learn and change patterns. In this sense, Ukraine has adapted quicklyand that makes it much more difficult for a system to accurately predict what will happen next. Still, the movement is more than significant: war is becoming a sensor competitionnetworks and decisions, and Russia is trying to have AI reduce a problem that has cost it too dearly. Image | Ministry of Defense of Ukraine In Xataka | 1,418 days have passed since Russia invaded Ukraine: the war has already lasted longer than the Soviet fight against Hitler In Xataka | The latest camouflages of Russian troops confirm an open secret: the war in Ukraine is the most Looney Tunes in history

Log In

Forgot password?

Forgot password?

Enter your account data and we will send you a link to reset your password.

Your password reset link appears to be invalid or expired.

Log in

Privacy Policy

Add to Collection

No Collections

Here you'll find all collections you've created before.