Russia

Ukraine has asked Russia if they stop for Christmas like in the First World War. The answer could not have been more Russian

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The inevitable reference when talking about a Christmas break in the middle of a conflict is the spontaneous truce December 1914in the first months of the First World War. On several sectors of the Western Front, British and German soldiers left the trenches, exchanged cigarettes, sang Christmas carols and even played football in no man’s land. Ukraine has remembered it, but it is going to be complicated. The first time. On that occasion of the First World War, the truce was not ordered by the commanders nor was it part of a political negotiation: came from belowof human exhaustion in the face of a war that had not yet shown all its industrial brutality. Precisely for this reason it was never repeated. The high command considered it dangerous, subversive and incompatible with a modern total war. Since then, Christmas has been used many times as a rhetorical symbol of peace, but almost never as an actual interruption of fighting. The Ukrainian proposal. In this historical context full of symbolism, Ukraine has raised the possibility of a ceasefire during Christmas, an idea carefully formulated so as not to appear as a disguised surrender. Zelensky has spoken of a specific pauseespecially linked to attacks against energy infrastructure, at a critical time of winter and with the civilian population as the main collateral victim. At the same time, kyiv is preparing a new package of peace proposals backed by European partners and channeled through the United States, with the expectation that Washington will offer top-level security guarantees if Moscow rejects the plan. Zelensky, however, has shown caution and has lowered any expectations of a quick deal, publicly assuming that Russia may choose to continue the war and that, in that case, Ukraine will ask for more sanctions and more weapons. Officers and men of the 26th Division Ammunition Train playing football at Salonica, Greece, on Christmas Day 1915 The Russian response. The Kremlin’s reaction to the “Christmas break” has been immediate and bluntalmost ritual in its formulation. Dmitri Peskov has discarded any temporary ceasefire, including a Christmas truce, with an argument that Moscow has been repeating for months: a pause would only serve for Ukraine to regroup, rearm and prolong the conflict. In official Russian language, the word “truce” is presented like a trapwhile the word “peace” is reserved for a scenario in which Russia has achieved all your strategic objectives. According to Peskov, Moscow is not ready to replace a comprehensive negotiation (in their own terms) for “momentary and non-viable” solutions. The logic is clear and brutal: either the Russian framework of political and territorial victory is accepted, or the war continues without sentimental interruptions. Territory, guarantees and red lines. Behind the exchange of statements lies the real core of the conflict. Russia demands that Ukraine rspread to wide areas of its territory, accept permanent limits on its armed forces and rule out any future accession to NATO. Ukraine, for its part, rejects hand over the Donbaseven under ambiguous formulas such as a supposed demilitarized “free economic zone,” and remembers that it was already betrayed once when it renounced its nuclear arsenal in 1994 in exchange for security guarantees that did not prevent the invasion. Polls show that a clear majority of Ukrainian society opposes withdrawing from the east and is willing to continue fighting, a domestic factor that greatly limits Zelensky’s political margin even as international pressure increases. Christmas without miracles. The proposal for a Christmas break actually exposes the abysmal distance between the war that we evoke in historical memory and the war that is being fought today. In 1914an improvised truce was possible because the soldiers still saw each other as human beings confronted by accident. In 2025, the war in Ukraine is a conflict of objectives strategic, existential red lines and cold calculation of power, where each day of pause is measured in kilometers of front, ammunition reserves and operational advantages. The Russian response dry and distrustfulis not only “very Russian”: it is confirmation that, in this war, Christmas has no capacity to suspend the logic of the conflict. Unlike more than a century agothere is no room for carols between the trenches, only for official statements that remind that, for Moscow, peace does not begin with a truce, but with the political defeat of the adversary. Image | RawPixel, WikiCommons, Ariel Varges In Xataka | 24 hours later, satellite images leave no doubt: a Ukrainian underwater drone has changed the future of wars In Xataka | Drums of peace sound in Ukraine. And that should be a good thing for Europe… unless Finland is right

Europe has finally approved how to help Ukraine. The great paradox is that the most unexpected vote has been imposed: that of Russia

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Europe has finally closed an agreement to guarantee financing for Ukraine for the next two years through a loan of 90,000 million of euros backed by the common budget of the Union, a decision taken after more than 16 hours of negotiations in Brussels and under explicit pressure to avoid a financial collapse of kyiv at the beginning of 2026. In the background, a crystal clear idea: Russia has imposed its “vote”. The lifeguard and a pulse. The pact comes at a particularly delicate moment, with the United States and Russia advancing conversations parallels about a possible end to the war and with Trump publicly urging Ukraine to accept a quick agreement. For European leaders, the loan is not just an economic instrument, but a way to reaffirm that the EU wants and needs to have its own voice in any outcome of the most serious conflict experienced on the continent in the last eight decades. The political message is clear: Europe cannot stand by while others decide the future of Ukraine and, by extension, its own security. The failure of the ideal plan. For months, Brussels’ preferred option was to use the fences of 210,000 million euros in Russian sovereign assets frozen in Europe as collateral for a large “reparations” loan for Ukraine, a formula that made it possible to finance the war effort and the functioning of the Ukrainian state without directly resorting to European taxpayers’ money. The idea was powerful, both economically as symbolically: that Russia would pay, at least indirectly, for the destruction caused by its invasion. However, the plan fell apart at the last moment, a victim of the legal, financial and political risks involved in touching that capital, above all and as we told yesterdayfor a handful of countries. Russia, in fact, has already initiated legal action denouncing an illegal confiscation, and fear of economic or judicial reprisals grew as the decisive summit approached. Bucha and the passing of the war A pragmatic agreement. Faced with the impossibility of closing ranks around the use of frozen assets, France and Italy led a more pragmatic alternative: use the common EU budget to issue debt on the markets and channel the funds to Ukraine. The result is a two year loan which guarantees immediate liquidity to kyiv, although it is more expensive and less scalable than the original option. To achieve consensus, a complex political architecture was also accepted: Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic will not assume obligations direct financial measures, a key condition to avoid an internal blockage. Still, the agreement was presented as a minimal but necessary victory. Ukraine gets the money it needs to survive and Europe avoids a picture of total paralysis at a critical moment. The resilience narrative. From kyiv, Zelenskiy celebrated the agreement as a real reinforcement of Ukrainian resilience, underscoring both the arrival of funds and the fact that Russian assets remain tied up. For the Ukrainian president, the combination it is essential: short-term financial security and sustained strategic pressure on Moscow. Zelenskiy had defended the use of frozen assets until the last moment, appealing to moral, legal and historical justice criteria, but he accepted the compromise. like a lesser evil facing the existential risk of running out of resources. The EU, for its part, insists that Ukraine will only have to repay the loan when Russia pays reparationsa formula that keeps the narrative of Russian responsibility alive without yet crossing the line of direct confiscation. Belgium and type C accounts. It we explained yesterday. In the background of the agreement there was a key actor: Belgium. Most of the Russian money frozen in Europe is there, guarded through critical financial infrastructure like Euroclear and linked to mechanisms such as called type C accountsdesigned precisely to immobilize assets without transferring ownership. Brussels demanded “unlimited” guarantees against possible Russian demands and retaliation, a level of protection that the rest of the partners were not willing to assume. The final result, although presented as a European commitment, essentially coincides with what was best for Moscow: that its sovereign capital not be confiscated or used as direct collateral. Russia loses access to the money, but retains the fundamental principle that these funds remain formally its own, avoiding a far-reaching legal precedent. If you also want, indirectly, Europe has chosen the safest path for itself and, at the same time, the least disruptive for the Kremlin. Europe and its limitations. So things are, the agreement leaves an ambivalent feeling. On the one hand, it shows that the EU is capable of mobilizing massive resources to support Ukraine and prevent its financial collapse in the middle of the war. On the other hand, it exposes again structural limitations of the European project when it comes to quick and risky decisions in foreign policy and security. The plan based on Russian assets promised to be more forceful and transformative, and the loan backed by the common budget is more conservativeslower and more politically comfortable. In a context in which Washington presses for an agreement and Russia hopes to buy time, Europe has chosen legal stability and internal cohesion over a direct financial confrontation with Moscow. Ukraine thus receives the oxygen it needs. The strategic pulse, however, is far from resolved. Image | RawPixel In Xataka | Ukraine’s biggest problem is not Russia. There are three European countries trapped in a perverse mechanism: type C accounts In Xataka | A Soviet missile is destroying Ukraine’s helicopters. The paradox is that it is not from Russia: it comes from the West

Ukraine’s biggest problem is not Russia. There are three European countries trapped in a perverse mechanism: type C accounts

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Europe faces a decision that goes far beyond an accounting discussion and that defines its strategic credibility: what to do with the more than 210,000 million of euros of Russian assets frozen since the beginning of the invasion of Ukraine. The problem is twofold, because it is not just about figures, but about what comes after activating the operation. The European crossroads. Yes, because the question is not only whether that money should be used to support kyiv at a critical moment, but whether the European Union is capable to take the risks political, legal and economic implications of doing so. As Washington presses for a quick exit to the conflict and reduces its financial support, Brussels finds itself caught between the urgency of avoiding a Ukrainian defeat and the fear of unleashing a russian retaliation that directly hits several of its Member States. Putin clearly. Statements this week by Vladimir Putinloaded with contempt for European elites and confidence in a protracted war, are not simple rhetoric. Moscow makes it clear that it is not contemplating real concessions and that it considers the use of its frozen assets as theft that demands a response. That response would not be symbolic, but surgical: selective seizures, accelerated nationalizations, endless litigation and the use of the Russian financial system as a weapon. The message, a priori, is unequivocal: if Europe crosses the line, Russia will not only punish Ukraine on the battlefield, but also European countries that still have exposed economic interests within their territory. The real blockage. I remembered this morning the financial times he crux of the whole situation. Although the debate is presented as a struggle between hawks and cautions, the real blockage comes from a handful of countries specific, with Belgium, Italy and Austria at the head. It is not a question of ideology, but of direct vulnerability. Belgium hosts Euroclear, the warehouse that guards most of the frozen Russian assets, and fears becoming the first target of retaliation judicial and economic. Italy and Austria, for their part, maintain banks and companies with billions trapped in Russia, benefits included, which they cannot repatriate. For these countries, authorizing the use of Russian money is not an abstract foreign policy decision, but rather an immediate risk to their financial and corporate systems. Type C accounts: the ace of Moscow. At the center of this fear are the calls type C accountsthe mechanism created by Moscow to withhold dividends, interest and assets from Western companies. That money, formally owned by European and American companies, is under Russian control and can be frozen, redistributed or directly transferred to the state budget with a simple decree. For the Kremlin, these accounts are a retaliation tool fast and effective, far superior in agility to slow Western judicial processes. For Europe, they are an invisible chain that binds entire governments when making strategic decisions, because any false step can translate into lost billions and internal political crises. Germany pushes, Europe hesitates. Germany has become the main political engine of the plan to use Russian assets, convinced that without that money there is no realistic way to support Ukraine for another two years without skyrocketing the European debt or depending on impossible unanimity. Berlin insists that the risk must be shared among everyone and that failure to act would send a devastating sign: Europe is not capable of defending its own security. However, this logic collides with the reality of countries that feel that the risk is not distributed, but rather concentrated in their national balance sheetsits banks and its courts. A (bad) peace as a threat. This financial blockade occurs in an even more disturbing context: European fear to an imposed peace on terms favorable to Russia. For many capitals, an agreement that consolidates Moscow’s territorial gains would not only leave Ukraine defenseless, but would force Europe to prepare for a scenario direct confrontation in the medium term, with longer borders, a strengthened Russian army and a weakened European deterrent. In this framework, the frozen Russian money stops being a tactical lever and becomes a strategic investment: either it is used now to support Ukraine, or it is paid for later in the form of massive rearmament and risk of war. The final dilemma. In short, the European Union has frozen Russian assets to prevent them from returning to Moscow without reparations, but now it must decide whether it dares to give the next step. Without that money, Ukraine could run out of liquidity in a matter of months, losing all negotiating power and forcing a deal from weakness. With him, Europe is exposed to reprisals, litigation and immediate economic losses, concentrated in a few countries that are currently holding back the decision. The crossroads are clear: assume the political and financial cost now, or accept that the fear of type C accounts determine European security policy. Not only the future of Ukraine is at stake in that election, but also Europe’s ability to act as a coherent geopolitical actor when your own interests are at risk. Image | RawPixel In Xataka | A missile has been bombarding Ukraine’s defenses for weeks. What no one could imagine is that he is not Russian: he is from the West In Xataka | A day later the satellites leave no doubt: Russia fortified a bridge, and a Ukrainian drone made science fiction a reality

The United States has turned Trinidad and Tobago into the war container it was missing. Venezuela has responded like Russia: an invisible fleet

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The conflict between the United States and Venezuela has entered a phase in which the silent accumulation media outweighs official statements. If you will, the Caribbean once again functions as a strategic belt from which Washington projects pressure without the need to declare an open war. Under the formal argument of the fight against drug trafficking, the White House has been weaving a support network logistics, radars, airstrips, ports and resupply spaces in an arc at a time bigger of “allies”. The Venezuela’s response We already saw it in Russia. The map of countries. That “arc” of allies Washington runs from the Dominican Republic to Trinidad and Tobago, passing through Aruba, Curaçao, Bonaire, Grenada, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. The deployment includes destroyers, nuclear submarines, amphibious ships, aircraft carriers, state-of-the-art fighters, drones and thousands of troops, not enough for a land invasion, but enough to control air and maritime space, monitor critical routes and sustain missile attacks if it is decided to escalate. It is a prepositioning strategy classic: being everywhere without publicly assuming that something else is in the works. Trinidad and Tobago, the most sensitive link. Within that architecture, Trinidad and Tobago emerges as the most delicate piece of the board. Its extreme proximity to the Venezuelan coast turns any gesture into a political and military message. The new government has authorized the use of its airports by US military aircraft, has received warships and marine units, has allowed joint exercises and has accepted the installation of an AN/TPS-80 G/ATOR radar capable of detecting aircraft, drones and missiles. Everything is presented as logistical and defensive cooperationbut it fits almost literally with the US National Security Strategy of 2025, which calls for a toughened version of the Monroe Doctrine to reaffirm the preeminence of the United States in the Western Hemisphere and prevent external actors from controlling strategic assets. Trinidad and Tobago insist in that it will not be a platform for offensive attacks except direct aggression, but its role as node of surveillance, resupply and intelligence places it at the center of any scenario of sustained pressure on Caracas. A blockage that is not. The announced threat by Trump of a “total and complete” interdiction of sanctioned oil tankers entering or leaving Venezuela fits into that model of gradual pressure. It is not about closing ports with a formal declaration of war, but about taking advantage of naval and air superiority, supported by friendly infrastructure, to intercept, seize or deter the ships that support the main source of income for the Nicolás Maduro regime. The recent seizure of an oil tanker loaded with nearly two million barrels and the warning that further action could follow shows the extent to which Washington is willing to take pressure beyond the symbolic, taking the risk of controlled incidents in international waters. The Venezuelan response. Faced with this siege, Caracas has reacted by raising the profile of its challenge. The order to escort ships that transport oil products and derivatives to Asia is a calculated move: it seeks to demonstrate that the Venezuelan State does not renounce its right to free navigation and that it is willing to involve to his Navy to keep exports open. It is also a response that increases the risk of confrontationbut that sends an internal and external message of resistance. Oil continues to be the financial pillar of the regime, and losing it would be equivalent to accepting total economic asphyxiation. The ghost fleets. Beyond the visible escort, the true backbone of the Venezuelan strategy is the ghost fleeta tactic practically copied from the used by Russia after Western sanctions. Old oil tankers, many with more than twenty or thirty years of service, change name and flagsteal the identities of already dismantled ships, sail under flags of convenience, turn off or manipulate their identification systems and carry out crude oil transfers on the high seas to hide the origin of the cargo. The result is an opaque trade that allows you to sell oil with large discounts to buyers willing to take risks, while the traceability required by sanctions is diluted. It is not a marginal phenomenon: a significant part of the world’s oil tanker fleet already operates in this gray ecosystem, transporting Venezuelan, Russian or Iranian crude. Sanctions that do not suffocate, they deform. The BBC reported that the data show that, although far from the historical levels of the end of the 20th century, Venezuelan exports have recovered notably compared to the collapse of 2019. This indicates that the sanctions have not paralyzed the flow, but rather have displaced it towards more opaque and risky circuits. As in the Russian caseeconomic punishment does not eliminate trade, it makes it more expensive, makes it less transparent and reinforces dependence on informal networks and actors willing to move illegally. The Caribbean as a conflict. With US aircraft carriers patrolling the Caribbean, radars deployed in islands near Venezuela and escorted or invisible tankers sailing to Asiathe conflict is located in a dangerous intermediate zone between economic pressure and military confrontation. The United States bets on the ccontrol of space and logistics regional via of discreet allieswhile Venezuela responds with the same manual that has allowed other sanctioned countries to survive: ghost fleets, aggressive discounts and specific shows of force. The Caribbean, for decades associated with tourism and trade, is thus once again a scene of high geopolitical tension where each radar installed and each oil tanker intercepted brings the risk of a clash that no one admits they want, but for which both sides seem to prepare, a little closer. Image: US Navy In Xataka | The situation between the US and Venezuela only needs one incident to escalate into something more: that incident is already here In Xataka | In full tension with the US, Venezuela has presented its drone simulator: it is equal to a three-euro Steam game

the reason is due to Russia and a new military corridor

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For years, the Finnish Arctic Circle has been reinvented as a theme park permanent winter, reindeer and northern lights, converted in global destination for those looking for an eternal Christmas and an experience carefully designed around the myth of Santa Claus. But there are always more surprises in Santa’s house, and an element that no one expected has just arrived in Finnish Lapland and that changes everything: Europe rearming itself. Santa and war. Rovaniemiinternationally promoted as the official home of Santa Claus, has been one of the great icons of the world for years. european arctic tourisma place where Christmas has become in permanent industry and where the experience is carefully designed for visitors from all over the world. However, this winter season the city is experiencing a silent but profound transformation: along with sledding, reindeer safaris and festive lights, the capital of Finnish Lapland has been filled with NATO soldiers who train for a scenario that until recently seemed unthinkable. Thousands of allied soldiers have recently passed through the area to maneuvers in Rovajärvithe largest training camp in Western Europe, located just 88 km from the Russian border, making Rovaniemi a a key point of the new security architecture of northern Europe. The longest and most sensitive border. The reason for this deployment is geographical and strategic. Finland shares almost 1,500 km of border with Russiaone of the largest and most complex in the entire Atlantic Alliance, and more than a quarter of it runs through the sparsely populated Lapland. Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Finnish intelligence services and military commanders have warned that Moscow is strengthening its infrastructure and its presence on the other side of the border, especially around the Kola Peninsula, a key enclave due to its enormous concentration of nuclear capabilities. The forecast in Helsinki is that, once the war in Ukraine ends, Russia can redeploy troops towards the north and adopt a much more robust stance towards Finland, structurally raising the level of tension in the region. NATO umbrella. Finland does not start from scratch in this defensive logic. His history and their relationship with Russia have marked for decades a culture of constant preparation, with national defense integrated into the Constitution itself and a conscription system widely accepted by society. However, the entry into NATO in 2023 It has meant a qualitative change: the country has gone from a defense designed in a national key to being part of a collective system that requires interoperability, allied presence and joint planning. This shift has translated into international cooperation much more intensethe opening of a new Allied command at Mikkeli and the designation of Rovaniemi as a future base of the Forward Land Forces, the Swedish-led battle group intended to reinforce the Alliance’s eastern flank. Military exercises in the Arctic. It we have counted before. While the tourists fill the Santa Claus Village and cameras capture idyllic scenes of snow and lights, a few kilometers away carry out military exercises of great technical and logistical complexity. Maneuvers like Lapland Steel 25held after other large multinational exercises, bring together Finnish, Swedish and British troops who train in extreme conditions, combining armor, helicopters, infantry and movement on skis in frozen forests and deep snow. Although a specific scenario is not officially tested, the maps and orientation of the exercises clearly reflect the type of threat that is in mind, making visible direct connection between the seemingly remote environment of the Arctic and high-intensity conventional warfare. A mentalized population. For many young Finns who serve in the military, in many cases voluntarily, the possibility of conflict is no longer an option. a distant abstraction. counted on a report in the Guardian that soldiers and conscripts assume extreme physical effort, endless marches and the weight of equipment as part of a collective responsibility, convinced that preparation is the best guarantee against uncertainty. The commanders describe the current situation as a new cold war, marked by the melting of the Arctic, the opening of new routes and natural resources and the rrenewed interest from Russia to ensure both its strategic deterrence and its economic assets in the north, in a context of prolonged and structural competition. Deterrence as a political message. The intensification of joint exercises and coordination between Finland, Sweden and Norway seeks more than just improving military capabilities: it seeks to send a clear political signal of cohesion, commitment and responsiveness. The bet is to avoid conflict precisely by demonstrating that any aggression would have a high cost and a collective response. In that delicate balance, Rovaniemi has become a powerful symbol of today’s Europe: a place where the imagery of peace, childhood and Christmas now coexists with bunkers, military aircraft and strategic planning, remembering that even in the extreme north of the continent, security has ceased to be a backdrop and has become a central priority. Image | Matias CalloneRawPixel, Tom Corser, BORN In Xataka | In the midst of rearmament, Europe has realized an unimportant detail: it does not have enough bullets In Xataka | France and Germany have just approved an unprecedented rearmament against the Russian threat: one hundreds of kilometers from Earth

If there is finally peace in Ukraine, Russia has a surprise for the rest of Europe

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The talks in Berlin have revived the idea of ​​an agreement to end the war in Ukraine like never before, to the point that Donald Trump has assured that peace is “closer than ever” after prolonged contacts with both European leaders and Vladimir Putin. If this horizon occurs, Finland has just sounded the alarm. The peace that appears. The United States has put on the table a plan that, according to its own negotiators, would solve around 90% of friction points and that includes a ceasefire supervised by Washington, security guarantees powerful and a central role for Europe in the stabilization of the country. kyiv admits real progressalthough he emphasizes that the territorial issue remains the most painful core of the negotiation, with Russia demanding concessions in the Donbas that Ukraine is reluctant to accept. Still, the general tone is contained optimismwith the feeling that, for the first time since 2022, there is a minimally viable political architecture to stop the fighting. Security guarantees. The key element of the plan is a package of security guarantees described by US officials as the most robust ever offered to Ukraine, with explicit parallels to NATO’s Article 5. Europe is ready to lead a multinational force on the ground, a “coalition of the willing” that would help regenerate the Ukrainian armed forces, protect its airspace and guarantee maritime security, always with political and operational support from the United States, although no US troops deployed in Ukraine. Furthermore, Washington would assume supervision of a ceasefire and an early warning system for possible violations, while European countries would legally commit to act in the event of new aggression. For kyiv, these guarantees are the essential condition to accept any freezing of the conflict, even leaving aspirations such as membership in NATO on hold, something that Zelenskiy has come to openly raise. The hidden price of peace. However, beneath this apparent diplomatic advance lies growing unrest on Europe’s eastern flank. Finland has issued a warning as clear as it is uncomfortable: peace in Ukraine will not mean the end of the Russian threat, but very likely its geographical displacement. According to Finnish Prime Minister Petteri Orpo, Moscow would take advantage of the end of hostilities to redeploy forces towards NATO’s borders, especially in the Baltic and northern Europe, strengthening its posture vis-à-vis the Alliance in a period of just three to five years. From Helsinki, it is insisted that Russia would continue to be a revisionist power and that interpreting peace as a general de-escalation would be a strategic error of the first order. The eastern flank prepares. The most exposed countries already act accordingly. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland are on track to spend more than 5% of its GDP in defense, well above the traditional objectives of NATO, while coordinate common capabilities in air defense, drones and ground forces, and are working to accelerate the movement of troops and weapons across the continent. Finland, with its historical culture of preparation against Russia, maintains bunkers, strategic reserves and training programs civil, despite going through a serious economic crisis. These countries fear that a peace agreement will lead some European partners, further away from the front, to relax their attention and their military spending just when, in their opinion, the threat would be reconfiguring and not disappearing. Europe and a decision. The debate comes in a critical week for the European Union, forced to decide whether to support financially to Ukraine in the long term, unlocks the use of frozen Russian assets and assumes that your future security It depends less on Washington and more on its own deterrence capabilities. Orpo has been explicit by warning that Europe cannot afford to just talk about peace, but must act quickly and resourcefully, because there is no credible alternative plan if support for kyiv fails. Thus, the paradox is strongly imposed: the advance towards peace in Ukrainefar from closing the chapter on European security, could open another equally delicatein which Russia, freed from the Ukrainian front, once again strains the continental chessboard and forces Europe to finally face the strategic consequences of a conflict that never was only from Ukraine. Image | Ministry of Defense of Ukraine In Xataka | Something unprecedented has happened in North Korea: a video has revealed that they are sending their soldiers in Ukraine to the “slaughterhouse” In Xataka | The drone war in Ukraine is complete nonsense: the manuals that were useful two weeks ago are a death trap today

The US has joined the “party” of China, Russia and Japan in the Pacific: with its nuclear bombers

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As if it were an air parade of an air force planetarythe sky of the Asia-Pacific has become a scene of military exhibitions that have rarely been seen outside of a major war conflict. It happens that these fireworks can lead with a single spark into something very different. The improvised aerial party. As we said, the sky of Asia is a tour de force where every time it hides lessand where you patrol, joint exercises and strategic flights function as political messages in broad daylight. Russia and China have been setting the pace with bombers and fighters over disputed seas, Japan responds by raising the profile of its air defense and, now, the United States has decided to join visibly to this choreography of power, incorporating its strategic bombers into a dynamic that reflects the extent to which the region has become one of the epicenters of global rivalry. Bombers Made in USA. The joint flight of two American B-52s with Japanese fighters over the Sea of ​​Japan represents a qualitative leap in the signal sent from Washington, not so much because of its technical novelty as because of its symbolic load. The presence of bombers capable of carry nuclear weapons escorted by Japanese F-35s and F-15s, publicly reinforces the idea that the alliance between both countries is not rhetorical, but operational, and that the United States is willing to support Tokyo with strategic assets at a time of maximum friction with Beijing. The background. This show of force does not arise in a vacuum, but in the midst of an accelerated deterioration of relations between China and Japan that we have been telling, fed by the statements from Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi on a possible conflict scenario around Taiwan. Beijing considers these words a direct provocation and has responded combining diplomatic pressure, economic threats and a notable increase in military activity near Japanese airspace and disputed islands, raising the risk of unwanted incidents. Russia enters the scene. The previous presence of russian bombers Flying alongside Chinese aircraft near Japan and South Korea adds an additional layer of complexity to the scenario, projecting an image of strategic coordination against US allies in the region. For Tokyo, these joint patrols are not routine exercises, but a clear sign of directed pressure, which explains why the Japanese response has involved reinforcing its coordination with Washington and unambiguously accept the presence of high-profile American assets. Washington balances muscle. Although the White House has tried to reduce the drama of these flights, pointing out that they were planned in advance, the regional context gives them meaning. hard to ignore. The United States tries to maintain a delicate balance: show military commitment to Japan and deter China without completely breaking the channels of dialogue with Beijing, especially at a time when Washington continues to seek commercial stability and avoid an open escalation in the Pacific. An increasingly charged sky. With fighters blocking radarsstrategic bombers crossing disputed seas and joint exercises Happening at an almost routine pace, the airspace of East Asia has become a board where each flight counts as a political statement. The explicit input of the United States in this aerial “party” confirms that the fight between China and Japan is no longer just bilateral, but a broader reflection of the competition between great powers, one in which bombers and fighters seem to speak louder (and clearer) than diplomatic communications. Image | Japan’s Ministry of Defense In Xataka | That Chinese and Russian bombers patrol together is not surprising. That they do it against Japan and South Korea has had an immediate response In Xataka | If the question is how far the tension between China and Japan has escalated, the answer is disturbing: they are targeting each other.

Porsche owners in Russia woke up this morning without being able to start their car. And they have a suspicion

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They said in Autonotion in 2019 that Russia was a country of extremes. They weren’t talking about the economy (at least not directly), they were talking about car sales. And the Russian market has always been particular, with Lada being the best-selling car brand and, at the same time, having the ability to sneak Porsche ahead of Peugeot. And Porsche lived a decade of love with Russia with constant growth. The wealthiest did not hesitate to opt for the luxury brands Germans. In fact, that report identified Mercedes and BMW as the tenth and eleventh most purchased car companies. In fact, despite the restrictions, Russians continue to buy Western cars, they explained in Motor1.com recently. Those continued sales have thousands of Porsche cars moving through the streets of Russian cities. Or they had them. Because overnight, car owners in Stuttgart keep reporting a problem as simple as it is obvious: their cars don’t move. No, they don’t work. Either they don’t start or they stop after traveling a few meters. The reason for the problem is already known. The origin is more diffuse. My Porsche doesn’t run They pick up their colleagues Motorpassion that since the last days of November, Russian owners of German sports cars are experiencing serious problems starting their cars. The problem seems to lie in the Porsche VTS (Porsche Vehicle Tracking System), a system that the German company offers as a protection measure. With it activated, the vehicle maintains a constant satellite connection so if someone steals the car it is easy to find its location. In that case, a thief must block the satellite signal but in that case the brand understands that, in fact, the car is being stolen and the car automatically does not start or stops after a few meters. This is what has happened in Russia. With a nuance, the Porsche system has incorrectly understood that hundreds or thousands of cars sold since 2013 have been stolen and, therefore, their starting is prevented. The reason is that these cars have lost the satellite connection for a reason that is still unknown. This automatically activates the system and, as we see, leaves the car inoperable. Rolf, the largest dealer group selling Porsche cars in Russia, has confirmed the latter. And the company ceased operations in the country completely in 2022, in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Since then its users have been left without technical service. It is now believed that the lack of maintenance of the servers may have caused a failure that has broken that satellite connection and the Porsches have become a gigantic paperweight. The event is so striking that those responsible for Rolf have assured Russian media that the widespread shutdown “may be deliberate.” However, there is no conclusive evidence for the latter. If so, it would be a hybrid warfare maneuver especially curious. For now, what is certain is that there are hundreds of post-2013 Porsches completely stranded… and with their customers looking for desperate solutions. The companions of Motorpassion They report that some of them claim to have solved the problem with hard reboots, such as turning off the battery for 10 hours. The car would have picked up the satellite signal again at that moment and could start moving again. Others have achieved it rebooting the VTS system or, directly, removing it completely, which involves disassembling the seats and a good part of the dashboard. Whether it was some kind of computer attack or simply due to a lack of server maintenance, the truth is that hundreds of Porsche cars have been stranded and that speaks volumes. how hopelessly connected our cars are nowadays. Almost always, arguing or defending greater driver safety. Our cars have become a connected data center… whether we want it or not. The Porsche case is an example of how an interesting and useful system to prevent car theft can leave us with a completely stopped car if the system architecture suffers irreparable damage. And in this case we are not talking about a failure in the vehicle, we are talking about a direct attack against servers or satellites that directly allow our cars to move. Right now, a new one keeps constant information about our driving in a small black box. We are connected to a network with geolocation to make an emergency call with eCall, mandatory since 2018. Some modern cars can receive notices in your browsers of various incidents, How does the DGT want to send when detect a car stopped on the road with the V-16 beacon active. But it has even been proposed to use the data collected to force us to circulate around the city. in fully electric mode if we have a plug-in hybrid car or harness its power if it is detected that the batteries have not been recharged for too long. Therefore, technically it is possible to turn off cars remotely. It would be very difficult to order a concrete attack against a single vehicle since connected information sent from a car is supposedly anonymous and end-to-end encrypted. As long as that car has not been reported stolen, which can allow the police to contact the manufacturer and him order a remote shutdown. However, vulnerabilities that could leave hundreds or thousands of cars completely stopped or at the mercy of a remote control are one of the industry’s biggest concerns. Especially in a geopolitical context in which hybrid warfare seems to be increasingly present. Photo | Josh Berquist and Vadim Artyukhin In Xataka | If you do not have the V16 beacon you will be fined, but the director of the DGT proposes a grace period: “the agents will be flexible”

Shahed drones were a piece of cake for Ukraine’s helicopters. Russia has just transformed them into its biggest nightmare

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In it huge catalog of innovations improvised measures brought by the war in ukrainefew are as revealing as the decision that Russia has taken to address one of the main vulnerabilities of its drones. In essence, they have turned the Shahed-136 (symbol of its saturation strategy through cheap and disposable platforms) in a rudimentary anti-aircraft fighter. The mutation. What was born as a suicide drone with autonomy to travel hundreds of kilometers following pre-programmed routes has been transformed, in some variants, into a system piloted in real timeequipped with cameras, modems and now with the R-60 missilea veteran infrared-guided missile from the 1970s that, despite its compact size, retains the lethality of a weapon capable of cutting a helicopter in two with its load of continuous rods. The broadcast images by Ukrainian organizations and electronic warfare experts confirm the presence of the R-60 mounted on the Shahed’s noseand the interception of one of them by a Ukrainian Sting drone illustrates that Russia is experimenting with the idea of ​​​​transforming a disposable projectile in a reactive vectorcapable of confronting the devices that, until now, acted as unpunished hunters of these platforms. The new tactical ecosystem. The success of the Ukrainian helicopters in intercepting Shaheds (with devices sporting dozens of shoot-down marks and crews accredited with hundreds of downed drones) had turned these aircraft in key pieces of low-level air defense. The combination of moderate speed, predictable trajectory and total lack of situational awareness made the drone a almost static whitevulnerable to cannon blasts or volleys used at close range. But the introduction of the R-60 upsets that balance: although the platform remains clumsy, slow and limited in maneuver, the simple fact that some drones can carry missiles will force Ukrainian pilots to rethink their proximity to the target. Each interception stops being a procedure and becomes in an unknown about what version of the enemy they will encounter. Extra ball. Even if the actual kill capability of the armed Shahed is small (and the operational window for targeting with a short-range missile is narrow) the statistical nature of swarm warfare change the calculation: In thousands of launches, just getting into a good position will be enough to cause the loss of a valuable helicopter. Technical limitations. The R-60, known by NATO as Aphidwas designed for supersonic fighters, not slow drones intended as loitering munitions. Its integration into the Shahed poses obvious challenges: the operator must manually retarget the drone until it is pointed at the target, achieving an adequate angle to allow the infrared seeker to acquire the thermal signature and maintain alignment long enough to authorize the shot. He narrow field of vision of the missile, the Shahed’s low maneuverability and the possibility of helicopters using infrared flares reduce the chances of success. However, historical experience shows that even imperfect weaponry can achieve victories if the tactical environment favors it. Remains of an intercepted Shahed with the R-60 attached The precedent. If we go back we have the Predator armed american with Stingers in 2002 (failed but deterrent), which reveals that these configurations do not seek air superiority, but rather force the enemy to act with caution. Just as Ukrainian unmanned ships were armed with missiles To scare away the Russian helicopters that were harassing them, Russia adopts the same defensive-offensive logic: a single one of these armed drones, hidden among a swarm of externally identical devices, forces the adversary to increase distance, use more expensive means or modify its interception doctrine. Drones against drones. The Shahed armed with an R-60 is not, by itself, a transformative weapon. It is, however, as symptom of evolution continued unmanned combat. Russia has expanded the Shahed family into versions with real time controljet variants already produced in its own factories and possible improvements based on artificial intelligence for dynamic target identification. Ukraine, for its part, develops interceptors low-cost that allow us to shoot down Russian drones without risking manned aircraft or spending expensive missiles. Every innovation generates a countermeasure: if Ukraine popularizes cheap hunting drones, Russia studies equipping the Shaheds of tiny turrets or new sensors, and if these become reactive, Ukraine adapts its doctrines and strengthens its electronic warfare. The conflict has entered a phase where the value is not in the perfection of each platform, but in the ability to produceadapt and deploy thousands of them in an environment where the line between offensive and defensive becomes blurred. The most dangerous sky. It is the result of these advances. The introduction of Shahed-R-60 marks a turning point because it erodes one of the few stable advantages that Ukraine had maintained: the capacity of its helicopters to hunt drones with relative safety. Now each aircraft must consider the possibility, however remote, of facing a missile that was not foreseen in the original mission design. This not only complicates interceptions, but forces disperse risks and rethink routes, altitudes and speeds. The Ukrainian sky, already saturated with suicide drones, cruise missiles, loitering munitions and manned aircraft operating in densely contested airspace, add another variable to an operational equation in constant mutation. And it is likely that this is just the beginning: the integration of missiles is a first step towards drones that, in addition to attacking by saturation, can defend themselves or even escort other devices in combined waves. Image | Telegram, X In Xataka | There is tourism that flies en masse where tragedies have occurred. So the Low Costs are preparing to travel to Ukraine In Xataka | Ukraine’s problem with peace negotiations is simple: if it rejects them, Russia will get tougher in the next ones.

The round of peace meetings in Ukraine has ended. Russia says it is “ready”, but for war with Europe

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The last two rounds of contacts between the Kremlin and Trump’s envoys have confirmed that the peace process for Ukraine is technically alive, but politically blocked. Putin took advantage of the arrival of the emissaries to launch a verbal offensive: Accused Europe of torpedoing peace, suggested the EU “is on the side of war,” and said Russia does not want a continental conflict but that if Europe starts one, “we are ready right now.” A trapped peace process. For Moscow, the talks are “very useful” as they allow it probe the limits Washington and explore what it is willing to sacrifice in exchange for a stable ceasefire. For the United States, they are an opportunity to zoom in positions without openly acknowledging that the original plan favored Russia too much and was unacceptable to kyiv. Five hours of meeting in Moscow served to review successive versions of the US document, but not to generate a “compromise option”: Russia accepts some elements, rejects others with a “critical and even negative attitude” and, above all, keeps intact its objective of translating its military advances in territorial gains formalized on paper. Moscow red lines. At the center of the disagreement is the territorial question. Moscow insists Ukraine must resign to 20% of Donetsk which he still preserves, while boasting (not without response from kyiv) of having taken Pokrovska key logistical hub that had been in operation for more than a year trying to capture with a great cost in lives and material. This insistence is not only cartographic: is part of a maximization logicin which victories at the front are used as an argument to tighten political conditions. Added to this are other structural requirements: deep cuts in the Ukrainian armed forces, severe limits on Western military aid and a fit of Ukraine into the Russian sphere of influence that would empty its formal sovereignty of content. In this context, talking about “progress” is, in reality, talk about margins: Washington explores how far it can give in without kyiv perceiving it as a capitulation, while Russia calculates how far it can stretch its demands without completely breaking the diplomatic channel that is useful to buy time and legitimize its narrative. Parallel diplomacy and mixed signals. Witkoff and Kushner’s role adds a ambiguity layer to the process. They are not classic diplomats, but political emissaries who operate in a gray zone between official diplomacy and American domestic politics. His presence in Moscow, after meeting with Ukrainians in Florida and reviewing a 28 point plan which initially tilted the board towards Moscow, sends several signals at once: kyiv is shown that Washington “listens” to its objections and tweaks the document, Moscow is made clear that the White House is willing to continue negotiating concession frameworks, and Europe is reminded that the decisive conversation remains, above all, Washington-Moscow. The Trump statement Calling the war a “mess” that is difficult to resolve fits with that approach: rather than a closed strategy, the administration seems to seek an agreement that reduces the political and economic cost of the war for the United States, although the final balance is very delicate for Ukraine. Europe as a scapegoat. The Putin’s words on Europe reveal a perfectly calculated strategy: presenting European capitals as the real obstacle to peace, accusing them of “being on the side of the war” and of preventing Washington from closing an agreement. By saying that “Europe is preventing the US administration from achieving peace in Ukraine,” the Kremlin is trying several things at the same time: put pressure on the Europeans to lower their demands, feed the fatigue of war in Western societies and drive a wedge between the United States and its allies, suggesting that Washington would be more flexible if it were not bound by “European demands.” The added threat that Russia “does not intend to fight Europe, but is ready if Europe starts” has a double effect: it works as a military warning and, at the same time, as an internal message to reinforce the idea of ​​a besieged Russia that only defends itself. The risk of being isolated. For Ukraine, cross-play is especially dangerous. Zelenskiy insists on receiving security guarantees “livable” for the future, that is, mechanisms that prevent a new Russian attack once an agreement has been signed. HE frontally opposes to any formula that forces him to give up territory that he currently controls or to reduce his army to levels that leave him defenseless. But, at the same time, it knows that a part of the European capitals and the American political class are seeking, with increasing urgency, an outcome that freezes the war and stabilizes the front, even if that enshrines a status quo very unfavorable for Ukraine. Its margin consists of supporting in the European bloc tougher (those countries that see a bad agreement as a disastrous precedent for continental security) and to remember that any credible reconstruction involves using frozen russian assets and for a framework of Western guarantees that makes another Kremlin attack politically unaffordable. Putin’s calculation of strength. The threats “cutting off Ukraine from the sea completely” and intensifying attacks on ports and ships entering them fit into a broader strategy: combine slow but steady advances in the Donbas with the ability to strangle the Ukrainian economy and make the protection of its maritime corridors more expensive. Each city taken or partially controlled serves the Kremlin as proof that time is in its favor and that it can rise the price of peace at each plan review. Editorials from related media, as Komsomolskaya Pravdareinforce this idea by presenting the negotiations as a scenario in which Russia can afford to tighten its conditions as “more and more Ukrainian territory” passes into its hands. The implicit message is clear: if the current proposals already seem harsh, the next round could be worse for kyiv if the war continues. Uncertainty. The final result is a peace process that formally remains open, but that moves on a dangerous … Read more

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