Ukraine

an army to “clean up” the most dangerous and lethal area of ​​Ukraine

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For months now, Western intelligence services and military analysts they were warning about what something deep was changing in North Korea: thanks to Russian support, the Kim Jong-un regime was beginning to accelerate the modernization of your armywith advances in missiles, drones and even signs of technical support in programs as sensitive as that of nuclear powered submarines. Moscow appeared to be breaking strategic taboos to shore up an isolated ally, but a key question remained unanswered. Now, it is beginning to become clear what the real price to pay for this military leap is. Alliance sealed with blood. As we said, the reactivated Moscow-Pyongyang axis alliance out of mutual necessity The true price of one side has been revealed with brutal clarity: North Korea is paying back its support for Russia by putting its own soldiers in the most dangerous task of the Ukrainian war. Not as advisors, nor as a symbolic rearguard, but as extreme risk meat, sent to clear minefields in active combat zones, where the probability of being killed or maimed is structurally high. The confirmation has come from Kim Jong-un himself, in an unusual gesture of propaganda transparency, and marks a qualitative leap in the degree of North Korean involvement in the European conflict. Engineers in the hell of Kursk. The North Korean soldiers deployed in Russia belong to specialized combat engineer units, sent to the Kursk region to carry out demining work after fighting with Ukrainian forces. This is a technically complex mission and psychologically devastatingeven for well-equipped professional armies, and even more so for troops coming from one of the most closed and disciplined regimes on the planet. According to the official datathe operation lasted about 120 days and resulted in the death of at least nine soldiers, although Western and South Korean intelligence services they estimate that actual North Korean personnel casualties in the war could run into the hundreds. Before these engineers, up to 15,000 troops North Koreans would have fought alongside Russian forces in the same region to expel Ukrainian units. The tacit agreement. The logic that supports this deployment It is as simple as it is disturbing. Russia, in need of men, ammunition and regeneration capacity after years of war, offers North Korea that in exchange what else do you need: fuel, food, financial aid and, above all, access to advanced military technologies that could modernize its military and its missile and weapons programs. For a regime suffocated by international sanctions, selling highly disciplined military manpower is a strategic asset. It is not just ideological or diplomatic support: it is a direct transaction in which Pyongyang exchanges human lives for economic and military oxygen. Scenery of the sacrifice. Over the weekend it was learned that the engineers’ return was celebrated in Pyongyang with a carefully designed ceremony to transform loss into epic. Kim Jong-un embraced wounded soldiers, some in wheelchairs, consoled families of the dead and awarded the dead with the highest state decorations, promising “eternal luster” to their sacrifice. The broadcast images by the KCNA agency show the leader kneeling before portraits of the fallen, placing flowers and medals, and talking about “miracles” achieved in deadly zones converted into safe spaces. All of this is part of a deliberate effort for normalizing the sending of troops abroad and strengthening internal support for a decision that, in any other context, would be politically explosive. Russian landmines laid during Ukraine’s advance in the 2022 Southern Ukraine counteroffensive. It reads “from a pure heart” and “with love from Russia” Propaganda and obedience. The official story goes beyond the tribute. North Korean state media they have spread images of soldiers advancing without hesitation through minefields or under intense fire, as well as scenes of wounded combatants committing suicide with grenades to avoid capture. It’s not just war propaganda: it’s an internal message of absolute disciplinewhere individual life is completely subordinated to the State and the leader. In this framework, the soldier is not an armed citizen, but rather an expendable strategic resource, trained to accept missions that other armies would consider almost suicidal. From ideological allies to operational partners. North Korean involvement is not limited to sending men. Pyongyang has supplied Moscow large quantities of projectiles of artillery, missiles and various weapons, de facto reactivating a mutual defense treaty inherited from the Cold War. However, the deployment of troops on the ground marks a new frontier: North Korea is no longer just a distant supplier, but an operational actor within the war. The choice of demining it is not coincidental: It is an essential, dangerous and inconspicuous function, perfect for an ally that can take losses without being accountable to public opinion. Disturbing precedent. That a State sells its soldiers to clear mines in a foreign war is not only a dark anecdote from the Ukrainian conflict, but a disturbing precedent. It demonstrates the extent to which war is becoming internationalized in layers, incorporating actors who exchange support not out of long-term strategic affinity, but out of sheer regime survival. In this scheme, North Korea has found an extreme way to break its isolation, while Russia obtains something increasingly scarce: men willing (or forced) to walk where no one else wants to. The price of this alliance is no longer measured in treaties or speeches, but in steps taken. on mined ground. Image | GoodFon, Stefan KrasowskiMinistry of Defense of Ukraine In Xataka | “It’s a level 10 Godzilla, but they only see a tiger”: South Korea’s surprising response to North Korea’s rearmament In Xataka | North Korea has been sending weapons to Russia for months. In return, Russia is giving him what he craves most: a functional army.

The drone war in Ukraine is advancing at the speed of light: what was useful two weeks ago is a death trap today

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Since the first months of the Russian invasion, Ukraine has converted the use of drones in one of the central pillars of its defense, and has done so to the point of transforming a conventional conflict into a permanent laboratory unmanned combat. In this environment of constant adaptation, drones have not only redefined the way we fight on the front, but have imposed an unprecedented pace of technological change that forces armies, industries and training centers to update almost in real time to avoid becoming obsolete. Classrooms at war. The Ukrainian drone schools have become one of the most extreme laboratories of military learning in the world, forced to rewrite their training programs at a dizzying pace that in some cases reaches the two weeks. In a conflict where drones have become the main instrument of attack, reconnaissance and attrition, the distance between an obsolete lesson and a lethal decision can be measured in days. For these centers, adapting is not an academic question, but rather a direct line between survival and death on the front, in an environment where technology, countermeasures and tactics change constantly and rapidly. In Xataka We had seen everything in Ukraine, but this is new: drones are disguising themselves as Russian soldiers, and it is working Synergy. To stay relevant, instructors are not limited to manuals or simulators. They regularly visit the battle lines, maintain permanent contact with alumni deployed and testing new technologies before incorporating them into their courses. In schools like Dronarium, with offices in kyiv and Lviv, its R&D manager, the veteran known as “Ruda”, explains that technological evolution on the front is so rapid that it requires almost immediate adaptability. There is no two equal classes: Each lesson incorporates small adjustments resulting from what happened days before in real combat. More than 16,000 students have passed through this center, and their experiences are directly integrated into the curriculum, turning training into a living system that feeds back on the war. Two-way learning. One of the pillars of this model is communication direct and permanent with the combatants. Messaging groups connect deployed instructors and operators, allowing soldiers to share new enemy tactics, technical problems or improvised solutions, while receiving advice in near real time from the rear. In centers like Karlsson, Karas & Associates or Kruk Drones, this relationship does not end at the end of the course: it is maintained throughout the operator’s operational life. The instruction is clear: nothing is taught that is not strictly necessary in combat, and what is no longer useful is unceremoniously discarded, no matter how recent it may be. A war that reinvents itself. The central weight of drones on the battlefield explains this urgency. The majority of frontline impacts and casualties already depend on unmanned systems, requiring continuous modification of both platforms and employment tactics. New models appear, others are neutralized by countermeasures, and the rules of the game are constantly rewritten. This speed has set off alarm bells in the West: military officials such as British Minister Luke Pollard warn that NATO forces run the risk of becoming obsolete, trapped in acquisition cycles that last years in the face of a war that repeats every two or three weeks. {“videoId”:”x8j6422″,”autoplay”:false,”title”:”Declassified video of the clash between Russian fighters and the American drone”, “tag”:”united states”, “duration”:”42″} The industry learns from Ukraine. The schools they are not alone in this race. Defense companies that observe the conflict have begun to copy this model of direct interaction with the front, shortening your cycles developmental. Manufacturers of anti-drone systems and UAV platforms visit the battlefield, chat with operators and fine-tune designs in a matter of weeks, not years. Some executives recognize that the ways in which Ukrainians use technology have surprised them, forcing them to rethink basic assumptions. At the same time, the soldiers themselves benefit from this exchange, providing constant feedback and receiving improvements, spare parts and solutions adapted to their real needs. In Genbeta According to psychology, those who grew up in the 1960s and 1970s developed mental strengths that are being lost today Schools under fire. There is no doubt, this permanent adaptation has a cost. Drone schools are not only competing against the technological clock, they are operating under the direct threat from Russian attacks and with limited financial resources, often depending on donations to continue functioning. In this context, their fight is not only to stay updated, but to survive. Even so, their role has become central in modern warfare: they are the link that connects innovation, industry and real combat, and the best example of how Ukraine has turned the urgency of conflict into a flexible and brutally efficient national military learning system. Image | Heute, RawPixel In Xataka | The new episode of terror in Ukraine does not involve missiles or drones: it involves leaving a city without cell phones In Xataka | Europe faces a question it can no longer avoid: how to respond to a war that is rarely declared (function() { window._JS_MODULES = window._JS_MODULES || {}; var headElement = document.getElementsByTagName(‘head’)(0); if (_JS_MODULES.instagram) { var instagramScript = document.createElement(‘script’); instagramScript.src=”https://platform.instagram.com/en_US/embeds.js”; instagramScript.async = true; instagramScript.defer = true; headElement.appendChild(instagramScript); – The news The drone war in Ukraine is advancing at the speed of light: what was useful two weeks ago is a death trap today was originally published in Xataka by Miguel Jorge .

Drones revolutionized warfare in Ukraine, now they are going to do it all over the world with one final trick: changing shape

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If something has become clear after these years of war in Ukraine, it is that drones are no longer a mere complement from the battlefield: they have become a such transformative technology like gunpowder or the Kalashnikov, and are entering a second, even more disruptive phase, driven by artificial intelligencethe miniaturization and the accelerated production. Their next landing is planetary. The second revolution. As we said, drones have gone from being tactical support to becoming a structural factor of modern warfare. Ukraine has shown that an inferior actor in means can degrade a great power with cheap swarms air, naval and land. At the same time, insurgencies, militias and states with few resources use the same logic to compensate for conventional disadvantages. The result, as we will see below, is a global diffusion of precision capabilities at low cost that reduces own risks, complicates defense and makes conflicts more accessible and resistant to resolution. War spine. The trajectory of drones goes from radio-controlled experiments in world wars to smart cruise missiles and platforms like the predator and the reaper in the “war on terror.” The recent turning point is Nagorno-Karabakhwhere an average country combined decoys and UCAVs with artillery to neutralize anti-aircraft defenses and dominate the air without powerful traditional aviation. Since then, the central lesson is that no need be a superpower: simply integrate drones, sensors and indirect fire intelligently to alter the tactical balance. Ukraine as a laboratory. In Ukraine, the drone design, testing and tuning cycle has been compressed to weeks. kyiv has scaled from imported platforms to its own industry that produces millions of unitscombining FPV, reconnaissance, long range and fiber optic guided systems to circumvent Russian electronic warfare. The proximity between workshops and front allows for rapid iterations on sensors, frequencies and flight profiles. Russia responds with mass production and specialized units like Rubikon. The front thus becomes an environment where each innovation is copied or counteracted in a very short time. Swarm globalization. The intensive use of drones has extended to conflicts with a lower media profile. In Africa, dozens of states and non-state actors have built-in armed UAV to internal wars, with markets dominated by exporters such as Türkiye and China. In Myanmar, rebels have converted commercial drones into a substitute for artilleryforcing army withdrawals. In Gaza, Hamas used them to blind Israeli sensors before raids. This shows that technology not only balances power relations, but also increases lethality and makes subsequent stabilization difficult. AI, ammunition and fire economy. The AI integration Drones transform the economy of combat: the cost per useful impact decreases and precision increases. Now there are kits software and hardware that allow existing platforms to locate, track and attack targets with limited human supervision. The practical effect is to reduce the need for classical artillery and increase the efficiency of fire, both on land as in sea. However, this does not eliminate the value of artillery or manned platforms, but rather shifts part of the fire load to systems more fungible and scalablewith clear implications for budgets and logistics. The new unmanned spectrum. And here comes one of the big changes, possibly the least expected. The drone family is expanding and transforming, changing shape and size: from nanodevices for close reconnaissance to enormous ships and underwater vehicles autonomous. The former allow discreet exploration in urban or closed environments, and the latter expand the presence on the surface and under the sea without embarking crews or assuming their risks. Between both extremes, ukrainian naval systems, Chinese XLUUV or AUV as the Ghost Shark redefine surveillance, anti-submarine warfare and area denial operations. The common pattern is to eliminate the need to protect lives on board, making it easier to accept high-risk missions and speed up production. A new generation of contractors. Companies like AndurilAuterion or Shield AI operate with startup logic: short development cycles, strong software integration and commitment to assuming own risk before winning large contracts. Some choose to control the entire chain (hardware and software), others to offer “operating systems” applicable to multiple platforms. This puts pressure on traditional, less agile contractors, and reconfigures the industrial ecosystemwith more mid-sized players competing in specific niches (loyal squires, swarms, mission software). The result is greater speed of innovation, but also more fragmentation of solutions. China, the US and the race. China part with advantage in commercial drones and transfers that leadership to the military fieldwhile investing very heavily in countermeasures after observing the performance of cheap drones in Ukraine. The proliferation of manufacturers of anti-drone systems and directed energy weapons indicates a strategic commitment to control both attack and defense. The United States, despite the accumulated experience, appears out of date in volume and in anti-swarm systems, with dispersed programs and irregular financing, which forces to emergency measures to accelerate purchases and use dual suppliers. This anticipates a long race in which quantity, cost and active defense weigh as much as the individual sophistication of each platform. Strategic limits. This point is often not taken into account. The destructive capacity of drones can lead to overestimating their strategic impact. From there what spectacular operations against high-value infrastructure do not always translate into lasting changes in the control of territory or in the political will of the adversary. Controllers like Radakin they underline that drones and algorithms do not replace the need for a coherent strategy or forces capable of occupying and holding ground. The temptation to build campaigns based on high-visibility specific hits can generate a dangerous gap between tactical success and strategic results. The era of eternal wars. All this breeding ground leads to a final scenario: by reducing costs and risks for those who prolong the combat, drones favor conflicts. no clear outcome. Statistics show fewer decisive victories and fewer peace agreements since the 1970s, while stagnant wars increase. In this context, drones provide continuous capacity for harm to actors who would otherwise be forced to negotiate or give in. The probable result is more long wars, distributed … Read more

that of Ukraine with disaster tourism

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In October we met that Ryanair was going to escalate its confrontation with the Spanish government with a figure that was going to appear in all the media: a 1.2 million cut of seats in the summer season of 2026, with enclaves such as Asturias especially affected. The figure, added to the previous cutsmeant three million fewer places in just twelve months. Now, in a surprising turn of events, the airline, along with the rest of Low Cost, is preparing an unexpected landing: Ukraine. Fly after the war. Yes, Europe is preparing for a scenario in which Ukrainian airspace reopens after a peace agreementand low-cost airlines see at that time not only the recovery of lost routes, but the beginning of an unprecedented stage in European commercial aviation. Wizz Air, which before the Russian invasion was the country’s largest foreign operator, anticipates a massive return supported by the diaspora that wants to return, in the gigantic reconstruction that will transform the Ukrainian economic geography and in an uncomfortable, but historically recurring phenomenon: the disaster tourismthat collective drive to visit scenes that have marked a traumatic chapter in recent history. A known phenomenon. That’s how it is, how it happened With the fall of the Berlin Wall, the visible wounds of war will attract millions of interested people for a time in being witnesses from the place where everything happened, and the airlines seek to position themselves before that human tide. For Wizz Air, this translates into deploy fifteen aircraft in the first two years after peace and fifty in a horizon of seven, a leap that outlines the ambition to quickly rebuild a network that operated more than 5,000 flights annually before February 2022. Ryanair’s strategy. In parallel, Ryanair has moved pieces with a speed that reveals the extent to which it considers Ukraine a key territory for its future growth. The Financial Times said A few hours ago its managers visited the main airports in the country with a plan already closed to achieve the four million passengers annually, almost tripling the 1.5 million it transported before the airspace closure. The fortress of your model (dozens of bases distributed throughout Europe and the ability to open routes from practically any point in a matter of days) would allow it to fly to cities like kyiv, Lviv or Odessa as soon as two weeks later that it is declared safe to do so. That logistical muscle will make the difference in a race in which each airline seeks to be the first to occupy an infrastructure that, although damaged, retains enormous strategic potential. Ryanair, depending on the mediuminsists that filling planes will not be a problem: the return of citizens, pent-up demand and the natural flow of European travelers guarantee robust occupancy from day one. The role of EasyJet. For its part, EasyJet, which never operated in Ukraine before the war, is eyeing the country as what could be Europe’s biggest civil project in decades. The attraction is not only tourist or demographic, but economic: The volume of investment that reconstruction will mobilize promises to turn Ukraine into a hub of activity that will attract companies, workers and entire logistics chains. The airline insist in that operational viability will depend on the ability to restore control towers, runways and terminals, but emphasizes that these processes can be restarted relatively quickly once the military risk ceases. Even so, unlike Wizz Air and Ryanair, EasyJet does not plan to base aircraft in the country in the short term, reflecting a more cautious approach in a market that continues to be conditioned by geopolitical uncertainty and the need to rebuild essential infrastructure from scratch. Security and the past. All this planning hits an inevitable and obvious obstacle: air safety. The European Aviation Safety Agency maintains the veto to fly over or land in Ukraine while the risk of attacks, misidentification or collateral damage persists, a warning that echoes the memory of the demolition of flight MH17 in 2014, a trauma that continues to mark continental aeronautical policy. The warning reflects the precarious balance between the economic urgency to reconnect the country with Europe and the need to prevent a hasty reopening from turning civil aviation into an easy target or an accidental victim of a conflict that has not yet been completely extinguished. Currently, only the Russian Smartavia has recorded flights in two years, an indication of the air vacuum in which Ukraine has lived since the beginning of the invasion. A future tied to the end of the war. There is no doubt, the renaissance of air traffic Ukrainian will depend, ultimately, on the long-awaited peace signing and the pace at which its airports are rebuilt, but also the narrative that the country manages to project. Ukraine will become a space where memory, economic opportunity, return mobility and a massive reconstruction effort converge that will reconfigure its position in Europe. And in this scenario, low-cost airlines are already competing for stand on the front line of a renaissance, convinced that, when the country reopens to the world, it will not only recover the almost fifteen million passengers before the war, but that it will become a symbolic destination of a new European stage. Paradoxically, their deceased aim to be the first to generate an economy. Image | Michael OrtegaZohra Bensemra, RawPixel In Xataka | A giant spider web has taken over the front lines in Ukraine: a death trap made of almost undetectable threads In Xataka | If the question is how peace negotiations in Ukraine are going, Russia’s answer is disturbing: “we are ready”

The terror of wars was always stepping on a mine. In Ukraine they carry scissors, because the panic is thinner: a spider web

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In May we count that an unexpected weapon had begun to be added among the Ukrainian troops: scissors. Given the brutality of the conflict, a technology had sneaked in to evade electronic warfare and enter the enemy camp on both sides as he had not done before: destroying the lines, making attacks invisible and evading any attempt at interference. Now, the tangle of cables has intensified. A deadly web. In 2025, the Ukrainian front is no longer understood without a sky and ground crossed by thousands of drones and by kilometers of optical cable that transform the land into a physical and tactical tangle. What started as a technological revolution to compensate for human shortcomings has evolved into an industrialized war in which each innovation immediately generates a counter-innovation, and where Ukraine, which for years led the initiative, now faces a scenario in which Russia obtains a sustained advantage. Fiber optic drones (invulnerable to electronic shielding) have colonized trenches, roads and wooded areas, leaving visible and invisible networks that slow down every movement and that, in the middle of the night, they get confused with real traps. Narratives from units like the Ukrainian Rangers show a landscape in which advancing is as dangerous as retreating: cables hanging from trees, entrenched in mud, or accidentally attached to weapons and vehicles after each mission. There is no “safe zone.” The great transformation is not in territorial advances, but in the Russian ability to hit supply lines tens of km from the front. What yesterday was a rearguard today is a vulnerable gray zoneand what once required manned aviation is now accomplished by swarms of small, remotely guided vehicles. The explosions that convoys have reached on theoretically protected roads confirm that Moscow has given absolute priority to the war of attrition: attacking where it hurts most, preventing rotations, exhausting Ukrainian drone pilots and forcing brigades to walk dozens of kilometers on foot to avoid detection. This logistical pressure not only undermines military resistance, but also alters the political balance: a country that loses strategic depth also loses negotiating capacity. The Rubikon unit. It we have counted before. The appearance of Rubikon, the elite unit that reorganized Russian doctrine after the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk, marks a before and after. Recruiting the best pilots, integrating optical drones, FPV and “mother” platforms like the Molniya, they exported a lethal model to the Donbas: attack supply before infantry, eliminate enemy pilots before riflemen, destroy capabilities before positions. Its success lies less in technology than on the scale: Russia produces more, deploys more and lets China nurture its fiber optic industry without limits. In Pokrovsk (the crudest laboratory of this mutation) Ukrainian soldiers calculate that Russian drones surpass them in a ratio of 10 to 1. The city, turned into a puzzle of ruins where the front line changes every few hours, exemplifies how tactical air dominance has become the decisive factor in controlling the terrain. The Ukrainian crisis. Ukraine continues to cause severe damage in the final strip before the front, where traditional FPVs remain lethal. But the rest of the board has leaned against her: a shortage of optical cables, pilots forced to launch from ever greater distances, disrupted logistics chains and a military industry struggling to produce what Russia receives on an industrial scale. Some controls they insist in which the strategic error is to prioritize the destruction of Russian infantry instead of replicating the Rubikon model: hunt down the operators, saturate the logistics nodes and act in depth. However, any solution requires resources that Ukraine does not have and that its allies provide too slowly. Chinese fiber optics, the officers point outis tipping the balance with more weight than many Western diplomatic decisions. Between swarms and cables. The conclusion is disturbing: war no longer depends so much on territorial advances as on who controls the drone ecosystem, who has more operational pilotswho can saturate the most kilometers of enemy rear and who turns rival logistics into a prohibited zone. The front, turned into a spider web physically by wires and digitally webed by unmanned swarms, is being redefined at a speed that Ukraine struggles to match. If kyiv does not regain the technological initiative and achieve a steady supply of optical capabilities and long-range platforms, 2026 could be the first year in which Russia’s structural advantage in drones not only complicates Ukrainian offensives, but seriously limits its ability to sustain current defenses. Image | reddit In Xataka | Russia had managed to manufacture drones and missiles despite the sanctions. So selling Zara clothes was a matter of time In Xataka | The round of peace meetings in Ukraine has ended. Russia says it is “ready”, but for war with Europe

The round of peace meetings in Ukraine has ended. Russia says it is “ready”, but for war with Europe

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The last two rounds of contacts between the Kremlin and Trump’s envoys have confirmed that the peace process for Ukraine is technically alive, but politically blocked. Putin took advantage of the arrival of the emissaries to launch a verbal offensive: Accused Europe of torpedoing peace, suggested the EU “is on the side of war,” and said Russia does not want a continental conflict but that if Europe starts one, “we are ready right now.” A trapped peace process. For Moscow, the talks are “very useful” as they allow it probe the limits Washington and explore what it is willing to sacrifice in exchange for a stable ceasefire. For the United States, they are an opportunity to zoom in positions without openly acknowledging that the original plan favored Russia too much and was unacceptable to kyiv. Five hours of meeting in Moscow served to review successive versions of the US document, but not to generate a “compromise option”: Russia accepts some elements, rejects others with a “critical and even negative attitude” and, above all, keeps intact its objective of translating its military advances in territorial gains formalized on paper. Moscow red lines. At the center of the disagreement is the territorial question. Moscow insists Ukraine must resign to 20% of Donetsk which he still preserves, while boasting (not without response from kyiv) of having taken Pokrovska key logistical hub that had been in operation for more than a year trying to capture with a great cost in lives and material. This insistence is not only cartographic: is part of a maximization logicin which victories at the front are used as an argument to tighten political conditions. Added to this are other structural requirements: deep cuts in the Ukrainian armed forces, severe limits on Western military aid and a fit of Ukraine into the Russian sphere of influence that would empty its formal sovereignty of content. In this context, talking about “progress” is, in reality, talk about margins: Washington explores how far it can give in without kyiv perceiving it as a capitulation, while Russia calculates how far it can stretch its demands without completely breaking the diplomatic channel that is useful to buy time and legitimize its narrative. Parallel diplomacy and mixed signals. Witkoff and Kushner’s role adds a ambiguity layer to the process. They are not classic diplomats, but political emissaries who operate in a gray zone between official diplomacy and American domestic politics. His presence in Moscow, after meeting with Ukrainians in Florida and reviewing a 28 point plan which initially tilted the board towards Moscow, sends several signals at once: kyiv is shown that Washington “listens” to its objections and tweaks the document, Moscow is made clear that the White House is willing to continue negotiating concession frameworks, and Europe is reminded that the decisive conversation remains, above all, Washington-Moscow. The Trump statement Calling the war a “mess” that is difficult to resolve fits with that approach: rather than a closed strategy, the administration seems to seek an agreement that reduces the political and economic cost of the war for the United States, although the final balance is very delicate for Ukraine. Europe as a scapegoat. The Putin’s words on Europe reveal a perfectly calculated strategy: presenting European capitals as the real obstacle to peace, accusing them of “being on the side of the war” and of preventing Washington from closing an agreement. By saying that “Europe is preventing the US administration from achieving peace in Ukraine,” the Kremlin is trying several things at the same time: put pressure on the Europeans to lower their demands, feed the fatigue of war in Western societies and drive a wedge between the United States and its allies, suggesting that Washington would be more flexible if it were not bound by “European demands.” The added threat that Russia “does not intend to fight Europe, but is ready if Europe starts” has a double effect: it works as a military warning and, at the same time, as an internal message to reinforce the idea of ​​a besieged Russia that only defends itself. The risk of being isolated. For Ukraine, cross-play is especially dangerous. Zelenskiy insists on receiving security guarantees “livable” for the future, that is, mechanisms that prevent a new Russian attack once an agreement has been signed. HE frontally opposes to any formula that forces him to give up territory that he currently controls or to reduce his army to levels that leave him defenseless. But, at the same time, it knows that a part of the European capitals and the American political class are seeking, with increasing urgency, an outcome that freezes the war and stabilizes the front, even if that enshrines a status quo very unfavorable for Ukraine. Its margin consists of supporting in the European bloc tougher (those countries that see a bad agreement as a disastrous precedent for continental security) and to remember that any credible reconstruction involves using frozen russian assets and for a framework of Western guarantees that makes another Kremlin attack politically unaffordable. Putin’s calculation of strength. The threats “cutting off Ukraine from the sea completely” and intensifying attacks on ports and ships entering them fit into a broader strategy: combine slow but steady advances in the Donbas with the ability to strangle the Ukrainian economy and make the protection of its maritime corridors more expensive. Each city taken or partially controlled serves the Kremlin as proof that time is in its favor and that it can rise the price of peace at each plan review. Editorials from related media, as Komsomolskaya Pravdareinforce this idea by presenting the negotiations as a scenario in which Russia can afford to tighten its conditions as “more and more Ukrainian territory” passes into its hands. The implicit message is clear: if the current proposals already seem harsh, the next round could be worse for kyiv if the war continues. Uncertainty. The final result is a peace process that formally remains open, but that moves on a dangerous … Read more

A new turn to end the war in Ukraine has left the final outcome in the hands of a decisive point: 900 km

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The latest diplomatic movement between the United States and Ukraine has crystallized into a peace draft reduced to 19 points which, according to both delegations, constitutes real progress with respect to the controversial document initial 28 points. That first draft, written largely with Russian participationcrossed multiple Ukrainian red lines and set off alarms throughout Europe. As things stand, the final decision is a little more 900 km. The new twist. In Geneva, after hours of tense negotiations that were on the verge of collapse, the team led by Andriy Yermak managed soften or reformulate most of the most problematic aspects. The new text, described as a “solid” body of convergence, integrates security guarantees, economic commitments and infrastructure protection in a framework that is no longer perceived like an ultimatumalthough it is far from resolving the most explosive core: the territorial question. That point (the possibility of giving up portions of the east) was explicitly “placed in brackets” for Presidents Trump and Zelensky to decide, a gesture that recognizes both the political gravity of the issue and the legal impossibility of resolving it without a national referendum in Ukraine. The revision of the draft also eliminates elements such as the limitation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to 600,000 troops or a total amnesty for war crimes, but deliberately preserves the biggest obstacle. Thus, although the White House describes the process as “optimistic,” the heart of the agreement is suspended in an uncomfortable balance: moving forward without defining the most decisive point. The air battle. In parallel to the negotiations, a strategic reflection runs through the debate: no agreement will survive if Ukraine lacks of air guarantees real. Moscow has shown that your fastest and most effective way to break a ceasefire is violate airspace with missiles, drones, bombers or fighters. Ukrainian cities have been subjected to long-range attacks and coercion from the sky for three years, and the country has only avoided total collapse thanks to a makeshift patchwork of Western anti-aircraft defenses. They remembered the analysts at Forbes that any sustainable peace requires three pillars: an integrated defense network that connects radars, Patriot batteries, NASAMS, IRIS-T and aviation in a common operational framework, a modernized, numerous Ukrainian air force capable of maintaining continuous patrols with F-16, Rafale or Gripen equipped with AESA radars, long-range missiles and advanced electronic warfare, and a visible presence of allies operating from or within Ukraine, similar to the Baltic Air Policingto deter violations and react unambiguously to any incursion. Clarity. Furthermore, it was pointed out that the rules of engagement should be explicit: immediate interception of unauthorized aircraft, shooting down any vector that poses a threat and automatic retaliation against launch points if Moscow fires missiles after an agreement. Without this aerial architecture, a peace signed on paper would become a fragile parenthesis, exposed to a Russia that historically explores every void and tests every border. The stability of the future agreement depends both on the diplomatic text and the firepower that supports its lines. The point that no one wants to write. What happened in Geneva shows that diplomacy is advancing, but also that it is doing so with a limp. counted the financial times that the meeting began almost broken: the Americans, upset by previous leaks, arrived tense, and the Ukrainians, distrustful of the pro-Russian bias of the original draft. It took a long conversation. almost therapeuticbetween Yermak and the American delegation to reduce tension. Afterwards, both sides revised the draft point by point, eliminated the troop cap, rewrote the amnesty and adjusted key definitions. The Europeans (United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy and the EU) joined later to coordinate priorities and synchronize postures. Subsequent statements reflect a “constructive atmosphere,” with Washington under self-inflicted pressure to present the document to Russia as soon as possible. Be that as it may, no technical correction can resolve the essential absence: the impossibility of deciding in that room about the territory. According to the Ukrainian negotiators, they did not have a mandate to give up a single kilometer, and the Constitution requires consultation to the population. Kyslytsya himself admitted that what is pending requires “leadership decisions,” a diplomatic euphemism to admit that what is unacceptable for Ukraine has been postponed, not eliminated. The 900 km as a judge. The peace draft can have changedbut the reality on the front changes even faster. As diplomats wrote, erased and rewrote sentences in Geneva, Russia intensified its offensive in multiple sectors: advances north of Huliaipole, increasing pressure towards Siversk and a siege that could be sealed in Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad. The front line, about 900 kilometershas become the silent arbiter of the negotiation: the more Ukraine retreats, the more strength Russia believes it has to demand concessions, and the more it resists, the more room Kyiv has to reject any territorial concession. The American and Russian proposal filtered It started from that premise: asking Ukraine to hand over areas that it still controls before it loses them. Zelensky, however, has reiterated that Ukraine will “defend its home” and that accepting territorial amputations would undermine not only its political legitimacy, but the very possibility of lasting peace. Time trial. The problem is that time on the front is against Kyiv. Russian advances, although extremely costly in men and material, are creating pockets of vulnerability and forcing to retreat reserves to cover cracks. And what is at stake in those 900 kilometers It’s not just terrain: is Ukraine’s ability to come to the table with a negotiating position that does not amount to staged surrender. Every kilometer lost on the map alters the draft in Geneva more than any paragraph. Between paper and the battlefield. What emerges from these three fronts (diplomacy, the sky and the line of contact) is a more or less clear picture: the peace agreement is closer in form, but not in depth. He 19 point text It represents an indisputable technical advance, but it depends on enormously costly presidential decisions. Air guarantees are the indispensable condition … Read more

A 28-page US document has brought peace in Ukraine closer than ever. The problem is that it is the translation of a Russian text

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And suddenly a 28 page document unpublished to date has suddenly entered as a missile in the negotiations of the war in Ukraine. Promoted by Washington, it has unleashed a diplomatic storm in Europe and in kyiv because, far from having been prepared with the main parties involved, it had been conceived in discreet negotiations between the American businessman Steve Witkoff and the Russian envoy Kirill Dmitriev, with the participation of Jared Kushner and the late endorsement of Trump. The origin of a plan. The result of these meetings was a text that Europe and Ukraine had not seen and that, to further alarm (according to one Bloomberg exclusive), preserved the linguistic structures typical of an original written in Russian, confirming the suspicions that Moscow had achieved filter your vision of the war in a document presented as a US initiative. The pressure exerted by Dan Driscoll (a close ally of JD Vance) on European and Ukrainian diplomats, urging them to accept territorial concessions in a matter of days, ended up setting off all the alarm signals. For European governments, which considered themselves central partners in any peace negotiations, the origin of the plan became a strategic question: they needed to know who had written it and with what objectives before sitting down to discuss. This information gap triggered a race against time to stop the imposition of a text that, in its initial form, was not only surprising for its demands, but also for its obvious alignment with Moscow’s interests. Territory, legitimization and a threat. The most explosive section of the American plan required that Ukraine will withdraw of the fortified urban centers that it still maintains in Donetsk, breaking the “belt of fortresses” that has slowed the Russian advance since 2014. This withdrawal would not only imply the displacement of tens of thousands of Ukrainian citizens, but it would open a corridor that would leave exposed to key cities like Dnipro and Zaporizhzhia. To make matters worse, the document proposed that the occupied areas be recognized as “de facto Russian”a more favorable formula for Moscow than the already problematic “de facto under Russian control”, and which, in practice, brought the international community closer to accept territorial changes achieved by force. Added to this was the idea of ​​converting the evacuated territories into a demilitarized zone whose violation by Russia (not an implausible scenario given recent history) would allow Moscow to open a new, even deeper offensive in the future. From the Ukrainian perspective, accepting this point would be sowing the conditions for a future war in worse terms, reinforcing the impression that the document did not seek a stable peace, but rather formalized a strategic result that Russia has not been able to obtain through military operations. Security cut and promises broken. The security guarantees included in the plan were vague to the point of irrelevance: they promised “reliable protection” without detailing mechanisms, but simultaneously prohibited Ukraine from entering never in NATOprevented the stationing of allied troops in its territory and forced kyiv to modify its Constitution to renounce accession. For a country marked by the experience of Budapest Memorandum (formal guarantees that prevented neither the annexation of Crimea nor the 2022 invasion), accepting an even more ambiguous framework would amount to to be left helpless facing an aggressor who has systematically broken all previous agreements. Red lines. The absence of a commitment type Article 5 and the refusal to allow training missions or deterrence forces on Ukrainian territory reinforced the conviction that Ukraine would be trapped between a strengthened Russia and a West that would reserve the right to “diplomatically support,” but not to intervene. This component fueled rejection in European capitals, which consider it essential that Ukraine keep an army strong as a land barrier that protects the continent. Limit to 600,000 troops to the only country in Europe at war, without imposing a similar restriction on Russia, was perceived as covert disarmament and a prelude to a future Russian offensive. Amnesty and frozen assets. One of the most shocking elements of the plan was the proposal of a general amnesty and Ukraine’s renunciation of any legal claim about war crimes, deportations or deliberate destruction of infrastructure. For an exposed population to documented atrocitiesthis clause meant not only the denial of justice, but also the elimination of the legal basis that allows Europe to advance the reparations loan backed by frozen Russian assets. That loan, of 140,000 million of euros, is considered by the EU as the more solid path and less expensive to sustain Ukraine during the postwar period. The US plan not only made it unviable, but also redistributed those funds in an unusual way: 100 billion would go to a US investment vehicle that would deliver half of its profits to Washington, another 100 billion would be contributed by Europe and the rest would go to a joint fund with Russia. For Berlin, Paris or Warsaw, the message was clear: Russia would obtain indirect financial relief while the Europeans would see their most effective tool of strategic pressure weakened. The attempt to force kyiv to renounce all moral and legal responsibility for the aggressor reinforced the perception that the plan sought to resolve the war “quickly,” not “fairly.” The Russian strategy. Since the beginning of the invasion, Moscow has not changed their fundamental demands: more territory in the east, military neutralization of Ukraine and permanent veto on its accession to NATO. This strategic immobility, together with gradual advances on the front, has allowed it to capitalize on Western fatigue, the political fractures in kyiv and transatlantic tensions. For the Kremlin, the leaked plan demonstrates that its commitment to prolonged resistance, military pressure and the erosion of Western will is bearing fruit. Putin openly celebrated it, affirming that the document could serve as a basis and that rejecting it would only lead to new Ukrainian defeats. Likewise, Moscow has hinted that even a signed agreement could be used as leverage to resume the … Read more

Ukraine has returned from Europe with 250 fighter jets under its arm. The problem is that only Spain has told him the truth

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The new European trip of the president of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky, has finished in Spain and has crystallized into a military agenda that aims to reconfigure the Ukrainian air force over the next decade, based on political agreements of enormous symbolic scope. If nothing goes wrong, the Ukrainian nation has nothing less than 250 European fighters under his arm along with a huge aid package and arsenal. The problem is that the financing is very uncertain and its execution is very distant. Aerial reconstruction as a continental ambition. In Paris, the Ukrainian president signed a letter of intent to acquire up to one hundred Rafale fightersdevices that France presents as the heart of the future defense of Ukraine, complemented by Samp/T systemsnew generation drones, guided munitions and incipient industrial cooperation to manufacture interceptors on Ukrainian territory. The French bet aims to elevate Ukraine to European technological standardintegrating it into a long-term security architecture and relying on a financing framework yet to be defined, where the European Union and frozen Russian assets appear as the great promise, although deeply controversial. The political gesture, celebrated as historic in parisresponds to the French ambition to lead the regeneration of Ukrainian air power and to reinforce the role of its defense industry in a continent that is rapidly rearming. Doubts about the bet. Diplomatic enthusiasm contrasts with operational uncertainties. They remembered TWZ analysts either The Wall Street Journal that Ukraine does not have of the financial margin to pay for neither the acquisition nor the maintenance of a hundred Rafale, and France is going through a period of budget fragility which makes sustained long-term commitments difficult. The idea that Europe could finance the purchase through new joint debt mechanisms or from income generated by frozen Russian assets divides the states members and poses enormous legal risks, especially for Belgium, which holds most of those funds. Added to this is the industrial reality: the Dassault production chain is saturatedwith deliveries committed for years, and the manufacturing of 100 additional devices would require extraordinary efforts. The perspective of a parallel program, with 150 Swedish Gripen also agreed in the preliminary phase, increases doubts about whether Ukraine could sustain, train and maintain such a vast fleet of 4/5th generation aircraft. For many, the initiative reflects more a political movement to keep France at the center of the Ukrainian equation and to boost European industry in the face of a United States more distantthan a realistic military acquisition plan in the short or medium term. A Gripen fighter The military horizon. Zelensky’s trip has also highlighted the arrival of a winter that anticipates a new Russian campaign focused in energy infrastructure and strategic cities. France insists that Samp/T systems are demonstrating remarkable effectiveness against Russian missiles with a complex trajectory, even higher, some French commanders claim, than the performance of the Patriot in certain scenarios. In parallel, Paris reinforces its role as a provider of interim air capabilities, including Mirage fighters and precision ammunition, while promoting a future coalition of countries Europeans willing to guarantee the security of Ukraine after an eventual ceasefire, a project still impossible as long as Moscow rejects any negotiation. This strategy, which attempts to combine immediate support with an architecture of long term securityreveals both French determination and the continent’s real limitations in simultaneously sustaining the current war and future rearmament. Among others, Spanish military aid to Ukraine will consist of 40 IRIS-T missiles Spain and the contrast with the promises. The final stop of the trip, in Madrid, has revealed a very marked contrast between the declarative exuberance of some allies and the measured (and often austere) approach of the Spanish Government. Spain announced a package of 817 million of euros, which includes 300 million in nationally produced weapons, 215 million channeled through European programs and additional 100 million to acquire US missiles through PURL initiative of NATO. It is a significant effort in political and logistical terms, but modest in comparison with the great European powers and especially small in the face of the air ambitions presented in France or Sweden. In practice, it is a calibrated support for immediate needs from the Ukrainian winter: anti-aircraft missiles to repel drones and protect critical infrastructures, plus a commitment to accelerate joint industrial capabilities in areas where Spanish companies (with Indra at the head) can offer practical solutions such as deployable radars or anti-drone systems. Spain and realism. If you also want, the Spanish case reflects a much more realistic line than that of other countries visited by Zelensky. Since the beginning of the war, Spain has contributed with useful materialsbut in many cases coming from surplus (Leopard 2A4 retired, M113 obsolete, Hawk batteries aging) and has prioritized its participation in European programs where the direct cost to its budget is lower. In comparative terms, and especially measured as a percentage of GDP, Spain is far behind of the hard core of military support for Ukraine. However, what it offers now is probably more sincere and sustainable: an acceptable package, focused on urgent and realistic needs, that does not promise fighter fleets, perhaps impossible to finance, or industrial projects that exceed national capacity. Spanish extra ball. Furthermore, Spain stands out where other countries they can’t: in the reception of refugees, in the medical rehabilitation of Ukrainian soldiers and in light but reliable industrial cooperation. So, on that journey that began with spectacular advertisements in Paris and Stockholm, the Spanish stop has served to balance in a way the expectations. In that sense, Spain appears as one of the few allies that gauges its support by looking ahead. the budget figuresavoiding promising what it will be difficult to fulfill and remaining firm in what it can offer: a modest but operational contribution. Image | Ronnie MacdonaldTuomo Salonen, Air and Space Army Ministry of Defense Spain In Xataka | Europe already knows the arsenal it needs for rearmament. Now the most difficult thing remains: how to make it arrive in time if Russia attacks … Read more

In Ukraine, the difficult thing is not to replace a drone, but its pilot. So Russia has started the hunt with something unprecedented: Rubikon

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For two years, Ukrainian drone operators had managed to maintain a decisive tactical advantage: the ability to detect, harass and destroy Russian positions with an agility that Moscow could not match. Pilots worked in small teams, in makeshift basements or camouflaged trenches, piloting from a distance FPV that turned the front into a transparent space where the enemy could rarely move unobserved. All that has changed with an appearance. The dark turn. Yes, that domain has been abruptly broken with the appearance Rubikona Russian unit created to track, locate and eliminate not so much drones as to those who operate them. The testimony in the financial times by Dmytro, a Ukrainian pilot and former rapper, summarizes this change of era: he went from being a hunter to being hunted in seconds when a Russian drone detected him on a reckless walk. That moment, which two years ago would have been exceptional, has become part of the daily routine on a front where the survival of the operator has become a strategic objective for Russia and a critical weak point for Ukraine. The result is a complete investment of roles: Innovators, previously almost untouchable, are now a priority target. Rubikon structure and ambition. This Russian elite corps is not simply a drone unit, but an organization of about 5,000 troops endowed with ample financial resources, tactical autonomy and a defined mission: deny Ukraine the ability to operate its drone network. Unlike the heavily bureaucratic operation that characterized the Russian army in the early stages of the war, this unit acts with speed, initiative and an approach more reminiscent of the Ukrainian groups it seeks to destroy. Their main task is not to attack the infantry on the front line, but penetrate behind the frontup to 10 kilometers in depth, to destroy logistics vehicles, ground robots and, above all, locate the operators who control the Ukrainian defensive swarms. Emblem of the elite Russian unit And much more. For Russian and Western experts, Rubikon functions as a development center of unmanned systems: trains other units, analyzes tactics, refines procedures and continually adapts its way of operating. Each technical or doctrinal improvement that emerges from Rubikon ends up radiating to the rest of the Russian army, which explains why the Ukrainians detect unexpected qualitative leaps in the performance of enemy drones. This ability fast learning It is one of the most disturbing elements, because it allows Russia to correct in months the technological gap that Ukraine built for years. The new invisible dimension. The combat is no longer limited to the visible sky, but is fought in a domain more abstract and lethal: the electromagnetic spectrum. Both Ukraine and Russia deploy electronic intelligence stations, signal guidance equipment and jamming systems capable of defeating, jamming or even hijacking adversary drones. This rivalry makes any radio broadcast a potential risk. Operators, no matter how hidden, need clear lines of sight, elevated antennas, and transmitters relatively close to the front, factors that Rubicon systematically explodes. Their teams track antennas on hills, thermal shadows in forests and emissions that reveal the presence of a pilot a few kilometers away. Andrey Belousov inspecting the Rubikon unit The signs. The inhibitorsdespite their usefulness, generate visible electrical signatures that can attract attacks. And in the midst of these maneuvers, both sides resort to signal hacking video to observe enemy cameras or locate the exact source of a remote control. Expert Tom Withington resume this complexity with a precise image: it is a game of cat and mouse where physics dictates the rules, and where each action leaves a trace that the opponent can exploit. Pressure on the pilots. Plus: unlike the Russians, Ukraine lacks the necessary troops to maintain continuous shiftswhich creates physical and psychological exhaustion that becomes as dangerous as the enemy itself. Zoommer, a Ukrainian soldier from a small drone unit, explained in the Times that Rubikon can operate without breaks because it has enough staff to rotate every few hours, while they must remain alert almost all day. The arrival of this unit to Pokrovsk area (a city that has been in a desperate defensive struggle for a year) has transformed life on the front, going from manageable days to a constant tension in which any movement can mean death. Before, says Zoommer.the area was almost “a vacation”, now it is an invisible hell where every antenna, every fleeting signal and every movement outside the trench can be a fatal mistake. This pressure has forced the Ukrainians to change routines, camouflage positions with extreme care, hide transmitters, disperse equipment and create anti-drone cells that act as a defensive mirror of Russia’s own tactics. The loss of transparency. Drones had provided Ukraine with a crucial tool: the ability to see and hit farther and faster, giving its defenders situational transparency that compensated for numerical inferiority. According to the RUSI analysisup to 80% of current casualties are attributed to drone operations, underscoring their central role in a war in which artillery and infantry depend on these mechanical eyes. What’s happening? Than Rubikon and the like have eroded that advantage in forcing Ukraine to reallocate resources from offensive missions to the protection of its own operators. The result is that, while Russia advances at an increasing pace, Ukraine devotes more efforts to stopping than hitting, losing the initiative at a critical moment in the conflict. Moscow has quickly absorbed the enemy’s lessons and turned them into doctrine, a process that would normally take years and that here has been compressed into months, tipping the balance on an increasingly dynamic front. Psychological warfare. The latest analysis show that the front is no longer defined only by the technology deployed, but by psychological pressure endured by Ukrainian operators and by the transformation of the Russian army towards a more agile structure, represented in Rubikon. The pilots, who have become priority objectives, live under constant tension that forces them to minimize any movement and operate with the permanent feeling of being watched, because … Read more

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