prologue

There is a historical irony that is difficult to overcome: the Treaty of Versailles It was signed in the same room (the Hall of Mirrors) where, in 1871, the German Empire was proclaimed after the French defeat. In 1919, France chose that same place on purpose to reverse the humiliation and force Germany to sign its defeat in the same scenario of its triumph. That peace was intended close a war…and twenty years later, Europe was entering an even worse situation. Peace in the same place, again. donald trump has signed an agreement with Iran in a place steeped in history: the Palace of Versailles. The image is powerful because it inevitably refers to the last great peace treaty sealed there, the one from 1919when Europe believed it was healing the wound of the First World War. That peace, however, was an imperfect peace: humiliated Germany, left open economic and political wounds, and fueled resentment that, two decades later, facilitated the rise of Adolf Hitlerthe collapse of the European order and the Second World War. The symbolism today is disturbing because Trump presents this pact as a historic victory, but many see in it the same pattern: a hasty truce, ambiguous concessions and structural problems that remain intact. From surrender to something else. Just a few weeks ago Trump demanded “unconditional surrender” of Iran. He signed memorandum This week it’s practically the opposite. Washington has agreed to release billions in frozen assets, relax sanctions, allow Iranian oil exports and open the door to a reconstruction fund. of 300 billion dollars funded by regional partners. In return, Tehran promises to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, contain its regional allies and continue talking about its nuclear program. The shift is enormous: from maximalist rhetoric to a negotiation that many in Washington consider a strategic transfer. The weapon that defeated Washington. The most striking thing is that Iran did not win this negotiation on the battlefield, but in the global economy. The closure of Hormuz (through which around 20% of the world’s oil passes) unleashed a cimmediate energy crisis. The threat of a global economic collapse was the factor that, according to Trump himselfpushed him to close a quick deal. I feared a spiral similar to that of Herbert Hoover and the Great Depression. Therein lies the great Iranian victory: it has shown that it does not need to militarily defeat the United States to impose conditions; just touch the circulatory system of the world economy. What was not resolved. There is no doubt, the central problem is still alive. The agreement barely touches the Iranian ballistic arsenal, leaves the question of its regional militias in the air and only establishes vague mechanisms to manage its enriched uranium. Trump even has publicly accepted for Iran to keep part of its missiles, something that until recently was a red line. The architecture of the pact is dangerously similar to that of the 2015 nuclear deal which he himself demolished during his first term. The difference is that now he signs it with less pressure and with an Iran that has proven its capacity for economic coercion. A peace that strengthens the adversary. Instead of weakening the regime, the war seems to have consolidated it. The apparatus of the Guardians of the Revolution still intact At its political core, the new leadership presents itself as surviving a direct clash with Washington and the flow of money can reinforce its internal stability. In practice, Trump has saved a regime he claimed he wanted to overthrow. That’s one of the most uncomfortable parallels. with 1919: Sometimes treaties do not close conflicts, they simply reorganize forces and give the actors time to recover. The poison of the 1919 Treaty. When the Treaty of Versailles was signed after the First World War, the winning powers imposed gigantic economic reparations on Germany, the loss of key territories, severe military limitations and, above all, the famous “guilt clause”, which forced Berlin to accept responsibility morale of the entire war. On paper it was a punishment. In practice it was a political bomb watchmaking. German society felt that peace not as closure, but as a historical humiliation that fueled a narrative of national betrayal and desire for revenge. From humiliation to Nazism. That resentment found perfect fuel in the hyperinflation of the 1920s, massive unemployment and the economic collapse after the crash of 1929. It was in that broth that Hitler built his rise: promising to break up Versailles, restore German greatness, and return lost sovereignty. And he did it. He reoccupied the Rhineland, rearmed the country, absorbed Austria, and dismantled the European order as Western democracies tried to buy time with concessions. The peace of 1919 did not prevent the following war; He incubated her slowly. and when broke out in 1939was much more devastating than the first. The lesson of Versailles. The great historical teaching of the Treaty of Versailles It was not that peace failed immediately, but that a very bad peace can incubate a worse war. In 1919 it was believed that the European chaos had been contained and what was done was to postpone it while growing up in silence. Today the risk is not a literal repetition, but the logic is recognizable: United States economic pressure easesIran retains tools of coercion and its nuclear capacity remains not completely neutralized. If Tehran concludes that being on the brink of the bomb is not enough to deter and that the real shield is to become another North Korea, this agreement could end up being remembered not as the end of a war, but as the prologue to a much larger crisis. Image | US NAVY, William Orpen In Xataka | The US entered Iran with the intention of disarming it and changing the regime: it is going to leave by strengthening its position and paying it money In Xataka | Iran always thought it would need a nuclear bomb to defend itself against the US: it has … Read more