Russian

In 1934 a Russian aristocrat proclaimed himself king of Andorra. He was actually the craziest scammer of the 20th century.

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Boris Skossyreff was a man of longevity. He died in 1989just turned 93 years old, in a nursing home in Boppardin what was then West Germany. However, even that long existence seems to fall short when we remember the many lives that Skossyreff chained: he was born into a rich family in Vilnius, but the Bolshevik Revolution forced him very soon to leave his country and look for a life, trying his fortune as a swindler, spy, forger, gigolo, translator and even contender for the throne of Andorra. Added to this extensive resume is his status as a troublemaker, born drinker, lover of good bad life, seducer, fortune hunter and possessor of an elastic morality that, among other things, allowed him to act as triple spy (they say that he served as such for Germany, Great Britain and the United States) and survive in concentration camps and gulags, even at the cost of collaborating with the Nazis. Anything to survive. His life may not be exemplary, but it is exciting enough to have made him the protagonist of a documentary and a bookboth titled ‘Boris Skossyreff, the swindler who was king’ and signed by Jorge Cebrián. Reconstructing his story did not only require years of interviews and diving into archives and newspaper archives. As confesses the director and authorthe work has had to go beyond the “myths, half-truths and lies” that surround the figure of Boris to discover the authentic character without “simplifying or romanticizing him.” And the Russian Revolution came Skossyreff’s must have been a life of privileges, comforts and income. At least those were the letters he found when he was born, in 1896, in Vilnius, today the capital of Lithuania but at that time part of the Russian dominions. Theirs was a good family, rich and aristocratic. The problem is that those cards turned against him when the Red Revolution of 1917 broke out. Young Boris had no choice but to run away and look for a life outside the country. He ended up in the Royal Navy British, maintaining a more or less comfortable life based on scams, bad checks and a lot of gossip. In addition to its good perch, they say that Skossyreff was a polyglot (he spoke at least Russian, English, French, German, Spanish and Italian, although he raised the list of languages ​​​​that he knew 20), he took such care of his appearance that he even walked around with a monocle in a prison camp and above all he exuded a charisma that opened doors for him. Among other things, he achieved a Nansen passport which allowed him to move around Europe even with the safe conduct already expired. His wanderings through Great Britain did not last long. From there he ended up going to the Netherlands, where he presented himself as a distinguished aristocrat in the service of the queen, and continued his life journey through Spain, Marseille and finally Spain again, where he ended up in Mallorca. His problems with the law haunt him, but he manages to gain the trust of two women: Marie Louise Parata rich divorcee 14 years older than him, whom he ends up marrying; and Florence Marmonex-wife of an automobile industry magnate, with whom he indulges in a life of debauchery. So many that it ends up forcing him to pack his bags and leave Mallorca. Boris I of Andorra After passing through Sitges accompanied by his lover, the Russian hustler decided to launch himself into the biggest and craziest of all his coups: invent an aristocratic lineage that would make him, he argued, the prince of Andorra. He even introduced himself as Boris I. The fact that he noticed just that portion of Pyrenean terrain is not causality. At that time Andorra was governed by the bishop of Seu d’Urgel and the president of France and presented a series of shortcomings (and potentialities) in which Skossyreff saw a huge opportunity. He encouraged the Andorrans to break with their rulersdelve into their independence and undertake a series of projects to modernize following the example of Monaco. In front, of course, he would put himself, something to which his family tree supposedly (supposedly) entitled him. Skossyreff managed to make noise and aroused the interest of the press. It is counted that even The New York Times (among other newspapers) came to give visibility to that extravagant aristocrat who insisted that he was born to occupy the throne of Andorra. The truth is that Boris was not content with moving papers and launching advertisements. In 1934 He even proclaimed himself Boris I, sovereign of Andorra, a daring move that did not last long. Fed up with his adventures, the bishop of La Seu d’Urgell notified the Civil Guard to stop him. His supposed (supposed) reign lasted just nine days. That could have been the final chapter for Boris Skossyreff, but he managed to navigate the turbulent 20th century, moving through Europe with astonishing ease. It does not matter that the civil war caught him in Spain, that France sent him to a republican refugee camp, that after the outbreak of World War II he ended up in a Dachau concentration camp or that, once Hitler fell, the Russians condemned him to more than two decades of forced labor in the icy Siberia. Like the most seasoned cat, he always managed to land on his feet. To achieve this, he had no qualms about dazzling women who sent him money or taking advantage of his linguistic skills to serve as a translator for the Nazis. If there is an anecdote that portrays his ability to survive, it is the one that circulates about his stay in the Dachau camp, where, makes sure In the documentary filmed by Cebrián, “he did not take off his monocle not even to clean the latrines“. Not even Siberia could put an end to it. In the mid-1950s he managed to return to Germany. He first settled with his French wife, then … Read more

stop importing Russian gas

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Brussels has announced a ban on importing Russian gas at the end of 2027. This is what They confirmed at a press conference the president of the European Commission, Ursula Von der Leyen, and the Commissioner for Energy, Dan Jørgensen. But, beyond the statements, there is an elephant in the room: the European Union has just promised something that it does not know if it will be able to fulfill. A “permanent” veto. According to the official statement of the European Commissionthe Parliament and Council have reached a political agreement to permanently stop imports of Russian gas – not only by gas pipeline, but also liquefied natural gas – and with a very specific timetable: LNG in short-term contracts: prohibited from April 25, 2026. Gas through pipeline in the short term: prohibited from June 17, 2026. LNG in long-term contracts: January 1, 2027. Long-term gas via pipeline: September 30, 2027 (or November 1 with extension if the storage level is not reached). Furthermore, the EU plans to stop importing Russian oil in 2027, something that confirms the Financial Times and that would complete the partial embargo in force since 2022. Even so, Hungary and Slovakia will continue to receive crude oil from the Druzhba pipelinerecently bombed— while their legal exceptions remain in effect. The political message is clear. The reality, less so. On paper, it is the final slam on Russian gas. Von der Leyen celebrated that the veto will allow “deplete Putin’s war chest”, while Jørgensen proclaimed that “blackmail and manipulation are over.” The political message is clear: Europe wants to show that it no longer depends on Moscow to get through the winter. However, consensus is fragile within the EU. The gas veto is official, but not unanimous. The Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Hungary published on his social networks which is already preparing an appeal to the Court of Justice of the EU to overturn the ban, while Slovakia asks to extend deadlines and protect its exceptions. The political agreement exists, but the operational unity is fragile: without real coordination between partners, an energy veto can become a simple declarative gesture. The actual reading is less triumphant. According to DWthe Moscow government accused the EU of precipitating “its own economic decline” by forcing the bloc to turn to more expensive alternatives and a global LNG market where already competes with Asia for each shipment. Brussels, aware of oil precedenthas shielded the veto with a much more severe legal framework. As explained by the Financial Timescompanies that try to circumvent the ban will face fines of up to 3.5% of their global turnover, fixed penalties that can reach 40 million euros and a mandatory system of certificates of origin to prevent Russian gas sneaks in disguise in the form of opaque mixtures, triangulations or indirect re-exports. The truth is even more uncomfortable. Europe still need gas to stabilize its electrical grid and cover demand peaks when the wind does not blow or the sun disappears. According to a report by McKinsey & CompanyEurope would need 75% more flexibility before 2030 to function without that fossil support, while global gas consumption will grow by 26% until 2050, just when it should fall by 75% to comply with the Paris Agreement. Added to this is the structural stress of the European gas system. The main Dutch regasification plants—Gate and Eemshaven— operate at 90–100% capacityjust when Europe faces winter with reserves at 83%, the lowest level since 2022. Spain, despite its large regasification capacity, can barely send 7,000–8,500 million m³ per year to France: the bottleneck is in the interconnections. And a cold wave is enough to destabilize prices, as Bloomberg warns. An accelerated roadmap. Brussels insists that this time there is a plan. Each Member State must be submitted before March 2026 a national diversification plan that details how it will replace the 35 billion m³ of Russian gas that was still entering the EU last year: new suppliers, new infrastructure and new LNG routes. On paper it makes sense. In practice, it means rebuilding in two years an energy system that took four decades to build. Meanwhile, Europe is held together by an unexpected lifeline: the United States. According to Bloombergthe continent has endured in recent months thanks to a boom in American LNG, with exports at record levels. This winter Europe “will probably be fine,” but real abundance will not arrive until the second half of 2026. Any unforeseen event—extreme cold, a rebound in Chinese demand, a technical failure—could strain the system again. And meanwhile, China plays another game. Europe looks at its deposits. China dig deeper. The Asian giant increased its domestic gas production by 5.8% in the first half of 2025, has had 20 years of almost uninterrupted growth, reduced its LNG imports by 22% and is moving forward with the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline, capable of absorbing 50 billion Russian m³ per year. The consequence is inevitable: if Europe stops buying, Russia you have someone to sell to. The precedent that worries Brussels. Here is the main fear: oil sanctions showed that when Europe closes a door, the market opens a window. As we have told in XatakaAfter the partial embargo, a phantom fleet of oil tankers emerged, European traders moved operations to Dubai, crude oil was mixed to hide its origin, and shell companies appeared in the Emirates that operated outside of European jurisdiction. The result was evident: Russian oil never stopped flowing, it simply changed flag, route and documentation. And that precedent is precisely what they now fear in Brussels: that gas will follow the same logic of opacity, triangulations and parallel markets. Europe promises to turn off Russian gas. On paper, it is a historic decision. By 2027, Europe says there will be no trace of Russian gas left in its energy system. In practice, the road is full of cracks: saturated infrastructure, porous sanctions, hesitant allies, a potentially cold winter and an energy transition that advances … Read more

Russian oil never stopped arriving in Europe and this 30-year-old German knows it well because he has earned millions by supporting the system.

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JR Ewing, the oil magnate dallasused to repeat that “the essential thing in this business was to always be one step ahead.” If I lived in 2025, I probably wouldn’t be wearing a Texan hat: I’d be a trader in my late 30s with a laptop, a rented office in Dubai, and a German passport. And perhaps he would look a lot like Christopher Eppinger, the young man who, according to an extensive report in the Financial Timeshas managed to become a millionaire by speculating with sanctioned Russian oil while Europe proclaimed from the rooftops that it was breaking dependence on the Kremlin. Because while Brussels talked about “energy sovereignty” and announced price caps, a parallel ecosystem of nomadic traders, ghost fleets and opaque companies continued to move millions of barrels away from the official radar. In that underground of the global economy, Eppinger found his opportunity. The sanctioned oil never stopped flowing; It simply stopped being visible. And he knew how to make it profitable. When a door closes. Christopher Eppinger, marked since childhood by the chapters of dallas that he saw with his grandmother, he found in the war a window to get rich. The young German moved with the same logic that much more veteran intermediaries have used for decades: special purpose companies in the United Arab Emirates, triangulated operations with India or China, sales contracts for discounted crude oil and the logistics of a ghost fleet that operates on the margins of maritime law. While European governments presented sanctions in solemn press conferences, he took advantage of every crack in the system to buy low and resell high. He didn’t need his own ships, or infrastructure, or even physically touching a barrel: it was enough to know where the opportunities were and who didn’t want to look too closely. Showing an uncomfortable truth. The story of this young German is not an anecdote, but evidence that the sanctioning system never acted as intended. Organization reports like Public Eye show that, between 2023 and 2024 alone, newly created companies or companies relocated to Dubai accounted for more than half of the Russian oil exported by sea, displacing traditional centers such as Switzerland and Singapore. According to Bloombergkey figures in the energy trade, such as Murtaza Lakhani, helped Rosneft reconfigure its export chains through the Emirates to keep flows active despite sanctions. And while much of Europe tried to break ties with Moscow, some countries —like Hungary and Slovakia— took advantage of exceptions to continue receiving crude oil and gas through the Druzhba pipeline. Energy dependence, far from being broken, fragmented into a more chaotic, less transparent and more vulnerable system. In this environment, profiles like Eppinger’s are not only possible: they are almost inevitable. The recipe for enrichment. Eppinger’s method follows a clear logic that the Financial Times details precisely. The first step is to move to Dubai, which has become the “Desert Ireland”thanks to minimal taxation, thousands of special purpose companies created in record time and a confidentiality regime that allows operations without revealing the beneficial owner. The United Arab Emirates does not apply sanctions against Moscow and serves as a perfect platform to move cargo, contracts and dividends without European surveillance. The second pillar is the ghost fleet: hundreds of aging, poorly insured oil tankers, with registrations in opaque countries and with transponders that turn off just when the ship approaches a Russian cargo. These ships They are the heart of parallel trade which has kept Russia exporting above the $60 limit imposed by the G7. The third consists of the Offshore transfers and triangulations. The scheme is simple: buy cheap Russian crude, transfer it to another tanker in international waters, mix it or rename it “Malaysian” or “Indian”, and resell it at an international price. A digital business, fast and — above all — difficult to track. And the fourth element is the ambiguous tolerance of the West. As Bloomberg has detailedthe United States avoided acting harshly for months to avoid causing a global rise in the price of oil. In the EU, exceptions and loopholes allowed non-European companies, although controlled by Europeans, to operate without restrictions. Eppinger moved precisely in that gray space: a legally ambiguous but economically explosive territory. The great gray void where everything is possible. The short answer is: it depends. The long answer is more uncomfortable. According to regulators cited in the different sources, an operation can be technically legal if Russian oil is purchased below the price ceiling, transported to a country that does not apply sanctions and is executed from a legally established entity outside the EU. Switzerland even recognizedaccording to Public Eye— that subsidiaries of Swiss companies established in Dubai are not subject to Swiss sanctioning legislation, as long as they are formally “independent.” This legal architecture allows traders like Eppinger to act without violating the letter of the law, even if they clearly violate its spirit. The question is not so much whether what you do is legal, but why it is possible to do it. Will there be consequences? The cracks in the system are beginning to produce visible effects. On the military front, Ukraine has expanded the war towards Russian energy infrastructure: attacking refineries thousands of kilometers from the front and disabled tankers linked to sanctioned crude oil trading. Russia has lost around 13% of its refining capacity and several regions have suffered queues and gasoline rationing, according to the Financial Times. On the diplomatic and economic level, according to BloombergWashington is already studying specific sanctions against intermediaries in the Emirates, while the United Kingdom has begun to penalize marketing companies with opaque property registered in Dubai. In Europe, pressure is growing on countries that continue to receive Russian energy by land, such as Hungary and Slovakia, identified as leakage points in the system. Eppinger’s business, like that of many others, could have its days numbered if the regulatory fence tightens. For now, it is still profitable. Russia gets richer while Europe … Read more

take down a Russian ghost fleet without the need for humans

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Europe has been dealing with the call for years “ghost fleet” Russian, a network of aging tankerspoorly insured and with opaque owners who have evaded sanctions, turned off transponders, manipulated routes and put European waters at risk with incidents, leaks and dangerous maneuvers. These ships have operated at border of legality to keep afloat energy income from the Kremlin, forcing Brussels to strengthen maritime controls and several coastal states to investigate suspicious incidents near critical infrastructure. The birth of an offensive. The night of November 28 marked a turning point silent but decisive in the war that has pitted Ukraine and Russia for almost three years. A few dozen km from the Turkish coast, far from the usual range of Ukrainian systems and in the heart of Moscow’s logistical rearguard, two Sea Baby naval drones (unmanned, guided by AI and armed with explosive charges weighing more than a ton) rushed at full speed against two oil tankers of the Russian “ghost fleet”the network of aging and opaquely owned ships that Moscow uses to circumvent Western sanctions. The hits against the Kairos and Virat not only showed a technological leap in the range and precision of Ukrainian naval drones, but also sent a strategic message to all actors in the global energy trade: any ship supporting Russian exports can become a military target, and kyiv is no longer limited by the geographic space of the northern Black Sea to impose that cost. The meticulous execution of the attacks (aiming propulsion and rudders to disable, not sink) reveals the extent to which Ukraine is trying to balance military effectiveness with the political risk before international partners, aware that it is hitting an economically sensitive terrain for Türkiye, Kazakhstan and several Western companies with energy interests. How the ghost fleet works. The so-called ghost fleet is one of the pillars that Russia has built since 2022 to maintain its income stream tankers, recruiting hundreds of tankers with decades of service, dubious insurers and convenience records, many of them under African flags like that of the Gambia. The Kairos and the Virat, pointed out by sanctions bodies from the United States, the United Kingdom, the EU, Switzerland and Canada, are perfect examples of this network: very old ships, with questionable maintenance, designed to operate in the legal shadows that allow real owners and routes to be hidden. Its function is key because oil continues to be the Kremlin’s financial key: only in October, Russia entered 13.1 billion dollars for sales of crude oil and derivatives, although the figure already shows a significant decrease compared to the previous year. Damaging these ships (and above all, showing that no part of the Black Sea is safe) turns each transit into a calculated risk. The ultimate goal it is erosive: increase insurance costs, slow down logistics, increase the risk perceived by intermediary companies and force them to reconsider their collaboration with Moscow. He sinking of the M/T Mersin off Senegal, although it is not proven that it was the work of Ukraine, it illustrates the growing deterioration of a fleet that operates with minimum standards. The transformation of the Sea Baby. The Sea Baby have established themselves as the spearhead of an unprecedented Ukrainian naval revolution. Their early versions acted as medium-range explosive platforms; but the updated prototype, shown by the SBU in October, has multiplied its capabilities: 1,500 kilometers of autonomy, high speeds, autonomous navigation supported by AI and up to 2,000 kilograms of payload. Now they can operate anywhere in the Black Sea, from Odessa to the Bosphorus, from Crimea to global oil routes. This expansion underlines an evolution with two simultaneous layers: Ukraine is destroying the historical Russian hegemony in the Black Sea, and it is doing no traditional boatswithout sailors and without risking lives, relying on a naval concept that Moscow has not managed to replicate with the same efficiency. The combination of drones, Western satellite reconnaissance, electronic intelligence and autonomous platforms makes the Russian navy look increasingly corneredforced to disperse fleets, reinforce escorts and operate with a caution that reduces their freedom of action. Geopolitical leap and message to third parties. That the blows occurred a few km from the Turkish coast is not a technical whim: it means that Ukraine has crossed a symbolic and geopolitical threshold. For the first time, it has attacked Russian naval infrastructure in areas where global trade, NATO and maritime law converge. The images verified by BBC show drones hitting ships that were assisted by the Turkish coast guard, in an extremely sensitive environment for Ankara. Türkiye reacted with a very low profilelimiting itself to putting out fires and rescuing crews, aware that openly protesting would go against its difficult balance between Russia, NATO and its own regional agenda. But the message is there: Ukraine is no longer limited to destroying Russian ships within the space that Moscow considered comfortable control; Now it can harass energy trade even when plying international routes. This reconfigures the calculations of insurers, shipping companies and states involved: even Kazakhstan protested after the Caspian Pipeline Consortium terminal was affected, underlining that the Ukrainian campaign is touching multinational interests. Hitting ships, but also infrastructure. One day after the attack on the oil tankers, the Sea Babies attacked the CPC marine terminal in Novorossiyskforcing it to stop operations. Is the third time In just a few months, Ukraine hits this crucial enclave. The emerging equation it’s clear: disabling ships is just one part; degrade the infrastructure that allows oil exports, another even more destructive for Moscow. Ukraine is applying a dual strategy that suffocates the Russian oil system at both ends: the ships that transport the crude oil and the points where they are loaded. The result is a predicted fall of 35% in Russian oil revenues in November and a fiscal impact that already force unpopular measures how to increase VAT or suspend payments to veterans, a sign that the Kremlin’s “war economy” is beginning to feel the accumulated pressure. A … Read more

that the Russian hypersonic missiles do not reach the target believing that they are in Peru

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He Kinzhalpresented by the Kremlin as a hypersonic missile “invincible” capable of overcoming any Western defense, has experienced a series of technical improvements designed to further increase their lethality and reduce the possibilities of interception. In fact, until three months ago it was a real toothache for Ukrainian defenses. Until they have come up with an idea… and a song. Evolution of a missile. Derived from Iskander-M and launched from aerial platforms such as MiG-31K or the Tu-22M3the missile combines speeds that can approach Mach 10 with a deeply maneuvered terminal profile, capable of executing abrupt descents, sudden lateral changes and trajectories designed to break the radar lock of Ukrainian Patriots. Its ability to hide within mixed salvos, blending in with slower missiles, has drastically reduced interception rates: from 37% in August to just one 6% in September. This has made, in theory, previously interceptable missiles become threats that are very difficult to stop, especially when they are used in massive attacks that combine hundreds of drones and dozens of ballistic or cruise missiles. The hidden weakness. However, despite its speed and maneuverability, the Kinzhal has a technical Achilles’ heel: it depends on the navigation system. GLONASS satellite to correct the natural errors of the inertial system, whose precision tends to degrade over time. TO INS differencethe satellite link can be manipulatedinterfered with or supplanted. And here lies the Ukrainian advance. Although the missile incorporates controlled pattern receiving antennas (taking their number from 4 to 8, 12 and now 16 elements in a Russian attempt to counter interference), these electronic defenses have proven to be insufficient against systems designed specifically for front-line conditions. Ukrainian unity Night Watch has shown that, despite Russian improvements, the Kometa receivers They are still based on technology inherited from the Soviet era, unable to resist a spoofing well executed. This combination of high kinematic complexity and electronic vulnerability creates a tactical paradox: Russia’s fastest and theoretically most advanced missile can be diverted by manipulated digital signals if they manage to infiltrate its navigation cycle. A kind of electronic optical illusion. Music as a weapon of precision. Before the fall of the Patriot effectivenessUkraine has opted for a completely different weapon: Lima, a electronic warfare system which not only blocks the Kinzhal’s satellite communications, but also replaces its navigation stream with false data. This system creates a large zone of electronic denial in which missiles lose their spatial reference, but does so with sufficient precision to induce highly controlled errors. Their spoofing technique is more sophisticated than simple jamming: it does not turn off navigation, but rather manipulates it. Lima sends a signal in binary format that can include any content, but operators have chosen to embed the ukrainian anthem “Our Father Is Flag”both for technical and symbolic reasons. This deceptive signal, once accepted by the missile’s receivers, allows it to believe that it is thousands of kilometers to the west, specifically in Lima (Peru), forcing it to abruptly correct its trajectory. At speeds above Mach 5, these changes generate structural stresses that overcome the resistance of the fuselage, causing the missile to break up in flight or crash without detonating. In this way, Ukraine has managed to divert or destroy more than about twenty Kinzhales in a few weeks, a much more significant achievement given its scarcity and its cost to Russia. The controlled diversion. The results of the Lima system are visible in the impact patterns: craters that appear in dozens or even hundreds of kilometers of the planned objectives, sometimes up to 200 km off course. The change in accuracy is drastic. Although Russia claims that the Kinzhal’s CEP is around 10 meters, leaked images by military analysts show missiles falling with errors of more than 140 meters even in recent attacks. There is no doubt, when a weapon designed to penetrate underground bunkers ends up hitting an open field, the effectiveness of spoofing is demonstrated. In many cases, the missile does not even activate the explosive charge because the impact sequence depends on parameters that are altered by the confusion generated in the guidance system. Night Watch Operators they underline that Lima does not act on a single receiver, but on all of them simultaneously, which nullifies the Russian strategy of multiplying antennas to “jump” between signal sources. Each missile receiver, upon entering the affected area, interprets the false data as valid, which turns spoofing into a kind of “enveloping trap” that is impossible to avoid. A constant evolution. This confrontation between hypersonic missile and spoofing techniques illustrates the character of “cat and mouse” that defines contemporary electronic warfare. Russia adjusts software, redesigns terminal profiles and multiplies antennas, and Ukraine responds by creating systems that replace the entire satellite data constellation by a corrupt flow impossible to filter. In fact, the United States and Western companies are already working on technologies capable of detecting or neutralizing spoofing, as Russia explores more robust guidance systems. For now, however, the electronic advantage is Ukrainian: the weapon that Putin called as “invincible” and “capable of overcoming any Western defense” is falling into empty fields, breaking up in mid-flight, or drifting harmlessly away. At the same time, the technique also affects other russian missiles that transit through the interference zone, expanding the defensive range without the need to intercept one by one. The strategic lesson is clear: in a conflict where Russian industry produces only between 10 and 15 Kinzhales a month, losing them to electronic manipulation is a disproportionate blow to the Kremlin’s offensive capacity. Speed ​​vs information. In short, the confrontation between the Kinzhal and the Lima EW system is a reminder that military superiority no longer depends only on speed, armor or explosive power, but on who controls the flow of information. The missile can fly at Mach 10 and be almost impossible physically intercept, but if its guidance system interprets that it has been “teleported” to Peruall its kinetic energy turns against itself. For Ukraine, this achievement represents the opening of … Read more

A 28-page US document has brought peace in Ukraine closer than ever. The problem is that it is the translation of a Russian text

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And suddenly a 28 page document unpublished to date has suddenly entered as a missile in the negotiations of the war in Ukraine. Promoted by Washington, it has unleashed a diplomatic storm in Europe and in kyiv because, far from having been prepared with the main parties involved, it had been conceived in discreet negotiations between the American businessman Steve Witkoff and the Russian envoy Kirill Dmitriev, with the participation of Jared Kushner and the late endorsement of Trump. The origin of a plan. The result of these meetings was a text that Europe and Ukraine had not seen and that, to further alarm (according to one Bloomberg exclusive), preserved the linguistic structures typical of an original written in Russian, confirming the suspicions that Moscow had achieved filter your vision of the war in a document presented as a US initiative. The pressure exerted by Dan Driscoll (a close ally of JD Vance) on European and Ukrainian diplomats, urging them to accept territorial concessions in a matter of days, ended up setting off all the alarm signals. For European governments, which considered themselves central partners in any peace negotiations, the origin of the plan became a strategic question: they needed to know who had written it and with what objectives before sitting down to discuss. This information gap triggered a race against time to stop the imposition of a text that, in its initial form, was not only surprising for its demands, but also for its obvious alignment with Moscow’s interests. Territory, legitimization and a threat. The most explosive section of the American plan required that Ukraine will withdraw of the fortified urban centers that it still maintains in Donetsk, breaking the “belt of fortresses” that has slowed the Russian advance since 2014. This withdrawal would not only imply the displacement of tens of thousands of Ukrainian citizens, but it would open a corridor that would leave exposed to key cities like Dnipro and Zaporizhzhia. To make matters worse, the document proposed that the occupied areas be recognized as “de facto Russian”a more favorable formula for Moscow than the already problematic “de facto under Russian control”, and which, in practice, brought the international community closer to accept territorial changes achieved by force. Added to this was the idea of ​​converting the evacuated territories into a demilitarized zone whose violation by Russia (not an implausible scenario given recent history) would allow Moscow to open a new, even deeper offensive in the future. From the Ukrainian perspective, accepting this point would be sowing the conditions for a future war in worse terms, reinforcing the impression that the document did not seek a stable peace, but rather formalized a strategic result that Russia has not been able to obtain through military operations. Security cut and promises broken. The security guarantees included in the plan were vague to the point of irrelevance: they promised “reliable protection” without detailing mechanisms, but simultaneously prohibited Ukraine from entering never in NATOprevented the stationing of allied troops in its territory and forced kyiv to modify its Constitution to renounce accession. For a country marked by the experience of Budapest Memorandum (formal guarantees that prevented neither the annexation of Crimea nor the 2022 invasion), accepting an even more ambiguous framework would amount to to be left helpless facing an aggressor who has systematically broken all previous agreements. Red lines. The absence of a commitment type Article 5 and the refusal to allow training missions or deterrence forces on Ukrainian territory reinforced the conviction that Ukraine would be trapped between a strengthened Russia and a West that would reserve the right to “diplomatically support,” but not to intervene. This component fueled rejection in European capitals, which consider it essential that Ukraine keep an army strong as a land barrier that protects the continent. Limit to 600,000 troops to the only country in Europe at war, without imposing a similar restriction on Russia, was perceived as covert disarmament and a prelude to a future Russian offensive. Amnesty and frozen assets. One of the most shocking elements of the plan was the proposal of a general amnesty and Ukraine’s renunciation of any legal claim about war crimes, deportations or deliberate destruction of infrastructure. For an exposed population to documented atrocitiesthis clause meant not only the denial of justice, but also the elimination of the legal basis that allows Europe to advance the reparations loan backed by frozen Russian assets. That loan, of 140,000 million of euros, is considered by the EU as the more solid path and less expensive to sustain Ukraine during the postwar period. The US plan not only made it unviable, but also redistributed those funds in an unusual way: 100 billion would go to a US investment vehicle that would deliver half of its profits to Washington, another 100 billion would be contributed by Europe and the rest would go to a joint fund with Russia. For Berlin, Paris or Warsaw, the message was clear: Russia would obtain indirect financial relief while the Europeans would see their most effective tool of strategic pressure weakened. The attempt to force kyiv to renounce all moral and legal responsibility for the aggressor reinforced the perception that the plan sought to resolve the war “quickly,” not “fairly.” The Russian strategy. Since the beginning of the invasion, Moscow has not changed their fundamental demands: more territory in the east, military neutralization of Ukraine and permanent veto on its accession to NATO. This strategic immobility, together with gradual advances on the front, has allowed it to capitalize on Western fatigue, the political fractures in kyiv and transatlantic tensions. For the Kremlin, the leaked plan demonstrates that its commitment to prolonged resistance, military pressure and the erosion of Western will is bearing fruit. Putin openly celebrated it, affirming that the document could serve as a basis and that rejecting it would only lead to new Ukrainian defeats. Likewise, Moscow has hinted that even a signed agreement could be used as leverage to resume the … Read more

We believed that nothing would surpass the Russian robot that ended up on the ground. Until they made one dance in front of Putin

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When it seemed that the humanoid robotics board was dominated by the United States and China, with proposals such as Neo from 1X startup or the Unitree G1 —which even starred in a moment at the Xataka NordVPN 2025 Awards—, Russia decided to make a move with AIDOL, presented as “the country’s first domestic anthropomorphic robot with AI.” The problem was that its debut did not exactly show technological stability: the robot began to wobble, lost its balance and ended up falling face down in front of the cameras. All this with the music of ‘Rocky’ playing in the background. The scene went viral in a matter of hours, overshadowing any technological message that the manufacturer intended to convey. The explanations came quicklybut the public conversation was filled with parodies and memes. In a context where every step in robotics is also measured in terms of reputation, Russia needed a response that showed more than just a failed prototype. Green, the technological replica of Russia. Now, the images arriving from Moscow show a project of a very different nature. Green is an AI-powered humanoid robot that, according to its creators“can move independently and interact with targets in real space.” All development, from mechanical design and electronics to GigaChat-based artificial intelligence, has been carried out by Sberthe country’s largest bank and an increasingly visible player in the Russian technological ecosystem. The humanoid that danced in front of Putin. His debut was very different from that of AIDOL: Green was presented at the conference Artificial Intelligence Journey 2025where he spoke a few words and then, as we can see on YouTubedanced in front of the Russian president, Vladimir Putin. “My name is Green. I am the first humanoid Russian robot that has embodied artificial intelligence. This means that I am not just a program on a screen, but a physical embodiment of technology. I was created by Sber engineers,” the robot said before beginning its demonstration. According to Sber, Green incorporates more than a hundred motors and a large number of sensors, allowing it to maintain balance even during rapid and coordinated movements. This time, the presentation did not only seek to surprise, but rather to convey control, stability and a more mature image of the Russian commitment to humanoid robotics. What it means for AI to become embodied The idea of ​​embodied artificial intelligence, according to Sber, goes beyond running models on a screen. It is not just about responding to what a user writes, but about interpreting the environment through sensors, cameras and microphones, processing that information in real time and physically acting. It means providing technology with perception, movement and the ability to make decisions in real situations. That approach proposes a model where hardware is built around artificial intelligence, and not the other way around. What is Russia looking for with humanoid robots? It remains to be seen whether humanoid robots will end up integrating into everyday life, as anticipated by Elon Musk and other figures in the sector. But, should that scenario materialize, Russia wants to ensure that it will have models developed within its borders. Its strategy aims to build technological sovereignty not only in the hardware of the automata, but also in the AI ​​models that drive them and in the infrastructure necessary to train and execute them. For now, there is no information on whether Green will ever become a commercial product or how much it might cost. It is still a technological demonstration and not a robot designed for the market. It is also not easy to place Russia within the global race for humanoids, because there is still no clear data on their real development, their autonomy or their possible applications. What it does seem is that, for the moment, the United States and China are setting the pace in this industry, with more consolidated and visible projects. Images | Kremlin In Xataka | Satya Nadella made the world love Microsoft again. AI is making people hate it again

They have published the plans for the future Russian nuclear bomber. And the worst thing for Moscow is that the West now knows how to deactivate it

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The last time Russia’s bombers made the news was to verify a unprecedented assault in the Ukrainian war. It happened with the Spiderweb operation that kyiv carried out in the heart of the Moscow air bases, when a swarm of more than 100 drones hidden in trucks managed to destroy an important part of the Russian fleet of strategic bombers. The truth is that Russia was developing an unprecedented bomber to renew its fleet, although there are now doubts that it could materialize. The fragility of an industry. The international intelligence network InformNapalmin cooperation with the Fenix ​​cyber center, has revealed one of the largest information blows against the Russian military-industrial complex since the start of the war in Ukraine. The data, obtained after infiltrating the internal systems of the Russian company OKBM (key supplier of components for strategic aviation and the space sector), show Russia’s deep dependence on foreign machinery and reveal classified technical information of two programs considered pillars of its new generation aviation: the stealth bomber PAK DA “Poslannik” and the Su-57 fifth-generation fighter. And more. According to InformNapalmthe stolen files were used for months for the benefit of the Ukrainian Defense Forces and allied countries, which amplifies the impact of the leak both at the operational and political levels. Between ambition and sanctions. The PAK DA, designed by Tupolev to replace veterans Tu-95 and Tu-160represents the Russian attempt to create a subsound strategic bomber flying wing with stealth capability, intercontinental autonomy and dual nuclear and conventional capability. Conceived since the early 2000s, the project has suffered chronic delaysbudget problems and a persistent inability to consolidate a national production chain. The leaked documents include coded hydraulic system specifications like 80RSh115responsible for opening the bomb bay hatches of Poslannik-1, and confirm the existence of a classified contract between Tupolev and OKBM which requires absolute confidentiality and allows it to be terminated if state secrecy is violated. Technical documentation with engineering drawings and specifications for the RSh type box used in the PAK DA bomb bay system Extra page. Not only that. Apparently, a additional annex (called Supplementary Agreement No. 7) details the scheduling of the production phases between 2024 and 2027, a calendar that is now more than compromised by the scandal and the deterrent effect of European sanctions. Technological dependence. The filtrationFurthermore, it reveals a structural contradiction: the Kremlin’s discourse on industrial sovereignty contrasts with the reality of a system that cannot sustain its own projects. no western technology. OKBM, an essential part of the gear that produces actuators and transmission systems for the Su-57 and the PAK DA, depends on CNC machinery imported from Taiwan (Hartford HCMC-1100AG and Johnford SL-50 models) and Serbia (Grindex BSD-700U grinding machine). The equipment was purchased through subsidies from the Ministry Russian Ministry of Industry and Commerce, which shows that the State itself finances the evasion of international sanctions. This framework (a mix of obsolete engineering, technological dependence and state bureaucracy) has become a strategic vulnerability that compromises Russia’s ability to sustain complex long-term programs. Supplementary agreement confirming the continuation of the contract of the PAK DA component under the revised technical code 80RSh A failed industrial pattern. The leaked internal emails They also include documentation on RSh-65 systems of hinge and transmission used in the weapons compartments of the Su-57, the fifth generation fighter that Moscow presents as a symbol of its technological autonomy. However, the materials confirm that production remains subject to the same bottlenecks than the PAK DA: lack of critical parts, dependence on foreign suppliers and delays caused by a shortage of precision tools. Despite public investment and the expansion of plants in Kazaninternal audits attribute the delays to the departure of international manufacturers from the Russian market after the invasion of Ukraine. The political coup. After the analysis of the documentsthe European Union officially included OKBM in its 19th sanctions package on October 23, 2025, recognizing its central role in Russian strategic weapons production and restriction evasion operations. This decision, directly motivated by the findings, confirms how cyber intelligence has become a battlefield expanse: a space where the exposure of industrial vulnerability can be as decisive as a physical attack. The operation, named OKBMLeaksis announced as the first chapter in a series of publications aimed at documenting the structural dependence of the Russian military sector on foreign technology and showing the erosion of its productive capacity. The Russian mirage. He OKBM case illustrates the distance between the Kremlin’s rhetoric about self-sufficiency and the material reality of an industrial complex sustained by imported parts, inherited engineering, and a network of opaque middlemen. If the PAK DA was to symbolize Russia’s entry into a new era of strategic aviation, the leak shows that the project is today a promise threatened by sanctionsproduction necks and lack of technological substitution. The vulnerability revealed transcends the technical: it reflects the accumulated cost of two decades industry dependency global and exposes the difficulty of sustaining a prolonged war without the support of a fully autonomous industrial base. In short, the scandal not only reveals aeronautical secretsbut rather it exposes the structural fragility of contemporary military Russia, whose defense apparatus seems increasingly sophisticated in its designs, but more than precarious in its actual capacity to manufacture them. Image | Russian Defense Minister, InformNapalm In Xataka | A 20-year-old technology led Ukraine to Russian bombers. Moscow’s answer comes from China: a laser cannon In Xataka | In 2024, Ukrainian trucks disguised as “home” entered Russia. Now they have dynamited their main air bases

In Ukraine we had seen armored vehicles from Mad Max, but the latest Russian invention has left everyone speechless: assault “hedgehogs”

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Last June, several images captured by reconnaissance drones of the Ukrainian forces sighted a unprecedented Russian offensive: Waves of two-wheeled troops launching motorcycle charges to break the kyiv front. If the scene seemed like a still from Mad Max, shortly after it would become reality with the appearance of trucks that we saw in the movie. The latest: in an unprecedented turn of the screw, Moscow has brought out its assault “hedgehogs” The tank turned into a “hedgehog”. The recent appearance of a T-80BVM Russian equipped with an extreme structure of steel cables along with foliage and tree branches, described as an “assault hedgehog”offers a revealing picture of the state of mechanized warfare in Ukraine. The photographs, broadcast by the channel Vodohray Telegramshow a T-80BVM with an anti-mine roller TMT-K and a T-72B3 with a KMT-7, both wrapped in dense cable cages covering the chassis, tower and top. On the T-80BVM, in addition, a electronic warfare system. This modification, primarily intended to thwart FPV drone attacks, represents the rapid adaptation of the battlefield to a threat that has completely altered the relationship between armor, mobility and survivability. And more. The structures that are seen look for prevent direct impact or cause drones to become trapped or damaged before reaching vulnerable points. However, the additional protection noticeably increases weightvolume and operational complexity: tanks become slower, more visible and difficult to maneuver in urban or forested areas. Still, the fact that these modifications arise not only from field improvisations but also from organized units highlights the extent to which drone warfare is redefining the very form of ground combat. T-80BV in the Kubinka tank museum Evolution of the T-80BVM. He original T-80developed in the late 1970s, was conceived as an elite tank capable of combining firepower with exceptional mobility thanks to its gas turbine engine. This feature made it faster and quieter than other Soviet models, which made it a symbol of military modernity in its time. With the dissolution of the USSR, many T-80s were stored, but the version T-80BVM (introduced in the 2010s) introduced important improvements: Relikt reactive shieldingmore modern optical and thermal systems, and mechanical adjustments to increase reliability, especially in cold environments. In Ukraine, where a war of attrition is being fought with very dynamic fronts, the T-80BVM has been used like crash car for quick attacks or penetration maneuvers, but the proliferation of drones has reduced their safety margins, forcing the modification of even a tank originally designed to move quickly and freely. Other armor seen in Ukraine FPV and the collapse of the classics. The expansion of FPV drones (capable of attacking from above or vulnerable flanks) has generated a conceptual crisis for traditional armor. Tower ledges, engine cover and commander’s hatch hinge have become critical points that even a cheap drone can exploit with an improvised payload. For this reason, both Russia and Ukraine have experimented with “cages”“mobile bunkers” and supplementary armor. It turns out that the first versions of these cages, superficial or with rigid bars, were insufficient: the drones learned to maneuver between gaps or detonate just above them. Hence the cable structures They represent a more advanced iteration of that improvised defense: they are more flexible, denser, and more likely to entangle or slow down small aircraft. However, its effectiveness is uneven, depending on the quality of the wiring, the speed of the drone and the ability of the FPV operator to manually adjust its trajectory. Camouflages and protections. we have gone counting before. The war has generated enormous tactical creativity on both sides. They have been seen covered armored of thermal networks to confuse infrared cameras, coated vehicles of tires to absorb shock waves, camouflaged transport with awnings and scrap metal to break silhouettes and even towers protected by improvisations of beams and bars that are reminiscent of shed roofs. Some of these designs seek to deceive reconnaissance drones, others intend just gain seconds before the impact of an FPV, a time that can allow the crew to abort, retreat or request cover. Each innovation introduces new countermeasures: when the cages appeareddrones began to carry loads at an angle, and when jammers appeared, wired drones or drones with more autonomous guidance systems began to be seen. War, in this sense, has become a constant laboratory where adaptation is measured in hours, not years. Uncertainty. Having said all this, the image of the “steel hedgehog” around the T-80BVM is not only curious: it symbolizes a war in which the rules of armored combat are changing at great speed. Tanks are still valuable, but can no longer operate without a dense layer electronic supportinfantry cover and constant surveillance of the nearby sky. The question that emerges is whether these adaptations keep the car useful or whether they represent an attempt to keep a car alive. concept in transformation. For now, the response on the front is pragmatic: any measure that allows us to survive one more mission is welcome, even if it turns a vehicle designed for speed and direct impact into a slow, heavy creature covered in metallic thorns. Because in the war in Ukraine, survival has become the true armor. Image | Telegram, Alan Wilson, ArmyInform In Xataka | An imperceptible hum is wreaking havoc in Ukraine. When it arrives there is no turning back: the Russians are already everywhere In Xataka | The Ukrainian army has been asked what it urgently needs. The answer was clear: no missiles or drones, just cars

OpenAI has turned the global economy into Russian roulette with a single bullet: AGI

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2025 is being the year in which OpenAI has ceased to be a technology company and has become a black hole that attracts capital, expectations and the destiny of companies that move billions, with a ‘b’. Sam Altman has designed a scenario where there are only two possible outcomes: AGI for them or collapse for everyone. Why it is important. OpenAI’s valuation has reached $500 billion as an unlisted company. It has moved more than a billion (also with ‘b’ and it is not a false friend of “billions”) in deals in recent weeks. Those figures only make sense if they get the AGI (Artificial General Intelligence). If not, everything explodes. The panoramic. A year ago, a round of 6.6 billion It seemed like an astronomical figure. Nine months later, 40 billion. Now we talk about 100 billion with NVIDIA. And so naughty. When we reach these magnitudes (and they are repeated) we stop talking about simple capital injections and talk about binary bets on the future of the world economy. The problem is that these figures have dragged other giants to the same precipice. The backdrop. Microsoft was the first to get hooked. Then he considered divorce and since then They are still together, but sleeping in separate beds. Furthermore, OpenAI has achieved something more dangerous: chaining Oracle, AMD and above all NVIDIA, the most valuable company on the planet on the stock market. If OpenAI clears its throat, all NVIDIA knobs jangle. And if NVIDIA falls, it drags down the S&P 500. The domino effect would reach pension funds, corporate spending and the US GDP. And from there, a chain effect for the economy of the rest of the world. behind the scenes. NVIDIA is not only funding OpenAI, it is also guaranteeing some of the debt the startup needs to build its own data centers. Is circular money: NVIDIA sends money in exchange for shares. OpenAI uses it to rent chips from NVIDIA. And those contracts allow NVIDIA to take on more debt to continue financing OpenAI. A loop that only works as long as the music continues playing. When the Titanic began to sink, the orchestra’s musicians were forced to continue playing. Yes, but. AI already works. It is already transforming sectors. Nobody doubts it. You don’t need to be AGI to have value. The problem is that OpenAI does need AGI to justify these insane valuations. They have set up a structure where any slowdown, any sign of doubt, will trigger panic. The money trail. Altman has found in Masayoshi Son to the perfect partner. The SoftBank founder has a history of big bets blowing up and miraculous saves (Alibaba, ARM). The Altman-Masa combination is a capital cannon pointing skyward. But it is also a detonator: if they fail, the explosion will be proportional to the ambition. According to Altman’s analysis, OpenAI has to beat Google before the latter’s TPUs hit the market and change the rules of the game. That’s why the rush. That’s why Atlas. That’s why the agreements with Broadcomconversations with Intel, promises to AMD. It’s not just about building the best AI, it’s about surviving until you get it. The big question. What if another macroeconomic event stops everything before superintelligence arrives? OpenAI is racing against the clock, it needs AGI before the economy trips over its own shadow. Meanwhile, the market rewards these alliances with instant increases. Oracle has multiplied its value just by announcing agreements with OpenAI. Capitalism of expectations: benefits are no longer needed, only promises of a future that does not yet exist. The same thing happens to others because OpenAI is the new King Midas. Decisive moment. This is no longer a bubble that can burst. It is a bet that can fail. And the difference matters. A bet drags down everything around it. OpenAI is already too big to fail without causing a cataclysm. Which makes it probable an Intel-type state bailout if things go wrong. Altman knows that many AI companies will disappear when the euphoria ends. Only the largest will survive. OpenAI plays at being so big that it has to be rescued. It’s already happened with the dotcoms‘. It can happen again. OpenAI has forced a binary scenario: either we achieve AGI or we face a brutal recession. AI works, transforms, improves processes. But that is no longer enough. We need trillions in value created. And if they don’t arrive in time, the collapse will be rapid. And ugly. In Xataka | AI is giving a second youth to unexpected actors: the old guard of enterprise software Featured image | OpenAI, Alexander Gray

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