Ukraines

The US ignored Ukraine’s pleas to Russia, and now Iran has turned the US into Ukraine

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In recent years, something curious has happened in the military world: the most influential drones on the battlefield are not the most advanced, but some of the cheapest. Small devices with triangular wings and simple engines, inspired by Iranian designs, have ended up starring thousands of attacks in several conflicts and forcing entire armies to rethink how to defend their skies. Paradoxically, stopping them usually costs much more than making them. And the United States has realized it late. The war that changed the battle. we have been counting. The Russian invasion of Ukraine inaugurated a new phase in modern warfare marked by the massive use of cheap drones capable of overwhelm the defenses traditional aerials. Since 2022, Russian forces have launched tens of thousands of Shahed drones (of Iranian origin) against Ukrainian cities and infrastructure, forcing kyiv to develop an improvised but increasingly sophisticated defense. This experience, acquired in extreme conditions and under constant bombing, has turned the country into the most advanced laboratory in the world to combat this type of weapons. What began as a desperate fight to protect their airspace ended generating new tacticselectronic warfare systems and interceptor drones specifically designed to destroy these low-cost loitering munitions. The weapon that changes the economy of war. The success of Shahed drones is based on brutally simple logic: its price. Each can cost between $20,000 and $50,000, a paltry figure compared to the systems designed to stop them. For years, Ukraine and other countries have been forced to use anti-aircraft missiles that can cost hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars to shoot down a single drone. This asymmetry turns each interception into an economic defeateven when the target is destroyed. To solve the problem, Ukraine began to develop cheaper solutions: interceptor drones that pursue and attack the Shahed, mobile teams with machine guns, electronic jamming systems and surveillance networks adapted to detect these devices before they reach their objectives. The great strategic paradox. Here appears one of the most striking ironies of the current conflict. For years, Ukraine asked for more help to defend against Iranian drone attacks used by Russia and developed specific technology to combat them in view of the fact that no one (or few) paid attention to them. Even now we know who came to offer that experience and those systems to the United States in meetings held at the White House, where he presented proposals to create anti-drone defense networks in the Middle East. That offer was ignored at that time. Ironies of fate, months later, after the start of the war with Iran and the launch of thousands of drones against American bases and allies, Washington has been forced to knock on kyiv’s door and ask for help. In a sense, the conflict has reversed the roles: The most powerful military power in the world is now facing the same dilemma that Ukraine has been trying to solve for years, defending its positions from swarms of cheap drones that force it to spend fortunes to be neutralized. The world calls kyiv. This accumulated experience has turned Ukraine into a unexpectedly valuable partner for countries now suffering similar attacks. Governments in the Middle East, Europe and the United States have begun to request advice, technology and training to defend themselves against Iranian drones. Zelensky himself confirmed that his government has received multiple requests to share knowledge on interceptors, electronic warfare and air defense tactics adapted to this type of threat. kyiv has responded sending experts and systems to some US bases in the region as it tries to balance that aid with its own defensive needs against Russia. From laboratory to export power. The war has also transformed the Ukrainian defense industrial sector. Local companies produce now thousands of interceptor drones every month and have developed models capable of pursuing and destroying Shahed at a fraction of the cost of traditional missiles. Some manufacturers claim to be able manufacture tens of thousands of monthly units, which has aroused enormous international interest. Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabiahave begun negotiations to acquire Ukrainian interceptors and technology, seeking more sustainable solutions than relying exclusively on extremely expensive Western anti-aircraft systems. A new global race: anti-drone defense. The rise of these technologies reflects a change unimaginable until recently in contemporary military logic. The great powers have discovered that systems designed to intercept ballistic missiles or fighter jets are not necessarily effective against swarms of cheap, mass-produced drones. In the Persian Gulf, Israel and the Arab states have had to spend large quantities of missiles Patriot, THAAD or Iron Dome to stop relatively cheap attacks. This dynamic has caused a global career to develop more economical solutions, from interceptor drones to automatic air defense systems capable of confronting massive threats. A global lesson. In short, what began as a regional war in Eastern Europe it’s over redefining the way many countries understand air defense. Ukraine, which for years fought almost alone against massive Iranian drone attacks operated by Russia, has unexpectedly become the world reference to combat this threat. The paradox is simple and obvious, because the technology and tactics developed by a country that was fighting to survive have become essential to protect some of the most advanced military powers on the planet. In the new drone war that extends from Europe to the Middle East, the experience accumulated in the skies over Ukraine has become one of the most valuable strategic assets of the moment. So much so that even has invested the papers with the United States. Image | ArmyInform, Lycksele-Nord, Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine In Xataka | The United Kingdom has opened the kamikaze drone that exploded at the European base. The surprise is capital: it is not from Iran, it is “made in Russia” In Xataka | Shahed drones are spreading terror in the Gulf. Ukraine has offered the solution and the price to pay has a name

Russia’s elite GRU moves its war against Ukraine’s power grid to Polish soil

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Winter in Eastern Europe is not just a season; It’s a damage multiplier. As my colleague Miguel Jorge described wellwhat is emerging in the region is a ruthless reality dubbed “thermal terror.” In this scenario, extreme cold becomes a weapon of war designed to make civil infrastructure – heating, electricity, water – the cruelest target. The ultimate goal is not only to destroy military capacity, but to make daily life physically unviable. Under this logic of making daily life unviable to wear down the population, the Kremlin’s most feared cyberespionage group has decided to cross a dangerous border. 500,000 homes in the spotlight. As Poland prepared for the holidays, its security systems detected what Energy Minister Milosz Motyka called the “strongest attack against Polish energy infrastructure in years,” as reported by Reuters. The sabotage occurred on December 29 and 30 and was surgical. The targets were not chosen at random, but instead targeted two cogeneration plants and systems that connect renewable energy facilities — such as wind farms — to power grid operators. In other words, directly to the key nodes so that energy reaches homes. local media they collected the statements from Prime Minister Donald Tusk, who put figures at risk: if the attack had been successful, half a million people would have been left without heat in the middle of winter. Fortunately, as detailed in the press release of the Polish Governmentthe defenses worked. “At no time was critical infrastructure threatened,” said Tusk, although the incident has been treated with the utmost seriousness, mobilizing the special services to their full capacity. Sandworm’s signature. The attack took on an international dimension when the cybersecurity firm ESET announced the discovery of the weapon used: a destructive malware called DynoWiper. As reported by TechCrunchESET attributed this operation with “medium confidence” to the Sandworm groupan elite unit within the Russian military intelligence agency (GRU). The choice of dates does not seem coincidental. As investigative journalist Kim Zetter points outthis attempted blackout in Poland came almost exactly ten years after the first Sandworm cyberattack against Ukraine’s power grid in 2015, which left 230,000 homes in the dark. For experts, the use of a wiper on Polish soil is an unprecedented event, as it marks Russia’s move from simple espionage to destructive sabotage against a NATO member. Furthermore, this is not an isolated episode because since the beginning of the Ukrainian War, Poland has undergone a sustained increase of cyberattacks attributed to Russian actors. Nevertheless, according to the Ministry of Energy itselfthe December attempt was a turning point both in its intensity and in its objective: it was no longer about probing defenses, but rather about causing a real blackout. Anatomy of the attack. To understand the seriousness of the issue, it is necessary to break down the technology used. Unlike the ransomware commona wiper It is software designed exclusively to destroy. Your goal is not to ask for a ransom, but delete permanently information and leave equipment unusable. In this case, the attackers went directly to the ICS (Industrial Control Systems) systems since these systems are the ones that allow electric companies regulate the supply and monitor the network. So, Sandworm sought to break communication between renewable energy sources and distribution operators. When attacking these nodes, the technicians’ margin of action is minimal because the failures propagate in a chain. A conflict that expands. The Polish Prime Minister directly linked this attack to his country’s support for Ukraine. “We sell electricity there and, in critical situations, we receive it from them,” Tusk explained.. Attacking the Polish network is, by extension, attacking Ukraine’s energy rear. This Russian aggressiveness is not new for Western intelligence services. In fact, the United States government keeps a reward 10 million dollars for information about six GRU officers belonging to Sandworm, responsible for global attacks such as NotPetya, which caused losses of 1 billion dollars. According to Microsoft, Sandworm—whom they call Iridium— has launched nearly 40 destructive attacks against critical infrastructure since the beginning of the invasion of Ukraine, seeking to degrade not only military capacity, but the population’s trust in its leaders. From NATO’s point of view, attempted sabotage does not automatically activate collective defense mechanisms, but it does reinforce disturbing evidence: hybrid warfare makes it possible to strain the European system without formally crossing the red lines of an armed conflict. The next frontier is no longer territorial, but digital. Faced with the growing threat. The Polish Government is finalizing the Law on the National Cybersecurity System, a regulation that seeks the “autonomy and polonization” of security systems to reduce dependence on devices that facilitate foreign interference, according to official information. However, December’s failed sabotage is a reminder that in modern warfare, the front lines are on power plant servers. While in the trenches of Ukraine soldiers try to hide their thermal trace from drones, in cities like Warsaw or Krakow the battle is being fought so that the simple act of turning on the heating does not become an impossible luxury. For now, Poland has won this defensive battle, even achieving a historical record of energy production a few days after the attack. However, Sandworm’s shadow is still long. The hackers’ message is clear: “If we can’t turn off the light, at least we can scare you.” The war for control of the European switch has only just begun. Image | Unsplash and freepik Xataka | La Gomera has been suffering constant total blackouts for years. Now you have a solution: a cable that is unique in the world

Ukraine’s latest tactic is an explosive turn for the war. It’s called “letting in,” and the Russians are falling into the trap.

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Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the front has been mutating with all kinds of tactics who sought to wear down the enemy. The arrival of drones everything has changedbut the strategies and ingenuity In the use of artillery they have remained a fundamental asset for the advance or defense of the front. For this reason, Ukraine’s latest strategy has disconcerted the Russians. When they reach the bunkers there is no one, and then the surprise comes. Win by letting in. Ukraine is applying a more flexible and lethal defense consisting in “pre-register” their artillery on their own front-line positions, so that when the Russians assault and capture them, they literally enter an already calibrated point to be destroyed: the fort falls, the enemy concentrates, and then comes the massive punishment that turns Russian success into a death trap. After that blow, a Ukrainian assault branch recover the points again devastated, closing a cycle that maximizes ranged damage and reduces the exposure of own infantry, something key in a context of growing shortage of trained soldiers. This logic, denounced even by pro-Russian voices as the strategy of “letting in” is actually a way of imposing the pace: it is not about always preventing them from advancing, but about making each advance expensive, slow and bloody. The “death zone” as doctrine. The tactic works because the battlefield has become in a “kill zone” permanent where the defender attempts to maintain a deadly gap between the leading edge and the rear: artillery is placed further back, out of the usual range of rival drones, and forward positions are fortified to attract attackswaiting for the enemy to enter to destroy them right there with fire and drones. The drone operators They not only strike at the front, they also hunt for supply and reinforcement routes, and any activity near “newly taken” positions becomes visible and attackable. Added to this is the constant mining (including remote) and the use of “ambushers” in the few possible logistical axes, so that the attacker not only pays to capture, but also pays twice as much to try to consolidate. The “let in” tactic after pre-registering a position The decisive blow. The most surprising point about this approach is that the defender does not seek so much to “hold every meter” as to prevent the attacker deploy your second step– When the advancing force attempts to bring in specialized reinforcements (e.g. drone operators to hold the ground), the defender launches fast local offensiveseven if they cost material, to keep the death zone intact and keep the enemy trapped in a space where they cannot settle. Thus, the advance exists on paper or in the drone image, but it becomes tactically sterile: you capture something and, before transforming it into a usable position, it becomes a slaughterhouse, like is described in sectors like Kupiansk. It is a war where “letting in” is not an extra: it is the moment in which the enemy advance stops being progress and becomes a loss. The psychological and moral consequence. These types of dynamics are eroding the offensive will because it forces us to choose between kilometers and livesespecially the “faces” of competent soldiers who know how to move in that death zone: It’s not just that advancement costs, it’s that it costs exactly the most valuable thing. From this arises a dilemma on the front itself: advancing in a big way without preparation means burn trained unitsbut advancing “minimally” or little to be able to report presence saves resources… at the cost of generating absurd situations where you can no longer request fire on positions that officially “they are yours”although in reality they are being crushed or disputed. In this framework, the information war of territorial control is mixed with real survival, and “progress” becomes a very diffuse decision. The technological revolution to the rescue. we have been counting. The bottom line is that Ukraine is at the center of a military transformation: soldiers are the most expensive and difficult resource to replace, while unmanned systems have passed to dominate the combatexpanding on an industrial scale, lowering costs and multiplying impact. The front is increasingly managed from the rear or bunkers with operators controlling the space, and attempts at “classic” breaches become almost suicidal: the key is no longer to launch columns, but to disperse, camouflage and gradually push the death zone back. As the war evolves into swarms, AI coordination and persistent attacks, the advantage is not having the most expensive weapon, but having thousands of cheap weaponsreliable communications networks and the ability to update systems non-stop. The coming war. Thus, the strategic decision moves to logistics and industry: cut off land routes, protect supplies, attack factorieslogistics centers and hidden commands, and do so with reusable media and unmanned is increasingly determining. Victories depend on producing drones en massesecure components, sustain communications Starlink type and dominate the cybernetic layer that can blind, uncoordinate or paralyze an entire front. That is why the strategy to “let in” It does not seem like an isolated trick, but rather a direct consequence of the new battlefield: if the first to enter dies, the one who waits and finishes with precision (with drones, mines, artillery and digital coordination) keeps the initiative even if it seems that is receding. Image | US Army Europe In Xataka | The video of the Russian soldier in Ukraine who ignores the bomb that just exploded on him has only two explanations. And one is science fiction In Xataka | The war in Ukraine has a new level of brutality. Russia calls it a “can opener” and turns recruits into detonators

Ukraine’s biggest problem is not Russia. There are three European countries trapped in a perverse mechanism: type C accounts

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Europe faces a decision that goes far beyond an accounting discussion and that defines its strategic credibility: what to do with the more than 210,000 million of euros of Russian assets frozen since the beginning of the invasion of Ukraine. The problem is twofold, because it is not just about figures, but about what comes after activating the operation. The European crossroads. Yes, because the question is not only whether that money should be used to support kyiv at a critical moment, but whether the European Union is capable to take the risks political, legal and economic implications of doing so. As Washington presses for a quick exit to the conflict and reduces its financial support, Brussels finds itself caught between the urgency of avoiding a Ukrainian defeat and the fear of unleashing a russian retaliation that directly hits several of its Member States. Putin clearly. Statements this week by Vladimir Putinloaded with contempt for European elites and confidence in a protracted war, are not simple rhetoric. Moscow makes it clear that it is not contemplating real concessions and that it considers the use of its frozen assets as theft that demands a response. That response would not be symbolic, but surgical: selective seizures, accelerated nationalizations, endless litigation and the use of the Russian financial system as a weapon. The message, a priori, is unequivocal: if Europe crosses the line, Russia will not only punish Ukraine on the battlefield, but also European countries that still have exposed economic interests within their territory. The real blockage. I remembered this morning the financial times he crux of the whole situation. Although the debate is presented as a struggle between hawks and cautions, the real blockage comes from a handful of countries specific, with Belgium, Italy and Austria at the head. It is not a question of ideology, but of direct vulnerability. Belgium hosts Euroclear, the warehouse that guards most of the frozen Russian assets, and fears becoming the first target of retaliation judicial and economic. Italy and Austria, for their part, maintain banks and companies with billions trapped in Russia, benefits included, which they cannot repatriate. For these countries, authorizing the use of Russian money is not an abstract foreign policy decision, but rather an immediate risk to their financial and corporate systems. Type C accounts: the ace of Moscow. At the center of this fear are the calls type C accountsthe mechanism created by Moscow to withhold dividends, interest and assets from Western companies. That money, formally owned by European and American companies, is under Russian control and can be frozen, redistributed or directly transferred to the state budget with a simple decree. For the Kremlin, these accounts are a retaliation tool fast and effective, far superior in agility to slow Western judicial processes. For Europe, they are an invisible chain that binds entire governments when making strategic decisions, because any false step can translate into lost billions and internal political crises. Germany pushes, Europe hesitates. Germany has become the main political engine of the plan to use Russian assets, convinced that without that money there is no realistic way to support Ukraine for another two years without skyrocketing the European debt or depending on impossible unanimity. Berlin insists that the risk must be shared among everyone and that failure to act would send a devastating sign: Europe is not capable of defending its own security. However, this logic collides with the reality of countries that feel that the risk is not distributed, but rather concentrated in their national balance sheetsits banks and its courts. A (bad) peace as a threat. This financial blockade occurs in an even more disturbing context: European fear to an imposed peace on terms favorable to Russia. For many capitals, an agreement that consolidates Moscow’s territorial gains would not only leave Ukraine defenseless, but would force Europe to prepare for a scenario direct confrontation in the medium term, with longer borders, a strengthened Russian army and a weakened European deterrent. In this framework, the frozen Russian money stops being a tactical lever and becomes a strategic investment: either it is used now to support Ukraine, or it is paid for later in the form of massive rearmament and risk of war. The final dilemma. In short, the European Union has frozen Russian assets to prevent them from returning to Moscow without reparations, but now it must decide whether it dares to give the next step. Without that money, Ukraine could run out of liquidity in a matter of months, losing all negotiating power and forcing a deal from weakness. With him, Europe is exposed to reprisals, litigation and immediate economic losses, concentrated in a few countries that are currently holding back the decision. The crossroads are clear: assume the political and financial cost now, or accept that the fear of type C accounts determine European security policy. Not only the future of Ukraine is at stake in that election, but also Europe’s ability to act as a coherent geopolitical actor when your own interests are at risk. Image | RawPixel In Xataka | A missile has been bombarding Ukraine’s defenses for weeks. What no one could imagine is that he is not Russian: he is from the West In Xataka | A day later the satellites leave no doubt: Russia fortified a bridge, and a Ukrainian drone made science fiction a reality

Shahed drones were a piece of cake for Ukraine’s helicopters. Russia has just transformed them into its biggest nightmare

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In it huge catalog of innovations improvised measures brought by the war in ukrainefew are as revealing as the decision that Russia has taken to address one of the main vulnerabilities of its drones. In essence, they have turned the Shahed-136 (symbol of its saturation strategy through cheap and disposable platforms) in a rudimentary anti-aircraft fighter. The mutation. What was born as a suicide drone with autonomy to travel hundreds of kilometers following pre-programmed routes has been transformed, in some variants, into a system piloted in real timeequipped with cameras, modems and now with the R-60 missilea veteran infrared-guided missile from the 1970s that, despite its compact size, retains the lethality of a weapon capable of cutting a helicopter in two with its load of continuous rods. The broadcast images by Ukrainian organizations and electronic warfare experts confirm the presence of the R-60 mounted on the Shahed’s noseand the interception of one of them by a Ukrainian Sting drone illustrates that Russia is experimenting with the idea of ​​​​transforming a disposable projectile in a reactive vectorcapable of confronting the devices that, until now, acted as unpunished hunters of these platforms. The new tactical ecosystem. The success of the Ukrainian helicopters in intercepting Shaheds (with devices sporting dozens of shoot-down marks and crews accredited with hundreds of downed drones) had turned these aircraft in key pieces of low-level air defense. The combination of moderate speed, predictable trajectory and total lack of situational awareness made the drone a almost static whitevulnerable to cannon blasts or volleys used at close range. But the introduction of the R-60 upsets that balance: although the platform remains clumsy, slow and limited in maneuver, the simple fact that some drones can carry missiles will force Ukrainian pilots to rethink their proximity to the target. Each interception stops being a procedure and becomes in an unknown about what version of the enemy they will encounter. Extra ball. Even if the actual kill capability of the armed Shahed is small (and the operational window for targeting with a short-range missile is narrow) the statistical nature of swarm warfare change the calculation: In thousands of launches, just getting into a good position will be enough to cause the loss of a valuable helicopter. Technical limitations. The R-60, known by NATO as Aphidwas designed for supersonic fighters, not slow drones intended as loitering munitions. Its integration into the Shahed poses obvious challenges: the operator must manually retarget the drone until it is pointed at the target, achieving an adequate angle to allow the infrared seeker to acquire the thermal signature and maintain alignment long enough to authorize the shot. He narrow field of vision of the missile, the Shahed’s low maneuverability and the possibility of helicopters using infrared flares reduce the chances of success. However, historical experience shows that even imperfect weaponry can achieve victories if the tactical environment favors it. Remains of an intercepted Shahed with the R-60 attached The precedent. If we go back we have the Predator armed american with Stingers in 2002 (failed but deterrent), which reveals that these configurations do not seek air superiority, but rather force the enemy to act with caution. Just as Ukrainian unmanned ships were armed with missiles To scare away the Russian helicopters that were harassing them, Russia adopts the same defensive-offensive logic: a single one of these armed drones, hidden among a swarm of externally identical devices, forces the adversary to increase distance, use more expensive means or modify its interception doctrine. Drones against drones. The Shahed armed with an R-60 is not, by itself, a transformative weapon. It is, however, as symptom of evolution continued unmanned combat. Russia has expanded the Shahed family into versions with real time controljet variants already produced in its own factories and possible improvements based on artificial intelligence for dynamic target identification. Ukraine, for its part, develops interceptors low-cost that allow us to shoot down Russian drones without risking manned aircraft or spending expensive missiles. Every innovation generates a countermeasure: if Ukraine popularizes cheap hunting drones, Russia studies equipping the Shaheds of tiny turrets or new sensors, and if these become reactive, Ukraine adapts its doctrines and strengthens its electronic warfare. The conflict has entered a phase where the value is not in the perfection of each platform, but in the ability to produceadapt and deploy thousands of them in an environment where the line between offensive and defensive becomes blurred. The most dangerous sky. It is the result of these advances. The introduction of Shahed-R-60 marks a turning point because it erodes one of the few stable advantages that Ukraine had maintained: the capacity of its helicopters to hunt drones with relative safety. Now each aircraft must consider the possibility, however remote, of facing a missile that was not foreseen in the original mission design. This not only complicates interceptions, but forces disperse risks and rethink routes, altitudes and speeds. The Ukrainian sky, already saturated with suicide drones, cruise missiles, loitering munitions and manned aircraft operating in densely contested airspace, add another variable to an operational equation in constant mutation. And it is likely that this is just the beginning: the integration of missiles is a first step towards drones that, in addition to attacking by saturation, can defend themselves or even escort other devices in combined waves. Image | Telegram, X In Xataka | There is tourism that flies en masse where tragedies have occurred. So the Low Costs are preparing to travel to Ukraine In Xataka | Ukraine’s problem with peace negotiations is simple: if it rejects them, Russia will get tougher in the next ones.

Russia has found an old ally from other wars to bring down Ukraine’s most impenetrable defense: snowfall

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Winter has once again established itself as a decisive actor in the Ukrainian war. To the mud and fog A new enemy has been added to the Ukrainian defenses. Heavy snowfall and freezing rain are degrading the tool that has allowed kyiv to make up for its numerical inferiority for two years: the swarms of light, agile and deadly FPV drones that form the backbone of their “death zones” defensive. Winter as a weapon. The meteorology, which in other winters had shaped the strategy, this year is dismantling a defensive system which Ukraine had perfected into a nearly impenetrable barrier. Russia understood this before anyone else and launched large scale assaults taking advantage of the climate vulnerability of drones, opening gaps around Kharkiv, Huliaipole and especially Pokrovsk. For the first time in months, Moscow is advancing not because it has decisively improved its military, but because nature has given it a window that it is exploiting. with brutal determination. The unexpected weakness. It turns out that FPV drones, so effective in summer, are extremely fragile in winter. Their lack of inertia makes them victims of the wind, which pushes them and makes their trajectory falter with each gust, humidity and ice fog the cameras, snow reduces contrasts, fog blurs the depth of the visual field and the lenses become covered with drops that distort the image at the most critical moment. The pilot, who needs perfect vision to hit with surgical precision, encounters a blurry screenwithout references, unable to distinguish trenches, obstacles or even the final objective. The slightest loss of clarity turns an attack in a crash against the terrain or in an erratic missile. The result is devastating for the Ukrainian defensive strategy: when the drones do not fly, the death zones they cease to existRussian columns can advance under dark clouds and motorcycles and pickup trucks carrying troops take advantage of the fog to infiltrate towns like Pokrovsk, where urban fighting is already fierce. A dangerous opportunity. The adverse weather has created for Russia an opportunity that it has not enjoyed since the beginning of the war. With Ukrainian drones forced to remain on the ground, Russian forces have managed to maneuver with greater freedom of movement, something that drone warfare had made nearly impossible for months. They have crossed rivers in fog, entered towns with light vehicles without being detected and pushed through Ukrainian lines while the defense was reorganized while waiting for the weather to improve. Moscow’s advance, although limited in territorial terms, is having an impact psychological and tactical significant: it exposes the fragility of the Ukrainian defensive model when it is left without its star tool and shows that Moscow has learned to detect weather patterns to time attacks precisely. The November Fog already allowed its troops to deepen positions in Pokrovsk, a critical point whose control has become a symbol both for the Kremlin (which seeks to show progress to Washington) and for Kyiv, which is struggling to resist on a front where pressure is constant. Innovation against the clock. But the climate does not act in a unidirectional way. Just as quickly as drones became inoperable, atmospheric improvements allowed Ukraine to recover part of their kill zones and launch counterattacks with your FPV. The brigades, such as the 28th Mechanized, have taken advantage of the clear weather to hit Russian units newly deployed in Kostiantynivka, trapping them in exposed positions. This dynamic confirms that Ukraine is not defeated: is forced to adapt faster. Its industry, extremely flexible since 2022, is already developing a new generation of drones with more wind-resistant fuselages, low-light cameras, simplified thermal systems and control algorithms capable of stabilizing flight in adverse conditions. The arrival of these drones, scheduled for the coming months, will be key to reverse the advantage temporary that Russia has obtained. If Ukraine manages to deploy a winter-hardy FPV force, the balance on the front could tip again. The other winter war. While the drones fight in the white sky ahead, winter hits the cities otherwise: with blackouts of up to 16 hours, failed heating, stopped elevators and parents who go to the shelter with their children in their arms between explosions. The BBC told cases like that of Oksana, in her apartment in kyiv, who lives with a 2,000 euro battery that only extends normality by a few hours. Her daughter plays by candlelight and her husband works in the dark when bombing cuts off supplies. Millions of Ukrainians are preparing for what the authorities describe how “the worst winter in our history.” Moscow has intensified its attacks against transmission networks, not only to leave the population without electricity and heat, but to close bakeries, paralyze factories, stop transportation and suffocate the economy until causing social discouragement. According to the Ukrainian government itself, the Russian objective is not only to defeat the country militarily, but to destroy its internal cohesion. human wear and tear. After almost four years of war, fatigue has become widespread. He insomnia affects three times as many Ukrainians as people in countries at peace, and the nights are marked by sirens, Shahed drones and waves of missiles that have reached record numbers. Moral fatigue is mixed with the physical: the front is far away, but the war is in every hallway, in every staircase, in every unlit light bulb. And yet, surprisingly, the surveys show a rebound in optimism: more than half of Ukrainians believe in a better future, even if it is a fragile, oscillating one that depends on the evolution of blocked negotiations, the arrival of foreign aid or the result of a Russian offensive that is still far from a decisive victory. Frozen diplomacy. Plus: international negotiations are going through their most uncertain moment. A possible Trump-Putin summit is on pause. The EU is still discussing how to use 180,000 million on frozen Russian assets, and kyiv sees with concern how Washington sends mixed signals and how some European governments could change with elections less … Read more

not only its drones come from China, but also Ukraine’s latest army

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In the month of October there was an anomaly for Ukrainian troops. Reconnaissance drones began to spot unknown figures among Moscow’s soldiers. It was known that there were north koreansbut a new front began to increase as the days went by: Cubans. Now, in an unpredictable turn of events, kyiv is being joined by a most unexpected group: Chinese. Why are there Chinese? The story was told in an extensive report by The Guardian newspaper. Although the contingent is still small, they speak of a few dozen, the very existence of Chinese fighting on the Ukrainian side is politically significant because contradicts the story that Beijing, as a social bloc, massively supports the invasion of Russia. Most of these volunteers did not set out as combatants from the beginning, but rather as observers or humanitarian volunteers: they arrived, saw direct damage to civilians, and concluded that simply donating or showing compassion was not enough. Cases like Tim’swho was scarred after seeing the bodies in the kyiv children’s hospital, and jumped into combat from the simple idea that his inaction would have been worse than the risk. There is no epic in his story: there is a feeling of moral urgency and the point of no return once the violence is seen in the first person. Disenchantment as a driving force. He explained the British media that these decisions are not only born from the war, but from a previous trajectory of personal wear within China: unemployment structural, feeling of vital stagnation, deterioration of freedoms and closure of civic space after the pandemic. Both Tim and Fan, another of the combatants, they express the same with different languages: to stay was to remain tied to a life that for them was not moving forward and that, as they saycould not be questioned publicly. War, paradoxically, offers them what they lacked: the ability to act, a real transformation of their own destiny and an environment where, although there is enormous physical risk, there is also room for personal decision. At least for them, it is more rational to risk their lives on a foreign front than to remain “frozen” in their country with no option to change. Public opinion. A investigation Tao Wang of Manchester Metropolitan University concluded that 80% of Chinese Respondents held pro-Russian views during the first year of the war and that “government-controlled media managed to influence public opinion in favor of Russia” as the war progressed. The volunteers they described an ecosystem where the pro-Kremlin narrative seemed the only one that circulated without cost, while sympathizing with Ukraine was seen as “deviation” and could bring social or legal consequences. That is why dissent seems like a rare bird: not because it does not exist, but because, according to the studyit is not safe to express it. Prudential asymmetry. Plus: the operating path is not symmetrical. There is a lot of pro-mercenary content for Russia that circulate in Chinese networks without brakes (video above), while finding instructions for enlisting in Ukraine requires bypassing censorship, using VPN and, as In the case of Fangetting to ask an AI where to start. Furthermore, the Guardian indicated that the risk to coming back is real: relatives questioned, possible ambiguous charges, surveillance. In other words, the State tolerates (and sometimes facilitates) the pro-Russian participationbut forces those who decide otherwise to go underground. This difference in cost explains why the pronuclear group with Ukraine is small, although it does not invalidate its relevance as a symptom. Limited military value. There is no doubt, militarily, these few dozen do not change the balance of the conflict. Symbolically, they confront part of the official discourse. They demonstrate that the legitimacy of the Beijing-Moscow alliance It is not socially homogeneous, or it is not always so, and that there is also a layer that rejects it when it has room to act. For Ukraine, its value possibly lies in proving that even in China there are citizens who consider the invasion unjustifiable and enough to risk their lives to stop it. What are they looking for? When the Guardian I asked them why take risks for a foreign country, the answers were not geopolitical but vital: the idea of ​​building a life in another environment, giving a different future to your children and/or demonstrating that your identity as Chinese is not automatically tied to the State or its foreign policy. In it Tim’s caseis also a message towards prejudices: nothing should be taken for granted about any society, much less just because the State is going in the opposite direction. Thus, the gesture of these unlikely recruits in the Ukrainian war once again demonstrates that the sides are invisible. If the Cubans went to Ukraine for an issue purely economicthe Chinese seem to do it for a much more vital issue. Image | LAC Chad Sharman, IToldYa In Xataka | Ukraine brought its drones closer to the Russian army. Their surprise is capital: the North Koreans are now Cubans with an irresistible promise In Xataka | In 2023, a pilot from Ukraine had an idea for Star Wars. Not only did it go well: his kamikaze plan has rewritten the war manual

Russia has up to four unpublished robots in a war. We hadn’t seen Ukraine’s response: Flamingo

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The war in Ukraine has resulted in a Technological competition that transcends aerial drones: the land front has become a improvised laboratory of unmanned vehicles, where both kyiv and Moscow are looking for formulas for Replace deficiencies human and logistics with Mechanical ingenuity. Russia is accelerating its own program with designs ranging from the rudimentary to the unusual, all aimed at gaining time, confusing the enemy and compensating the high wear of personnel in the front. Ukraine has Flamingo. Improvised prototypes. It We count some time ago. Among the most striking “robotic” examples The “Termit”a four -wheelbound buggy presented by Prorruse channels Like an assault drone. Actually, it does not carry integrated weapons, but a chair in which it can Travel a soldier completely exposed, with additional space to transport water, food or ammunition. Another design observed on the battlefield proved to be little more than a Open box on wheelsdestined to carry provisions, but destroyed by a Ukrainian drone of first person vision before fulfilling its mission. These models, although rudimentary, reflect an effort to adapt minimal resources to the demands of mechanized war. Launch rockets without humans. More ambitious is the proposal of a system of Non -manned multiple randomwhose models circulated in specialized media show it capable of firing ten ammunition autonomously. Inspired by him Soviet coughalthough with a third of its tubes, this prototype suggests an attempt to transfer heavy artillery to the field of robotic systems, eliminating human risk in saturation operations and adding one more layer to the war at a distance. Themit Explosive Hoverboards. Perhaps the most unusual facet of this experimentation is the Hoverboards use converted into platforms for Carry explosive loads or anti -tank mines. In April, Russian military bloggers videos They showed Prototypes manufactured with simple consumer scooters, adapted as kamikaze vehicles, smoke systems, observation platforms and even for demining work. Its low cost and stability provided by gyroscopes make them suitable to be mass producedwhich makes these improvised solutions a threat multiplied by the possibility of deploying hundreds of units simultaneously. The drone. Another outstanding development is The “dronobus”presented by the state agency TASS, an unmanned vehicle conceived as “nodriza ship” of drones by fiber optic cable, with the capacity to operate two units at the same time with 15 kilometers of reach. This type of platform points to an integration model, in which unmanned land vehicles do not act in isolation, but as nodes of an autonomous weapons network capable of coordinating on the battlefield. Russian drone kyiv’s answer. For its part, Ukraine has revealed the existence of flamingoa land cruise missile with a declared range of 3,000 kilometers and an eyelet of more than one ton, capable of putting under direct threat to Moscow, St. Petersburg and even certain regions of Siberia. According to initial information disseminated by the Ukrainian press and confirmed visually In videos of launches From mobile ramps, the missile would have already been used in attacks within Russian territory. Its production is in charge of the company Fire Point and is presented as the most ambitious long -range system developed so far by kyiv, with a destructive potential higher than that of any previous weapon in its arsenal. The enigma of its origins. Flamingo keeps an almost exact similarity with the FP-5, a cruise missile exhibited by the Emiratí Milanion companythat in the past already supplied material to the Ukrainian forces. The FP-5 has sub-seonic speed specifications of up to 950 km/h, a wingspan of six meters and a maximum take-off weight of 6,000 kilos, with an eyelet of a ton. In addition, it includes mixed guidance systems that combine satellite and inertial navigation with protection against electronic warfare. Although it is not confirmed if flamingo is a direct variant of the FP-5 or an independent development inspired by it, the coincidence in technical parameters and design is difficult to ignore. Comparisons. Analysts They have compared Flamingo with historical referents such as V-1 flying pump German or the American missile MGM-13 MACEboth cruise systems launched from terrestrial ramps during the cold war. Also remembers in certain aspects the old Soviet Drones Tu-141 and TU-143converted by Ukraine into long -distance attack weapons. However, what differentiates flamingo is magnitude of its reachwell above the previous Ukrainian alternatives, and its explosive load capacity, which places it in a strategic category similar to that of the Russian Kalibrfrequently used by Moscow from ships and submarines, although with a minor radius. Strategic impact The appearance of Flamingo gives Ukraine a tool that alters the balance of fire scope against Russia. Its scope covers practically All the heart From the Russian territory and, in theory, it would allow devastating attacks against air bombers, energy infrastructure and key logistics centers. In addition, being a National Development And not a system delivered by Western allies, Ukraine would have full freedom to use without the political limitations that weigh on weapons Like Storm Shadow, Scalp-EG either Atacms. In other words, it makes the missile an element with great military and diplomatic value, since it demonstrates the Ukrainian capacity to innovate and manufacture strategic weapons on their own. Mass production A key aspect of flamingo is the possibility of manufacturing it in series at a relatively low cost, According to their developers. If Ukraine managed to produce large quantities, he could launch waves of missiles combined with drone swarms, saturating the Russian aerial defenses that have already demonstrated difficulties in curbing minor attacks. Although Flamingo lacks rankiness and, being subsonic, it is not immune to interceptionthe volume of fire could overload Moscow’s ability to respond. Plus: The incorporation of lures and other deception tactics would increase its operational lethality. Perspectives and limits. It remains to be seen How far Ukraine can materialize the potential of Flamingo. Its effectiveness will depend not only on the technical perfection of the system, but above all on the industrial capacity to manufacture it in significant numbers. If kyiv manages to do so, he will have for … Read more

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