United States national security has always been measured on aircraft carriers, missiles and satellites. Today, however, a growing part of that security depends on something much more everyday: electricity. The grid that powers homes, hospitals, data centers and military bases is going through —despite political resistance from the Trump administration— an accelerated transformation towards renewable sources. But that transition, key to the country’s energy future, has introduced a silent vulnerability.
The back door open. The expansion of solar energy has made the US electrical grid depend massively of inverters made in China, essential devices for converting solar energy into electricity usable by the grid. They are not simple pieces of hardware: they are digital systems, connected, with software, remote communication capabilities and, in many cases, manufactured by companies with direct or indirect links to Beijing.
For years, this dependency was seen as an industrial or commercial problem. Today, for those responsible for national security, it has become something very different.
The agency notice. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency (CISA), the National Security Agency (NSA) and the FBI published a joint notice in which they alleged that cyber actors sponsored by the People’s Republic of China had compromised and maintained persistent access to critical US infrastructure. The identified group, known as Volt Typhoonhad managed to infiltrate organizations in key sectors such as energy, water, transportation and communications.
The objective was not to steal data or obtain financial benefits. According to the security agencies documentthe behavior detected “is not consistent with traditional espionage” and points, with “high confidence”, to a different strategy: enter critical systems, remain hidden for long periods and wait. Wait for a crisis or conflict scenario in which those same infrastructures may be interrupted or degraded. It’s exactly the scenario that FBI Director Christopher Wray has described before Congress warning that China is positioning itself to attack American civilian infrastructure as part of its strategic planning.
From stealing secrets to preparing chaos. For years, cyber activities attributed to China focused on the theft of intellectual property and trade secrets. Today, according to security officialsthe objective is different: to create the ability to cause internal chaos in the United States and limit its room for maneuver in a conflict, especially in the Indo-Pacific.
The systems attacked by Volt Typhoon—such as ports, regional power grids, or water utilities—have no immediate economic or political value. Precisely for this reason, experts conclude that the only reason to infiltrate them is to be able to sabotage them later. It is not necessarily about causing a national blackout. As government sources explainselective interruptions, cascading failures or highly visible incidents would be enough to generate social panic, put pressure on policy makers and condition decision-making.
Towards the transition. The U.S. power grid is increasingly reliant on solar inverters and storage systems—so-called investor-based resources— which are not simple pieces of hardware. They are digital, connected systems that regulate the flow of energy, stabilize the frequency and constantly communicate with other elements of the network. According to the In Broad Daylight reportprepared by Strider Technologies, since 2015 China has exported nearly 2.68 billion kilograms of inverters to the United States, dominating two-thirds of the world market.
To understand the scale of the phenomenon: 86% of electricity companies analyzed by Striderwhich represent about 12% of the installed capacity in the United States, use at least one Chinese supplier considered risky. Together, these devices are present in 5,400 megawatts of solar capacity spread across 22 states, enough electricity to keep more than a million homes powered for a year.
The concern is not trivial. A Chinese manufacturer remotely disabled inverters installed in the United States and other countries amid a contract dispute, demonstrating that manufacturers retain operational control on already deployed equipment.
Furthermore, research cited by The Washington Post reveal the existence of undocumented communication components in some inverters, capable of connecting to external networks without the operators’ knowledge. According to Striderthe problem is compounded because Chinese academic and military institutions have produced thousands of studies on foreign power grid vulnerabilities, many of them focused on deliberate disruption scenarios.
China has come forward against the accusations. A spokesman for its embassy in Washington responded to Reuters and Washington Post rejecting that there is a security problem and denouncing what he described as a “generalization” of the concept of national security to discredit Chinese advances in energy infrastructure. Beijing has not announced technical reviews, external audits or changes to the control mechanisms of these devices.
A dilemma without a simple solution. In the short term, US authorities have ordered electric companies to limit or monitor external communications from these devices. However, as officials recognizethe fragmentation of the electricity sector—with thousands of operators and unequal standards—makes a uniform response difficult.
In the medium term, the dilemma is more complex. A massive recall of Chinese hardware could put energy supplies at risk at a time of strong demand growth. Maintaining it implies accepting a strategic vulnerability. In the long term, the consensus among analysts is clear: energy is no longer just an economic or climate issue, but a matter of national security. As Strider’s report concludesensuring the transition to clean energy without creating new strategic dependencies has become a defensive priority.
The new dimension of national security. The US power grid does not need to be attacked tomorrow to become a pressure tool today. The vulnerability already exists, integrated in the form of everyday devices, invisible to the end user but critical to the functioning of the country.
The question raised by the official documents themselves is not whether that capacity will be used, but in what context and for what purpose. Because, in the strategic competition of the 21st century, the control of energy can be as decisive as the control of territory.
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