Ukraine

Ukraine sensed that there was a superpower behind Russia’s kamikaze drones. The surprise is that there are actually two

by

Many phases have passed since the Russian invasion in 2022 until today, but if one thing has become crystal clear, it is that the war in Ukraine has become a brutal laboratory where drones are the most decisive and fastest weapon to improve, to the point of concentrating a huge part of the recent losses and setting the pace of the war of attrition. In this scenario, Ukraine has been asking itself the same question for some time: how does Russia get so many drones? An industrial war. In the current scenario, the front is not only in Donetsk or Kharkiv, but also in industrial parks from Guangdong and Shenzhenwhere processors, cameras, motors, sensors and controllers are made that determine how much a drone flies, what it sees and how accurately it hits. The most disturbing thing here is not only the technological dependence, but the fact that this dependence is shared by both sideswhich turns the supply of parts into a kind of undercurrent that sustains the conflict even when sanctions seek to cut it off. The Geran-5. Now, Ukraine claims have identified a new Russian attack drone, the Geran-5which breaks with the classic “delta wing” type profile associated with the Iranian Shahed and adopts a shape more similar to a conventional aircraft, visually linking it Iranian Karrar and, by extension, to older designs inspired by American systems. The key is that it would be a more powerful and faster jet model, with an estimated speed up to 600 km/hand with tactical ambitions that go beyond the simple cheap “kamikaze drone”: it is attributed a range of about 900 km and an approximate war load of 90 kilos. Ukraine affirms that Russia is studying launching it from Su-25 aircraft to expand your radius of action, as well as explore configurations that include R-73 air-to-air missiles to complicate life for Ukrainian aviation. In other words, Russia is not only multiplying quantity, it is also testing a ladder of sophistication that mixes loitering munitions with concepts closer to a combat UAV. Geran-5 He Deja Vú. The central element, and the most politically controversial, is the list of foreign components that Ukraine claims to have found in the wreckage of the new Geran-5, including more than a dozen western and chinese electronic partswith at least nine attributed to American manufacturers and one identified like german. are mentioned critical components for navigation, communications and control, such as signal processors, clock generators and transceivers, that is, the type of electronics that does not “explode” by itself, but that turns a drone into a reliable, stable and reproducible system. For kyiv, this shows that Russia continues to avoid sanctions structurally, relying on gray markets and supply chains where real traceability is dissolved, and which has a huge machinery behind it headed by two superpowers (China and the US), along with the rest of Western “allies”. The underlying message is simple: modern war is not only won by manufacturing metal and explosives, also getting chipssensors and modules that are cheap, easy to transport and difficult to block without paralyzing global trade. Image provided by GUR showing the partial remains of a Geran-5 China as epicenter. The Financial Times said an almost absurd scene: Ukrainian businessmen visiting Chinese factories with schedules calculated to the second so as not to coincide with Russian buyers, entering through side doors and waiting in corridors, as if the conflict was managed with hotel logistics. The reason is that both armies they need the same parts and they go after the same suppliers because China dominates the material base of the commercial drone: not only does it produce a large part of the drones on the market, it also controls key elements such as cameras, sensors, controllers and propulsion, with costs much lower than Western equivalents. The result is that innovation leaks on both sides almost at the same time: if Ukraine sees a new transmitter on Russian drones, it locates the Chinese manufacturer and tries to buy it. If Ukraine asks for a specific upgrade, you may find that a week later that same supplier offers it to Russia as well. The war thus becomes a race of “components” more than doctrines, and China goes from being a “neutral” country to being the place where it is decided how quickly the conflict evolves. The supply chain. Beijing maintains the public line of neutrality and affirms that it does not supply lethal weapons, that it strictly controls dual-use goods and that its position is “objective and fair.” However, as we have said, the reality It’s different: Even if controls are in place, the system is filled with middlemen, shell companies, opaque routes and deliberate ambiguity about the end user. A market where some exhibitors show platforms with simulated weaponswhere military buyers mix with civilian fairs. In parallel, there is an imbalance of power: Russia, with more resources and priority state, can pay more, buy earlier and secure quotas, leaving Ukraine waiting or forcing it to improvise at the front due to lack of parts. Neutrality, in practice, is not just about prohibiting, but about who can best circumvent the restrictions. How to avoid restrictions. The real circumvention ecosystem works with shipments via indirect routestransportation through third countries, trucks crossing Central Asia with limited controls, and a logistics market specialized in “sensitive merchandise” that continues to operate because the economic incentive is enormous. Plus: the role of regional financial clearing platforms, which facilitate payments for sanctioned productsand the ability to create intermediate entities even in European countries to disguise operations. If you like, sanctions, as they work, introduce friction, but not rupture: they make it more expensive, slow down, force people to hide better, but they do not cut off the flow of chips, motors or cameras. And in a war where an FPV drone can be as decisive as an armoredthat logistical continuity is equivalent to operational continuity on the battlefield. Ukrainian dependency. Ukraine has made a lot of progress in … Read more

What the war in Ukraine has not achieved, Greenland has done. Europe has taken out its “commercial bazooka” against the US: Ozempic

by

For more than a year, Europe has become accustomed to living trapped in an uncomfortable balance where depends on the United States for its security through NATO, to sustain the Ukrainian effort and, ultimately, for the strategic architecture that has protected it since the Cold War. Now Greenland has done jump into the air part of the rhetoric. Europe and the counterattack. The crisis has erupted when Trump has returned to ignite a trade war using Greenland as an excuse and as an ultimatum: either some type of “agreement” that brings the island closer to the United States is accepted, or tariffs arrive first from 10% and after 25% a group of European countries designated by a minimal but symbolic gesture, to participate in Arctic maneuvers with Denmark. What until recently many in Europe preferred to interpret as bravado or negotiating tactics becomes an explicit message of political pressure that no longer leaves room for the fantasy of appeasement. And there appears the real change: what the Ukrainian war had not completely achieved (a frontal European response to American reprisals) Greenland is doing itbecause the coup is not against a geopolitical adversary but against alliesand because it puts Europe before a brutal choice: accept the blackmail and normalize it, or respond even if it hurts, even knowing that it continues to depend on Washington for its security and to contain Russia. The European bazooka. There is no doubt, the European reaction It is not born from enthusiasm, but from the feeling that there are no longer many other solutions: Greenland cannot be “handed over”, nor can Denmark sell an autonomous territory against the will of its population, and the very idea that an acquisition could be forced due to commercial threats opens a pandora’s box that affects the entire continent. In this context, Brussels dusts off for the first time his toughest tool, the so-called anti-coercion instrumentdesigned precisely to punish political pressures through rapid and forceful economic measures. on the table two paths appear that mark a leap in mentality: reactivate a package of tariffs worth of 93,000 million of euros already prepared and, if the escalation continues, go further of goods and target services, investment and even access to the European market for large American companies. The European message tries to be twofold, seeking a de-escalation that avoids an open clash, but making it clear that, if Trump turns trade into a method of extortion, Europe can also respond strongly. The crash that nobody wanted. The most disturbing thing about this episode is not only the economic impact of a tariff war, but the strategic fracture that it implies: Europe knows that a serious trade conflict with the United States will would infect NATOto Ukraine and the entire deterrence architecture against Russia. That is why the continent moves cautiouslycalling emergency meetings, preparing the ground for talks in Davos and even delaying previously agreed trade detente measures. But the core of the problem is that Trump is not negotiating a percentage or a clause: you are elevating a territorial objective to a national priority, presenting it as a requirement to “improve the security” of the Arctic, and implicitly denying that Europe can guarantee it. In this framework, Europe tries not to break the bridge, but assumes that it can no longer behave as if the bridge were indestructible. The sovereignty of Greenland. We’ve told it before: while Washington talks about “acquisition,” Greenland insists that its future belongs to them, that many they want more independencenot change flag. This point is essential because it explains why Europe doesn’t want to give in: it is not just about Danish pride or formalisms, but about sovereignty and democratic legitimacy, as well as an explosive precedent within the Union itself. The tariff threattherefore, works as an attempt to isolate Denmark and make it the weak link, although it has the opposite effect: it reinforces the idea that if you are attacked over a strategic issue, you will be respond as a block. And therein lies the paradox: instead of dividing, the pressure forces coordination, especially between Paris and Berlin, which push a harder line while others ask for time to see if Trump offers a “way out” before the punishment is activated. The “Ozempic bomb”. Amid the noise of bases, submarines and Arctic routes, the unexpected weapon appears: Denmark is not a commercial giant, but it exports products to the United States that directly affect the pocket and everyday lifeand that turns any tariff into a kind of political boomerang. The half of its sales Recent visits to Washington focus on medicines, vaccines, insulin and related products, because Novo Nordisk is there, the Danish economic engine and the factory of the global phenomenon Ozempic and Wegovy. That dependency converts Denmark in a kind of de facto “pharmaceutical state”: Your private growth and employment largely revolve around that industry, and any trade turbulence impacts both sides. If Trump makes these medicines more expensive, the blow will not stay in Europe: it enters the US market like health inflation and social unrest, just where the political margin is most fragile. And that is why Ozempic, more than a product, works as symbol of interdependence reality that makes a tariff war not just a lever, but rather a grenade. Lego and other reminders. The same effect is seen with Lego and other products Danes beloved in the United States, or with less visible but critical sectors such as hearing aids and certain medical equipment. In the real world, supply chains do not respect emotional boundaries: many parts are manufactured in different countries, assembled in others, and sold in markets that depend on global logistics. This means that tariffs punish not only the “enemy” exporter, but also companies, distributors and consumers. Trump can imagine squeezing Denmark to bend it, but the pressure leaks out in prices and disruptions in the US market itself, and also erodes the relationship with an ally that already offers military access in … Read more

Ukraine is proving that kamikaze drones are the future of warfare. And that is why Spain is going to start manufacturing them

by

Europe has been talking about defense as an abstract concept for years, but the war in Ukraine turned the threat into something physical and quantifiable: drones, missiles, loitering munitions and a logistics chain under constant fire, forcing NATO to assume that the modern battlefield is a “death zone” where those who do not mass produce are at a disadvantage. And in that equation an unexpected nation has emerged: Spain. The new shield of Europe. To that strategic pressure after the invasion of Russia and the appearance of his ghost fleet An even more uncomfortable factor has been added: the political tension with the United States and the growing sense that the Western security umbrella is no longer It is not an automationbut a negotiation. In this double impulse is born the rush for a European defensive shield (perhaps that repeated drone wall), and not only in radars or interceptors, but in industry, stocks and real response capacity, where manufacturing speed matters as much as quality and where technological sovereignty becomes a survival requirement. The unexpected actor: Spain. In this scenario of rapid rearmament and need for autonomy, Spain aims to go from being a country that buys to being one who producesand also do it with a weapon that defines contemporary war: the kamikaze droneor loitering munition, which watches, waits and strikes with precision at costs much lower than manned aviation or traditional missiles. The move is ambitious because Spain does not compete from the heavy industrial tradition of other European partners, there is no doubt, but from a commitment to the most demanded segmentscalable and urgent of the moment: cheap, numerous, quickly upgradeable platforms and capable of saturating defenses. The political and military thesis seems clear: if Europe’s immediate future is decided by who can produce and replenish drones the fastest, then a country that leads that manufacturing not only wins contracts, also influence. Comparison of UAVs in the international market The Indra-Edge alliance. The core of the movement was in the news yesterday with the agreement between Indra and Emirati giant Edge to create a joint venture focused on the development, production and full lifecycle support of loitering munitions and smart weapons, with an estimated order book of about 2 billion euros annually. There is talk of manufacturing drones and sustained capacity: design, assembly line, maintenance, replacement and scaling, something essential in a type of war where systems are consumed at an industrial rate. Indra relies on experience Edge on suicide drones to accelerate the technological leap, while underlining that the real value for Europe is in pproduce in European territoryfulfilling the logic of sovereignty and reducing dependencies and deadlines in a market that is moving due to urgency and not by comfortable calendars. Castilla y León as a military-industrial hub. The bet has taken concrete form with two plants in Castilla y León: in Villadangos del Páramo (León), a production facility dedicated to drones and loitering munitions will be built, with an investment of about 20 million euros and a forecast of up to 200 jobs at full capacity. Another plant focused on micromotors will be installed in Boecillo (Valladolid), a critical component that defines autonomy, reliability and production capacity. The combination is revealing: it is not only the “final product”, also, and very important, the control of key pieces, which allows manufacture without bottlenecks and sustain a high exit rate when the strategic environment demands constant replacement. The objective is for Spain to not only be an assembler, but also part of the industrial heart that makes war with drones possible. Defense turns it into a state program. The Ministry of Defense has presented the project as part of the Industrial and Technological Plan for Security and Defense approved in May 2025, and has stated that the León factory will produce “the most advanced drones that can operate today in Europe and NATO.” Beyond the owner, what is relevant is that the new company would already be born with valued contracts around 2 billion of euros, with a workload committed to covering the needs of the Spanish Armed Forces and also other European armies, and with a performance horizon in 2026 and 2027. The implicit message is that Spain wants to be in the industrial layer that supports the European defensive shield, not as a secondary actor, but as a real supplier of a capacity that decides tactical survival on the front. Politics gets on the drone. The announcement, furthermore, is made with a staging in the Senate and in a pre-electoral context in Castilla y León, where the local impact (those 00 jobs distributed between León and Valladolid) turns the defense industry into territorial policy tool. The narrative mixes national security and reindustrialization: Small areas such as Villadangos del Páramo appear as recipients of a project of high technological value, while it is presented as a historic turn for the Spanish industrial base. At the same time, it is linked to other military initiatives in the community, emphasizing that rearmament It is not only a strategic debate, but a map of investments, works, infrastructure and employment that reorders public priorities. The real game. Finally, the movement also gives clues about the future of Europe with Ukraine as a mirror: the defensive shield It is no longer measured only in troops and doctrine, but in the ability to produce cheap, intelligent and massive systems, with short innovation cycles and controlled supply chains. Somehow, Russia has imposed the pace of the threat, and Washington has added the political pressure of not depending eternally on an external guarantor. In this scenario, Spain tries to occupy an unexpected gap: become the protagonist of the European loitering ammunition, the tool kamikaze which not only serves to attack, but also to deny space, saturate defenses and impose costs on the adversary. In a Europe that has belatedly discovered that modern war is also won in factories, Spain wants are in their territory. Image | Khamenei.ir In Xataka | Europe faces … Read more

A video of a Russian soldier ignoring a bomb falling on him is the clue to something deeper in Ukraine

by

This circulating a clip as brief as it is disturbing: what appears to be a fragmentation munition falls at a soldier’s feet, explodes practically beneath him and, against all logic, the man continues walking as if nothing had happened, “ignoring” the immediate impact of a detonation that, by pure physics, should have destroyed him or at least knocked him down and left him incapacitated. The explanation points to a tactic that is not new. What doesn’t fit. The most striking from the video It is not just that he remains standing, but the absence of the instinctive reaction that any body has to pain and shock, as if the nervous system were disconnected or anesthetized. And here comes the detail that makes the scene even more disturbing: according to Canadian analyst Roythe scene suggests that it is a Russian soldier, and that what we see is not a typical Ukrainian attack, but a deliberate attempt to eliminate him by his own people, perhaps because he was trying to defect. In that reading, the explosion would not be bad luck, but rather a covert execution, with what appears to be una OFSP-0.5, launched with the intention of cutting his retreat short and erasing any uncomfortable history before he crosses a line or surrenders. The “zombies” of Bakhmut. The image does not appear out of nowhere: it fits within a sensation that is repeated from the hardest moments of the siege at Bakhmutwhen Ukrainian fighters they described Russian attacks that seemed written by someone who doesn’t understand human survival. Waves of men advancing without coordination, without visible tactical logic, walking almost in a straight line towards enemy fire, with stories that spoke of soldiers who kept appearingalthough the first had already been killed, and with a strange passivity even under bombardment. We talk about videos where soldiers were seen move slowlystaggering, as if they were stuck in a thick dream, unable to move away even as grenades fell around them. In that framework, the video soldier current seems like the extreme version of the same impression. The drug hypothesis. For months, many Ukrainians have sustained an uncomfortable idea: that part of these attacks are not explained only by incompetence or desperation, but by soldiers “doped” envoyswith substances that reduce fear and disconnect prudence. The accusation appears in direct testimonies: men who seem euphoric or absent, who advance without understanding what they are doing, who do not retreat even if death is obvious, who react late or not at all. Not only that. Suspicion persists because, from a military point of view, the temptation it’s too clear: If what you need is infantry who will walk toward fire, who will endure a corridor battered by artillery, who will not be slowed by anxiety, and who will execute orders in an environment where instinct would say “flight,” a stimulant or narcotic mixture can make a soldier a more manageable asset. Pervitin, an early form of methamphetamine, which was widely used in Nazi Germany The Nazi shadow. To understand why this idea is not science fiction, just look at the most famous historical precedent: Nazi Germany led drug use combat at an industrial level with Pervitina low-dose amphetamine similar to modern methamphetamine that was first popularized in civilian society and then became a military multiplier. wanted something simple: reduce sleep, raise morale, reduce fear, increase aggression and sustain the execution of tasks without rest for days, just what is needed for rapid offensives and to maintain the rhythm when the body should collapse. And it wasn’t just the Nazis, also the allies. Super soldiers. That logic fit like a key in the blitzkrieg lock: continuous movements, mechanized attacks, advance without pause, a sensation of permanent thrust that overwhelmed the enemy not only because of the power, but because of the ability to not stop. He myth of the “super soldier” It wasn’t a futuristic helmet: it was a pill. And if that episode taught anything, it is that armies, when they believe they can gain an advantage or sustain performance, usually put immediate effectiveness before medium-term human cost. Soldiers under the influence. The pattern of effects attributed to this type of stimulant is perfectly compatible with what appears in many stories of the war: less fear, more aggressiveness, less need to sleep, more resistance to fatigue and a certain ease in executing simple commands even in extreme conditions. The price is usually the psychological and physical toll: dependency, depression, impulsivity, loss of judgment, and a progressive degradation of the soldier as a functional person outside of the moment of combat. On the front line, however, that bill is irrelevant to a short-term planner: if what you need is for someone to cross a field of fire today, you care little about what happens to them a month from now. That’s why video on networks It is so symbolic and striking: it seems to be the exact moment in which the body stops behaving like a human that preserves its life and begins to behave like a moving object that only obeys the forward vector. The other side of the coin. However, there is an essential nuance: “zombie” behavior does not always involve drugs. It may simply be the ugliest version from reality: extreme coldlack of equipment, exhaustion, hungeraccumulated sleep, sustained stress and the confusion of a mind that shuts down. The early hypothermiafor example, fits brutally with many clips: slowness, clumsiness, difficulty processing stimuli, confused speech, lost gaze. And in the Russian case there is also a historical tradition of war “fuel” much more mundane: alcohol as a tactical and psychological value, from vodka rations in World War II (used to combat the cold and to give courage before attacks) until modern episodes of indiscipline and documented drunkenness. A sign of the times. In short, the video that has gone viral In networks it leaves that somewhat absurd feeling of “two options”: either it was a Terminator, or the soldier was under some type … Read more

Ukraine has unlocked a wild “online mode.” The one about Russia recruiting Africans on Discord to turn them into “can openers”

by

The Ukrainian War I had already flirted with the language of the gamer world: rewards for objectives, loot lists and even a “military Amazon” improvised to redeem successes by real material. But if that seemed like a way to gamify logisticswhat is happening now goes up a level: it is no longer about buying drones with points, but about recruiting soldiers within the player communities themselves and turning them into human bombs. War as a global industry. On the Ukrainian front, Russia has ended up building a collection machinery that is not limited to looking for soldiers, but drags them from places increasingly unlikelyas if the war had become a global funnel. What was once a conflict between armies begins to look like a international recruitment network where young people enter, attracted by money, by a promise of the future or simply by a casual conversation that becomes irreversible. The result is a constant drip of foreigners who arrive in Russia, sign a paper, receive rushed training and disappear into the most brutal landscape of Europe, where the distance between signing a contract and death can be measured in weeks. Recruitment on a screen. The story Bloomberg told and starts with two young South Africans, regular Discord users and Arma 3 players, who end up talking about enlist in the Russian army with someone who identifies himself as @Dash. What seems like just another exchange in a digital community rises in temperature until it becomes a real plan: they meet in Cape Town, move together and end up visiting the Russian consulate, as if this bureaucratic step gave legitimacy to what, deep down, is already a flight towards war. On July 29, they embark on a trip to Russia via the United Arab Emirates and, after arriving, they meet “Dash” there. Shortly after, in early September, they sign one-year military contracts near St. Petersburg and they are trapped in the fast lane of a conflict that doesn’t stop to check if anyone really understands what they’re getting into. Contract, training and front. Only a few weeks pass between the signing and the front. After a brief period of basic training, one of the two is sent to combat in Ukraine, where he performs duties as an assistant marksman for a grenade launcher, a description that sounds like a military routine but is, in reality, the prelude of a disappearance. The last time he contacted his family was October 6. On December 17, a friend reported that has died in combat. The confirmation comes with a medical document that his family later obtained, dated months later, which states that he died on October 23, 2024 in Verkhnekamenskoye, in the Luhansk region. Nothing is known about the other young man: his whereabouts remain up in the air, as happens with many names who enter the war and get lost in the noise of the front. The scandal that breaks out at home. In South Africa, the case is not only read as a personal tragedy, but as a national problem, because since 1998 It is illegal to fight for or assist the armed forces of a foreign country. And it also arrives at a moment especially sensitive: More allegations of recruiting towards Russia have emerged in recent weeks, with investigations pointing to to catchment networks already told stories with acceptable costumes (escort courses, security training) that become suspicious when they lead to military contracts. This climate of public alarm worsens with arrests and judicial processeswhile the South African authorities, the Russian consulate and the platform itself appear wrapped in silence without clear answers and with families trying to piece together, through emails and calls, the map of a disappearance. The lie. Explained the medium that among the incentives that are put on the table appear always the same: money, attractive conditions, the possibility of obtaining Russian citizenship and the idea that the service could open educational or advancement doors. It is an offer designed to ring concrete and reasonableas if combat were hard but passable work, a dangerous but temporary experience. However, the story makes clear What happens when that promise lands in Ukraine: war is not a contract, it is rather a crusher, and for those who arrive without roots, a support network or the ability to get out of the wheel, destiny is reduced to a date on a piece of paper and a lost location in the east of the country. Kamikaze bodies. At another point in the same conflict appears a scene that has gone viral on networks, a video even more brutal: an African mercenary is “armed” with a TM-62 anti-tank mine attached to the body and sent towards Ukrainian positions with the intention of blowing himself up to open a bunker. The video shows crudeness without metaphors: the man protests, but a Russian soldier threatens him with a rifle, pushes him, expels him from a basement and orders him to run into the forest. in that language They call it a “can opener.”as if it were a piece of engineering, an instrument designed to break a door at the cost of disappearing, and the scene remains recorded for what it reveals: not only are foreigners recruited, they are used in missions where life is not a value to be protected, but rather the closest thing to a detonator available. Foreigners in war. Ukraine maintains that there are at least 1,436 citizens from 36 countries identified fighting in the Russian ranks, and that the real number may be higher. There is talk, again, of recruitment by financial promises, deception or pressureand warns of minimal survival: many do not survive more than a month after arriving at the front. The statement, however harsh it may be, fits with the landscape they draw these stories: people who enter through lateral routes, who arrive attracted by incentives or trapped by intermediaries, and who end up absorbed by a war that has been devouring troops until making replenishment a constant … Read more

Russia has reminded the planet that the war in Ukraine is a ticking bomb. And for this he has pressed a nuclear button: Oreshnik

by

Over the past few months, the war in Ukraine has seemed advance by inertia: fronts that barely move, stalled negotiations and constant wear and tear that threatens with normalizing the conflict in Europe. But in recent weeks Moscow has remembered, without the need for major territorial conquests, that it continues to have the ability to alter the chessboard with a single gesture: the nuclear one. The button that is always there. In a stuck war In the mud of the front and industrial wear and tear, Russia has once again remembered that it is still sitting on a strategic bomb pressing a button that does not need to be pressed completely to take effect: that of Oreshnik missilean intermediate-range system with nuclear capacity whose use, even with inert or conventional charges, functions as a political message rather than as a tactical weapon. The launch detection from the Kapustin Yar strategic polygon and the subsequent explosions near Lviv, a few kilometers from the Polish border, do not seek so much to destroy decisive objectives as to point out that Moscow can escalate whenever it wants and from wherever it wants, even from facilities associated with its strategic nuclear forces, deliberately breaking the “conventional” routine of the conflict. Symbolic weapon, real threat. It we have counted before: the Oreshnik, derived from the RS-26 program and capable of carrying multiple warheads that separate in flight, it is not a missile designed to win battles in Ukraine, but to cross psychological red lines in Europe. Its hypersonic speed, its potential range of up to 5,500 kilometers and the fact that Ukraine lacks defenses capable of intercepting it turn each launch into a demonstration of the structural vulnerability of NATO’s eastern flank. When Russia first used it against Dnipro in 2024 with dummy heads, he made it clear that he was not testing marksmanship, but rather strategic credibility. Now, by bringing the impact closer to the NATO border and the European Union, the message is even more explicit. Controlled climbing. The reappearance of the Oreshnik is no coincidence. It occurs while Ukraine refuses to give up territory in the negotiations, while Moscow insists that any Western troops deployed on Ukrainian soil would be a legitimate objective and while Washington, under Trump, intensifies pressure on Russia’s allies like Venezuela. The Kremlin justifies the attacks as retaliation for alleged Ukrainian attempts to attack the residence of Vladimir Putinaccusations that even US intelligence services they doubtbut the real logic is different: to raise the psychological and political cost of Western support without formally crossing the nuclear threshold. Energy, winter and strategic terror. As in previous winters, Russian missiles and drones are once again baiting the Ukrainian energy infrastructureleaving entire neighborhoods in kyiv and other cities without electricity or heating amid sub-zero temperatures. The Oreshnik fits into this strategy of calculated terror: not only does it damage critical facilities, but it amplifies the feeling of helplessness by introducing a weapon that symbolizes the maximum possible escalation. Ukraine responds by hitting power grids in Russian regions such as Belgorod or Oryol, but the strategic asymmetry remains intact. Europe as a target audience. Furthermore, by hitting near Lviv and, by extension, Poland, Russia is not just talking to kyiv, but with Brussels, Berlin and Paris. The Oreshnik is a reminder that Ukrainian theater is inseparably linked to European security and that any expansion of military support has an immediate reflection on the deterrence ladder. It is no coincidence that Moscow recently showed the deployment of the system in Belarus, further extending the reach shadow over the continent. The temptation of blackmail. Thus, with minimal and extremely slow territorial advances, and a growing human and industrial cost, Russia uses the Oreshnik missile as a substitute for victories on the battlefield. It is not a weapon to conquer Ukraine, of course, but rather to remind the world that the conflict cannot be closed by ignoring the Russian nuclear dimension. From that prism, each launch is a warning: Moscow does not need to detonate a warhead to reactivate the founding fear of the Cold War. Just show the button, press it even half and make it clear that it is still there, waiting, like a time bomb that sets the pace of all future negotiations. Image | Ministry of Defense of Ukraine In Xataka | Ukraine has become an animal slaughterhouse: Russian soldiers appear with horses and drones blow them up In Xataka | First it was Finland, now the US has confirmed it: when the war in Ukraine ends, Russia has a plan for Europe

When the war in Ukraine ends, Russia has a plan for Europe

by

A week ago and in the midst of the peace negotiations that the United States has tried to lead between Russia and Ukraine, the president of Finland issued a warning to the old continent. If peace comes to Eastern Europe, it will be the end of the war, but also, possibly, the beginning of another. Now it has been Washington’s intelligence that seems to be on the same line. The ultimate goal. counted this week Reuters that US intelligence reports have been conveying a less than reassuring message for more than two years: Putin’s objectives in Ukraine have not been moderated or reduced, despite military attrition, economic sanctions and ongoing diplomatic talks. Since the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022, the assessment of US agencies has been that the Kremlin aims to subdue all of Ukraine and, beyond that, to restore a sphere of influence over territories that were part of the former Soviet bloc, including countries that today they are part of NATO. This reading is neither punctual nor cyclical, but rather a line of analysis sustained over time that agrees widely with the conclusions of the European intelligence services and with the strategic perception of countries especially exposed as Poland or the Baltic Stateswhich are considered the next potential targets if Moscow manages to consolidate its position in Ukraine. Between intelligence and speech. This diagnosis collides head-on with the narrative promoted by Trump and his negotiating team, who maintain that Putin wants to end the conflict and that a peace agreement would be closer than ever. For intelligence analysts, that view ignores both the Russian leader’s own public statements and the logic of your actions military and political. From Washington it is emphasized that Putin has denied repeatedly be a threat to Europe, but the facts (the annexation of territories, sustained military pressure and the refusal to renounce maximalist demands) contradict that discourse. Even voices within the US Congress, such as that of the Democratic congressman Mike Quigleya member of the House Intelligence Committee, have insisted that the conviction that Russia “wants more” is shared by allies key in Europe and is based on solid information, not assumptions. Territorial control. On the ground, Russia controls approximately 20% of Ukrainian territory. This domain includes almost all of the provinces of Luhansk and Donetsk, the industrial heart of Donbas, large areas of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson, and the Crimean peninsula, a strategic enclave in the Black Sea. Putin does not present these conquests as provisional or negotiable: he has formally declared that Crimea and the four occupied provinces belong to Russiaa statement that sets a clear red line for any negotiation. This position turns the territorial debate into the main obstacle of diplomatic contacts, since accepting these demands would mean, de facto, legitimizing a war of annexation and setting a dangerous precedent for the post-Cold War European order. Pressure on kyiv. In this context, Washington’s pressure on kyiv has been increasing. According to sources familiar with the talks, the US proposal would include Ukraine withdraw your forces of the areas of Donetsk that it still controls, as part of a peace agreement. For Volodymyr Zelenskiy and the majority of Ukrainian society, this concession is unacceptable. Not only would it imply ceding sovereign territory under military coercion, but it would call into question future viability of the Ukrainian State and its ability to defend itself from new aggression. kyiv insists that any agreement that does not include real and credible security guarantees would be equivalent to freeze the conflict on terms favorable to Moscow, leaving the door open to a resumption of the war when Russia feels stronger. Security: the great debate. The negotiations led by Trump’s entourage, with figures such as Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff, have advanced in defining a package of security guarantees backed by the United States and generally accepted by Ukraine and several European countries. These guarantees would contemplate the deployment of a security force mainly European in neighboring countries and in areas of Ukraine far from the front, with the aim of deterring and responding to future Russian aggression. The scheme would also include a limit on the size of the Ukrainian army, set at around the 800,000 troopsalthough Moscow is pushing to reduce it further, a demand to which some American negotiators are open. To this would be added intelligence support by the United States, air patrols backed by Washington and the ratification of the agreement by the US Senate, which in theory would give the commitment greater political solidity. Mistrust and Russian mystery. Despite these advances, Zelenskiy has publicly expressed your doubts about the real effectiveness of those guarantees, wondering what would prevent Russia from attacking again in practice. Uncertainty worsens because Putin has rejected the presence of foreign troops in Ukraine, even as part of a peace agreement. In parallel, the Russian leader has not offered signs of flexibility: although he declares himself willing to talk about peace, he insists that his conditions must be met and boasts of the territorial advances achieved by his forces, which he estimates at about 6,000 square kilometers in the last year. The lack of a clear response from Washington to these demands fuels the perception that Moscow could be using the talks as a tactical tool to buy time and consolidate positions. Strategic risk. From the Office of the Director of National Intelligence has qualified that Russia, in its current state, lacks the military capacity to conquer all of Ukraine or to launch a full-scale offensive against Europe. However, the reports themselves emphasize that the lack of immediate capacity does not equate to a strategic renunciation. Putin’s political intention, according to US intelligence, remains being expansiveand their calculation seems oriented toward a long war, in which the attrition of Ukraine and the political fatigue of the West work in their favor. That combination of unbroken ambition and strategic patience is what explains the caution (also, if you will, skepticism) of the intelligence services regarding … Read more

that the war in Ukraine has reached the Mediterranean

by

For months, the so-called “tanker war” between Ukraine and Russia had remained contained in a relatively limited space: the Black Sea and its immediate accesses. There, attacks with naval and aerial drones against ships linked to Moscow had become a logical extension of the conflict, an indirect but effective way to hit Russian energy revenues without directly confronting its war fleet. Until now. An invisible line. Everything has taken a 180 degree turn with the attack against the oil tanker Qendil in the Mediterranean, which represents an unprecedented qualitative leap. Not only because of the distance (more than 2,000 kilometers from Ukrainian territory), but because it shows that kyiv is willing to carry out this campaign much further of the traditional theater of operations, calling into question the idea that European sea routes were safe from war. The fleet in the shadows. He Qendilan Oman-flagged crude oil tanker built in 2006, was not chosen at random. Before heading to India it had departed from the Russian port of Novorossiysk, one of the key outlets for Russian oil to the global market. Both the European Union and the United Kingdom consider it part of the called “shadow fleet”the network of ships that Russia uses to avoid sanctions through flag changes, opaque ownership structures and routes designed to dilute legal responsibilities. For Ukraine, these ships are not simple commercial assets, but a direct extension of the Russian war efforta source of income that fuels the war. Hence, the Security Service of Ukraine has defended the attack as a legitimate objective under the law of armed conflict. A surgical operation. According to SBU sourcesthe attack was an “unprecedented special operation”, carried out by its Alpha Special Group using bomber-type aerial drones. The broadcast images They show munitions falling onto the ship’s deck from a hexacopter, pointing to a short-range attack launched from a nearby platform, probably a ship. Tracking data indicate that the tanker was sailing between Malta and Crete when it made a sharp turn and changed course towards Port Said, Egypt, a move that reinforces the idea that something abnormal happened at that point in the journey. Although the ship was empty at the time of the attack (reducing the environmental risk), the SBU holds which suffered critical damage that leaves it unusable for its original function. The message. Beyond the physical damage, the blow has enormous symbolic and strategic value. It comes on the same day that Russian President Vladimir Putin warned that it would cut off Ukraine’s access to the sea in retaliation for the attacks on the shadow fleet. kyiv’s response seems clear: if Russia can finance its war by exporting oil along increasingly distant routes, those routes too can become a battlefield. The SBU statement That Ukraine “will strike the enemy anywhere in the world” is not just rhetoric, it is a signal to shipowners, insurers and governments that the conflict is no longer limited to a specific sea. Echoes of other wars. This type of attack is reminiscent of the covert war that for years Iran and Israel have fought against merchant ships in the Middle East, a campaign of targeted sabotage designed to send political messages without escalating into open conflict. Everything indicates that Ukraine has studied that model and it is adapting it to its own war, using relatively cheap drones to impose disproportionate costs on the adversary. The possibility of using drones in the future of greater scopeeven with satellite links like Starlink, suggests that the radius of action could be expanded even further. Maritime consequences. He attack on Qendil introduces a new factor of uncertainty in the Mediterranean. Although the target was directly linked to Russia, the simple fact that armed drones can operate against merchant ships in such busy waters forces the maritime sector to rethink security measures, routes and insurance. For Moscow, the message is disturbing: its floats in the shadowestimated at more than a thousand ships and essential to sustain its crude oil exports, is no longer protected by geographical distance. For Europe, it is an uncomfortable reminder that a war that began on land and in the Black Sea is beginning to cast its shadow over one of the planet’s main trade corridors. A conflict that expands. Plus: the attack against the Qendil is not just a tactical action, but an implicit statement that the maritime war is entering a new phase. Ukraine demonstrates that it can bring economic and military pressure to spaces that until now They were considered peripheralwhile Russia threatens to respond without making clear how. Between them, the Mediterranean appears suddenly as a potential scenario of a confrontation that no one has formally declared, but that is already beginning to be felt in commercial navigation. As so many other times After this war, the border between the military and the civil becomes more blurred, and the feeling that there are no completely safe areas begins to extend far beyond the front. Image | x In Xataka | Baba Yaga is a Slavic mythological witch who devours skulls at night. And Ukraine has decided to make it a reality In Xataka | Ukraine has asked Russia if it is going to stop the war for Christmas. Russia has responded bluntly

Baba Yaga was an old woman who devoured skulls at night. So Ukraine just turned Russia’s worst nightmare into a drone

by

In Slavic folklore, Baba Yaga She is an ancient figure associated with nocturnal fear, a witch who devours skulls and flies in the dark, punishing the reckless and inhabiting a territory where normal rules no longer apply. It is not a spectacular monster or the usual one, but a persistent presencedisturbing, impossible to ignore. Ukraine remembered it… and transformed it into a drone. The nightmare in war. This symbolic load explains why the name was not born in Ukrainian propaganda, but in the Russian channels themselves: when the soldiers began to describe night attacks that fell almost silently from the sky, the collective imagination did the rest. Today, “Baba Yaga” does not designate a fairy tale creature, but a family heavy bomber drones Ukrainians who have transformed the night of the front into a permanent hostile space for Russian forces. What really is a Baba Yaga. Under that name is grouped an entire class of heavy multicopters, many of them derived of agricultural platforms and others already designed for military purposes, capable of transporting from 15 kilos in their most common versions to several dozen in larger configurations. Unlike the kamikaze FPVs, the Baba Yaga They are reusable systemsconceived as aerial bombers themselves. They can launch mortar mines, fragmentation charges, adapted munitions or even converted anti-tank mines with remarkable accuracy from several hundreds of meters high. Its distinctive feature is not only the load, but the combination of thermal and optical sensors which allows them to operate at night, in fog, rain or wind, and remain effective where light drones begin to fail. This capacity has made them go from being a tactical complement to becoming a structural piece of the Ukrainian device. A Baba Yaga captured by Russian forces The night stops being a refuge. For months, trenches, concrete shelters or fortified buildings offered Russian infantry a relative sense of security from artillery and light drones. The Baba Yaga break that logic. If a point appears marked on a thermal image or reconnaissance map, no cover guarantees survival. A single drone can perform cascade attacksreleasing ammunition successively and dismantling a position section by section. The effect is cumulative: it not only destroys material, but forces units to disperseto rotate more frequently, to invest time and resources in camouflage and fortification, and to avoid concentrations of troops or vehicles. In a war of attrition, that behavioral change is as important as direct destruction. From tactical weapon to major system. Although they were born as a short-range solution, the Baba Yaga have been integrated into operations increasingly complex. They do not act in isolation, but as part of a drone ecosystem that includes FPV, long-range UAVs and, in some cases, naval platforms unmanned. In Crimea, for example, we have seen how maritime drones are used as advanced shuttles to allow heavy multicopters to reach radars and air defense systems like the Nebo-Mattacking antennas, technical installations and command posts. This logic is revealing: first the target is blinded or disorganized by other means, and then the Baba Yaga finish the job where it was previously considered too risky or inaccessible. Thus, these drones have ceased to be “flying artillery” and have become tools that connect the immediate front with the operational rear. Technical evolution. The development of these drones has not stopped. Ukrainian volunteer engineers and teams they have been improving engines, propellers, structures and suspension systems for ammunition of different calibers, while communications are reinforced with redundant channels, separate antennas and, in some cases, satellite links that expand the radius of action at the expense of payload. Russian electronic warfare has forced experimentation with system duplication control and backup plans to prevent the loss of a link from dragging down the entire set. This adaptation race explains why, even when Russia manages to shoot down some of these drones, the problem does not disappear: The threat materializes again the following night. Psychological impact. Beyond the technique, the Baba Yaga hits morale. Its low, recognizable hum does not announce an immediate explosion, but rather a tense wait– Someone, somewhere, is peering through a thermal scope and choosing the next target. Unlike artillery, there is no clearly safe haven or predictable pattern. Combined with FPV attacks and indirect fire, these drones create a sensation continuous pressure from above, from the front and from the rear. Military analysts match in which this constant stress accelerates organizational wear and tear, makes coordination difficult and forces commanders to focus on maintaining basic cohesion instead of planning offensive maneuvers. Lessons for the future of war. For Western observers and for NATO itself, the Baba Yaga are a practical demonstration of how future conflicts will be fought with swarms of relatively cheap, reusable and rapidly adapted platforms. It is not a miracle weapon, but a component within a system that combines intelligence, communications, flexible production and accelerated training. Ukraine has managed to assemble that system under extreme conditions, relying on industry, the State and voluntary networks. For Russia, the result is clear: the “witch” of folklore has returnednot as a myth, but as a technological presence that redefines the battlefield and makes it impossible to return to a war according to the standards of the 20th century. Image | Telegram, ArmіяІнформ In Xataka | Ukraine has asked Russia if they stop for Christmas like in the First World War. The answer could not have been more Russian In Xataka | Europe wanted to expropriate Russian funds on the continent to finance Ukraine. Until Belgium took the lead

Ukraine has asked Russia if they stop for Christmas like in the First World War. The answer could not have been more Russian

by

The inevitable reference when talking about a Christmas break in the middle of a conflict is the spontaneous truce December 1914in the first months of the First World War. On several sectors of the Western Front, British and German soldiers left the trenches, exchanged cigarettes, sang Christmas carols and even played football in no man’s land. Ukraine has remembered it, but it is going to be complicated. The first time. On that occasion of the First World War, the truce was not ordered by the commanders nor was it part of a political negotiation: came from belowof human exhaustion in the face of a war that had not yet shown all its industrial brutality. Precisely for this reason it was never repeated. The high command considered it dangerous, subversive and incompatible with a modern total war. Since then, Christmas has been used many times as a rhetorical symbol of peace, but almost never as an actual interruption of fighting. The Ukrainian proposal. In this historical context full of symbolism, Ukraine has raised the possibility of a ceasefire during Christmas, an idea carefully formulated so as not to appear as a disguised surrender. Zelensky has spoken of a specific pauseespecially linked to attacks against energy infrastructure, at a critical time of winter and with the civilian population as the main collateral victim. At the same time, kyiv is preparing a new package of peace proposals backed by European partners and channeled through the United States, with the expectation that Washington will offer top-level security guarantees if Moscow rejects the plan. Zelensky, however, has shown caution and has lowered any expectations of a quick deal, publicly assuming that Russia may choose to continue the war and that, in that case, Ukraine will ask for more sanctions and more weapons. Officers and men of the 26th Division Ammunition Train playing football at Salonica, Greece, on Christmas Day 1915 The Russian response. The Kremlin’s reaction to the “Christmas break” has been immediate and bluntalmost ritual in its formulation. Dmitri Peskov has discarded any temporary ceasefire, including a Christmas truce, with an argument that Moscow has been repeating for months: a pause would only serve for Ukraine to regroup, rearm and prolong the conflict. In official Russian language, the word “truce” is presented like a trapwhile the word “peace” is reserved for a scenario in which Russia has achieved all your strategic objectives. According to Peskov, Moscow is not ready to replace a comprehensive negotiation (in their own terms) for “momentary and non-viable” solutions. The logic is clear and brutal: either the Russian framework of political and territorial victory is accepted, or the war continues without sentimental interruptions. Territory, guarantees and red lines. Behind the exchange of statements lies the real core of the conflict. Russia demands that Ukraine rspread to wide areas of its territory, accept permanent limits on its armed forces and rule out any future accession to NATO. Ukraine, for its part, rejects hand over the Donbaseven under ambiguous formulas such as a supposed demilitarized “free economic zone,” and remembers that it was already betrayed once when it renounced its nuclear arsenal in 1994 in exchange for security guarantees that did not prevent the invasion. Polls show that a clear majority of Ukrainian society opposes withdrawing from the east and is willing to continue fighting, a domestic factor that greatly limits Zelensky’s political margin even as international pressure increases. Christmas without miracles. The proposal for a Christmas break actually exposes the abysmal distance between the war that we evoke in historical memory and the war that is being fought today. In 1914an improvised truce was possible because the soldiers still saw each other as human beings confronted by accident. In 2025, the war in Ukraine is a conflict of objectives strategic, existential red lines and cold calculation of power, where each day of pause is measured in kilometers of front, ammunition reserves and operational advantages. The Russian response dry and distrustfulis not only “very Russian”: it is confirmation that, in this war, Christmas has no capacity to suspend the logic of the conflict. Unlike more than a century agothere is no room for carols between the trenches, only for official statements that remind that, for Moscow, peace does not begin with a truce, but with the political defeat of the adversary. Image | RawPixel, WikiCommons, Ariel Varges In Xataka | 24 hours later, satellite images leave no doubt: a Ukrainian underwater drone has changed the future of wars In Xataka | Drums of peace sound in Ukraine. And that should be a good thing for Europe… unless Finland is right

Log In

Forgot password?

Forgot password?

Enter your account data and we will send you a link to reset your password.

Your password reset link appears to be invalid or expired.

Log in

Privacy Policy

Add to Collection

No Collections

Here you'll find all collections you've created before.