Ukraine

Ukraine has a weapon against Russia that we had only seen in James Bond. Her name is Sea Baby and when she finishes her work she blows herself up.

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At the end of September Ukraine sent a message: It was already the largest drone laboratory on the planet, but with its latest 12-meter “monster” it wanted to do the same under the sea. This is how the family of Toloka underwater dronesa technological leap that redefined naval warfare in the Black Sea. That effort now has its continuation in a drone that until recently we had only seen in James Bond movies and the like. Technological evolution. Ukraine has taken its “Sea Baby” naval drones from being disposable explosive boats to becoming attack and multiple mission platforms capable of operating at more than 1,500 kilometers, transporting up to 2,000 kilos and mount heavy telecontrolled weaponry (multiple rocket launchers, stabilized turrets, secondary drone launch) while incorporating self-destruct systems to avoid capture and AI-assisted functions to reduce identification errors. This step not only adds firepower and range, but turns a low-cost means into a sustained system that can penetrate, hit, return and remain available (or self-destruct), something that repositions the naval drone from immediate consumption to renewable operating capital. The Black Sea. Successive waves of drones have forced Russia to withdraw most of its fleet from Sevastopol to Novorossiyska change in posture that does not respond to a specific defeat but to that persistent risk that makes it unfeasible to sustain an advanced presence without assuming continuous losses. The “Sea Baby” have been attributed by the SBU to eleven attacks against shipsas well as repeated blows against the Crimean bridge and other logistics facilities, producing a chain effect: Moscow has had to redirect its military transport to land and more distant ports, making each kilometer of support more expensive and reducing its ability to condition Ukrainian trade routes to Europe. Doctrinal change. What once required steel fleets, shipyards and squadrons can now be inflicted with platforms cheap, reproducible and guided at a distance, which modifies the unspoken rule that the maritime domain belongs to the one who owns tonnage: here control emanates from who can inflict repeated damage at a lower cost than that imposed on the defender. The Ukrainian case surpasses precedents such as the coastal missiles of the Lebanon in 2006 because it not only denies a coastline, but forces a structural reconfiguration of an entire squadron and its main base, demonstrating that an entire naval theater can be altered without having a conventional navy. Industry and allies. kyiv claims to produce around 4,000 naval drones and needing only half for his own defense, opening the door to sell the surplus to partner countries while NATO observes and adjusts doctrine after verifying that these systems have changed the cost/effect relationship at sea. Public financing via United24 and coordination with political and military command make the program an example of how a country at war can generate dual technology with external projection, replicating what happened with aerial UAVs: first combat effectiveness, then international adoption and doctrinal adjustment by third parties. Consequences and cycles. There is no doubt, offensive success is strong now defensive investment: floating barriers, sensors, redundant electronic warfare and point defense layers in ports and terminals to prevent innovation that has worked externally from reversing its own infrastructure. Russia tries to copy these platforms and use them againwhat chains a cycle of innovation in the face of interference that pushes both sides to adapt communications, navigation and mission architecture to overcome the electronic blockade. The result: a loop of accelerated evolution in which the advantage is no longer in possessing an isolated weapon, but in the ability to continually improve it before the opponent degrades its effect. Strategic conclusion. The Ukrainian naval drones have shown that sea power can be eroded without a conventional fleet through cheap mass, strategic reach and sustained pressure on valuable nodes, altering the adversary’s posture and reallocating its resources on the defensive. The displacement of the Russian fleet, the logistical impact and the international adoption as a reference point to a change of era: the sea ceases to be a domain secured by the capital spent on steel and becomes a space where the advantage belongs to whoever controls the marginal cost of the next impactnot the size of the hulls it anchors. Image | Security Service of Ukraine In Xataka | Ukraine cannot believe what it found inside Russia’s ballistic missiles: déjà vu In Xataka | After Cubans and North Koreans fighting alongside Russian troops, new guests have appeared in Ukraine: Chinese

Ukraine has opened Russia’s cruise and ballistic missiles. War is impossible if your allies make weapons for you

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He fed up with Ukraine with the hole that exists around international sanctions it is palpable and numeric. kyiv intelligence has hundreds of reports in your possession that reveal that Russian drones have passed those sanctions for the lining. And not just drones, even in the tanks. The latest: Ukraine has begun analyzing parts of Moscow’s latest cruise and ballistic missiles. And what they found is a deja vu. Clandestine circuit. Three and a half years after the start of the invasion, Ukraine continues to dismantle the last Russian missiles and drones and find tens of thousands of parts inside made in the westthe majority of his “allies” (microcontrollers, sensors, connectors, converters) from countries that have theoretically embargoed the supply: United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Switzerland, Netherlands, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan. Of course also, Moscow’s allies like china. In fact, Zelensky put in more than 100,000 the foreign components found only among 550 vectors used in a single recent bombing, confirming that the sanctions have not turned off the tap: if anything they have made it more expensive and slowed down, but not dried up. The escape mechanism. It we have counted before. The mode of entry does not require sophisticated espionage, but rather exploiting loopholes in global trade: pieces “dual use” sold to civil actors who then they deviatecomponents placed on the market before sanctions, networks of shell companies and brokers in lax jurisdictions, and triangulated purchases via third countries that do not apply or execute controls. The sanctions gave the West three years to close the gaps, but they also gave Russia (and those who traffic for it) the same time to learn to get around them. In practice, it is a market: if you pay more, there is always someone willing to move the merchandise with layers of opacity sufficient to break traceability. Iran and North Korea. Moscow relies on two veterans of the sanctioning regime: Iran (which has spent decades refining the engineering of commercial border hopping) and North Korea (capable of moving components and complete systems despite being formally embargoed). Cooperation with both not only transfers material: it transfers method. Both logistical routes and corporate and financial camouflage techniques now migrate to the Russian military supply chain. What is possible and what is not. They remembered on Insider that the West hardens the perimeter: compliance guides for companies, “catch-all” to block sensitive exports (even if they are not listed), border inspections, criminal threat to repeat offenders, closures of loopholes when Ukraine identifies specific pieces. But even so, the regime is not airtight: global trade in components is massive, triangulation via third countries It is structural and already exists “pirate” production replacement that replicates or falsifies sanctioned parts. By design, control is reactive: it is as if each new closure encourages Moscow to seek an alternative route. Partial effectiveness. Plus: just because embargoes haven’t cut off the flow doesn’t mean they’re irrelevant. London estimates that the sanctions have deprived Russia of at least 450,000 million of dollars and have multiplied by up to six the price of dual pieces, draining war liquidity and adding temporary friction to the Russian military chain. This, a priori, penalizes rhythms, quality, scaling and maintenance, even if it does not prevent the material from arriving. The structural limit. If you want, the export control It is an instrument of soft power: its real power depends on what the rest of the world is willing to do and tolerate. It can raise the cost, strangle necks, penalize intensities, but it can hardly seal an economy-state Russian size connected to global intermediaries willing to charge for the risk. The result is an industrial war where the blockade is never binary (flows / does not flow), but rather marginal: raising the cost per Russian shot, reducing the cadence, pushing failures due to logistical stress and buy time, but hardly prevent a chip made for a laptop I ended up controlling the guidance of a kamikaze drone over a Ukrainian city. Image | Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation In Xataka | After Cubans and North Koreans fighting alongside Russian troops, new guests have appeared in Ukraine: Chinese In Xataka | In 2023, a pilot from Ukraine had an idea for Star Wars. Not only did it go well: his kamikaze plan has rewritten the war manual

Ukraine has returned from the US with two bad news, and the least of it is the Tomahawk missiles

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Last Friday it was supposed to take place a nuclear meeting for the future of war in ukraine. However, what happened in the White House ended up being less a diplomatic exercise than a scene of head-on collision: a president demanding territorial capitulation from an invaded country, a president refusing to give up what he still defends under fire, and a third absent actor marking the remote script of what Trump repeated with a literality that blurred any pretense of mediation. Concessions and threats. He had exclusive the financial times that Trump discarded the maps of the front, repeated that the war was not such but a “special operation” in Putin’s words, and urged Zelensky to accept the loss of Donetsk and the entire Donbas as the price of peace, warning that “If Putin wants, he will destroy you.” The conversation degeneratedapparently in shouts and ultimatum language, with the Ukrainian delegation attempting achieve Tomahawks (denied) while listening to arguments identical to those from Moscow put forward one day before to Trump himself. The American president even verbalized in public, already on Air Force One, the solution of freezing the war “where the lines are,” leaving negotiations on territory “for later.” The Russian proposal. Putin, in his previous call, demanded total surrender of Donetsk (a military objective that Moscow has failed to achieve in eleven years of combined war) offering as a counterpart only parts of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia that it currently controls precariously. For Ukraine, surrender the eastern bastion without combat (key to containing a penetration towards the Dnieper and kyiv) it is unacceptable because it would be equivalent to dynamiting the strategic defense of the entire country and, in psychological and political terms, to legitimizing a violent annexation project active since 2014. Trump and the European reading. trump had hinted Weeks ago that Ukraine could recover “everything and more,” and that Russia was a “paper tiger,” he now maintains that Moscow “has gained property” and should be given some credit. The literal echo of Putin’s points in Trump’s words dissipated among allies the hope of reopening the arms route and revealed that the matrix of the negotiation that Washington is pushing is no longer symmetrical but asymmetrical: downward pressure on the invaded and assumption of the invader’s premise. Russian internal calculation. For Ukrainian analysts, Donetsk’s demand does not so much seek to maximize territorial gain as to induce a sociopolitical fracture within Ukraine: forcing the leadership to consider what society will not tolerate to open an axis of internal delegitimization. Putin, in fact, already knows the social impossibility of barter, and that is why he insists: the desired cost is the erosion of cohesion rather than the line on the map. The Ukrainian position. Zelenskiy confirmed after the meeting that I would agree to freeze the front in its current location as a condition for entering talks, but stressed that there will not be additional delivery of territory. Considers that any negotiation must start with an immediate cessation on the line of contact, not with prior territorial modifications in favor of the aggressor. Trump’s public statements and the prospect of a Trump-Putin meeting in Budapest They do not alter that principle: without prior freezing and without forced concession, there is no viable dialogue. Tactical horizon. Ukraine enters winter under massive attacks on your energy infrastructure while responding by hitting Russian refineries. The lack of long range missiles from Washington after the call with Putin limits its capacity for deep counter-escalation just when Moscow is looking for time, social fatigue and diplomatic fracture. kyiv, in the absence of immediate alternatives, indicates that a ceasefire on current lines would be acceptable as a table key, but not the surrender of Donetsk as an entry passport. Peace on demand. If you will, the scheme that has emerged from this sequence (Putin-Trump call, Trump-Zelensky meeting, territorial barter proposal and appeal to the “agreement” freezing positions) places Ukraine before a conditional peace that recognizes the violence of annexation as a fait accompli and requires the invaded to formalize it. The ukrainian reaction (freeze, negotiate, but not give in) is the last dam between an end to the fire and an end to the State in the political-strategic sense. The meeting did not bring closer an equitable end to the war: it clarified the type of end that certain architecture is willing to accept, even if it does not say it out loud. Image | Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, NARA In Xataka | The factories of deep America have reopened. And they all make the same “toy”: an army of combat drones In Xataka | The crazy number of drones has turned the Ukrainian sky into the M-30 at rush hour. Identifying the enemy is a danger

There are so many drones in Ukraine that they have become cars. So the army has created a DGT to regulate its traffic

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In a battle where drones are already they don’t need humans to coordinate and attack, and where these combat devices have taken technological warfare to a new crazy phase where they are knocking themselves downsooner or later it had to happen. Drones and Ukrainian airspace are increasingly similar, for better and worse, to cars and roads around the planet. The congested sky. The Ukrainian front has turned into an airspace so saturated with drones that its operators they must negotiate between them to avoid collisions and, above all, interference from their own electronic warfare systems. In an environment where thousands of devices they fly simultaneouslythe pilots establish “flight corridors” temporary, agreed by group messages or by radio, to cross areas under friendly control without being shot down by the signal jammers of their own army. This exchange, at times chaotic and spontaneous, reflects how modern warfare is fought both in the air and on the electromagnetic spectrum, where waves, rather than bullets, determine who sees, who shoots, and who survives. The invisible war. we have told before. The battle for dominance electromagnetic spectrum is already one of the most decisive of the conflict. each side try to saturate or protect the other’s frequencies through jamming systems that can nullify drones, missiles or radars, but also blind their own. Pilots as Dimko Zhluktenkoof the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces, they explain Insiere that his work includes identifying Russian electronic warfare systems to destroy them before they block the signal of his drones. Other operators, however, they must coordinate with several units simultaneously, seeking a balance between protecting their troops and the need to keep flight routes open. In many cases, the commanders who control the jamming systems are at higher hierarchical levels, so units on the ground can barely request changes, with no real ability to turn them off or adjust them according to their missions. The chaos of the sky. The device density in the air has created an environment almost impossible to manage. Commercial drones modifiedappliances FPV explosives, reconnaissance dronesinterceptors and systems electronic warfare They compete for space and signal, in a landscape where distinguishing between friend and enemy is increasingly difficult. Many soldiers shoot or activate their inhibitors at any approaching drone, unable to identify it precisely. The similarity between the Russian and Ukrainian models aggravates the confusion, and sometimes the Ukrainians themselves Allied aircraft are shot down out of fear or uncertainty. In this scenario, the war resembles a gigantic air traffic jam where each operator must warn, coordinate and wait their turn to cross the front without being blocked or destroyed by their own side. Non-stop race. In the background, Ukraine and Russia compete to develop technologies capable of resisting the electromagnetic lock. New models include drones no dependence on GPScontrolled by fiber optic cableequipped with artificial intelligence or capable of changing frequency to escape enemy “noise.” However, these innovations slowly reach the front lines, where they coexist with outdated equipment that requires improvisation and constant communication. Thus, each flight is a negotiation between units, each mission a bet against the chaos of the spectrum, and each Russian advance forces an immediate Ukrainian response. The new frontier. Ultimately, the conflict in Ukraine has turned the sky into a laboratory where 21st century war is redefined. It is no longer just about tanks or missiles, but about waves, signals and microprocessors. The coordination between drones and interference systems reveals both the maturity and fragility of an army that has made ingenuity its main weapon. And it also shows a limit: the more saturated the spectrum, the more likely it will be that the technology will turn against those who use it. In that invisible space, where every interference can decide the fate of a drone or a life, Ukraine is waging a war as modern as it is paradoxical: a war in which communication It is the only way to prevent the defense from becoming its own enemy. Image | TASS In Xataka | If the question is how to end the war in Ukraine, the US has a disturbing solution: threaten Russia with a missile In Xataka | Russia’s technological superiority over Ukraine is growing every day. And all thanks to a friend: China

After imposing a peace agreement in Gaza, the US is heading to Ukraine to do the same. And that has two nuclear problems

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United States, in omnipresent figure of its president Donald Trump, seems willing to finish once and for all the invasion of Ukraine. It happens that trying to reproduce the same diplomatic “success” that is exhibited after the agreement in Gaza runs into two problems nuclear: on the one hand, the attempt to impose an agreement on Russia calls into question the sovereignty and legitimacy of the process and pushes Moscow to react. On the other hand, perhaps more dangerous, the pressure campaign that is articulated around the threat with long range missiles drastically increases the risk of an escalation that is difficult to control. From ambiguity to challenge. For a long time, Trump’s foreign policy toward Russia and Ukraine moved between deference and confusiona mix of praise for Putin, vague warnings and broken promises to kyiv. But in recent weeks, something has changed. trump has radically changed his speech, going from suggesting that Ukraine should accept territorial losses to presenting himself as the man capable of ending the war. What started as a rhetorical gesture before the UN has become a political process that seeks to consolidate the role of the United States as arbiter of the conflict, with a mix of military pressure, transactional diplomacy and calculated threat. Change and breakup. Trump, who had historically shown a almost personal indulgence towards Putin, surprised his allies and his critics with a speech in which rated Russia “paper tiger” and stated that Ukraine can recover all your territory with the support of Europe and NATO. This change, announced after his meeting with Zelensky and Macron, marks an abandonment of his traditional strategy of avoiding direct confrontations with Moscow. However, behind the turn there does not seem to be an articulated policy yet, but rather a combination of gestures: hints of sanctions, threats of retaliation and an explicit desire to reintroduce the idea of force as an instrument of negotiation. What was once indifference toward kyiv has become an instrumental interest, mixing rivalry with Putin and a desire to demonstrate international leadership. Tomahawks and ultimatums. The most visible symbol of this transformation is the word that has become recurrent in the communications from Washington: Tomahawk. Trump has openly threatened to supply Ukraine with long-range cruise missiles if Putin does not agree to reopen peace negotiations, an ultimatum which has put the Kremlin on alert. Moscow has responded calling the measure a “qualitatively new escalation” and warning that it could not distinguish whether the missiles carry nuclear warheads or not. For Trump, however, the announcement meets a double function: reinforces your image as a negotiator who commands respect and pressures Putin to prevent him from prolonging a war he can no longer win. Zelensky, for his part, sees the possibility of obtaining Tomahawks as not only a military instrument. but psychological: the threat of its use would be enough to push Russia to the negotiation table. The mere fact of discussing its delivery represents a break with the caution of the Biden erain which Washington rejected outright any action that could be considered direct aggression. From Gaza to Ukraine: export a model. The partial success of ceasefire in Gaza has offered Trump a narrative of diplomatic victory that he is now trying to convey on the European front. After freeing the Israeli hostages and achieving a temporary cessation of hostilities, the American president declared that his next objective was to “focus on Russia” and end the war in Ukraine. What is apparently a humanitarian movement also responds to a repositioning strategy global: demonstrate that Washington can impose order in both the Middle East and Europe without needing to deploy large military contingents. Trump has presented this new stage under a classic concept that has republished with pragmatism: “peace through strength.” It is the same logic that he seeks to apply with Putin (that is, not from conciliation, but from a credible threat). Ukraine, which for months feigned faith in some sterile negotiations to ingratiate himself with the White House, now perceives a window of opportunity: to replace the dialogue tables with the delivery of advanced weapons that change the balance of the battlefield. A military agreement. The visit of a Ukrainian delegation to Washington, led by Prime Minister Yuliia Svyrydenko, has sealed the new phase. The negotiators arrived with a list of valued acquisitions in 90,000 million of dollars, including Patriot anti-aircraft systemslong-range missiles and drone co-production agreements. Zelensky has learned to speak Trump’s language: that of transactions. It is no longer about asking for help out of solidarity, but rather offer “mega deals” that benefit both parties, presenting Ukraine as a profitable partner for the US military industry. The White House, in turn, has implicitly accepted that the talks with Moscow they are sold outand that only a substantial increase in military pressure will be able to force Putin to negotiate from weakness. The new strategic calculation. If you like, the Kremlin also crosses a point operational fatigue. Its territorial advances have become more marginal, and Zelensky himself has taken it upon himself to remember this in Washington with maps and figures: in a thousand days of war, Russia has barely conquered less than one percent of additional Ukrainian territory from 2022. The narrative of inevitable victory fades, and Trump seems to have understood. His speech on networks, in which stated that Ukraine is “in a position to recover his entire country in its original form,” was interpreted as confirmation of that change in perception. In other words: it is no longer about keeping a conflict frozen, but about precipitating its outcome through technological superiority and Russian economic collapse. The paradox. Paradoxically, the trump turn does not imply a return to the liberal idealism that defined US foreign policy for decades, but rather a pragmatism that mixes interests, spectacle and coercion. Washington does not seek to rebuild Ukraine, but rather to close a war that has stopped serving its image of power. From that perspective, the American president does not seem … Read more

Russia has found a key advantage to multiply the range of its most lethal weapon in Ukraine: Chinese factories

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Last July Reuters was made with some documents that proved the scope of the help from Beijing to Moscow with the war in Ukraine as a backdrop. The proliferation of Russian drones was possible thanks to a system labeling called “industrial refrigeration units” during transportation, one that allowed sanctions imposed by the West to be bypassed through fictitious companies. Now we know something else: that there are entire factories dedicated to collaboration. The invisible industrial alliance. The war in Ukraine has entered a new phase in which Russia’s technological advantage on the battlefield increasingly depends on a network of factories and chinese suppliers. Although Beijing proclaims neutrality, the official customs data show a spectacular increase in exports of critical components (especially fiber optic cables and batteries lithium-ion) that have allowed Moscow to mass-build the wired drones that are transforming the balance of power on the front. These aircraft, operated through ultra-fine glass threads that unwind in flight up to more than twenty kilometers, They are almost immune to electronic warfare and have managed to breach Ukrainian defenses with an efficiency reminiscent of a silent industrial evolution. The Chinese quantitative leap. How much? counted the Washington Post that between May and August, Chinese exports of fiber optic cables to Russia multiplied tenfold, reaching 528,000 kilometers per month, while shipments of lithium-ion batteries climbed to $54 million. In contrast, Ukraine barely received a few tens of km of cable and a testimonial volume of batteries. For analysts, this asymmetry it is not coincidental: China has restricted the transfer of technologies to kyiv and its allies, but has opened the floodgates of the flow towards Moscowtransforming what were simple commercial components into decisive pieces of the Russian war machine. The combination of low cost, high production capacity and speed in developing prototypes makes Chinese factories a material extension of the Kremlin’s war effort, a “precision rearguard” capable of sustaining the offensive even under Western sanctions. The weapon against electronic chaos. we have been counting. Faced with Ukrainian dominance in FPV drones, Russia has found fiber optic models a devastating tool. As they do not depend on radio frequencies, these devices are impossible to block through interference, and their wiring guarantees total control even in environments saturated with electronic warfare. Moscow uses them to destroy logistics lines, command centers and jamming equipment before launching offensives terrestrial. Its scope (coinciding with the advances measured “by sections of cable”) illustrates how this technology defines the very geometry of the front. Since the Ukrainian withdrawal in the Kursk region, wired drones have been the protagonists of precision attacks, such as the registered in Kramatorsk on October 5, cementing a pattern of warfare in which electronic resistance has become useless. The new factories of conflict. After the withdrawal of the giant DJI of the Russian market in 2022, a constellation of minor Chinese manufacturers has taken up its space. Companies like Shenzhen Huaxin Energy either Nasmin Technologyofficially dedicated to civil products, have become major suppliers of batteries and motors for Russian assemblers. The signature Rustakt LLCone of the largest in the Russian military sector, imported from China more than 577 million dollars in pieces between July 2023 and December of the same year, a volume that reveals the scale of covert industrial support. In turn, Russian manufacturers as ASFPV or Stribog exhibit on their websites production lines located in Chinese territorywith personnel, machinery and labels in Mandarin, manufacturing ultralight coils 0.28 mm and 20 km range designed by Chinese engineers. It is a transnational industrial network that no contracts needed formal military to nourish the Russian war effort: the flow of trade is its camouflage. The dilemma of the West. We have also been counting. Despite the sanctions imposed by the United States and the European Union, the majority of these shipments are protected by the ambiguity of the products “dual use”whose civil application allows controls to be avoided. For NATO, China has become a “decisive facilitator” of Putin’s war, Brussels accuses it of selectively applying its own export rules and to tolerate traffic of components that supports the Russian military industry. Beijing, meanwhile, continues to proclaim its neutrality, while its industrial system benefits economically from the prolongation of the conflict. Its strategy is subtle but effective: it does not supply weapons, but the infrastructure that makes them possible. A strategic advantage. Taken together, the convergence between Russian ingenuity and Chinese manufacturing capacity has created a war ecosystem that combines improvisation with industrial efficiency. The fiber drones optics symbolize that symbiosis: cheap, adaptable and difficult to counter. By providing Russia with technological independence from sanctions and tactical superiority on the battlefield, China not only strengthens its strategic partner, but also redefines global balance of power around a new form of hybrid warfare, where factories and cables count as much as missiles. The result is a cumulative advantage that, in the long term, threatens to turn the Ukrainian front into a manufactured warfare laboratorysupported not so much by soldiers, but by production lines on the other side of the world. Image | Ukraine Mod, Ministry of Defense Ukraine In Xataka | Europe has found the antidote to Russian drones. So demand for a 100-year-old gun has skyrocketed In Xataka | Europe has been working for three years to isolate itself from Russian gas. Two countries have decided to build a direct gas pipeline to Russia

There are fewer and fewer North Koreans fighting with Russia in Ukraine. An army has arrived with an irrefutable promise: Cubans

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For months, reports about foreign fighters in Ukraine indicated to North Korea as the main source of soldiers sent to support Russia. Then there was official confirmation by both nations. Quietly, however, that balance is shifting in surprising ways. On the board of the war in Eastern Europe, another country begins to displace Pyongyang in the role of largest supplier of troops to Moscow, an unexpected turn that reveals both the fragility of Russia and the depth of its authoritarian alliances. The Cuban front. What began as a regional invasion has transformed into a global war, in which Russia not only faces Ukraine and its Western allies, but also mobilize a network of regimes to sustain the war effort. Among them, Cuba emerges as an unexpected actor: according to Ukrainian estimates, up to 25,000 Cubans They could join the Russian front, becoming the largest foreign force in Ukraine, above the North Korean contingents. For the Kremlin, the usefulness of this formula it is evident: The casualties of foreign fighters do not generate internal protests, do not require compensation to Russian families and reduce the political cost of the conflict. In a country with more than one million estimated casualtiesattract soldiers overseas It is also a matter of strategic survival. A formula that is difficult to reject. The main motivation for many Cuban recruits is simple: economic. On an island mired in one of the worst crises in recent decades, where the average salary barely exceeds 20 dollars a month, the promises of charge $2,000 a month They fight any ideological objection. Some accept the contracts convinced, others are deceived with job offers in construction or factories, to discover upon arriving in Russia that their destination is the battle front. Analysts like Cristina López-Gottardi they point out that the economic attraction is irresistible, but they also highlight the political dimension: Havana obtains income from remittances from combatants and consolidates its alignment with Moscow, presenting it as a gesture of “revolutionary loyalty” and, incidentally, a symbolic challenge to Washington. Experts point out that the regime seeks reinforce your narrative anti-American, presenting participation as an act of internationalist solidarity, although in practice it is a source of foreign currency in times of hardship. Mercenaries, coercion and globality. The Cuban presence is part of a broader trend: the growing Russian dependence on foreign fighters. According to intelligence data, in 2025 almost half of the prisoners captured in Ukraine They were not Russian citizenswhen in 2022 they barely represented 1%. From Africans recruited under threats of deportation, until deceived students With false job offers in “shampoo factories”, including North Koreans sent as cannon fodder, Moscow turns to a whole mosaic of forced soldiers or mercenaries. In this sense, the Cuban contribution not only strengthens the Russian lines, but also magnify the image of a war waged by an international authoritarian axis that includes Iran, Venezuela, North Korea and now Cuba, sharing weapons, technology and experience on a battlefield converted into a laboratory for modern warfare with drones, electronic warfare and new combat tactics. Cuba as a diplomatic target. Cuban involvement in Ukraine has not gone unnoticed by the United States. The Trump administration has decided to use it as a central argument in his diplomatic offensive against Havana at the UN. An internal State Department cable, dated October 2, instructed US delegations to pressure allies to vote against the traditional annual resolution demanding an end to the US embargo on Cuba. Year after year, the measure has had overwhelming support (in 2024, 187 countries voted in favor and only the United States and Israel against), although Washington hopes to reduce that margin by presenting evidence that the Miguel Díaz-Canel regime has become in active accomplice of Russian aggression, with between 1,000 and 5,000 fighters deployed on the front. In the documents is underlined that Cuba “has failed to protect its citizens from being used as pawns” in the war, and the regime is accused of “undermining democracy” in the region, particularly through its alliance with Venezuela. The embargo and sanctions. Washington’s strategy seeks to disarm the Havana narrative, which presents the embargo as the root of all their evils. The diplomatic cable instructs to highlight the corruption and incompetence of the Cuban government, in addition to highlighting that the economic problems do not derive from the sanctions, but from its mismanagement. Trump, upon his return to the presidency, has hardened the restrictions: has reinstated Cuba to the list of countries sponsoring terrorism, has further limited financial transactions and has sanctioned third countries that collaborate with Cuban doctors abroad. Faced with this pressure, the Cuban regime accuses Washington of seeking a pretext for aggression and even instrumentalizing the anti-drug fight in the Caribbean as an excuse to increase tension. That said, the backdrop seems different: the combination internal collapse and military alliance with Moscow places Cuba at the epicenter of the geopolitical struggle between Washington and the authoritarian bloc. Military school. Beyond the diplomatic balances, what worries many analysts is that the war in Ukraine has become an involuntary academy for allied armies of Russia. Every foreign contingent that steps on the front learn first hand the techniques of the first great drone war in history: from swarm operations to electronic warfare. As warns Bill Colefounder of Peace Through Strength Institute“the real danger is not the thousands of Cubans or North Koreans sent, but what they learn and then export to other conflicts in Latin America, Africa or Asia.” This transfer of war knowledge turns war into a multiplier of global instability, with authoritarian regimes absorbing tactics and adapting them to their own scenarios. The Cuban paradox. The participation of thousands of Cubans in the Ukrainian war also reveals a paradox: while for the Havana regime it represents both a source of foreign currency and a reaffirmation of its anti-American identity, for Moscow it is a cheap solution and politically comfortable to internal wear and tear, and for Washington an opportunity to intensify diplomatic pressure … Read more

The greatest attack of Ukraine on Russian soil discovered a new threat with drones. China has just multiply it

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In 2024, Ukraine managed to enter trucks disguised as mobile houses in Russian terrain. It was the origin of what happened in June 2025, when The Spiderweb operation It was activated giving rise to kyiv’s greatest attack on Moscow since the beginning of the invasion in Ukraine. The offensive also staged the Future of the contests. China has taken another step in that threat marked by drones. Show converted into threat. They told them Analysts at The War Zone. China, through the company Damodahas presented a containerized system designed in principle for light shows with drones, but whose concept reveals deep military implications. The Automated Drone Swarm Container System is capable to display and recover Hundreds (potentially thousands) of small grid drones automatically, in a matter of minutes and with a single operator. Although the declared objective is entertainment, the system encapsulates the logic of how a simple container can be transformed into a portable swarm launcher with capacity of saturating skies and objectives at will. What today is a viral show on social networks, tomorrow can be a devastating weapon on the battlefield. From Guinness to War. Damoda already holds the world record with More than 11,000 drones in simultaneous flight in a coordinated show. Now, with this modular system of extensible racks, each container can accommodate At least 648 dronesready to take off and land synchronized. Drones automatically return to their positions and recover in the system itself, which It allows constant repetition With minimal human intervention. The promise for the civil market is speed, portability and cost reduction, but from the military perspective what is shown is the ability to convert a truck or a container into a force multiplier, camouflaged in an innocuous appearance. The precedents. The most immediate parallelism is found in the Ukraine War. As we said at the beginning, in mid -2024, kyiv carried out the call Spiderweb Operationwhere hidden containers as sheds or mobile houses were used as undercover kamikaze drones. Those attacks against aerodromes inside Russia They damaged or destroyed dozens of aircraft, including strategic long -range bombers. The blow was so serious that the Pentagon estimates the loss of at least ten of these devices. Something similar It happened in the Middle Eastwhen Israeli commands used covert structures to launch drones and missiles against goals in Iran during the beginning of the twelve -day war. Both operations show that the container, the most banal and ubiquitous infrastructure of global trade can become A lethal vector of power projection. The military potential. If civil design is extrapolated to the war, the concept is transformed into A swarm weapon low cost with saturation effects. Several trucks equipped with these containers could simultaneously launch hundreds or thousands of drones with diverse missions: from exploration and recognition to electronic warfare, interference of radars or kinetic attacks with small explosive loads. It would be enough Reduced number of systems To sweep an air base, disable radars or cover an urban front with lethal swarm. Its deployment in scenarios where the control lines are diffuse, such as cities in war, would allow devastating and almost impossible to stop with traditional defenses. The defense challenge. The difficulty in repelling a massive attack of swarms is multiplied with each advance in Autonomy and artificial intelligence. A swarm with the ability to Autonomous search and destruction It could penetrate shegars, hangars or buildings in search of objectives, exceeding the limitations of preprogrammed attacks. Let’s think that conventional anti -aircraft systems, designed to intercept specific threats, are overwhelmed in front of hundreds of simultaneous drones. The directed energy weapons, like lasers or microwaveThey offer partial but limited solutions by scope, direction and power. One of the few effective alternatives is to respond with another defensive swarm of interceptor drones, capable of creating a mobile barrier in the sky. Even so, cost-efficacy asymmetry plays in favor of the attacker: while an interceptor missile It can cost millionseach suicide drone barely reaches some thousands of dollars. Representation of a container launch system for the Merodeo ammunition of the Hero family of the German contractor Rheinmetall, as another example of a relevant concept that has previously been shown A show in the contest. The great risk is that what is now deployed as a cultural or tourist show can be transformed With hardly modifications In a gun of war. The camouflage, a priori, is perfect: a load container standard, transported by train, truck or ship, does not raise suspicions until, in minutes, it becomes A lethal swarm. This multiplies the strategic challenge for air bases, ports and cities close to the front, where a single infiltrated container could inflict damage comparable to that of a cruise missile sap. In wars where surprise and saturation are key, this kind of “drone box” emerges as the contemporary equivalent of an unpublished intelligent cluster bomb and precision. Global threat in buds. The truth is that China is not the only country in Explore this land. Defense companies and contractors In the United States And Europe also work in similar conceptssome even thought for naval pitchers. The debate in the US Navy already proposes to install containerized swarms In ships for defense and attack, which shows the inevitability of this transition. The Chinese precedent and the war in Ukraine indicate that the next future of the Air War is not only in the great seasons of sixth generation or in hypersonic missiles, but in low -cost swarms capable of overflowing any defense. The paradox. The Automated Drone Swarm Container System of Damoda It is officially a civil product to illuminate the skies in celebrations. But what projects, beyond its luminous choreographies, is a disturbing mirror of the future of war. Each viral show is at the same time, An essay From what can happen on the battlefield: the replacement of the power concentrated by distributed saturation, the replacement of the missile of millions with hundreds of low -cost drones, the transit of the technological war to … Read more

The electronic war is lying the technologies in Ukraine. So Russia has returned to World War II: horse soldiers

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In the month of June Some images They highlighted a dangerous evolution of assault tactics, one where the Russian army began to Use motorcycles as a main tool to move towards the Ukrainian lines, in an attempt to avoid the destruction of their armored Modern to the power of drones. Now, the electronic war in Ukraine has turned each technological innovation into a weapon with the days counted. Solution? The return of the cavalry. A symbolic return. Yes, the war in Ukraine, characterized by a massive deployment of drones, precision artillery and electronic war, has led the Russian army to explore solutions of archaic appearance: the Reintroduction of horses On the battlefield. What began as improvisations With donkeys and horses To transport supplies in the front, it has evolved towards formal training units mounted, according to The Kommersant newspaper. The idea greatly reflects the point of the dead to which modern technologies have reached a saturated front of electronic interference, where even the most sophisticated systems have been limited, forcing resort to basic methods that evoke the wars of the past. Training and tactics. In the Donetsk region, the commander of the “Storm” unit of the 9th Brigade has organized Horse training for assault troops. Exercises, video recorded and released in pro -government channels Like “Wargonzo”show soldiers galloping through open fields, some sharing a mount: one controls the animal and the other prepares to open fire. The approach is that, once the objective is achieved, both combatants dismantle and advance on foot against the enemy position. The tests also seek that horses get used to noise of shooting and explosions, minimizing the risk of being scared in combat. Its alleged advantages include the ability to move at night, accelerate without roads and, according to Russian controls, guide themselves by instinct to avoid mines. Limitations and symbolism. Despite these virtues, the use of horses raises important inconveniences: their weight can detonate antipersonnel mines, require constant food and care, and have a load capacity much lower than that of armored vehicles. Therefore, even Kommersant emphasizes that the cavalry will hardly be deployed on a large scale and that the measure is, above all, a symbolic gesture in a conflict that, despite being the scene of leading technologies, has forced the parties to also resort to rudimentary solutionsfrom analog telephone lines to cargo animals. The stamp of Russian soldiers on horseback contrasts with the official story of technological innovation and highlights the material and tactical wear of the campaign. Cavalry Brigade of the SS in Russia, 1941 The vintage resource. The resource for horses is not the first Russian attempt to use unconventional alternatives in the front. It We have counted before: units have been documented in motorcycles, quads, and even E-SCOOTERS AND MONOCICLOS electric, with unequal results. In particular, motorcyclist brigades destined to evade Ukrainian drones have suffered Massive casualties: The open field exposure and the absence of coverage made them easy blank, with most bikers eliminated before achieving their goals. The commitment to cavalry reflects the same logic: Quick and low -cost solutions to an enemy with technological advantage, although without guarantees of real effectiveness in combat. Military stagnation The context of this equine return is the stagnation of the Russian offensive. Between September 20 and 30, Moscow only achieved advance 29 square kmand although in the whole of the month he added 447, most of the profits occurred in little disputed rural areas. In Donetsk, where the “Storm” unit is concentrated, Russia barely He won 181 square kilometersone of its lowest records in a year. The front has been practically frozen for weeks, which has forced the Kremlin to resort to propaganda measures To show dynamism, while Ukraine recognizes difficulties, but maintains resistance in key nuclei such as Pokrovsk and Dobropillia. Echoes of the twentieth century. The return of horses to the battlefield is not an exclusive phenomenon of war in Ukraine. During World War II, both Germany and the Soviet Union They used cavalry In patrol operations and logistics support, while Poland was hard stigmatized by the famous riders of riders against tanks in 1939a partially exaggerated myth but showed the obsolescence of classical cavalry against mechanization. In the Soviet Union, however, mounted units are They used effectively In wooded environments and in the antipartisan struggle, where their mobility offered advantages that vehicles could not match. In subsequent conflicts, horses They reappeared in low intensity wars or in difficult access scenarios. Afghan resistance against Soviet invasion in the 1980s depended largely of horses and mules to transport weapons in mountainous terrain. Paradoxically, after 11-S, the US special forces deployed in Afghanistan They turned to horses To move with its local allies, an image that became a symbol of the clash between the technological war of the 21st century and the indomitable geography of the Hindu Kush. The paradox. The image of Russian soldiers galloping Between drones and artillery summarizes the paradox of the war in Ukraine: in a conflict turned into a showcase of military innovations (Drones swarms, artificial intelligence applied to combat, Hypersonic weapons and Electronic War), the fatigue of materials and the tactical blockade have returned to the battlefield tools typical of another era. While it is unlikely that modern cavalry changes the course of the contest, His mere reappearance It is a powerful symbol of to what extent the war in Ukraine has stressed the limits of technology and has forced to reimagine, even with primitive means, the way of fighting. Image | Wargonzo In Xataka | An AIM-9X missile cost a million dollars to tear down a Russian drone. Ukraine has found the solution for 2,000 dollars In Xataka | In a crucial Ukraine agreement he has given the US his best weapon. In return he has received something unpublished: a map to knock Russia

An AIM-9X missile cost a million dollars to tear down a Russian drone. Ukraine has found the solution for 2,000 dollars

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For Moscow, the Shahed drones They have been a cheap and scalable resource to wear out the Ukrainian defenses, first thrown into small batches and later in waves at greater heightoutside the reach of machine guns and cannons. For kyiv, the challenge has been not only to neutralize those swarms, but do it Without ruined: Each Shahed forced to shoot missile prices missiles, a long -term ruinous equation. This cost asymmetry forced Ukraine to accelerate innovation giving rise to a new air defense paradigm. The birth of something new. In the heavens of Ukraine an unexpected weapon has emerged against the incessant waves of Russian drones: the low cost interceptors Designed in Kyiv. Among them stand out The stinga projectile quadcopter capable of exceeding 315 km/hyred to destroy shaheds and gerberas in flight. Its tiny silhouette and acute sound contrast with the great traditional anti -aircraft systems, and their initial success (with hundreds of enemy drones demolished in a few months) demonstrates that it is possible to neutralize mass threats with fast and cheap solutions. Companies Like Wild Hornetsin collaboration with the Brave1 government platformThey have turned accelerated innovation into the country’s aerial survival axis. The cost war. The great challenge is not just technician, but economic. A Shahed drone costs $ 35,000, while The AIM-9Xused by systems Like Nasams To tear them down, it exceeds million per unit. This imbalance placed Ukraine already its allies in a clear financial disadvantage: each interception was tens of times more expensive than the Russian attack itself. The stinghowever, costs just $ 2,100 and acts as a suicide drone when impacting directly against the objective. The difference is abysmal: by the price of a single AIM-9x they can be manufactured Almost five hundred stinga proportion that explains why Kyiv considers its massive deployment vital to resist bombings of up to 800 drones in a single night. Accelerated innovation. The Ukrainian advantage does not only reside in the unit cost, but in the Radaptation apidity. Each new model responds to the last Russian tactic, either Shaheds to greater altitude, more numerous swarms or reaction versions. Engineers have gone from cannons and machine guns on land interceptors capable of operating partially autonomouslyand even experiences with totally automatic systems that detect, pursue and destroy without direct human intervention. This daily iteration capacity, fueled by the Front feedback, has turned Ukraine into a War laboratory unprecedented aerial. Europe and the lesson. The recent incursion of 21 Russian drones in Poland forced F-35 to deploy that used missiles of very high value to demolish just four devices. The episode has triggered European interest in Ukrainian solutions, which offer A “Drones Wall” much cheaper and scalable than any traditional system. German companies and other countries already Test interceptors Inspired by kyiv, aware that their current defenses are not prepared for cheap and massive waves. For Europe, the lesson is clear: the aerial defense of the future cannot be based on shooting millions from millions against objectives of a few thousand. New paradigm. The irruption of interceptors Like Sting It reflects a paradigm shift. What was previously resolved with very expensive static and arsenal systems now requires flexible, economical and serial solutions. Ukraine, pressured by the urgency of surviving, has made its way Towards a model in which the cost, speed and constant innovation weigh as much as pure technology. If you get displayed Thousands of daily interceptorsnot only will it reinforce its immediate defense, but it will have seated the foundations of a new military approach that will force NATO to rethink their strategy and to abandon the logic of the “Millonada” worn in each missile in front of an enemy that bets on the saturation and wear. Image | Wild Hornets/Telegram In Xataka | In a crucial Ukraine agreement he has given the US his best weapon. In return he has received something unpublished: a map to knock Russia In Xataka | Something has gone out wrong in Ukraine. So much, that the drone war has reached the most unexpected place: Türkiye

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