Ukraine

A new turn to end the war in Ukraine has left the final outcome in the hands of a decisive point: 900 km

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The latest diplomatic movement between the United States and Ukraine has crystallized into a peace draft reduced to 19 points which, according to both delegations, constitutes real progress with respect to the controversial document initial 28 points. That first draft, written largely with Russian participationcrossed multiple Ukrainian red lines and set off alarms throughout Europe. As things stand, the final decision is a little more 900 km. The new twist. In Geneva, after hours of tense negotiations that were on the verge of collapse, the team led by Andriy Yermak managed soften or reformulate most of the most problematic aspects. The new text, described as a “solid” body of convergence, integrates security guarantees, economic commitments and infrastructure protection in a framework that is no longer perceived like an ultimatumalthough it is far from resolving the most explosive core: the territorial question. That point (the possibility of giving up portions of the east) was explicitly “placed in brackets” for Presidents Trump and Zelensky to decide, a gesture that recognizes both the political gravity of the issue and the legal impossibility of resolving it without a national referendum in Ukraine. The revision of the draft also eliminates elements such as the limitation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to 600,000 troops or a total amnesty for war crimes, but deliberately preserves the biggest obstacle. Thus, although the White House describes the process as “optimistic,” the heart of the agreement is suspended in an uncomfortable balance: moving forward without defining the most decisive point. The air battle. In parallel to the negotiations, a strategic reflection runs through the debate: no agreement will survive if Ukraine lacks of air guarantees real. Moscow has shown that your fastest and most effective way to break a ceasefire is violate airspace with missiles, drones, bombers or fighters. Ukrainian cities have been subjected to long-range attacks and coercion from the sky for three years, and the country has only avoided total collapse thanks to a makeshift patchwork of Western anti-aircraft defenses. They remembered the analysts at Forbes that any sustainable peace requires three pillars: an integrated defense network that connects radars, Patriot batteries, NASAMS, IRIS-T and aviation in a common operational framework, a modernized, numerous Ukrainian air force capable of maintaining continuous patrols with F-16, Rafale or Gripen equipped with AESA radars, long-range missiles and advanced electronic warfare, and a visible presence of allies operating from or within Ukraine, similar to the Baltic Air Policingto deter violations and react unambiguously to any incursion. Clarity. Furthermore, it was pointed out that the rules of engagement should be explicit: immediate interception of unauthorized aircraft, shooting down any vector that poses a threat and automatic retaliation against launch points if Moscow fires missiles after an agreement. Without this aerial architecture, a peace signed on paper would become a fragile parenthesis, exposed to a Russia that historically explores every void and tests every border. The stability of the future agreement depends both on the diplomatic text and the firepower that supports its lines. The point that no one wants to write. What happened in Geneva shows that diplomacy is advancing, but also that it is doing so with a limp. counted the financial times that the meeting began almost broken: the Americans, upset by previous leaks, arrived tense, and the Ukrainians, distrustful of the pro-Russian bias of the original draft. It took a long conversation. almost therapeuticbetween Yermak and the American delegation to reduce tension. Afterwards, both sides revised the draft point by point, eliminated the troop cap, rewrote the amnesty and adjusted key definitions. The Europeans (United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy and the EU) joined later to coordinate priorities and synchronize postures. Subsequent statements reflect a “constructive atmosphere,” with Washington under self-inflicted pressure to present the document to Russia as soon as possible. Be that as it may, no technical correction can resolve the essential absence: the impossibility of deciding in that room about the territory. According to the Ukrainian negotiators, they did not have a mandate to give up a single kilometer, and the Constitution requires consultation to the population. Kyslytsya himself admitted that what is pending requires “leadership decisions,” a diplomatic euphemism to admit that what is unacceptable for Ukraine has been postponed, not eliminated. The 900 km as a judge. The peace draft can have changedbut the reality on the front changes even faster. As diplomats wrote, erased and rewrote sentences in Geneva, Russia intensified its offensive in multiple sectors: advances north of Huliaipole, increasing pressure towards Siversk and a siege that could be sealed in Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad. The front line, about 900 kilometershas become the silent arbiter of the negotiation: the more Ukraine retreats, the more strength Russia believes it has to demand concessions, and the more it resists, the more room Kyiv has to reject any territorial concession. The American and Russian proposal filtered It started from that premise: asking Ukraine to hand over areas that it still controls before it loses them. Zelensky, however, has reiterated that Ukraine will “defend its home” and that accepting territorial amputations would undermine not only its political legitimacy, but the very possibility of lasting peace. Time trial. The problem is that time on the front is against Kyiv. Russian advances, although extremely costly in men and material, are creating pockets of vulnerability and forcing to retreat reserves to cover cracks. And what is at stake in those 900 kilometers It’s not just terrain: is Ukraine’s ability to come to the table with a negotiating position that does not amount to staged surrender. Every kilometer lost on the map alters the draft in Geneva more than any paragraph. Between paper and the battlefield. What emerges from these three fronts (diplomacy, the sky and the line of contact) is a more or less clear picture: the peace agreement is closer in form, but not in depth. He 19 point text It represents an indisputable technical advance, but it depends on enormously costly presidential decisions. Air guarantees are the indispensable condition … Read more

A 28-page US document has brought peace in Ukraine closer than ever. The problem is that it is the translation of a Russian text

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And suddenly a 28 page document unpublished to date has suddenly entered as a missile in the negotiations of the war in Ukraine. Promoted by Washington, it has unleashed a diplomatic storm in Europe and in kyiv because, far from having been prepared with the main parties involved, it had been conceived in discreet negotiations between the American businessman Steve Witkoff and the Russian envoy Kirill Dmitriev, with the participation of Jared Kushner and the late endorsement of Trump. The origin of a plan. The result of these meetings was a text that Europe and Ukraine had not seen and that, to further alarm (according to one Bloomberg exclusive), preserved the linguistic structures typical of an original written in Russian, confirming the suspicions that Moscow had achieved filter your vision of the war in a document presented as a US initiative. The pressure exerted by Dan Driscoll (a close ally of JD Vance) on European and Ukrainian diplomats, urging them to accept territorial concessions in a matter of days, ended up setting off all the alarm signals. For European governments, which considered themselves central partners in any peace negotiations, the origin of the plan became a strategic question: they needed to know who had written it and with what objectives before sitting down to discuss. This information gap triggered a race against time to stop the imposition of a text that, in its initial form, was not only surprising for its demands, but also for its obvious alignment with Moscow’s interests. Territory, legitimization and a threat. The most explosive section of the American plan required that Ukraine will withdraw of the fortified urban centers that it still maintains in Donetsk, breaking the “belt of fortresses” that has slowed the Russian advance since 2014. This withdrawal would not only imply the displacement of tens of thousands of Ukrainian citizens, but it would open a corridor that would leave exposed to key cities like Dnipro and Zaporizhzhia. To make matters worse, the document proposed that the occupied areas be recognized as “de facto Russian”a more favorable formula for Moscow than the already problematic “de facto under Russian control”, and which, in practice, brought the international community closer to accept territorial changes achieved by force. Added to this was the idea of ​​converting the evacuated territories into a demilitarized zone whose violation by Russia (not an implausible scenario given recent history) would allow Moscow to open a new, even deeper offensive in the future. From the Ukrainian perspective, accepting this point would be sowing the conditions for a future war in worse terms, reinforcing the impression that the document did not seek a stable peace, but rather formalized a strategic result that Russia has not been able to obtain through military operations. Security cut and promises broken. The security guarantees included in the plan were vague to the point of irrelevance: they promised “reliable protection” without detailing mechanisms, but simultaneously prohibited Ukraine from entering never in NATOprevented the stationing of allied troops in its territory and forced kyiv to modify its Constitution to renounce accession. For a country marked by the experience of Budapest Memorandum (formal guarantees that prevented neither the annexation of Crimea nor the 2022 invasion), accepting an even more ambiguous framework would amount to to be left helpless facing an aggressor who has systematically broken all previous agreements. Red lines. The absence of a commitment type Article 5 and the refusal to allow training missions or deterrence forces on Ukrainian territory reinforced the conviction that Ukraine would be trapped between a strengthened Russia and a West that would reserve the right to “diplomatically support,” but not to intervene. This component fueled rejection in European capitals, which consider it essential that Ukraine keep an army strong as a land barrier that protects the continent. Limit to 600,000 troops to the only country in Europe at war, without imposing a similar restriction on Russia, was perceived as covert disarmament and a prelude to a future Russian offensive. Amnesty and frozen assets. One of the most shocking elements of the plan was the proposal of a general amnesty and Ukraine’s renunciation of any legal claim about war crimes, deportations or deliberate destruction of infrastructure. For an exposed population to documented atrocitiesthis clause meant not only the denial of justice, but also the elimination of the legal basis that allows Europe to advance the reparations loan backed by frozen Russian assets. That loan, of 140,000 million of euros, is considered by the EU as the more solid path and less expensive to sustain Ukraine during the postwar period. The US plan not only made it unviable, but also redistributed those funds in an unusual way: 100 billion would go to a US investment vehicle that would deliver half of its profits to Washington, another 100 billion would be contributed by Europe and the rest would go to a joint fund with Russia. For Berlin, Paris or Warsaw, the message was clear: Russia would obtain indirect financial relief while the Europeans would see their most effective tool of strategic pressure weakened. The attempt to force kyiv to renounce all moral and legal responsibility for the aggressor reinforced the perception that the plan sought to resolve the war “quickly,” not “fairly.” The Russian strategy. Since the beginning of the invasion, Moscow has not changed their fundamental demands: more territory in the east, military neutralization of Ukraine and permanent veto on its accession to NATO. This strategic immobility, together with gradual advances on the front, has allowed it to capitalize on Western fatigue, the political fractures in kyiv and transatlantic tensions. For the Kremlin, the leaked plan demonstrates that its commitment to prolonged resistance, military pressure and the erosion of Western will is bearing fruit. Putin openly celebrated it, affirming that the document could serve as a basis and that rejecting it would only lead to new Ukrainian defeats. Likewise, Moscow has hinted that even a signed agreement could be used as leverage to resume the … Read more

Ukraine has returned from Europe with 250 fighter jets under its arm. The problem is that only Spain has told him the truth

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The new European trip of the president of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky, has finished in Spain and has crystallized into a military agenda that aims to reconfigure the Ukrainian air force over the next decade, based on political agreements of enormous symbolic scope. If nothing goes wrong, the Ukrainian nation has nothing less than 250 European fighters under his arm along with a huge aid package and arsenal. The problem is that the financing is very uncertain and its execution is very distant. Aerial reconstruction as a continental ambition. In Paris, the Ukrainian president signed a letter of intent to acquire up to one hundred Rafale fightersdevices that France presents as the heart of the future defense of Ukraine, complemented by Samp/T systemsnew generation drones, guided munitions and incipient industrial cooperation to manufacture interceptors on Ukrainian territory. The French bet aims to elevate Ukraine to European technological standardintegrating it into a long-term security architecture and relying on a financing framework yet to be defined, where the European Union and frozen Russian assets appear as the great promise, although deeply controversial. The political gesture, celebrated as historic in parisresponds to the French ambition to lead the regeneration of Ukrainian air power and to reinforce the role of its defense industry in a continent that is rapidly rearming. Doubts about the bet. Diplomatic enthusiasm contrasts with operational uncertainties. They remembered TWZ analysts either The Wall Street Journal that Ukraine does not have of the financial margin to pay for neither the acquisition nor the maintenance of a hundred Rafale, and France is going through a period of budget fragility which makes sustained long-term commitments difficult. The idea that Europe could finance the purchase through new joint debt mechanisms or from income generated by frozen Russian assets divides the states members and poses enormous legal risks, especially for Belgium, which holds most of those funds. Added to this is the industrial reality: the Dassault production chain is saturatedwith deliveries committed for years, and the manufacturing of 100 additional devices would require extraordinary efforts. The perspective of a parallel program, with 150 Swedish Gripen also agreed in the preliminary phase, increases doubts about whether Ukraine could sustain, train and maintain such a vast fleet of 4/5th generation aircraft. For many, the initiative reflects more a political movement to keep France at the center of the Ukrainian equation and to boost European industry in the face of a United States more distantthan a realistic military acquisition plan in the short or medium term. A Gripen fighter The military horizon. Zelensky’s trip has also highlighted the arrival of a winter that anticipates a new Russian campaign focused in energy infrastructure and strategic cities. France insists that Samp/T systems are demonstrating remarkable effectiveness against Russian missiles with a complex trajectory, even higher, some French commanders claim, than the performance of the Patriot in certain scenarios. In parallel, Paris reinforces its role as a provider of interim air capabilities, including Mirage fighters and precision ammunition, while promoting a future coalition of countries Europeans willing to guarantee the security of Ukraine after an eventual ceasefire, a project still impossible as long as Moscow rejects any negotiation. This strategy, which attempts to combine immediate support with an architecture of long term securityreveals both French determination and the continent’s real limitations in simultaneously sustaining the current war and future rearmament. Among others, Spanish military aid to Ukraine will consist of 40 IRIS-T missiles Spain and the contrast with the promises. The final stop of the trip, in Madrid, has revealed a very marked contrast between the declarative exuberance of some allies and the measured (and often austere) approach of the Spanish Government. Spain announced a package of 817 million of euros, which includes 300 million in nationally produced weapons, 215 million channeled through European programs and additional 100 million to acquire US missiles through PURL initiative of NATO. It is a significant effort in political and logistical terms, but modest in comparison with the great European powers and especially small in the face of the air ambitions presented in France or Sweden. In practice, it is a calibrated support for immediate needs from the Ukrainian winter: anti-aircraft missiles to repel drones and protect critical infrastructures, plus a commitment to accelerate joint industrial capabilities in areas where Spanish companies (with Indra at the head) can offer practical solutions such as deployable radars or anti-drone systems. Spain and realism. If you also want, the Spanish case reflects a much more realistic line than that of other countries visited by Zelensky. Since the beginning of the war, Spain has contributed with useful materialsbut in many cases coming from surplus (Leopard 2A4 retired, M113 obsolete, Hawk batteries aging) and has prioritized its participation in European programs where the direct cost to its budget is lower. In comparative terms, and especially measured as a percentage of GDP, Spain is far behind of the hard core of military support for Ukraine. However, what it offers now is probably more sincere and sustainable: an acceptable package, focused on urgent and realistic needs, that does not promise fighter fleets, perhaps impossible to finance, or industrial projects that exceed national capacity. Spanish extra ball. Furthermore, Spain stands out where other countries they can’t: in the reception of refugees, in the medical rehabilitation of Ukrainian soldiers and in light but reliable industrial cooperation. So, on that journey that began with spectacular advertisements in Paris and Stockholm, the Spanish stop has served to balance in a way the expectations. In that sense, Spain appears as one of the few allies that gauges its support by looking ahead. the budget figuresavoiding promising what it will be difficult to fulfill and remaining firm in what it can offer: a modest but operational contribution. Image | Ronnie MacdonaldTuomo Salonen, Air and Space Army Ministry of Defense Spain In Xataka | Europe already knows the arsenal it needs for rearmament. Now the most difficult thing remains: how to make it arrive in time if Russia attacks … Read more

In Ukraine, the difficult thing is not to replace a drone, but its pilot. So Russia has started the hunt with something unprecedented: Rubikon

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For two years, Ukrainian drone operators had managed to maintain a decisive tactical advantage: the ability to detect, harass and destroy Russian positions with an agility that Moscow could not match. Pilots worked in small teams, in makeshift basements or camouflaged trenches, piloting from a distance FPV that turned the front into a transparent space where the enemy could rarely move unobserved. All that has changed with an appearance. The dark turn. Yes, that domain has been abruptly broken with the appearance Rubikona Russian unit created to track, locate and eliminate not so much drones as to those who operate them. The testimony in the financial times by Dmytro, a Ukrainian pilot and former rapper, summarizes this change of era: he went from being a hunter to being hunted in seconds when a Russian drone detected him on a reckless walk. That moment, which two years ago would have been exceptional, has become part of the daily routine on a front where the survival of the operator has become a strategic objective for Russia and a critical weak point for Ukraine. The result is a complete investment of roles: Innovators, previously almost untouchable, are now a priority target. Rubikon structure and ambition. This Russian elite corps is not simply a drone unit, but an organization of about 5,000 troops endowed with ample financial resources, tactical autonomy and a defined mission: deny Ukraine the ability to operate its drone network. Unlike the heavily bureaucratic operation that characterized the Russian army in the early stages of the war, this unit acts with speed, initiative and an approach more reminiscent of the Ukrainian groups it seeks to destroy. Their main task is not to attack the infantry on the front line, but penetrate behind the frontup to 10 kilometers in depth, to destroy logistics vehicles, ground robots and, above all, locate the operators who control the Ukrainian defensive swarms. Emblem of the elite Russian unit And much more. For Russian and Western experts, Rubikon functions as a development center of unmanned systems: trains other units, analyzes tactics, refines procedures and continually adapts its way of operating. Each technical or doctrinal improvement that emerges from Rubikon ends up radiating to the rest of the Russian army, which explains why the Ukrainians detect unexpected qualitative leaps in the performance of enemy drones. This ability fast learning It is one of the most disturbing elements, because it allows Russia to correct in months the technological gap that Ukraine built for years. The new invisible dimension. The combat is no longer limited to the visible sky, but is fought in a domain more abstract and lethal: the electromagnetic spectrum. Both Ukraine and Russia deploy electronic intelligence stations, signal guidance equipment and jamming systems capable of defeating, jamming or even hijacking adversary drones. This rivalry makes any radio broadcast a potential risk. Operators, no matter how hidden, need clear lines of sight, elevated antennas, and transmitters relatively close to the front, factors that Rubicon systematically explodes. Their teams track antennas on hills, thermal shadows in forests and emissions that reveal the presence of a pilot a few kilometers away. Andrey Belousov inspecting the Rubikon unit The signs. The inhibitorsdespite their usefulness, generate visible electrical signatures that can attract attacks. And in the midst of these maneuvers, both sides resort to signal hacking video to observe enemy cameras or locate the exact source of a remote control. Expert Tom Withington resume this complexity with a precise image: it is a game of cat and mouse where physics dictates the rules, and where each action leaves a trace that the opponent can exploit. Pressure on the pilots. Plus: unlike the Russians, Ukraine lacks the necessary troops to maintain continuous shiftswhich creates physical and psychological exhaustion that becomes as dangerous as the enemy itself. Zoommer, a Ukrainian soldier from a small drone unit, explained in the Times that Rubikon can operate without breaks because it has enough staff to rotate every few hours, while they must remain alert almost all day. The arrival of this unit to Pokrovsk area (a city that has been in a desperate defensive struggle for a year) has transformed life on the front, going from manageable days to a constant tension in which any movement can mean death. Before, says Zoommer.the area was almost “a vacation”, now it is an invisible hell where every antenna, every fleeting signal and every movement outside the trench can be a fatal mistake. This pressure has forced the Ukrainians to change routines, camouflage positions with extreme care, hide transmitters, disperse equipment and create anti-drone cells that act as a defensive mirror of Russia’s own tactics. The loss of transparency. Drones had provided Ukraine with a crucial tool: the ability to see and hit farther and faster, giving its defenders situational transparency that compensated for numerical inferiority. According to the RUSI analysisup to 80% of current casualties are attributed to drone operations, underscoring their central role in a war in which artillery and infantry depend on these mechanical eyes. What’s happening? Than Rubikon and the like have eroded that advantage in forcing Ukraine to reallocate resources from offensive missions to the protection of its own operators. The result is that, while Russia advances at an increasing pace, Ukraine devotes more efforts to stopping than hitting, losing the initiative at a critical moment in the conflict. Moscow has quickly absorbed the enemy’s lessons and turned them into doctrine, a process that would normally take years and that here has been compressed into months, tipping the balance on an increasingly dynamic front. Psychological warfare. The latest analysis show that the front is no longer defined only by the technology deployed, but by psychological pressure endured by Ukrainian operators and by the transformation of the Russian army towards a more agile structure, represented in Rubikon. The pilots, who have become priority objectives, live under constant tension that forces them to minimize any movement and operate with the permanent feeling of being watched, because … Read more

The war in Ukraine has crossed a red line in Europe. They are no longer drones violating airspace, they are nuclear plants

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Ukraine has once again placed the nuclear alarm at the center of the European conflict after denouncing that Russia is deliberately attacking the electrical substations that feed the Khmelnitsky and Rivne power plants. According to Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha, drone attacks are not isolated incidents, but planned operations to endanger continental nuclear security. It happens that drones are reaching European power plants. The drone offensive. Over the past weekend, Moscow launched more than 450 drones and 45 missiles against various regions of Ukraine, causing at least seven dead and damage to critical infrastructure. In Dnipro, a drone hit a residential building, killing three people, while other attacks occurred in Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia. kyiv accuses Russia of instrumentalizing the atomic risk as a psychological weapon and trying to cause an accident in plants that still depend on external electricity supply to avoid a collapse of the cooling system. Nuclear risk. In parallel, Moscow is advancing with its own nuclear agenda: the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, confirmed that the Kremlin is working on proposals for a possible nuclear test on the direct order of Vladimir Putin, a response to US President Donald Trump’s recent statement that Washington could resume their own tests. The atomic stress between both powers, exacerbated by the war in Ukraine, has plunged Europe into a scenario of unprecedented vulnerability since the Cold War. The epicenter of the threat: Belgium. While Ukraine try to contain the Russian offensive on its own territory, Western Europe has begun to feel the echoes of a hybrid war that expands beyond the front. In Belgium, one of the countries with the highest density of critical infrastructure on the continent, there has been a wave of raids of drones over strategic installations. The most alarming took place at the Doel nuclear power plant, located next to the port of Antwerp, when three drones were initially detected at dusk on November 9, which were later confirmed as five different devices flying over the complex for almost an hour. The energy company Engie, which manages the plant, assured that operations were not affected, but authorities activated the National Crisis Center and reinforced security in the area. Belgium nuclear plant near Doel And more. Hours before, air traffic at Liège airport was had suspended briefly after multiple reports of drones, and in the previous days both Brussels airport and the Kleine Brogel air base (where NATO nuclear weapons are stored) had been targeted of similar sightings. Research points to a coordinated pattern affecting several northern European countries, including Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands, where unidentified aerial intrusions have also been reported. Suspicions of espionage. Belgian Defense Minister Theo Francken has linked sightings with possible foreign espionage operations and pointed to Russia as the most plausible suspect, although without conclusive evidence. The country’s intelligence services consider that drones could be part of a recognition strategy aimed at evaluating the European response capacity to combined attacks on critical infrastructure. The accumulation of incidents led the Belgian government to convene a National Security Council, after which the Minister of the Interior, Bernard Quintin, assured that the situation was “under control”although he recognized the seriousness of the incursions. The United Kingdom, France and Germany announced sending specialized personnel and equipment to assist Belgium in the detection and neutralization of hostile drones, a gesture that underlines the shared fear that the border between visible war and covert war is becoming dangerously blurred. Technological epicenter. Faced with this new dimension of the conflict, Ukraine has positioned itself as a key actor in the technological response. President Volodymyr Zelensky advertisement the upcoming opening of defense production offices in Berlin and Copenhagen before the end of the year, with the aim of strengthening industrial cooperation on drones and electronic weapons. These “export capitals”, according to his wordsthey will finance the domestic production of scarce equipment and help European allies build their own defensive systems. kyiv, which has made the use of drones one of the pillars of its military strategy, now offers your experience to countries that are beginning to suffer firsthand the effects of the Russian hybrid war. Ukraine as a test. In parallel, Ukrainian creativity in the improvised field of defense is reflected even in unusual solutions: old fishing nets French drones, made from horse hair, are being reused to create tunnels where the propellers of Russian drones become trapped. In contemporary warfare, technology intersects with craftsmanship, and ingenuity has become a form of national survival. Nuclear vulnerability. The incidents in Belgium and Ukraine reveal the same constant: the European nuclear infrastructure (plant, wiring, energy, logistics) has become a target symbolic and strategic. The attacks on Ukrainian substations that feed power plants and the drones that fly over Belgian reactors expose the fragility of a continent that depends on complex systems where any sabotage can multiply its effects. The threat no longer comes only from missiles, but from invisible swarms of drones, of disinformation, of political and technological engineering that undermines stability from within. Russia, faced with isolation and with a still powerful military industry, seems willing to use this asymmetry as an instrument of prolonged pressure. The European responsestill fragmentary, is beginning to be articulated between military cooperation, technological innovation and civil defense. Plus: the lesson left by this sequence of attacks and suspicions seems clear. In the Europe of 2025, the border between energy security and military security has fadedand the future of continental stability could depend less on the size of armies than on how quickly a drone is detected on radar before reaching a nuclear power plant. Image | Trougnouf, Wwuyts In Xataka | The latest tactic of the Russians in Ukraine breaks with the previous one: they have gone from appearing “out of nowhere” to directly disappearing In Xataka | Orion was the Russian version of the US’s most lethal drone. Ukraine can’t believe it when it opens: it’s not a version, it’s the work of the US

a poncho turns its soldiers in Ukraine into an invisible army

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Last October Ukraine I remembered to his troops that Russian soldiers had come up with a new infiltration system. After the helmets with antennathe lures and the optical illusionsMoscow had found a way to appear among the Ukrainian forces “out of nowhere”. Now, in a new unprecedented twist in the conflict, Russia has found the closest thing to an invisibility shield. From the video game to the fight. Something very similar to what we saw in the Metal Gear saga, then called optical camouflagehas appeared in the conflict in Europe. The war on the Russian-Ukrainian front has seen a tactical evolution that has shifted classic protection (armor and vehicles) towards mobility and thermal stealth: Russian assault forces have adopted ponchos or thermal tarps (the so-called “invisibility cloaks”) as an essential element to minimize the infrared signature and allow infiltrations on foot in the wide swath controlled by the drones. There is no perfect thermal concealment, but the difference between being detected or not can decide the life of an assault group. That’s why these clothes, combined with night movements and the use of specific environmental conditions, have become a central tactical tool that, in practice, today protects more than many armored vehicles against the aerial threat of reconnaissance and attack. Tactical evolution. Thermal tarps are blankets made with reflective layers and materials that accelerate heat dissipation, their purpose is approximate the temperature superficial of the human body to that of the environment to reduce contrast that thermal cameras detect. However, its effectiveness depends of multiple factors: quality of the material, contour sealing (bare feet and hands are detectable signs), weather conditions and, above all, the time of day. The so-called as “thermal crossover” (two brief daily periods in which vegetation, soil and air have similar temperatures) reduces global thermal contrast and offers the optimal window to move forward without standing out, while fog, rain or humidity can complement that invisibility. Improperly used, ponchos generate “cold spots” that attract attentionbut used well, multiply the probability of achieving tactical objectives. Limitations and learning. It must be clarified that thermal tarps do not make the attacker invulnerable. Experienced drone operators look for subtle signs (bare feet, movement under the cover, small thermal disturbances) and learn to distinguish behavioral patterns that reveal infiltrations. In addition, there are low quality materials and training errors: there are cases of soldiers who tried to camouflage themselves in broad daylight or with inappropriate ponchos and were detected. The tactic is therefore effective but fragile: it works best en masse, under optimal conditions and when the adversary lacks sufficient alternative sensors or personnel on the line. US Marine Corps uniform with built-in thermal camouflage Countermeasures and tactical recovery. To counteract these infiltrations, the solution it is not unique: involves deploying complementary sensors (acoustic, magnetic, seismic) that do not depend on the thermal spectrum, or reinforcing minefields and physical barriers, densifying human or robotic presence in exposed sectors, or even improving doctrine multisensory surveillance and train detection teams to identify minimal signs of intrusion. In strategic terms, Ukrainian forces agree that the response involves combining technology (more sensors, better integration) with greater territorial occupation, because passive defense based solely in aerial interceptions It is insufficient against equipment that infiltrates at low visibility. Operational implications. The resort to small infiltrated groups reflects broader tensions: troop shortages, accumulated material wear and tear, and an environment where air or drone superiority does not guarantee the security of the rear. For those who attack, the tactics allows you to exploit holes in defense and wear down positions through groups that, although they lose part of their troops, can complete reconnaissance, sabotage or local assault missions. For those who defend it, it forces us to rethink the segmentation of the front and the provision of resources: the balance between expensive sensors and effective personnel, the need for mobile reserves and the growing importance of passive and active containment measures on the ground. Strategic conclusion. If you like, we are facing a tactical transformation where war becomes more granular and less dependent on traditional armor: the multiplication of drones and sensors has revalued thermal invisibility and human mobility, while it has revealed the fragility of conventional defensive schemes. In the short term, the balance favors those who know integrate camouflagemeteorology and discreet logistics. In the medium term, effective defense will require a greater density of heterogeneous sensors, more troops or robotic means on the line and a doctrinal adaptation that combines multisensory detection with physical measures that close the gaps that infiltrators exploit today. In short, in the current field a thermal tarpwell used, can offer an attacker more practical protection than many armored vehicles, and this realization forces us to rethink tactical defense and territory management in a conflict dominated by sensor warfare. Image | UKRAINE MOD, Metal Gear In Xataka | Russia’s latest tactic is the closest thing to a magic trick: By the time Ukraine realizes it, the Russians are already behind it In Xataka | The Ukrainian army has been asked what it urgently needs. The answer was clear: no missiles or drones, just cars

In Ukraine we had seen armored vehicles from Mad Max, but the latest Russian invention has left everyone speechless: assault “hedgehogs”

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Last June, several images captured by reconnaissance drones of the Ukrainian forces sighted a unprecedented Russian offensive: Waves of two-wheeled troops launching motorcycle charges to break the kyiv front. If the scene seemed like a still from Mad Max, shortly after it would become reality with the appearance of trucks that we saw in the movie. The latest: in an unprecedented turn of the screw, Moscow has brought out its assault “hedgehogs” The tank turned into a “hedgehog”. The recent appearance of a T-80BVM Russian equipped with an extreme structure of steel cables along with foliage and tree branches, described as an “assault hedgehog”offers a revealing picture of the state of mechanized warfare in Ukraine. The photographs, broadcast by the channel Vodohray Telegramshow a T-80BVM with an anti-mine roller TMT-K and a T-72B3 with a KMT-7, both wrapped in dense cable cages covering the chassis, tower and top. On the T-80BVM, in addition, a electronic warfare system. This modification, primarily intended to thwart FPV drone attacks, represents the rapid adaptation of the battlefield to a threat that has completely altered the relationship between armor, mobility and survivability. And more. The structures that are seen look for prevent direct impact or cause drones to become trapped or damaged before reaching vulnerable points. However, the additional protection noticeably increases weightvolume and operational complexity: tanks become slower, more visible and difficult to maneuver in urban or forested areas. Still, the fact that these modifications arise not only from field improvisations but also from organized units highlights the extent to which drone warfare is redefining the very form of ground combat. T-80BV in the Kubinka tank museum Evolution of the T-80BVM. He original T-80developed in the late 1970s, was conceived as an elite tank capable of combining firepower with exceptional mobility thanks to its gas turbine engine. This feature made it faster and quieter than other Soviet models, which made it a symbol of military modernity in its time. With the dissolution of the USSR, many T-80s were stored, but the version T-80BVM (introduced in the 2010s) introduced important improvements: Relikt reactive shieldingmore modern optical and thermal systems, and mechanical adjustments to increase reliability, especially in cold environments. In Ukraine, where a war of attrition is being fought with very dynamic fronts, the T-80BVM has been used like crash car for quick attacks or penetration maneuvers, but the proliferation of drones has reduced their safety margins, forcing the modification of even a tank originally designed to move quickly and freely. Other armor seen in Ukraine FPV and the collapse of the classics. The expansion of FPV drones (capable of attacking from above or vulnerable flanks) has generated a conceptual crisis for traditional armor. Tower ledges, engine cover and commander’s hatch hinge have become critical points that even a cheap drone can exploit with an improvised payload. For this reason, both Russia and Ukraine have experimented with “cages”“mobile bunkers” and supplementary armor. It turns out that the first versions of these cages, superficial or with rigid bars, were insufficient: the drones learned to maneuver between gaps or detonate just above them. Hence the cable structures They represent a more advanced iteration of that improvised defense: they are more flexible, denser, and more likely to entangle or slow down small aircraft. However, its effectiveness is uneven, depending on the quality of the wiring, the speed of the drone and the ability of the FPV operator to manually adjust its trajectory. Camouflages and protections. we have gone counting before. The war has generated enormous tactical creativity on both sides. They have been seen covered armored of thermal networks to confuse infrared cameras, coated vehicles of tires to absorb shock waves, camouflaged transport with awnings and scrap metal to break silhouettes and even towers protected by improvisations of beams and bars that are reminiscent of shed roofs. Some of these designs seek to deceive reconnaissance drones, others intend just gain seconds before the impact of an FPV, a time that can allow the crew to abort, retreat or request cover. Each innovation introduces new countermeasures: when the cages appeareddrones began to carry loads at an angle, and when jammers appeared, wired drones or drones with more autonomous guidance systems began to be seen. War, in this sense, has become a constant laboratory where adaptation is measured in hours, not years. Uncertainty. Having said all this, the image of the “steel hedgehog” around the T-80BVM is not only curious: it symbolizes a war in which the rules of armored combat are changing at great speed. Tanks are still valuable, but can no longer operate without a dense layer electronic supportinfantry cover and constant surveillance of the nearby sky. The question that emerges is whether these adaptations keep the car useful or whether they represent an attempt to keep a car alive. concept in transformation. For now, the response on the front is pragmatic: any measure that allows us to survive one more mission is welcome, even if it turns a vehicle designed for speed and direct impact into a slow, heavy creature covered in metallic thorns. Because in the war in Ukraine, survival has become the true armor. Image | Telegram, Alan Wilson, ArmyInform In Xataka | An imperceptible hum is wreaking havoc in Ukraine. When it arrives there is no turning back: the Russians are already everywhere In Xataka | The Ukrainian army has been asked what it urgently needs. The answer was clear: no missiles or drones, just cars

Ukraine has updated the nation’s bloodiest game. Eliminating Russians is now the closest thing to “ordering an Uber”

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In the month of May, a unprecedented merger between military technology and video game logic. Ukraine had launched a reward system which awarded its soldiers points for killing Russian troops or destroying their vehicles, as long as these acts were verified by drone video recordings. That system, a kind from “Amazon military”has been updated with drones as protagonists. A real shooter. The now called “Army of Drones Bonus System” that has emerged in Ukraine presents itself on the surface as a incentive platform which includes the aesthetics and mechanics of video games (scores, ‘leaderboards’, online stores and rewards) but at its core is an operational transformation: an institutionalized scheme that quantifies casualties, observation successes and logistical achievements to translate them into real resources (drones, autonomous vehicles, electronic warfare systems) through the internal store call Brave1. Born a little over a year ago and accelerated in recent months until passing from 95 to 400 units participants, the system already exhibits strong effects on combat (according to official figures, 18,000 Russian casualties attributable to actions linked to the system in a single month) and has expanded its radius of action beyond the air attack to reconnaissance, artillery and logistics missions, incorporating into military practice notions of competition, internal market and performance metrics that were previously foreign to the art of war. Mechanics and logic. The program architecture works with clear and convertible rules– Each credited action (from eliminating an enemy combatant to capturing a prisoner to destroying a drone operator) awards points that can be exchanged for materiel in Brave1which creates a feedback loop where operational success is transformed into material capacity to continue fighting. The update of the score table (for example, doubling points for killing infantry or setting 120 points for capturing a prisoner) reveals the system’s ability to reorient incentives based on strategic priorities and political needs, and at the same time evidences a commodification of efficiency: life and death pass through a technical-economic threshold that converts lethal decisions into a cost-benefit function. This internal economy alters the microdecision of the combatant and resituates logistics and acquisition within the tactical space itself, with the Brave1 store acting as a war market that prioritizes allocation by competitive merit. Screenshot of the rewards system Automation and AI. The system is not limited to accounting, integrate tools technologies that change the very nature of target selection and engagement. Drones partially controlled by algorithms that suggest targets and correct the terminal phase of the trajectory represent a step towards lethal automation, while practices such as “Uber targeting” They demonstrate how consumerist and geospatial interfaces have been converted for war uses. Thus, marking a point on a map and triggering a remote impact is the operational translation of the everyday gesture. to request a transport. The video proof requirement To obtain points, it also generates a vast operational database that feeds institutional learning: what objectives were achieved, with what platform, from what distance and how the enemy defense behaved. That visual and metric file facilitates dissemination of techniques between units and accelerates innovation from below, with real effects on tactics and doctrine. Psychological effects. The Guardian said that, beyond the material and the technical, the system produces a kind of emotional breakdown: Senior officials recognize that the process of assigning a numerical value to human life has ended up turning violence into technical, “practical” and “emotionless” work. At the same time, gamification produces camaraderie effects and competition that, according to the commanders, are healthy and encourages discipline and learning between peers. However, this same dynamic can generate operational biases (prioritizing high-scoring objectives over tactically relevant objectives, or the temptation of operations with low effectiveness but high cumulative performance) that distort strategic coherence. Implications and extension. The Ukrainian experience shows that incentive principles can be transferred to other areas: artillery that receives points for valid hits, reconnaissance that earns rewards for identifying targets, and logistics that scores the use of autonomous vehicles instead of human convoys. This extension transforms the war ecosystem into a set of internal markets where tactical-technological innovation is quickly monetized and scaled, forcing planners a double urgency: exploit the immediate advantages of the system without losing strategic coherence and design ethical and operational countermeasures that prevent internal competition from fragmenting the priorities of the military effort. And ethics? It’s the big question. Ethically, the commodification of violence raises profound questions about responsibility, proportionality and war crimes: Who responds when a score induces an action that violates humanitarian law? The appropriation of AI for target selection also introduces the question of attribution of responsibility between human operators, algorithms and the chain of command. Strategically, converting equipment gain into the primary source of replenishment aims to create dependency loops that, in logistical wear and tear scenarios, discourage long-term wear and tear operations that are necessary in the short term for larger objectives. Score the violence. The “Army of Drones Bonus System” represents a mutation relevant to the way motivation, acquisition and innovation are organized in contemporary warfare: it incorporates market logicpoint economies and automation technologies that increase lethality and efficiency, while eroding moral frameworks and opening new vectors of risk. Its contribution is undeniable in terms of capacity and adaptation, but its expansion urgently claim a framework that does not yet exist at national or international level. In the background, a long doubt in this species Amazon military: that what is celebrated today as tactical innovation can tomorrow become a structural source of insecurity and lack of moral control on the battlefield. Image | Ministry of Defense Ukraine, Ministry of Defense of Ukraine In Xataka | An imperceptible hum is wreaking havoc in Ukraine. When it arrives there is no turning back: the Russians are already everywhere In Xataka | The Ukrainian army has been asked what it urgently needs. The answer was clear: no missiles or drones, just cars

Russia’s biggest threat in Ukraine is not a drone or a missile. It is a film agency with 30 secret floors

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That the war in Ukraine has become the largest drone laboratory combat power on the planet is beyond any doubt. In fact, both Russia like, to a greater extent, Ukraine, have elevated these devices to configure a war industry unprecedented that places machines as the army of the future of any conflict. What was not so well known was where most of Ukraine’s drones came from. Origin and metamorphosis. What started three years ago as a location and props agency in basements and garages has mutated into a war industry on an almost industrial scale: Fire Point, whose owner and executives come from from the world of cinema and the construction of outdoor furniture, has gone from assembling drones with commercial parts to producing, according to its executives, hundreds of propelled and long-range munitions from at least thirty secret locations scattered throughout Ukraine. But there is much more, because the company has grown so much that it has currently consolidated itself with contracts for around billion dollars in a single year. A transit that reflects the rapid professionalization and commercialization of initiatives born out of patriotism and urgency in February 2022, when improvised underground workshops became an effective (although precarious and fragmentary) response to a large-scale invasion. Production, design and employment. Fire Point products, such as your FP-1 droneare simple machines in materials (polystyrene, plywood, plastics, and carbon fiber from cycling) but assembled with a logic of volume production: rocket-assisted takeoff, two-stroke engine, range measured in hundreds of kilometers and warheads of more than fifty kilos in some designs. Its catalog also includes the promising Flamingo missilea larger device, with a jet engine and a theoretical autonomy and load that, if confirmed at scale, could reconfigure the Ukrainian capacity to hit deep targets. The Ukrainian industrial philosophy here is clear: cheap, disposable, massive. Efficiency does not require reprocessing or longevity, only that some specimens cross the defense networks and fulfill their unique mission. An FP-1 Military strategy and effects. The proliferation of these munitions has allowed Ukraine to sustain a systematic campaign against energy infrastructure Russian companies (refineries and logistics nodes) seeking not only a tactical effect but also strategic pressure and leverage in eventual negotiations. In fact, the multiplicity of manufacturers domestic forces and technical adaptability have forced Russia to face a daily erosion of its apparent air immunity, forcing it to reallocate defensive resources and contemplate low-cost warfare as a decisive vector. Transparency and control. Fire Point’s meteoric rise has not been free of shadows: Public complaints and audits point out opaque awards, absence of mandatory price negotiations, questions about initial technical quality and the possible involvement of actors linked to the media and business environment close to power. In fact, the National Anti-Corruption Agency has inspected links with figures associated with the presidential circle and there are parliamentary calls to investigate pricesspecifications and the destination of multimillion-dollar benefits. Despite this, the public narrative combines suspicion and exaltation: national heroes and strategic businessmen who have shored up the defensive capacity, while activists and analysts demand more controls and transparency in war contracts. Industrialization and ecosystem. The phenomenon is not an isolated case but the center of an industrial revolution: Thousands of companies, hundreds focused on long-range drones and dozens competing for contracts, attract foreign funds, partners and joint venture projects. State agencies charter incentiveswhile international funds (such as the recent Norwegian-Ukrainian vehicle) show that the ecosystem is beginning to professionalize and seek commercial and technological legitimation beyond the emergency. For European and North American defense, Ukraine now offers a unique experience in unmanned missions and rapid design, which arouses interest both military as industrial. Ethical dilemmas. There is no doubt, the balance raises dilemmas: the domestic war economy reduces dependence on allied donations and scales offensive capacity, but it raises questions on democratic control, accountability and the risk that lucrative war businesses are perpetuated beyond strategic necessity. Plus: the proliferation of cheap and massive systems exacerbates the asymmetric nature of the conflict and poses risks of escalation and diffuse responsibility for selective objectives and collateral damage. Perspectives. In sum, the Fire Point history summarizes the Ukrainian phenomenon: industrial creativity (in many cases, they have no other choice) converted into a strategic muscle, an industry that emerged from volunteering transformed into key actor of the military apparatusbut also in focus of controversy due to its speed, its margins and the opacity typical of a country at war. The future challenge is twofold: to consolidate technological and productive capabilities that continue to perform in combat, and at the same time insert this thriving sector into frameworks of governance and transparency that prevent war efficiency from evolving towards economies of corruption or political capture. How Ukraine resolves this binomial will define whether its revolution dronistics It remains a collective merit or becomes an institutional burden. Image | xMezha In Xataka | They call it Skyfall, Burevestnik, or flying Chernobyl. The problem is not the name, it is what Russia’s latest missile does In Xataka | The war in Ukraine was a drone war. Now it is a war of drones that are not actually combat drones

Ukraine and Russia are not only fighting a drone war, but also deception

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The phrase was literal from a Ukrainian high command. The war they have been fighting since the Russian invasion in 2022 is currently the closest thing to a cat and mouse hunt. In the current asymmetric conflict between Russia and Ukraine, where every night a kind of war is fought over energy infrastructurewhat has put both commands on alert is not only the destructive effect of armed drones, but the massive expansion of cheap decoys that force defenses to be spent. Curiously, Russia and Ukraine have resorted to the same thing: Second World War. Alarm. While the Russian Shahed cause blackouts and the Ukrainian Lyutyi and FP-1 they light refineriesboth parties they use decoys whose objective is to saturate, deceive and exhaust the enemy interception layer, and it is precisely this logic of multiplication (the effectiveness not only of the direct impact but also of the distraction) that turns these decoys (decoys) into a strategic multiplier capable of amplifying an already harmful campaign. The historical precedent. The tactic it’s not new: modern military history contains paradigmatic examplesfrom the shadow analemmas to the jet-decoys of the 20th century. And, of all, the case of the ADM-20 Quail illustrates better than any the conversion of vulnerability into advantage through transient imitators that consume defender resources. The Quail, small and cheap compared to the bomber it simulated, carried reflectors and simple patterns of flight to deceive radars and force the expense of expensive interceptors. Today that principle applies miniature and industrial scale with easily manufactured platforms that, although lacking lethal capacity, force the adversary to decide whether to fire a missile worth hundreds of thousands of dollars or take the risk of missing what could be the real target. A B-52 launching a Quail decoy The Russian range and its role. Moscow, which in 2024 industrialized the shahed of Iranian origin to saturate defensesalso produces lures like the Gerbera and the simple Parodiya; some are volumetric replicas with lower mass and range, others incorporate equipment electronic warfare to scout and mark radar locations, and some even carry small explosives to wound recovery teams. This variety pursues three purposes: inflict material wear on missile and air-to-air missile reserves, reveal defense positions, and complicate radar discrimination with reflectors Luneburg type that make targets the size of larger vehicles appear on the screens. The practical result is an increase in false positives that degrades the efficiency of the defense chain. An Lyutyi The Ukrainian range. Ukraine, later to scale its drone campaign, has combined attack vehicles such as the FP-1 either the Lyutyand with low-cost devices designed in local workshops (plastic tubes, wooden frames, metal foil to increase radar section) to explore corridors and distract responses while the units that cause real damage take another route. When working as “pathfinders”these devices allow Ukrainian planners to plot and verify secure routes, test defense sectors and create temporary penetration windows. In other words, its appeal lies in the reduced cost and ease of production, which makes the lure a repeatable tactical capital. Ukrainian decoy Cost asymmetry. The economy of confrontation is brutally simple: a Shahed of a few tens of thousands of dollars can force a response with air-to-air or surface-to-air missiles whose unit price can multiply to those of the target by factors of tens or hundreds. It we have counted: recent examples, like Sidewinders or similar missiles, reach prices that make them strategically scarce. That cost-benefit ratio tilts tactical and political decisions: waste a critical capability on potential decoys or hold on to it and accept the damage? Its proliferation makes the first option a safe way towards the depletion of stocks and the second in a bet for local resilience and operational trickery. Gerbera Lures Defensive capabilities. Although Ukraine has developed anti-aircraft artillery units and interceptor drones that have proven effective, comprehensive defense continues to depend on missiles and systems that are finite. Electronics, spectrum warfare and mobile units provide mitigation, but the physics of aerial combat continues to offer opportunities to those who have the volume and creativity to saturate. The introduction of decoys with EW components or communications relays adds another layer: they not only distract, but can map defenses, degrade chains and amplify subsequent attacks with greater precision. Foreseeable evolution. The scenario drawn by the combination of attack drones and lures is dynamic: iterative improvement of decoys (more realisticwith greater electronic signatures, with active deception capabilities) will match the technical challenge with costly countermeasures (better discrimination, multisensory sensors, finer intelligence). At a strategic level, the proliferation of these tactics erodes sustainability from the intensive use of conventional interceptors and pressures nations to invest in alternatives: low-cost missiles for home defense, AI-directed interceptors, mobile deployments, and greater reliance on offensive electronic warfare. Meanwhile, in the short term, the Ukrainian tactic of using lures as a multiplier It increases the likelihood of real material damage to critical Russian systems and highlights a legitimate fear in Moscow: that its defenses will be exhausted before the real threat is neutralized. So? If you like, the decoys work like power amplifiers: not only for what they destroy, but for what they force the adversary to burn, reveal or reconfigure. The lesson historic quail applied to mini-UAVs provokes a contemporary dilemma where economics, logistics and homemade innovation can tip the tactical balance. For Russia, the proliferation of Ukrainian decoys represents a operational and symbolic threat: The erosion of advantage in expensive systems and the realization that modern warfare rewards not just direct explosion but the ability to manipulate enemy perception and expenditure, transforming false targets into a strategic weapon in their own right. Image | StahlkocherGASTELLO DESIGN BUREAU, In Xataka | Ukraine accelerates the assault on Russia with an unprecedented army of robots: they are aquatic, carry rocket launchers and are lethal if stopped In Xataka | Ukraine cannot believe what it found inside Russia’s ballistic missiles: déjà vu

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