Chinese

The US bans Chinese drones and turns DJI into the new Huawei. It’s an absolutely crazy idea.

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The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) of the United States has decided ban all drones and critical components of these vehicles that have been manufactured in foreign countries. In addition to this, he has vetoed any team of communication and video surveillance from the largest Chinese manufacturers, and there is one name above all others: DJI. It’s another shot in the foot for the Trump administration. what has happened. Does almost a decade that some government officials in the US were asking for a veto on drones manufactured by Chinese companies, and that veto is now official. The FCC decision It will prevent this body from authorizing drones or critical drone components, something that is essential to be able to import them into the United States. The measure clearly affects DJI, which becomes the new Huaweialthough there is another firm, Autel, that will also be greatly impacted by the decision. Both come to form part of the so-called “covered list”. The reason is the usual one: to protect national security. It only affects (for now) future drones. The existing drones They will not be affected for the moment by the veto and their users will be able to continue using them. Stores that had models in their inventory and warehouses will be able to sell them normally, as the FCC’s action focuses specifically on future models. Thus, the decision is not retroactive, but that could change in the future and affect many models. What DJI says. Those responsible for DJI indicate in The Wall Street Journal that the company is prepared to be audited and highlights that independent analyzes have indicated that its products are completely safe. “DJI’s data security concerns are not based on evidence and instead reflect protectionism, contrary to the principles of an open market.” Drone pilots cry out to the sky. There are nearly half a million certified drone pilots in the United States, and in this segment between 70 and 90% of commercial drones used by local governments and hobbyists come from DJI. The measure therefore has an enormous impact on this entire industry in the United States. Many of these pilots are collecting drones and components to mitigate the impact of the measure. bad future. Greg Reverdiau, co-founder of the Pilot Institute in Arizona, conducted a survey in which 8,000 pilots participated. 43% indicated that the veto would be “extremely negative” and “potentially a cause of business closure”, and nearly 85% said they could stay in business for up to two years due to the prospect of not being able to access future DJI equipment and components. As this expert said, “People don’t buy DJI drones because it’s Chinese, they buy it because it’s available, very affordable, and capable.” DJI has no competition. And less, American. Eric Ebert, owner of a construction firm and user of these drones, explained the problem. “I’m American through and through. I drive a Chebrolet truck. But American drones can’t compete.” Ebert has a team of seven drone pilots who monitor wind turbine and solar panel installations. These weeks they have not stopped hoarding DJI drones and components “knowing what was going to come our way in 2026.” Protectionism…One of the companies that will benefit from the measure is Brinc Drones, a Seattle firm that sells them to more than 700 state agencies. Blake Resnick, its founder, explained that “it is impossible to compete with DJI unless you are subsidized by the state.” …and rear doors. In November XTI Aerospace, which makes helicopters, acquired a DJI distributor called Drone Nerds and also Anzu Robotics, which makes drones by licensing technology from DJI. As part of the agreement, the drone component manufacturing firm Unusual Machines invested 25 million. Guess who is a shareholder and board member of Unusual Machines: Donald Trump Jr, President Trump’s son. Image | jonas In Xataka | China conquered us with its cheap drones. Now the price of their pieces is skyrocketing for a reason that is not coincidental.

China wants Chinese people to have more children. So he’s going to put a special tax on condoms

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China wants more babies. Many more. Enough to increase their birth rate and stop the population loss which has allowed India ahead as the most populous nation on the planet. After repealing his ‘one child’ policy and display a wide range of measurements pro-natalism at a political, social and economic level, Xi Jinping’s Government has made a radical decision: make condoms more expensive and other contraceptive items. By first time in 30 yearswhoever wants to buy them will no longer enjoy a VAT exemption. In summary: sex becomes more expensive…at least the insurance. Sex with a condom? Pay more. have sex you will be more expensive in China from now on. At least if you want to do it with contraceptives. In the context of a broader tax reform that basically affects the value added tax (our VAT), Xi Jinping’s Government has decided remove exemption tax that condoms enjoyed until now. The decision is not exactly new. The law on which it is based was approved at the end of 2024, but it is now generating noise on social networks and the media for a very simple reason: its effects will begin to be felt shortly, from the January 1, 2026which is when Chinese couples will encounter rising prices on contraceptives. One figure: 13%. The change is important because this type of contraceptive items enjoyed a VAT exemption since 1993when China implemented the rate nationwide. From now on the scenario will be different and those who want to buy condoms will find themselves with a VAT of 13%. Today, precise Guardiana package of standard prophylactics costs between 40 and 60 yuan ($5.7-8.5). The contraceptive pill, available in the country without a prescription, ranges between 50 and 130 yuan, from 7.1 to 18.5 dollars. The price increase will not be exorbitant, but it has generated criticism on networks such as Weibo. “I was very angry when I saw that condoms were going to have taxes and increase in price,” he complained recently a user on RedNote. “Is it so easy to profit from us workers? I got so angry that I placed an order at night for the condoms that I like… I accidentally bought too many.” Why now? The million dollar question. The Chinese government has not simply imposed taxes on condoms. The measure is framed in a broader initiative that seeks to modernize the tax system and check the list of products and services exempt from VAT. At the end of the day, the consumption tax represents a crucial part of the tax revenues that feed the Chinese coffers. All in all, it is striking that Beijing decides to make contraceptives more expensive precisely at a time when the country loses population and look for ways to encourage their birth rate, which has led the State to act as a matchmaker, help to couples with babies or even go household by household to encourage women to have children. It has also not gone unnoticed that the same tax reform contemplates a tax reduction for childcare services. There is more at stake than Chinese demographics: there is the country’s economy, supported by its enormous domestic market, and the challenge of what to do with million pensioners. “Unlikely”. The other question is… Does the Government really expect that applying a 13% tax on condoms will result in more babies? An IndexBox report shows that in 2020, close to 5.4 billion condoms. There is who thinkslike Quian Cai, from the University of Virginia, that a price increase may “reduce access” to contraceptives, especially among the poorest population, but warns of the consequences. “It could lead to more abortions and increased health care costs,” prevents Cai. The risk? That in an attempt to increase the birth rate, China finds itself with more terminations of pregnancies and a resurgence of diseases sexually transmitted. Others are simply skeptical that making condoms more expensive is going to influence the number of pregnancies, especially if one takes into account that one of the brakes on birth rates is the high cost of parenting. “The tax itself is unlikely to have a noticeable effect on birth rates,” explains to TIME Yuan Mei, professor at the School of Economics, Singapore Management University. “Decisions about having children in China are mainly influenced by economic and lifestyle factors, such as the cost of raising a child and long working hours. These factors outweigh small changes in the price of condoms.” So what for? There is who considers that the rate has a symbolic nature and really seeks to delve into a message. “Now that China’s birth policy has shifted toward promoting birth and no longer promotes contraception, it is reasonable to tax condoms again,” reflect He Yafu, Guangdong demographer. Nor does it seem that the initiative will have a notable economic impact. Not at least if you put it in context. Lee Ding of Dezan Shira & Associated explains to Guardian that taxing condoms will add around 5 billion extra yuan a year to state coffers (about $710 million). It is a considerable figure, but very small when compared to the billions that the country collects in general. “We don’t believe that income generation is the main motivation.” Images | Fenghua (Unsplash) 1 and 2 and CDC (Unsplash) In Xataka | While the birth rate in China plummets, a region does not stop having children. Their secret: being a large family has a reward

Scooter, Chinese and with the last name “ADV”. The Zontes 368G is destroying the Spanish market for good reason

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Spain It’s scooter country. They are cheap to maintain, they hardly use fuel and some of them did not need a driving license to buy them. And I speak in the past tense because the DGT It already requires you to take a small driving course for new drivers who want to get a 125cc motorcycle with the B license (the car license). Taking into account that for years it has been possible to drive scooters without a license and the economy of maintenance, it is more than logical that these small vehicles have occupied the top 3 sales for years. What was not so predictable is that a Chinese manufacturer, launching an A2 license scooter, has blown up the ranking of the best-selling motorcycles in Spain and has catapulted itself to the top 3, very close to the historic Japanese Yamaha. We talk about Zontes with his 368Gand take a good look at the photo, since once you recognize it you will not stop seeing it on the Spanish streets. The reason for this motorcycle. Zontes has been in Spain since 2018 and, since then, has had a very modest presence. In China, The culture of copying has nothing to do with how we perceive it in Spain: For the Asian country it is a way of recognizing that a product is well made. For years, traditional Chinese education was based on memorization, tracing and exact reproduction of classical texts. Copying was the correct way to learn, and if a student could exactly replicate their teacher’s work, it demonstrated respect and having achieved a high level of skill. So, analyzing that the best-selling A2 scooter in Spain is the Honda 350 ADVZontes decided to make his own. The anti-ADV. A motorcycle for the city, road and (some) countryside, all with an aesthetic similar to Honda’s most expensive ADV, the X-ADV. The Zontes 368G is the third best-selling motorcycle in Spain according to Anesdor, dangerously close to the Yamaha Nmax. That’s key for several reasons. It is the best-selling Chinese scooter in Spain. It is the first time that an A2 license scooter is close to surpassing a B license scooter in sales. This Zontes model has surpassed Voge, a Chinese manufacturer that seemed unbeatable in Spain. While Chinese manufacturers are betting on a fragmented distribution strategy, Zontes has bet practically everything on this model. Why is it devastating?. Zontes has touched the x pillars necessary for a motorcycle to sweep sales in Spain. The price is absurdly low. Zontes asks 5,529 euros for a 368G with almost 40 HP and fully equipped. On a technological level, it is one of the most ambitious proposals on the market: heated grips, 8-inch TFT screen with mirroring connectivity, rear camera, front camera, keyless start, electric seat opening, full LED lights. Expansion of dealer network in Spain and good response from technical service. The small print. Like practically all Chinese manufacturers (except for some high-displacement models from Voge), the toll to pay for buying an Asian motorcycle is that you have to go to the workshop quite a bit. The Voge’s maintenance is every 4,000km, compared to 12,000km for its direct rival, the Honda ADV 350. A point to keep in mind for all those drivers who drive close to 10,000km annually. 2026 is coming even stronger. Zontes has made a splash in 2025, and has even more reason to do so in 2026. They are going to increase the maintenance interval to 5,000km thanks to an oil cooler. The bike will come with a heated seat. New display. Cruise control. Suspension improvements. On the other hand, in China, it is sold at the same price as the current model, so hardly any price increase is expected. 2026 will be a key year in the motorcycle world: it is more than likely that Chinese manufacturers will take the top 1 for the first time. Zontes is not alone. Zontes has become a manufacturer capable of surpassing giants such as BWM, Kymco and Kawasaki in registrations. But just look at the top 10 units registered in Spain to understand that it is not alone. Position four is occupied by Voge, a Chinese manufacturer that has managed to place its 900 DSX as the best-selling trail in Spain. In 10th place, QJmotor is beginning to make its mark. The future of the motorcycle in Spain is inevitable: it passes through China. Image | Zontes In Xataka | Chinese motorcycles are sweeping Spain: who is who in this puzzle of brands

The US electrical grid depends on Chinese devices. And that worries their national security

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United States national security has always been measured on aircraft carriers, missiles and satellites. Today, however, a growing part of that security depends on something much more everyday: electricity. The grid that powers homes, hospitals, data centers and military bases is going through —despite political resistance from the Trump administration— an accelerated transformation towards renewable sources. But that transition, key to the country’s energy future, has introduced a silent vulnerability. The back door open. The expansion of solar energy has made the US electrical grid depend massively of inverters made in China, essential devices for converting solar energy into electricity usable by the grid. They are not simple pieces of hardware: they are digital systems, connected, with software, remote communication capabilities and, in many cases, manufactured by companies with direct or indirect links to Beijing. For years, this dependency was seen as an industrial or commercial problem. Today, for those responsible for national security, it has become something very different. The agency notice. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency (CISA), the National Security Agency (NSA) and the FBI published a joint notice in which they alleged that cyber actors sponsored by the People’s Republic of China had compromised and maintained persistent access to critical US infrastructure. The identified group, known as Volt Typhoonhad managed to infiltrate organizations in key sectors such as energy, water, transportation and communications. The objective was not to steal data or obtain financial benefits. According to the security agencies documentthe behavior detected “is not consistent with traditional espionage” and points, with “high confidence”, to a different strategy: enter critical systems, remain hidden for long periods and wait. Wait for a crisis or conflict scenario in which those same infrastructures may be interrupted or degraded. It’s exactly the scenario that FBI Director Christopher Wray has described before Congress warning that China is positioning itself to attack American civilian infrastructure as part of its strategic planning. From stealing secrets to preparing chaos. For years, cyber activities attributed to China focused on the theft of intellectual property and trade secrets. Today, according to security officialsthe objective is different: to create the ability to cause internal chaos in the United States and limit its room for maneuver in a conflict, especially in the Indo-Pacific. The systems attacked by Volt Typhoon—such as ports, regional power grids, or water utilities—have no immediate economic or political value. Precisely for this reason, experts conclude that the only reason to infiltrate them is to be able to sabotage them later. It is not necessarily about causing a national blackout. As government sources explainselective interruptions, cascading failures or highly visible incidents would be enough to generate social panic, put pressure on policy makers and condition decision-making. Towards the transition. The U.S. power grid is increasingly reliant on solar inverters and storage systems—so-called investor-based resources— which are not simple pieces of hardware. They are digital, connected systems that regulate the flow of energy, stabilize the frequency and constantly communicate with other elements of the network. According to the In Broad Daylight reportprepared by Strider Technologies, since 2015 China has exported nearly 2.68 billion kilograms of inverters to the United States, dominating two-thirds of the world market. To understand the scale of the phenomenon: 86% of electricity companies analyzed by Striderwhich represent about 12% of the installed capacity in the United States, use at least one Chinese supplier considered risky. Together, these devices are present in 5,400 megawatts of solar capacity spread across 22 states, enough electricity to keep more than a million homes powered for a year. The concern is not trivial. A Chinese manufacturer remotely disabled inverters installed in the United States and other countries amid a contract dispute, demonstrating that manufacturers retain operational control on already deployed equipment. Furthermore, research cited by The Washington Post reveal the existence of undocumented communication components in some inverters, capable of connecting to external networks without the operators’ knowledge. According to Striderthe problem is compounded because Chinese academic and military institutions have produced thousands of studies on foreign power grid vulnerabilities, many of them focused on deliberate disruption scenarios. China has come forward against the accusations. A spokesman for its embassy in Washington responded to Reuters and Washington Post rejecting that there is a security problem and denouncing what he described as a “generalization” of the concept of national security to discredit Chinese advances in energy infrastructure. Beijing has not announced technical reviews, external audits or changes to the control mechanisms of these devices. A dilemma without a simple solution. In the short term, US authorities have ordered electric companies to limit or monitor external communications from these devices. However, as officials recognizethe fragmentation of the electricity sector—with thousands of operators and unequal standards—makes a uniform response difficult. In the medium term, the dilemma is more complex. A massive recall of Chinese hardware could put energy supplies at risk at a time of strong demand growth. Maintaining it implies accepting a strategic vulnerability. In the long term, the consensus among analysts is clear: energy is no longer just an economic or climate issue, but a matter of national security. As Strider’s report concludesensuring the transition to clean energy without creating new strategic dependencies has become a defensive priority. The new dimension of national security. The US power grid does not need to be attacked tomorrow to become a pressure tool today. The vulnerability already exists, integrated in the form of everyday devices, invisible to the end user but critical to the functioning of the country. The question raised by the official documents themselves is not whether that capacity will be used, but in what context and for what purpose. Because, in the strategic competition of the 21st century, the control of energy can be as decisive as the control of territory. Image | Unsplash and freepik Xataka | The US and China are involved in a controversy over renewable devices: what we know (and, above all, what we do not know) so far

30 years ago a young Chinese man set up an ice cream stand. Now he leads an emporium with more stores than McDonald’s

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It’s hard to believe in a world dominated by big brands and multinationals, but there is a hospitality chain with more stores than McDonald’s and Starbucks that you’ve probably never heard of. His name is Mixue (Mìxuě Bīngchéng) was founded in the late 90s by a university student from Zhenghou, China, and today it is considered the largest food and beverage chain in the world. This is how it is recognized, for example, by the magazine TIMEwhich has included it in your listing of the 100 most influential companies of 2025. It is estimated that it has more than 46,000 stores spread throughout Asia, Australia, the Middle East and South America, a vast network of stores offering a menu based on ice creams, smoothies, coffees, traditional teas and bubble teas. Bigger than McDonald’s? Yes, if we talk about the number of establishments. The benefits already they are something else. While McDonald’s boasts of having more than 43,000 restaurants spread across more than a hundred countries and Starbucks managed 40,576 stores At the end of the first quarter of fiscal year 2025, Mixue surpasses (and quite comfortably) both figures. A few months ago the magazine TIME assured that the chain has more than 45,000 spread mainly throughout mainland China, although it also operates in other regions. Do you have so many stores? Yeah. Fortune calculate which exceeds 46,000 points of sale throughout Asia, Austria, the Middle East and South America. Other sources speak of more storesraising the total network to 53,000 points selling. Beyond these dancing numbers, one thing is clear: Mixue is normally considered the food and beverage chain with a greater deployment of establishments in the world. In addition, its branch network continues to expand to good If in the West its brand is less known to us than McDonald’s or Starbucks, it is because (despite the international jump that has given in recent years) most of the Mixue stores they remain focused in China. The firm also has another handicap that helps understand its global expansion: while in the case of Starbucks more than 50% of the stores are in the hands of the company itself, in Mixue practically all They operate through franchises. What is your story? Mixue’s is the typical story of improvement and accelerated growth that gives shine to the classes of coaching business. The father of the company is Zhang Hongchao, who laid its foundation almost 30 years ago from scratch. Your story starts in 1997in Zhengzhou, when Zhang, then a university student, managed to get his grandmother to lend him 3,000 yuan ($420) to set up a small slushie and soft drink stand. Despite the challenges that were encountered along the way (and some other business failure), Zhang moved forward, managed to adapt to the changes in Zhenghou, reinvested in machinery and found the key to creating a million-dollar business. Sam Tang account that his first success came in 2006, when he launched ice creams for one yuan. In 2014, its brand already had 1,000 stores. In 2020 there were 10,000. And how has it succeeded? The big question. Mixue’s business model has several clear characteristics. The first, its commercial approach. The chain basically sells ice cream. soft servesmoothies, tea drinks and bubble teasalthough in your menu coffee and Fortune assures which in the future plans to expand its offering with beer. The other great features of your menu are the affordable priceswith ice creams for less than one euro. Other peculiarities of the company are its commitment to dominate the supply chainits commitment to a clearly identifiable brand thanks to symbols such as its mascot (Snow King) and, above all, an expansion through franchises. In a report from a few months ago the company itself recognizes that almost all of its stores (99%) are opened and operate through franchises. Mixue is responsible for supervising businesses, choosing locations, decoration and assessing the capacity of the staff. For her, the business is not so much in the fee that those stores then pay as in the equipment, merchandise and packaging that she sells to them. And the future? It doesn’t look bad. In spring the company went public in Hong Kong and managed to raise nearly 450 million of dollars, starring in one of its best premieres of the first half of 2025. The company seems willing also to get into the powerful (and disputed) US market. According to precise Fortuneduring the first half of the year the company reached a revenue volume of 2,000 million dollars (40% more than in 2024) with profits of 370 million. Despite its humble origins, its founder and his brother now manage a fortune of billions of dollars. Images | Choo Yut Shing (Flickr) 1 and 2 and Jeremy Thompson (Flickr) In Xataka | One of the biggest wine critics is French and has toured China. There is no good news for French wine

The EU already has a date to charge Chinese platforms at least three euros per package. Temu had been preparing for a long time

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Buying something cheap online has become an almost automatic gesture for many. A pair of t-shirts, a mobile accessory or a small gadget that costs little more than a coffee arrives at home in a few days, often from platforms such as Shein, AliExpress or Temu. It is not an isolated perception. The compliance reports themselves under the Digital Services Law They show the extent to which these platforms have been integrated into the day-to-day life of digital consumption in the Old Continent. This change in habits has a very concrete translation in figures and logistics. In 2024, the European Union received 4.6 billion low-value shipments, equivalent to more than twelve million a day. According to the European Commission91% of these shipments came from China, a constant flow that has not only grown exponentially in recent years, but has put customs and control systems, designed for another volume and another reality of international trade, under unprecedented pressure. What changes come and when. Brussels’ response to this scenario has a calendar and concrete measures. It has been agreed to apply a fixed tariff of three euros to items contained in small shipments that enter the European Union and have a value of less than 150 euros. We are facing a transitional solution that will begin to be applied on July 1, 2026 and that will serve as a bridge until the entry into operation of the new European customs systemwith a large data node to centralize information and improve risk management, and with a community authority to coordinate and homogenize the application of the rules. The EU has been working for some time on a structural reform of its customs union to unify data, streamline procedures and strengthen supervision at community level. The creation of a common information system and a European customs authority seeks to correct the fragmentation between Member States, a problem that the massive increase in small shipments has made evident. Faced with increasingly atomized and low-value trade, Brussels aspires to a different model, with more coordination and a more homogeneous application of the rules throughout the internal market. Behind the scenes of the measure. The political impulse behind this reform responds to several fronts open at the same time. On the one hand, European authorities have been warning for years about undervaluation practices that distort competition and penalize businesses that do comply with the rules. Added to this are “risks to the health and safety of consumers, high levels of fraud and environmental concerns.” When is the fee paid? The key to this measure is the moment in which the tax is activated. The three-euro tariff is applied when the merchandise enters the European Union, that is, at the time of importation. This implies a fundamental difference for our purchases. If the product is shipped directly from outside the EU, the shipping is subject to that rate. Things change when the order leaves a warehouse located within the single market, the package does not cross a customs border again and the tax is not activated in this case because the import should have occurred earlier. The document approved by the EU does not say at any time that the consumer will pay this tariff directly. The rule is limited to establishing that the tax will be applied to the goods at the time of their importation. From there, the logic of the market suggests that it will be the platforms, sellers or logistics operators who manage the payment before the customs authority and then decide how to integrate that cost. In practice, the most common thing is that it ends up being reflected in the final price or in the costs of the order, that is, we would see it reflected at the time of “checkout” of our purchase. Three euros per product or per item? The Council document is precise in one key nuance. The tariff is defined as a fixed charge of three euros on items contained in small shipments, and not as a flat rate per package or as a surcharge for each individual unit. This choice of words indicates that the calculation is linked to the declared content of the shipment, and not only to the box in which it travels. In the absence of a more detailed operational guide from the authorities, and following the usual logic of customs, this allows us to interpret that several identical products would be grouped under the same item. For example, if an order includes three pairs of sneakers and three watches, the tax would not be applied six times, but rather once for the sneakers and once for the watches. That is, three euros for each type of product included in the shipment, and not for each unit purchased. Temu anticipates the change. Faced with this new scenario, Temu has been adjusting its model in Europe for some time. The platform has reinforced agreements with local logistics operators to expand delivery options and support its local seller program, with a bid to serve more orders from within the community market. In its official communications, the company notes that it expects local sellers and logistical compliance within the EU represent up to 80% of its European sales, a strategy that seeks to gain agility, shorten deadlines and adapt to a more demanding regulatory environment. The key question is whether this model pays off. Centralizing stock in the EU provides control and speed, but requires better selection of which products are offered and in what quantities. The calendar, in any case, is already defined and the countdown for the changes in the community customs system to come into force is underway. At the same time, e-commerce platforms are starting to respond. Everything indicates that part of this adjustment will end up being reflected in higher prices for some products from China, although its real scope will depend on how logistics is reorganized in the coming months. Images | Xataka with Grok | Olga Nayda In Xataka … Read more

That Chinese and Russian bombers patrol together is not surprising. That they do it against Japan and South Korea has had an immediate response

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The growing synchronicity between China and Russia in the airspace of Northeast Asia has ceased to be an anomaly and has become an increasingly calculated strategic pattern. The problem is that the last joint patrol between both nations once again demonstrated how the airspace has been transformed into an area of ​​maximum tension. Strategic pressure. The last patrol joint Sino-Russian has certified that the airspace around Japan and South Korea has been transformed into a zone of permanent friction. Russian Tu-95 and Chinese H-6 bombers, escorted by J-16, made a circuit that forced Tokyo and Seoul to deploy fighters as the formation traversed corridors where any mistake can escalate quickly. The flight, although it fits in annual exercises between both countries, occurred just after Chinese J-15 fighters launched from the Liaoning aircraft carrier They will activate their radars of fire against Japanese F-15s, an act considered equivalent to announcing an imminent attack. For Japanthese maneuvers are no longer simple demonstrations of force: they symbolize coordinated pressure in response to its increasingly declared involvement in the defense of Taiwan, a stance that China considers a direct provocation. “It is a serious concern for national security,” has settled the Japanese minister. South Korea and a pattern. In parallel, South Korea had to mobilize your aviation when seven Russian and two Chinese aircraft entered the KADIZ without warning, a practice recurring since 2019. Although the zone does not constitute sovereign space, its systematic violation allows Beijing and Moscow to measure reaction times, saturate surveillance and normalize incursions that, in other circumstances, would have been interpreted as signs of crisis. The aircraft remained about an hour before withdrawing, on a route that overlaps both the Chinese defense zone and disputed areas between Tokyo and Seoul. This routine erodes stability: forces South Korea to invest resources, exposes regulatory divergences (Russia does not even legally recognize the existence of KADIZ) and builds an environment where the exception becomes an operating habit. japanese fighter The Japanese doubt. The background of this escalation we have been counting and started with the comments from the Japanese prime minister, who stated that a Chinese attack on Taiwan would be an existential threat to Japan. The message, aligned with the doctrine of collective self-defense, meant for Beijing a crossing of red lines that unleashed diplomatic and economic reprisalsaccompanied by a notable increase of his military activity near Okinawa and especially Yonaguni, the closest Japanese point to Taiwan. So, Tokyo plans to deploy electronic warfare units and air defense systems, reinforcing an island whose location makes it both a shield and a priority objective. For Japan, this militarization is a necessary response. For China, it is an indicator that Tokyo is willing to integrate more actively in an eventual scenario of support for Taiwan. Wear tool. China-Russia joint patrols are no longer isolated exercises, but expressions of increasing coordination spanning from Alaska to the Sea of ​​Japan. They integrate bombers, fighters, early warning aircraft and synchronized maneuvers that show a willingness to project power and generate a constant cost to the region’s defensive systems. In addition to their military value, these missions have a clear political objective: underline that the airspace over Japan and South Korea is not a monopoly of their Western allies, but rather an environment in which Moscow and Beijing can operate freely and predictability. At a time when China responds With every Japanese gesture on Taiwan, this cooperation acts as a pressure amplifier and a reminder that Tokyo could be confronted with two powers at the same time. Fragile balance. The combination radar-locksflights in identification zones, maneuvers without warning and diplomatic tensions accumulated has created a climate where an unforeseen incident could escalate quickly. Japan reinforces its military presence, South Korea adjusts its protocols and China and Russia intensify their joint missions, raising the level of structural friction. As Taiwan establishes itself as a strategic epicenter, nearby air routes become permanent contact lines and every approach, every response, every silence on a radio frequency can be interpreted as a signal. In other words, a wrong calculation can transform an annual patrol in the trigger of a broader regional crisis. Image | CHINESE GOVERNMENT, US Air Force In Xataka | If the question is how far the tension between China and Japan has escalated, the answer is disturbing: they are targeting each other. In Xataka | China has just shown Japan a diplomatic dart that it had been keeping for decades: World War II

The elite of the open models spoke in Chinese. Mistral has just placed Europe at a level that not even the US managed to reach

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Over the last year, the elite of open models for assisted programming, at least in benchmarks as SWE-Bench Verifiedhas spoken with a Chinese accent. Names like DeepSeek, Kimi either qwen They had settled into the top positions in testing and were setting the pace in complex software engineering tasks, while Europe was still searching for its position. The arrival of Devstral 2 alters that distribution. It does not displace those who were already at the top, but it places Mistral at the same level of demand and turns a European company into a real contender in a field that until now seemed reserved for others. League change: the technical leap that had been brewing for some time. During recent months, the open models developed in Europe and the United States had shown constant evolution, although still without the performance necessary to compete in the most demanding tests. The progress was evident, but there was a lack of a project capable of consolidating it at a higher level and demonstrating that this path could give results comparable to those of the sector. Devstral 2 in data: performance, size and licenses. The new Mistral model reaches 123B parameters in a dense architecture and offers an expanded context of 256K tokens, accompanied by a modified MIT license that facilitates its adoption in open environments. Its compact version, Devstral Small 2, reduces the model to 24B licensed parameters Apache 2.0. In the SWE-Bench Verified figures published by the companyDevstral 2 obtains 72.2%, a mark that places it in the most competitive section of the open models evaluated and that confirms its presence among the most advanced alternatives in the segment. It is reflected by a panorama concentrated in the upper part of the benchmark. Among the open models, DeepSeek V3.2 leads the group with 73.1%, followed by Kimi K2 Thinking with 71.3% and for proposals such as Qwen 3 Coder Plus and Minimax M2, which are around 69 points. At lower levels GLM 4.6, GPT-OSS-120B, CWM and DeepSWE appear, with more moderate results. In the closed commercial environment (proprietary models), the graph incorporates higher scores: Gemini 3 Pro reaches 76.2%, GPT 5.1 Codex Max rises to 77.9% and Claude Sonnet 4.5 scores 77.2%, all of them above the best brands registered for open models. What SWE-Bench Verified Really Measures and Why It Matters. SWE-Bench Verified is a test designed to evaluate whether a model can solve real programming tasks, not synthetic exercises. Each case presents a bug in an open source repository and requires a patch to pass the previously failed tests. The evaluation seeks to measure whether the system understands the structure of the project, identifies the cause of the problem and proposes a coherent solution. It is a useful and demanding metric, although limited to Python repositories and a specific set of situations that do not cover the full breadth of software work. From co-pilots to agents who act on the project. The arrival of Devstral 2 coincides with a broader change in the way of working with programming tools. It is no longer just about receiving suggestions in the editor, but about having agents capable of exploring an entire repository, interpreting its structure and proposing changes consistent with its real state. In this context, Vibe CLI appears, a tool that allows Devstral to analyze files, modify parts of the code and execute actions directly from the terminal, bringing these capabilities closer to the daily workflow of developers. Cost and deployment: what each type of user can do with Devstral. The model will be available for free for an initial period and will then cost $0.40 per million tokens for input and $2.00 per million for output, while the Small 2 version will be priced lower. Its deployment also makes a difference: Devstral 2 requires at least four H100-class GPUs, aimed at data centers, while Devstral Small 2 is intended to run on a single GPU and, according to Mistral documentation, the Devstral Small family can also run in CPU-only configurations, without a dedicated GPU. This variety allows both companies and individual developers to find a suitable entry point. The appearance of Devstral 2 introduces an unexpected element in a space where Chinese companies set the pace and where not even the United States, despite its leadership in artificial intelligence, had an open model in this high performance range in SWE-Bench Verified. Mistral does not displace those who were already at the top, but it does broaden the conversation and shows that Europe can compete in a field where it did not appear until now. It is a movement that does not alter the general hierarchy, although it does open a new margin for the evolution of assisted programming tools. Images | Xataka with Gemini 3 In Xataka | OpenAI and Google deny that they are going to put ads in ChatGPT and Gemini. The reality is that accounts do not come only with subscriptions

Chinese fighters have targeted Japanese fighters over Okinawa. Japan’s response has been forceful: an archipelago of missiles

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The tension between China and Japan has entered a cycle of accelerated deterioration that is no longer limited to diplomatic exchanges or formal protests. In recent weeks, the western Pacific has been the scene of maneuvers increasingly aggressive in which the lines between deterrence, warning and provocation become dangerously blurred. In the last few hours the most serious episode to date has taken place. A strategic rivalry. It all started on the weekend, with the lighting with fire control radar of Japanese fighters by J-15 aircraft from the Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning near Okinawa, a situation that has set off all the alarms in Tokyo. The gesture (an act iunequivocally hostile in military parlance) comes at a time when Japan has committed to reinforce its presence in the area around Taiwan and the Ryukyu island chain, a decision that Beijing perceives as a frontal challenge to its regional ambitions. The spiral is worsened by the statements of Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, pointing out that an attack on the strait could activate collective defense Japanese, a phrase that China has elevated to the rank of strategic provocation. Radar, aircraft carriers and a risk. Aerial interaction near Okinawa fu much more an isolated incident: it marked the first time that Japan officially disclosed a radar lock Chinese about their fighters. The Japanese Ministry of Defense registered about a hundred of takeoff and landing operations of Liaoning aircraft, in parallel to two episodes in which the J-15 fixed their firing sensors on Japanese F-15s, forcing the latter country to immediately deploy its own combat air patrols. China responded accusing Japan of interfering in their exercises, alleging that it had previously delimited the maneuver area. Chinese aircraft carriers and destroyers moved through the Miyako Strait, one of the sea corridors connecting the Pacific to the East China Sea, while official Chinese media they ridiculed Japanese defensive capabilities and warned that any move toward a more active military role “would lead to its own destruction.” The language, accompanied by real maneuvers which combine naval presence, air patrols and psychological pressure, defines an environment where any tactical error could lead to a crisis. Liaoning Ryukyu as an advanced shield. Faced with this escalation, Bloomberg told that Japan has undertaken the largest military reconfiguration since the Cold War, articulated around a concept that analysts have called the “missile archipelago”. Yonaguni, the country’s westernmost island, has become a surveillance and electronic warfare outpost just a stone’s throw away. 110 kilometers from Taiwan. From 2022, after the salvo of Chinese missiles that fell near its coasts, Tokyo has multiplied the installation of anti-aircraft batteries, long-range radars and response units amphibian distributed throughout the Ryukyu chain. The military presence in Kyushu is also increasing, with deployments of F-35s and long-range missiles. At the same time, the government has started to prepare to the local population with briefings that reveal both the magnitude of the challenge and the growing concern among citizens who vividly remember the trauma of the battle of okinawa. The militarization of the region, although supported by a majority of young Japanese, continues awakening misgivings between sectors that fear that a conflict in the strait will turn their islands into the first line of fire. Japanese military in Okinawa Fight for historical legitimacy. we have been counting. The operational tension is added to an equally volatile front: the historical dispute. Chinese state media has reactivated narratives that question Japanese sovereignty over the Ryukyu, reinterpreting the postwar period and selectively citing statements of 1945 to present Japan as a nation whose sovereignty “is to be determined.” Beijing takes advantage of these references to reinforce its claim about the Senkaku and to argue that his view on Taiwan has a historical legitimacy that Japan cannot contradict. Tokyo responds by appealing to Treaty of San Francisco and to the existing international legal framework, but its effort to maintain stability collides with Chinese pressure, which combines repressive diplomacy with psychological operations aimed at local communities. In other words, the historical dispute is not rhetorical: it feeds the perception in Japan that the conflict with China is not temporary, but deeply structural. Taiwan in the shadows. The link between Japanese security and the fate of Taiwan is today explicit. The doctrine collective defense revised in 2015 allows the country to intervene if Japan’s survival could be compromised, and security analysts they point out that a hypothetical American operation to defend the island would require the use of Japanese bases. Tokyo’s refusal to cooperate with Washington, in such a scenario, would put the alliance itself at risk, making Japanese participation almost inevitable. China is fully aware of this and concentrates its efforts on fracturing the perception of inevitability, putting political, military and psychological pressure to erode the Japanese margin of decision. On that board, the new electronic warfare units in Yonaguni and the missile batteries distributed throughout the archipelago, they could become, if necessary, key nodes in an integrated attack chain between Japan and the United States, which would make them priority targets for a Chinese offensive in the initial phase. Uncertainty. The result of these dynamics is a western Pacific that advances towards an area permanent frictionwhere each movement is interpreted as a dress rehearsal and every political statement is magnified as a strategic notice. The air raidsnaval exercises, the militarization of the islands and the historical dispute between great powers converge in a reduced geopolitical spacedensely populated and highly symbolic. For Japan, the crossroads It is complex: reinforce its defense without reigniting domestic fears about militarism, coordinate with the United States without becoming an automatic target, and respond to China without setting the region on fire. For Beijing, the key is in maintaining the pressureexpand its margin of future action in the Taiwan Strait and fragment the strategic unity of its adversaries. Image | US Indo-Pacific Command, GoodFon, rhk111, RawPixel In Xataka | China has just shown Japan a diplomatic dart that it had been keeping for decades: World War II … Read more

Ford CEO is completely obsessed with Chinese electric cars

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“Xiaomi is the Apple of China.” These are the words not of just anyone, but of Jim Farley, CEO of Ford. The boss of the American company is one of the bosses who has been the most talked about in recent years. And the reason is approach when studying rivals. It is rare to see the CEO of a company praising a rival, but Farley not only does not mince words, but is determined to air the details that need to be improved to catch up. And if there’s one thing that’s catching Farley’s attention, it’s Chinese cars and, in particular, the Xiaomi SU7. Knowing the competition. The automobile industry has embarked on electrification, and if this adventure is making one thing clear, it is that China is leading the way. Although Tesla struck first from the West, it is the Asian giant’s companies that are pushing both technology and batteries. This is generating an ecosystem in which chinese cars They are extremely competitive in the market, something that is making Western manufacturers nervous. To better understand his competition, Farley had the idea of ​​carrying out a series of trips to China to select cars to take back to the United States. Not to dismantle them – or not only – but to drive them on a daily basis on everyday trips. In a recent interview with La Naciónstates that the entire management team is going on that trip to choose 50 cars. He doesn’t want to get off his SU7. Of those 50, they keep five, and they are the ones they take back to Detroit. The one chosen by Farley? He Xiaomi SU7. He liked it to the point of saying that “it’s fantastic,” stating that he didn’t want to get off of it. Previously, already rated the company as “an industry giant and a much stronger consumer brand than automotive companies,” but now it has gone a little further. The Apple of China. “Everyone talks about the Apple car, but the Xiaomi car already exists and it is fantastic,” said before the official cancellation of the car was known. And, in fact, in that interview for La Nación, Farley commented that he is not surprised that Xiaomi is so successful. “It is the Apple of China.” Precisely, it is the “ecosystem” that stands out, something that is Apple’s strong point: “You get into the car with your phone and you don’t have to pair it because it automatically identifies it. It has facial recognition, an AI assistant and can accelerate from 0 to 100 km/h in three seconds with just the push of a button. It looks like a porsche taycan”, he assures. Humiliating. Is it perfect? “No, and we could surpass it in the segments in which we compete,” adds the manager. But Farley’s ‘flowers’ are not only for Xiaomi, but for the Chinese industry. At the Aspen Ideas Festival held in June of this year, CEO described what he saw in China as “lor most humiliating thing I have ever seen in my life”. The reason? That 70% of the world’s electric vehicles are manufactured in China and that they have cabin technology much superior to that offered by many Western brands. “Automatically, your entire digital life is reflected in the car.” Technology gap. Farley’s interest in competitors, both Chinese and domestic, is evident. When Ford entered the electric segment, He did it like an elephant in a china shopwith a Ford Mustang Mach-E which was very expensive to develop when its competitors already had much more optimized processes that allowed the price of cars to be lowered. Since then, they have been changing strategy and moving chips. They hired Doug Field, former chief engineer of the Tesla Model 3 and member in Apple car design, and was the one who opened cars to Farley. Field sincere: “Jim, your parts release system and development architecture are 25 years behind. You can’t compete like that with BYD”. The acid test will be the new electric pickup that Ford is preparing for 2027 with the aim of making it affordable. We will see, of course, how the market responds, but what is clear is that Farley does not fall short when it comes to praising the competition. Images | Xataka, Ford In Xataka | Ford invested 1 billion to produce electric cars in Europe. Now it will invest money in laying off 1,000 employees

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