Russian

Drones are disguising themselves as Russian soldiers, and it’s working

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More than three years after the start of the Russian invasion, the war in Ukraine has transformed into a conflict that seems have no end in sight, trapped in a logic slow wear and cumulative in which each meter gained costs weeks of combat and a constant flow of resources. In this scenario, the border between high military technology and elemental ingenuity to survive has been blurring: drones with AI coexist with improvised traps, robots armed with solutions born of scarcity, and the most advanced innovation It is mixed with the raw creativity of those who fight every day to stay alive. Thus, Ukraine has just found something: speakers. Against a higher power. The Ukrainian command assumes that the conflict has become a war of attrition in which Russia part with advantage structural by population, industry and replacement capacity, so the strategy involves maximizing enemy losses while minimizing one’s own. Oleksandr Syrskyi, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, has described recently made this approach clear: Ukraine cannot win by volume, but it can do so by constantly raising the human and material cost that Moscow must pay to advance, and to do so it has turned unmanned systems into the central axis of its way of fighting, both on a tactical and psychological level. Drones that attack the mind. One of the most striking innovations is the use of drones equipped with speakersused not to directly destroy but to deceive and wear down the enemy. These drones reproduce military vehicle sounds that simulate imminent attacks, forcing Russian units to deploy reconnaissance drones and single-use loitering munitions that cannot be recovered, also revealing their positions. The exchange is radically asymmetric: Ukraine uses a cheap and reusable system to force the adversary to waste valuable and limited resources. The voice in Russian. The most disturbing variant of this tactic takes psychological warfare to a new level, with drones that emit Russian recordings of screams for help, moans or desperate, shocking calls for help. In essence, the drones are disguising themselves as Russian recruits. In a front saturated with tension, these voices explode basic human reflexes and they push Russian soldiers to leave safe positions to check the source of the sound, at which point they are exposed to artillery or attack drones already prepared. It’s not just about killing more, it’s about inducing errors, eroding trust, and turning compassion into tactical vulnerability. The climate in favor. It we have counted before. The thick fog, the freezing rain and the wind have reduced the effectiveness of Ukrainian FPV drones in key sectors, enabling recent Russian advances, but the response has been integrate aerial drones with ground robots hidden in approach routes. These systems detect the passage of vehicles enemies and transmit precise data to operators who position attack drones at low altitudeusing the fog itself as cover and waiting in ambush until the objective enters the impact zone, a solution that has proven to be effective in stopping armor without exposing infantry. Armed robots so as not to risk. The use of armed unmanned ground vehicles illustrates the extent to which Ukraine seeks to replace soldiers with machines in lethal missions, as demonstrated by the use Droid TW 12.7equipped with a heavy machine gun M2 Browning. counted this week Insider an example. It happened in a night ambush, when this system was able to destroy a transport Russian armored vehicle MT-LBpierce its armor, incapacitate the crew and eliminate the transported infantry, showing that these UGVs are no longer experiments, but combat tools designed to take risks that previously fell on people. Extreme ingenuity where there is no margin. Constant pressure and supply shortages have reinforced a culture of improvisation in which damaged drones are reused like explosive traps, buildings they become in improvised weapons and unexploded Russian ammunition launches again against enemy trenches. This ingenuity not only maximizes resources, but also fits with the general logic of attrition: each recovered object and each improvised trick reduces logistical dependence and maintains offensive capacity even in adverse conditions. Laboratory of the future. In the end, this entire set of tactics relies on a Ukrainian industry that has accelerated the development of drones with better navigation, computer vision, artificial intelligence-assisted control and swarming capabilities, sending them quickly to the front to be tested in real combat. The result is a continuous cycle of adaptation in which technology and doctrine they evolve togetherturning the front into a test bed (it has been for virtually three years) that is not only shaping the course of the current war, but also the way future conflicts will be fought. Image | RawPixel In Xataka | The new episode of terror in Ukraine does not involve missiles or drones: it involves leaving a city without cell phones In Xataka | Shahed drones were a piece of cake for Ukraine’s helicopters. Russia has just transformed them into its biggest nightmare

The only Russian access gate to the ISS remains out of service. And that is forcing NASA to take action

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“We are taking a very serious risk; we have no technical reserves for platform number 31; There is only one position for Soyuz-2 launches (in Baikonur),” warned Dmitri Rogozin, then director general of Roscosmos, on January 25, 2022. That wake-up call went almost unnoticed, but today it takes on unexpected weight. What was then described as a structural vulnerability has become an immediate problem for Russia’s ability to reach low orbit. And, in turn, for the operational balance of the International Space Station. That reflection of 2022 seemed distant until the last takeoff from Baikonur showed that the lack of redundancy is no longer a hypothetical risk. Platform 31/6, from where manned missions and freighters take off to the ISS, was damaged after the launch of Soyuz MS-28 (Expedition 74). The ship docked without problems, but the ramp did not pass the test. From that moment on, the question stopped being technical and became operational: what does it mean for the only infrastructure configured for these missions to be out of service from one day to the next. What happened in Baikonur and how is Russian access to the ISS? The first images of the Baikonur complex after the launch showed that the incident had not been minor. The service platform located under the rocket, a mobile structure of about 20 tons used for access prior to takeoff, a fall appeared in the ramp pit. According to sources consulted by Ars Technica, everything indicates that it was not secured correctly and was ejected by the thrust of Soyuz-2. Roscosmos admitted damage to “several elements” of the complex, although without going into details. The visible magnitude of the impact suggests a more complex repair than the official message indicates. Condition of damaged platform in Baikonur, Kazakhstan Now, one of the least visible elements of the Russian program is the diversity of platforms from which the different Soyuz take off. However, only a subset of them meets the technical and orbital conditions to send crew or cargo to the ISS. That detail explains why the damage in Baikonur generates such an immediate impact on international planning. Current overview of the main ramps: Baikonur, Kazakhstan. Site 31/6 (Soyuz-2): ramp used for manned missions and Progress freighters. Currently not operational. Baikonur, Kazakhstan. Site 45 (Baiterek/Soyuz-5): future candidate, still in the testing phase and without certification for missions to the ISS. Baikonur, Kazakhstan. Gagarin’s Start: symbolic installation of the Soviet program, today deactivated and in the process of becoming a museum. Plesetsk, Russia: designed for high and polar orbits, it is not suitable for reaching the inclination of the ISS. Vostochny, Russia: in use for cargo missions, but not configured for crewed flights or missions to the ISS. The temporary paralysis of the Russian capacity to launch missions to the station affects a decisive element of the orbital ecosystem: the Progress freighters. These ships not only transport supplies for the Russian segment, but also provide the fuel necessary to periodically raise the orbit of the ISS and use their thrusters to assist in attitude control. Other ships, such as Dragon or Cygnus, have demonstrated ability to contribute in part to these tasksalthough they do not cover all uses of Progress. NASA’s response was not long in coming. According to internal planning cited by Ars Technica, lThe agency has advanced two Dragon cargo missions to ensure sufficient operating margin in the coming months. CRS-34, initially scheduled for June 2026, moves to May, and CRS-35 moves from November to August. One source describes these changes as a “direct result” of the Baikonur incident. The goal is simple: ensure that the station has supplies without depending on the uncertain schedule of upcoming Progress missions. Launch of Soyuz MS-28 from Baikonur on November 27, 2025 From the outside, the agency has insisted that the station maintains sufficient capacity for the maneuvers of reboot and attitude control and that no immediate impacts are expected. Everything seems to indicate that the rescheduling of the Dragon missions works as an additional cushion. Roscosmos claims to have of the necessary spare parts and maintains that the repairs will be completed “in the near future.” However, the official estimate contrasts with the valuations collected by the Russian newspaper Kommersant. In that publication, Aleksandr Khokhlov, a member of the St. Petersburg branch of the Russian Cosmonautics Federation, maintains that the repairs could be prolonged from half a year to more than a yeardepending on the actual extent of the damage. Added to this are the extreme temperatures in Kazakhstan in winter and the budgetary pressure derived from the war in Ukraine. What happened at Baikonur reminds us that the architecture of the station depends on both technical decisions and political priorities. NASA has already reinforced its operating margin and now the question is how Russia will respond to a setback that reveals the lack of redundancies in its infrastructure. The pace of repair and the willingness to sustain their participation will mark the stability of the program in the coming months. Ultimately, this episode anticipates the challenges of a stage in which the ISS requires more effort than is sometimes visible. Images | NASA (1, 2, 3) | Roscosmos In Xataka | We already know when the interstellar comet 3I/ATLAS will be closest to Earth and what’s better: how to see it

That Chinese and Russian bombers patrol together is not surprising. That they do it against Japan and South Korea has had an immediate response

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The growing synchronicity between China and Russia in the airspace of Northeast Asia has ceased to be an anomaly and has become an increasingly calculated strategic pattern. The problem is that the last joint patrol between both nations once again demonstrated how the airspace has been transformed into an area of ​​maximum tension. Strategic pressure. The last patrol joint Sino-Russian has certified that the airspace around Japan and South Korea has been transformed into a zone of permanent friction. Russian Tu-95 and Chinese H-6 bombers, escorted by J-16, made a circuit that forced Tokyo and Seoul to deploy fighters as the formation traversed corridors where any mistake can escalate quickly. The flight, although it fits in annual exercises between both countries, occurred just after Chinese J-15 fighters launched from the Liaoning aircraft carrier They will activate their radars of fire against Japanese F-15s, an act considered equivalent to announcing an imminent attack. For Japanthese maneuvers are no longer simple demonstrations of force: they symbolize coordinated pressure in response to its increasingly declared involvement in the defense of Taiwan, a stance that China considers a direct provocation. “It is a serious concern for national security,” has settled the Japanese minister. South Korea and a pattern. In parallel, South Korea had to mobilize your aviation when seven Russian and two Chinese aircraft entered the KADIZ without warning, a practice recurring since 2019. Although the zone does not constitute sovereign space, its systematic violation allows Beijing and Moscow to measure reaction times, saturate surveillance and normalize incursions that, in other circumstances, would have been interpreted as signs of crisis. The aircraft remained about an hour before withdrawing, on a route that overlaps both the Chinese defense zone and disputed areas between Tokyo and Seoul. This routine erodes stability: forces South Korea to invest resources, exposes regulatory divergences (Russia does not even legally recognize the existence of KADIZ) and builds an environment where the exception becomes an operating habit. japanese fighter The Japanese doubt. The background of this escalation we have been counting and started with the comments from the Japanese prime minister, who stated that a Chinese attack on Taiwan would be an existential threat to Japan. The message, aligned with the doctrine of collective self-defense, meant for Beijing a crossing of red lines that unleashed diplomatic and economic reprisalsaccompanied by a notable increase of his military activity near Okinawa and especially Yonaguni, the closest Japanese point to Taiwan. So, Tokyo plans to deploy electronic warfare units and air defense systems, reinforcing an island whose location makes it both a shield and a priority objective. For Japan, this militarization is a necessary response. For China, it is an indicator that Tokyo is willing to integrate more actively in an eventual scenario of support for Taiwan. Wear tool. China-Russia joint patrols are no longer isolated exercises, but expressions of increasing coordination spanning from Alaska to the Sea of ​​Japan. They integrate bombers, fighters, early warning aircraft and synchronized maneuvers that show a willingness to project power and generate a constant cost to the region’s defensive systems. In addition to their military value, these missions have a clear political objective: underline that the airspace over Japan and South Korea is not a monopoly of their Western allies, but rather an environment in which Moscow and Beijing can operate freely and predictability. At a time when China responds With every Japanese gesture on Taiwan, this cooperation acts as a pressure amplifier and a reminder that Tokyo could be confronted with two powers at the same time. Fragile balance. The combination radar-locksflights in identification zones, maneuvers without warning and diplomatic tensions accumulated has created a climate where an unforeseen incident could escalate quickly. Japan reinforces its military presence, South Korea adjusts its protocols and China and Russia intensify their joint missions, raising the level of structural friction. As Taiwan establishes itself as a strategic epicenter, nearby air routes become permanent contact lines and every approach, every response, every silence on a radio frequency can be interpreted as a signal. In other words, a wrong calculation can transform an annual patrol in the trigger of a broader regional crisis. Image | CHINESE GOVERNMENT, US Air Force In Xataka | If the question is how far the tension between China and Japan has escalated, the answer is disturbing: they are targeting each other. In Xataka | China has just shown Japan a diplomatic dart that it had been keeping for decades: World War II

An “invisible” Russian submarine has set off alarms in the Arctic. Europe’s response: Atlantic Bastion

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The launching of the Khabarovskthe new and ultra-quiet Russian submarine capable of deploying nuclear torpedoes Poseidonhas reactivated a fear that had been latent for decades in cities like London: the possibility that the naval balance of the Atlantic is once again tilting in favor of Moscow. The response from the United Kingdom has been forceful, and it is called Atlantic Bastion. Submarine warfare. Although the public image of the Russian threat usually revolves around research vessels like Yantarsuspected of mapping and potentially manipulating underwater cables and pipes, European specialists know that what is truly disturbing lies much further down. Russia has spent decades reducing the acoustic signature of its submarines to levels that they border on invisibilitycombining new propulsion systems, composite coatings and virtually undetectable cooling pumps. In this environment, where silence is power, a ghost submarine with nuclear capacity alters not only the sea routes, but the very heart of the strategic infrastructures that connect Europe with the world. UK reinvents itself. Faced with the resurgent threat from Khabarovskthe Royal Navy has launched what they have called as Atlantic Bastiona plan designed to restore British strategic advantage in its own and allied waters. Its origin is not new and it we have counted before: the United Kingdom has been monitoring the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap (GIUK gap) since before the creation of NATO, and the Second World War already demonstrated that controlling that maritime corridor was essential to prevent enemy forces from slipping into the North Atlantic. But what used to be destroyers and acoustic sweeps is becoming a hybrid framework that combines Type 26 frigates equipped with new generation sonar, aircraft P-8 Poseidon capable of patrolling thousands of kilometers and, above all, swarms of underwater drones equipped with artificial intelligence. According to the Ministry of Defensethis architecture aims to detect, classify and follow any enemy submarine that tries to penetrate British or Irish waters, and to do so constantly, autonomously and with an unprecedented range. The algorithms arrive. The core of the project will be Atlantic Neta distributed network of autonomous underwater gliders equipped with acoustic sensors and guided by artificial intelligence systems capable of recognize sound signatures with a level of precision that until a few years ago was little less than the preserve of science fiction. Unlike the SOSUS of the Cold War, based on gigantic fixed hydrophones placed on the seabed, the new generation will be mobile, expandable and adaptable to the routes and behaviors of increasingly soundproof submarines. The ultimate ambition is to deploy hundreds of cheap, persistent units that together create aa surveillance mesh much harder to evade. The metaphor is revealing: if finding a silent submarine is like searching for a needle in an oceanic haystack, modern technology makes it possible to exponentially multiply the number of searching hands. Khabarovk The technological challenge of hunting shadows. However, even with this technological revolution, experts warn that detecting new Russian submarines will continue to be an extremely complex undertaking. Since the 1980s, Moscow has drastically reduced lacoustic emissions of its fleet, which requires combining passive and active sensors and complex configurations such as bistatic sonar, where one vessel emits a pulse and another collects the echo. These techniques require coordination, multiple platforms, and significant sensor density, something that Atlantic Bastionaims to provide but it is still far from being deployed on a full scale. The arrival of the Type 26 frigates, designed to be the flagship of British anti-submarine warfare, is fundamental to this purpose, as is the cooperation with Norway and other allies that are also strengthening their capabilities in the North Atlantic. The Russian Bastion Puzzle. Even if Atlantic Bastion managed to limit the presence of Russian attack submarines in the Atlantic, there is one dimension that no Western system can solve: Russian strategic submarines already they don’t need to abandon its own bastion in the Arctic to threaten Europe or the United States. Its intercontinental ballistic missiles can hit targets thousands of kilometers without moving from the Barents Sea or the White Sea, protected by layers of defenses and favorable geographical conditions. There they play a hiding place lethal where the West cannot penetrate without significantly escalating the conflict. The paradox is clear: the United Kingdom can reinforce its waters and monitor every meter of the GIUK gapbut it cannot deny the Russian nuclear capacity deployed in its natural refuge, a reality that frames the entire British effort within a logic of containment rather than domination. An underwater chess. If you want, Atlantic Bastion ultimately represents the recognition that underwater competition has returned with a vengeance, now fueled for digital capabilitiesdistributed sensors and autonomous platforms that transform the nature of ocean surveillance. The North Atlantic once again becomes a stage silent maneuvers where Russia and the United Kingdom measure their technological resistance in an environment reminiscent of the Cold War, but with algorithms and autonomy as new weapons. A career that is not decided by great battles, but by the ability to listen better, process faster and anticipate invisible movements. In this theater of shadows, the advantage is not whoever shoots the most, but rather whoever is able to detect first (already happens in Ukraine). Thus, Atlantic Bastion aspires to return that capacity to the British, although the contest that is opening now does not look like it will be brief nor simple: In the depths of the Atlantic, the prelude to the next era of strategic rivalry between Russia and the West is underway. Image | SEVMASH/VKONTAKTE In Xataka | A Russian submarine has appeared off the coast of France. And Europe’s reaction has been surprising: have a laugh In Xataka | Russia’s most advanced nuclear submarine was a secret. Until Ukraine has revealed everything, including its failures

In 1934 a Russian aristocrat proclaimed himself king of Andorra. He was actually the craziest scammer of the 20th century.

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Boris Skossyreff was a man of longevity. He died in 1989just turned 93 years old, in a nursing home in Boppardin what was then West Germany. However, even that long existence seems to fall short when we remember the many lives that Skossyreff chained: he was born into a rich family in Vilnius, but the Bolshevik Revolution forced him very soon to leave his country and look for a life, trying his fortune as a swindler, spy, forger, gigolo, translator and even contender for the throne of Andorra. Added to this extensive resume is his status as a troublemaker, born drinker, lover of good bad life, seducer, fortune hunter and possessor of an elastic morality that, among other things, allowed him to act as triple spy (they say that he served as such for Germany, Great Britain and the United States) and survive in concentration camps and gulags, even at the cost of collaborating with the Nazis. Anything to survive. His life may not be exemplary, but it is exciting enough to have made him the protagonist of a documentary and a bookboth titled ‘Boris Skossyreff, the swindler who was king’ and signed by Jorge Cebrián. Reconstructing his story did not only require years of interviews and diving into archives and newspaper archives. As confesses the director and authorthe work has had to go beyond the “myths, half-truths and lies” that surround the figure of Boris to discover the authentic character without “simplifying or romanticizing him.” And the Russian Revolution came Skossyreff’s must have been a life of privileges, comforts and income. At least those were the letters he found when he was born, in 1896, in Vilnius, today the capital of Lithuania but at that time part of the Russian dominions. Theirs was a good family, rich and aristocratic. The problem is that those cards turned against him when the Red Revolution of 1917 broke out. Young Boris had no choice but to run away and look for a life outside the country. He ended up in the Royal Navy British, maintaining a more or less comfortable life based on scams, bad checks and a lot of gossip. In addition to its good perch, they say that Skossyreff was a polyglot (he spoke at least Russian, English, French, German, Spanish and Italian, although he raised the list of languages ​​​​that he knew 20), he took such care of his appearance that he even walked around with a monocle in a prison camp and above all he exuded a charisma that opened doors for him. Among other things, he achieved a Nansen passport which allowed him to move around Europe even with the safe conduct already expired. His wanderings through Great Britain did not last long. From there he ended up going to the Netherlands, where he presented himself as a distinguished aristocrat in the service of the queen, and continued his life journey through Spain, Marseille and finally Spain again, where he ended up in Mallorca. His problems with the law haunt him, but he manages to gain the trust of two women: Marie Louise Parata rich divorcee 14 years older than him, whom he ends up marrying; and Florence Marmonex-wife of an automobile industry magnate, with whom he indulges in a life of debauchery. So many that it ends up forcing him to pack his bags and leave Mallorca. Boris I of Andorra After passing through Sitges accompanied by his lover, the Russian hustler decided to launch himself into the biggest and craziest of all his coups: invent an aristocratic lineage that would make him, he argued, the prince of Andorra. He even introduced himself as Boris I. The fact that he noticed just that portion of Pyrenean terrain is not causality. At that time Andorra was governed by the bishop of Seu d’Urgel and the president of France and presented a series of shortcomings (and potentialities) in which Skossyreff saw a huge opportunity. He encouraged the Andorrans to break with their rulersdelve into their independence and undertake a series of projects to modernize following the example of Monaco. In front, of course, he would put himself, something to which his family tree supposedly (supposedly) entitled him. Skossyreff managed to make noise and aroused the interest of the press. It is counted that even The New York Times (among other newspapers) came to give visibility to that extravagant aristocrat who insisted that he was born to occupy the throne of Andorra. The truth is that Boris was not content with moving papers and launching advertisements. In 1934 He even proclaimed himself Boris I, sovereign of Andorra, a daring move that did not last long. Fed up with his adventures, the bishop of La Seu d’Urgell notified the Civil Guard to stop him. His supposed (supposed) reign lasted just nine days. That could have been the final chapter for Boris Skossyreff, but he managed to navigate the turbulent 20th century, moving through Europe with astonishing ease. It does not matter that the civil war caught him in Spain, that France sent him to a republican refugee camp, that after the outbreak of World War II he ended up in a Dachau concentration camp or that, once Hitler fell, the Russians condemned him to more than two decades of forced labor in the icy Siberia. Like the most seasoned cat, he always managed to land on his feet. To achieve this, he had no qualms about dazzling women who sent him money or taking advantage of his linguistic skills to serve as a translator for the Nazis. If there is an anecdote that portrays his ability to survive, it is the one that circulates about his stay in the Dachau camp, where, makes sure In the documentary filmed by Cebrián, “he did not take off his monocle not even to clean the latrines“. Not even Siberia could put an end to it. In the mid-1950s he managed to return to Germany. He first settled with his French wife, then … Read more

stop importing Russian gas

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Brussels has announced a ban on importing Russian gas at the end of 2027. This is what They confirmed at a press conference the president of the European Commission, Ursula Von der Leyen, and the Commissioner for Energy, Dan Jørgensen. But, beyond the statements, there is an elephant in the room: the European Union has just promised something that it does not know if it will be able to fulfill. A “permanent” veto. According to the official statement of the European Commissionthe Parliament and Council have reached a political agreement to permanently stop imports of Russian gas – not only by gas pipeline, but also liquefied natural gas – and with a very specific timetable: LNG in short-term contracts: prohibited from April 25, 2026. Gas through pipeline in the short term: prohibited from June 17, 2026. LNG in long-term contracts: January 1, 2027. Long-term gas via pipeline: September 30, 2027 (or November 1 with extension if the storage level is not reached). Furthermore, the EU plans to stop importing Russian oil in 2027, something that confirms the Financial Times and that would complete the partial embargo in force since 2022. Even so, Hungary and Slovakia will continue to receive crude oil from the Druzhba pipelinerecently bombed— while their legal exceptions remain in effect. The political message is clear. The reality, less so. On paper, it is the final slam on Russian gas. Von der Leyen celebrated that the veto will allow “deplete Putin’s war chest”, while Jørgensen proclaimed that “blackmail and manipulation are over.” The political message is clear: Europe wants to show that it no longer depends on Moscow to get through the winter. However, consensus is fragile within the EU. The gas veto is official, but not unanimous. The Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Hungary published on his social networks which is already preparing an appeal to the Court of Justice of the EU to overturn the ban, while Slovakia asks to extend deadlines and protect its exceptions. The political agreement exists, but the operational unity is fragile: without real coordination between partners, an energy veto can become a simple declarative gesture. The actual reading is less triumphant. According to DWthe Moscow government accused the EU of precipitating “its own economic decline” by forcing the bloc to turn to more expensive alternatives and a global LNG market where already competes with Asia for each shipment. Brussels, aware of oil precedenthas shielded the veto with a much more severe legal framework. As explained by the Financial Timescompanies that try to circumvent the ban will face fines of up to 3.5% of their global turnover, fixed penalties that can reach 40 million euros and a mandatory system of certificates of origin to prevent Russian gas sneaks in disguise in the form of opaque mixtures, triangulations or indirect re-exports. The truth is even more uncomfortable. Europe still need gas to stabilize its electrical grid and cover demand peaks when the wind does not blow or the sun disappears. According to a report by McKinsey & CompanyEurope would need 75% more flexibility before 2030 to function without that fossil support, while global gas consumption will grow by 26% until 2050, just when it should fall by 75% to comply with the Paris Agreement. Added to this is the structural stress of the European gas system. The main Dutch regasification plants—Gate and Eemshaven— operate at 90–100% capacityjust when Europe faces winter with reserves at 83%, the lowest level since 2022. Spain, despite its large regasification capacity, can barely send 7,000–8,500 million m³ per year to France: the bottleneck is in the interconnections. And a cold wave is enough to destabilize prices, as Bloomberg warns. An accelerated roadmap. Brussels insists that this time there is a plan. Each Member State must be submitted before March 2026 a national diversification plan that details how it will replace the 35 billion m³ of Russian gas that was still entering the EU last year: new suppliers, new infrastructure and new LNG routes. On paper it makes sense. In practice, it means rebuilding in two years an energy system that took four decades to build. Meanwhile, Europe is held together by an unexpected lifeline: the United States. According to Bloombergthe continent has endured in recent months thanks to a boom in American LNG, with exports at record levels. This winter Europe “will probably be fine,” but real abundance will not arrive until the second half of 2026. Any unforeseen event—extreme cold, a rebound in Chinese demand, a technical failure—could strain the system again. And meanwhile, China plays another game. Europe looks at its deposits. China dig deeper. The Asian giant increased its domestic gas production by 5.8% in the first half of 2025, has had 20 years of almost uninterrupted growth, reduced its LNG imports by 22% and is moving forward with the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline, capable of absorbing 50 billion Russian m³ per year. The consequence is inevitable: if Europe stops buying, Russia you have someone to sell to. The precedent that worries Brussels. Here is the main fear: oil sanctions showed that when Europe closes a door, the market opens a window. As we have told in XatakaAfter the partial embargo, a phantom fleet of oil tankers emerged, European traders moved operations to Dubai, crude oil was mixed to hide its origin, and shell companies appeared in the Emirates that operated outside of European jurisdiction. The result was evident: Russian oil never stopped flowing, it simply changed flag, route and documentation. And that precedent is precisely what they now fear in Brussels: that gas will follow the same logic of opacity, triangulations and parallel markets. Europe promises to turn off Russian gas. On paper, it is a historic decision. By 2027, Europe says there will be no trace of Russian gas left in its energy system. In practice, the road is full of cracks: saturated infrastructure, porous sanctions, hesitant allies, a potentially cold winter and an energy transition that advances … Read more

Russian oil never stopped arriving in Europe and this 30-year-old German knows it well because he has earned millions by supporting the system.

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JR Ewing, the oil magnate dallasused to repeat that “the essential thing in this business was to always be one step ahead.” If I lived in 2025, I probably wouldn’t be wearing a Texan hat: I’d be a trader in my late 30s with a laptop, a rented office in Dubai, and a German passport. And perhaps he would look a lot like Christopher Eppinger, the young man who, according to an extensive report in the Financial Timeshas managed to become a millionaire by speculating with sanctioned Russian oil while Europe proclaimed from the rooftops that it was breaking dependence on the Kremlin. Because while Brussels talked about “energy sovereignty” and announced price caps, a parallel ecosystem of nomadic traders, ghost fleets and opaque companies continued to move millions of barrels away from the official radar. In that underground of the global economy, Eppinger found his opportunity. The sanctioned oil never stopped flowing; It simply stopped being visible. And he knew how to make it profitable. When a door closes. Christopher Eppinger, marked since childhood by the chapters of dallas that he saw with his grandmother, he found in the war a window to get rich. The young German moved with the same logic that much more veteran intermediaries have used for decades: special purpose companies in the United Arab Emirates, triangulated operations with India or China, sales contracts for discounted crude oil and the logistics of a ghost fleet that operates on the margins of maritime law. While European governments presented sanctions in solemn press conferences, he took advantage of every crack in the system to buy low and resell high. He didn’t need his own ships, or infrastructure, or even physically touching a barrel: it was enough to know where the opportunities were and who didn’t want to look too closely. Showing an uncomfortable truth. The story of this young German is not an anecdote, but evidence that the sanctioning system never acted as intended. Organization reports like Public Eye show that, between 2023 and 2024 alone, newly created companies or companies relocated to Dubai accounted for more than half of the Russian oil exported by sea, displacing traditional centers such as Switzerland and Singapore. According to Bloombergkey figures in the energy trade, such as Murtaza Lakhani, helped Rosneft reconfigure its export chains through the Emirates to keep flows active despite sanctions. And while much of Europe tried to break ties with Moscow, some countries —like Hungary and Slovakia— took advantage of exceptions to continue receiving crude oil and gas through the Druzhba pipeline. Energy dependence, far from being broken, fragmented into a more chaotic, less transparent and more vulnerable system. In this environment, profiles like Eppinger’s are not only possible: they are almost inevitable. The recipe for enrichment. Eppinger’s method follows a clear logic that the Financial Times details precisely. The first step is to move to Dubai, which has become the “Desert Ireland”thanks to minimal taxation, thousands of special purpose companies created in record time and a confidentiality regime that allows operations without revealing the beneficial owner. The United Arab Emirates does not apply sanctions against Moscow and serves as a perfect platform to move cargo, contracts and dividends without European surveillance. The second pillar is the ghost fleet: hundreds of aging, poorly insured oil tankers, with registrations in opaque countries and with transponders that turn off just when the ship approaches a Russian cargo. These ships They are the heart of parallel trade which has kept Russia exporting above the $60 limit imposed by the G7. The third consists of the Offshore transfers and triangulations. The scheme is simple: buy cheap Russian crude, transfer it to another tanker in international waters, mix it or rename it “Malaysian” or “Indian”, and resell it at an international price. A digital business, fast and — above all — difficult to track. And the fourth element is the ambiguous tolerance of the West. As Bloomberg has detailedthe United States avoided acting harshly for months to avoid causing a global rise in the price of oil. In the EU, exceptions and loopholes allowed non-European companies, although controlled by Europeans, to operate without restrictions. Eppinger moved precisely in that gray space: a legally ambiguous but economically explosive territory. The great gray void where everything is possible. The short answer is: it depends. The long answer is more uncomfortable. According to regulators cited in the different sources, an operation can be technically legal if Russian oil is purchased below the price ceiling, transported to a country that does not apply sanctions and is executed from a legally established entity outside the EU. Switzerland even recognizedaccording to Public Eye— that subsidiaries of Swiss companies established in Dubai are not subject to Swiss sanctioning legislation, as long as they are formally “independent.” This legal architecture allows traders like Eppinger to act without violating the letter of the law, even if they clearly violate its spirit. The question is not so much whether what you do is legal, but why it is possible to do it. Will there be consequences? The cracks in the system are beginning to produce visible effects. On the military front, Ukraine has expanded the war towards Russian energy infrastructure: attacking refineries thousands of kilometers from the front and disabled tankers linked to sanctioned crude oil trading. Russia has lost around 13% of its refining capacity and several regions have suffered queues and gasoline rationing, according to the Financial Times. On the diplomatic and economic level, according to BloombergWashington is already studying specific sanctions against intermediaries in the Emirates, while the United Kingdom has begun to penalize marketing companies with opaque property registered in Dubai. In Europe, pressure is growing on countries that continue to receive Russian energy by land, such as Hungary and Slovakia, identified as leakage points in the system. Eppinger’s business, like that of many others, could have its days numbered if the regulatory fence tightens. For now, it is still profitable. Russia gets richer while Europe … Read more

take down a Russian ghost fleet without the need for humans

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Europe has been dealing with the call for years “ghost fleet” Russian, a network of aging tankerspoorly insured and with opaque owners who have evaded sanctions, turned off transponders, manipulated routes and put European waters at risk with incidents, leaks and dangerous maneuvers. These ships have operated at border of legality to keep afloat energy income from the Kremlin, forcing Brussels to strengthen maritime controls and several coastal states to investigate suspicious incidents near critical infrastructure. The birth of an offensive. The night of November 28 marked a turning point silent but decisive in the war that has pitted Ukraine and Russia for almost three years. A few dozen km from the Turkish coast, far from the usual range of Ukrainian systems and in the heart of Moscow’s logistical rearguard, two Sea Baby naval drones (unmanned, guided by AI and armed with explosive charges weighing more than a ton) rushed at full speed against two oil tankers of the Russian “ghost fleet”the network of aging and opaquely owned ships that Moscow uses to circumvent Western sanctions. The hits against the Kairos and Virat not only showed a technological leap in the range and precision of Ukrainian naval drones, but also sent a strategic message to all actors in the global energy trade: any ship supporting Russian exports can become a military target, and kyiv is no longer limited by the geographic space of the northern Black Sea to impose that cost. The meticulous execution of the attacks (aiming propulsion and rudders to disable, not sink) reveals the extent to which Ukraine is trying to balance military effectiveness with the political risk before international partners, aware that it is hitting an economically sensitive terrain for Türkiye, Kazakhstan and several Western companies with energy interests. How the ghost fleet works. The so-called ghost fleet is one of the pillars that Russia has built since 2022 to maintain its income stream tankers, recruiting hundreds of tankers with decades of service, dubious insurers and convenience records, many of them under African flags like that of the Gambia. The Kairos and the Virat, pointed out by sanctions bodies from the United States, the United Kingdom, the EU, Switzerland and Canada, are perfect examples of this network: very old ships, with questionable maintenance, designed to operate in the legal shadows that allow real owners and routes to be hidden. Its function is key because oil continues to be the Kremlin’s financial key: only in October, Russia entered 13.1 billion dollars for sales of crude oil and derivatives, although the figure already shows a significant decrease compared to the previous year. Damaging these ships (and above all, showing that no part of the Black Sea is safe) turns each transit into a calculated risk. The ultimate goal it is erosive: increase insurance costs, slow down logistics, increase the risk perceived by intermediary companies and force them to reconsider their collaboration with Moscow. He sinking of the M/T Mersin off Senegal, although it is not proven that it was the work of Ukraine, it illustrates the growing deterioration of a fleet that operates with minimum standards. The transformation of the Sea Baby. The Sea Baby have established themselves as the spearhead of an unprecedented Ukrainian naval revolution. Their early versions acted as medium-range explosive platforms; but the updated prototype, shown by the SBU in October, has multiplied its capabilities: 1,500 kilometers of autonomy, high speeds, autonomous navigation supported by AI and up to 2,000 kilograms of payload. Now they can operate anywhere in the Black Sea, from Odessa to the Bosphorus, from Crimea to global oil routes. This expansion underlines an evolution with two simultaneous layers: Ukraine is destroying the historical Russian hegemony in the Black Sea, and it is doing no traditional boatswithout sailors and without risking lives, relying on a naval concept that Moscow has not managed to replicate with the same efficiency. The combination of drones, Western satellite reconnaissance, electronic intelligence and autonomous platforms makes the Russian navy look increasingly corneredforced to disperse fleets, reinforce escorts and operate with a caution that reduces their freedom of action. Geopolitical leap and message to third parties. That the blows occurred a few km from the Turkish coast is not a technical whim: it means that Ukraine has crossed a symbolic and geopolitical threshold. For the first time, it has attacked Russian naval infrastructure in areas where global trade, NATO and maritime law converge. The images verified by BBC show drones hitting ships that were assisted by the Turkish coast guard, in an extremely sensitive environment for Ankara. Türkiye reacted with a very low profilelimiting itself to putting out fires and rescuing crews, aware that openly protesting would go against its difficult balance between Russia, NATO and its own regional agenda. But the message is there: Ukraine is no longer limited to destroying Russian ships within the space that Moscow considered comfortable control; Now it can harass energy trade even when plying international routes. This reconfigures the calculations of insurers, shipping companies and states involved: even Kazakhstan protested after the Caspian Pipeline Consortium terminal was affected, underlining that the Ukrainian campaign is touching multinational interests. Hitting ships, but also infrastructure. One day after the attack on the oil tankers, the Sea Babies attacked the CPC marine terminal in Novorossiyskforcing it to stop operations. Is the third time In just a few months, Ukraine hits this crucial enclave. The emerging equation it’s clear: disabling ships is just one part; degrade the infrastructure that allows oil exports, another even more destructive for Moscow. Ukraine is applying a dual strategy that suffocates the Russian oil system at both ends: the ships that transport the crude oil and the points where they are loaded. The result is a predicted fall of 35% in Russian oil revenues in November and a fiscal impact that already force unpopular measures how to increase VAT or suspend payments to veterans, a sign that the Kremlin’s “war economy” is beginning to feel the accumulated pressure. A … Read more

that the Russian hypersonic missiles do not reach the target believing that they are in Peru

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He Kinzhalpresented by the Kremlin as a hypersonic missile “invincible” capable of overcoming any Western defense, has experienced a series of technical improvements designed to further increase their lethality and reduce the possibilities of interception. In fact, until three months ago it was a real toothache for Ukrainian defenses. Until they have come up with an idea… and a song. Evolution of a missile. Derived from Iskander-M and launched from aerial platforms such as MiG-31K or the Tu-22M3the missile combines speeds that can approach Mach 10 with a deeply maneuvered terminal profile, capable of executing abrupt descents, sudden lateral changes and trajectories designed to break the radar lock of Ukrainian Patriots. Its ability to hide within mixed salvos, blending in with slower missiles, has drastically reduced interception rates: from 37% in August to just one 6% in September. This has made, in theory, previously interceptable missiles become threats that are very difficult to stop, especially when they are used in massive attacks that combine hundreds of drones and dozens of ballistic or cruise missiles. The hidden weakness. However, despite its speed and maneuverability, the Kinzhal has a technical Achilles’ heel: it depends on the navigation system. GLONASS satellite to correct the natural errors of the inertial system, whose precision tends to degrade over time. TO INS differencethe satellite link can be manipulatedinterfered with or supplanted. And here lies the Ukrainian advance. Although the missile incorporates controlled pattern receiving antennas (taking their number from 4 to 8, 12 and now 16 elements in a Russian attempt to counter interference), these electronic defenses have proven to be insufficient against systems designed specifically for front-line conditions. Ukrainian unity Night Watch has shown that, despite Russian improvements, the Kometa receivers They are still based on technology inherited from the Soviet era, unable to resist a spoofing well executed. This combination of high kinematic complexity and electronic vulnerability creates a tactical paradox: Russia’s fastest and theoretically most advanced missile can be diverted by manipulated digital signals if they manage to infiltrate its navigation cycle. A kind of electronic optical illusion. Music as a weapon of precision. Before the fall of the Patriot effectivenessUkraine has opted for a completely different weapon: Lima, a electronic warfare system which not only blocks the Kinzhal’s satellite communications, but also replaces its navigation stream with false data. This system creates a large zone of electronic denial in which missiles lose their spatial reference, but does so with sufficient precision to induce highly controlled errors. Their spoofing technique is more sophisticated than simple jamming: it does not turn off navigation, but rather manipulates it. Lima sends a signal in binary format that can include any content, but operators have chosen to embed the ukrainian anthem “Our Father Is Flag”both for technical and symbolic reasons. This deceptive signal, once accepted by the missile’s receivers, allows it to believe that it is thousands of kilometers to the west, specifically in Lima (Peru), forcing it to abruptly correct its trajectory. At speeds above Mach 5, these changes generate structural stresses that overcome the resistance of the fuselage, causing the missile to break up in flight or crash without detonating. In this way, Ukraine has managed to divert or destroy more than about twenty Kinzhales in a few weeks, a much more significant achievement given its scarcity and its cost to Russia. The controlled diversion. The results of the Lima system are visible in the impact patterns: craters that appear in dozens or even hundreds of kilometers of the planned objectives, sometimes up to 200 km off course. The change in accuracy is drastic. Although Russia claims that the Kinzhal’s CEP is around 10 meters, leaked images by military analysts show missiles falling with errors of more than 140 meters even in recent attacks. There is no doubt, when a weapon designed to penetrate underground bunkers ends up hitting an open field, the effectiveness of spoofing is demonstrated. In many cases, the missile does not even activate the explosive charge because the impact sequence depends on parameters that are altered by the confusion generated in the guidance system. Night Watch Operators they underline that Lima does not act on a single receiver, but on all of them simultaneously, which nullifies the Russian strategy of multiplying antennas to “jump” between signal sources. Each missile receiver, upon entering the affected area, interprets the false data as valid, which turns spoofing into a kind of “enveloping trap” that is impossible to avoid. A constant evolution. This confrontation between hypersonic missile and spoofing techniques illustrates the character of “cat and mouse” that defines contemporary electronic warfare. Russia adjusts software, redesigns terminal profiles and multiplies antennas, and Ukraine responds by creating systems that replace the entire satellite data constellation by a corrupt flow impossible to filter. In fact, the United States and Western companies are already working on technologies capable of detecting or neutralizing spoofing, as Russia explores more robust guidance systems. For now, however, the electronic advantage is Ukrainian: the weapon that Putin called as “invincible” and “capable of overcoming any Western defense” is falling into empty fields, breaking up in mid-flight, or drifting harmlessly away. At the same time, the technique also affects other russian missiles that transit through the interference zone, expanding the defensive range without the need to intercept one by one. The strategic lesson is clear: in a conflict where Russian industry produces only between 10 and 15 Kinzhales a month, losing them to electronic manipulation is a disproportionate blow to the Kremlin’s offensive capacity. Speed ​​vs information. In short, the confrontation between the Kinzhal and the Lima EW system is a reminder that military superiority no longer depends only on speed, armor or explosive power, but on who controls the flow of information. The missile can fly at Mach 10 and be almost impossible physically intercept, but if its guidance system interprets that it has been “teleported” to Peruall its kinetic energy turns against itself. For Ukraine, this achievement represents the opening of … Read more

A 28-page US document has brought peace in Ukraine closer than ever. The problem is that it is the translation of a Russian text

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And suddenly a 28 page document unpublished to date has suddenly entered as a missile in the negotiations of the war in Ukraine. Promoted by Washington, it has unleashed a diplomatic storm in Europe and in kyiv because, far from having been prepared with the main parties involved, it had been conceived in discreet negotiations between the American businessman Steve Witkoff and the Russian envoy Kirill Dmitriev, with the participation of Jared Kushner and the late endorsement of Trump. The origin of a plan. The result of these meetings was a text that Europe and Ukraine had not seen and that, to further alarm (according to one Bloomberg exclusive), preserved the linguistic structures typical of an original written in Russian, confirming the suspicions that Moscow had achieved filter your vision of the war in a document presented as a US initiative. The pressure exerted by Dan Driscoll (a close ally of JD Vance) on European and Ukrainian diplomats, urging them to accept territorial concessions in a matter of days, ended up setting off all the alarm signals. For European governments, which considered themselves central partners in any peace negotiations, the origin of the plan became a strategic question: they needed to know who had written it and with what objectives before sitting down to discuss. This information gap triggered a race against time to stop the imposition of a text that, in its initial form, was not only surprising for its demands, but also for its obvious alignment with Moscow’s interests. Territory, legitimization and a threat. The most explosive section of the American plan required that Ukraine will withdraw of the fortified urban centers that it still maintains in Donetsk, breaking the “belt of fortresses” that has slowed the Russian advance since 2014. This withdrawal would not only imply the displacement of tens of thousands of Ukrainian citizens, but it would open a corridor that would leave exposed to key cities like Dnipro and Zaporizhzhia. To make matters worse, the document proposed that the occupied areas be recognized as “de facto Russian”a more favorable formula for Moscow than the already problematic “de facto under Russian control”, and which, in practice, brought the international community closer to accept territorial changes achieved by force. Added to this was the idea of ​​converting the evacuated territories into a demilitarized zone whose violation by Russia (not an implausible scenario given recent history) would allow Moscow to open a new, even deeper offensive in the future. From the Ukrainian perspective, accepting this point would be sowing the conditions for a future war in worse terms, reinforcing the impression that the document did not seek a stable peace, but rather formalized a strategic result that Russia has not been able to obtain through military operations. Security cut and promises broken. The security guarantees included in the plan were vague to the point of irrelevance: they promised “reliable protection” without detailing mechanisms, but simultaneously prohibited Ukraine from entering never in NATOprevented the stationing of allied troops in its territory and forced kyiv to modify its Constitution to renounce accession. For a country marked by the experience of Budapest Memorandum (formal guarantees that prevented neither the annexation of Crimea nor the 2022 invasion), accepting an even more ambiguous framework would amount to to be left helpless facing an aggressor who has systematically broken all previous agreements. Red lines. The absence of a commitment type Article 5 and the refusal to allow training missions or deterrence forces on Ukrainian territory reinforced the conviction that Ukraine would be trapped between a strengthened Russia and a West that would reserve the right to “diplomatically support,” but not to intervene. This component fueled rejection in European capitals, which consider it essential that Ukraine keep an army strong as a land barrier that protects the continent. Limit to 600,000 troops to the only country in Europe at war, without imposing a similar restriction on Russia, was perceived as covert disarmament and a prelude to a future Russian offensive. Amnesty and frozen assets. One of the most shocking elements of the plan was the proposal of a general amnesty and Ukraine’s renunciation of any legal claim about war crimes, deportations or deliberate destruction of infrastructure. For an exposed population to documented atrocitiesthis clause meant not only the denial of justice, but also the elimination of the legal basis that allows Europe to advance the reparations loan backed by frozen Russian assets. That loan, of 140,000 million of euros, is considered by the EU as the more solid path and less expensive to sustain Ukraine during the postwar period. The US plan not only made it unviable, but also redistributed those funds in an unusual way: 100 billion would go to a US investment vehicle that would deliver half of its profits to Washington, another 100 billion would be contributed by Europe and the rest would go to a joint fund with Russia. For Berlin, Paris or Warsaw, the message was clear: Russia would obtain indirect financial relief while the Europeans would see their most effective tool of strategic pressure weakened. The attempt to force kyiv to renounce all moral and legal responsibility for the aggressor reinforced the perception that the plan sought to resolve the war “quickly,” not “fairly.” The Russian strategy. Since the beginning of the invasion, Moscow has not changed their fundamental demands: more territory in the east, military neutralization of Ukraine and permanent veto on its accession to NATO. This strategic immobility, together with gradual advances on the front, has allowed it to capitalize on Western fatigue, the political fractures in kyiv and transatlantic tensions. For the Kremlin, the leaked plan demonstrates that its commitment to prolonged resistance, military pressure and the erosion of Western will is bearing fruit. Putin openly celebrated it, affirming that the document could serve as a basis and that rejecting it would only lead to new Ukrainian defeats. Likewise, Moscow has hinted that even a signed agreement could be used as leverage to resume the … Read more

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