F35

The US has more than 800 F-35 fighters in service. Only one in four is ready to do everything he should

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We have talked many times about F-35 as one of the great symbols of American air power, but its most pressing problem is not in the capabilities that have made it a centerpiece of US military aviation, nor even in the number of units planned for the coming decades. It’s on land. The latest GAO report once again puts numbers on the tension: the US has many F-35s, but the fleet spends much less time fully prepared than it should. Deterioration. According to the GAOthe rate mission capable It measures the percentage of time in which an aircraft can fly and perform at least one of its assigned missions. The rate full mission capableon the other hand, measures when you can fulfill all of them. In fiscal year 2025, the US F-35 fleet recorded 44% in the first category and just 25% in the second. Simply put: America’s F-35s can do something a limited portion of the time, but are only fully ready a quarter of the time. Background. The report shows that the problem has been accumulating for several years. Between fiscal year 2021 and fiscal year 2025, the rate mission capable of the fleet fell from 67% to 44%, while the rate full mission capable fell from 38% to 25%. The difference matters because we are not facing a minor maintenance oscillation, but rather a sustained loss of availability. What we have seen is a fleet that remains central to the United States, but that spends less and less time in a position to fulfill its missions. New planes, old problems. One of the most striking parts of the document is that the 2025 drop is not explained only by aging devices or accumulated wear. Air Force officials attributed part of the decline to the acceptance of new aircraft that could not fulfill missions due to software delays. Added to this were the shortage of parts and inspection and repair work due to corrosion. The report also points to maintenance not optimized to reduce workload or time on the ground, and to high technical complexity due to the continuous development of the program. Global Support Solution Reset. The F-35 Joint Program Office launched this update to its sustainment strategy in June 2025, with an ambitious goal for 2030: to bring the rate mission capable at 80% and the full mission capable 65% in the fleet as a whole. On paper, it is the attempt to correct years of accumulated problems in maintenance, parts and industrial support. More money, not necessarily more margin. The solution is not only to reorganize processes or order more parts from the industry. It also requires a considerable budget injection. The document estimates that an additional $13.7 billion will be needed through fiscal year 2031, although not all of that money officially belongs to the GSS Reset. The Joint Program Office itself places that part at about 2.2 billion. The other 11.5 billion covers a wider gap: what the military branches had planned to spend versus what sustaining the fleet actually demands. The most expensive plane also becomes more expensive on the ground: The problem does not end with availability or missing parts. Since 2021, according to the report, F-35 sustainment costs have continued to rise while the program has not met its performance goals and its performance has continued on a downward trend. The scale helps understand why it matters: the F-35 is the Department of Defense’s most expensive weapons system, with sustainment costs for the United States estimated at $1.6 trillion over its lifetime, according to 2024 figures. By the mid-2030s, military branches would face an annual gap of more than $1 billion between what it will cost to sustain their F-35s and what they consider affordable. The exit. Auditors propose risk mitigation plans for initiatives such as the GSS Reset, a review of contractual incentives and a reliable system to record what is paid, why it is paid and with what results. The Department of Defense said it agreed with the recommendations, according to the report, but the challenge remains intact. The F-35 will remain a centerpiece of American military aviation for decades. The question is whether the US will achieve that this centrality is measured less by the number of aircraft purchased and more by how many are ready when needed. Images | Aawyer Andrews In Xataka | The European fighter may have died, but there is a plan B to avoid the F-35. One with Spain, Germany and an unexpected guest

The European fighter may have died, but there is a plan B to avoid the F-35. One with Spain, Germany and an unexpected guest

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While Europe was still trying to convince itself that another great war was impossible, Germany blew up for the first time the Messerschmitt Bf 109 in 1935: the fighter that would become the backbone of the Luftwaffe. Ninety years later, the continent is once again debating the same underlying question: who will build its next air superiority. The death of the great European fighter. The great European dream of building a common sixth generation fighter has crashed. The manned core of the FCAS program, the so-called NGF, had been blocked for years by the industrial war between Airbus and Dassault Aviation, but now it’s official now: the Franco-German formula has collapsed. What was supposed to be the joint heir to the Eurofighter Typhoon and the Rafale has been broken by something very European: distribution of power, money and technological sovereignty. France wanted to lead it, and Germany did not agree to be a secondary partner. The danger of emptiness. When a program like this dies, the risk is not only industrial. It is also strategic. Europe need a substitute for its current fighters between 2040 and 2045, and the clock is ticking. The quickest way out would be to buy more Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning IIs, something that is already on the table in Berlin. But that would mean assuming that European air sovereignty has failed and that dependence on Washington is irreversible. At a time when America looks increasingly towards Asia and less towards Europe, that has much deeper implications than simply buying airplanes. Plan B exists. Here comes the real twist, because the great European fighter has died, but not the idea of ​​building one. Germany and Spain they have made a move with the so-called “Team Gen 6”a new industrial alliance led by Airbus that tries to rescue what is useful from FCAS and turn it into something else: a more agile, less political and more realistic project. It is not a restart from scratch, since the engines, combat networks, guided weapons and accompanying drones are still alive, and what has died is the original political architecture. Spain is no longer secondary. On this new board, there is no doubt, Spain I would gain weight. Until now it was the junior partner in a project dominated by Paris and Berlin, but the collapse has changed circumstances. Companies such as Indra Sistemas, GMV, ITP Aero or Sener become part of the hard core of the new design. For Spain, this is not just a matter of defense, It is also industrytechnology and presence in the value chain of future European air combat. In other words, if the plan succeeds, the Spanish nation will cease to be a companion and become a central actor. Sweden as an unexpected piece. The big problem by Team Gen 6 is the size. Germany and Spain together hardly economically justify a program worth hundreds of billions. That’s why the name that begins to sound strongly It’s Saab AB. Sweden fits better than the United Kingdom or Japan because its needs they are more similar: a more contained, cheaper and less gigantic plane than the Anglo-Japanese GCAP. If Berlin, Madrid and Stockholm converge, there could be a third way European very different from the French and the British. One bullet remains before the F-35. If you want too, that’s what’s really important. He collapse of the NGF It does not mean that Europe has lost its last chance. It means that the old formula has died and another is trying to be born from the rubble. In that sense, Germany, Spain and Airbus know it. That is why the real plan B is not to buy the American F-35, that is el emergency plan. The real plan B is to try to save a European industrial autonomy with another coalition, another logic and another calendar. And although it may seem like a desperate maneuver, it is actually the last attempt to prevent the future of European air combat from being designed (again) in Washington. Image | Robert Sullivan In Xataka | Spain refuses to buy the F-35 from the US, so it has gotten something in exchange: Harrier pieces as LEGO In Xataka | The US opted for the quality of the F-35 rather than quantity. China opted for the opposite and it is already a problem

Spain’s “no” to the F-35 has led to a curious agreement. The US is going to send you its Harriers like Ikea: in pieces to assemble

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In 1982, during the Falklands War, the British had to modify and move several Harriers were hurriedly shipped to the South Atlantic. Some arrived at the area of ​​operations transported on adapted merchant ships and were prepared for combat during deployment, an example of the extent to which this aircraft has always been associated with logistical solutions. unconventional. An emergency solution. The Spanish Navy faces a countdown that has been conditioning its future for years. Maintaining aviation on board the Juan Carlos I is considered an essential strategic capability, but the problem is that the Harriers that make it possible are reaching the limit. end of useful life and the natural relief, the F-35B, continues out of plans of government procurement. Faced with this situation, Defense has opted for a formula as pragmatic as it is unique: prolonging the life of current aircraft until 2032 through a massive reserve of spare parts coming from the last American Harriers that are being retired from service. Harrier Av 8b The Harriers arrive, but not to fly. The operation has something of a logistical paradox. Spain is going to receive five AV-8B Harrier complete from the United States, but none of them are destined to join the flight line. Its mission will be much less visible and perhaps more important: to become a gigantic reserve of components. Although initially it was studied to take advantage of the transatlantic voyage of the Juan Carlos I to transport them, finally the devices will be dismantled at origin and sent to Spain andn separate packages. They will arrive practically as a kit of parts to assemble from the famous Swedish furniture store, although in this case ready to be cannibalized in Rota and keep the fighters of the 9th Squadron operational for the next few years. While others advance, Spain stretches the calendar. The decision reflects the particular situation in which the Navy has been left. USA will officially retire its Harriers this year and Italy plans to do the same before the end of the decade, both replacing them with the F-35B, the only real heir to the short takeoff and vertical landing capabilities of the veteran British-American aircraft. Spain, on the other hand, is preparing to become the last relevant operator of the model. The refusal to buy The F-35 has forced additional time to be sought for a fleet that should have begun its transition to a more modern successor years ago. The Spanish industry gains prominence. This scenario is also driving an unusual industrial effort. The Navy and Airbus have extended contracts maintenance of the Harriers and significantly increased the work hours dedicated to inspections, repairs and recovery of components. The objective is not only to maintain the current aircraft, but to develop in Spain a technical capacity capable of sustain a fleet increasingly scarce in the world. The fewer operators left, the greater the importance of having knowledge, tools and own spare parts to continue maintaining the devices in flying condition. The price of postponing the decision. All this effort has a very specific objective: to prevent Spain from losing its ability to operate aircraft combat from the sea before having an alternative. However, it also shows the provisional nature of the solution. The American Harriers that will cross the Atlantic will not do so to reinforce the Spanish embarked air force, but to feed the specimens that are already in service. If you like, it is a quite revealing image of the current moment: while other allies replace their old planes with a new generationSpain tries to gain a few more years by assembling the Marines’ latest Harriers and transforming them into a floating parts warehouse. In a way, the negative to buy the F-35 has led to an agreement as peculiar as it is symbolic: receiving the fighters retired from the United States disassembled… ready to assemble, disassemble and reuse as the survival of the fleet demands. Image | RawPixel, Michael Pereckas In Xataka | The US opted for the quality of the F-35 rather than quantity. China opted for the opposite and it is already a problem In Xataka | Europe has asked its military experts how to become independent from the US for the next war. The answer is déjà vu: the F-35

that an F-35 not only detects the enemy, but also gets rid of it on its own

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In 1991, during the Gulf War, a good part of the air missions depended on uploaded threat maps before takeoff and analyzes that could take hours to update after each departure. In the following years, the digital revolution allowed the integration of sensors, data links and information fusion systems that forever changed situational awareness in the cockpit. But even the most advanced fighters continue to carry a legacy from the past: they react to what they already know better than to what has just appeared. Until now. From advanced sensor to autonomous hunter. For years, the F-35 has been presented as a platform able to see everything thanks to its fusion of sensors and to your powerful suite of electronic warfare, but was still dependent on pre-loaded threat libraries and updates that could take days or weeks. The appearance of unknown emissions or radars operating in unforeseen modes required identifying the signal, downloading the data after the mission and reprogramming the system before the next flight. That logic, although effective, left a dangerous margin in scenarios saturated with changing air defenses. With Project Overwatchthe United States has taken a decisive step to close that gap and transform the role of the F-35 on the battlefield. AI enters the cabin. Lockheed Martin has tried successfully in flight a model AI integrated into the system of the F-35 combat identification, one capable of resolving ambiguities between emitters and generating an independent identification that appears directly in the viewfinder of the pilot’s helmet. During testing at Nellis, the algorithm not only distinguished dubious signals, but allowed label new emissionsretrain the model in a matter of minutes and load the updated version within the same planning cycle. The information from the classic system and that from the new model coexisted on the screen, reducing latency in decision-making and relieving the pilot of part of the cognitive load in an environment where every second counts. The big problem. It happens that modern air defense systems they no longer broadcast always the same signature. They can alter radar modes, frequencies and patterns to confuse enemy electronic warfare, as seen with variants of the S-300/SA-20 that operated in unforeseen configurations and generated doubts in identification. Until now, the plane pointed out the anomaly, but the in-depth analysis depended on a subsequent human cycle. Plus: in an environment where the proliferation of AI also accelerates the evolution of defenses, that dependency could become a vulnerability. And this is where cognitive electronic warfare appears, which seeks precisely to break that bottleneck and react to unprecedented signals. without waiting to the next mission. The “holy grail” of aerial combat. If you like, Lockheed Martin has achieved the “holy grail” of combat in tests: that an F-35 not only detects the enemy, but also how to get rid of it on your own. The ultimate goal of cognitive electronic warfare is to the system is not limited not only register an unknown threat, but analyze it, determine the best response and adjust its own parameters in near real time, even in the middle of combat. This involves detecting a new release, characterizing it, deciding whether to avoid it, interfere with it, or exploit a weakness, and update the threat library without immediate external intervention. In this scenario, the plane stops being a simple executor with predefined software and becomes a platform that learns and adapts your survival on the go. Towards mid-flight updates. It will be the next step. Previous experience with rapid updates of the Aegis system on US ships and the effort to shorten F-35 reprogramming times from months to days, and eventually hours, point to an architecture where data flows almost in real time between platforms. They count at Lockheed Martin that the ambition is for the improvements derived from a mission to be quickly integrated into other aircraft or even into compatible naval systems, creating a defense ecosystem that evolves in a distributed manner. While the Block 4 package promises a new generation of electronic capabilities, Project Overwatch It already anticipates a deeper transition: that of the fighter that not only sees and shoots first, but also learns before anyone else and survives on its own. Image | RawPixel In Xataka | Europe has asked its military experts how to become independent from the US for the next war. The answer is déjà vu: the F-35 In Xataka | The Netherlands has just activated panic in Spain and the US allies: the F-35 can be “released” like an iPhone

The F-35 cannot be hacked like an iPhone. The explanation is the same why Spain and Europe cannot go to war without the US.

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There was a moment, probably towards the end of the Cold War, when the concept of Western military superiority stopped being measured solely in tons of steel or number of divisions and began to depend more and more on lines of code, networks and invisible architectures. As the decades passed, that technological transformation redefined not only how war is fought, but who really has control of the tools with which war is waged. Europe is realizing that that train has missed it. The jailbreak myth. Last year we already have that the possibility of an “off” button on the American F-35 it wasn’t exactly like that. Now, the comparison launched last week by the Dutch minister when suggesting that the fighter could “break free” like an iPhone It simplifies to the absurdity what is, in reality, a combat system defined by software and armored by cryptographic architecture. The F-35 is not designed for the operator to modify its code, but only to run software authenticated by keyscontrolled supply chains and closed validation environments, which means that physically accessing the aircraft is not the same as controlling its system. It is therefore not a consumer device on which alternative applications are installed like those on a mobile phone, but rather a platform whose integrity depends on digital signaturestrusted hardware modules and a support infrastructure that validates each update before the aircraft executes it. ODIN and structural dependency. They remembered in the middle The Aviationist that the real core of the problem is not in “hacking” the plane, but in keeping it outside the American ecosystem that keeps it operational. The F-35 depends on ODINthe logistics and data network that manages maintenance, mission planning, software updates and threat files, all under the control of infrastructure and processes largely managed from the United States. Disconnecting it does not turn it off immediately, but it initiates a progressive loss of capabilities that transforms it from a fully integrated fifth-generation platform to a combat fighter that is increasingly less relevant in the face of modern threats. So yes, exactly the same as a phone that stops receiving critical patches and updates. The same European dependence. Curiously, or perhaps not so much, this logic does not end with the plane, but runs through the entire European military architecture. The Financial Times recalled this morning in a piece that tried to answer the big European questions, that the continent’s armies depend on American software, clouds and systems for secure communications, data analysis, command and control, intelligence and platform maintenance. We are talking about platforms with contracts that involve giants like Google, Microsoft or Palantir and fundamental systems such asl Lockheed Martin Aegis integrated into, for example, European ships. The European military commanders themselves they recognized in the report that an abrupt break would generate operational gaps, fragmentation and loss of effectiveness, because a good part of the digital “back-end” on which its capabilities rest is not under European sovereign control. Digital sovereignty vs reality. Now that Washington is going through a phase where the word “ally” does not fit to the profile, the political speeches that advocate accelerate technological sovereignty in defense they collide with a structural reality: replicating the entire ecosystem that supports platforms, networks, encryption, AI and cloud services is not as simple as moving servers to European soil or changing providers overnight. And it is not because data localization does not equate to real sovereignty when that same software, updates, cryptographic keys and interoperability depend on American supply chains and regulatory frameworks, and where European generals themselves warn that a hasty decoupling would put daily operations at risk. Same explanation. In the end, the F-35 can’t be hacked like an iPhone has the same explanation why Spain and Europe cannot aspire to full digital sovereignty or resort to a high-intensity war without the United States: the structural dependence of the North American technological ecosystem. In the air, that translates into a fighter whose effectiveness rests on updates, threat data and logistical support controlled from Washington. On the ground, in militaries that operate on digital infrastructures, critical software and command architectures deeply intertwined with American suppliers and standards. If you also want, it is not so much a question of political will, but rather of technical architecture: whoever controls the software, controls the capacity. Image | RawPixel In Xataka | “It’s not what we need”: Germany has just put the finishing touches on Spain’s great military dream, the European anti-F-35 is disappearing In Xataka | The Netherlands has just activated panic in Spain and the US allies: the F-35 can be “released” like an iPhone

the F-35 can be “unlocked” like an iPhone

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Since the Cold War, the United States has not only exported weapons, but also forms of control over how, when and what they are used for. For decades, that oversight was exercised through licensing, maintenance and parts supply. Today, in the era of software and network warfare, that logic has changed scale: control is no longer just in the hangar or in the contract, but embedded in the system itself. With the F-35, for the first time, that old question is no longer theoretical. The controversy. Just like has stated the Dutch defense minister, the F-35’s “computing brain,” including its cloud components, can be hacked to accept third-party software updates, much like jailbreaking an iPhone. “If, despite everything, you still want to update, I’m going to say something that I should never say, but I’ll do it anyway: you can jailbreak an F-35 like you would jailbreak an iPhone,” Gijs Tuinman said verbatim during an episode from the podcast “Boekestijn en de Wijk” by BNR Nieuwsradio. A fighter and more things. The statement by the Dutch Defense Minister that the F-35 can be “released” as a rover does not reveal so much a technical secret as a strategic discomfort that has been latent for years among the allies. The airplane is not just an aerial platform, but a deeply integrated system in a digital, logistical and doctrinal architecture designed in the United States, where software, mission data, maintenance and spare parts supply form an inseparable whole. In this context, talking about “jailbreak” does not describe a real solution, but rather the expression of a limit: the recognition that operational sovereignty over the F-35 is conditioned from its design and that any attempt to break that dependency is, in itself, a sign of political crisis more than a viable technical option. Why “releasing” an F-35 is a fear. For Washington’s allies, the fear is not that the fighter cannot be released, but rather that it could be. If it is accepted that the software can be broken, it is assumed that American control over the system is not only contractual, but structuraland that maintaining it depends on political trust between allies. The F-35 lives connected to networks as ALIS and his successor ODINwhich not only update the aircraft, but also load the mission data packages that make its combat survival possible: calculated routes, enemy defense bubbles, sensor fusion and shared tactics. “Releasing” the plane would mean cut that central arterybut also lose what makes it a decisive tool. The dilemma. For Washington, the mere possibility of an ally operating the system outside of that ecosystem poses risks of technological security and use not aligned with its interests. For their part, for the allies, the dilemma is even more uncomfortable: either they accept a permanent dependency, or they risk being left with a technically advanced fighter, but operationally amputated, without data, without support and without a future. A member of the US Air Force uses a laptop to review ALIS system maintenance data The Israeli exception. Israel is the anomaly which confirms the rule. It is the only operator that has negotiated integrate own softwareoperate largely outside of ALIS/ODIN and maintain their F-35s with industrial autonomy. This exception is not replicable for the rest because it responds to a unique strategic relationship, built over decades and based on a level of trust and alignment that does not exist with other partners. For European countries like the Netherlands, any real “liberation” would imply not only enormous technical capabilities, but assuming a head-on crash with the manufacturer and the US Government, with immediate consequences in spare parts, maintenance and logistical support. The result would be paradoxical: a freed F-35 that would quickly end up immobilized, not by a digital blockade, but by the suffocation of its supply chain. The myth of the button and the reason of Spain. This is where, indirectly, the controversy ends up agreeing with Spain in his historical skepticism about the famous off “button”. No secret switch or hidden kill switch is needed to neutralize an F-35 in the hands of an ally with whom relations are broken. Control is not in remote command, but in everyday dependence on validated software, mission data, certified maintenance and critical parts. Spain always maintained that the problem was not a magic button, but something more deep and less visible: the dependency architecture. The Dutch statements They reinforce that idea, because they implicitly admit that, although the plane can continue flying, its real military value quickly degrades if it is disconnected from the ecosystem that feeds it. A symptom of a relationship that is strained. Ultimately, talking about “jailbreak” is talking about directly from distrust. As far as is known, no country is seriously considering releasing an F-35 while the relationship with Washington works, because the system is designed to operate in a network, not in isolation. But the fact that this debate resurfaces now does not seem trivial, and reflects a geopolitical context rougherwith allies who are beginning to wonder what happens if the political umbrella folds. The F-35 remains, as even its critics acknowledge, an extraordinary fighter in its current state. But it is also proof that modern technological superiority is not bought with airplanes alone, but with a tacit acceptance of strategic dependence. And when that dependency begins to bother, the problem is no longer (only) technical: It’s political. Image | Robert SullivanUSAF In Xataka | Spain agreed with Germany and France to bypass the US. And it will end with a fleet of F-35s because of a French name In Xataka | France and Germany have agreed to give Spain the worst news: one in which the F-35 and its “button” are the winners

The Rafale takes advantage over the US F-35 and the Russian Su-57E

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India has launched one of the most ambitious military acquisition movements in recent years, a process that, due to its economic volume and strategic dimension, clearly transcends the national sphere and fully connects with the industrial and geopolitical balances that Europe observes. Although the decision still does not amount to a signed contract nor does it close all the technical details, it points a direction within a board where several powers were competing. In that initial context, France appears well positioned to occupy a central role if the next phases of the process progress as planned by the Indian authorities. On February 12, 2026, the Defense Acquisition Council chaired by Defense Minister Rajnath Singh granted the so-called “Acceptance of necessity” to a set of acquisition proposals valued at around Rs 3.60 lakh crore, a figure roughly equivalent to €33.5 billion. In the case of the Indian Air Force, this preliminary approval includes the purchase of MRFA (Multi Role Fighter Aircraft), identified as Rafale in the statement, in addition to combat missiles and a high-altitude aerial system intended for intelligence, surveillance and persistent reconnaissance. The move that can change India’s aerial balance It is advisable to stop at this administrative nuance because it defines the real scope of the advertisement. We are not facing a contractcalendars, final prices or closed technical configurations, but before a resource that authorizes the armed forces to begin the formal acquisition process within the approved budget framework. From there, commercial phases, technical negotiations and industrial adjustments usually begin that can last for months or even years before leading to a definitive signature. Beyond what was confirmed by the Indian Government, some specialized media provide additional elements that help outline the potential scope of the program. Defense News claims that the approved proposal would include the purchase of 114 Rafale. In any case, the institutional approval occurs a few days before French President Emmanuel Macron’s visit to the Indian capitala calendar that suggests the existence of political and industrial talks still developing. This possible French role cannot be understood without the competitive context in which the process has developed. The proposal linked to the Rafale coexisted with offers presented by The United States with its F-35 and Russia with the Su-57Etwo platforms that aspired to occupy the same space within the Indian aerial modernization program. To understand why this platform now occupies the center of the debate, it is worth briefly focusing on what exactly the Rafale is within the panorama of contemporary combat aviation. It is a twin-engine fighter conceived from its origin as a multirole aircraft, capable of operating from both land bases and aircraft carriers and taking on missions ranging from air superiority to reconnaissance or deep attacks. The device entered service with the French Navy in 2004 and with the Air Force in 2006, and has demonstrated its capabilities in real operations since 2007. Within this general architecture, the Rafale is not a single closed model, but a family of aircraft with a high degree of common elements and adaptations depending on the operating environment. Dassault Aviation distinguishes three configurations that share a cell and mission system, but respond to different needs for deployment, training and on-board use. Rafale C: single-seat version operated from land bases, designed for conventional combat missions within the air force. Rafale M: variant adapted to operations on aircraft carriers, with structural modifications such as reinforced landing gear and landing hook for naval use. Rafale B: two-seat configuration also based on land, used both for training and for missions that require workload sharing between two crew members. Beyond its external configuration, a good part of the Rafale’s international positioning is based on its technical capabilities. which describes its own manufacturer. Dassault Aviation maintains that the aircraft can take on a full spectrum of combat missions, from air superiority and defense to close support, reconnaissance, anti-ship strikes or nuclear deterrence, supported by a broad suite of sensors and systems such as digital flight control. fly-by-wire or the automatic terrain collision avoidance system. Specifying which aircraft the Indian Air Force would actually receive remains, for the moment, an open question. In this sense, it is necessary to point out that there is no official public detail that confirms the specific version of the Rafale or the exact set of systems and weapons that would accompany a possible order. Where there is a greater definition is in the naval field. The agreement for the Indian Navy includes 26 devices of the M variant. Another important fact is that India already operates 36 Rafales incorporated since 2020 and deployed in different bases. As we can see, the current photograph combines indications of a strategic inclination with a still open process, where the final signature and definitive configuration are still pending negotiation. Images | Dylan Agbagni (CC0 1.0 Universal) | Dassault Aviation In Xataka | A strange night noise was disturbing Alcalá de Henares’ sleep. Until the mystery was solved

one in which the F-35 and its “button” are the winners

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Europe has been repeating the same debate for some time every time a strategic technology comes into play: to what extent can talk about sovereignty whether critical systems depend on external decisions, codes and suppliers. Under labels such as autonomy or digital sovereignty, the Union has tried build own alternatives in key areas with the promise of no longer being tied to infrastructures that it does not fully control. History now shows that the challenge has not been to imagine these tools, but to get the major European partners to accept share real power to make them possible. A project for European sovereignty. He Future Combat Air System was born as the great strategic bet of France, Germany and Spain to prevent Europe will be relegated in the 21st century air race, combining a sixth-generation fighter with swarms of drones and a combat cloud capable of integrating sensors, weapons and command in real time. Designed to replace platforms such as the Rafale and the Eurofighter and preserve industrial knowledge that Europe never developed in the fifth generation, the FCAS was presented as more than just an airplane: it was the promise of technological autonomy against the United States, its own air war architecture and the symbol that European defense could act as a coherent block. A lost decade. From its inception, the program was trapped in a head-on crash between national and industrial interests, with France defending leadership Dassault’s absolute in the manned aircraft and Germany demanding distribution real technology and knowledge through Airbus. For its part, Spain was seen as a clearly secondary partner despite its key role in sensors through Indra. The Russian invasion of Ukraine further hardened positions: Berlin, in the midst of the Zeitenwende, began to question a project that did not guarantee its own capabilities. Paris, reinforced by the Rafale export successbecame even more reluctant to give up control. The result was a prolonged paralysisdeadlines that moved towards 2045 and the idea, increasingly less hidden, that the fighter could disappear leaving only remains of the original project. Germany begins to look home. The fracture has become explicit when unions and representatives of German industry have openly defended the option of develop your own fighter or, at a minimum, two separate aircraft within the FCAS, a conceptual break with the initial idea of ​​a common system. At the same time, in Berlin he began to discreetly explore a way out towards the rival program led by the United Kingdom, Italy and Japan, while the new German chancellor conveyed to Paris that even abandoning the FCAS was no longer a taboo. At that point, the project stopped being a complex negotiation and became a question of how to communicate its end without assuming the political cost of acknowledging failure. Sentenced in the offices. The last few weeks have confirmed what was privately taken for granted for months: the FCAS is practically dead and a closure announcement is more likely than any credible relaunch, despite Paris’ attempts to save time. As we count a few weeks ago, the confrontation between Dassault and Airbus over control of the Next Generation Fighter remains without a solution, Germany is already contemplating save only the cloud combat and other shared systems, and the program that was to be the flagship of European rearmament has become the best example of its limits. For Spain, the news is especially bitter: the project that was supposed to guarantee it a seat at the high aviation technology table is fading without a clear European alternative in the short term. The hidden winner: F-35. In this strategic vacuum, an indirect winner emerges that summarizes the worst of the paradoxes: the Lockheed Martin F-35, the plane that FCAS was to counterbecomes the default solution for many European countries. With the European program collapsedthe only new generation platform available, interoperable and in production is the American one, along with everything that its closed ecosystem implies, including the controversial technological dependence and the famous “button” symbolizing Washington’s ultimate control over the system. Spain has been clear reject that model and defend a European fighter like guarantee of sovereigntybut the message that comes from Paris and Berlin It’s devastating: The inability to reach an agreement has left the way clear for the F-35, making the United States the great beneficiary of a European failure. Thus, France and Germany have ended up conveying to Spain what it did not want to hear: that the project that was to emancipate Europe is dying, and the plane that symbolizes strategic dependence is the one that comes out stronger. Image | airbus, Vitaly V. Kuzmin In Xataka | If the question is where is the 100 billion European fighter, the answer is simple: stuck on a dead-end runway In Xataka | It is being a complicated summer for the US F-35: after Spain’s “no” Russia and China have appeared to do more damage

a JF-17 that threatens the US F-35

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After 20 years of research, development and volatilizing banknotes, the United States declared in 2019 that the F-35 fighter was “ready for combat and ready to win“It is the most expensive fighter in history ($100 million per unit, $400,000 just for the pilot’s helmet), but also a very advanced machine. One that is costing the US the combat drone raceone that not liked in Europe and that, as we say, it’s terribly expensive. And, in troubled waters, China has seen an opportunity. That of converting the JF-17 fighters into their “new” electric cars. In short. Following Israel’s attacks on Doha last year, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia signed a mutual defense agreement. Within the agreement, there are billions on the table both to arm itself and to meet certain commitments. And, within that strategy, from Reuters They point to a historic agreement between both countries. The JF-17 is a Chinese-Pakistani development. The program was launched in 1999 and each country contributed 50% to its achievement. It has been demonstrating its versatility in combat for some time and in recent years, different countries have acquired a fleet of fighters. Myanmar was one of the first foreign buyers, followed by Nigeria and Azerbaijan. In recent weeks, it has been Bangladesh that has shown interested in renewing its aging fleet, but its customer base continues to grow. They don’t even play the same sport. In the Reuters report, and as they also point out in South China Morning PostSaudi Arabia would be the next country to acquire the latest version of the JF-17. The sources mention an agreement that would be between 2,000 and 4,000 million dollars, and is point that there would be other nations interested, such as Iraq, Libya or Sri Lanka. The key is the price: a quarter of what the American F-35 costs. In addition, the burden is also shared between China, which manufactures a number of components, and Pakistan, which takes care of the others. That price is the lever for the countries of the Middle East and Africa to modernize their fighter fleet, but it must be taken into account that the JF-17 do not compete in the same league as the F-35. In fact, they don’t even play the same sport. While the Chinese-Pakistani fighter is fourth generation, the American one is fifth, with better features and a minor signature in the airallowing it to be more efficient in stealth operations. It responds to a philosophy of winning combats before the enemy finds out that it has started. The gift of opportunity. However, despite the technological inferiority, the Chinese fighter has the advantage of weapons (more weight to carry more weapons, compromising its signature on radars) and, above all, the price and the costs. The United States is fighting with time when it comes to delivering its F-35s and, furthermore, maintaining them is expensive. The JF-17 is easier to manufacture and maintain, which is a huge advantage for countries. The estimate is that, for the price of two F-35s, you buy a dozen JF-17s. and this is a huge opportunity for African and Eastern countries that want to renew their fleet with current equipment. It is that gift of opportunity from China that we are seeing in other segments, such as the electric car. Frying pan by the handle. This battle to be the supplier of weapons is not only played in the finished and delivered products. It starts much earlier, and China has a say in those F-35 trade delays. The complexity of the fighter implies that its manufacturing is complex, but movements resulting from another war must be added: the commercial. The key components of a fighter depend on materials derived from rare earthand China is the one who has the upper hand in that field. They dominate exploitation and production of metals and elements from rare earths, and in the same way that The US tightened the screws prohibiting China from purchasing Nvidia GPUs and ASML machines to make advanced chips, China activated the lever to regulate the export of magnets and rare earth metals to companies linked to the United States military complex. A J-20 with PL-15 missiles inside the weapons bay Tensions. It is these factors that are turning a less advanced aircraft than the F-35 into an attractive option, but above all practical for the tense times in which we find ourselves. Pakistan and India are in a spiral of geopolitical tensions. India has Russian MIG and French Rafale aircraft, and now the JF-17 has PL-15 missiles Chinese manufacturing. They are China’s most advanced fighter missiles, with an effective range of about 150 km and systems capable of pursuing targets with ease. And, although they were developed for the fighter Fifth generation J-20 (one of the china air banners), can be mounted on the JUF-17. In fact, the current JF-17 is the Block III, considered 4.5 generation. It is the philosophy of the very veteran F-16. If the conflict escalates, there is someone point that a war between India and Pakistan would be a test of Chinese weapons against Western ones. And Europe… what? This is what you may be wondering: what is Europe doing while the others rearm. The old continent has embarked on the path of sovereignty in several fields, being the spaceman and the weapons two important pots of money for the coming years. As for fighters, there are two poles. On the one hand, the FCAS, with French, German and Spanish support. They are three heavyweights in this industry and they have the aim to reach 2040 with a system capable of replacing current fighters. On the other hand, Italy and the United Kingdom (two other powers with companies like Leonardo), as well as Japan, support the GCAP program: a support aircraft that coordinates formations of drones and other fighters. Although before all that, the countries will have to agree, and It’s not something that seems feasible.. Images | Anna Zvereva, emperornie In Xataka | The … Read more

Spain, France and Germany could not depend on the “button” of the F-35. So the future European fighter aims for something else

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In the month of September the future European fighter in which Spain participates began to disfigure publicly. Germany threatened to open FCAS to new partners if there was no agreement with France, while Spain joined Berlin with Indra and, on the opposite sidewalk, a continental bet appeared, the Global Combat Air Program (GCAP) that brought together Italy, the United Kingdom and Japan around a different philosophy. Now, in a new twist of the script, the European fighter is aiming for something else. An overflowing program. He Future Combat Air System (FCAS), conceived in 2017 as Europe’s great bet to build the combat air ecosystem of the second half of the 21st century and put aside the american dependencyis going through its crisis deeper. Germany and France, political and industrial drivers of the project, they study abandoning the most symbolic piece (the new generation fighter) to take refuge in its only still viable element: the combat clouda command and control network based on artificial intelligence capable of integrating manned aircraft, swarms of drones, radars, sensors and naval and land systems in the same operational environment. The shift does not seem like a simple technical reorientation, but rather a tacit recognition that the differences between Airbus and Dassault Aviation They have reached a point of no return. At a time when Europe wants to demonstrate strategic autonomy after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the largest military program of the continent is at risk of fracturing due to the inability of its two main contractors to share responsibilities, cede control and coordinate incompatible industrial visions. The Airbus-Dassault divorce. The conflict between Dassault and Airbus it’s not recentbut it has now reached an intensity that makes advancing the fighter impossible. Dassault, creator of the Rafale and a family-owned company, demands total authority on the design of the aircraft and selection of suppliers. For its part, Airbus (which represents Germany and part of Spain) considers that a European project of this magnitude should be governed by a balanced distribution of work. Negotiations have been stalled for years, with each party accusing the other of breaking agreements. While Dassault threatens to continue alone because “it has all the necessary experience”, the temptation to replace France grows in Berlin through the United Kingdom or Swedentwo partners who already participate in the rival Tempest program. The result is a vicious circle: without trust, there is no cooperation, without cooperation, there is no plane, and without plane, the FCAS becomes an empty shell supported only by the idea. from combat cloud. FCAS The German temptation and the French dilemma. The pressure is not symmetrical. Germany, which has relaxed its spending limit to rearm on a large scaledoes not want to be held hostage by a French company that is blocking progress. According to the Financial Timesin the environment of Chancellor Friedrich Merz an increasingly clear message is heard: if collaboration does not work, Berlin has the resources to continue without Paris. France, for its part, shows caution: its nuclear deterrent It depends on the replacement of the Rafale starting in the next decade, and an abrupt divorce could delay a key system for its strategic security. Although Macron hoped to rebuild trust after years of disagreements, even French voices admit that the project is “immobilized and almost dead,” and that the only real way out is through direct intervention by the president on Éric Trappier, the powerful CEO of Dassault. Combat Cloud The combat cloud as a strategic refuge. Just because the plane stalls doesn’t mean FCAS is meaningless. The most transformative piece of the program is not the fighter, but the AI-based distributed command and control system: a combat cloud european that allows any platform (Rafale, Eurofighter, long-range drones, naval sensors or ground radars) to share data in real time. This system, developed by Airbus (Germany), Thales (France) and Indra (Spain), is the only thing that everyone agrees on: Europe can (co)live with several planes, but not with incompatible networks that depend entirely on the American technological umbrella as was the case with the F-35. That is why it is proposed to accelerate the entry into service from the cloud to 2030a decade ahead of schedule, and armor it as a common pillar even if the joint fighter disappears. For many European countries, having their own cloud is the only way to guarantee that, if Washington one day looks the other way, the continent’s armies can operate in a cohesive and autonomous manner. Failure with implications. If he FCAS collapsesit will not just be an industrial setback, but a devastating geopolitical message. Europe has been proclaiming its desire for military autonomy for years, but every time it tries to create its own capabilities it runs into problems. same obstacles: competition between nations, political misgivings, absence of common governance and divergent priorities. This crisis also comes at a critical moment, when the war in Ukraine has demonstrated that technological superiority it is played onlinethat reaction time is vital and that Western systems must interoperate seamlessly. That the largest European defense project could collapse for corporate disputes shows the extent to which the dream of an integrated defense continues to depend on fragile foundations. What is played in a few weeks. The Financial Times recalled that the calendar is tight. Paris, Berlin and Madrid must decide before the end of the year whether to finance the airplane demonstration, an investment of several billion that no one wants to approve while the project remains blocked. The meetings between the French minister Catherine Vautrin, her German counterpart Boris Pistorius, Merz and Macron will be decisive: or the FCAS is redefined around to combat cloud or formally disintegrates. Everyone repeats that the Franco-German bilateral relationship should not be damaged, but the reality is that companies have carried out the program to the limit. The FCAS was born to symbolize defense Europe, but today only the combat cloud keeps that symbol alive as the last possible bridge between two industries that no longer … Read more

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