Ukraine

The war in Ukraine has crossed a red line in Europe. They are no longer drones violating airspace, they are nuclear plants

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Ukraine has once again placed the nuclear alarm at the center of the European conflict after denouncing that Russia is deliberately attacking the electrical substations that feed the Khmelnitsky and Rivne power plants. According to Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha, drone attacks are not isolated incidents, but planned operations to endanger continental nuclear security. It happens that drones are reaching European power plants. The drone offensive. Over the past weekend, Moscow launched more than 450 drones and 45 missiles against various regions of Ukraine, causing at least seven dead and damage to critical infrastructure. In Dnipro, a drone hit a residential building, killing three people, while other attacks occurred in Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia. kyiv accuses Russia of instrumentalizing the atomic risk as a psychological weapon and trying to cause an accident in plants that still depend on external electricity supply to avoid a collapse of the cooling system. Nuclear risk. In parallel, Moscow is advancing with its own nuclear agenda: the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, confirmed that the Kremlin is working on proposals for a possible nuclear test on the direct order of Vladimir Putin, a response to US President Donald Trump’s recent statement that Washington could resume their own tests. The atomic stress between both powers, exacerbated by the war in Ukraine, has plunged Europe into a scenario of unprecedented vulnerability since the Cold War. The epicenter of the threat: Belgium. While Ukraine try to contain the Russian offensive on its own territory, Western Europe has begun to feel the echoes of a hybrid war that expands beyond the front. In Belgium, one of the countries with the highest density of critical infrastructure on the continent, there has been a wave of raids of drones over strategic installations. The most alarming took place at the Doel nuclear power plant, located next to the port of Antwerp, when three drones were initially detected at dusk on November 9, which were later confirmed as five different devices flying over the complex for almost an hour. The energy company Engie, which manages the plant, assured that operations were not affected, but authorities activated the National Crisis Center and reinforced security in the area. Belgium nuclear plant near Doel And more. Hours before, air traffic at Liège airport was had suspended briefly after multiple reports of drones, and in the previous days both Brussels airport and the Kleine Brogel air base (where NATO nuclear weapons are stored) had been targeted of similar sightings. Research points to a coordinated pattern affecting several northern European countries, including Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands, where unidentified aerial intrusions have also been reported. Suspicions of espionage. Belgian Defense Minister Theo Francken has linked sightings with possible foreign espionage operations and pointed to Russia as the most plausible suspect, although without conclusive evidence. The country’s intelligence services consider that drones could be part of a recognition strategy aimed at evaluating the European response capacity to combined attacks on critical infrastructure. The accumulation of incidents led the Belgian government to convene a National Security Council, after which the Minister of the Interior, Bernard Quintin, assured that the situation was “under control”although he recognized the seriousness of the incursions. The United Kingdom, France and Germany announced sending specialized personnel and equipment to assist Belgium in the detection and neutralization of hostile drones, a gesture that underlines the shared fear that the border between visible war and covert war is becoming dangerously blurred. Technological epicenter. Faced with this new dimension of the conflict, Ukraine has positioned itself as a key actor in the technological response. President Volodymyr Zelensky advertisement the upcoming opening of defense production offices in Berlin and Copenhagen before the end of the year, with the aim of strengthening industrial cooperation on drones and electronic weapons. These “export capitals”, according to his wordsthey will finance the domestic production of scarce equipment and help European allies build their own defensive systems. kyiv, which has made the use of drones one of the pillars of its military strategy, now offers your experience to countries that are beginning to suffer firsthand the effects of the Russian hybrid war. Ukraine as a test. In parallel, Ukrainian creativity in the improvised field of defense is reflected even in unusual solutions: old fishing nets French drones, made from horse hair, are being reused to create tunnels where the propellers of Russian drones become trapped. In contemporary warfare, technology intersects with craftsmanship, and ingenuity has become a form of national survival. Nuclear vulnerability. The incidents in Belgium and Ukraine reveal the same constant: the European nuclear infrastructure (plant, wiring, energy, logistics) has become a target symbolic and strategic. The attacks on Ukrainian substations that feed power plants and the drones that fly over Belgian reactors expose the fragility of a continent that depends on complex systems where any sabotage can multiply its effects. The threat no longer comes only from missiles, but from invisible swarms of drones, of disinformation, of political and technological engineering that undermines stability from within. Russia, faced with isolation and with a still powerful military industry, seems willing to use this asymmetry as an instrument of prolonged pressure. The European responsestill fragmentary, is beginning to be articulated between military cooperation, technological innovation and civil defense. Plus: the lesson left by this sequence of attacks and suspicions seems clear. In the Europe of 2025, the border between energy security and military security has fadedand the future of continental stability could depend less on the size of armies than on how quickly a drone is detected on radar before reaching a nuclear power plant. Image | Trougnouf, Wwuyts In Xataka | The latest tactic of the Russians in Ukraine breaks with the previous one: they have gone from appearing “out of nowhere” to directly disappearing In Xataka | Orion was the Russian version of the US’s most lethal drone. Ukraine can’t believe it when it opens: it’s not a version, it’s the work of the US

a poncho turns its soldiers in Ukraine into an invisible army

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Last October Ukraine I remembered to his troops that Russian soldiers had come up with a new infiltration system. After the helmets with antennathe lures and the optical illusionsMoscow had found a way to appear among the Ukrainian forces “out of nowhere”. Now, in a new unprecedented twist in the conflict, Russia has found the closest thing to an invisibility shield. From the video game to the fight. Something very similar to what we saw in the Metal Gear saga, then called optical camouflagehas appeared in the conflict in Europe. The war on the Russian-Ukrainian front has seen a tactical evolution that has shifted classic protection (armor and vehicles) towards mobility and thermal stealth: Russian assault forces have adopted ponchos or thermal tarps (the so-called “invisibility cloaks”) as an essential element to minimize the infrared signature and allow infiltrations on foot in the wide swath controlled by the drones. There is no perfect thermal concealment, but the difference between being detected or not can decide the life of an assault group. That’s why these clothes, combined with night movements and the use of specific environmental conditions, have become a central tactical tool that, in practice, today protects more than many armored vehicles against the aerial threat of reconnaissance and attack. Tactical evolution. Thermal tarps are blankets made with reflective layers and materials that accelerate heat dissipation, their purpose is approximate the temperature superficial of the human body to that of the environment to reduce contrast that thermal cameras detect. However, its effectiveness depends of multiple factors: quality of the material, contour sealing (bare feet and hands are detectable signs), weather conditions and, above all, the time of day. The so-called as “thermal crossover” (two brief daily periods in which vegetation, soil and air have similar temperatures) reduces global thermal contrast and offers the optimal window to move forward without standing out, while fog, rain or humidity can complement that invisibility. Improperly used, ponchos generate “cold spots” that attract attentionbut used well, multiply the probability of achieving tactical objectives. Limitations and learning. It must be clarified that thermal tarps do not make the attacker invulnerable. Experienced drone operators look for subtle signs (bare feet, movement under the cover, small thermal disturbances) and learn to distinguish behavioral patterns that reveal infiltrations. In addition, there are low quality materials and training errors: there are cases of soldiers who tried to camouflage themselves in broad daylight or with inappropriate ponchos and were detected. The tactic is therefore effective but fragile: it works best en masse, under optimal conditions and when the adversary lacks sufficient alternative sensors or personnel on the line. US Marine Corps uniform with built-in thermal camouflage Countermeasures and tactical recovery. To counteract these infiltrations, the solution it is not unique: involves deploying complementary sensors (acoustic, magnetic, seismic) that do not depend on the thermal spectrum, or reinforcing minefields and physical barriers, densifying human or robotic presence in exposed sectors, or even improving doctrine multisensory surveillance and train detection teams to identify minimal signs of intrusion. In strategic terms, Ukrainian forces agree that the response involves combining technology (more sensors, better integration) with greater territorial occupation, because passive defense based solely in aerial interceptions It is insufficient against equipment that infiltrates at low visibility. Operational implications. The resort to small infiltrated groups reflects broader tensions: troop shortages, accumulated material wear and tear, and an environment where air or drone superiority does not guarantee the security of the rear. For those who attack, the tactics allows you to exploit holes in defense and wear down positions through groups that, although they lose part of their troops, can complete reconnaissance, sabotage or local assault missions. For those who defend it, it forces us to rethink the segmentation of the front and the provision of resources: the balance between expensive sensors and effective personnel, the need for mobile reserves and the growing importance of passive and active containment measures on the ground. Strategic conclusion. If you like, we are facing a tactical transformation where war becomes more granular and less dependent on traditional armor: the multiplication of drones and sensors has revalued thermal invisibility and human mobility, while it has revealed the fragility of conventional defensive schemes. In the short term, the balance favors those who know integrate camouflagemeteorology and discreet logistics. In the medium term, effective defense will require a greater density of heterogeneous sensors, more troops or robotic means on the line and a doctrinal adaptation that combines multisensory detection with physical measures that close the gaps that infiltrators exploit today. In short, in the current field a thermal tarpwell used, can offer an attacker more practical protection than many armored vehicles, and this realization forces us to rethink tactical defense and territory management in a conflict dominated by sensor warfare. Image | UKRAINE MOD, Metal Gear In Xataka | Russia’s latest tactic is the closest thing to a magic trick: By the time Ukraine realizes it, the Russians are already behind it In Xataka | The Ukrainian army has been asked what it urgently needs. The answer was clear: no missiles or drones, just cars

In Ukraine we had seen armored vehicles from Mad Max, but the latest Russian invention has left everyone speechless: assault “hedgehogs”

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Last June, several images captured by reconnaissance drones of the Ukrainian forces sighted a unprecedented Russian offensive: Waves of two-wheeled troops launching motorcycle charges to break the kyiv front. If the scene seemed like a still from Mad Max, shortly after it would become reality with the appearance of trucks that we saw in the movie. The latest: in an unprecedented turn of the screw, Moscow has brought out its assault “hedgehogs” The tank turned into a “hedgehog”. The recent appearance of a T-80BVM Russian equipped with an extreme structure of steel cables along with foliage and tree branches, described as an “assault hedgehog”offers a revealing picture of the state of mechanized warfare in Ukraine. The photographs, broadcast by the channel Vodohray Telegramshow a T-80BVM with an anti-mine roller TMT-K and a T-72B3 with a KMT-7, both wrapped in dense cable cages covering the chassis, tower and top. On the T-80BVM, in addition, a electronic warfare system. This modification, primarily intended to thwart FPV drone attacks, represents the rapid adaptation of the battlefield to a threat that has completely altered the relationship between armor, mobility and survivability. And more. The structures that are seen look for prevent direct impact or cause drones to become trapped or damaged before reaching vulnerable points. However, the additional protection noticeably increases weightvolume and operational complexity: tanks become slower, more visible and difficult to maneuver in urban or forested areas. Still, the fact that these modifications arise not only from field improvisations but also from organized units highlights the extent to which drone warfare is redefining the very form of ground combat. T-80BV in the Kubinka tank museum Evolution of the T-80BVM. He original T-80developed in the late 1970s, was conceived as an elite tank capable of combining firepower with exceptional mobility thanks to its gas turbine engine. This feature made it faster and quieter than other Soviet models, which made it a symbol of military modernity in its time. With the dissolution of the USSR, many T-80s were stored, but the version T-80BVM (introduced in the 2010s) introduced important improvements: Relikt reactive shieldingmore modern optical and thermal systems, and mechanical adjustments to increase reliability, especially in cold environments. In Ukraine, where a war of attrition is being fought with very dynamic fronts, the T-80BVM has been used like crash car for quick attacks or penetration maneuvers, but the proliferation of drones has reduced their safety margins, forcing the modification of even a tank originally designed to move quickly and freely. Other armor seen in Ukraine FPV and the collapse of the classics. The expansion of FPV drones (capable of attacking from above or vulnerable flanks) has generated a conceptual crisis for traditional armor. Tower ledges, engine cover and commander’s hatch hinge have become critical points that even a cheap drone can exploit with an improvised payload. For this reason, both Russia and Ukraine have experimented with “cages”“mobile bunkers” and supplementary armor. It turns out that the first versions of these cages, superficial or with rigid bars, were insufficient: the drones learned to maneuver between gaps or detonate just above them. Hence the cable structures They represent a more advanced iteration of that improvised defense: they are more flexible, denser, and more likely to entangle or slow down small aircraft. However, its effectiveness is uneven, depending on the quality of the wiring, the speed of the drone and the ability of the FPV operator to manually adjust its trajectory. Camouflages and protections. we have gone counting before. The war has generated enormous tactical creativity on both sides. They have been seen covered armored of thermal networks to confuse infrared cameras, coated vehicles of tires to absorb shock waves, camouflaged transport with awnings and scrap metal to break silhouettes and even towers protected by improvisations of beams and bars that are reminiscent of shed roofs. Some of these designs seek to deceive reconnaissance drones, others intend just gain seconds before the impact of an FPV, a time that can allow the crew to abort, retreat or request cover. Each innovation introduces new countermeasures: when the cages appeareddrones began to carry loads at an angle, and when jammers appeared, wired drones or drones with more autonomous guidance systems began to be seen. War, in this sense, has become a constant laboratory where adaptation is measured in hours, not years. Uncertainty. Having said all this, the image of the “steel hedgehog” around the T-80BVM is not only curious: it symbolizes a war in which the rules of armored combat are changing at great speed. Tanks are still valuable, but can no longer operate without a dense layer electronic supportinfantry cover and constant surveillance of the nearby sky. The question that emerges is whether these adaptations keep the car useful or whether they represent an attempt to keep a car alive. concept in transformation. For now, the response on the front is pragmatic: any measure that allows us to survive one more mission is welcome, even if it turns a vehicle designed for speed and direct impact into a slow, heavy creature covered in metallic thorns. Because in the war in Ukraine, survival has become the true armor. Image | Telegram, Alan Wilson, ArmyInform In Xataka | An imperceptible hum is wreaking havoc in Ukraine. When it arrives there is no turning back: the Russians are already everywhere In Xataka | The Ukrainian army has been asked what it urgently needs. The answer was clear: no missiles or drones, just cars

Ukraine has updated the nation’s bloodiest game. Eliminating Russians is now the closest thing to “ordering an Uber”

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In the month of May, a unprecedented merger between military technology and video game logic. Ukraine had launched a reward system which awarded its soldiers points for killing Russian troops or destroying their vehicles, as long as these acts were verified by drone video recordings. That system, a kind from “Amazon military”has been updated with drones as protagonists. A real shooter. The now called “Army of Drones Bonus System” that has emerged in Ukraine presents itself on the surface as a incentive platform which includes the aesthetics and mechanics of video games (scores, ‘leaderboards’, online stores and rewards) but at its core is an operational transformation: an institutionalized scheme that quantifies casualties, observation successes and logistical achievements to translate them into real resources (drones, autonomous vehicles, electronic warfare systems) through the internal store call Brave1. Born a little over a year ago and accelerated in recent months until passing from 95 to 400 units participants, the system already exhibits strong effects on combat (according to official figures, 18,000 Russian casualties attributable to actions linked to the system in a single month) and has expanded its radius of action beyond the air attack to reconnaissance, artillery and logistics missions, incorporating into military practice notions of competition, internal market and performance metrics that were previously foreign to the art of war. Mechanics and logic. The program architecture works with clear and convertible rules– Each credited action (from eliminating an enemy combatant to capturing a prisoner to destroying a drone operator) awards points that can be exchanged for materiel in Brave1which creates a feedback loop where operational success is transformed into material capacity to continue fighting. The update of the score table (for example, doubling points for killing infantry or setting 120 points for capturing a prisoner) reveals the system’s ability to reorient incentives based on strategic priorities and political needs, and at the same time evidences a commodification of efficiency: life and death pass through a technical-economic threshold that converts lethal decisions into a cost-benefit function. This internal economy alters the microdecision of the combatant and resituates logistics and acquisition within the tactical space itself, with the Brave1 store acting as a war market that prioritizes allocation by competitive merit. Screenshot of the rewards system Automation and AI. The system is not limited to accounting, integrate tools technologies that change the very nature of target selection and engagement. Drones partially controlled by algorithms that suggest targets and correct the terminal phase of the trajectory represent a step towards lethal automation, while practices such as “Uber targeting” They demonstrate how consumerist and geospatial interfaces have been converted for war uses. Thus, marking a point on a map and triggering a remote impact is the operational translation of the everyday gesture. to request a transport. The video proof requirement To obtain points, it also generates a vast operational database that feeds institutional learning: what objectives were achieved, with what platform, from what distance and how the enemy defense behaved. That visual and metric file facilitates dissemination of techniques between units and accelerates innovation from below, with real effects on tactics and doctrine. Psychological effects. The Guardian said that, beyond the material and the technical, the system produces a kind of emotional breakdown: Senior officials recognize that the process of assigning a numerical value to human life has ended up turning violence into technical, “practical” and “emotionless” work. At the same time, gamification produces camaraderie effects and competition that, according to the commanders, are healthy and encourages discipline and learning between peers. However, this same dynamic can generate operational biases (prioritizing high-scoring objectives over tactically relevant objectives, or the temptation of operations with low effectiveness but high cumulative performance) that distort strategic coherence. Implications and extension. The Ukrainian experience shows that incentive principles can be transferred to other areas: artillery that receives points for valid hits, reconnaissance that earns rewards for identifying targets, and logistics that scores the use of autonomous vehicles instead of human convoys. This extension transforms the war ecosystem into a set of internal markets where tactical-technological innovation is quickly monetized and scaled, forcing planners a double urgency: exploit the immediate advantages of the system without losing strategic coherence and design ethical and operational countermeasures that prevent internal competition from fragmenting the priorities of the military effort. And ethics? It’s the big question. Ethically, the commodification of violence raises profound questions about responsibility, proportionality and war crimes: Who responds when a score induces an action that violates humanitarian law? The appropriation of AI for target selection also introduces the question of attribution of responsibility between human operators, algorithms and the chain of command. Strategically, converting equipment gain into the primary source of replenishment aims to create dependency loops that, in logistical wear and tear scenarios, discourage long-term wear and tear operations that are necessary in the short term for larger objectives. Score the violence. The “Army of Drones Bonus System” represents a mutation relevant to the way motivation, acquisition and innovation are organized in contemporary warfare: it incorporates market logicpoint economies and automation technologies that increase lethality and efficiency, while eroding moral frameworks and opening new vectors of risk. Its contribution is undeniable in terms of capacity and adaptation, but its expansion urgently claim a framework that does not yet exist at national or international level. In the background, a long doubt in this species Amazon military: that what is celebrated today as tactical innovation can tomorrow become a structural source of insecurity and lack of moral control on the battlefield. Image | Ministry of Defense Ukraine, Ministry of Defense of Ukraine In Xataka | An imperceptible hum is wreaking havoc in Ukraine. When it arrives there is no turning back: the Russians are already everywhere In Xataka | The Ukrainian army has been asked what it urgently needs. The answer was clear: no missiles or drones, just cars

Russia’s biggest threat in Ukraine is not a drone or a missile. It is a film agency with 30 secret floors

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That the war in Ukraine has become the largest drone laboratory combat power on the planet is beyond any doubt. In fact, both Russia like, to a greater extent, Ukraine, have elevated these devices to configure a war industry unprecedented that places machines as the army of the future of any conflict. What was not so well known was where most of Ukraine’s drones came from. Origin and metamorphosis. What started three years ago as a location and props agency in basements and garages has mutated into a war industry on an almost industrial scale: Fire Point, whose owner and executives come from from the world of cinema and the construction of outdoor furniture, has gone from assembling drones with commercial parts to producing, according to its executives, hundreds of propelled and long-range munitions from at least thirty secret locations scattered throughout Ukraine. But there is much more, because the company has grown so much that it has currently consolidated itself with contracts for around billion dollars in a single year. A transit that reflects the rapid professionalization and commercialization of initiatives born out of patriotism and urgency in February 2022, when improvised underground workshops became an effective (although precarious and fragmentary) response to a large-scale invasion. Production, design and employment. Fire Point products, such as your FP-1 droneare simple machines in materials (polystyrene, plywood, plastics, and carbon fiber from cycling) but assembled with a logic of volume production: rocket-assisted takeoff, two-stroke engine, range measured in hundreds of kilometers and warheads of more than fifty kilos in some designs. Its catalog also includes the promising Flamingo missilea larger device, with a jet engine and a theoretical autonomy and load that, if confirmed at scale, could reconfigure the Ukrainian capacity to hit deep targets. The Ukrainian industrial philosophy here is clear: cheap, disposable, massive. Efficiency does not require reprocessing or longevity, only that some specimens cross the defense networks and fulfill their unique mission. An FP-1 Military strategy and effects. The proliferation of these munitions has allowed Ukraine to sustain a systematic campaign against energy infrastructure Russian companies (refineries and logistics nodes) seeking not only a tactical effect but also strategic pressure and leverage in eventual negotiations. In fact, the multiplicity of manufacturers domestic forces and technical adaptability have forced Russia to face a daily erosion of its apparent air immunity, forcing it to reallocate defensive resources and contemplate low-cost warfare as a decisive vector. Transparency and control. Fire Point’s meteoric rise has not been free of shadows: Public complaints and audits point out opaque awards, absence of mandatory price negotiations, questions about initial technical quality and the possible involvement of actors linked to the media and business environment close to power. In fact, the National Anti-Corruption Agency has inspected links with figures associated with the presidential circle and there are parliamentary calls to investigate pricesspecifications and the destination of multimillion-dollar benefits. Despite this, the public narrative combines suspicion and exaltation: national heroes and strategic businessmen who have shored up the defensive capacity, while activists and analysts demand more controls and transparency in war contracts. Industrialization and ecosystem. The phenomenon is not an isolated case but the center of an industrial revolution: Thousands of companies, hundreds focused on long-range drones and dozens competing for contracts, attract foreign funds, partners and joint venture projects. State agencies charter incentiveswhile international funds (such as the recent Norwegian-Ukrainian vehicle) show that the ecosystem is beginning to professionalize and seek commercial and technological legitimation beyond the emergency. For European and North American defense, Ukraine now offers a unique experience in unmanned missions and rapid design, which arouses interest both military as industrial. Ethical dilemmas. There is no doubt, the balance raises dilemmas: the domestic war economy reduces dependence on allied donations and scales offensive capacity, but it raises questions on democratic control, accountability and the risk that lucrative war businesses are perpetuated beyond strategic necessity. Plus: the proliferation of cheap and massive systems exacerbates the asymmetric nature of the conflict and poses risks of escalation and diffuse responsibility for selective objectives and collateral damage. Perspectives. In sum, the Fire Point history summarizes the Ukrainian phenomenon: industrial creativity (in many cases, they have no other choice) converted into a strategic muscle, an industry that emerged from volunteering transformed into key actor of the military apparatusbut also in focus of controversy due to its speed, its margins and the opacity typical of a country at war. The future challenge is twofold: to consolidate technological and productive capabilities that continue to perform in combat, and at the same time insert this thriving sector into frameworks of governance and transparency that prevent war efficiency from evolving towards economies of corruption or political capture. How Ukraine resolves this binomial will define whether its revolution dronistics It remains a collective merit or becomes an institutional burden. Image | xMezha In Xataka | They call it Skyfall, Burevestnik, or flying Chernobyl. The problem is not the name, it is what Russia’s latest missile does In Xataka | The war in Ukraine was a drone war. Now it is a war of drones that are not actually combat drones

Ukraine and Russia are not only fighting a drone war, but also deception

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The phrase was literal from a Ukrainian high command. The war they have been fighting since the Russian invasion in 2022 is currently the closest thing to a cat and mouse hunt. In the current asymmetric conflict between Russia and Ukraine, where every night a kind of war is fought over energy infrastructurewhat has put both commands on alert is not only the destructive effect of armed drones, but the massive expansion of cheap decoys that force defenses to be spent. Curiously, Russia and Ukraine have resorted to the same thing: Second World War. Alarm. While the Russian Shahed cause blackouts and the Ukrainian Lyutyi and FP-1 they light refineriesboth parties they use decoys whose objective is to saturate, deceive and exhaust the enemy interception layer, and it is precisely this logic of multiplication (the effectiveness not only of the direct impact but also of the distraction) that turns these decoys (decoys) into a strategic multiplier capable of amplifying an already harmful campaign. The historical precedent. The tactic it’s not new: modern military history contains paradigmatic examplesfrom the shadow analemmas to the jet-decoys of the 20th century. And, of all, the case of the ADM-20 Quail illustrates better than any the conversion of vulnerability into advantage through transient imitators that consume defender resources. The Quail, small and cheap compared to the bomber it simulated, carried reflectors and simple patterns of flight to deceive radars and force the expense of expensive interceptors. Today that principle applies miniature and industrial scale with easily manufactured platforms that, although lacking lethal capacity, force the adversary to decide whether to fire a missile worth hundreds of thousands of dollars or take the risk of missing what could be the real target. A B-52 launching a Quail decoy The Russian range and its role. Moscow, which in 2024 industrialized the shahed of Iranian origin to saturate defensesalso produces lures like the Gerbera and the simple Parodiya; some are volumetric replicas with lower mass and range, others incorporate equipment electronic warfare to scout and mark radar locations, and some even carry small explosives to wound recovery teams. This variety pursues three purposes: inflict material wear on missile and air-to-air missile reserves, reveal defense positions, and complicate radar discrimination with reflectors Luneburg type that make targets the size of larger vehicles appear on the screens. The practical result is an increase in false positives that degrades the efficiency of the defense chain. An Lyutyi The Ukrainian range. Ukraine, later to scale its drone campaign, has combined attack vehicles such as the FP-1 either the Lyutyand with low-cost devices designed in local workshops (plastic tubes, wooden frames, metal foil to increase radar section) to explore corridors and distract responses while the units that cause real damage take another route. When working as “pathfinders”these devices allow Ukrainian planners to plot and verify secure routes, test defense sectors and create temporary penetration windows. In other words, its appeal lies in the reduced cost and ease of production, which makes the lure a repeatable tactical capital. Ukrainian decoy Cost asymmetry. The economy of confrontation is brutally simple: a Shahed of a few tens of thousands of dollars can force a response with air-to-air or surface-to-air missiles whose unit price can multiply to those of the target by factors of tens or hundreds. It we have counted: recent examples, like Sidewinders or similar missiles, reach prices that make them strategically scarce. That cost-benefit ratio tilts tactical and political decisions: waste a critical capability on potential decoys or hold on to it and accept the damage? Its proliferation makes the first option a safe way towards the depletion of stocks and the second in a bet for local resilience and operational trickery. Gerbera Lures Defensive capabilities. Although Ukraine has developed anti-aircraft artillery units and interceptor drones that have proven effective, comprehensive defense continues to depend on missiles and systems that are finite. Electronics, spectrum warfare and mobile units provide mitigation, but the physics of aerial combat continues to offer opportunities to those who have the volume and creativity to saturate. The introduction of decoys with EW components or communications relays adds another layer: they not only distract, but can map defenses, degrade chains and amplify subsequent attacks with greater precision. Foreseeable evolution. The scenario drawn by the combination of attack drones and lures is dynamic: iterative improvement of decoys (more realisticwith greater electronic signatures, with active deception capabilities) will match the technical challenge with costly countermeasures (better discrimination, multisensory sensors, finer intelligence). At a strategic level, the proliferation of these tactics erodes sustainability from the intensive use of conventional interceptors and pressures nations to invest in alternatives: low-cost missiles for home defense, AI-directed interceptors, mobile deployments, and greater reliance on offensive electronic warfare. Meanwhile, in the short term, the Ukrainian tactic of using lures as a multiplier It increases the likelihood of real material damage to critical Russian systems and highlights a legitimate fear in Moscow: that its defenses will be exhausted before the real threat is neutralized. So? If you like, the decoys work like power amplifiers: not only for what they destroy, but for what they force the adversary to burn, reveal or reconfigure. The lesson historic quail applied to mini-UAVs provokes a contemporary dilemma where economics, logistics and homemade innovation can tip the tactical balance. For Russia, the proliferation of Ukrainian decoys represents a operational and symbolic threat: The erosion of advantage in expensive systems and the realization that modern warfare rewards not just direct explosion but the ability to manipulate enemy perception and expenditure, transforming false targets into a strategic weapon in their own right. Image | StahlkocherGASTELLO DESIGN BUREAU, In Xataka | Ukraine accelerates the assault on Russia with an unprecedented army of robots: they are aquatic, carry rocket launchers and are lethal if stopped In Xataka | Ukraine cannot believe what it found inside Russia’s ballistic missiles: déjà vu

Ukraine has a weapon against Russia that we had only seen in James Bond. Her name is Sea Baby and when she finishes her work she blows herself up.

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At the end of September Ukraine sent a message: It was already the largest drone laboratory on the planet, but with its latest 12-meter “monster” it wanted to do the same under the sea. This is how the family of Toloka underwater dronesa technological leap that redefined naval warfare in the Black Sea. That effort now has its continuation in a drone that until recently we had only seen in James Bond movies and the like. Technological evolution. Ukraine has taken its “Sea Baby” naval drones from being disposable explosive boats to becoming attack and multiple mission platforms capable of operating at more than 1,500 kilometers, transporting up to 2,000 kilos and mount heavy telecontrolled weaponry (multiple rocket launchers, stabilized turrets, secondary drone launch) while incorporating self-destruct systems to avoid capture and AI-assisted functions to reduce identification errors. This step not only adds firepower and range, but turns a low-cost means into a sustained system that can penetrate, hit, return and remain available (or self-destruct), something that repositions the naval drone from immediate consumption to renewable operating capital. The Black Sea. Successive waves of drones have forced Russia to withdraw most of its fleet from Sevastopol to Novorossiyska change in posture that does not respond to a specific defeat but to that persistent risk that makes it unfeasible to sustain an advanced presence without assuming continuous losses. The “Sea Baby” have been attributed by the SBU to eleven attacks against shipsas well as repeated blows against the Crimean bridge and other logistics facilities, producing a chain effect: Moscow has had to redirect its military transport to land and more distant ports, making each kilometer of support more expensive and reducing its ability to condition Ukrainian trade routes to Europe. Doctrinal change. What once required steel fleets, shipyards and squadrons can now be inflicted with platforms cheap, reproducible and guided at a distance, which modifies the unspoken rule that the maritime domain belongs to the one who owns tonnage: here control emanates from who can inflict repeated damage at a lower cost than that imposed on the defender. The Ukrainian case surpasses precedents such as the coastal missiles of the Lebanon in 2006 because it not only denies a coastline, but forces a structural reconfiguration of an entire squadron and its main base, demonstrating that an entire naval theater can be altered without having a conventional navy. Industry and allies. kyiv claims to produce around 4,000 naval drones and needing only half for his own defense, opening the door to sell the surplus to partner countries while NATO observes and adjusts doctrine after verifying that these systems have changed the cost/effect relationship at sea. Public financing via United24 and coordination with political and military command make the program an example of how a country at war can generate dual technology with external projection, replicating what happened with aerial UAVs: first combat effectiveness, then international adoption and doctrinal adjustment by third parties. Consequences and cycles. There is no doubt, offensive success is strong now defensive investment: floating barriers, sensors, redundant electronic warfare and point defense layers in ports and terminals to prevent innovation that has worked externally from reversing its own infrastructure. Russia tries to copy these platforms and use them againwhat chains a cycle of innovation in the face of interference that pushes both sides to adapt communications, navigation and mission architecture to overcome the electronic blockade. The result: a loop of accelerated evolution in which the advantage is no longer in possessing an isolated weapon, but in the ability to continually improve it before the opponent degrades its effect. Strategic conclusion. The Ukrainian naval drones have shown that sea power can be eroded without a conventional fleet through cheap mass, strategic reach and sustained pressure on valuable nodes, altering the adversary’s posture and reallocating its resources on the defensive. The displacement of the Russian fleet, the logistical impact and the international adoption as a reference point to a change of era: the sea ceases to be a domain secured by the capital spent on steel and becomes a space where the advantage belongs to whoever controls the marginal cost of the next impactnot the size of the hulls it anchors. Image | Security Service of Ukraine In Xataka | Ukraine cannot believe what it found inside Russia’s ballistic missiles: déjà vu In Xataka | After Cubans and North Koreans fighting alongside Russian troops, new guests have appeared in Ukraine: Chinese

Ukraine has opened Russia’s cruise and ballistic missiles. War is impossible if your allies make weapons for you

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He fed up with Ukraine with the hole that exists around international sanctions it is palpable and numeric. kyiv intelligence has hundreds of reports in your possession that reveal that Russian drones have passed those sanctions for the lining. And not just drones, even in the tanks. The latest: Ukraine has begun analyzing parts of Moscow’s latest cruise and ballistic missiles. And what they found is a deja vu. Clandestine circuit. Three and a half years after the start of the invasion, Ukraine continues to dismantle the last Russian missiles and drones and find tens of thousands of parts inside made in the westthe majority of his “allies” (microcontrollers, sensors, connectors, converters) from countries that have theoretically embargoed the supply: United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Switzerland, Netherlands, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan. Of course also, Moscow’s allies like china. In fact, Zelensky put in more than 100,000 the foreign components found only among 550 vectors used in a single recent bombing, confirming that the sanctions have not turned off the tap: if anything they have made it more expensive and slowed down, but not dried up. The escape mechanism. It we have counted before. The mode of entry does not require sophisticated espionage, but rather exploiting loopholes in global trade: pieces “dual use” sold to civil actors who then they deviatecomponents placed on the market before sanctions, networks of shell companies and brokers in lax jurisdictions, and triangulated purchases via third countries that do not apply or execute controls. The sanctions gave the West three years to close the gaps, but they also gave Russia (and those who traffic for it) the same time to learn to get around them. In practice, it is a market: if you pay more, there is always someone willing to move the merchandise with layers of opacity sufficient to break traceability. Iran and North Korea. Moscow relies on two veterans of the sanctioning regime: Iran (which has spent decades refining the engineering of commercial border hopping) and North Korea (capable of moving components and complete systems despite being formally embargoed). Cooperation with both not only transfers material: it transfers method. Both logistical routes and corporate and financial camouflage techniques now migrate to the Russian military supply chain. What is possible and what is not. They remembered on Insider that the West hardens the perimeter: compliance guides for companies, “catch-all” to block sensitive exports (even if they are not listed), border inspections, criminal threat to repeat offenders, closures of loopholes when Ukraine identifies specific pieces. But even so, the regime is not airtight: global trade in components is massive, triangulation via third countries It is structural and already exists “pirate” production replacement that replicates or falsifies sanctioned parts. By design, control is reactive: it is as if each new closure encourages Moscow to seek an alternative route. Partial effectiveness. Plus: just because embargoes haven’t cut off the flow doesn’t mean they’re irrelevant. London estimates that the sanctions have deprived Russia of at least 450,000 million of dollars and have multiplied by up to six the price of dual pieces, draining war liquidity and adding temporary friction to the Russian military chain. This, a priori, penalizes rhythms, quality, scaling and maintenance, even if it does not prevent the material from arriving. The structural limit. If you want, the export control It is an instrument of soft power: its real power depends on what the rest of the world is willing to do and tolerate. It can raise the cost, strangle necks, penalize intensities, but it can hardly seal an economy-state Russian size connected to global intermediaries willing to charge for the risk. The result is an industrial war where the blockade is never binary (flows / does not flow), but rather marginal: raising the cost per Russian shot, reducing the cadence, pushing failures due to logistical stress and buy time, but hardly prevent a chip made for a laptop I ended up controlling the guidance of a kamikaze drone over a Ukrainian city. Image | Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation In Xataka | After Cubans and North Koreans fighting alongside Russian troops, new guests have appeared in Ukraine: Chinese In Xataka | In 2023, a pilot from Ukraine had an idea for Star Wars. Not only did it go well: his kamikaze plan has rewritten the war manual

Ukraine has returned from the US with two bad news, and the least of it is the Tomahawk missiles

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Last Friday it was supposed to take place a nuclear meeting for the future of war in ukraine. However, what happened in the White House ended up being less a diplomatic exercise than a scene of head-on collision: a president demanding territorial capitulation from an invaded country, a president refusing to give up what he still defends under fire, and a third absent actor marking the remote script of what Trump repeated with a literality that blurred any pretense of mediation. Concessions and threats. He had exclusive the financial times that Trump discarded the maps of the front, repeated that the war was not such but a “special operation” in Putin’s words, and urged Zelensky to accept the loss of Donetsk and the entire Donbas as the price of peace, warning that “If Putin wants, he will destroy you.” The conversation degeneratedapparently in shouts and ultimatum language, with the Ukrainian delegation attempting achieve Tomahawks (denied) while listening to arguments identical to those from Moscow put forward one day before to Trump himself. The American president even verbalized in public, already on Air Force One, the solution of freezing the war “where the lines are,” leaving negotiations on territory “for later.” The Russian proposal. Putin, in his previous call, demanded total surrender of Donetsk (a military objective that Moscow has failed to achieve in eleven years of combined war) offering as a counterpart only parts of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia that it currently controls precariously. For Ukraine, surrender the eastern bastion without combat (key to containing a penetration towards the Dnieper and kyiv) it is unacceptable because it would be equivalent to dynamiting the strategic defense of the entire country and, in psychological and political terms, to legitimizing a violent annexation project active since 2014. Trump and the European reading. trump had hinted Weeks ago that Ukraine could recover “everything and more,” and that Russia was a “paper tiger,” he now maintains that Moscow “has gained property” and should be given some credit. The literal echo of Putin’s points in Trump’s words dissipated among allies the hope of reopening the arms route and revealed that the matrix of the negotiation that Washington is pushing is no longer symmetrical but asymmetrical: downward pressure on the invaded and assumption of the invader’s premise. Russian internal calculation. For Ukrainian analysts, Donetsk’s demand does not so much seek to maximize territorial gain as to induce a sociopolitical fracture within Ukraine: forcing the leadership to consider what society will not tolerate to open an axis of internal delegitimization. Putin, in fact, already knows the social impossibility of barter, and that is why he insists: the desired cost is the erosion of cohesion rather than the line on the map. The Ukrainian position. Zelenskiy confirmed after the meeting that I would agree to freeze the front in its current location as a condition for entering talks, but stressed that there will not be additional delivery of territory. Considers that any negotiation must start with an immediate cessation on the line of contact, not with prior territorial modifications in favor of the aggressor. Trump’s public statements and the prospect of a Trump-Putin meeting in Budapest They do not alter that principle: without prior freezing and without forced concession, there is no viable dialogue. Tactical horizon. Ukraine enters winter under massive attacks on your energy infrastructure while responding by hitting Russian refineries. The lack of long range missiles from Washington after the call with Putin limits its capacity for deep counter-escalation just when Moscow is looking for time, social fatigue and diplomatic fracture. kyiv, in the absence of immediate alternatives, indicates that a ceasefire on current lines would be acceptable as a table key, but not the surrender of Donetsk as an entry passport. Peace on demand. If you will, the scheme that has emerged from this sequence (Putin-Trump call, Trump-Zelensky meeting, territorial barter proposal and appeal to the “agreement” freezing positions) places Ukraine before a conditional peace that recognizes the violence of annexation as a fait accompli and requires the invaded to formalize it. The ukrainian reaction (freeze, negotiate, but not give in) is the last dam between an end to the fire and an end to the State in the political-strategic sense. The meeting did not bring closer an equitable end to the war: it clarified the type of end that certain architecture is willing to accept, even if it does not say it out loud. Image | Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, NARA In Xataka | The factories of deep America have reopened. And they all make the same “toy”: an army of combat drones In Xataka | The crazy number of drones has turned the Ukrainian sky into the M-30 at rush hour. Identifying the enemy is a danger

There are so many drones in Ukraine that they have become cars. So the army has created a DGT to regulate its traffic

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In a battle where drones are already they don’t need humans to coordinate and attack, and where these combat devices have taken technological warfare to a new crazy phase where they are knocking themselves downsooner or later it had to happen. Drones and Ukrainian airspace are increasingly similar, for better and worse, to cars and roads around the planet. The congested sky. The Ukrainian front has turned into an airspace so saturated with drones that its operators they must negotiate between them to avoid collisions and, above all, interference from their own electronic warfare systems. In an environment where thousands of devices they fly simultaneouslythe pilots establish “flight corridors” temporary, agreed by group messages or by radio, to cross areas under friendly control without being shot down by the signal jammers of their own army. This exchange, at times chaotic and spontaneous, reflects how modern warfare is fought both in the air and on the electromagnetic spectrum, where waves, rather than bullets, determine who sees, who shoots, and who survives. The invisible war. we have told before. The battle for dominance electromagnetic spectrum is already one of the most decisive of the conflict. each side try to saturate or protect the other’s frequencies through jamming systems that can nullify drones, missiles or radars, but also blind their own. Pilots as Dimko Zhluktenkoof the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces, they explain Insiere that his work includes identifying Russian electronic warfare systems to destroy them before they block the signal of his drones. Other operators, however, they must coordinate with several units simultaneously, seeking a balance between protecting their troops and the need to keep flight routes open. In many cases, the commanders who control the jamming systems are at higher hierarchical levels, so units on the ground can barely request changes, with no real ability to turn them off or adjust them according to their missions. The chaos of the sky. The device density in the air has created an environment almost impossible to manage. Commercial drones modifiedappliances FPV explosives, reconnaissance dronesinterceptors and systems electronic warfare They compete for space and signal, in a landscape where distinguishing between friend and enemy is increasingly difficult. Many soldiers shoot or activate their inhibitors at any approaching drone, unable to identify it precisely. The similarity between the Russian and Ukrainian models aggravates the confusion, and sometimes the Ukrainians themselves Allied aircraft are shot down out of fear or uncertainty. In this scenario, the war resembles a gigantic air traffic jam where each operator must warn, coordinate and wait their turn to cross the front without being blocked or destroyed by their own side. Non-stop race. In the background, Ukraine and Russia compete to develop technologies capable of resisting the electromagnetic lock. New models include drones no dependence on GPScontrolled by fiber optic cableequipped with artificial intelligence or capable of changing frequency to escape enemy “noise.” However, these innovations slowly reach the front lines, where they coexist with outdated equipment that requires improvisation and constant communication. Thus, each flight is a negotiation between units, each mission a bet against the chaos of the spectrum, and each Russian advance forces an immediate Ukrainian response. The new frontier. Ultimately, the conflict in Ukraine has turned the sky into a laboratory where 21st century war is redefined. It is no longer just about tanks or missiles, but about waves, signals and microprocessors. The coordination between drones and interference systems reveals both the maturity and fragility of an army that has made ingenuity its main weapon. And it also shows a limit: the more saturated the spectrum, the more likely it will be that the technology will turn against those who use it. In that invisible space, where every interference can decide the fate of a drone or a life, Ukraine is waging a war as modern as it is paradoxical: a war in which communication It is the only way to prevent the defense from becoming its own enemy. Image | TASS In Xataka | If the question is how to end the war in Ukraine, the US has a disturbing solution: threaten Russia with a missile In Xataka | Russia’s technological superiority over Ukraine is growing every day. And all thanks to a friend: China

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