Europe

Europe seeks sovereignty in rare earths: the first step to achieve it is a megamine in Sweden

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In world geopolitics, having oil, gas or rare earths (let us remember that They are neither earth nor are they rare) is the equivalent of starting a game of mus with several kings in hand. And if we talk about rare earths, this map of the world’s (known) reservesIt shows that China has the best possible hand. Finding rare earths in your territory is very good, then you have to know how to extract them and create an industry around them. This is neither easy nor quick nor cheap. The good news is that the European Union could cover 18% of its lanthanide needs. The not so good thing is that first he has to launch a megaproject: the Per Geijer supermine, in Kiruna (Sweden). Per Geijer has never been just any mine. In fact, it is the underground iron mine largest in the world (the underground surname is important in that the Brazilian Carajás Complex produces more but in the open pit and the Australian Hamersley Ranges has a larger deposit) and also the most ambitious and complex metal mining project that the European Union has faced in decades. The mine is operated by the state through the public company Luossavaara-Kiirunavaara Aktiebolag (LKAB). That it has rare earths makes it special, but how they are present is also particular: it is not a pure lanthanide mine, but a high-grade iron deposit with significant concentrations of phosphorus and rare earth oxides. How much? Early 2026 LKAB estimates 2.2 million tons of rare earth oxides, more than double what I thought about 2023. Mine in Kiruna. LKAB Why is it important. As noted in the intro, because China processes about 90% of the world’s rare earths and taking into account the mine’s estimates, if these rare earths could be extracted for use, the European Union could cover 18% of its needs. according to LKAB estimates. Own resources instead of having to buy them, which leads to dependencies on third parties, market fluctuations and diplomacy. In mining, the time between discovery and the first ton of commercial around between 15 and 20 years old. But the European Union has considered it as a strategic project, so it is on the “fast track” thanks to the Critical Raw Materials Law (CRMA). In Xataka The rare earth war has reached Spain. And it is in Ciudad Real where mining and ecology are in conflict under the microscope. The presence of these oxides in a high-grade iron mine like Per Geijer hides a couple of aces up its sleeve: processing synergy and phosphorus, another strategic element (but less so). And the cost of extracting rare earths is more profitable when there is already an operation to extract iron. On the other hand, these lanthanides are trapped in apatite, which is essentially calcium phosphate. Through magnetic separations for iron and chemicals, two high-value products emerge: one is the rare earth concentrate and the other is phosphoric acid, essential for fertilizers. {“videoId”:”x8wlh9q”,”autoplay”:true,”title”:”United States vs. China: The CHIPS WAR”, “tag”:”webedia-prod”, “duration”:”1611″} The northern triangle. Although the site is located in Kiruna, the project is actually an industrial ecosystem made up of three points: Kiruna for extraction, Malmberget for concentration and Luleå is in charge of separation. Thus, the Kiruna deposit provides the mineral from a new deposit of iron, phosphorus and rare earths discovered next to the current mine, about 700 meters away. Malmberget provides the volume of rare earths from the already operational iron mine from apatite waste and also from what will be extracted. Finally, Luleå provides chemical technology with a processing center in charge of separating the rare earths from the rest using hydrometallurgical technology. The schedule until it is operational. Although the normal thing would be to have to wait almost 20 years, we have already seen that the EU has stepped on the accelerator. Tunnels are currently being built to connect the current Kiruna iron mine with the new deposit. In 2026, Malmberget plans to have permits to open a new plant to treat apatite, and the Luleå plant is expected to be operational by the end of this year. However, for the large-scale commercial plant to be commercialized, estimates point to the 2030s due to the series of permits and environmental evaluations that must be successfully passed. It won’t be easy. Despite the importance of rare earths in the EU plans and the apparent profitability of the process, the megaproject faces several challenges beyond the technical and the inherent waste generated. Without going any further, the city of Kiruna itself is sinking and its citizens have to move, literally, building by building, to allow mining expansion, as picks up CNBC. Furthermore, there is conflict with the indigenous Sami peoplesince the site is located on reindeer grazing routes. In Xataka | Spain has a plan to become a rare earth powerhouse and stop depending on China: you will recycle In Xataka | Europe wants to be competitive in the rare earths market. Its enemies are old acquaintances: China and Europe itself Cover | LKAB (function() { window._JS_MODULES = window._JS_MODULES || {}; var headElement = document.getElementsByTagName(‘head’)(0); if (_JS_MODULES.instagram) { var instagramScript = document.createElement(‘script’); instagramScript.src=”https://platform.instagram.com/en_US/embeds.js”; instagramScript.async = true; instagramScript.defer = true; headElement.appendChild(instagramScript); – The news Europe seeks sovereignty in rare earths: the first step to achieve it is a megamine in Sweden was originally published in Xataka by Eva R. de Luis .

Europe produces more clean electricity than fossil electricity for the first time. The hard part starts now

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For years, the European energy transition advanced without completely displacing fossil fuels. Last year marked that turning point. According to the report European Electricity Review 2026wind and solar generated 30% of EU electricity in 2025, surpassing coal, gas and oil combined for the first time, which fell to 29%. As Dr. Petrovich explains by Emberwe are facing record growth. It is not normal to go from a 20% to 30% quota in just five years, but the numbers are there. The energy map is changing: there are now 14 EU countries where wind and sun generate more than gas or coal. In this scenario, Spain, Greece or Hungary already play in the league of solar powers. Beyond statistics. The milestone does not imply that Europe has left fossil fuels behind or that gas has disappeared from the system, but rather that it changes the hierarchy of the electricity mix. For the first time, variable renewable energies come to occupy the center of the electricity mix, while fossils are relegated to a technical and security support role. According to Emberrenewable energies as a whole contributed 48% of the EU’s electricity in 2025, practically half of the total, a figure that remained stable even in a year marked by adverse weather conditions, with less wind and less rain than usual. Coal, the most polluting fuel in the system, continues its withdrawal. In 2024 it fell to 9.2% of the European electricity mix, a historical minimum compared to the almost 25% it represented a decade ago. Gas, for its part, rose slightly compared to 2024, although it is still 18% below its 2019 maximum, confirming that its role in the system is increasingly residual. This rebalancing has consequences that range beyond the energy mix: Dependence on imported fossil fuels continues to be the main source of price instability and strategic vulnerability in Europe, even outside the climate debate. Five years that changed everything. The sorpasso – as it has begun to be called in the sector – is not the result of a mild winter or a stroke of meteorological luck. It is the consequence of sustained growth, especially in solar energy, during the last decade, accelerated very notably in the last five years. According to the reportsolar generation grew by 20.1%, this being the fourth consecutive year with increases of more than 20%, an unprecedented growth rate in European energy history. In absolute terms, solar reached 369 terawatt hours (TWh), more than double that of 2020, and the annual increase in 2025 alone is equivalent to the electrical production of three French nuclear reactors. A dizzying growth. This expansion responds mainly to the installed capacity. In 2025, 65.1 GW of new solar power was added in the EU, distributed almost equally between large plants and self-consumption on rooftops. All community countries increased their solar production, and in several of them—Hungary, Cyprus, Greece, Spain and the Netherlands—the sun already provides more than 20% of national electricity. As for wind power, although more affected by the weather conditions at the beginning of the year, it remains the second largest electricity source in the EU, with 17% of the total, above gas. The system, therefore, begins to rely structurally on variable renewables, something unthinkable just a decade ago. The reverse of success: when gas continues to set the price. Despite the historic advance of wind and solar, 2025 made it clear that gas continues to have a disproportionate weight in the European electricity system, especially in price formation. According to the think tank, gas-fired electricity generation increased by 8% in the EU, mainly to compensate for the drop in hydroelectric energy caused by the drought, and this greater use of gas raised the electricity sector’s import bill to 32 billion euros, 16% more than the previous year. The impact was especially visible in the electricity markets. Ember detects that price spikes They are concentrated in the hours with the highest gas use, while the hours with abundant solar and wind tend to make electricity cheaper. In 21 European countries, wholesale prices rose in 2025, driven almost exclusively by these fossil time slots. This is where the paradox of the current system: although gas no longer dominates by volume, it continues to set the marginal price of the market at critical moments. In other words, despite the oversupply, the price structure continues to be conditioned by fossil fuel when there is a lack of wind or sun. The new energy frontier. Ember’s report devote an entire chapter to what it considers the next big front of the transition: storage and system flexibility. Without these pieces, he warns, the sorpasso runs the risk of remaining a statistical victory. This was one of the large deficits of the European transition: investing massively in generation without doing so at the same pace in networks and storage. Batteries are now emerging as the piece that connects renewable success with stable prices and security of supply. Last year, the EU exceeded 10 GW of large-scale batteries in operation for the first time, more than double that of 2023. In addition, there is a portfolio of projects that could raise that figure above 40 GW if fully implemented. The first signs are already visible in countries like Italy, where batteries have begun to cover part of the demand during peak gas hours, reducing prices and displacing fossil generation. Physical bottlenecks: European infrastructure. It is not just a question of how much energy is generated, but where it enters and how it circulates within the continent. Europe has reduced its direct dependence of Russian gas, but continues to face physical limitations in terminals, transportation networks and cross-border connections. This substitution of Russian gas has been slowed by the slowness in the construction of critical facilities, such as regasification terminals and high-capacity networks, and by the insufficient interconnection between national electrical systems. This bottleneck explains why countries with abundant renewable production, like Spain, often cannot easily export that surplus, or why the European … Read more

What the war in Ukraine has not achieved, Greenland has done. Europe has taken out its “commercial bazooka” against the US: Ozempic

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For more than a year, Europe has become accustomed to living trapped in an uncomfortable balance where depends on the United States for its security through NATO, to sustain the Ukrainian effort and, ultimately, for the strategic architecture that has protected it since the Cold War. Now Greenland has done jump into the air part of the rhetoric. Europe and the counterattack. The crisis has erupted when Trump has returned to ignite a trade war using Greenland as an excuse and as an ultimatum: either some type of “agreement” that brings the island closer to the United States is accepted, or tariffs arrive first from 10% and after 25% a group of European countries designated by a minimal but symbolic gesture, to participate in Arctic maneuvers with Denmark. What until recently many in Europe preferred to interpret as bravado or negotiating tactics becomes an explicit message of political pressure that no longer leaves room for the fantasy of appeasement. And there appears the real change: what the Ukrainian war had not completely achieved (a frontal European response to American reprisals) Greenland is doing itbecause the coup is not against a geopolitical adversary but against alliesand because it puts Europe before a brutal choice: accept the blackmail and normalize it, or respond even if it hurts, even knowing that it continues to depend on Washington for its security and to contain Russia. The European bazooka. There is no doubt, the European reaction It is not born from enthusiasm, but from the feeling that there are no longer many other solutions: Greenland cannot be “handed over”, nor can Denmark sell an autonomous territory against the will of its population, and the very idea that an acquisition could be forced due to commercial threats opens a pandora’s box that affects the entire continent. In this context, Brussels dusts off for the first time his toughest tool, the so-called anti-coercion instrumentdesigned precisely to punish political pressures through rapid and forceful economic measures. on the table two paths appear that mark a leap in mentality: reactivate a package of tariffs worth of 93,000 million of euros already prepared and, if the escalation continues, go further of goods and target services, investment and even access to the European market for large American companies. The European message tries to be twofold, seeking a de-escalation that avoids an open clash, but making it clear that, if Trump turns trade into a method of extortion, Europe can also respond strongly. The crash that nobody wanted. The most disturbing thing about this episode is not only the economic impact of a tariff war, but the strategic fracture that it implies: Europe knows that a serious trade conflict with the United States will would infect NATOto Ukraine and the entire deterrence architecture against Russia. That is why the continent moves cautiouslycalling emergency meetings, preparing the ground for talks in Davos and even delaying previously agreed trade detente measures. But the core of the problem is that Trump is not negotiating a percentage or a clause: you are elevating a territorial objective to a national priority, presenting it as a requirement to “improve the security” of the Arctic, and implicitly denying that Europe can guarantee it. In this framework, Europe tries not to break the bridge, but assumes that it can no longer behave as if the bridge were indestructible. The sovereignty of Greenland. We’ve told it before: while Washington talks about “acquisition,” Greenland insists that its future belongs to them, that many they want more independencenot change flag. This point is essential because it explains why Europe doesn’t want to give in: it is not just about Danish pride or formalisms, but about sovereignty and democratic legitimacy, as well as an explosive precedent within the Union itself. The tariff threattherefore, works as an attempt to isolate Denmark and make it the weak link, although it has the opposite effect: it reinforces the idea that if you are attacked over a strategic issue, you will be respond as a block. And therein lies the paradox: instead of dividing, the pressure forces coordination, especially between Paris and Berlin, which push a harder line while others ask for time to see if Trump offers a “way out” before the punishment is activated. The “Ozempic bomb”. Amid the noise of bases, submarines and Arctic routes, the unexpected weapon appears: Denmark is not a commercial giant, but it exports products to the United States that directly affect the pocket and everyday lifeand that turns any tariff into a kind of political boomerang. The half of its sales Recent visits to Washington focus on medicines, vaccines, insulin and related products, because Novo Nordisk is there, the Danish economic engine and the factory of the global phenomenon Ozempic and Wegovy. That dependency converts Denmark in a kind of de facto “pharmaceutical state”: Your private growth and employment largely revolve around that industry, and any trade turbulence impacts both sides. If Trump makes these medicines more expensive, the blow will not stay in Europe: it enters the US market like health inflation and social unrest, just where the political margin is most fragile. And that is why Ozempic, more than a product, works as symbol of interdependence reality that makes a tariff war not just a lever, but rather a grenade. Lego and other reminders. The same effect is seen with Lego and other products Danes beloved in the United States, or with less visible but critical sectors such as hearing aids and certain medical equipment. In the real world, supply chains do not respect emotional boundaries: many parts are manufactured in different countries, assembled in others, and sold in markets that depend on global logistics. This means that tariffs punish not only the “enemy” exporter, but also companies, distributors and consumers. Trump can imagine squeezing Denmark to bend it, but the pressure leaks out in prices and disruptions in the US market itself, and also erodes the relationship with an ally that already offers military access in … Read more

In medieval Europe, not only humans ended up on the gallows. Other criminals were also executed: the “murderer” pigs

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For centuries, medieval Europe It was a place where justice was dispensed not only in the courts, but in the squares, in full view of everyone, with public rituals designed to repair order when someone broke it in an intolerable way. At that time, the fear of the unforeseeable did not come only from armies, plagues or famines, but also from what moved through the streets and corrals. In the France Medieval times, for example, the public ritual of punishment (carriage amidst mockery, solemn sentence and execution before the community) did not always have a human as the protagonist: sometimes, the condemned was a pig. The image, which today seems like an oddity from a black chronicle or a folkloric exaggeration, was real enough to leave repeated documentary traces: animals led as prisoners, hung upside down until they died and treated, in practice, as perpetrators responsible for a crime that had broken the social balance. The pig as a real threat The frequency of these cases is better understood by remembering that the medieval world lived attached to animals and their risks. Pigs, in particular, were useful because they ate everything and could feed on scraps, but that same omnivorous condition made them dangerous if they roamed free near small children. The records collect numerous episodes in which pigs killed and even devoured children, a violence that today clashes with the modern image of the docile and slow animal, but which was then associated with specimens closest to the wild boar: fast, strong and capable of imposing themselves physically in seconds. Medieval archives collect cases like the one from 1379when a group of pigs in Saint-Marcel-lès-Jussey killed the son of a swineherd, or the from 1386 in FalaiseNormandy, where a sow destroyed a child who ended up dying. Also that of 1457 in Savigny, Burgundywhen little Jehan Martin was killed by a sow and, especially disturbingly, his six piglets were found nearby, stained with blood. They were not vague rumors, but stories that were fixed with names and placesand that fueled the need for a public response that was not limited to a simple private loss. In France, these events often led to in judicial proceedings formalities in which the animal was imprisoned, transferred and executed as if it were a common criminal. Sources talk about expenses registered normally (cart, prison, executioner even brought from Paris) and an administrative routine that suggests that, for the people of that time, it was not an absurd spectacle, but a legitimate mechanism of justice. The strangeness, therefore, was not that there was violence, but rather that the violence was channeled through a trial with the appearance of ordinary procedure. When money is not enough A practical explanation of these processes was that medieval justice tended to seek reconciliation between partiesand many disputes could be resolved with compensation or agreements. But when a child death came into the picture, that logic was broken: the damage was too serious and the money could be insufficient to close the social wound. In that context, the court intervened to “take control” of the conflict, separate it from private revenge and offer an institutional solution that would distribute the emotional and political burden of the outcome. Trials also functioned as a form of organize the story: It was not just about punishing the animal, but about clarifying human responsibilities. If a pig was known for being dangerouswhy was he allowed to loiter near children? Was there negligence on the part of the owner? a chain of negligence? There was even a suggestion of the possibility of darkest questions: if the child was “unwanted”, if he or she was deliberately left in a risky situation or if the accident hid an intention. The court, by intervening, not only imposed a penalty, it produced an official explanation that the community could accept. Sometimes, the local machinery was not the last word and the matter escalated towards higher authorities. In the case of 1379, some of the accused pigs belonged to an abbey, and from there a petition was sent to Duke Philip “the Bold” requesting clemency. They defended that their animals had not participated and that they were “well-behaved pigs.” The duke heeded the request and issued a pardon for the animals of the abbey, showing that these processes, strange as they may seem, were inserted in real networks of power, influences and political decisions. Far from being simple superstition or peasant rage, these executions could serve to assert authority. The right to erect a gallows and execute criminals it was a privilegeand taking a case to the end allowed a local lord to exhibit the ability to punish and control order. There are episodes that reinforce that reading: a pig murderer from the 15th century it remained imprisoned five years before being executed, and formal letters were sent for permission to build a gallows. When the duke finally agreed, the triumph was not only symbolic: in addition to showing power, the lord stopped carrying the practical cost of keeping the animal imprisoned and feeding it. Plus: another key is the medieval vision of reality as a logical system created by godwith animals destined to serve humans. For a pig to devour a child was an unbearable investment of that order, a rupture of hierarchies that demanded public reparation. In that mental framework, the trial and execution were not theater: they were a way of “putting back together” what had been broken, of affirming that the world still had rules and that chaos, even when it came from an animal, could be put back into place by a solemn act of justice. Image | Ernest Figueras, Zoe Clarke In Xataka | The Middle Ages were not as dark as they told us In Xataka | 900 years ago, Europe had its own Manhattan: the impressive skyscrapers of more than 100 meters of Bologna

There is a Europe that is suffocating to pay for housing and another that lives in peace. And this map shows the differences

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Beyond the political ups and downs, corruption, unemployment, the war in Ukraine, or the (increasingly) convulsive scenario of international geopolitics, from time to time The CIS reminds us that there is a much more everyday problem that keeps us Spaniards up at night: access to housing. At the end of 2025 39.9% of those surveyed by the organization pointed out housing as “the main problem” facing the country. And it is normal if you take into account the mismatch between supply and demand, the pressure that carries out tourist rentals and (above all) the sharp rise in prices of recent years. Every time we talk about the residential market, however, the same question arises: beyond the exact cost of the square meter (m2), calculated by the General Council of Notaries, the executive or portals like IdealisticHow “unaffordable” is accommodation in Spain? What economic effort does it require from families? Is it more or less than what other European households must assume? Getting perspective Type of housing (in m2) available spending 40% of monthly income. ESPON, the program who is dedicated to studying cohesion of the EU, has published a series of maps that help answer these questions in a quick, direct and, above all, visual way. To prepare them, two parameters have been basically set: the prices of the real estate market for sales and rentals and the income data published by Eurostat. Everything divided by regions. By crossing them the organism has been able to carry out two calculations. The first is to estimate what type of housing (in m2) a person who allocates 40% of their income to this purpose can rent in each EU region. The second is what percentage of their rent that same tenant should dedicate if they wanted a 100 m2 house. Percentage of monthly income necessary to rent a 100 m2 home. ESPON does not stop there. He has also transferred those same questions to the buying and selling market residential. That is, what type of housing could a person willing to invest 40% of their annual income for an entire decade afford? And how many years would you have to endure that same budgetary effort if you wanted to buy a 100 m2 apartment? In both cases the maps are similar and they leave behind a series of conclusions, such as the profound differences that exist within the same country. “Regions containing and surrounding capital cities such as Paris, Berlin, Lisbon and Madrid tend to be less affordable compared to the rest of the nation. Additionally, coastal regions tend to be less affordable, which is also clearly seen in the Netherlands and Germany, Portugal, Spain and France.” Available housing (m2) investing 40% of the income for 10 years. Years necessary to buy a 100 m2 home investing 40% of the income. For example, while a Madrid resident willing to invest 40% of his annual income in housing would need between 20 and 25 years To pay for a 100 m2 house, a resident of the province of Teruel would need at most ten years of effort. In Barcelona it would need around 20-25 years while on the other side of the peninsula, in Pontevedra, between 15 and 20 years would be enough. The worst part in Spain is Malaga, the Balearic Islands and the Canary Islands, where ESPON calculates that on average a buyer would need to invest 40% of their annual income for more than three and a half decades. A very similar effort would have to be endured by the inhabitants of the Algarve, Setúbal, part of the Paris area, Monaco, Corsica or different points spread across Eastern Europe, where ESPON itself recognizes that “quite unaffordable” areas are concentrated. If we talk about the rental market, the panorama It’s not very different. A Madrid resident who would like to rent a 100 m2 apartment would need to dedicate (on average) between 80 and 90% of their income to it. The situation is worse in coastal points, such as Barcelona, ​​Huelva, Malaga and Eastern European regions. In the provinces of Zamora or Huesca they would be enough between 30 and 40%which is closer to the debt ceiling level than recommend assuming the experts. Images | Quique Olivar (Unsplash) and ESPON In Xataka | It is not a country for Spaniards: Madrid and Catalonia are losing national population while gaining foreign population

India. It will no longer be possible for another reason: Europe

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In recent years, cars are not the only thing that has risen in price disproportionately. The general escalation of prices has affected also to the world of motorcycles and, to try to contain even greater increases, in recent years the most common practice by large manufacturers has been to move part of their production to India to save costs. The EU has not been amused in the slightest. New tariffs. The month of January starts with new tariffs on motorcycles and scooters made in India. And not a single model manufactured outside European territory is spared. 8% tariff for models up to 250cc Tariff of 6% for larger cylinder capacities In a market with tight margins, a tariff of this amount will force large European manufacturers to completely rethink their strategy. Who is affected?. KTM, Triumph, BMW, Suzuki, Aprillia and mainly Royal Enfield will be the main affected after this measure by the European Union. KTM manufactures its small displacement motorcycles in India, such as the KTM 390 Duke and Adventure. BMW and its best-selling contender, the GS 450is manufactured together with TVS Motor, an Indian conglomerate. Aprillia manufactures together with Bajaj its 457. Triumph has been allied hand in hand with Bajaj for years to manufacture its stars of displacement 400. Why is it important. Given the increase in prices in recent years, manufacturers made a very clear bet: to commit to manufacturing medium-low displacement models in India. Seeing premium brands like Triumph or BMW launch 400 models that aspire to be bestsellers is a true reflection of the state of the sector. The key? Manage to sell competitive models between 5,000 and 6,000 euros, in a segment ideal for everyday use and occasional outings. The 6% tariff will shake this pricing strategy. Because now. Although the measure seems like an attack from Europe on external manufacturing, the context goes further. The EU has the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) to regulate the flow of exports from developing countries to Europe. But there is fine print: The EU requires certain minimum standards when manufacturing the product. It also requires that, if certain export volume thresholds are exceeded, preferential tariffs end. Although there is no official data on how many motorcycles manufacturers are exporting from India, the threshold has been exceeded, and with it tariffs are once again applied without any type of bonus. The great beneficiary. China is sweeping Spain with economical models and much more equipped than the rest of its competitors, and China will continue to sweep if tariffs negatively affect the main European manufacturers. With Zontes making its way as the third manufacturer in our country, the countdown to see a podium headed by motorcycles made in China. Image | bmw In Xataka | The 11 cheapest electric motorcycles with the most autonomy: the best quality-price options

Europe had few options in the face of the US threat in Greenland. Until Germany has remembered Russia with an unprecedented plan

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Growing pressure from the United States to take over Greenland has transformed a hitherto latent issue into a problem political and strategic of the first order for Europe and NATO, by explicitly placing for the first time the risk of an internal clash between allies. It was known that there were a couple of options on the table as a defense. Germany has just presented another unprecedented one. An unprecedented crisis. The insistence of the US administration on presenting control of the island as a necessity of national security, accompanied by rhetoric increasingly harderhas forced European partners to react not only in defense of Denmark’s sovereignty and Greenland’s right to self-determination, but also to protect credibility of an alliance designed precisely to prevent force from prevailing among its members. The problem is not only territorial, but systemicbecause it raises the extent to which NATO can manage a crisis caused from within without eroding its own foundations. Germany and the allied response. Faced with the difficulty of directly confronting Washington, Berlin has emerged as the actor in charge of articulating a solution that combines political firmness and strategic containment. Germany has chosen to channel the response through NATO. As? proposing a joint mission in the Arctic that makes it possible to strengthen regional security without turning the conflict into a bilateral battle between the United States and Denmark. The initiative seeks to save time, reduce tensions and offer an institutional alternative that frames American concerns within a collective logic, while sending a clear signal that Greenlandic sovereignty is non-negotiable. This German role reflects a commitment to multilateral management of the conflict and to prevent the crisis from leading to an open fracture within the alliance. From the Baltic to the Arctic. The German proposal takes as a direct reference the operation Baltic Sentrylaunched to protect critical infrastructure in the Baltic Sea from sabotage and covert activities linked to Russia and its ghost fleet. The idea is to replicate this scheme in the Arctic through a hypothetical “Arctic Sentry” missionwhich would include Greenland and allow increased surveillance, naval presence and allied coordination in an increasingly disputed region. This approach has a double function: on the one hand, respond to the security concerns raised by Washington about the Russian and Chinese presence in the Arctic, and on the other, prevent those concerns from being used as a pretext for unilateral action. Turning the Arctic into a space of collective management seeks to deactivate the security vacuum narrative that fuels American aspirations. The shadow of Article 4. Although it has not yet been formally activated, the idea of invoke Article 4 of the NATO treaty, which provides for consultations when an ally perceives a threat to its territorial integrity or security, has gained weight in diplomatic debates. The mere possibility of Denmark resorting to this mechanism reflects the seriousness of the situation and the growing nervousness in European capitals. Invoking Article 4 would not imply an automatic military response, but it would force the alliance to address it head on. an internal crisis that many would prefer to manage in silence. The underlying fear is that, if not managed institutionally, the conflict sets a dangerous precedent that normalize pressure between allies and voids the founding principles of NATO. Diplomacy, deterrence and limits. Beyond the military dimension, the European Union has explored diplomatic and economic options to contain the United States, from the reinforcement of political dialogue to the theoretical threat of instruments commercial pressure. However, Europe’s dependence on the American technology, defense and security umbrella drastically reduces the credibility of these tools. Economic sanctions, although powerful on paper, are perceived as unrealistic in a context marked by the war in Ukraine and the need to keep Washington engaged with European security. This imbalance reinforces the idea that the most viable path is to offer shared security solutions, such as the proposed Arctic mission, rather than a direct confrontation that Europe could hardly sustain. Greenland as autonomy. The economic dimension It adds another layer of complexity to the conflict, as Greenland relies heavily on Danish transfers and warily watches American promises of massive investment. From Brussels we study increase financial support European to prevent the island from being trapped in a relationship of dependency with Washington, especially with the prospect of future independence. This effort not only seeks to counteract American economic influence, but also preserve the social and political model that the Greenlanders might want to keep. In this context, the crisis reveals that the battle for Greenland is not only fought in the military field, but also in that of investment, legitimacy and the projection of soft power. A stress test. Altogether, the American pressure over Greenland has exposed the internal tensions of a NATO designed to deter external threats, not manage territorial ambitions of one of its members. The german initiative of transferring the problem to the field of collective security, inspired by the Baltic model, is an attempt to preserve allied cohesion and avoid an existential crisis. However, the simple fact that mechanisms are being considered like Article 4 It demonstrates the extent to which the alliance faces an unprecedented scenario, one in which unity no longer depends only on stopping external adversaries, but on containing power impulses within its own ranks. Image | Program Executive Office Soldier, pathanMinistry of Defense of the Russian Federation In Xataka | After the Nazi occupation, Denmark signed a pact in 1951. Since then, the US can ask for whatever it wants in Greenland In Xataka | Greenland has become an obsession for the United States for a simple reason: they believe in global warming

It’s so cold in Europe that KLM has had to cancel more than 2,300 flights for one simple reason: antifreeze

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This 2026 has started off cold. In the Spanish state, the Temporary Francis It has made us spend the Three Kings’ night in snow, rain and cold and in the rest of Europe things have not been better. The mass of arctic air has spread across the continent and has been joined by the storm Gorettiwhich has caused the temperature in the Sierra Nevada to plummet to -17 degrees, part of France is on orange alert with power outages and mobility problems and in several countries in central Europe, heavy snowfall and the storm have caused chaos in transport, with flights and trains cancelled. One of the airlines affected is the Dutch KLM, which has seen cHow their planes are freezing at the airport from Amsterdam. Literally, because there is not enough antifreeze fluid to prevent it while the supplier that supplies that additive has run out of stock. Because just like cars that sleep on the street in the middle of winter, planes also freeze. Only with a vehicle it is enough to scratch the windows a little, start the engine with the heating on and in less than five minutes, it will be running. Too many days too cold Taking off with a frozen plane is not an option: ice affects the aerodynamic conditions of the aircraft, making takeoff and landing maneuvers especially dangerous. Furthermore, solving it is not so simple or immediate: there is a strict protocol which, although it may vary with each airline, is intended to ensure that the fuselage is free of contamination and there is no degradation of the aerodynamic or mechanical conditions. Within that protocol There is deicing on the ground: the plane must be sprayed with deicing liquid to remove ice or snow. Anti-icing is then used, another ice that prevents the plane from freezing again before takeoff and the ice or snow from falling off at that time. This operation is carried out every day in hundreds of airports around the world on thousands of planes. The problem is when for too many days it is too coldwhich results in having to use more defrosting fluid than usual. If there is no stock, that polar cold wave becomes dramatic in terms of cancellations. This is what has happened to KLM, which on January 2 announced that its operations at Amsterdam Schiphol Airport were going to suffer alterations. Almost a week later, they remained the same. Without going any further, Simple Flying with Flight Radar data echoes of the cancellation of 2,374 flights until January 7. To keep aircraft operational in this harsh winter, the Dutch airline is using 25 de-icing trucks continuously in Amsterdam, consuming approximately 85,000 liters per day of freezing point depressant fluids. Faced with the shortage, Reuters explains that KLM has already sent employees to its main supplier in Germany in search of more antifreeze stocks. KLM has warned that “Due to a combination of extreme weather conditions and delays in supply by the supplier, stocks are running out. This problem is currently spreading throughout Europe“. On January 8, logistics gave KLM a break in the form of the first supply of antifreeze of those more than 100,000 liters that are on their way to Schiphol. If this has happened in Amsterdam, how can it not happen in other cities further north like Helsinki? Well, paradoxically, it happens less: they are better prepared when it comes to considering needs and available stock. In Xataka | Vigo airport has enjoyed international flights for years. Until Ryanair declared war on Spain In Xataka | The triangles on the plane window are not for decoration: they are a quick way to check that the flight is going well Cover | David Syphers

not be the country in Europe with the most unemployment

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After almost four decades being the European country with one of the worst employment data on the continent, Spain has just witnessed a historic change: Finland has surpassed us as the EU country with the highest unemployment rate in November 2025. According to Eurostat dataFinland recorded an unemployment rate of 10.6%, compared to 10.4% in Spain. The change may seem minuscule (just two tenths), but it is an indicator of something bigger: for the first time since 2013, Spain has stopped occupying first place in this unenviable category. A change of trend. This shift in unemployment figures reflects an interesting paradox. While Spain has improved its labor market figures in recent years, with a sustained drop in unemployment that was only interrupted during the COVID-19 pandemic, Finland has experienced an economic deterioration that has skyrocketed its unemployment. In any case, and despite this change in trend, the figures are not good at all. Both countries remain well above the European Union average, which in November stands at 6.0%, demonstrating that they have a serious structural problem that goes beyond the specific ups and downs. Finland: how a prosperous country has reached the worst unemployment in 15 years. The most striking thing about the Finnish data is the surprising speed of the deterioration of its labor market. The government of the Nordic country implemented reforms a few years ago to reduce public debt, an objective that prioritized job creation. As collected SwissinfoElina Pylkkänen, Undersecretary of State at the Ministry of Employment of Finland, speaking to national television YLEstated that “Increased productivity has been sought by cutting costs, rather than expanding operations and investing.” In November 2025, more than 250,000 people found themselves without work in Finland, a figure that represents the highest unemployment in the country since 2009. A fact that has been aggravated by the approval of a regulation more lax for dismissal. Unemployment improves as measured. Although Finland leads the unemployment rate with the seasonally adjusted data (10.6%), there is an important nuance since Eurostat uses trend data for Finland, not seasonally adjusted, so the situation reflected in these data still needs to be consolidated. If you use the seasonally adjusted unemployment data facilitated by the EU, Spain remains at 10.4% while Finland is at 10.1%. However, the unemployment trend for the third quarter of 2025 It already showed the stagnation of the Finnish labor market and the improvement of employment in Spain. Spain: decades of an unemployment problem that does not end. Spain has not arrived at this situation suddenly either. According to the data from the National Statistics Institute (INE), the unemployment rate in the third quarter of 2025 was 10.45%, which demonstrates the persistence of the problem. During the last 39 consecutive monthsSpain has been the country with the highest unemployment rate in the EU, an undesirable leadership that has remained practically without interruption since 2013. He origin of this problem chronic work it’s complexcombining a high rate of temporary contracts with a more limited level of investment in training. This generates an extreme sensitivity of employment to economic cycles: when the economy slows down, employment is the variable that adjusts most quickly, but falls at the same speed when it slows down. The 2008 crisis exemplified this vulnerability, bringing the Unemployment at historic highs. Although Spain has consistently created jobs since then, unemployment rates remain almost double the European average. That Spain loses a title that it has held for almost four decades does not represent a solution to the problem, but rather the confirmation that another country faces a situation even more complicated. In Xataka | The “Spanishization” of Sweden and Finland: youth unemployment is the key for Spain to stop being the EU unemployment champion Image | Pexels (Bulat369)

Europe is months away from registering a demographic milestone that has not occurred since the Black Death: it is literally shrinking

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In June the latest Eurostat data putting the EU median age at 44.7 years (and growing). The reading then seemed more or less clear. Europe’s demographic collapse was bringing it closer to an invisible threshold that was once unthinkable: the Middle Ages. 50 years old. Half a year later, the data has not improved. Historical contraction. Yes, Europe is heading towards a demographic turning point unprecedented since the black plague from the 14th century. After decades of sustained decline in birth rates, the population of the European Union will reach its maximum next year and it will start after a prolonged fallthe first of its kind in centuries. This is not a temporary adjustment, but rather a deep structural change that threatens to redefine the economy, the welfare state and the social balance of the continent. The alarm does not arise only from the total number of inhabitants, but from the aging speed and the thinning of the working-age population, on which the pension, health and care systems built over generations rest. Political panic and a race. counted the Washington Post that, given this panorama, governments of all ideological stripes have entered into a race against time to see if a combination of economic incentives, public policies and cultural messages can reverse (or at least stop) the decline in birth rates. In the Nordic countries, for decades exhibited as a model of conciliation and well-being, commissions of experts have been created to understand why their systems did not prevent the collapse of fertility. In France, the discourse has acquired a almost military tonewith calls for “demographic rearmament” after a drop of 18% in births in just ten years. In the east and south of the continent, especially in countries governed by nationalist forces, the response has been more direct: money, tax advantages and an explicit exaltation of the traditional family as a pillar of the nation. Incentives and results. Italy offers bonuses to working mothers with two or more children. Poland has increased notably the monthly transfers per child and has expanded tax breaks for large families. On paper, these policies seem compelling, even enviable from countries like the United States, where the cost of raising children is systematically cited as the main brake to birth. However, the European experience shows a repeated pattern: even the most ambitious programs barely succeed in slowing the decline, don’t invest it. The problem is not the lack of public effort, but the magnitude of the phenomenon they face. Hungary, the laboratory. No country better embodies the ambitions and limits of this strategy than Hungary. For more than a decade, the government has deployed a support system of a generosity comparable to that of Scandinavia, allocating around 5% of its GDP to family policies, a higher proportion than the United States dedicates to defense. The range of measures it’s wide: leave for grandparents, subsidized mortgages for young married couples, loans of up to $30,000 that become subsidies if the family has three or more children, and lifetime tax exemptions for women with three children, extended to mothers of two children under 40 starting next year. The message is clear: having children is not only desirable, it is a matter of national survival. Initial successes. They remembered in the post that for a time, the data seemed to prove this bet right. Hungary’s fertility rate went from one of the lowest levels in Europe to figures that suggested a sustained recovery. But the relief was short-lived. In recent years, the trend has been reversed and the country has practically returned to the European average. For some demographers, the program did not generate new births, but rather advanced decisions by those who were already planning to have children. Others point out that, although the impact on fertility is limited, the policies have coincided with an increase in marriage, a reduction in child poverty and greater female labor participation. The key question is whether these collateral benefits justify the enormous public spending. State limits. Beyond the checks and exemptions prosecutors, the decision to have children remains deeply personal and increasingly complex. The rise in housing prices, persistent inflation and job insecurity they weigh as much or more than any incentive. Added to this is a factor that is rarely recognized in the political debate: many of the drivers of the decline in birth rates are social advances that no one wants to reverse. Widespread access to contraception, decline in teen pregnancy, and increased education and career opportunities for women have transformed motherhood and fatherhood in a late choice, carefully calculated and, for many, expendable. Modernity as a trap. The fertility drop has spread so widely that many experts interpret it as a consequence inherent to modernity. Parenthood is delayed until one’s thirties, when one has achieved job and economic stability that comes later and later. Social media idealizes a life focused on the individual, travel, and personal freedom. dating apps multiply apparent options, but they make lasting commitment difficult. And a generation raised in small families has less daily contact with babies and children, fueling overly negative perceptions about the sacrifice involved in raising children. A politicized debate. Not everyone considers the population decline to be a tragedy. Some defend assuming it as a gradual transition towards more sustainable societies, questioning apocalyptic visions who talk about “demographic collapse.” In the long term, even in the most pessimistic scenarios, Europe would still have hundreds of millions of inhabitants. But these global figures hide a much more immediate structural problem: the imbalance between workers and retirees. In just a few decades, the ratio of people of working age to each elderly person will increase. will have drastically reducedputting under strain systems designed for a demographic pyramid that no longer exists. The fragility of immigration. For years, immigration has been presented as Europe’s demographic lifeline. However, this option is becomes more uncertain as fertility falls across almost the entire planet. Even countries that until now were large demographic reserves … Read more

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