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The number of Venezuelan casualties after the United States incursion in Caracas and the subsequent capture of Nicolás Maduro varies with the passing of the days and the sources, but it seems clear that it amounts to at least double digits (we speak of up to 100). In any case, another piece of information has now been revealed that amplifies the mission. In reality, Washington’s key weapon did not fire a single bullet. The attack that was not heard. Yes, the American operation in Caracas was not defined by explosions or columns of smoke, but by the sudden silence of radars, radios and command centers, a demonstration of force in which more than 150 aircraft acted in a coordinated manner to enter, hit and leave with hardly any visible resistance. In fact and how explains the Wall Street Journalthe key was not to destroy the enemy, but to leave him blind and disoriented from the first minute, unable to understand what was happening or to react coherently while special forces captured Maduro in the heart of Venezuelan power. The invisible weapon. At the center of that blackout was the EA-18G Growler, an aircraft that does not attack people or physical positions, but rather the opponent’s nervous systemspecialized in locating, jamming and neutralizing radars and communications until turning an apparently solid defensive framework into a collection of mute sensors and useless screens. While stealth fighters and bombers performed deterrence and targeted attack functions, the Growler ensured that the Venezuelan defenses they will never get to see them clearly, demonstrating to what extent electronic warfare has ceased to be a complement and has become the precondition of any modern high-intensity operation. Blind before hitting. The logic applied in Caracas reflects a lesson learned and refined in Ukraine– It is not necessary to physically destroy all enemy systems if you can overwhelm, confuse or fool them until void your operating profit. The Growler can simulate multiple targets on the radar, flood the electromagnetic spectrum with noise, interfere with command links and, if necessary, guide anti-radiation missiles against active emitters, creating temporary windows of absolute superiority that allow helicopters and ground forces to operate with minimal risk even in theoretically defended environments. The Russian defenses that did not fire. They recalled in Insider that the most striking result was that none of the Russian-made air defenses in Venezuela’s possession managed to shoot down a single plane American during the operation, despite the fact that the country had on paper respectable systems such as S-300VM, Buk-M2, Pantsir-S1 and radars of Russian and Chinese origin. The image of airspace simply collapsing under a well-planned operation It has been devastating from a symbolic point of view, because it shows that having advanced systems does not guarantee their effectiveness if they are overcome by a combination of surprise, electronic warfare, stealth and multi-domain coordination. 9A83ME launcher of the S-300VM Antey-2500 missile system Not everything is the system. The Venezuelan failure cannot be explained solely by the technical limitations of the Russian systems, but also due to structural factors such as the state of maintenance, the real integration of the defense network, the quality of command and control and, above all, the training and experience of the operators. An anti-aircraft system is only as effective as the doctrine that supports it and the people who operate it, and in Caracas it became clear that, in the face of a well-trained Western force, even feared equipment can be defeated. reduced to passive spectators if they do not function as part of a coherent whole. Repeating pattern. What happened in Venezuela is not an isolated case, but rather fits with a pattern observed in other scenarios like syria or attacks Israelis against Iranwhere air defenses of Russian origin have shown irregular performance against forces that master electronic warfare and stealth. Although in Ukraine, operated directly by Russia, these defenses have worked betterhave also not achieved the invulnerability that their reputation promised, which reinforces the idea that their effectiveness decreases considerably when faced with adversaries capable of combining interference, cyberattacks, deception and precision attacks. Without triumphalism. There is no doubt, for the United States, about the Caracas operation strengthens confidence in its ability to penetrate airspace defended by Russian systems, but it also emphasizes that this success depends on exhaustive planning and intensive use of invisible capabilities that are not improvised. The lesson is not so much that Russian defenses are useless, but that in the face of an adversary that dominates the electromagnetic spectrumEven feared systems can be neutralized long enough for a decisive operation to take place. The war that is not seen. If you also want, the assault on Caracas leaves an uncomfortable and increasingly obvious conclusion: modern war is decided before the first shotin an intangible space made of signals, links and frequencies, where whoever controls the information controls the result. He Growler He did not fire a single bullet, but its effect It was more devastating than that of many bombs, remembering that in current conflicts lose seeing and hearing is almost always equivalent to losing the war before it begins. Image | COMSEVENTHFLTSenior Airman John Linzmeier, Vitaly V. Kuzmin In Xataka | The war in Ukraine has just met that of Venezuela: that means that its two invaders are facing each other In Xataka | While the whole world looks at oil, Venezuela’s true treasure is hidden in the basements of London: its gold