fighters

Spain’s main problem is not weapons, fighters or drones. It is the number of hands you need to use them.

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In recent years, the defense debate in Europe has revolved almost exclusively around money and technology. It talks about percentages of GDPmodernization and new systems capable of changing the battlefield. However, there is a much less visible factor that ends up being decisive when it comes time to turn plans into reality. A decade of losing muscle. The news Europa Press gave it. Since 2010, the Spanish Armed Forces They have lost 13,300 troops and they carry a structural deficit that the Military Life Observatory describes as chronic. As of January 1, 2025 there were 116,739 soldiers in active service, very far from the legal minimum of 130,000 established by the Military Career Law. The gap ranges between 13,000 and 23,000 uniformed personnel, a figure that is practically equivalent to an entire army within the system itself. Objectives that are not met. Several weeks ago another news item put the target on an enlightening fact: the regulatory framework establishes a maximum of 50,000 officers and non-commissioned officers, but there are only 40,656 dashboardsincluding 227 generals, leaving a wide margin unfilled. In the troops and Navy, the budget ceiling has limited staff numbers to 79,000 for years, although it is barely exceed 76,000 troops. The distance between what is provided for in the law and what is available in the barracks is not temporary, but sustained over time. More budget on weapons, fewer hands to operate them. The strategic debate in Europe has turned towards the modernization of systems and increased spending up to 2.1% of GDPbut the emphasis has not been transferred with the same intensity to the staff. Weapons programs and technological capabilities are expanding, but the number of military personnel is barely growing or even go back. Hence all this leads us to another reality very different from what we usually think: Spain’s main problem is not fighters, drones or new systems, but rather the great number of staff missing to use them and keep them operational. A 2025 that closed in negative. Despite the government’s commitment to increase staff by 7,500 personnel in four years, 2025 ended with 832 fewer soldiers than the previous year. The drop was especially pronounced at the officer level, where a thousand professionals they abandoned or passed to the reserve without sufficient replacement. Although non-commissioned officers and troops registered slight increases, the global balance was once again negative at a time when the international environment demands just the opposite. Lack of interest. The interpretation of these data leaves little room for doubt. The number of places offered has increased, but the proportion of applicants per vacancy has decreased worryingly. In the troop area the ratio has fallen to 4.2 applicants per placefar from the levels of a decade ago. In officers and non-commissioned officers, the descent is even more pronouncedwith fewer candidates and a worse selection margin, which limits the quality of replacement and anticipates problems of generational change. Salaries, mobility and little incentive for promotion. There is much more, as the report points to lower salaries to other bodies of the State and to an accumulated loss of purchasing power that discourages a military career. Constant mobility can imply a higher cost of living and low salary compensationleading many to give up promotions. The result is that “little interest” in progressing within the institution and a structure that ages without sufficient renewal. Stressed and aged. The other elephant in the room: more than a third of the dashboards exceeds 50 years and the troops also show progressive aging, while the reservists have decreased steadily since 2014. For its part, female participation grows slightly up to 13.1%above the NATO average, but it does not compensate for the overall loss of troops. I remembered the newspaper El Mundo that the system is also facing an increase in harassment complaints that adds reputational pressure at a time of low recruitment. Material capacity without critical mass. All this leaves a more or less illuminating map. Spain is investing in capabilities and is committed to increasingly demanding international missions, but it does so with less staff that fifteen years ago. The organizational structures and operational commitments have not diminished, rather the oppositewhile the human base it doesn’t stop shrinking. From that perspective, everything indicates that, if the trend is not reversed, the country may find itself with a future where the Armed Forces are modernized in equipment, but without the critical mass necessary to sustain them over time and respond reliably to an increasingly demanding strategic environment. Image | Air and Space Army Ministry of Defense Spain, Spanish Army In Xataka | Spain has a dilemma that is difficult to solve: call the US or be the last with a fighter jet in danger of extinction In Xataka | Spain has built a laser that shields the backbone of its Navy: the A400M is now ready for combat

China has just crossed a red line in Taiwan. They are no longer drones, they are their fighters shooting “attached” to the Taiwanese F-16s

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China has been tightening the siege on Taiwan for years with pressure constant and calculated: increasingly frequent air raids, naval exercises large scalesymbolic crosses of the midline of the strait and military deployments designed to rememberwithout firing a single shot, that the island lives under permanent surveillance. This strategy of attrition, made of demonstrations of force and controlled ambiguity, has marked the relationship between Beijing and Taipei long before the current pulse reached disturbing levels. One (another) red line. If a few weeks ago we said that China had taken a qualitative step in its military pressure on Taiwan by crossing the island’s airspace with a military dronehas now redoubled its efforts, going from intimidating maneuvers to direct aerial encounters with manned fighters flying meters away and firing flares near Taiwanese planes, an escalation that multiplies the risk of accident and turns intimidation into something much closer to a deliberate clash. during exercises “Justice Mission”J-16 planes of the People’s Liberation Army not only came dangerously close to Taiwanese F-16s when they came to intercept them near the middle line of the strait, but they also arrived to launch flares at close range, a maneuver considered unsafe even by demanding military standards and that marks a before and after in the face of previous, more indirect provocations. From symbolic pressure to physical risk. In just 24 hours, dozens of Chinese aircraft crossed the midline of the strait and penetrated the airspace controlled by Taiwan, showing a pattern of behavior that no longer seems to seek only to saturate radars or send political messages, but rather to put enemy pilots in extreme situations. Unlike radar jamming or the presence of military drones, these encounters centimeters away introduce a human and physical factor. much more dangerouswhere a mistake, turbulence, or knee-jerk reaction can trigger an immediate crisis between China and Taiwan. One of the Chinese J-16 fighters photographed during Chinese People’s Liberation Army military exercises while being monitored by a Taiwanese F-16V aircraft Intimidating maneuvers. The actions were not limited to direct harassment: Chinese fighters used concealment tactics flying close to H-6K bombers to evade radars, revealing itself, according to local Taiwanese media, “ostentatiously” by displaying missiles at close range, in maneuvers compared by observers to historical tricks of military infiltration. They remembered in the Financial Times That this behavior, described by some sources as more typical of a “thug” than a professional pilot, reinforces the feeling that Beijing is testing new risk thresholds to measure the Taiwanese and allied response. A regional pattern. What happened around Taiwan is not an isolated event, but part of a incident sequence in which the Chinese air force has raised the tone towards neighbors like Japan and the Philippinesincluding blocking radar and firing flares against patrol aircraft. In fact, analysts warn that the next logical step in this escalation could be to operate regularly within the 12 nautical miles of Taiwanese territorial airspace, a scenario that would then exponentially increase the risk of collision or armed confrontation. Political pressure and risk of lack of control. If you like, this increase in boldness coincides with those publicized changes in the chain of command China and with political pressure from Xi Jinping for the armed forces to demonstrate their preparation for an eventual conflict, which could be pushing pilots and commanders to take risks that were previously avoided. Under that prism, Beijing would not only have crossed another red line against Taiwan, but would have entered a phase in which aerial intimidation ceases to be a calculated game and becomes a much more dangerous gamble, one with potentially explosive consequences for regional stability and security. appearance of “third parties” on the board. Image | 日本防衛省・統合幕僚監部, Ministry of National Defense In Xataka | China already has drones capable of shooting with surgical precision at 100 meters. Not good news for Taiwan In Xataka | The biggest geopolitical risk on the planet is not Greenland. It’s a smaller island with a disturbing neighbor: Taiwan

A group of Spanish pilots wait in front of Russia for an alarm that will sound 500 times in 2025. They only have 15 minutes to launch their fighters

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A few minutes from Russian airspace, a handful of Spanish pilots live in the most tense routine that exists in peacetime: be ready to take off at any moment from an icy base from the Balticone where the sky is watched as if each blip on the radar could be the start of something bigger. Fifteen minutes. At Šiauliai, a Lithuanian air base that functions as first line of surveillance over the Baltic, the routine can be broken at any second with a siren and a countdown. When the alert goes off (in 2025 alone it did so up to 500 times), the Spanish pilots of the 15th Wing They put on their equipment, get into the vans and run towards the hangars with a single objective: to be in the air in less than fifteen minutes. It is a millimetric mechanic, repeated so many times in training that becomes automaticbecause the mission does not wait for anyone and because in that area an unidentified plane, without a transponder or without communication, can be the beginning of a serious incident. The shadow of an enemy. The function of these quick exits, called “scrambles”is to intercept and escort suspicious aircraft until they leave Allied space or their intentions become clear, and in the Baltic they are almost an everyday language. The route is especially sensitive because it connects Russia with the militarized enclave of Kaliningradand there intersect fighters, surveillance planes and traffic that sometimes fly without a flight plan or without the expected signals. The result is constant tension: some days there are several outings and other weeks everything seems calm, but the feeling is always the same, that the next warning can come when you are resting or half asleep. 15th Wing Fighter Mission since 2004. NATO started this baltic air police in 2004 to protect the space of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, and since then the countries have taken turns in rotation four months so that the umbrella is permanent. Over time, the deployment was expanded to other bases in the region, first after the first Russian invasion of Ukraine and later with further expansion, because the Eastern Front ceased to be a theoretical concept. In recent months, furthermore, the incursions became more disturbing due to a new detail: not only manned aircraft appeared, but also drones that crossed borders and forced us to react quickly. Spain and the fighters. The Spanish contingent arrived in December with more than 200 troops and eleven EF-18Ma modernized version of the Hornet that Spain operates and maintains ready to fly day or night. The planes are armed with air-to-air missiles and the pilots train with night vision goggles, because surveillance does not stop when the sun goes down. Behind each exit there is a system that monitors the sky relentlessly, control centers that detect traces on the radar and a decision chain that, when activated, turns the entire base into a fast, silent and perfectly rehearsed choreography. Drones change the script. The big twist is that now the problem is not only the classic military plane that approaches without identifying itself, but the emergence of cheap dronesslow, low and erratic, more difficult to classify and more complicated to stop with means designed for another era. It we have counted. In September last year, a wave of Russian drones penetrated Polish airspace during an attack on Ukraine, and then there were similar episodess that forced the activation of fighter jets in countries like Romania. In parallel, small unidentified drones began to be seen near airports, bases and sensitive facilities throughout Europe, fueling the feeling of vulnerability and suspect that someone is measuring response times and blind spots. Crow, the anti-drone. For this reason, in this deployment the 15th Wing arrived with a historical novelty for them: the Indra Crow systeman anti-drone defense that adds a different layer of protection to the base and its surroundings. Crow combines radars, cameras and sensors to detect small aircraft and, once located, attempts to take them down using signal jamming, that is, electronic warfare from fixed or mobile positions. Its range not only protects planes and runways, it also covers the nearby city, because the real goal is to shield critical infrastructure and reduce the risk of a cheap drone causing disproportionate damage. The cost dilemma. Behind this adaptation is a problem that NATO is being forced to solve at full speed: intercepting cheap drones with weapons designed to shoot down fighters is an unsustainable equation. Firing expensive missiles from a fighter jet to take down a small aircraft may work, but it turns every defense in a waste and opens the door to volume saturation. That is why procedures and tactics are being reviewed, looking for cheaper and more specific systems, and assuming that the fighter will no longer always be the best tool to put out the fire. The strategic signal. The arrival of fighters with anti-drone protection It reflects a Europe that begins to fortify the sky as if war were already knocking at the door, although it has not yet fully crossed. In the Baltic, each rotation is a political and military message: there is presence, there is a response and there is an intention to fill gaps that did not exist before. Thus, what was previously an almost routine escort and identification mission is becoming a comprehensive defense exercise against hybrid threatswhere the enemy can be a large plane, a tiny drone or a provocation designed solely to check if, when the alarm sounds, there is really someone capable of taking off in those fifteen minutes. Image | Pexels, Pavel Vanka In Xataka | There are “invisible” Russian submarines happily sailing through the Baltic and that has led Europe to unprecedented measures In Xataka | A Russian submarine has appeared off the coast of France. And Europe’s reaction has been surprising: have a laugh

We believed that everything happened because of the new fighters. The F-16 has been in the air for 50 years and continues to sell like hotcakes

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For years we have heard that the future of air combat is called F-35a program associated with stealth, advanced sensors and a very specific idea of ​​Western technological superiority. It’s the plane that makes headlinesbudgets and strategic debates. But while that conversation progresses, there is a much quieter reality that dislodges the story: a fighter designed in the seventies not only is it still in service, but construction continues in South Carolinaand continues to find buyers in 2025. The interesting thing about the F-16 is not only that it continues to fly, but to understand why so many countries continue to bet on it when there are newer alternatives. To answer that question you have to go back to its origin, follow its evolution and look at the present with data, contracts and calendars. It is also advisable to separate promises from real capabilities, because not all air forces buy the “best”, they buy what they can operate on a sustained basis. The secret of a fighter that does not retire The F-16 was born from an internal discussion in the United States about the drift towards increasingly larger, more complex and more expensive fighters. In the early 1970s, the United States Air Force promoted the Lightweight Fighter program to see if a lighter plane could gain maneuverability and be more affordable without sacrificing efficiency. The YF-16 prototype first flew in 1974 and, in January 1975, was selected in the Air Combat Fighter (ACF) competitiona decisive step towards production. The idea was simple: operational performance before unlimited ambition. That philosophy translated into very specific design decisions. The F-16 opted for a compact cell with controls fly-by-wire that allowed finer control and relaxed stability difficult to achieve with traditional systems. The cabin was also part of the approach, with a high visibility dome, a stick side and a reclined pilot position to better withstand G forces. Over time, this approach focused on air-to-air combat expanded. The F-16 incorporated improvements in avionics, sensors and payload capacity that they pushed it towards a multi-role capabilitywith room for ground attack and increasingly demanding missions. In parallel, its international expansion was supported by cooperation, standardization and support programs between allies, which created a broad community of operators. That network remains one of the reasons the plane stays alive. Almost continuous modernization is the bridge between the original design and the F-16 currently rolling off the production lines. In its most recent standards, such as the F-16V and the new Block 70/72updated mission displays and computing, data link systems such as MIDS-JTRS, and a AESA APG-83 radar as a central part of the equipment. These newly manufactured devices are offered with a declared structural life of 12,000 hours. Almost continuous modernization is the bridge between the original design and the F-16 currently rolling off the production lines. Here the question stops being just technical and becomes operational. The F-16 continues to fit because it offers a relationship between capabilities, cost and availability that is difficult to match in many defense plans. It is a well-known aircraft, with acceptable maintenancescalable training and a mature logistics chain, something especially valuable in periods of tension and urgency. In addition, it facilitates interoperability with allies and the integration of Western weaponry in a predictable framework. Recent contracts illustrate that pattern with names and numbers, and are often channeled through government agreements and programs like the Foreign Military Sales of the United States. Slovakia has been receiving new F-16 Block 70 from 2024. Bulgaria has also opted for this modernized aircraft. Taiwan maintains an order for 66 F-16Vs approved in 2019with deliveries and testing affected by publicly acknowledged delays.Bahrain ordered 16 Block 70 and Jordan signed an offer letter and acceptance for eight units. The case of Ukraine introduces a different dimension. Here the F-16 does not arrive as part of a planned modernization, but as rexposed to an ongoing war and the need to reinforce air defense. The transfers have been materialized by the Netherlands and Denmarkand deliveries have been confirmed in phases with a limited level of detail for operational reasons. Beyond the exact figures, the jump is relevant because it introduces a platform compatible with Western doctrines, support and weapons in a real combat environment. Argentina is a different example, but just as revealing. In this case, the F-16 arrives to fill a long gap in air defense capabilities and recover supersonic flight after years without an equivalent fleet. The operation is supported by the transfer of 24 used aircraft from Denmark, with deliveries in sections, and the first batch of six devices arrived in December 2025. For Buenos Aires, the value is not just the plane, but also the training and support package that accompanies it. If we look at the current Western catalogue, the temptation is to think that the future has already been resolved. The F-35 has become the great bet of several allies and, in parallel, Eurofighter and Rafale have continued to grow with new variants, radars and weapons. The problem is that an air force is not measured only by the most advanced aircraft it can buy, but by how many it can sustain, train and deploy on a continuous basis. That’s where the balanced fleet model gains weight and the F-16 falls into place again. And if we look one step further, the conversation is already in the sixth generation. The United States works in NGADEurope pushes FCAS and the United Kingdom has allied with Italy and Japan in GCAPa proposal that aims to redefine sensors, connectivity and cooperation with unmanned systems. But they are programs with long calendars and a very high investment, in addition to the uncertainty inherent in any technological leap. In that gap, the F-16 maintains a clear space, because it offers real and available capacity while the future finishes arriving. Images | United States Air Force (1, 2, 3, 4, 5,) | Volodymyr Zelenskyy | Ministry of Defense of Argentina In Xataka | The Comac C919 … Read more

The fighters and bombers were a warning to Japan. Now China has taken action with a devastating veto: pandas

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The crisis between China and Japan has entered a deeper and symbolically harsher phase, marked by a clear transition from direct military pressure to political, cultural and emotional coercion. It all began after the statements of the Japanese Prime Minister, Sanae Takaichi, stating that a Chinese attack against Taiwan would mean an existential threat for Japan, a phrase that Beijing interpreted as the prelude to a possible Japanese military involvement in a conflict on the island. From warning to punishment. Since those words, China has raised the pulse with a calculated combination of demonstrations of force and indirect retaliation: J-15 fighters illuminating Japanese aircraft with radar from the Liaoning aircraft carrier, joint flights of strategic bombers Chinese and Russians near the Japanese archipelago and a diplomatic campaign that seeks to isolate Tokyo by remembering the Japanese imperial past and its role in World War II. Heaven as a message. The aerial maneuvers They are not isolated incidents, but carefully choreographed messages. The passage of the Liaoning south of Okinawa, the radar jams and the flights of nuclear-capable bombers over the Sea of ​​Japan and the East China Sea are part of a pattern of intimidation that seeks highlight two ideas: that China is willing to escalate and that Japan cannot count on an automatic response from the United States. Washington, focused on stabilizing its relationship with Beijing and ambiguous about its degree of involvement in a crisis over Taiwan, has left Tokyo in an uncomfortable position. Only after the Chinese-Russian flights came a joint response with American B-52 bombers and Japanese fighters, a sign of deterrence that does not clear up the underlying uncertainty and confirms that the regional balance has become more fragile. The pressure changes. But the most revealing turn in Chinese strategy comes when the confrontation has left the strictly military level and has filtered into everyday life. Beijing has urged its citizens to avoid Japan, discouraged Chinese students from enrolling in Japanese universities, cut flights and dropped organized tourism. Added to this is a waterfall of cultural cancellations: concerts suspended, screenings canceled and shows held in empty pavilions following decisions by Chinese organizers. These are not improvised gestures, but a form of selective punishment that seeks to generate visible costs for Japan without crossing military thresholds, a warning addressed both to Tokyo and other countries tempted to express similar commitments to Taiwan. Panda diplomacy. In this context it takes on all its meaning. the withdrawal of the last giant pandas in Japan. Since the normalization of relations in 1972, pandas have been one of the more refined tools of Chinese soft power: iconic animals, formally on loan, that symbolize friendship, scientific cooperation and goodwill, but whose legal ownership always remains Chinese. Over the decades, Beijing has used its transfer, renewal or withdrawal as a political thermometerrewarding fluid relationships and freezing those that come into conflict. “Panda diplomacy” is not folklore, but a carefully designed form of strategic signaling, capable of conveying closeness or disapproval without the need for official communications. Tokyo is left without pandas. The decision to return to China to Xiao Xiao and Lei Leithe last two pandas at the Ueno Zoo, leaves Japan without any for the first time in more than half a century. Although formally it is presented as the expiration of an agreement and a logistical issue, the chosen moment and Beijing’s silence regarding any possibility of renewal make the march of the pandas in a political gesture impossible to ignore. In a city where these animals are a mass phenomenon and a cultural and economic asset, their departure functions as a tangible reminder who controls the symbols of the bilateral relationship. The expectation of hundreds of thousands of visitors saying goodbye to the pandas underlines the extent to which Chinese punishment has moved beyond the strategic level. to the emotional. A calculated climb. The sequence is revealing: first, military warningsafter, diplomatic pressureand finally, sanction cultural and symbolic. China thus displays a manual of gradual coercion that combines hard and soft force to shape the behavior of its neighbors. Japan, far from giving in, maintains its position on Taiwan supported by public opinion increasingly critical of Beijing, while assuming that the bilateral relationship has entered its lowest point since the Senkaku Islands crisis in 2012. The disturbing thing about the episode is not only the removal of some pandas wave concert cancellationbut the clarity with which China has demonstrated that it has multiple levers (military, economic, cultural and symbolic) to respond to any political challenge. And she is willing to use them all, progressively, when she considers that her red lines have been crossed. Image | Alert5, kumachii, Colegota In Xataka | Everything is going great between China and Japan, they are just pointing heavy weapons at each other In Xataka | China has drawn a very clear red line to Japan: being an ally of the United States is good, supporting Taiwan is bad.

Chinese fighters have targeted Japanese fighters over Okinawa. Japan’s response has been forceful: an archipelago of missiles

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The tension between China and Japan has entered a cycle of accelerated deterioration that is no longer limited to diplomatic exchanges or formal protests. In recent weeks, the western Pacific has been the scene of maneuvers increasingly aggressive in which the lines between deterrence, warning and provocation become dangerously blurred. In the last few hours the most serious episode to date has taken place. A strategic rivalry. It all started on the weekend, with the lighting with fire control radar of Japanese fighters by J-15 aircraft from the Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning near Okinawa, a situation that has set off all the alarms in Tokyo. The gesture (an act iunequivocally hostile in military parlance) comes at a time when Japan has committed to reinforce its presence in the area around Taiwan and the Ryukyu island chain, a decision that Beijing perceives as a frontal challenge to its regional ambitions. The spiral is worsened by the statements of Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, pointing out that an attack on the strait could activate collective defense Japanese, a phrase that China has elevated to the rank of strategic provocation. Radar, aircraft carriers and a risk. Aerial interaction near Okinawa fu much more an isolated incident: it marked the first time that Japan officially disclosed a radar lock Chinese about their fighters. The Japanese Ministry of Defense registered about a hundred of takeoff and landing operations of Liaoning aircraft, in parallel to two episodes in which the J-15 fixed their firing sensors on Japanese F-15s, forcing the latter country to immediately deploy its own combat air patrols. China responded accusing Japan of interfering in their exercises, alleging that it had previously delimited the maneuver area. Chinese aircraft carriers and destroyers moved through the Miyako Strait, one of the sea corridors connecting the Pacific to the East China Sea, while official Chinese media they ridiculed Japanese defensive capabilities and warned that any move toward a more active military role “would lead to its own destruction.” The language, accompanied by real maneuvers which combine naval presence, air patrols and psychological pressure, defines an environment where any tactical error could lead to a crisis. Liaoning Ryukyu as an advanced shield. Faced with this escalation, Bloomberg told that Japan has undertaken the largest military reconfiguration since the Cold War, articulated around a concept that analysts have called the “missile archipelago”. Yonaguni, the country’s westernmost island, has become a surveillance and electronic warfare outpost just a stone’s throw away. 110 kilometers from Taiwan. From 2022, after the salvo of Chinese missiles that fell near its coasts, Tokyo has multiplied the installation of anti-aircraft batteries, long-range radars and response units amphibian distributed throughout the Ryukyu chain. The military presence in Kyushu is also increasing, with deployments of F-35s and long-range missiles. At the same time, the government has started to prepare to the local population with briefings that reveal both the magnitude of the challenge and the growing concern among citizens who vividly remember the trauma of the battle of okinawa. The militarization of the region, although supported by a majority of young Japanese, continues awakening misgivings between sectors that fear that a conflict in the strait will turn their islands into the first line of fire. Japanese military in Okinawa Fight for historical legitimacy. we have been counting. The operational tension is added to an equally volatile front: the historical dispute. Chinese state media has reactivated narratives that question Japanese sovereignty over the Ryukyu, reinterpreting the postwar period and selectively citing statements of 1945 to present Japan as a nation whose sovereignty “is to be determined.” Beijing takes advantage of these references to reinforce its claim about the Senkaku and to argue that his view on Taiwan has a historical legitimacy that Japan cannot contradict. Tokyo responds by appealing to Treaty of San Francisco and to the existing international legal framework, but its effort to maintain stability collides with Chinese pressure, which combines repressive diplomacy with psychological operations aimed at local communities. In other words, the historical dispute is not rhetorical: it feeds the perception in Japan that the conflict with China is not temporary, but deeply structural. Taiwan in the shadows. The link between Japanese security and the fate of Taiwan is today explicit. The doctrine collective defense revised in 2015 allows the country to intervene if Japan’s survival could be compromised, and security analysts they point out that a hypothetical American operation to defend the island would require the use of Japanese bases. Tokyo’s refusal to cooperate with Washington, in such a scenario, would put the alliance itself at risk, making Japanese participation almost inevitable. China is fully aware of this and concentrates its efforts on fracturing the perception of inevitability, putting political, military and psychological pressure to erode the Japanese margin of decision. On that board, the new electronic warfare units in Yonaguni and the missile batteries distributed throughout the archipelago, they could become, if necessary, key nodes in an integrated attack chain between Japan and the United States, which would make them priority targets for a Chinese offensive in the initial phase. Uncertainty. The result of these dynamics is a western Pacific that advances towards an area permanent frictionwhere each movement is interpreted as a dress rehearsal and every political statement is magnified as a strategic notice. The air raidsnaval exercises, the militarization of the islands and the historical dispute between great powers converge in a reduced geopolitical spacedensely populated and highly symbolic. For Japan, the crossroads It is complex: reinforce its defense without reigniting domestic fears about militarism, coordinate with the United States without becoming an automatic target, and respond to China without setting the region on fire. For Beijing, the key is in maintaining the pressureexpand its margin of future action in the Taiwan Strait and fragment the strategic unity of its adversaries. Image | US Indo-Pacific Command, GoodFon, rhk111, RawPixel In Xataka | China has just shown Japan a diplomatic dart that it had been keeping for decades: World War II … Read more

There has been a “flattening of the Earth” due to radars and missiles. And that makes fighters an easy target

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The technological transformation in aerial combat has reached a point where legacy tactics of the 20th century have ceased to offer minimum guarantees of survival. For decades, pilots could rely on low-flying flight to penetrate hostile defenses: the curvature of the planet, terrain shadows, and background noise hid planes speeding below the radar horizon. That world has disappeared. The end of the old certainties. They remembered in a wide report in Insider that the modernization of sensors and missiles, the proliferation of electronic scanning radars advanced technology, the expansion of beyond-line-of-sight systems and permanent aerial surveillance have created an environment where safe altitudes no longer exist. The idea that terrain protects is, for contemporary air forces, a relic. Detection distances have gone from being a tactical inconvenience to becoming a a strategic condition that can span entire regions, redefining the way a country plans its defense and offense. The British example. counted Air Vice Marshal James Beck, RAF Director of Capabilities and Programmes, who when flying the fighter jet Tornado multipurpose In the early 2000s, it was still assumed that flying at very low altitude would allow a formation to penetrate enemy territory without being detected by their integrated missile defense systems. The military delved into the same theory, that new radar and missile technologies have caused a kind of “flattening of the earth” that puts even aircraft that fly at much greater risk. very low height. The Eurofighter Typhoon with the nose fairing removed, revealing its AESA Euroradar CAPTOR radar antenna The growth of prohibited areas. At this point, the strategies of anti-access and area denialpreviously limited to defensive belts around critical points, have expanded to configure operational spaces covering entire countries and that, in a few years, could extend over entire continents. For example, the rise of OTH radars capable of “seeing” behind the Earth’s curvature, the increase in the range of surface-to-air missiles or the multiplication of air platforms that continuously patrol have created defensive bubbles which entering becomes a high risk exercise even for advanced fleets. The aerial danger. This phenomenon not only changes the way deep strikes are planned, but also the priority structure in which air powers operate. Controlling the air stops being another objective and becomes the indispensable condition so that any other operation (hitting command nodes, degrading enemy logistics or destroying missile silos) is even conceivable. In recent conflicts, especially in the ukrainian warthe inability of either side to dominate the air It has generated a battlefield frozen by dense defenses, where planes fly low to the ground only to deliver ranged weaponry, and where deep penetration has disappeared from the equation. A Tornado of German forces Sensors and vulnerability. The evolution of AESA radarscapable of detecting multiple targets at high speed and adjusting their beam with electronic precision, combined with sensor expansion land, naval, air and space, has created a network that reduces the margin of error practically to zero. Surveillance systems no longer depend on a single layer or a single type of platform: they function as an eoverlapping weavereplicates and expands, maintaining continuous surveillance with immediate response capacity. In this context, even missiles have expanded its radius of action with a speed which exceeds the modernization capacity of many air forces. The consequence is an environment in which aircraft without reduced signature, expanded connectivity, and platform-level sensor fusion simply will not survive crossing the enemy threshold. New air capabilities. In it Insider report The British military delved into an idea: the acceleration of innovation forces to reconfigure both existing systems and the future architecture of the air forces. Modernizing command and control, integrating distributed sensors across multiple domains, and expanding the reach of active and passive defenses becomes as crucial as developing new generations of aircraft. The current fifth generation platforms, like the F-35represent the minimum necessary to operate in a saturated airspace, although they are no longer sufficient on their own to guarantee that depth penetration. The fighters sixth generation should incorporate comprehensive invisibilityintelligent signal management, accompanying drone swarms (already is being tested) and autonomous capabilities selection and attack of targets located behind increasingly complex defensive networks. That is, where a pilot of the past relied on his expertise and the terrain, the pilot of the future will depend of complete ecosystems of manned and unmanned platforms, permanent connectivity and tactical analysis in real time. A basic truth. The recent experience It shows that modern war punishes those who renounce air dominance. Without going too far, in Ukraineboth sides have lost the ability to operate freely over enemy territory due to dense, mobile and highly sophisticated defenses. This aerial stalemate has prolonged the conflict, increased reliance on drones and missiles, and reduced operational mobility on the ground. The warnings from Western commanders underscore the urgency of learn from this scenariobecause the speed of change only increases. The next decade points to challenges driven by both states and non-state actors, with advanced systems becoming cheaper, more accessible and more difficult to neutralize. Image | Ministry of Defense/CPL Mike Jones, naraILA_Berlin In Xataka | The 10 Most Powerful Air Forces in the World, Compared in One Enlightening Chart In Xataka | A loaf of bread costs one euro in the supermarket. For the same price Europe just bought 18 fighter jets

The world keeps asking for more F-35 fighters, but China has turned off the tap to build them

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He F-35 Lightning IIthe fighter more expensive and complex never built, is going through a critical point in its history. In September 2025, a report of the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) revealed that all deliveries in 2024 arrived late, accumulating an average of 238 days late. Now, a leak has revealed that delays can multiply, and China plays a fundamental role. The problem of the largest military program. They remembered a few months ago on Insider that the 2024 delays had one main cause: the stagnation of the Technology Refresh 3 technology package (TR-3), an essential hardware and software update on which the block 4 modernizationalready with an extra cost of 6,000 million dollars and five years behind schedule. The paradox was that, despite maintenance failures, deficiencies in availability and costs that already exceed 2 trillion dollars Throughout its service life, the F-35 remains the cornerstone of American and allied air defense. More than 2,500 units remain in the Pentagon’s planning, while the current fleet is barely “operational” half of the time. More money. Lockheed Martin, its prime contractor, continues to receive incentives even for late deliveriesin a program that no longer only faces technical delays, but a much more structural threat: global dependence on its supply chain. A global network. The F-35 is, by definition, a multinational aircraft. Of the more than 1,200 devices manufactured to date, about 42% of its components are produced outside the United States, in an industrial network that involves more than twenty countries. The United Kingdom, the only Tier 1 partner, manufactures in Lancashire the rear fuselages of all the F-35s in the world, as well as their tails, ejection seats and part of the electronic warfare system code. Italy and the Netherlands assemble structures and optical systems, while Australia, Canada, Norway or Denmark provide fuselage sections, wings or specialized electronics. Germany, Japan and Israel also contribute critical parts: from fuel tanks to helmet-mounted visors. This ecosystem, which combines thousands of suppliers under a single oversight, has made the F-35 the largest industrial cooperation project of defense of the planet. The small print. But, despite the geographical dispersion, total control The United States preserves it: the Department of Defense and Lockheed Martin jealously guard it the source codemaintenance keys, stealth algorithms and the ALIS logistics system, without which no country can operate the aircraft independently. Each export includes clauses that maneuvers are prohibited joint with Russian or Chinese systems and allow Washington to supervise every flight, every review and every software update. You hunt like hotcakes. By 2025, Lockheed Martin has opted to reverse the narrative of delays with a figure that reflects both ambition and vulnerability: manufacturing 200 fighters in a single yearone for each working day. In its third quarter earnings call, CEO Jim Taiclet announced that 143 units had already been delivered, with an order book valued at 179 billion dollars, the largest in the company’s history. The boom responds to the global increase in defense spending, with European countries accelerating its rearmament and new buyers (such as Finland or Japan) incorporating the F-35 as the central axis of their fleets. The plane has become a tool deterrence and cohesion between allies, a symbol of interoperability under the umbrella of Washington. But industrial success hides a strategic fragility: the complex network of components of the F-35 depends, directly or indirectly, on materials that almost entirely come from Chinafrom rare earth magnets to elements for critical sensors, servomotors and actuators. Beijing’s silent weapon. Through a Wall Street Journal exclusive We have learned that, while Lockheed Martin celebrated its best year for deliveries, China moved its own parts with surgical precision. Beijing announced the creation of a system of “validated end users” (VEU) to regulate the export of magnets and rare earth metals: essential materials for both F-35 fighters and submarines, drones or electric vehicles. The plan, presented as a measure of trade opening after the tariff truce between Xi Jinping and Donald Trump, in reality aims to exclude any company from the flow of exports. linked to the military complex United States. In other words, the companies that supply the F-35 (from engine manufacturers to aerospace subcontractors) will be blocked, while supplies to civilian industries are prioritized. Strategic deterrence. With this system, Beijing can formally fulfill its promise of liberalize tradewhile suffocating the critical chains of the North American defense sector. The VEU architecture, inspired by the United States’ own export control mechanisms, turns industrial policy into a deterrent instrument strategic. The bottleneck. Chinese control over rare earths (70% of the extraction and more than 90% of the world’s processing) places Washington before a structural dilemma: Your most advanced hunting depends on a monopolized resource by its main geopolitical rival. Although the White House seeks to diversify sources through agreements with countries such as Kazakhstan, Greenland or Ukraine, replacing Chinese capacity will take years. In recent months, Chinese magnet exports to the United States fell 29%which has already begun to affect engine and guidance system manufacturers. If Beijing strictly implements its new system, it would not only slow down F-35 production, but could temporarily interrupt the logistics chain for maintaining fleets already deployed. In that scenario, the program that symbolizes Western technological supremacy would be conditioned by dependence on a strategic enemy. The paradox of a fighter. The F-35 was born as an emblem of interoperability and technological masterybut its evolution shows that military superiority is no longer measured only in radars or missiles, but also in access to mineralschips and advanced materials. As the world’s most expensive plane is assembled from parts manufactured on three continents and with magnets processed in China, its story becomes a metaphor for the 21st century: a war of interdependencies where each fighter that takes off carries within it a dose of global vulnerability. Thus, while Lockheed Martin tries to maintain its record pace of production and the Pentagon reinforces its leadership narrative, the real battlefield is being fought in the mines, laboratories … Read more

A new threat has arrived in the skies of Europe. They are not drones or fighters, and the order is to shoot before you ask

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For weeks now, the European sky has has converted in a silent front of hybrid war: brief incursions, weak signals, ambiguous trajectories and objects that, without carrying clear flags, force airport closures, diversions of trade routes and military responses that consume resources and erode civil normality. The pattern is repeated from the Baltics to Central Europe and seems designed to measure the NATO reflexes. Now something else has arrived, and it’s not drones or fighter jets. Balloon waves. Lithuania has announced that will bring down any balloon that crosses from Belarus after detecting in one go 66 night intrusions and chain closures of Vilnius airport. The government described the phenomenon as hybrid attack and activated the closure of the eastern border, initially temporary but set to become indefinite, with minimal exceptions for diplomats and EU citizens in transit. The decision marks a turning point on NATO’s eastern flank, where violations of airspace by drones, balloons and Russian aircraft are increasing. have become recurring in recent weeks, from Estonia and Poland to Denmark, Norway and Germany, fueling the impression of a sustained campaign of provocations calibrated to measure reflexes, saturate defenses and erode political tolerance at the cost of deterrence. Nature and sign. The balloons (some weighing more than 50 kilos, also used for tobacco smuggling) are interpreted not only as a criminal economy but also as a cheap instrument. psychological warfare and technical rehearsal: they stretch the “gray zone” five kilometers inward, force airport closures, degrade logistics, strain the civil and military decision chain and expose the friction of activating rules of engagement against targets no classic military sign. Lithuania will involve NASAMS, RBS-70, Avengers and MANPADS in neutralization, despite stocks depleted by transfers to Ukraine and the intrinsic difficulty of shooting down balloons with low radar signature and low kinetic energy. The political message is deliberate: any permeability (even if it seems marginal) will be treated as a strategic precedent. Escalation in NATO. We said it at the beginning, the episode arrives after penetrations of Su-30, Il-78 and MiG-31 in the Baltics, and after the recording of swarms of drones over Poland, Denmark, Munich or the Baltic, with more than 170 flights disrupted in one week in Vilnius and almost 14,000 passengers affected. Reiteration converts the episodic in pattern: state actors exploit loopholes in regulations (civil balloons, meteorological assumptions, smuggling) to degrade the continuity of European civil aviation and test the elasticity of ROE and allied cohesion without crossing explicit thresholds of article 5. Lithuania, in fact, studies consultations under article 4and has hinted that the closure could extend to the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad, raising the economic-logistical vector of the pulse. Hybrid war as a framework. Vilnius is clearand describes the phenomenon as a psychological operation aimed at disrupting daily life, testing NATO-EU synchrony and normalizing aggression (of low lethality, of course) as noise permanent. The background signal (at no point is Moscow explicitly named) fits into the repertoire hybrid warfare: discreet sabotage, information manipulation, low signal intrusion, erosion of trust and critical infrastructure, in conjunction with the war in Ukraine and under the plausible protection of Belarus. Plus: the closure of borders is accompanied by tougher criminal penalties against smuggling and coordination with Poland and Latvia to shield the eastern edge as a strategic unit, given the calculation that firmness, the earlier, will define how much the enemy will dare later. Image | LITHUANIAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE In Xataka | Europe has decided to take action against Moscow’s hybrid war. So Germany has started hunting for Russian drones In Xataka | The Spanish invention that simplifies the hunt for Europe’s biggest threat: how to detect the arrival of drones in a matter of seconds

In China they have created a material for their fighters that opens a new technological direction: it aims directly at radars

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From the early days of World War II to the stealth fighters of the 21st century, the goal of remaining unnoticed by the enemy has been a constant obsession in military aviation. Aerial “invisibility”, more than a myth, It is a technological challenge that has marked decades of innovation in materials and design. A team from Chinese universities describes a flexible and ultra-thin coating capable of absorbing radar waves without losing thermal resistance, collects SCMP. If its effectiveness is confirmed in flight, it could change the conversation about modern aerial stealth. The development was detailed on October 14 in Advanced Materials. The study, signed by Cui Guang, Liu ZhongfanHuihui Wang and Maoyuan Li, among others, presents a graphene-on-silica-fabric (G@SF) metasurface that combines flexibility, low weight and thermal resistance of up to 1,000 degrees Celsius. According to its authors, the direct integration of the material into the insulating layer of an aircraft would allow the reflected radar signal to be reduced to −42 dB, without compromising the structure or weight of the aircraft. A surface that wants to defy the radar The material is based on a silica textile base on which the researchers deposited graphene using a chemical vapor deposition process. On that layer they applied a laser “erasing” technique, which allowed them to create a precise pattern on the surface and adjust your electrical impedance. In this way, they claim, they managed to make the coating effectively absorb electromagnetic waves without needing to increase its thickness or weight. The result is a flexible, ultralight metasurface with an adjustable sheet resistance between 50 and 5,000 ohms per square. {“videoId”:”x9ri2iu”,”autoplay”:false,”title”:”How China, the biggest polluter on the planet, has also become the complete opposite”, “tag”:”webedia-prod”, “duration”:”740″} Laboratory tests showed that the material maintains stable performance even under extreme conditions. After five minutes of exposure to 600 degrees Celsius in air, it retained its absorption capacity, and also withstood prolonged heating to 1,000 degrees in a vacuum without degrading. In tests with air currents of up to 200 meters per second, its loss of efficiency was less than 1%, and neither the surface pattern nor the resistance of the sheet were altered. These properties make it an ideal candidate for high-speed aircraft exposed to intense heat and friction. Withstood prolonged heating to 1,000 degrees in vacuum without degrading The material described in the study poses a possible alternative to conventional coatings, although it has yet to be demonstrated whether its advantages are sustainable outside the laboratory. US stealth fighters, such as the F-22 and F-35they use absorbent compounds They offer good initial performance, but require constant and expensive maintenance. In China, the J-20 has been seen with a coating apparently more stable, although those impressions come from displays and not verifiable technical data. The difference, for now, is in the discourse rather than the evidence. The new coating is still far from becoming a technology in real use, but it illustrates the direction of Chinese research in stealth materials. The challenge is not only to achieve high performance in the laboratory, but to keep it in flight and under extreme conditions. Chinese scientists aim to solve one of the most persistent limitations of modern fighters: the fragility of absorbent coatings. If the material achieves this stability, it could open a different stage in aircraft protection. In Xataka We believed that the F-16s were Ukraine’s great achievement: it has just taken the first step to receive up to 150 European Gripen fighters Beijing has set 2035 as the horizon to complete the modernization of its armed forces. In this context, the development of new compounds, sensors and materials responds to a broader policy aimed at strengthening its technological and military industry. Each advance in the field of stealth materials is interpreted not only as a technical improvement, but also as a step towards greater strategic independence. Images | Wikimedia Commons | Arthur Wang In Xataka | The Chinese ambition to lead each and every area of ​​the planet has found its next adversary: ​​Jaén (function() { window._JS_MODULES = window._JS_MODULES || {}; var headElement = document.getElementsByTagName(‘head’)(0); if (_JS_MODULES.instagram) { var instagramScript = document.createElement(‘script’); instagramScript.src=”https://platform.instagram.com/en_US/embeds.js”; instagramScript.async = true; instagramScript.defer = true; headElement.appendChild(instagramScript); } })(); – The news In China they have created a material for their fighters that opens a new technological direction: it aims directly at radars was originally published in Xataka by Javier Marquez .

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