Russia

Now that we know what is going to happen in Greenland, the most surprising thing is the name of the winners: Russia and China

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If the Trump’s words in Davos are confirmed, it seems that “nothing” is going to happen in Greenland. This leaves another reading that is beginning to gain strength among analysts: that the threats from the United States to force control of Greenland they have opened a crack which, without needing to fire a single shot or lift a single finger, immediately benefits two nations. The geopolitical gift. While Washington has presented the move as a maneuver to stop your rivalsin Europe it is interpreted as a direct threat to the sovereignty of an ally and to the very credibility of NATO. Meanwhile, in Moscow and Beijing it is read as proof that the Western order no longer holds about shared rules, but about impulses, blackmail and force. In this climate, the simple debate about “who’s in charge” and “how far the American umbrella extends” erodes the cohesion that for decades had been the main strategic brake (at least on paper) for Russia in Europe and the biggest structural obstacle for China in its global struggle. Russia far ahead. It we have counted before. In the Arctic, Russia is not starting from scratch or playing for the future: it is already installed and has been operating for years with a material and geographical advantage that the United States can’t match quickly. Moscow has a consolidated military presence in the north, with bases, infrastructure, operational experience and an integrated defense logic around its sea routes, its resources and its strategic deterrence, in addition to key assets such as its Northern Fleet and the symbolic and technical weight of having used the region as a space for testing and projection since the soviet era. So when Washington turns Greenland into an open crisis, Russia watches. two things at the same time: the opportunity to weaken Western unity and the risk that the Arctic will go from being a terrain of contained competition to a zone of direct confrontation, one in which any miscalculated move accelerates militarization and possible escalation. The Russian method. The Russian reaction to the tension over Greenland has been marked by a combination of irony, enthusiasm and cold calculation, like someone who suddenly finds a perfect lever to improve your position without visible effort. The message that is repeated around the Kremlin is transparent: the best thing that can happen to Russia is for the United States and Europe to dedicate themselves to fight among themselvesbecause that, first of all, distracts from Ukraine, poisons cooperation and pushes allies to distrust American leadership. In that framework, they counted in AP that Russian propaganda allows itself the luxury of celebrating that “Atlantic unity is ending,” of joking that Europe has no real tools against Washington and to present the entire episode as a didactic scene in which Russia’s rivals tangle themselves. Greenland as a smoke screen. One of the most immediate benefits for Moscow is that focus shift political and media: when the European agenda is filled with Greenland, Ukraine loses diplomatic oxygen and negotiation space. The tension is forcing European leaders to put out internal fires rather than focus on the war, and that rreduces pressure collective action on Russia just when Moscow is seeking concessions or relief in any negotiation process. Furthermore, the simple fact that NATO is discussing whether or not to “block” American expansion introduces a disturbing idea: that the alliance is not an automatic pact of trust, but rather a kind of club where the strongest can change the rules if it suits them. Putin and Trump. Russia, furthermore, seems to be watching your tone with the White House because his priority is not to clash with Trump while he tries to obtain advantages over Ukraine and rebuild his relationship with Washington. That is why he avoids openly condemning the pressure on Greenland (a few hours ago Putin said that they care about “zero”) and, instead, wraps it in a comfortable ambiguity. It is a position that, although passive, in reality It’s strategicbecause it lets the conflict cook within the Western camp without Moscow appearing as the instigator. At the same time, introduce a dangerous idea in the debate: that international legality is secondary to the will of a great power, something that Russia knows well and cynically exploits when it suits it. China doesn’t need Greenland. From Beijing, the opportunity is not so much in “winning” Greenland, but in observing how the United States fights with its allies and devalues ​​the system that gave it a strategic advantage over China. They remembered in the Guardian that, in Chinese eyes, the ideal scenario is not to conquer Arctic territory, but see how it breaks the discipline of the Western bloc, because the great multiplier of American power has always been its network of alliances. China may have interests in polar routes, research and resources, but its biggest prize It’s political: a Europe more distrustful of Washington, open to its own balance and more tempted to take refuge in trade as a lifeline in a world of tariffs and blackmail. The Polar Silk Road. It we have counted before. China has been building an Arctic story for years that presents it as a legitimate actor, with official roles where it defines itself. as “almost arctic” and with the promise of a Polar Silk Road supported by melting ice, new sea routes and faster transport between Asia and Europe. There is concrete signs of that ambition, such as the use of Northern Maritime Route to drastically shorten travel timesalthough that route depends largely on Russia and its control over the corridor. In that sense, each crisis between the United States and Europe is not only a political problem: it is an economic window for Beijing, because it messes up rules, pushes Europe to look for alternatives and gives China room to present itself as a “stable” trading partner, although that stability may be more rhetorical than real. Davos and a resignation. He clash over Greenland It is aggravated … Read more

Ukraine has unlocked a wild “online mode.” The one about Russia recruiting Africans on Discord to turn them into “can openers”

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The Ukrainian War I had already flirted with the language of the gamer world: rewards for objectives, loot lists and even a “military Amazon” improvised to redeem successes by real material. But if that seemed like a way to gamify logisticswhat is happening now goes up a level: it is no longer about buying drones with points, but about recruiting soldiers within the player communities themselves and turning them into human bombs. War as a global industry. On the Ukrainian front, Russia has ended up building a collection machinery that is not limited to looking for soldiers, but drags them from places increasingly unlikelyas if the war had become a global funnel. What was once a conflict between armies begins to look like a international recruitment network where young people enter, attracted by money, by a promise of the future or simply by a casual conversation that becomes irreversible. The result is a constant drip of foreigners who arrive in Russia, sign a paper, receive rushed training and disappear into the most brutal landscape of Europe, where the distance between signing a contract and death can be measured in weeks. Recruitment on a screen. The story Bloomberg told and starts with two young South Africans, regular Discord users and Arma 3 players, who end up talking about enlist in the Russian army with someone who identifies himself as @Dash. What seems like just another exchange in a digital community rises in temperature until it becomes a real plan: they meet in Cape Town, move together and end up visiting the Russian consulate, as if this bureaucratic step gave legitimacy to what, deep down, is already a flight towards war. On July 29, they embark on a trip to Russia via the United Arab Emirates and, after arriving, they meet “Dash” there. Shortly after, in early September, they sign one-year military contracts near St. Petersburg and they are trapped in the fast lane of a conflict that doesn’t stop to check if anyone really understands what they’re getting into. Contract, training and front. Only a few weeks pass between the signing and the front. After a brief period of basic training, one of the two is sent to combat in Ukraine, where he performs duties as an assistant marksman for a grenade launcher, a description that sounds like a military routine but is, in reality, the prelude of a disappearance. The last time he contacted his family was October 6. On December 17, a friend reported that has died in combat. The confirmation comes with a medical document that his family later obtained, dated months later, which states that he died on October 23, 2024 in Verkhnekamenskoye, in the Luhansk region. Nothing is known about the other young man: his whereabouts remain up in the air, as happens with many names who enter the war and get lost in the noise of the front. The scandal that breaks out at home. In South Africa, the case is not only read as a personal tragedy, but as a national problem, because since 1998 It is illegal to fight for or assist the armed forces of a foreign country. And it also arrives at a moment especially sensitive: More allegations of recruiting towards Russia have emerged in recent weeks, with investigations pointing to to catchment networks already told stories with acceptable costumes (escort courses, security training) that become suspicious when they lead to military contracts. This climate of public alarm worsens with arrests and judicial processeswhile the South African authorities, the Russian consulate and the platform itself appear wrapped in silence without clear answers and with families trying to piece together, through emails and calls, the map of a disappearance. The lie. Explained the medium that among the incentives that are put on the table appear always the same: money, attractive conditions, the possibility of obtaining Russian citizenship and the idea that the service could open educational or advancement doors. It is an offer designed to ring concrete and reasonableas if combat were hard but passable work, a dangerous but temporary experience. However, the story makes clear What happens when that promise lands in Ukraine: war is not a contract, it is rather a crusher, and for those who arrive without roots, a support network or the ability to get out of the wheel, destiny is reduced to a date on a piece of paper and a lost location in the east of the country. Kamikaze bodies. At another point in the same conflict appears a scene that has gone viral on networks, a video even more brutal: an African mercenary is “armed” with a TM-62 anti-tank mine attached to the body and sent towards Ukrainian positions with the intention of blowing himself up to open a bunker. The video shows crudeness without metaphors: the man protests, but a Russian soldier threatens him with a rifle, pushes him, expels him from a basement and orders him to run into the forest. in that language They call it a “can opener.”as if it were a piece of engineering, an instrument designed to break a door at the cost of disappearing, and the scene remains recorded for what it reveals: not only are foreigners recruited, they are used in missions where life is not a value to be protected, but rather the closest thing to a detonator available. Foreigners in war. Ukraine maintains that there are at least 1,436 citizens from 36 countries identified fighting in the Russian ranks, and that the real number may be higher. There is talk, again, of recruitment by financial promises, deception or pressureand warns of minimal survival: many do not survive more than a month after arriving at the front. The statement, however harsh it may be, fits with the landscape they draw these stories: people who enter through lateral routes, who arrive attracted by incentives or trapped by intermediaries, and who end up absorbed by a war that has been devouring troops until making replenishment a constant … Read more

Europe had few options in the face of the US threat in Greenland. Until Germany has remembered Russia with an unprecedented plan

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Growing pressure from the United States to take over Greenland has transformed a hitherto latent issue into a problem political and strategic of the first order for Europe and NATO, by explicitly placing for the first time the risk of an internal clash between allies. It was known that there were a couple of options on the table as a defense. Germany has just presented another unprecedented one. An unprecedented crisis. The insistence of the US administration on presenting control of the island as a necessity of national security, accompanied by rhetoric increasingly harderhas forced European partners to react not only in defense of Denmark’s sovereignty and Greenland’s right to self-determination, but also to protect credibility of an alliance designed precisely to prevent force from prevailing among its members. The problem is not only territorial, but systemicbecause it raises the extent to which NATO can manage a crisis caused from within without eroding its own foundations. Germany and the allied response. Faced with the difficulty of directly confronting Washington, Berlin has emerged as the actor in charge of articulating a solution that combines political firmness and strategic containment. Germany has chosen to channel the response through NATO. As? proposing a joint mission in the Arctic that makes it possible to strengthen regional security without turning the conflict into a bilateral battle between the United States and Denmark. The initiative seeks to save time, reduce tensions and offer an institutional alternative that frames American concerns within a collective logic, while sending a clear signal that Greenlandic sovereignty is non-negotiable. This German role reflects a commitment to multilateral management of the conflict and to prevent the crisis from leading to an open fracture within the alliance. From the Baltic to the Arctic. The German proposal takes as a direct reference the operation Baltic Sentrylaunched to protect critical infrastructure in the Baltic Sea from sabotage and covert activities linked to Russia and its ghost fleet. The idea is to replicate this scheme in the Arctic through a hypothetical “Arctic Sentry” missionwhich would include Greenland and allow increased surveillance, naval presence and allied coordination in an increasingly disputed region. This approach has a double function: on the one hand, respond to the security concerns raised by Washington about the Russian and Chinese presence in the Arctic, and on the other, prevent those concerns from being used as a pretext for unilateral action. Turning the Arctic into a space of collective management seeks to deactivate the security vacuum narrative that fuels American aspirations. The shadow of Article 4. Although it has not yet been formally activated, the idea of invoke Article 4 of the NATO treaty, which provides for consultations when an ally perceives a threat to its territorial integrity or security, has gained weight in diplomatic debates. The mere possibility of Denmark resorting to this mechanism reflects the seriousness of the situation and the growing nervousness in European capitals. Invoking Article 4 would not imply an automatic military response, but it would force the alliance to address it head on. an internal crisis that many would prefer to manage in silence. The underlying fear is that, if not managed institutionally, the conflict sets a dangerous precedent that normalize pressure between allies and voids the founding principles of NATO. Diplomacy, deterrence and limits. Beyond the military dimension, the European Union has explored diplomatic and economic options to contain the United States, from the reinforcement of political dialogue to the theoretical threat of instruments commercial pressure. However, Europe’s dependence on the American technology, defense and security umbrella drastically reduces the credibility of these tools. Economic sanctions, although powerful on paper, are perceived as unrealistic in a context marked by the war in Ukraine and the need to keep Washington engaged with European security. This imbalance reinforces the idea that the most viable path is to offer shared security solutions, such as the proposed Arctic mission, rather than a direct confrontation that Europe could hardly sustain. Greenland as autonomy. The economic dimension It adds another layer of complexity to the conflict, as Greenland relies heavily on Danish transfers and warily watches American promises of massive investment. From Brussels we study increase financial support European to prevent the island from being trapped in a relationship of dependency with Washington, especially with the prospect of future independence. This effort not only seeks to counteract American economic influence, but also preserve the social and political model that the Greenlanders might want to keep. In this context, the crisis reveals that the battle for Greenland is not only fought in the military field, but also in that of investment, legitimacy and the projection of soft power. A stress test. Altogether, the American pressure over Greenland has exposed the internal tensions of a NATO designed to deter external threats, not manage territorial ambitions of one of its members. The german initiative of transferring the problem to the field of collective security, inspired by the Baltic model, is an attempt to preserve allied cohesion and avoid an existential crisis. However, the simple fact that mechanisms are being considered like Article 4 It demonstrates the extent to which the alliance faces an unprecedented scenario, one in which unity no longer depends only on stopping external adversaries, but on containing power impulses within its own ranks. Image | Program Executive Office Soldier, pathanMinistry of Defense of the Russian Federation In Xataka | After the Nazi occupation, Denmark signed a pact in 1951. Since then, the US can ask for whatever it wants in Greenland In Xataka | Greenland has become an obsession for the United States for a simple reason: they believe in global warming

the Ukrainian drone that stopped Russia for six weeks with a machine gun and not a single human soldier

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On the Ukrainian front, where every meter conquered or defended is paid for with a human cost that is increasingly difficult to assume, ingenuity is has become a resource as valuable as ammunition. In this context of extreme wear and constant adaptation, some units are experimenting with little visible solutions that, without attracting attention, are beginning to change the way a battle line is held. When there are no soldiers left. In a war marked by a shortage of infantry and the extreme lethality of maintaining forward positions, Ukraine has begun to test a solution that until recently belonged to military science fiction: leaving the front in machine hands. During 45 consecutive daysa Ukrainian unit maintained front-line sectors without direct human presence, entrusting the defense to a single land vehicle unmanned, a bet that summarizes the crude logic of the current conflict: if something can receive enemy fire, it better not bleed. The doctrine. The experience was reported by the NC-13 Strike Company, integrated into the Third Corps of the Ukrainian Army, a unit created specifically to operate unmanned ground vehicles. Its commander, Mykola “Makar” Zinkevych, explained that the idea was radically simple: “robots don’t bleed,” and the ground drone was the only element present in the position, carrying out constant suppressive fire missions to deter Russian advances and force the enemy to confront a defense that could not be psychologically worn down or eliminated with human casualties. The droid TW 12.7. The system used was the Droid TW 12.7developed by the Ukrainian company DevDroida small tracked vehicle armed with a heavy machine gun M2 Browning .50 caliber. Far from being an isolated prototype, the drone was displaced between different positions at the request of local command posts, acting as a mobile punishment platform that turned each attempted Russian advance into a costly and risky operation. The Droid TW 12.7 Wear and tear… also for machines. Although the robot could remain in place for days, it needed withdraw every 48 hours for maintenance, resupply of ammunition and recharging of batteries, tasks carried out by a team located several kilometers from the front. The process, initially four hours, is reduced by half thanks to the purchase of additional batteries paid for by the soldiers themselves, a detail that illustrates the extent to which the Ukrainian war continues to depend on local initiatives and improvised financing even when talking about advanced technology. Limited autonomy. DevDroid affirms that the Droid TW 12.7 can operate at distances of up to 15 miles and has artificial intelligence-assisted navigation functions, although it is unclear to what extent it can act autonomously in combat. Even so, the simple fact that a single UGV has held positions for six weeks demonstrates that the value of these systems lies not only in their sophistication, but in their ability to replace human bodies in tasks where survival is minimal. From experiment to military doctrine. After this experience, the Zinkevych unit plans to expand the use of UGVs in both defensive and offensive missions, relying on new variants equipped with grenade launchers already approved for official use. The demand, recognizeis very high, but so are the costs, to the point that development continues to be partially financed through crowdfunding campaigns. The future of the front. If you like, the case Droid TW 12.7 It is not just a technological anecdote, but a sign of where to go war is headed modern in Ukraine: a battlefield where every meter can be defended with sensors, steel and algorithms instead of flesh and blood, and where the strategic value of a soldier begins to also be measured by his ability not to be physically there. Image | Tank Bureau In Xataka | Russia has reminded the planet that the war in Ukraine is a ticking bomb. And for this he has pressed a nuclear button: Oreshnik In Xataka | Ukraine has become an animal slaughterhouse: Russian soldiers appear with horses and drones blow them up

Russia has reminded the planet that the war in Ukraine is a ticking bomb. And for this he has pressed a nuclear button: Oreshnik

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Over the past few months, the war in Ukraine has seemed advance by inertia: fronts that barely move, stalled negotiations and constant wear and tear that threatens with normalizing the conflict in Europe. But in recent weeks Moscow has remembered, without the need for major territorial conquests, that it continues to have the ability to alter the chessboard with a single gesture: the nuclear one. The button that is always there. In a stuck war In the mud of the front and industrial wear and tear, Russia has once again remembered that it is still sitting on a strategic bomb pressing a button that does not need to be pressed completely to take effect: that of Oreshnik missilean intermediate-range system with nuclear capacity whose use, even with inert or conventional charges, functions as a political message rather than as a tactical weapon. The launch detection from the Kapustin Yar strategic polygon and the subsequent explosions near Lviv, a few kilometers from the Polish border, do not seek so much to destroy decisive objectives as to point out that Moscow can escalate whenever it wants and from wherever it wants, even from facilities associated with its strategic nuclear forces, deliberately breaking the “conventional” routine of the conflict. Symbolic weapon, real threat. It we have counted before: the Oreshnik, derived from the RS-26 program and capable of carrying multiple warheads that separate in flight, it is not a missile designed to win battles in Ukraine, but to cross psychological red lines in Europe. Its hypersonic speed, its potential range of up to 5,500 kilometers and the fact that Ukraine lacks defenses capable of intercepting it turn each launch into a demonstration of the structural vulnerability of NATO’s eastern flank. When Russia first used it against Dnipro in 2024 with dummy heads, he made it clear that he was not testing marksmanship, but rather strategic credibility. Now, by bringing the impact closer to the NATO border and the European Union, the message is even more explicit. Controlled climbing. The reappearance of the Oreshnik is no coincidence. It occurs while Ukraine refuses to give up territory in the negotiations, while Moscow insists that any Western troops deployed on Ukrainian soil would be a legitimate objective and while Washington, under Trump, intensifies pressure on Russia’s allies like Venezuela. The Kremlin justifies the attacks as retaliation for alleged Ukrainian attempts to attack the residence of Vladimir Putinaccusations that even US intelligence services they doubtbut the real logic is different: to raise the psychological and political cost of Western support without formally crossing the nuclear threshold. Energy, winter and strategic terror. As in previous winters, Russian missiles and drones are once again baiting the Ukrainian energy infrastructureleaving entire neighborhoods in kyiv and other cities without electricity or heating amid sub-zero temperatures. The Oreshnik fits into this strategy of calculated terror: not only does it damage critical facilities, but it amplifies the feeling of helplessness by introducing a weapon that symbolizes the maximum possible escalation. Ukraine responds by hitting power grids in Russian regions such as Belgorod or Oryol, but the strategic asymmetry remains intact. Europe as a target audience. Furthermore, by hitting near Lviv and, by extension, Poland, Russia is not just talking to kyiv, but with Brussels, Berlin and Paris. The Oreshnik is a reminder that Ukrainian theater is inseparably linked to European security and that any expansion of military support has an immediate reflection on the deterrence ladder. It is no coincidence that Moscow recently showed the deployment of the system in Belarus, further extending the reach shadow over the continent. The temptation of blackmail. Thus, with minimal and extremely slow territorial advances, and a growing human and industrial cost, Russia uses the Oreshnik missile as a substitute for victories on the battlefield. It is not a weapon to conquer Ukraine, of course, but rather to remind the world that the conflict cannot be closed by ignoring the Russian nuclear dimension. From that prism, each launch is a warning: Moscow does not need to detonate a warhead to reactivate the founding fear of the Cold War. Just show the button, press it even half and make it clear that it is still there, waiting, like a time bomb that sets the pace of all future negotiations. Image | Ministry of Defense of Ukraine In Xataka | Ukraine has become an animal slaughterhouse: Russian soldiers appear with horses and drones blow them up In Xataka | First it was Finland, now the US has confirmed it: when the war in Ukraine ends, Russia has a plan for Europe

Russia and the US face to face

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What started as an American operation apparently limited to imposing a naval blockade on sanctioned oil tankers off the coast of Venezuela has ended up becoming an episode of high strategic voltage in the North Atlantic. He assault has reached Europe, and Russia and Russia have appeared on the horizon. his ghost fleet. From the Caribbean to the Atlantic. What has happened is that Washington has boarded an oil tanker already reflagged by Russia while Moscow has sent naval assets, including a submarineto escort him. The case of the old Bella 1hastily renamed as Sailor and with a Russian flag painted with a broad brush in the middle of the chasesymbolizes the transition from an economic war and sanctions on the Latin American periphery to a direct, physical and potentially scalable clash between two nuclear powers in European waters. There is no simple rusty ship here, but a collision of red lines that until now had been carefully avoided. The ghost fleet comes out of the shadows. we have been counting. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Moscow, Tehran and Caracas have built a vast “ghost fleet” of more than a thousand aging tankerswith opaque ownership, non-existent insurance and false flags, designed to keep the flow of oil outside of Western sanctions. For years, the system relied on ambiguity and plausible deniability: registrations in administrative havens, shell companies in Dubai or Seychelles and flags of convenience that minimized political risk. The recent turn is radically different. Dozens of these ships have begun to raise the Russian flag directly, not out of discretion, but as a shield. It is a kind of flight forward: by declaring them Russian, the Kremlin raises the cost of any interdiction, transforming a legal problem into a strategic one. The perfect example. He Sailor is he most extreme example of that mutation. Pursued by the US Coast Guard from the Caribbean, he refused a boarding, fled into the Atlantic, changed his identity and received a Russian registration without formal inspections. With this, Moscow sought something very specific: deter Washington by raising the implicit question of whether the United States was willing to forcibly board a Russian-flagged ship on the high seas. The answer has left no room for doubt. The televised approach. The American operation was anything but improvised, with a video of the assault who has turned the helm. For weeks, the tanker was followed by a Coast Guard cutter while aerial assets were deployed in the United Kingdom, including special forces and surveillance platforms. The final boarding in waters between Iceland and Scotland It involved US military personnel and occurred despite the nearby presence of Russian naval units. According to Moscowit was a violation of international law. According to Washingtonthe ship had previously been stateless, was under a judicial seizure order and was part of an illicit transportation network of Iranian and Venezuelan oil. Munro following the tanker Bella 1 Repercussions. The crucial detail is not legal, but political. Russia had formally requested that the United States cease the persecution and, at send a submarine and other assets, introduced an element of direct military deterrence. The United States, by moving forward, de facto accepted a risk it had so far avoided: an incident between Russian and American forces outside the Ukrainian theater and without the usual diplomatic buffers. The disturbing change of scenery. Previously, the US tightening against the ghost fleet was concentrated in the Caribbean and around Venezuela, especially after Maduro’s captureconverted by Trump into a show of force and the pillar of a strategy to control Venezuelan oil. In that context, boarding oil tankers with a dubious flag off the Latin American coast implied limited risks: Guyana or fictitious records were not going to respond militarily. The jump to the North Atlantic changes everything. He Sailor was not intercepted near Venezuela, but on routes close to Europe, with the UK operational support and under the watchful eye of NATO allies. The scene, therefore, is no longer the American “backyard,” but rather a space where any miscalculation has direct implications for European security. Suddenly, sanctions enforcement overlaps with nuclear deterrence. Moment of the assault on the oil tanker The nuclear factor. No one needs to mention weapons for are present. Russia is a nuclear power that bases much of its doctrine on controlled escalation and ambiguity, and the United States perfectly understands the implicit message when Moscow escorts an oil tanker with a submarine. The Marinera incident demonstrates the extent to which the sanctions war has reached a dangerous threshold: it is no longer just about money or oil, but about strategic credibility. Each boarding of a ship re-flagged by Russia poses an uncomfortable question: How far is Moscow willing to protect its ghost fleet without crossing a line that provokes a direct response? And at the same time, how many times can Washington repeat an operation like this before the Kremlin feels the need to respond so as not to appear weak? In a stressful environment, an accidental collision or misunderstanding can escalate quickly. Europe and the crossroads. The seizure of Sailor occurs while Europe debate what to do with these oil tankers, increasingly associated not only with evasion of sanctions, but to sabotagedamage to submarine cables and serious environmental risks. Countries like Finland and France have already used special forces to board suspicious ships. However, the American case introduces a disturbing precedent: what is legal is not always prudent. If great powers normalize the use of force on the high seas against strategically reflagged ships, other less responsible actors may imitate the behavior. An old ship as a symbol. He Sailor It did not carry oil, nor is there conclusive evidence that it transported weapons. Its value is different: as a symbol. It represents the transition of the russian hybrid war from the shadow to open confrontationand shows that the United States is willing to push the pressure beyond the margins comfortable of the Caribbean. “Venezuela” is no longer a … Read more

The gold of the 21st century is not in Venezuela. China and Russia know it, and that is why the US wants Greenland no matter what.

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As if it were a Deja Vú2026 has exactly begun same as 2025: with Trump’s insistence on take over Greenland. It happens that it no longer seems like an isolated whim or a rhetorical eccentricity, but rather the convergence of a personal drive, a strategic opportunity perceived as easy, and a high-impact geopolitical calculation. Venezuela It has served to light the fuse. Greenland as an obsession. After the capture of MaduroTrump confirmed once again that the use of force abroad lacks the legal and judicial brakes that do constrain his domestic action, and that, in the face of clearly outmatched adversaries or allies, the reality is imposed on international law without too many immediate consequences. Greenland then appears (again) as the perfect prize: a huge, sparsely populated territory, defended by an ally incapable of military resistance and located in an area where Washington can dress territorial ambition in the language of “national security”. The reiteration of the message, the appointment of a specific envoy and the public statements that normalize even the military option indicate that this is not a joke or simple diplomatic pressure, but rather an obsession that grows as Trump’s internal political margin narrows. The founding paradox of NATO. The central problem is that Greenland belongs to the Kingdom of Denmarka full member of NATO, and any US action against it would place the Alliance before a paradox for which it was not designed. He Article 5, designed to deter external enemies, does not see clearly What happens when the aggressor is the hegemonic member. As has warned Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen, in that scenario “everything would stop”: NATO could continue to exist formally, but its credibility would be destroyed. No one would come to the defense of Greenland against the United States, not only due to a lack of political will, but also due to the absolute material asymmetry between Washington and the rest of the allies. The implicit message is thunder for Europe: security guarantees are no longer automatic, and force is once again in place above the treatyan outcome that directly benefits Russia at the moment of greatest tension since the end of the Cold War. Critical minerals. The economic and technological argument is supported in mineral wealth that lies under the Greenland ice, the result of an ancient geology that concentrates rare earths and other essential critical minerals for the energy transition. From the 19th century to today, different actors have tried exploit that potential, from Ivittuut cryolite during World War II to contemporary rare earth projects. However, the enthusiasm collides with a stubborn reality: extracting these resources is extraordinarily expensive, slow and risky. The almost total lack of infrastructure, the dependence on maritime or air transport, the complexity of processing (with minerals often associated with uranium) and restrictive environmental legislation mean that only a minimal fraction of exploration projects become operational mines, usually after more than a decade of investment. Extra ball. Furthermore, the memory of the environmental damage caused by past exploitations, whose effects are still detectable half a century later in extremely fragile ecosystems, explains why Greenlandic society only contemplates mining. like an opportunity if you actively participate in decision-making and project ownership. The loot exists, but it is neither immediate nor easy, and it certainly does not seem to be able to justify the American strategic urgency on its own. Hybrid war. The backdrop is a northern Europe increasingly militarizedwhere incidents against submarine cables, gas pipelines and critical infrastructure in the Baltic have normalized the idea of a permanent hybrid war. In this context, Washington observes how Moscow and Beijing test pressure tactics below the threshold of open conflict, while legal and judicial responses appear slow or ineffective. The explicit willingness of the United States to include military option for Greenland fits into that fait accompli logic: securing key positions before the strategic environment deteriorates further. It is not just about denying advantages to rivals, but about getting ahead of a scenario in which infrastructure, logistics and control of physical nodes are worth more than declarations of principles. The navigable Arctic and a port. Here a possible decisive derivative emerges. Science has been warning for some time a stage where the Arctic is heading, on a horizon of decades, to be navigable for most of the year. The sustained retreat of sea ice is transforming routes that were once seasonal into viable commercial corridorsdrastically reducing the distances between Asia, Europe and North America. Today, they capitalize on that advantage especially Russiawith the Northern Maritime Route, and Chinawhich presents itself as a “near-Arctic power” and invests in ports, icebreakers and logistics agreements. For the United States, which is late to this board, Greenland represents the perfect shortcut: an enclave located between the Atlantic and the Arctic, capable of hosting deep-water ports, air bases and logistics nodes from which to offset the Russian-Chinese advantage. Seen this way, more than a mine, Greenland is a port ahead of the world to come, a piece from which to influence the global trade of the 21st century and the control of routes that, for the first time in modern history, cease to be be closed by ice. A small island, a global change. If you will, the final paradox is that all this pulse revolves around a tiny territory of less than 60,000 inhabitantsone mostly opposed to integrating into the United States and in favor, at best, of a slow and cautious independence. However, its symbolic and strategic value is disproportionate. Greenland condenses the transition to a world where melting ice reconfigures maps, critical minerals redefine dependencies, and alliances are strained to the limit. For Trump, it is a source of political impact, potential money and demolition of the old order. For Europe, possibly proof that geography prevails again to the law. And for the international system, the warning that the Arctic is no longer a remote edge of the planet, but one of its new centers of gravity. Image | The … Read more

Europe believes it has won the gas war against Russia, but it has forgotten one small detail: infrastructure

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Europe has made a historic decision: 2027 will be the year in which the last trace of Russian gas disappear from the energy system of the continent. However, between the offices in Brussels and the reality of homes there is a chasm that is not measured in cubic meters, but in months of construction. The continent’s security no longer depends on diplomacy with the Kremlin, but on the speed at which terminals can be erected, tubes connected and ships deployed. The new European sovereignty is in the hands of the engineers. A system to build. As analyst Giacomo Prandelli explainsthe focus of the Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) market has been on the price, but the real crisis is infrastructure. Europe is in a frantic race to replace Russian gas, but much of the necessary capacity is still under construction or in the planning phase. This has created a golden opportunity for a very select group of companies that own the physical assets. According to Prandelli, there are vital European companies that still go unnoticed. He gives as an example a firm valued at 662 million euros that operates “at a bargain price”: Their profits are very high compared to their stock market value and, most importantly, they already have government contracts secured until 2030. They are, basically, the owners of the “plugs” that Europe is forced to go through. The reasons for structural change. The reason for this urgency is an irreversible “divorce”. According to data collected by OilPriceRussian exports by gas pipeline to Europe have fallen by 44% in 2025, reaching lows in the 1970s. The definitive closure of the Ukrainian route this December leaves the continent without its historic arteries. The reasons for this new reality are three: US dependence: US gas It already represents 56% of LNG imports in Europe. The July 2025 agreementby which the EU will buy 750 billion dollars in energy from the US, has reconfigured the global board. The physical rigidity of the system: Although there is plenty of gas in the global market, European regasification plants (especially in the Netherlands) have operated at the limit of their technical capacity. Spain has the gas, but cannot send it to the rest of Europe: its pipelines with France they only allow export 8,500 million m³ per year. The problem is not the lack of fuel, it is the “funnel” of the pipes. Gas as an eternal backup: A report from McKinsey & Company issues an uncomfortable warning: Gas demand will grow by 26% until 2050. Europe needs gas to stabilize its electricity grid when renewables fail. The energy transition, far from eliminating gas, has turned it into a “permanent strategic pillar.” The Black Sea axis and the ghost fleet. However, the European wall has cracks. Hungary and Slovakia they keep injecting money to the Kremlin via the Druzhba pipeline and the TurkStream route. While Brussels asks for disconnection, Budapest and Bratislava build new connections towards the Black Sea, claiming that the cut would be “economic suicide.” Added to this is the fear of the “ghost fleet.” Brussels fears that Russian gas will repeat the oil scriptan opaque market of ships that change flag and documentation to hide the origin of the gas. To avoid this, the EU has imposed fines of up to 3.5% of global turnover and certificate of origin systems, but the crude oil precedent shows that, when Europe closes a door, the market usually opens a clandestine window. Europe’s floating lifebuoy. Given the slowness of concrete, a technical solution arises. According to Professor Alexandre Munspoints towards FSRUs (Floating Storage and Regasification Units). These ships are mobile regasification plants that use the heat of the sea to process the gas. According to Muns, their advantages are the speed of deployment and the cost since they can be rented for about $155,000 per day. Giants such as Excelerate Energy or Höegh LNG are those that today allow the EU to keep the pulse. Without these ships, the gas crossing the Atlantic simply would have nowhere to enter the continent. The tyranny of the calendar. Europe closes 2025 with deceptive calm. As reported by El Economistaprices have fallen to four-year lows (€27/MWh) thanks to a mild winter and the constant flow of ships. But, as the president of Sedigas, Joan Batalla, warns, this stability is “conditional.” Any extreme cold snap or technical failure in a saturated terminal could skyrocket prices again, because the network operates without margin for error. Europe’s autonomy is no longer negotiated in Moscow; It is built in the ports of Germany, in the interconnections of the Pyrenees and in the FSRU shipyards. The success of the 2027 plan will not depend on politicians’ promises, but on cranes and welders finishing their work before the climate changes the rules of the game. Image | freepik Xataka | The European Union has finally made the decision that has terrified it for so many years: stop importing Russian gas

While Silicon Valley dreams of servers in orbit, Russia prepares a nuclear reactor on lunar soil

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Until recently, the space race was about seeing who could get there first. Today, the question is different: who will be able to turn on the light on the Moon? While companies like Google or Nvidia imagine satellites loaded with computers for their Artificial Intelligence, Russia has hit the table with a much more earthly (or lunar) plan: installing a small nuclear power plant on the surface of our satellite. A reactor by 2036. The Russian space corporation, Roscosmos, has signed a state contract with the aerospace company NPO Lavochkin to develop a lunar nuclear power plant. According to Reutersthe deadline marked in the contract is 2036. However, the political times are much more aggressive: Yury Borisov, head of Roscosmos, has placed the real operational window between 2033 and 2035. Although official statements sometimes avoid the word “nuclear” directly, project participants dispel any doubts, the Kurchatov Institute (a leader in nuclear research in Russia) and Rosatom (the state atomic flagship company) are in charge. As the Interfax media points outthe objective is to power the infrastructure of the International Lunar Research Station (ILRS), a joint project with China that seeks to move from “round trip” missions to a permanent human presence. But why what nuclear? A colony on the Moon faces nights that last 14 Earth days. During that time, the frigid temperatures and lack of light make the solar panels useless to keep astronauts alive or power life support systems. Mikhail Kovalchuk, head of the Kurchatov Institute, he explained in an interview with the Russian agency TASS that Russia must “run forward.” According to this medium, the country seeks to consolidate its leadership through the “Atomic Project 2.0”, which includes new generation reactors and closed cycle systems. It’s not just about science; Russia admits that partners like China and India have learned a lot from them and are now direct competitors. Eyes in the sky: preparing the ground. For the Russian reactor to reach the Moon, Moscow is already preparing the logistics. According to another TASS statementRussia plans to launch 52 satellites from the Vostochny cosmodrome. Among them, the Aist-2T stands out, capable of creating 3D models of the lunar terrain and monitoring emergency situations. It is the necessary infrastructure so that the “lunar atom” does not suffer the same fate as the failed Luna-25 probe in 2023. The Moscow-Beijing axis: a long-range alliance. This deployment is not a solitary effort. As Interfax detailsRussia and China formalized their ambition in May 2024 with a memorandum of cooperation for the joint construction of this nuclear plant. They are not starting from scratch: both countries presented a roadmap in 2021 that includes five joint missions to deploy modules in lunar orbit and surface. While Russia brings its historical advantage in space nuclear facilities, China provides the scientific capacity and resources for the ILRS Station to be permanently inhabited from 2030. The board of the new Cold War. Washington has not stood idly by in the face of the Russian-Chinese alliance. NASA has received a clear directive from the current administration, in which they state that They need a reactor on the Moon by 2030. “We are in a race with China,” said Sean Duffy, Secretary of Transportation and who has led this directive. The background of this urgency is not only prestige, but the control of strategic resources. The Moon is the great deposit of Helium-3, an extremely rare isotope that is emerging as the “fuel of the future” for nuclear fusion. The White House’s fear is that if the alliance between Russia and China comes sooner, they will be able to declare “exclusion zones,” blocking access to this isotope and other essential metals for the technology industry. Faced with this threat, the US has increased the power of its nuclear project from the original 40 kW to a minimum power of 100 kW. Infrastructure over prestige. The space race of the 21st century has ceased to be a question of prestige and has become a question of infrastructure. While Big Tech tries to solve its energy limits with promises of servers in orbitRussia and China have opted for the pragmatism of the reactor on solid, but lunar, soil. Image| freepik Xataka | The race to bring data centers to space promises a lot. Physics says otherwise

When the war in Ukraine ends, Russia has a plan for Europe

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A week ago and in the midst of the peace negotiations that the United States has tried to lead between Russia and Ukraine, the president of Finland issued a warning to the old continent. If peace comes to Eastern Europe, it will be the end of the war, but also, possibly, the beginning of another. Now it has been Washington’s intelligence that seems to be on the same line. The ultimate goal. counted this week Reuters that US intelligence reports have been conveying a less than reassuring message for more than two years: Putin’s objectives in Ukraine have not been moderated or reduced, despite military attrition, economic sanctions and ongoing diplomatic talks. Since the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022, the assessment of US agencies has been that the Kremlin aims to subdue all of Ukraine and, beyond that, to restore a sphere of influence over territories that were part of the former Soviet bloc, including countries that today they are part of NATO. This reading is neither punctual nor cyclical, but rather a line of analysis sustained over time that agrees widely with the conclusions of the European intelligence services and with the strategic perception of countries especially exposed as Poland or the Baltic Stateswhich are considered the next potential targets if Moscow manages to consolidate its position in Ukraine. Between intelligence and speech. This diagnosis collides head-on with the narrative promoted by Trump and his negotiating team, who maintain that Putin wants to end the conflict and that a peace agreement would be closer than ever. For intelligence analysts, that view ignores both the Russian leader’s own public statements and the logic of your actions military and political. From Washington it is emphasized that Putin has denied repeatedly be a threat to Europe, but the facts (the annexation of territories, sustained military pressure and the refusal to renounce maximalist demands) contradict that discourse. Even voices within the US Congress, such as that of the Democratic congressman Mike Quigleya member of the House Intelligence Committee, have insisted that the conviction that Russia “wants more” is shared by allies key in Europe and is based on solid information, not assumptions. Territorial control. On the ground, Russia controls approximately 20% of Ukrainian territory. This domain includes almost all of the provinces of Luhansk and Donetsk, the industrial heart of Donbas, large areas of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson, and the Crimean peninsula, a strategic enclave in the Black Sea. Putin does not present these conquests as provisional or negotiable: he has formally declared that Crimea and the four occupied provinces belong to Russiaa statement that sets a clear red line for any negotiation. This position turns the territorial debate into the main obstacle of diplomatic contacts, since accepting these demands would mean, de facto, legitimizing a war of annexation and setting a dangerous precedent for the post-Cold War European order. Pressure on kyiv. In this context, Washington’s pressure on kyiv has been increasing. According to sources familiar with the talks, the US proposal would include Ukraine withdraw your forces of the areas of Donetsk that it still controls, as part of a peace agreement. For Volodymyr Zelenskiy and the majority of Ukrainian society, this concession is unacceptable. Not only would it imply ceding sovereign territory under military coercion, but it would call into question future viability of the Ukrainian State and its ability to defend itself from new aggression. kyiv insists that any agreement that does not include real and credible security guarantees would be equivalent to freeze the conflict on terms favorable to Moscow, leaving the door open to a resumption of the war when Russia feels stronger. Security: the great debate. The negotiations led by Trump’s entourage, with figures such as Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff, have advanced in defining a package of security guarantees backed by the United States and generally accepted by Ukraine and several European countries. These guarantees would contemplate the deployment of a security force mainly European in neighboring countries and in areas of Ukraine far from the front, with the aim of deterring and responding to future Russian aggression. The scheme would also include a limit on the size of the Ukrainian army, set at around the 800,000 troopsalthough Moscow is pushing to reduce it further, a demand to which some American negotiators are open. To this would be added intelligence support by the United States, air patrols backed by Washington and the ratification of the agreement by the US Senate, which in theory would give the commitment greater political solidity. Mistrust and Russian mystery. Despite these advances, Zelenskiy has publicly expressed your doubts about the real effectiveness of those guarantees, wondering what would prevent Russia from attacking again in practice. Uncertainty worsens because Putin has rejected the presence of foreign troops in Ukraine, even as part of a peace agreement. In parallel, the Russian leader has not offered signs of flexibility: although he declares himself willing to talk about peace, he insists that his conditions must be met and boasts of the territorial advances achieved by his forces, which he estimates at about 6,000 square kilometers in the last year. The lack of a clear response from Washington to these demands fuels the perception that Moscow could be using the talks as a tactical tool to buy time and consolidate positions. Strategic risk. From the Office of the Director of National Intelligence has qualified that Russia, in its current state, lacks the military capacity to conquer all of Ukraine or to launch a full-scale offensive against Europe. However, the reports themselves emphasize that the lack of immediate capacity does not equate to a strategic renunciation. Putin’s political intention, according to US intelligence, remains being expansiveand their calculation seems oriented toward a long war, in which the attrition of Ukraine and the political fatigue of the West work in their favor. That combination of unbroken ambition and strategic patience is what explains the caution (also, if you will, skepticism) of the intelligence services regarding … Read more

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