And suddenly a 28 page document unpublished to date has suddenly entered as a missile in the negotiations of the war in Ukraine. Promoted by Washington, it has unleashed a diplomatic storm in Europe and in kyiv because, far from having been prepared with the main parties involved, it had been conceived in discreet negotiations between the American businessman Steve Witkoff and the Russian envoy Kirill Dmitriev, with the participation of Jared Kushner and the late endorsement of Trump. The origin of a plan. The result of these meetings was a text that Europe and Ukraine had not seen and that, to further alarm (according to one Bloomberg exclusive), preserved the linguistic structures typical of an original written in Russian, confirming the suspicions that Moscow had achieved filter your vision of the war in a document presented as a US initiative. The pressure exerted by Dan Driscoll (a close ally of JD Vance) on European and Ukrainian diplomats, urging them to accept territorial concessions in a matter of days, ended up setting off all the alarm signals. For European governments, which considered themselves central partners in any peace negotiations, the origin of the plan became a strategic question: they needed to know who had written it and with what objectives before sitting down to discuss. This information gap triggered a race against time to stop the imposition of a text that, in its initial form, was not only surprising for its demands, but also for its obvious alignment with Moscow’s interests. Territory, legitimization and a threat. The most explosive section of the American plan required that Ukraine will withdraw of the fortified urban centers that it still maintains in Donetsk, breaking the “belt of fortresses” that has slowed the Russian advance since 2014. This withdrawal would not only imply the displacement of tens of thousands of Ukrainian citizens, but it would open a corridor that would leave exposed to key cities like Dnipro and Zaporizhzhia. To make matters worse, the document proposed that the occupied areas be recognized as “de facto Russian”a more favorable formula for Moscow than the already problematic “de facto under Russian control”, and which, in practice, brought the international community closer to accept territorial changes achieved by force. Added to this was the idea of converting the evacuated territories into a demilitarized zone whose violation by Russia (not an implausible scenario given recent history) would allow Moscow to open a new, even deeper offensive in the future. From the Ukrainian perspective, accepting this point would be sowing the conditions for a future war in worse terms, reinforcing the impression that the document did not seek a stable peace, but rather formalized a strategic result that Russia has not been able to obtain through military operations. Security cut and promises broken. The security guarantees included in the plan were vague to the point of irrelevance: they promised “reliable protection” without detailing mechanisms, but simultaneously prohibited Ukraine from entering never in NATOprevented the stationing of allied troops in its territory and forced kyiv to modify its Constitution to renounce accession. For a country marked by the experience of Budapest Memorandum (formal guarantees that prevented neither the annexation of Crimea nor the 2022 invasion), accepting an even more ambiguous framework would amount to to be left helpless facing an aggressor who has systematically broken all previous agreements. Red lines. The absence of a commitment type Article 5 and the refusal to allow training missions or deterrence forces on Ukrainian territory reinforced the conviction that Ukraine would be trapped between a strengthened Russia and a West that would reserve the right to “diplomatically support,” but not to intervene. This component fueled rejection in European capitals, which consider it essential that Ukraine keep an army strong as a land barrier that protects the continent. Limit to 600,000 troops to the only country in Europe at war, without imposing a similar restriction on Russia, was perceived as covert disarmament and a prelude to a future Russian offensive. Amnesty and frozen assets. One of the most shocking elements of the plan was the proposal of a general amnesty and Ukraine’s renunciation of any legal claim about war crimes, deportations or deliberate destruction of infrastructure. For an exposed population to documented atrocitiesthis clause meant not only the denial of justice, but also the elimination of the legal basis that allows Europe to advance the reparations loan backed by frozen Russian assets. That loan, of 140,000 million of euros, is considered by the EU as the more solid path and less expensive to sustain Ukraine during the postwar period. The US plan not only made it unviable, but also redistributed those funds in an unusual way: 100 billion would go to a US investment vehicle that would deliver half of its profits to Washington, another 100 billion would be contributed by Europe and the rest would go to a joint fund with Russia. For Berlin, Paris or Warsaw, the message was clear: Russia would obtain indirect financial relief while the Europeans would see their most effective tool of strategic pressure weakened. The attempt to force kyiv to renounce all moral and legal responsibility for the aggressor reinforced the perception that the plan sought to resolve the war “quickly,” not “fairly.” The Russian strategy. Since the beginning of the invasion, Moscow has not changed their fundamental demands: more territory in the east, military neutralization of Ukraine and permanent veto on its accession to NATO. This strategic immobility, together with gradual advances on the front, has allowed it to capitalize on Western fatigue, the political fractures in kyiv and transatlantic tensions. For the Kremlin, the leaked plan demonstrates that its commitment to prolonged resistance, military pressure and the erosion of Western will is bearing fruit. Putin openly celebrated it, affirming that the document could serve as a basis and that rejecting it would only lead to new Ukrainian defeats. Likewise, Moscow has hinted that even a signed agreement could be used as leverage to resume the … Read more
