Russias

hunt down Russia’s most ruthless group without a single shot

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Since the start of the full-scale invasion, the war in Ukraine has been a succession of adaptations forced, where each side has had to learn faster than the other to survive. What began as a bet on speed and political collapse led to a long conflicttechnical and increasingly ruthless, one in which the rules have changed as many times as the weapons on the field. From wear to operational calculation. After almost four years of war, Ukraine has begun to accept that inflicting massive casualties like explained recently A minister, by himself, does not change the logic of the conflict. Russia has shown that it can absorb huge losses without modifying its strategy, while using drones and deep strikes to erode the Ukrainian rear, cut off supplies and psychologically break the troops holding the front. This context has forced a rethinking from kyiv: the battlefield is no longer decided only on the line of contact, but in what happens dozens of kilometers behind, where commanders, drone operators and logistics routes support the Russian advance in slow motion. The war of the rearguard. In open regions like Zaporizhzhia, the difference between resisting and giving ground comes down to the ability to deny the enemy freedom of movement in the rear. Russia has converted medium-range drones in your key weaponattacking Ukrainian roads, convoys and equipment before they even enter combat. Ukraine, on the other hand, has depended for too long of death zones close to the front, betting on annihilating Russian infantry when it is too late to stop the general pressure. More and more Ukrainian commanders assume that, if it is not hit before to the system that fuels the assaults, war becomes a race of attrition impossible to win. The window of opportunity. This change of mentality coincides with a series of blows that have disorganized the Russian army. Disconnection of terminals key communications and internal decisions that have limited its own coordination channels have created a temporary vacuum in enemy command and control. Ukraine has read that weakness not as an occasion to launch local attacks, but as a strategic opportunity rare: for the first time in months, a large Russian formation appears exposed, dependent on fragile lines of communication and struggling to coordinate its defense in depth. And not just any one. The hunt for an army, not adding corpses. The plan that begins to take shape It goes far beyond “kill more or how many more.” The objective now is to encircle, isolate and destroy a specific and hitherto implacable formation of the Russian army, depriving it of reinforcements, ammunition and effective command until it becomes a a burden for Moscow instead of an offensive instrument. Where? In the southeast of Ukraine, where movements indicate that kyiv tries to wrap to the 36th Russian Navybut not through a great armored advance, but with a constant pressure on their flanks, selective attacks on key nodes and a systematic denial of their rear. In other words, it is not a spectacular offensive, because the least important thing is the shots, but rather a prolonged and methodical hunt. A risky but necessary position. There is no doubt, the shift involves risks more than obvious: for example, it demands more intelligence, more medium-range drones and even complex coordination at a time when Ukraine remains very limited by resources and irregular external support. But it also reflects a harsh and realistic conclusion: as long as Russia can rotate units and replenish men, the casualty accounting does not decide the war. Only the destruction of formations entire, unable to withdraw or reorganize, may alter the operational balance and, with it, Ukraine’s position both on the front and in any future negotiations. In that sense, what is underway is not just another offensive, but an attempt to change the rules of the game on the ground. Image | RawPixel In Xataka | An unprecedented experiment is happening in Ukraine: bombs have turned dogs into other animals In Xataka | Europe has been wondering for years “what Russia will do when the war in Ukraine is over.” The answers are not optimistic

A report has set off alarm bells in Europe. Russia’s shell production is meaningless for a single war

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When Russia crossed the Ukrainian border in 2022, Europe reacted as it had not done since the end of the Cold War: massive sanctions, accelerated rearmament and a political unity forced by urgency. During these years, the European debate revolved around a seemingly simple question about kyiv’s resistance, as the conflict lengthened, became normalized, and ceased to be a “temporary” war. Now, with the front stagnant and the calendar moving forward, in the European capitals it is beginning to prevail another concern. What will Russia do when this war is no longer the center of the board? It’s not just the front. Yes, as the conflict in Ukraine approaches its fourth anniversary, it is beginning to take hold in Europe a different reading And more disturbing: Russia is not acting like a country trapped in a war of attrition, but rather like a power that uses the conflict as, perhaps, a preparatory phase. In the last few hours, a piece of information has appeared on the old continent: the massive increase in its military production suggests that Moscow is not only thinking about supporting the current front, but about setting up a later strategic scenarioin which having reserves, industrial capacity and room for maneuver will be as important as any territorial advance achieved in Ukraine. The figure that triggers the alarms. The data that most worries the European intelligence services is the Russian production of ammunition, which has exceeded the seven million projectiles annually, a figure 17 times higher to that of the first stages of the invasion. According to the Estonian intelligence service Välisluureamet, this jump is not explained by a simple intensification of combat, mainly because it makes no sense, but by the construction of new industrial plants and the will to rebuild strategic reserves in the long term. For Europe, the implicit message is clear: no one manufactures at that rate if they are only thinking about surviving the current conflict. Resist and prepare. This rearmament occurs despite the Russian economic deterioration, enormous human cost of the war and the increasing difficulties for recruit soldiersreinforcing the idea that the Kremlin prioritizes material accumulation over internal well-being. The support of North Korea, which has come to supply a substantial part of the ammunition used in Ukraine, has allowed Moscow to gain time and rebuild arsenals. For Estonia, maintaining these reserve levels is a central element of planning possible future conflictsnot simple insurance for the ongoing war. The north enters the radar. we have been counting in recent months. That fear of what comes next is not limited to the eastern flank. Now Norway has warned openly that a Russian move to protect its nuclear assets in the Arctic, concentrated on the Kola Peninsula, a short distance from its border, cannot be ruled out. This is not a classic ambition of conquest, but rather an aggressive defensive logic: ensuring the ability second nuclear attack in case of an escalation with NATO. The Ukrainian War has forced Nordic countries to plan for scenarios that a few years ago would have seemed unlikely. Tactical peace for strategy. The Guardian said this morning that, while increasing its military capacity, Russia deploys calculated diplomacy that seeks to buy time and divide the West. Estonian intelligence describes opening gestures toward the United States and negotiating rhetoric as a maneuver to reduce pressures, exploit cracks between Washington and Europe and consolidate positions without giving up the underlying objectives. In parallel, Moscow intensifies influence operations and hybrid warfareaware that the Ukrainian post-war can be as decisive as the war itself. The disturbing scene. In short, the combination of mass production of ammunition, possible nuclear planning, hybrid pressure and instrumental diplomacy seem to paint a panorama most uncomfortable for Europe: one where even when the weapons end fading in Ukraine, Russia will remain an actor ready to act. From that perspective, it is not only the end of a war that is worrying European capitals, but the beginning of a stage in which Moscow, industrially reinforced, could decide when and where to tighten the chess again. Hence, what comes after Ukraine is precisely what generates the most fear. Image | Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, Vitaly V. Kuzmin In Xataka | The question is no longer whether Europe “is at war”: the question is whether it is willing to defend itself In Xataka | First it was Finland, now the US has confirmed it: when the war in Ukraine ends, Russia has a plan for Europe

the “eyes” to anticipate Russia’s drones

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Since the beginning of the Russian invasion, Ukraine has had to fight a parallel battle far from the front: to convince his allies of what weapons he needed, when and how far that aid could go without cross sensitive political lines. Between delays, partial vetoes and fears of escalation, air defense became one of the most critical bottlenecks for months, leaving kyiv exposed to campaigns missiles and drones while the international response moved more slowly than the war. A radar that changes the calculation. Therefore, the arrival in Ukraine of the Spanish radar LTR-25 launcher represents a qualitative leap in its air defense, by incorporating a long-range detection capacity capable of identifying threats to more than 450 kilometers. From drones and cruise missiles to ballistic systems and stealth aircraft, radar will help in a conflict where Russia has made massive and combined air strike one of its main instruments of attrition. The system, developed by Indra, is neither a prototype nor a future promise, but rather a technology already validated by NATO on its eastern flank, designed to operate in environments saturated with interference and electronic warfare and to integrate without friction with the Western batteries that protect the Ukrainian sky. The unexpected ally. Another reading of the movement is clear. Ukraine has just received from Spain what it had been taking for months claiming the United States: a true long range defense that allows us to see Russian attacks coming early enough to organize an effective response. While Washington has been reticent to give up certain sensors and strategic capabilities, Madrid has taken a step that changes the Ukrainian defensive depth, offering not only interceptors, but the necessary “eyes” to anticipate and coordinate defense against waves of missiles and drones that seek to saturate the system. In that sense, the LTR-25 is not just another radar, but a critical piece that extends reaction time and reduces Ukraine’s structural vulnerability to Moscow. Technology proven in the most demanding environment. The LTR-25 radar operates in L-band with phased array architecture and digital beam forming. In other words, it has characteristics that allow it track hundreds of targets simultaneously with great precision even under electronic attack, a key capability to detect low radar signature targets such as Shahed drones or cruise missiles. Your mobility tactics and philosophy “turn on, detect and move” reinforce its survival on a front where Russia tries to hunt radars and command systems, and its integration with command networks and NATO control makes it a force multiplier for systems such as Patriot, SAMP/T, IRIS-T or NASAMS already deployed in Ukraine. Silent revolution of Spanish industry. For decades, Spain maintained a low profile in defensebut in the meantime it was building an advanced technological base that today emerges strongly on the European stage. Here one name rises above the rest. Indra, with one of the largest radar factories on the continent, has supplied systems to countries like franceGermany or the United Kingdom, and now translates that knowledge into a real conflict that acts as possibly the toughest testbed imaginable. Hence this delivery symbolizes a profound change: from discreet partner to strategic provider of critical capabilities in high-intensity warfare. Beyond the gesture. If you also want, the delivery of the LTR-25 It is part of a much broader shift in Spanish policy towards Ukraine, one backed by an unprecedented military and financial support package and staged at the highest level by Spanish President Pedro Sánchez alongside his Ukrainian counterpart, Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Beyond symbolism, the contract with Indra opens the door to future deliveries if the system proves effective, consolidating industrial cooperation that reflects a broader European trend: technological alliances of all colors that, pushed by war, evolve towards full and lasting defense associations. Image | Indra, RawPixel In Xataka | Russia has activated the “dandelion” armor: the scarier the tank, the more confused Ukraine’s drones are In Xataka | Russia has activated the “dandelion” armor: the scarier the tank, the more confused Ukraine’s drones are

The Canary Islands and Galicia have set off the Navy’s alarm bells. Russia’s ghost fleet has arrived in Spain with warships

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Since the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and, above all, after the invasion large-scale ukrainian In 2022, Russia has been perfecting a form of confrontation that avoids direct clashes and moves in the shadows of international law: hybrid war. Sabotage, energy pressure, disinformation and opaque commercial fleets have become tools as strategic as tanks or missiles, and among them the called “ghost fleet”. Now everything indicates that they have found a new route: Spain. The “fleet” arrives from the south. At the end of January 2026, a Russian tanker sanctioned by the European Union was left adrift off the coast of Almería and was escorted by Spanish Maritime Rescue to a port in Morocco without being detained. He did it despite transporting more than 425,000 barrels of refined products of Russian origin. The episode, starring a ship integrated the ghost fleet (old ships, with frequent changes of name and flag and opaque structures of ownership) showed how Spain has become a key point of passage and incident management of a system designed to circumvent Western sanctions. Something happens. In the heart of the western Mediterranean, the Russian hybrid war was beginning to materialize not with missiles, but with timely breakdowns, gray areas of maritime law and routes connecting Russian ports with North Africa under the attentive, but limited, action of the European authorities. Morocco as a hinge, the Canary Islands as an entrance. A few days later, the arrival in Las Palmas de Gran Canaria of a oil tanker from Tangier set off alarms about a possible indirect entry of Russian fuel into Spain, using Morocco as an intermediate platform. Maritime security experts stressed that it was not an illegal operation in itself, but it was an unusual route which fits with the patterns of the ghost fleet, given that Morocco lacks sufficient refining capacity and has become a common destination for oil tankers linked to Russia. The Severomorsk Destroyer in 2023 The crux. The key, they insisted, is in the loading documentation, because the origin of the product remains Russian even if there are intermediate stops. In this context, the Canary Islands appear as a vulnerable link: a lightly guarded Exclusive Economic Zone, located in the transit axis of opaque oil tankers, which reinforces the idea that Spain offers the perfect combination of geography, infrastructure and control loopholes for this new phase of the Russian economic war. Silent pressure. Finally, and in parallel to these commercial and logistical movements, the most classic dimension of Russian naval power has ended up becoming visible in Spanish waters, forcing the Navy Spanish to intensify its surveillance operations. Within a week, Spanish units have followed the transit of several Russian vessels (including the destroyer Severomorsk and a mixed military-merchant convoy) from the Strait of Gibraltar to the Atlantic, with monitoring relays off the Galician coast and constant coordination with the command centers. Hybrid war. These missions, framed in the permanent surveillance of waters of national interest, show that the phenomenon is by no means isolated: while the ghost fleet operates on the economic and logistical level, the Russian naval presence reinforces the strategic pressure about key runners such as the Alboran Sea, Gibraltar and the Atlantic coast. Spain, the perfect route. The sum of these episodes draws a coherent pattern: the russia hybrid war has left the Baltic and the North Sea to settle in the Mediterranean and the eastern Atlantic, and Spain has become one of your most effective routes. It seems clear that all those breakdowns managed without detention, indirect discharges via Morocco, fuels of dubious traceability entering through the Canary Islands and Russian military ships crossing runners strategic are part of the same logic of attrition, ambiguity and saturation that we had already seen in other parts of Europe. And as in those cases, it is not a frontal attack, but rather a constant pressure that exploits the gray areas of trade, energy and maritime security, now placing Spain at the center of a board where war is not declared, it is navigated. Image | US Navy, Mil.ru In Xataka | Russia’s ghost fleet has changed its business model. Oil has given way to a much bigger target: Europe In Xataka | For years Europe has wondered how to stop the Russian ghost fleet. Ukraine just showed you the way: with AI

Russia’s elite GRU moves its war against Ukraine’s power grid to Polish soil

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Winter in Eastern Europe is not just a season; It’s a damage multiplier. As my colleague Miguel Jorge described wellwhat is emerging in the region is a ruthless reality dubbed “thermal terror.” In this scenario, extreme cold becomes a weapon of war designed to make civil infrastructure – heating, electricity, water – the cruelest target. The ultimate goal is not only to destroy military capacity, but to make daily life physically unviable. Under this logic of making daily life unviable to wear down the population, the Kremlin’s most feared cyberespionage group has decided to cross a dangerous border. 500,000 homes in the spotlight. As Poland prepared for the holidays, its security systems detected what Energy Minister Milosz Motyka called the “strongest attack against Polish energy infrastructure in years,” as reported by Reuters. The sabotage occurred on December 29 and 30 and was surgical. The targets were not chosen at random, but instead targeted two cogeneration plants and systems that connect renewable energy facilities — such as wind farms — to power grid operators. In other words, directly to the key nodes so that energy reaches homes. local media they collected the statements from Prime Minister Donald Tusk, who put figures at risk: if the attack had been successful, half a million people would have been left without heat in the middle of winter. Fortunately, as detailed in the press release of the Polish Governmentthe defenses worked. “At no time was critical infrastructure threatened,” said Tusk, although the incident has been treated with the utmost seriousness, mobilizing the special services to their full capacity. Sandworm’s signature. The attack took on an international dimension when the cybersecurity firm ESET announced the discovery of the weapon used: a destructive malware called DynoWiper. As reported by TechCrunchESET attributed this operation with “medium confidence” to the Sandworm groupan elite unit within the Russian military intelligence agency (GRU). The choice of dates does not seem coincidental. As investigative journalist Kim Zetter points outthis attempted blackout in Poland came almost exactly ten years after the first Sandworm cyberattack against Ukraine’s power grid in 2015, which left 230,000 homes in the dark. For experts, the use of a wiper on Polish soil is an unprecedented event, as it marks Russia’s move from simple espionage to destructive sabotage against a NATO member. Furthermore, this is not an isolated episode because since the beginning of the Ukrainian War, Poland has undergone a sustained increase of cyberattacks attributed to Russian actors. Nevertheless, according to the Ministry of Energy itselfthe December attempt was a turning point both in its intensity and in its objective: it was no longer about probing defenses, but rather about causing a real blackout. Anatomy of the attack. To understand the seriousness of the issue, it is necessary to break down the technology used. Unlike the ransomware commona wiper It is software designed exclusively to destroy. Your goal is not to ask for a ransom, but delete permanently information and leave equipment unusable. In this case, the attackers went directly to the ICS (Industrial Control Systems) systems since these systems are the ones that allow electric companies regulate the supply and monitor the network. So, Sandworm sought to break communication between renewable energy sources and distribution operators. When attacking these nodes, the technicians’ margin of action is minimal because the failures propagate in a chain. A conflict that expands. The Polish Prime Minister directly linked this attack to his country’s support for Ukraine. “We sell electricity there and, in critical situations, we receive it from them,” Tusk explained.. Attacking the Polish network is, by extension, attacking Ukraine’s energy rear. This Russian aggressiveness is not new for Western intelligence services. In fact, the United States government keeps a reward 10 million dollars for information about six GRU officers belonging to Sandworm, responsible for global attacks such as NotPetya, which caused losses of 1 billion dollars. According to Microsoft, Sandworm—whom they call Iridium— has launched nearly 40 destructive attacks against critical infrastructure since the beginning of the invasion of Ukraine, seeking to degrade not only military capacity, but the population’s trust in its leaders. From NATO’s point of view, attempted sabotage does not automatically activate collective defense mechanisms, but it does reinforce disturbing evidence: hybrid warfare makes it possible to strain the European system without formally crossing the red lines of an armed conflict. The next frontier is no longer territorial, but digital. Faced with the growing threat. The Polish Government is finalizing the Law on the National Cybersecurity System, a regulation that seeks the “autonomy and polonization” of security systems to reduce dependence on devices that facilitate foreign interference, according to official information. However, December’s failed sabotage is a reminder that in modern warfare, the front lines are on power plant servers. While in the trenches of Ukraine soldiers try to hide their thermal trace from drones, in cities like Warsaw or Krakow the battle is being fought so that the simple act of turning on the heating does not become an impossible luxury. For now, Poland has won this defensive battle, even achieving a historical record of energy production a few days after the attack. However, Sandworm’s shadow is still long. The hackers’ message is clear: “If we can’t turn off the light, at least we can scare you.” The war for control of the European switch has only just begun. Image | Unsplash and freepik Xataka | La Gomera has been suffering constant total blackouts for years. Now you have a solution: a cable that is unique in the world

Ukraine sensed that there was a superpower behind Russia’s kamikaze drones. The surprise is that there are actually two

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Many phases have passed since the Russian invasion in 2022 until today, but if one thing has become crystal clear, it is that the war in Ukraine has become a brutal laboratory where drones are the most decisive and fastest weapon to improve, to the point of concentrating a huge part of the recent losses and setting the pace of the war of attrition. In this scenario, Ukraine has been asking itself the same question for some time: how does Russia get so many drones? An industrial war. In the current scenario, the front is not only in Donetsk or Kharkiv, but also in industrial parks from Guangdong and Shenzhenwhere processors, cameras, motors, sensors and controllers are made that determine how much a drone flies, what it sees and how accurately it hits. The most disturbing thing here is not only the technological dependence, but the fact that this dependence is shared by both sideswhich turns the supply of parts into a kind of undercurrent that sustains the conflict even when sanctions seek to cut it off. The Geran-5. Now, Ukraine claims have identified a new Russian attack drone, the Geran-5which breaks with the classic “delta wing” type profile associated with the Iranian Shahed and adopts a shape more similar to a conventional aircraft, visually linking it Iranian Karrar and, by extension, to older designs inspired by American systems. The key is that it would be a more powerful and faster jet model, with an estimated speed up to 600 km/hand with tactical ambitions that go beyond the simple cheap “kamikaze drone”: it is attributed a range of about 900 km and an approximate war load of 90 kilos. Ukraine affirms that Russia is studying launching it from Su-25 aircraft to expand your radius of action, as well as explore configurations that include R-73 air-to-air missiles to complicate life for Ukrainian aviation. In other words, Russia is not only multiplying quantity, it is also testing a ladder of sophistication that mixes loitering munitions with concepts closer to a combat UAV. Geran-5 He Deja Vú. The central element, and the most politically controversial, is the list of foreign components that Ukraine claims to have found in the wreckage of the new Geran-5, including more than a dozen western and chinese electronic partswith at least nine attributed to American manufacturers and one identified like german. are mentioned critical components for navigation, communications and control, such as signal processors, clock generators and transceivers, that is, the type of electronics that does not “explode” by itself, but that turns a drone into a reliable, stable and reproducible system. For kyiv, this shows that Russia continues to avoid sanctions structurally, relying on gray markets and supply chains where real traceability is dissolved, and which has a huge machinery behind it headed by two superpowers (China and the US), along with the rest of Western “allies”. The underlying message is simple: modern war is not only won by manufacturing metal and explosives, also getting chipssensors and modules that are cheap, easy to transport and difficult to block without paralyzing global trade. Image provided by GUR showing the partial remains of a Geran-5 China as epicenter. The Financial Times said an almost absurd scene: Ukrainian businessmen visiting Chinese factories with schedules calculated to the second so as not to coincide with Russian buyers, entering through side doors and waiting in corridors, as if the conflict was managed with hotel logistics. The reason is that both armies they need the same parts and they go after the same suppliers because China dominates the material base of the commercial drone: not only does it produce a large part of the drones on the market, it also controls key elements such as cameras, sensors, controllers and propulsion, with costs much lower than Western equivalents. The result is that innovation leaks on both sides almost at the same time: if Ukraine sees a new transmitter on Russian drones, it locates the Chinese manufacturer and tries to buy it. If Ukraine asks for a specific upgrade, you may find that a week later that same supplier offers it to Russia as well. The war thus becomes a race of “components” more than doctrines, and China goes from being a “neutral” country to being the place where it is decided how quickly the conflict evolves. The supply chain. Beijing maintains the public line of neutrality and affirms that it does not supply lethal weapons, that it strictly controls dual-use goods and that its position is “objective and fair.” However, as we have said, the reality It’s different: Even if controls are in place, the system is filled with middlemen, shell companies, opaque routes and deliberate ambiguity about the end user. A market where some exhibitors show platforms with simulated weaponswhere military buyers mix with civilian fairs. In parallel, there is an imbalance of power: Russia, with more resources and priority state, can pay more, buy earlier and secure quotas, leaving Ukraine waiting or forcing it to improvise at the front due to lack of parts. Neutrality, in practice, is not just about prohibiting, but about who can best circumvent the restrictions. How to avoid restrictions. The real circumvention ecosystem works with shipments via indirect routestransportation through third countries, trucks crossing Central Asia with limited controls, and a logistics market specialized in “sensitive merchandise” that continues to operate because the economic incentive is enormous. Plus: the role of regional financial clearing platforms, which facilitate payments for sanctioned productsand the ability to create intermediate entities even in European countries to disguise operations. If you like, sanctions, as they work, introduce friction, but not rupture: they make it more expensive, slow down, force people to hide better, but they do not cut off the flow of chips, motors or cameras. And in a war where an FPV drone can be as decisive as an armoredthat logistical continuity is equivalent to operational continuity on the battlefield. Ukrainian dependency. Ukraine has made a lot of progress in … Read more

Baba Yaga was an old woman who devoured skulls at night. So Ukraine just turned Russia’s worst nightmare into a drone

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In Slavic folklore, Baba Yaga She is an ancient figure associated with nocturnal fear, a witch who devours skulls and flies in the dark, punishing the reckless and inhabiting a territory where normal rules no longer apply. It is not a spectacular monster or the usual one, but a persistent presencedisturbing, impossible to ignore. Ukraine remembered it… and transformed it into a drone. The nightmare in war. This symbolic load explains why the name was not born in Ukrainian propaganda, but in the Russian channels themselves: when the soldiers began to describe night attacks that fell almost silently from the sky, the collective imagination did the rest. Today, “Baba Yaga” does not designate a fairy tale creature, but a family heavy bomber drones Ukrainians who have transformed the night of the front into a permanent hostile space for Russian forces. What really is a Baba Yaga. Under that name is grouped an entire class of heavy multicopters, many of them derived of agricultural platforms and others already designed for military purposes, capable of transporting from 15 kilos in their most common versions to several dozen in larger configurations. Unlike the kamikaze FPVs, the Baba Yaga They are reusable systemsconceived as aerial bombers themselves. They can launch mortar mines, fragmentation charges, adapted munitions or even converted anti-tank mines with remarkable accuracy from several hundreds of meters high. Its distinctive feature is not only the load, but the combination of thermal and optical sensors which allows them to operate at night, in fog, rain or wind, and remain effective where light drones begin to fail. This capacity has made them go from being a tactical complement to becoming a structural piece of the Ukrainian device. A Baba Yaga captured by Russian forces The night stops being a refuge. For months, trenches, concrete shelters or fortified buildings offered Russian infantry a relative sense of security from artillery and light drones. The Baba Yaga break that logic. If a point appears marked on a thermal image or reconnaissance map, no cover guarantees survival. A single drone can perform cascade attacksreleasing ammunition successively and dismantling a position section by section. The effect is cumulative: it not only destroys material, but forces units to disperseto rotate more frequently, to invest time and resources in camouflage and fortification, and to avoid concentrations of troops or vehicles. In a war of attrition, that behavioral change is as important as direct destruction. From tactical weapon to major system. Although they were born as a short-range solution, the Baba Yaga have been integrated into operations increasingly complex. They do not act in isolation, but as part of a drone ecosystem that includes FPV, long-range UAVs and, in some cases, naval platforms unmanned. In Crimea, for example, we have seen how maritime drones are used as advanced shuttles to allow heavy multicopters to reach radars and air defense systems like the Nebo-Mattacking antennas, technical installations and command posts. This logic is revealing: first the target is blinded or disorganized by other means, and then the Baba Yaga finish the job where it was previously considered too risky or inaccessible. Thus, these drones have ceased to be “flying artillery” and have become tools that connect the immediate front with the operational rear. Technical evolution. The development of these drones has not stopped. Ukrainian volunteer engineers and teams they have been improving engines, propellers, structures and suspension systems for ammunition of different calibers, while communications are reinforced with redundant channels, separate antennas and, in some cases, satellite links that expand the radius of action at the expense of payload. Russian electronic warfare has forced experimentation with system duplication control and backup plans to prevent the loss of a link from dragging down the entire set. This adaptation race explains why, even when Russia manages to shoot down some of these drones, the problem does not disappear: The threat materializes again the following night. Psychological impact. Beyond the technique, the Baba Yaga hits morale. Its low, recognizable hum does not announce an immediate explosion, but rather a tense wait– Someone, somewhere, is peering through a thermal scope and choosing the next target. Unlike artillery, there is no clearly safe haven or predictable pattern. Combined with FPV attacks and indirect fire, these drones create a sensation continuous pressure from above, from the front and from the rear. Military analysts match in which this constant stress accelerates organizational wear and tear, makes coordination difficult and forces commanders to focus on maintaining basic cohesion instead of planning offensive maneuvers. Lessons for the future of war. For Western observers and for NATO itself, the Baba Yaga are a practical demonstration of how future conflicts will be fought with swarms of relatively cheap, reusable and rapidly adapted platforms. It is not a miracle weapon, but a component within a system that combines intelligence, communications, flexible production and accelerated training. Ukraine has managed to assemble that system under extreme conditions, relying on industry, the State and voluntary networks. For Russia, the result is clear: the “witch” of folklore has returnednot as a myth, but as a technological presence that redefines the battlefield and makes it impossible to return to a war according to the standards of the 20th century. Image | Telegram, ArmіяІнформ In Xataka | Ukraine has asked Russia if they stop for Christmas like in the First World War. The answer could not have been more Russian In Xataka | Europe wanted to expropriate Russian funds on the continent to finance Ukraine. Until Belgium took the lead

Russia’s ghost fleet has changed its business model. Oil has given way to a much bigger target: Europe

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Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia has not only built a vast fleet of tankers to avoid Western sanctions and continue exporting crude oil from the Baltic and the Black Sea, but has turned that logistical infrastructure into something much more ambitious. How much? The size of an old continent. The fleet in the shadows. According to Western and Ukrainian intelligence sources cited by CNN, Part of this so-called shadow fleet is being used as a covert platform for espionage and hybrid operations in European waters. We are talking about hundreds of ships that routinely sail near the coasts of EU and NATO countries, generating income of hundreds of millions of dollars for Moscow while, at the same time, expanding the radius of action of its security services away from Russian territory. “Civilian” crews with a detail. The pattern detected by the intelligence services is revealing. Many of these tankers, registered under flags of convenience and with mostly Asian or African crews, incorporate just before setting sail to one or two Russian citizens additional. The crew lists show as simple “technicians”but his background tells another story: former police officers, members of special units of the Ministry of the Interior, veterans of the Russian army or former mercenaries linked to Wagner. They are often the only Russians on board and, according to testimonies of Danish maritime pilots and European observers, exercise an authority that goes beyond the civilian chain of command, even imposing itself over the ship’s captain. Moran Security and privatization. Many of these men would be linked to Moran Security Groupa private Russian company with deep ties to the FSB, GRU, and the Kremlin’s military contractor ecosystem. Moran was sanctioned by the United States Treasury in 2024 for providing armed security services to Russian state companies, and his history connects directly with Wagner and with operations in scenarios such as Syria or Somalia. Its corporate structure (with registrations in Moscow and in opaque jurisdictions such as Belize) and its professional profile, explicitly oriented to recruit veterans of special forces, fit perfectly into the logic of hybrid warfare: formally private actors that allow the Russian state to operate with a high degree of plausible deniability. Espionage and internal control. The functions of these “technicians” would not be limited to protecting the cargo. Ukrainian and Western sources maintain that also supervise captains non-Russian vessels to ensure that the ships are acting in the interests of the Kremlin and that, in at least one documented case, took photographs of European military installations from one of these tankers. Furthermore, although details are scarce, intelligence services suggest that some of these men have participated in acts of sabotage. These would not be direct confrontations, but rather low-profile actions designed to collect information, generate uncertainty and strain the limits of the Western response. The Boracay case. He Boracay tanker illustrates this dynamic well. Sanctioned, with frequent changes of name and flag, two Russian citizens embarked in September in the port of Primorsk, near Saint Petersburg. Both were listed as technicians and were the only Russians among a crew of Chinese, Burmese and Bangladeshis. Coincidence or not, his crossing through Danish waters overlapped with a wave of sightings of drones near the Copenhagen airport and Danish military bases. Days later, the ship was boarded by the French navy against Brittany for irregularities in their documentation. No drones were found on board, but the presence of the two Russians came to light and they were discreetly questioned. For some analyststemporal correlation proves nothing, but for others It fits too well with the pattern of trial and error in the “gray zone.” Drones, sensors and something new. Beyond Boracay, Swedish and Danish authorities have detected on other ships in the shadow fleet antennas and masts not usually found on civilian merchant ships, as well as hostile behavior towards inspectors and an obsession with photographing critical infrastructure. In an environment like the Baltic, a strategic bottleneck surrounded by NATO countries, any anomalous activity becomes a disproportionate weight. For European security services, these ships are ideal mobile platforms: seemingly legal, difficult to intercept without diplomatic escalation and capable of approaching ports, cables, bases and airports without raising immediate alarms. Hybrid warfare at sea. All this fits with a broader strategy that senior intelligence officials, such as the new head of British MI6describe as constant testing “below the threshold of war.” Drones near airports, aggressive activity at sea, discreet sabotage and covert espionage are part of the same repertoire. The shadow fleet is not only an economic instrument to circumvent sanctions, but an extension of the Russian security apparatus, capable of operating in a space where Western legal and military responses are slow and politically sensitive. The European dilemma. Europe thus faces an uncomfortable decision. Intercepting ships without insurance, with dubious documentation or with armed personnel on board could stop these practices, but it also carries the risk of a direct russian reaction. As summarized on CNN a veteran Danish maritime pilot, no small country wants to be the first to make the move. The answer, if it comes, will have to be collective. Meanwhile, the shadow fleet continues growing and sailingdemonstrating that for the Kremlin the war is not only being fought in Ukraine, but also in the seas surrounding Europe, silently and in civilian uniform. Image | kees torn, Greg Bishop In Xataka | For years Europe has wondered how to stop the Russian ghost fleet. Ukraine just showed you the way: with AI In Xataka | A ghost fleet has mapped the entire underwater structure of the EU. The question is what Moscow is going to do with that information.

Russia’s biggest threat in Ukraine is not a drone or a missile. It is a film agency with 30 secret floors

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That the war in Ukraine has become the largest drone laboratory combat power on the planet is beyond any doubt. In fact, both Russia like, to a greater extent, Ukraine, have elevated these devices to configure a war industry unprecedented that places machines as the army of the future of any conflict. What was not so well known was where most of Ukraine’s drones came from. Origin and metamorphosis. What started three years ago as a location and props agency in basements and garages has mutated into a war industry on an almost industrial scale: Fire Point, whose owner and executives come from from the world of cinema and the construction of outdoor furniture, has gone from assembling drones with commercial parts to producing, according to its executives, hundreds of propelled and long-range munitions from at least thirty secret locations scattered throughout Ukraine. But there is much more, because the company has grown so much that it has currently consolidated itself with contracts for around billion dollars in a single year. A transit that reflects the rapid professionalization and commercialization of initiatives born out of patriotism and urgency in February 2022, when improvised underground workshops became an effective (although precarious and fragmentary) response to a large-scale invasion. Production, design and employment. Fire Point products, such as your FP-1 droneare simple machines in materials (polystyrene, plywood, plastics, and carbon fiber from cycling) but assembled with a logic of volume production: rocket-assisted takeoff, two-stroke engine, range measured in hundreds of kilometers and warheads of more than fifty kilos in some designs. Its catalog also includes the promising Flamingo missilea larger device, with a jet engine and a theoretical autonomy and load that, if confirmed at scale, could reconfigure the Ukrainian capacity to hit deep targets. The Ukrainian industrial philosophy here is clear: cheap, disposable, massive. Efficiency does not require reprocessing or longevity, only that some specimens cross the defense networks and fulfill their unique mission. An FP-1 Military strategy and effects. The proliferation of these munitions has allowed Ukraine to sustain a systematic campaign against energy infrastructure Russian companies (refineries and logistics nodes) seeking not only a tactical effect but also strategic pressure and leverage in eventual negotiations. In fact, the multiplicity of manufacturers domestic forces and technical adaptability have forced Russia to face a daily erosion of its apparent air immunity, forcing it to reallocate defensive resources and contemplate low-cost warfare as a decisive vector. Transparency and control. Fire Point’s meteoric rise has not been free of shadows: Public complaints and audits point out opaque awards, absence of mandatory price negotiations, questions about initial technical quality and the possible involvement of actors linked to the media and business environment close to power. In fact, the National Anti-Corruption Agency has inspected links with figures associated with the presidential circle and there are parliamentary calls to investigate pricesspecifications and the destination of multimillion-dollar benefits. Despite this, the public narrative combines suspicion and exaltation: national heroes and strategic businessmen who have shored up the defensive capacity, while activists and analysts demand more controls and transparency in war contracts. Industrialization and ecosystem. The phenomenon is not an isolated case but the center of an industrial revolution: Thousands of companies, hundreds focused on long-range drones and dozens competing for contracts, attract foreign funds, partners and joint venture projects. State agencies charter incentiveswhile international funds (such as the recent Norwegian-Ukrainian vehicle) show that the ecosystem is beginning to professionalize and seek commercial and technological legitimation beyond the emergency. For European and North American defense, Ukraine now offers a unique experience in unmanned missions and rapid design, which arouses interest both military as industrial. Ethical dilemmas. There is no doubt, the balance raises dilemmas: the domestic war economy reduces dependence on allied donations and scales offensive capacity, but it raises questions on democratic control, accountability and the risk that lucrative war businesses are perpetuated beyond strategic necessity. Plus: the proliferation of cheap and massive systems exacerbates the asymmetric nature of the conflict and poses risks of escalation and diffuse responsibility for selective objectives and collateral damage. Perspectives. In sum, the Fire Point history summarizes the Ukrainian phenomenon: industrial creativity (in many cases, they have no other choice) converted into a strategic muscle, an industry that emerged from volunteering transformed into key actor of the military apparatusbut also in focus of controversy due to its speed, its margins and the opacity typical of a country at war. The future challenge is twofold: to consolidate technological and productive capabilities that continue to perform in combat, and at the same time insert this thriving sector into frameworks of governance and transparency that prevent war efficiency from evolving towards economies of corruption or political capture. How Ukraine resolves this binomial will define whether its revolution dronistics It remains a collective merit or becomes an institutional burden. Image | xMezha In Xataka | They call it Skyfall, Burevestnik, or flying Chernobyl. The problem is not the name, it is what Russia’s latest missile does In Xataka | The war in Ukraine was a drone war. Now it is a war of drones that are not actually combat drones

Ukraine has opened Russia’s cruise and ballistic missiles. War is impossible if your allies make weapons for you

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He fed up with Ukraine with the hole that exists around international sanctions it is palpable and numeric. kyiv intelligence has hundreds of reports in your possession that reveal that Russian drones have passed those sanctions for the lining. And not just drones, even in the tanks. The latest: Ukraine has begun analyzing parts of Moscow’s latest cruise and ballistic missiles. And what they found is a deja vu. Clandestine circuit. Three and a half years after the start of the invasion, Ukraine continues to dismantle the last Russian missiles and drones and find tens of thousands of parts inside made in the westthe majority of his “allies” (microcontrollers, sensors, connectors, converters) from countries that have theoretically embargoed the supply: United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Switzerland, Netherlands, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan. Of course also, Moscow’s allies like china. In fact, Zelensky put in more than 100,000 the foreign components found only among 550 vectors used in a single recent bombing, confirming that the sanctions have not turned off the tap: if anything they have made it more expensive and slowed down, but not dried up. The escape mechanism. It we have counted before. The mode of entry does not require sophisticated espionage, but rather exploiting loopholes in global trade: pieces “dual use” sold to civil actors who then they deviatecomponents placed on the market before sanctions, networks of shell companies and brokers in lax jurisdictions, and triangulated purchases via third countries that do not apply or execute controls. The sanctions gave the West three years to close the gaps, but they also gave Russia (and those who traffic for it) the same time to learn to get around them. In practice, it is a market: if you pay more, there is always someone willing to move the merchandise with layers of opacity sufficient to break traceability. Iran and North Korea. Moscow relies on two veterans of the sanctioning regime: Iran (which has spent decades refining the engineering of commercial border hopping) and North Korea (capable of moving components and complete systems despite being formally embargoed). Cooperation with both not only transfers material: it transfers method. Both logistical routes and corporate and financial camouflage techniques now migrate to the Russian military supply chain. What is possible and what is not. They remembered on Insider that the West hardens the perimeter: compliance guides for companies, “catch-all” to block sensitive exports (even if they are not listed), border inspections, criminal threat to repeat offenders, closures of loopholes when Ukraine identifies specific pieces. But even so, the regime is not airtight: global trade in components is massive, triangulation via third countries It is structural and already exists “pirate” production replacement that replicates or falsifies sanctioned parts. By design, control is reactive: it is as if each new closure encourages Moscow to seek an alternative route. Partial effectiveness. Plus: just because embargoes haven’t cut off the flow doesn’t mean they’re irrelevant. London estimates that the sanctions have deprived Russia of at least 450,000 million of dollars and have multiplied by up to six the price of dual pieces, draining war liquidity and adding temporary friction to the Russian military chain. This, a priori, penalizes rhythms, quality, scaling and maintenance, even if it does not prevent the material from arriving. The structural limit. If you want, the export control It is an instrument of soft power: its real power depends on what the rest of the world is willing to do and tolerate. It can raise the cost, strangle necks, penalize intensities, but it can hardly seal an economy-state Russian size connected to global intermediaries willing to charge for the risk. The result is an industrial war where the blockade is never binary (flows / does not flow), but rather marginal: raising the cost per Russian shot, reducing the cadence, pushing failures due to logistical stress and buy time, but hardly prevent a chip made for a laptop I ended up controlling the guidance of a kamikaze drone over a Ukrainian city. Image | Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation In Xataka | After Cubans and North Koreans fighting alongside Russian troops, new guests have appeared in Ukraine: Chinese In Xataka | In 2023, a pilot from Ukraine had an idea for Star Wars. Not only did it go well: his kamikaze plan has rewritten the war manual

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