When he finishes he will steal the last advantage that the US had left

It is estimated that around more than 80% of the planet’s oceans remains to be mapped in detail, and in many areas we know less about the seabed than about the surface of the Moon. Still, that unknown environment is key to some of the world’s most advanced technologies. Also for war. The invisible map. I had a few days ago in a extensive Reuters report that China has been mapping the planet’s ocean floor for some time and that, when it is finished, it will have the last tactical advantage that the United States had left: knowing better than anyone else the terrain where the quietest war of all will be fought. For decades, American superiority under the sea rested not just on more advanced submarines, but on something much more intangible: a deep knowledge of the ocean environment. Now that balance starts to change because Beijing is building, step by step, a detailed image of that invisible world that conditions every movement underwater. A global network. What at first glance seems like oceanographic research is actually a global scale operation which combines dozens of vessels, hundreds of sensors and years of data accumulated in the Pacific, Indian Ocean and Arctic. These ships travel repeated routes, scanning the seabed and collecting key information on temperature, salinity and currents, factors that determine how sound propagates underwater. It is not a trivial detail, it is crucial because, in underwater combat, seeing does not matter so much: what is really key is listening better than your opponent and hiding from them. The “transparent ocean”. Here is possibly the crux of the whole thing. radiography that Beijing is carrying out. Because the heart of the strategy is the idea of ​​creating a species of “transparent ocean”a network of sensors capable of monitoring what happens beneath the surface with an unprecedented level of precision. The reason: although not everything is in real time, even delayed data allows build models that anticipateFor example, where a submarine can hide or how to detect it. In other words, China not only wants to sail better, but reduce uncertainty which has always protected these ships, transforming the ocean into a much less opaque and much more controllable space. Military power. They remembered in Reuters that one of the keys to the Chinese advance is how it is using universities, scientific institutes and civilian ships to build this knowledge base without openly resorting to military means. This fusion between civil and military allows it to operate more freely in international waters, accumulating strategic information without raising the same level of alert that a direct naval presence would cause… although the result is the same: a database that can be translated into operational advantages in the event of conflict. The end of a historic advantage. There is no doubt, all this effort aims to a clear objective: erode one of the greatest strategic advantages the United States has had, its dominance of the underwater environment. If China manages to match (or even surpass) that knowledge, it will be able, a priori, deploy your submarines more effectively, detect those of the adversary and monitor critical routes such as the approaches to the Pacific or the Strait of Malacca. It is therefore not a race of boats, but of information, and in this field the one who best understands the bottom of the ocean will have the initiative. A new balance. Taken together, the Chinese strategy reveals a profound change in the nature of naval power: one where it is no longer enough to have more ships or better weapons, but rather dominate the environment in which they operate. By systematically mapping the seafloor and deploying sensors at key points, Beijing is preparing the ground for a competition in which the advantage will not be visible, but yes decisive. And if that process is completed, the United States could find itself for the first time in decades without its traditional superiority in the most difficult domain to control: the one that cannot be seen. Image | RawPixel, Youth Daily News In Xataka | There are two global superpowers fighting to gain a foothold on the coast of Peru: the United States and China. In Xataka | It’s not that China is serious in the Pacific, it’s that space has revealed the size of a dizzying naval domain

Ukraine has a weapon against Russia that we had only seen in James Bond. Her name is Sea Baby and when she finishes her work she blows herself up.

At the end of September Ukraine sent a message: It was already the largest drone laboratory on the planet, but with its latest 12-meter “monster” it wanted to do the same under the sea. This is how the family of Toloka underwater dronesa technological leap that redefined naval warfare in the Black Sea. That effort now has its continuation in a drone that until recently we had only seen in James Bond movies and the like. Technological evolution. Ukraine has taken its “Sea Baby” naval drones from being disposable explosive boats to becoming attack and multiple mission platforms capable of operating at more than 1,500 kilometers, transporting up to 2,000 kilos and mount heavy telecontrolled weaponry (multiple rocket launchers, stabilized turrets, secondary drone launch) while incorporating self-destruct systems to avoid capture and AI-assisted functions to reduce identification errors. This step not only adds firepower and range, but turns a low-cost means into a sustained system that can penetrate, hit, return and remain available (or self-destruct), something that repositions the naval drone from immediate consumption to renewable operating capital. The Black Sea. Successive waves of drones have forced Russia to withdraw most of its fleet from Sevastopol to Novorossiyska change in posture that does not respond to a specific defeat but to that persistent risk that makes it unfeasible to sustain an advanced presence without assuming continuous losses. The “Sea Baby” have been attributed by the SBU to eleven attacks against shipsas well as repeated blows against the Crimean bridge and other logistics facilities, producing a chain effect: Moscow has had to redirect its military transport to land and more distant ports, making each kilometer of support more expensive and reducing its ability to condition Ukrainian trade routes to Europe. Doctrinal change. What once required steel fleets, shipyards and squadrons can now be inflicted with platforms cheap, reproducible and guided at a distance, which modifies the unspoken rule that the maritime domain belongs to the one who owns tonnage: here control emanates from who can inflict repeated damage at a lower cost than that imposed on the defender. The Ukrainian case surpasses precedents such as the coastal missiles of the Lebanon in 2006 because it not only denies a coastline, but forces a structural reconfiguration of an entire squadron and its main base, demonstrating that an entire naval theater can be altered without having a conventional navy. Industry and allies. kyiv claims to produce around 4,000 naval drones and needing only half for his own defense, opening the door to sell the surplus to partner countries while NATO observes and adjusts doctrine after verifying that these systems have changed the cost/effect relationship at sea. Public financing via United24 and coordination with political and military command make the program an example of how a country at war can generate dual technology with external projection, replicating what happened with aerial UAVs: first combat effectiveness, then international adoption and doctrinal adjustment by third parties. Consequences and cycles. There is no doubt, offensive success is strong now defensive investment: floating barriers, sensors, redundant electronic warfare and point defense layers in ports and terminals to prevent innovation that has worked externally from reversing its own infrastructure. Russia tries to copy these platforms and use them againwhat chains a cycle of innovation in the face of interference that pushes both sides to adapt communications, navigation and mission architecture to overcome the electronic blockade. The result: a loop of accelerated evolution in which the advantage is no longer in possessing an isolated weapon, but in the ability to continually improve it before the opponent degrades its effect. Strategic conclusion. The Ukrainian naval drones have shown that sea power can be eroded without a conventional fleet through cheap mass, strategic reach and sustained pressure on valuable nodes, altering the adversary’s posture and reallocating its resources on the defensive. The displacement of the Russian fleet, the logistical impact and the international adoption as a reference point to a change of era: the sea ceases to be a domain secured by the capital spent on steel and becomes a space where the advantage belongs to whoever controls the marginal cost of the next impactnot the size of the hulls it anchors. Image | Security Service of Ukraine In Xataka | Ukraine cannot believe what it found inside Russia’s ballistic missiles: déjà vu In Xataka | After Cubans and North Koreans fighting alongside Russian troops, new guests have appeared in Ukraine: Chinese

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