the Ukrainian drone that stopped Russia for six weeks with a machine gun and not a single human soldier

On the Ukrainian front, where every meter conquered or defended is paid for with a human cost that is increasingly difficult to assume, ingenuity is has become a resource as valuable as ammunition. In this context of extreme wear and constant adaptation, some units are experimenting with little visible solutions that, without attracting attention, are beginning to change the way a battle line is held. When there are no soldiers left. In a war marked by a shortage of infantry and the extreme lethality of maintaining forward positions, Ukraine has begun to test a solution that until recently belonged to military science fiction: leaving the front in machine hands. During 45 consecutive daysa Ukrainian unit maintained front-line sectors without direct human presence, entrusting the defense to a single land vehicle unmanned, a bet that summarizes the crude logic of the current conflict: if something can receive enemy fire, it better not bleed. The doctrine. The experience was reported by the NC-13 Strike Company, integrated into the Third Corps of the Ukrainian Army, a unit created specifically to operate unmanned ground vehicles. Its commander, Mykola “Makar” Zinkevych, explained that the idea was radically simple: “robots don’t bleed,” and the ground drone was the only element present in the position, carrying out constant suppressive fire missions to deter Russian advances and force the enemy to confront a defense that could not be psychologically worn down or eliminated with human casualties. The droid TW 12.7. The system used was the Droid TW 12.7developed by the Ukrainian company DevDroida small tracked vehicle armed with a heavy machine gun M2 Browning .50 caliber. Far from being an isolated prototype, the drone was displaced between different positions at the request of local command posts, acting as a mobile punishment platform that turned each attempted Russian advance into a costly and risky operation. The Droid TW 12.7 Wear and tear… also for machines. Although the robot could remain in place for days, it needed withdraw every 48 hours for maintenance, resupply of ammunition and recharging of batteries, tasks carried out by a team located several kilometers from the front. The process, initially four hours, is reduced by half thanks to the purchase of additional batteries paid for by the soldiers themselves, a detail that illustrates the extent to which the Ukrainian war continues to depend on local initiatives and improvised financing even when talking about advanced technology. Limited autonomy. DevDroid affirms that the Droid TW 12.7 can operate at distances of up to 15 miles and has artificial intelligence-assisted navigation functions, although it is unclear to what extent it can act autonomously in combat. Even so, the simple fact that a single UGV has held positions for six weeks demonstrates that the value of these systems lies not only in their sophistication, but in their ability to replace human bodies in tasks where survival is minimal. From experiment to military doctrine. After this experience, the Zinkevych unit plans to expand the use of UGVs in both defensive and offensive missions, relying on new variants equipped with grenade launchers already approved for official use. The demand, recognizeis very high, but so are the costs, to the point that development continues to be partially financed through crowdfunding campaigns. The future of the front. If you like, the case Droid TW 12.7 It is not just a technological anecdote, but a sign of where to go war is headed modern in Ukraine: a battlefield where every meter can be defended with sensors, steel and algorithms instead of flesh and blood, and where the strategic value of a soldier begins to also be measured by his ability not to be physically there. Image | Tank Bureau In Xataka | Russia has reminded the planet that the war in Ukraine is a ticking bomb. And for this he has pressed a nuclear button: Oreshnik In Xataka | Ukraine has become an animal slaughterhouse: Russian soldiers appear with horses and drones blow them up

The mission in Caracas revealed that the best kept secret in the US is not a drone: it is called DAP and you will not see it in the movies

The capture of Nicolás Maduroby US forces has not only meant a political earthquakebut rather he explained with almost surgical clarity the media type that the United States reserves for maximum risk direct action operations. In fact, the famous Night Stalkers of Washington’s Army made it clear that the drone is still in second place. Designed to enter where no one else can.Qbecause the first place is reserved to DAPthe MH-60M Direct Action Penetrator, the most aggressive and specialized variant of the black hawk operated by the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, the Night Stalkers. Venezuela was, in every sense, the ideal setting for this device: a hostile urban environment, potential air defenses, the need for rapid insertion, armed escort, precise fire and absolute coordination with assault teams. Although armed versions of the H-60 ​​exist in several countriesthe DAP of the 160th SOAR represents the maximum degree of maturity of the concept, far above even those already sophisticated MH-60 transportation of the regiment itself. It is not a helicopter adapted after the fact, but a platform conceived decades ago, operational at least since 1990to accompany special forces where error is not an option. In Xataka Neither drones nor fighters nor elite soldiers: the US entered Venezuela disguising a 20th-century tactic as technology. XIX Modular firepower. The heart of the DAP is its ability to combine the punch of an attack helicopter with the flexibility of a special operations device. The current configuration of the MH-60M incorporates modular short wings with one or two heavy points per side, capable of carrying a mix of 70mm missiles,AGM-114 Hellfireair-to-air missiles Stinger ATASheavy machine guns GAU-19/B .50 caliber and M230 cannons 30 mm, the same model used by the AH-64 Apache. Added to this are two 7.62mm miniguns which can be fixed in a frontal position to maximize the volume of fire during low-altitude passes. The introduction of APKWS II guided rockets laser has added surgical precision that allows beat specific objectives in dense environments without resorting to more destructive ammunition. All this arsenal is integrated into a platform that maintains a key advantage: its dual character. In a matter of hours, the DAP can return to a transport configuration, a critical quality for unpredictable operations where the same helicopter may need to escort, attack and evacuate in a single mission. Penetrate at night and fly low. Beyond weapons, what defines the MH-60M DAP is its ability to reach the target without being detected and survive once inside. The aircraft shares with the rest of the 160th SOAR fleet an avionics suite designed for extreme night flight and nap-of-the-earth profilesliterally skimming the terrain even in adverse weather conditions. They counted the TWZ analysts that the terrain tracking and avoidance radar, in its most modern version AN/APQ-187 Silent Knightallows the crew to fly blind to any other conventional helicopter, while the electro-optical and infrared system AN/ZSQ-2 provides identification, laser designation and video in real time. Systems like the Degraded Visual Environment Pilotage Systemwhich combines cameras, LIDAR and terrain databases, allow operating in dust, smoke, heavy rain or fog, common conditions in a night urban assault. And more. This set of sensors not only facilitates navigation, but also allows the DAP to fight at very close range, executing the classic combination of strafing and rockets that has been seen in videos of the Venezuelan operation, erroneously attributed in some cases to AH-1Z helicopters of the Marines. {“videoId”:”x9cqyyg”,”autoplay”:false,”title”:”A KEY of 8 ZEROS PROTECTED the WORLD from an unauthorized NUCLEAR ATTACK”, “tag”:”Webedia-prod”, “duration”:”457″} Invisible shielding. Plus: If there is something that distinguishes the 160th SOAR helicopters, it is their obsession with survival. The MH-60M DAP is covered by a genuine self protection bubble which integrates infrared, radar and laser missile warnings, active electronic warfare systems, chaff and flare dispensers, and directional laser countermeasures such as the CIRCM systemcapable of blinding infrared guided missile seekers in mid-flight. This entire ecosystem is interconnected– Detection of a threat can automatically trigger jamming, countermeasures and evasive maneuvers without direct crew intervention. Added to this is a complete electronic intelligence system and data links that allow us to know the location of emerging threats and receive information from other platforms in real time. The result is one of the most difficult helicopters in the world to shoot down, especially in night and low-altitude missions. In Espinof Hugh Jackman presents the extraordinary trailer for his new film, where he becomes one of the most legendary characters of all time The coming war. The operation in Venezuela also has hinted the immediate future of this type of platforms. The US Army has been experimenting for years with the so-called lpunched effectsdrones launchable from helicopters capable of attacking, interfering or deceiving defenses tens or hundreds of kilometers away. Although its operational use has not been officially confirmed, there are indications that the MH-60M DAP could use them for the first time in combat during this mission, expanding its effective range and reducing direct exposure to enemy fire. Added to all this is the ability to refuel in flight using a telescopic probe, normally from MC-130J aircraftwhich extends the helicopter’s radius of action to limits imposed more by human resistance than by fuel. In short, the MH-60M DAP is consolidated as the version more armed and protected of the Black Hawk ever built, a tool tailor-made for operations like the one in Venezuela, where perfect coordination between helicopters, special forces and air support decides success or failure. Far from being a simple armed escort, the DAP is the closest thing to an integral force multiplier, difficult to replace by conventional means and a central piece of the way in which the United States today executes its most delicate missions. Image | MATTHEW WILLIAMS In Xataka | The attack on Venezuela has recovered an uncomfortable truth: that it would not have happened to North Korea for a very simple reason In Xataka | Satellite images of Venezuela before and after the attack have cleared up any doubt: … Read more

Baba Yaga was an old woman who devoured skulls at night. So Ukraine just turned Russia’s worst nightmare into a drone

In Slavic folklore, Baba Yaga She is an ancient figure associated with nocturnal fear, a witch who devours skulls and flies in the dark, punishing the reckless and inhabiting a territory where normal rules no longer apply. It is not a spectacular monster or the usual one, but a persistent presencedisturbing, impossible to ignore. Ukraine remembered it… and transformed it into a drone. The nightmare in war. This symbolic load explains why the name was not born in Ukrainian propaganda, but in the Russian channels themselves: when the soldiers began to describe night attacks that fell almost silently from the sky, the collective imagination did the rest. Today, “Baba Yaga” does not designate a fairy tale creature, but a family heavy bomber drones Ukrainians who have transformed the night of the front into a permanent hostile space for Russian forces. What really is a Baba Yaga. Under that name is grouped an entire class of heavy multicopters, many of them derived of agricultural platforms and others already designed for military purposes, capable of transporting from 15 kilos in their most common versions to several dozen in larger configurations. Unlike the kamikaze FPVs, the Baba Yaga They are reusable systemsconceived as aerial bombers themselves. They can launch mortar mines, fragmentation charges, adapted munitions or even converted anti-tank mines with remarkable accuracy from several hundreds of meters high. Its distinctive feature is not only the load, but the combination of thermal and optical sensors which allows them to operate at night, in fog, rain or wind, and remain effective where light drones begin to fail. This capacity has made them go from being a tactical complement to becoming a structural piece of the Ukrainian device. A Baba Yaga captured by Russian forces The night stops being a refuge. For months, trenches, concrete shelters or fortified buildings offered Russian infantry a relative sense of security from artillery and light drones. The Baba Yaga break that logic. If a point appears marked on a thermal image or reconnaissance map, no cover guarantees survival. A single drone can perform cascade attacksreleasing ammunition successively and dismantling a position section by section. The effect is cumulative: it not only destroys material, but forces units to disperseto rotate more frequently, to invest time and resources in camouflage and fortification, and to avoid concentrations of troops or vehicles. In a war of attrition, that behavioral change is as important as direct destruction. From tactical weapon to major system. Although they were born as a short-range solution, the Baba Yaga have been integrated into operations increasingly complex. They do not act in isolation, but as part of a drone ecosystem that includes FPV, long-range UAVs and, in some cases, naval platforms unmanned. In Crimea, for example, we have seen how maritime drones are used as advanced shuttles to allow heavy multicopters to reach radars and air defense systems like the Nebo-Mattacking antennas, technical installations and command posts. This logic is revealing: first the target is blinded or disorganized by other means, and then the Baba Yaga finish the job where it was previously considered too risky or inaccessible. Thus, these drones have ceased to be “flying artillery” and have become tools that connect the immediate front with the operational rear. Technical evolution. The development of these drones has not stopped. Ukrainian volunteer engineers and teams they have been improving engines, propellers, structures and suspension systems for ammunition of different calibers, while communications are reinforced with redundant channels, separate antennas and, in some cases, satellite links that expand the radius of action at the expense of payload. Russian electronic warfare has forced experimentation with system duplication control and backup plans to prevent the loss of a link from dragging down the entire set. This adaptation race explains why, even when Russia manages to shoot down some of these drones, the problem does not disappear: The threat materializes again the following night. Psychological impact. Beyond the technique, the Baba Yaga hits morale. Its low, recognizable hum does not announce an immediate explosion, but rather a tense wait– Someone, somewhere, is peering through a thermal scope and choosing the next target. Unlike artillery, there is no clearly safe haven or predictable pattern. Combined with FPV attacks and indirect fire, these drones create a sensation continuous pressure from above, from the front and from the rear. Military analysts match in which this constant stress accelerates organizational wear and tear, makes coordination difficult and forces commanders to focus on maintaining basic cohesion instead of planning offensive maneuvers. Lessons for the future of war. For Western observers and for NATO itself, the Baba Yaga are a practical demonstration of how future conflicts will be fought with swarms of relatively cheap, reusable and rapidly adapted platforms. It is not a miracle weapon, but a component within a system that combines intelligence, communications, flexible production and accelerated training. Ukraine has managed to assemble that system under extreme conditions, relying on industry, the State and voluntary networks. For Russia, the result is clear: the “witch” of folklore has returnednot as a myth, but as a technological presence that redefines the battlefield and makes it impossible to return to a war according to the standards of the 20th century. Image | Telegram, ArmіяІнформ In Xataka | Ukraine has asked Russia if they stop for Christmas like in the First World War. The answer could not have been more Russian In Xataka | Europe wanted to expropriate Russian funds on the continent to finance Ukraine. Until Belgium took the lead

An underwater drone from Ukraine has changed the future of wars

A little more than 24 hours ago an event occurred that was unprecedented in the history of war conflicts. It happens that there was only evidence from a video and statements of some involvedbut something else was missing that could certify that, indeed, an underwater drone had been able to disrupt a fortified port. Now there are no longer any doubts: the satellites have revealed what happened. Silent attack. The pfirst satellite images of the Ukrainian attack against a Russian submarine in Novorossiysk have confirmed that kyiv managed to introduce an unmanned underwater drone into one of the best protected ports in the Black Sea and detonate it a few meters from an Improved Kilo class diesel-electric submarine. According to the Ukrainian Security Serviceit would be the first known attack against a Russian ship using an unmanned underwater vehicle and, potentially, the first successful use of this type of system as an anti-ship weapon in a real conflict. Although the exact extent of the damage remains impossible to determine with certainty, the simple fact of having reached the objective is already a major operational and psychological milestone. What we know. Images obtained by commercial satellites confirm that the drone, named by Ukraine as Sub Sea Baby and until now unknown, detonated next to the stern of the submarine while it was moored to the dock. Part of the port infrastructure was clearly destroyed, consistent with the videos recorded from land and released by the SBU, where the explosion and damage to the dock can be seen. The submarine, a Project 636.3 Varshavyankaremains in the same position as before the attack, while two other units that were nearby have been displaced, suggesting an immediate security reaction. However, there are no unequivocal signs of sinking, no visible emergency operations, or fuel spills, which suggests that, if there was damage, it could be below the waterline or be of a limited nature, something impossible to confirm with aerial images alone. Satellite image after the attack, with a general view of the target submarine, inside the port, and another submarine moored outside. There are also other boats moored nearby Official denials. As expected, the Russian Ministry of Defense has denied any damage to the submarine or personnel, and has released a video which supposedly shows the ship intact, although without offering a clear view of the stern and with large areas censored. Still, even that material suggests concrete rubble on the dock, coinciding with the recorded explosion. The Black Sea Fleet has also rejected any operational impact, and Russian naval channels they have replicated that speechalthough without providing conclusive evidence. At this point, uncertainty is part of the information battlefield itself: Russia avoids recognizing vulnerabilities, while Ukraine emphasizes the audacity of the attack more than its physical effects. The same area seen before the attack, in an image from December 11, 2025. The gap in the defenses. Beyond the specific damage, the truly disruptive element of the attack is that the underwater drone managed to get through the defensive barriers of the port of Novorossiysk, designed to stop incursions Ukrainians. Those defenses had been deployed primarily in response to the surface drones that kyiv has used with notable success in the Black Sea, forcing Russia to adapt its port protection. The use of a UUV introduces a new dimension to the Russian defensive problem and confirms a key dynamic of the conflict: each countermeasure generates a different technological response, in a constant race of adaptation. Ukrainian ecosystem. He Sub Sea Baby It doesn’t come out of nowhere. Before this attack, Ukraine had already presented other underwater drones such as the Marichka, designed for kamikaze attacks against ships and maritime infrastructure, or the Toloka, of which fewer details are known. It is not clear whether there is a direct relationship between these systems, but the pattern is evident: kyiv is cbuilding a portfolio of unmanned submarine capabilities, aware that Russian underwater dominance was one of the few areas where Moscow still maintained clear superiority. The submarine as a target. The attack further confirms that the Black Sea Fleet remains a priority objective for Ukraine, especially its submarines Project 636 classcapable of throwing Kalibr cruise missiles regularly used against Ukrainian cities and infrastructure. Sustained pressure from kyiv had already forced Russia to withdraw a large part of its fleet from Crimea to Novorossiysk, and it is not the first time that these submarines have been attacked: in September 2023the Rostov-on-Don turned out seriously damaged in Sevastopol during a combined attack with missiles and surface drones. At the beginning of the large-scale invasion, Russia had six submarines of this type: each lost or neutralized one has considerable strategic weight. A message for Russia. Even if the submarine was not critically damaged, the attack has sent an unequivocal message: No Russian port is completely safe and naval warfare has entered a new phase, where underwater unmanned systems move from experiment to actual operational use. Other military powers, from United States to Chinacarefully observe a precedent that validates years of doctrinal development on UUVs as attack, reconnaissance and mining platforms. In that sense, the Novorossiysk episode reinforces a already recurring idea in the conflict: the war in Ukraine is not only fought over territories, but functions as a brutal laboratory for the military technologies of the future, where each innovation is tested in real conditions and its lessons are studied in all the military capitals of the planet. Image | VANTOR In Xataka | Drums of peace sound in Ukraine. And that should be a good thing for Europe… unless Finland is right In Xataka | If the video published by Ukraine is real, it has just blown up the naval war: an underwater drone has made history

an underwater drone has made history

Ukraine, that lwar laboratory of the present and future, was a pioneer in the use of drones and in the creation of an unprecedented industry around the use of these quadcopters as elements front key. This is how we saw mother drones sending drones to annihilate other drones. In Ukraine too, another unprecedented milestone has just taken place. With drones, but this time under the sea. A before and after. Ukraine claims to have carried out the first combat attack successful in history with an underwater drone against a warship, specifically a Russian submarine of the Improved Kilo class docked in the port of Novorossiysk, one of the current main refuges of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. According to the Ukrainian Security Servicethe attack was carried out with a known unmanned underwater vehicle as Sub Sea Babycapable of sailing underwater to a densely protected port and hitting a specific target without being detected, something that, if confirmed, would represent a qualitative leap in modern naval warfare. The images. He broadcast video by kyiv shows an explosion next to the submarine while it remains moored, which would indicate that the drone managed to penetrate the port’s defenses and reach one of the most valuable platforms of the Russian arsenal, valued at about 400 million dollars and equipped with launchers of Kalibr cruise missiles used recurrently against Ukrainian cities. Blow to the heart of Russian flora. The attacked submarine belongs to one of the most silent and difficult to detect of the Russian Navy when operating submerged and in battery mode, and is part of a small group of six units assigned to the Black Sea Fleet before the war. Sources close to the Russian military they point because the impact would have occurred near the stern, damaging rudders and propeller, critical components that, even without piercing the hull, could leave the submarine out of service for long periods. If the damage is as serious as kyiv claims, Russia would stay with only four Kilo submarines operational in the area, significantly reducing their ability to launch missile attacks from the sea and reinforcing the Ukrainian strategy of hitting launch platforms rather than intercepting individual projectiles. The forced withdrawal. This attack cannot be understood without the context of the Ukrainian naval campaign started in 2023based almost entirely on unmanned systems. The massive use of surface drones loaded with explosives allowed Ukraine to damage or neutralize approximately a third of the Russian Fleet of the Black Sea and forced Moscow to withdraw many of its ships from occupied Sevastopol to Novorossiysk, in Russian territory, until now considered a relatively safe haven. Submarines like Rostov-on-Don they had already been attacked in port on previous occasions, but the use of an underwater drone dramatically expands the range of threats, by making it possible to avoid networks, floating barriers and defenses specifically designed to stop surface attacks. The logic of asymmetric war. For kyiv, the commitment to naval drones, both surface and underwater, responds to a logic of cost and survival. While a Russian submarine costs hundreds of millions of dollars and years to build, a Ukrainian naval drone can be manufactured for between 250,000 and 300,000 dollars. This asymmetry allows Ukraine to compensate for its numerical and technological inferiority compared to Russia, forcing the Kremlin to invest huge resources defensive and live in a constant cycle of adaptation. Each new Ukrainian tactic generates Russian countermeasures, which in turn are neutralized by new developments in periods ranging from weeks to a few months, permanently altering the rules of naval combat in the Black Sea. A sign of what is to come. The operational use of underwater drones as offensive weapons opens a completely new scenario, not only for this conflict, but for global naval warfare. The United States, China and other powers have years developing UUV for reconnaissance missions, mine laying or long range attacksbut Ukraine could have been the first country in demonstrating its real effectiveness in combat. If Novorossiysk is no longer a safe sanctuary and submarines can be attacked even in port, the Russian defensive posture will have to change again, extending even more resources and protection. At the same time, the attack reinforces the idea that the war in Ukraine has become in a laboratory where theoretical concepts are tested on a large scale, anticipating a future in which ports, naval bases and large ships will no longer be able to rely on the depth of the sea as their last line of defense. Image | SBU SCREENCAP In Xataka | Now we know the price North Korea pays Russia for its nuclear submarine: the most dangerous job of the war in Ukraine In Xataka | The drone war in Ukraine is complete nonsense: the manuals that were useful two weeks ago are a death trap today

The drone war in Ukraine is advancing at the speed of light: what was useful two weeks ago is a death trap today

Since the first months of the Russian invasion, Ukraine has converted the use of drones in one of the central pillars of its defense, and has done so to the point of transforming a conventional conflict into a permanent laboratory unmanned combat. In this environment of constant adaptation, drones have not only redefined the way we fight on the front, but have imposed an unprecedented pace of technological change that forces armies, industries and training centers to update almost in real time to avoid becoming obsolete. Classrooms at war. The Ukrainian drone schools have become one of the most extreme laboratories of military learning in the world, forced to rewrite their training programs at a dizzying pace that in some cases reaches the two weeks. In a conflict where drones have become the main instrument of attack, reconnaissance and attrition, the distance between an obsolete lesson and a lethal decision can be measured in days. For these centers, adapting is not an academic question, but rather a direct line between survival and death on the front, in an environment where technology, countermeasures and tactics change constantly and rapidly. In Xataka We had seen everything in Ukraine, but this is new: drones are disguising themselves as Russian soldiers, and it is working Synergy. To stay relevant, instructors are not limited to manuals or simulators. They regularly visit the battle lines, maintain permanent contact with alumni deployed and testing new technologies before incorporating them into their courses. In schools like Dronarium, with offices in kyiv and Lviv, its R&D manager, the veteran known as “Ruda”, explains that technological evolution on the front is so rapid that it requires almost immediate adaptability. There is no two equal classes: Each lesson incorporates small adjustments resulting from what happened days before in real combat. More than 16,000 students have passed through this center, and their experiences are directly integrated into the curriculum, turning training into a living system that feeds back on the war. Two-way learning. One of the pillars of this model is communication direct and permanent with the combatants. Messaging groups connect deployed instructors and operators, allowing soldiers to share new enemy tactics, technical problems or improvised solutions, while receiving advice in near real time from the rear. In centers like Karlsson, Karas & Associates or Kruk Drones, this relationship does not end at the end of the course: it is maintained throughout the operator’s operational life. The instruction is clear: nothing is taught that is not strictly necessary in combat, and what is no longer useful is unceremoniously discarded, no matter how recent it may be. A war that reinvents itself. The central weight of drones on the battlefield explains this urgency. The majority of frontline impacts and casualties already depend on unmanned systems, requiring continuous modification of both platforms and employment tactics. New models appear, others are neutralized by countermeasures, and the rules of the game are constantly rewritten. This speed has set off alarm bells in the West: military officials such as British Minister Luke Pollard warn that NATO forces run the risk of becoming obsolete, trapped in acquisition cycles that last years in the face of a war that repeats every two or three weeks. {“videoId”:”x8j6422″,”autoplay”:false,”title”:”Declassified video of the clash between Russian fighters and the American drone”, “tag”:”united states”, “duration”:”42″} The industry learns from Ukraine. The schools they are not alone in this race. Defense companies that observe the conflict have begun to copy this model of direct interaction with the front, shortening your cycles developmental. Manufacturers of anti-drone systems and UAV platforms visit the battlefield, chat with operators and fine-tune designs in a matter of weeks, not years. Some executives recognize that the ways in which Ukrainians use technology have surprised them, forcing them to rethink basic assumptions. At the same time, the soldiers themselves benefit from this exchange, providing constant feedback and receiving improvements, spare parts and solutions adapted to their real needs. In Genbeta According to psychology, those who grew up in the 1960s and 1970s developed mental strengths that are being lost today Schools under fire. There is no doubt, this permanent adaptation has a cost. Drone schools are not only competing against the technological clock, they are operating under the direct threat from Russian attacks and with limited financial resources, often depending on donations to continue functioning. In this context, their fight is not only to stay updated, but to survive. Even so, their role has become central in modern warfare: they are the link that connects innovation, industry and real combat, and the best example of how Ukraine has turned the urgency of conflict into a flexible and brutally efficient national military learning system. Image | Heute, RawPixel In Xataka | The new episode of terror in Ukraine does not involve missiles or drones: it involves leaving a city without cell phones In Xataka | Europe faces a question it can no longer avoid: how to respond to a war that is rarely declared (function() { window._JS_MODULES = window._JS_MODULES || {}; var headElement = document.getElementsByTagName(‘head’)(0); if (_JS_MODULES.instagram) { var instagramScript = document.createElement(‘script’); instagramScript.src=”https://platform.instagram.com/en_US/embeds.js”; instagramScript.async = true; instagramScript.defer = true; headElement.appendChild(instagramScript); – The news The drone war in Ukraine is advancing at the speed of light: what was useful two weeks ago is a death trap today was originally published in Xataka by Miguel Jorge .

a mother drone with 16 tons of surprises

If drones are the weapons of present and futureChina is several galaxies ahead of the rest of the planet with a single architecture. HE called Jiu Tianand it is the evolution of old war aircraft carriers adapted to new times: a huge mother plane that has just successfully completed its first overhaul. The rise of the aerial mother. China has given a decisive step in the global race for dominance of unmanned airspace with the inaugural flight of the Jiutian, a 16-ton colossus that not only symbolizes the maturity of its aeronautical industry, but also marks a turning point in the very conception of air power in the 21st century. Although officially presented as a civil platform Versatile for heavy transportation, emergency communications or advanced mapping, the Jiutian (next to the Jetankits version more openly oriented towards dual missions) represents the culmination of a strategy in which drones cease to be simple support vectors and become motherships capable of releasing swarmstransport loitering munitions, and completely alter the way the military views saturation operations, electronic warfare, and spectrum control. And much more. The official media they have insisted after its first test in modularity and the diversity of civilian roles, but the combination of load capacity, range, autonomy and mission architecture has aroused interest that goes far beyond the commercial: it is the birth of the “aircraft carriers of the sky” (or rather drone carriers), platforms that are inserted in the global strategic competition. The metamorphosis of the drone. The first characteristic that distinguishes the Jiutian (and the Jetank) is its size. At 16.35 meters in length and 25 meters in wingspan, it is placed in an unprecedented category: large tonnage drones with the capacity to transport 6,000 kilos of payload. Added to this is an autonomy of 12 hours and a range of 7,000 kilometers, figures that were previously only associated with manned transport or ISR aircraft. This structural base allows mounting mission modules completely interchangeable: from high-precision logistics containers to communications capsules to restore networks in disaster situations. However, beneath that multifunction façade hides the real qualitative leap: an internal compartment “hive” type capable of hosting dozens to more than a hundred smaller drones or loitering munitions, along with eight external points from which guided weapons, air-to-air missiles, glider bombs or electronic warfare charges can be launched. Two versions of the same revolution. The figures presented by the Chinese developers show that the two models share dimensions, maximum takeoff weight, payload and autonomy, which indicates that Jiutian and Jetank are part of the same family of megadrones aimed at covering everything from logistical needs to complex military missions. One where the Jetank stands out is in the more explicit emphasis on its ability to launch swarms in mid-flight and change roles in a few hours thanks to mission modules that are quickly assembled. Chinese analysts describe it as a “world-class” platformcapable of acting as a multipurpose transporter, swarm nurse, electronic warfare vector and even light bomber with precision munitions. Its open architecture system allows you to process, integrate and update sensors and software in an agile way, which transforms the drone on a flexible node within a broader network of manned and unmanned systems. In essence, both models are not simple UAVs: they are aerial ecosystems capable of adapting their function to any tactical or strategic scenario. A doctrine of formation. The real value of these drone carriers lies not only in their size or the weapons they can carry, but in the ability to release swarms of small drones (including kamikaze UAVs) that introduces a dynamic that surpasses the traditional logic of combat aviation. For example, a single Jiutian could deploy a swarm sufficient to overwhelm anti-aircraft systemscollapse sensors, overwhelm radars and allow other platforms to penetrate previously insurmountable defenses. In parallel, its autonomy allows, a priori, that the combination of reconnaissance, attack, electronic warfare and saturation be integrated into a single extended missionsomething that has rarely existed in unmanned platforms of this size. In recent conflicts like the one in Ukrainedrones have proven to be low-cost weapons with a disproportionate impact: their ability to destroy much more expensive equipment has rewritten the relationship between investment and military effect. China, with these developments, appears to have internalized that lesson and taken it a step further: from individual drones to turning one larger drone into the matrix from which hundreds are deployed. The future and 2049. He Jiutian development It is part of Xi Jinping’s goal of turning the Chinese Armed Forces into a “world-class army” by 2049. The exhibition in Zhuhai the previous year had already shown prototypes of combat drones equipped with AI capable of operating in tandem with manned fighters, and the flight of Jiutian confirms that the country is accelerating the technological pillars necessary to sustain a network combat model: megadrones, distributed artificial intelligence, swarms, modular sensors and platforms capable of exerting pressure on any regional theater. From that perspective, Jiutian and Jetank become in fundamental pieces for surveillance, reconnaissance, electromagnetic interference, saturation attacks and power projection missions in remote scenarios. Its design does not respond to an isolated program, but to a broader strategic architecture that China is perfecting to sustain its military rise. Image | CCTV, EPL In Xataka | One of China’s most disturbing weapons already has a flight date: a huge mother drone with 100 kamikaze drones on board In Xataka | China is sending drones to an island 100 km from Taiwan. The problem is that Japan and the US are filling it with missiles

This is how Moscow wants to stop Ukrainian drone incursions

Losing your mobile connection when entering Russia has become, in recent days, a very real possibility for those traveling to the country. It is not a blackout zone or an operator error, but a measure that is part of the new approach with which Moscow is monitoring its networks amid the conflict with Ukraine. On November 10 began to be applied in Russia a mechanism that allows you to temporarily restrict the use of certain SIM cards when they reconnect to the country’s network. According to the Ministry of Digital Developmentit is a system aimed at verifying that the line belongs to a real user and not to a device used for other purposes. The idea fits with what Minister Maksut Shadayev advanced in August, when he explained that his department was studying blocking SIMs from abroad for a few hours when crossing the border. When the SIM reappears. In the case of Russian cards, the authorities have established a mechanism that is activated when the line reconnects to the national network after having been inactive for 72 hours or after a period of roaming. During this interval, access to mobile data and the use of SMS is suspended. It is not presented as a technical failure, but rather as a preliminary check that the network executes before allowing normal use of the service. For SIM cards that arrive from abroad, the system works more directly. When the line connects to the Russian network, the same temporary blocking that we have already talked about is applied, but with a clear procedure to remove it. The user receives an SMS from the operator that explains the restriction and includes a link to complete a captcha that proves that the card is in the hands of a person. If you prefer, you can do this by phone, where the operator confirms your details before reactivating services. The drone war is also going through mobile networks. The official explanation maintains that some SIM cards with data access can be found inside enemy drones and serve as a navigation or control channel. It is not an isolated idea. In Operation Spider’s Web, described by CSISUkraine used drones equipped with 4G/LTE-based systems and autonomous flight software. Even without stating that they all work the same, this precedent shows that mobile networks have become one more element of a conflict where each communication channel counts. One more measure in a much larger mosaic. Determining the real impact of these limitations on drone raids is not easy, among other things because there is no single operating model. The CSIS analysis reflects that even in systems that rely on mobile networks, autonomy plays a key role and that the weight of connectivity can vary depending on the mission. In this context, the restrictions applied by Russia fit as another tool, the exact scope of which depends on factors that are not public and that vary from one operation to another. For users, these measures mean living with a system that introduces an additional pause every time the SIM card changes context. The impact is especially visible in border areas, where mobile phones can automatically connect to networks in other countries and activate unwanted restrictions. Authorities have recommended configuring network selection manually to avoid this. Recovering the service involves following the steps we have mentioned. Images | Xataka with Gemini 2.5 In Xataka | In Ukraine the difficult thing is not to replace a drone but its pilot. So Russia has started the hunt with something unprecedented: Rubikon

In Ukraine, the difficult thing is not to replace a drone, but its pilot. So Russia has started the hunt with something unprecedented: Rubikon

For two years, Ukrainian drone operators had managed to maintain a decisive tactical advantage: the ability to detect, harass and destroy Russian positions with an agility that Moscow could not match. Pilots worked in small teams, in makeshift basements or camouflaged trenches, piloting from a distance FPV that turned the front into a transparent space where the enemy could rarely move unobserved. All that has changed with an appearance. The dark turn. Yes, that domain has been abruptly broken with the appearance Rubikona Russian unit created to track, locate and eliminate not so much drones as to those who operate them. The testimony in the financial times by Dmytro, a Ukrainian pilot and former rapper, summarizes this change of era: he went from being a hunter to being hunted in seconds when a Russian drone detected him on a reckless walk. That moment, which two years ago would have been exceptional, has become part of the daily routine on a front where the survival of the operator has become a strategic objective for Russia and a critical weak point for Ukraine. The result is a complete investment of roles: Innovators, previously almost untouchable, are now a priority target. Rubikon structure and ambition. This Russian elite corps is not simply a drone unit, but an organization of about 5,000 troops endowed with ample financial resources, tactical autonomy and a defined mission: deny Ukraine the ability to operate its drone network. Unlike the heavily bureaucratic operation that characterized the Russian army in the early stages of the war, this unit acts with speed, initiative and an approach more reminiscent of the Ukrainian groups it seeks to destroy. Their main task is not to attack the infantry on the front line, but penetrate behind the frontup to 10 kilometers in depth, to destroy logistics vehicles, ground robots and, above all, locate the operators who control the Ukrainian defensive swarms. Emblem of the elite Russian unit And much more. For Russian and Western experts, Rubikon functions as a development center of unmanned systems: trains other units, analyzes tactics, refines procedures and continually adapts its way of operating. Each technical or doctrinal improvement that emerges from Rubikon ends up radiating to the rest of the Russian army, which explains why the Ukrainians detect unexpected qualitative leaps in the performance of enemy drones. This ability fast learning It is one of the most disturbing elements, because it allows Russia to correct in months the technological gap that Ukraine built for years. The new invisible dimension. The combat is no longer limited to the visible sky, but is fought in a domain more abstract and lethal: the electromagnetic spectrum. Both Ukraine and Russia deploy electronic intelligence stations, signal guidance equipment and jamming systems capable of defeating, jamming or even hijacking adversary drones. This rivalry makes any radio broadcast a potential risk. Operators, no matter how hidden, need clear lines of sight, elevated antennas, and transmitters relatively close to the front, factors that Rubicon systematically explodes. Their teams track antennas on hills, thermal shadows in forests and emissions that reveal the presence of a pilot a few kilometers away. Andrey Belousov inspecting the Rubikon unit The signs. The inhibitorsdespite their usefulness, generate visible electrical signatures that can attract attacks. And in the midst of these maneuvers, both sides resort to signal hacking video to observe enemy cameras or locate the exact source of a remote control. Expert Tom Withington resume this complexity with a precise image: it is a game of cat and mouse where physics dictates the rules, and where each action leaves a trace that the opponent can exploit. Pressure on the pilots. Plus: unlike the Russians, Ukraine lacks the necessary troops to maintain continuous shiftswhich creates physical and psychological exhaustion that becomes as dangerous as the enemy itself. Zoommer, a Ukrainian soldier from a small drone unit, explained in the Times that Rubikon can operate without breaks because it has enough staff to rotate every few hours, while they must remain alert almost all day. The arrival of this unit to Pokrovsk area (a city that has been in a desperate defensive struggle for a year) has transformed life on the front, going from manageable days to a constant tension in which any movement can mean death. Before, says Zoommer.the area was almost “a vacation”, now it is an invisible hell where every antenna, every fleeting signal and every movement outside the trench can be a fatal mistake. This pressure has forced the Ukrainians to change routines, camouflage positions with extreme care, hide transmitters, disperse equipment and create anti-drone cells that act as a defensive mirror of Russia’s own tactics. The loss of transparency. Drones had provided Ukraine with a crucial tool: the ability to see and hit farther and faster, giving its defenders situational transparency that compensated for numerical inferiority. According to the RUSI analysisup to 80% of current casualties are attributed to drone operations, underscoring their central role in a war in which artillery and infantry depend on these mechanical eyes. What’s happening? Than Rubikon and the like have eroded that advantage in forcing Ukraine to reallocate resources from offensive missions to the protection of its own operators. The result is that, while Russia advances at an increasing pace, Ukraine devotes more efforts to stopping than hitting, losing the initiative at a critical moment in the conflict. Moscow has quickly absorbed the enemy’s lessons and turned them into doctrine, a process that would normally take years and that here has been compressed into months, tipping the balance on an increasingly dynamic front. Psychological warfare. The latest analysis show that the front is no longer defined only by the technology deployed, but by psychological pressure endured by Ukrainian operators and by the transformation of the Russian army towards a more agile structure, represented in Rubikon. The pilots, who have become priority objectives, live under constant tension that forces them to minimize any movement and operate with the permanent feeling of being watched, because … Read more

There were thousands of mysterious holes lined up in Peru. We didn’t know why until a drone saw them from the air

In the arid hills of Pisco Valleyin the south of Peru, extends a monument as mysterious as it is precise: a strip of almost a kilometer and a half made up of some 5,200 perfectly aligned cavities, known like Mount Sierpe or the Band of Holes. Discovered in 1931 by the geologist Robert Shippee and Lieutenant George R. Johnson during one of the first aerial expeditions over the Andes, the site baffled generations of archaeologists. Until now. A mysterious landscape. For decades, theories were proposed ranging from its defensive use to fog capture or water storage, but none of them quite fit. Now, a new study published in Antiquity provides a convincing hypothesis from a point of view that no one had valued: from the air. In this way, Mount Sierpe would have functioned as a accounting and barter system on a large scale, a kind of “spreadsheet” of the pre-Hispanic Andes. The geometry that speaks. The international team of researchers, led by archaeologist Jacob Bongers from the University of Sydney, used drones to map the site with millimeter precision. Aerial images revealed an organized structure into about 60 blocks or sections, each with distinct alignments and regular number patterns. Some areas show rows of nine by eight holesothers alternate between groups of seven and eight. This internal order, absent any defensive or agricultural logic, suggests an administrative purpose. Sediment analyzes extracted microscopic remains corn, totora and willow (plants traditionally used to make baskets and mats), which suggests that the cavities were lined with plant fibers and were used to store goods, possibly in packages or braided baskets. The holes of Mount Sierpe From local barter to administration. Researchers believe that Monte Sierpe was born as a space for exchange between highland and coastal communities, an organized market for balance the flow of goods in the absence of currency. Products (for example, corn, coca or cotton) could be deposited in each cavity as a visible representation of the value of one good compared to another, allowing quantities to be compared in a public and transparent manner. Centuries later, with the expansion of inca empirethat system would have been reinterpreted and expanded as an accounting tool to manage the tribute of local populations. Each block of holes would have corresponded to a different community group, and the variations in number and arrangement would reflect the contribution levels or work shifts required by the Inca State. In essence, Monte Sierpe would have been a physical data recorda stone matrix destined to organize the unwritten economy of the Andean world. A carved khipu. The most revealing finding is the similarity between the structure of the site and the Inca khipusthe rope systems with knots used to record censuses, taxes or resources. One of the khipus found near Pisco presents around 80 groups of lacesa figure surprisingly close to the 60 segments of Monte Sierpe. This correspondence suggests that the Band of Holes could have been a three-dimensional khipua monumental version of that woven numerical language, designed to coordinate the flow of goods and work between communities. Unlike the tablets or inscriptions of other civilizations, the Andean peoples turned geography itself into a support for information. Code in the desert. If you also want, Monte Sierpe redefines our understanding of pre-columbian organizational intelligence. Without writing, without currency and in a hostile environment, Andean societies managed to develop a visual, modular and mathematical method to represent their economy. Each hole would have been a cell a great living recordmanaged collectively, perhaps accompanied by ceremonies or ritual exchanges. Thus, in its apparent geometric simplicity, this “spreadsheet” carved into the rock reveals a advanced economic systembased on reciprocity and communal control of resources. What for the first explorers were simple rows of holes now emerge as the physical testimony of a civilization that, centuries before European contact, had already found its own way of turning the landscape into memory. Image | JL Bongers In Xataka | We have found 76 megatraps in the Andes. It’s amazing we hadn’t done it before. In Xataka | A secret room has just revealed how they ruled in Peru 2,000 years ago: with the help of drugs

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