Chinese researchers wanted to know if it was possible to block Starlink in Taiwan: now they have an awkward answer

Communications have become the invisible thread that sustains any modern military operation. Troops, vehicles or missiles are no longer enough: without a stable and resilient network, the situation can become complicated. During the Ukrainian war, Starlink demonstrated be able to keep Ukrainian forces connected even under pressure, and has since been placed at the center of the debate over its role in military scenarios. According to South China Morning Posta group of Chinese researchers linked to defense institutions has examined to what extent that network could resist a large-scale interference attempt on a territory like Taiwan. Starlink is not a typical satellite network. Instead of relying on a few high-altitude satellites in fixed positions above the equator, it is made up of thousands of small satellites that orbit the Earth at low altitudes and on changing routes. This architecture allows a terminal on the ground to not always connect to the same satellite, but to jump between several in a matter of seconds, forming a flexible mesh that is difficult to interrupt. That dynamic behavior largely explains why it has become a key element in debates about electronic warfare. A laboratory experiment. The study that has put numbers to this scenario is titled “Simulation research of distributed jammers against mega-constellation downlink communication transmissions” and appeared on November 5 in the Chinese magazine Systems Engineering and Electronics. It is signed by a team from Zhejiang University and the Beijing Institute of Technology, an institution with a prominent presence in the country’s military research. It should be noted that it is not an operational document or an official proposal from the Chinese Army, but rather an academic simulation that explores, from a technical point of view, what it would take to interfere with a network like Starlink on a regional scale. {“videoId”:”x9ri2iu”,”autoplay”:false,”title”:”How China, the biggest polluter on the planet, has also become the complete opposite”, “tag”:”webedia-prod”, “duration”:”740″} A constellation designed to avoid interference. The study does not limit itself to describing that the terminals change satellites, but analyzes how this change thwarts any attempt at sustained interference. When a hostile signal affects a link, the terminal automatically redirects traffic to another visible satellite, and the network adapts the channel and frequency in real time. That reaction, combined with highly directional antennas capable of concentrating the signal toward specific points, reduces the impact of interfering emitters. The researchers highlight that even if a connection is momentarily blocked, the network can restore communication from another angle or frequency almost immediately. A thousand drones in action? The simulation was based on real data from Starlink’s orbital positioning and modeled how the signal would behave for twelve hours over eastern China. The researchers placed a virtual network of jammers 20 kilometers high, spaced between five and nine kilometers apart, as if they formed a checkerboard in the sky. The study considers that these nodes could be installed on drones, balloons or similar aerial platforms, capable of supporting coordinated interference systems. Using 26 dBW power and narrow beam antennas, each node managed to block an average of 38.5 square kilometers. With that efficiency, at least 935 units would be needed to cover a territory the size of Taiwan, not counting redundancies, failures or geographical barriers such as mountains. In Xataka China is sending drones to an island 100 km from Taiwan. The problem is that Japan and the US are filling it with missiles The authors themselves acknowledge that their results are only an approximation. They explain that they do not have real data on the radiation patterns of the terminals or measured signal suppression coefficients, which limits the precision of the simulation. They also do not know Starlink’s internal adaptation mechanisms against coordinated interference. Even so, they consider that the model serves to estimate the scale of the necessary effort and opens a line of study that allows quantifying, although imperfectly, how a blocking strategy would work in a real scenario. Images | starlink In Xataka | Starlink satellites have transformed war: China and Russia work on “Starlink Killers” to deactivate them (function() { window._JS_MODULES = window._JS_MODULES || {}; var headElement = document.getElementsByTagName(‘head’)(0); if (_JS_MODULES.instagram) { var instagramScript = document.createElement(‘script’); instagramScript.src=”https://platform.instagram.com/en_US/embeds.js”; instagramScript.async = true; instagramScript.defer = true; headElement.appendChild(instagramScript); – The news Chinese researchers wanted to know if it was possible to block Starlink in Taiwan: now they have an awkward answer was originally published in Xataka by Javier Marquez .

China is sending drones to an island 100 km from Taiwan. The problem is that Japan and the US are filling it with missiles

The small Japanese island by Yonagunilocated just over 100 kilometers away from Taiwan, has gone in a matter of months from being a remote enclave with a modest self-defense detachment to becoming one of the most sensitive points of the strategic balance in Asia. The United States, China and Japan itself are carrying their disputes to the small enclave. An island as a front. The intensification of chinese drone flights over the island and the strait, intercepted on two consecutive occasions by Japanese fighters, has reinforced the perception in Tokyo that the first island chain is entering a phase of chronic instability. Japan, aware of the real possibility of a conflict around Taiwan, has decided to turn Yonaguni into a defensive node fully integrated: a place where operates a FARP American that extends the range of Marine Corps helicopters, where capabilities are consolidated electronic surveillance and where the installation of air defense missiles is progressing like the Type 03 Chu-SAM. Weapons and more weapons. This system, capable of tracking one hundred simultaneous targets and shooting down twelve of them with Mach 2.5 missilesimplies that Japan is beginning to give teeth to a position whose mere proximity to the democratic island makes it an advanced platform to detect, deter or even respond to a possible Chinese attack. For Tokyo, reinforcing Yonaguni is not a provocation but a life policy national: any attack on Taiwan, as as stated the new Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, would constitute an existential threat to the archipelago. Yonaguni Beijing’s reaction. China, which interprets any Japanese defensive measure as one more step in a strategic siege promoted by the United States, has reacted with increasing hardness. From historical comparisons to veiled threats, including the summoning of the Japanese ambassador and the suspension of economic exchanges, Beijing frames the installation of missiles in Yonaguni as an “offensive act” that violates the spirit of the bilateral normalization of 1972. The rhetoric has gone in crescendo after Takaichi’s words about the possibility of Japan intervening militarily in the event of an attack on Taiwan, something that China considers a space invasion diplomat reserved for Washington. The climate has deteriorated to such a level that a Chinese diplomat even published (and removed) a direct threat against the prime minister, while the central government canceled meetings, stopped imports and called for boycott trips to Japansinking the influx of Chinese tourists who represented almost a third of foreign visitors. In parallel, China has intensified its military demonstrations, spreading videos YKJ-1000 hypersonic missile destroying Japanese targets, a message designed to emphasize that any expansion of the Japanese military footprint will be met with a response. The strategic dilemma. Far from backing down, Japan has adopted a tone unusually firm. Under the leadership of Takaichi, the political heir to Shinzo Abe’s strategic nationalism, Tokyo has made Yonaguni the tangible manifestation of a doctrinal turn: accept that Japanese stability requires preventing China from dominating the Taiwan Strait. from there the proliferation of radar installations, electronic warfare capabilities and additional plans that contemplate systems such as US Patriots, US Army Typhon, HIMARS and the NMESIS equipped with NSM missiles, capable of denying access to Chinese ships around the Taiwanese eastern coast. USA discreetly supports this redesign: approved sales of NASAMS and spare parts to the Taiwan Air Force, deployed CH-53E helicopters in Yonaguni (an unprecedented milestone) and coordinates with Japan a doctrine that assumes that, in the event of an outbreak of hostilities, the Marines must operate from the lethality zone itself of Chinese missiles. All of this positions Yonaguni not only as an advanced observatory, but as a critical point whose defense and survival would determine the first stages of any crisis in the strait. Yonaguni Taiwan’s hardening. While Japan reinforces the front line, Taiwan assumes that time to prepare is running out. President Lai Ching-te has announced a massive increase in military spending, raising it by $40 billion until 2033, with a roadmap that will place it at 3.3% of GDP in 2026 and with the declared ambition of reaching 5% before 2030. What Taipei is proposing is not a simple rearmament, but a comprehensive redesign: new missiles and drones, integrating AI into existing systems, protecting against infiltration operations, dramatically improving procurement (often delayed in the United States), and measures against transnational Chinese repression targeting Taiwanese abroad. For Lai, the most dangerous threat is not a Chinese landing but internal erosion: that Taiwan “gives up” due to psychological or economic pressure. It flatly rejects the “one country, two systems” model and affirms that the only way to maintain peace is to make an invasion too costly for Beijing. The United States, through its de facto representation, has described the decision as a crucial step to strengthen deterrence. A strategic powder keg. The juxtaposition of Japanese military movements, Chinese threats and unprecedented rearmament of Taiwan produces a “traffic” that raises the risk of calculation errors. The experts warn that a poorly calibrated comment, a overflight unreported or a maritime incident could accelerate a spiral that is difficult to contain, especially when Beijing tries to use its contacts with Washington to simultaneously pressure Tokyo and Taipei. In this context, Yonaguni becomes symbol and detonator: too close to Taiwan to be irrelevant, too exposed to be invulnerable, and too strategic for either side to relinquish control or influence. Plus: the island is both within immediate range of Chinese missiles and within the American concept of advanced distributed operationsmeaning it could be both a multiplier of Allied defense and a priority objective in the first minute of a war. A fragile balance. In short, China hardens his stanceJapan resignation definitely to ambiguity, Taiwan accelerate the shielding of its sovereignty and the United States consolidates its role as operational guarantor. In the midst of all this, Yonaguni emerges as a microcosm where the resistance of that regional order is tested. An enclave of barely 1,700 inhabitants that, due to its geographical positionhas become a thermometer, border and barrier. Its immediate … Read more

Germany has spent three nights copying Taiwan. If Russia decides to invade it, it has had an idea: surprise them underground

Last July, the Taiwan subway experienced an unusual day: Instead of passengers loaded with purses and suitcases, soldiers, soldiers and more soldiers armed with anti-tank missiles began to arrive at Taipei stations. The reason was twofold: to send a message inside and outside (China) of the country. That idea seduced Germany, and now that it has begun its rearmament it has launched in Berlin. A disturbing return. The exercise Bollwerk Bärlin III Last week, he returned to the German capital a scene that seemed banished to the memories of the 20th century: soldiers descending U-Bahn stairsjumping onto the tracks and advancing through smoke, simulated gunshots and cars taken over by “saboteurs.” For three nights, between 1 and 4 in the morning, about 250 members of the Wachbataillon (a unit known for its ceremonial role but with infantry functions) transformed stations like Jungfernheide into a real underground battlefield to practice assaults, close combat, evacuation of civilians and protection of critical infrastructure in a realistic environment in which nothing is altered or mocked up: the narrowness of the tunnels, limited visibility and changes in light are the same as they would find in a real war scenario. In the background: Russia. They remembered the TWZ analysts that this return to urban warfare in tunnels and stations, without embellishments or theatrical simulations, symbolizes a profound change in Germany’s strategic priorities and revealed the extent to which the shadow of a possible conflict with Russia has penetrated into the very heart of Germany. his military planning. The metamorphosis. The battalion in charge of displaying honors on state visits had been conceived for decades as a symbol of institutional stability, not as a combat force. However, its real operational mission (protecting the federal government and its facilities in the event of a crisis) today takes on an urgency that has not been seen for a long time. Hence the direct tone of his commanderlieutenant colonel Maik Teichgräber: Berlin is your area of ​​operations and they must prepare for “the worst case scenario,” which means training where you would really fight. The use of stations closed to the public allows practice quick entriesassaults on trains, neutralization of enemies and immediate removal of wounded, integrating snipers, perimeter security and coordination between units in a densely urbanized environment. The presence of additional scenarios (such as the former Rüdersdorf chemical plant or the Ruhleben police complex) underlines the desire to turn the capital’s defense into a multidimensional exercisecapable of absorbing everything from internal sabotage to coordinated incursions that seek to paralyze the political center of Germany. Global dimension of the trend. Which happens in Berlin It is also reflected in other regions of the world. How we countTaiwan uses its subway as a defensive artery during the Han Kuang exercises, aware that, in the event of a Chinese invasion, underground infrastructure they would be vital to move troops and supplies while the surface becomes a continuous target. In parallel, the United States has raised the underground war a priority for its special forces, responding to the proliferation of fortified tunnels, dense urban areas and the expansion of drone swarms that force troops to seek refuge underground. The growing autonomy of unmanned systems, already present in Ukraine, accelerates this trend: in a future where aerial surveillance will be almost constant, defending in depth will mean dominating not only streets and buildings, but subways, tunnels, pipelines and interconnected bunkers. The war of the future, according to these emerging doctrines, will be fought both upwards (against drones, sensors and loitering munitions) and downwards, in an underground network that takes on strategic value. Echoes of the Cold War. He training on the U-Bahn inevitably refers to a divided Berlinwhen the city was a western enclave surrounded by Warsaw Pact forces. At that time, the United States, the United Kingdom and France were rehearsing urban operations aimed at slowing down an invasion to gain political time, aware that holding the city indefinitely was unrealistic. Units like the (secret) Detachment A They practiced sabotage and unconventional warfare techniques from the shadows. Even stations, such as Pankstraße or Siemensdamm, were designed like nuclear shelters for more than 3,000 people for weeks, with armored doors and air filtering. The reunified Germany had left behind that architecture of fear, and today, faced with a panorama of uncertainty, it returns to study how to reactivate these civil protection capabilities. The contrast is evident: what in 1994 seemed unnecessary is once again considered a strategic necessity. Historical rearmament. we have been counting. The exercise is also part of a context transformation unprecedented german military apparatus. By 2029, Berlin plans spend 153,000 million euros per year in defense (around 3.5% of GDP), an enormous jump from the levels that for decades were a source of friction with Washington. It is a rearmament designed not only for modernize capabilitiesbut to adapt the country to threats that They are no longer theoretical: What happens 900 kilometers away, in Ukraine, conditions the entire strategy. This budget increase has led NATO to consider a symbolic turn that would have been unthinkable during the Cold War: that Germany would command the allied forces in Europe. Although that moment has not arrivedthe expectation underscores the pressure on Berlin to demonstrate that it can take on top responsibilities and is willing to prepare its military for complex scenariosfrom urban sabotage to large-scale conventional warfare. Strategic warning. Teichgräber put it clearly: Nobody can guarantee that the war that is currently devastating Ukraine will not one day reach German territory. That phrase sums up the background of Bollwerk Bärlin III. The Bundeswehr trains in the subway tunnels because it understands that contemporary conflicts do not respect borders or capitals. The hybrid warcoordinated attacks on critical infrastructure and the massive use of drones They make the interior of cities as vulnerable as their borders. If you like, what is at stake is not only the defense of Berlin, but Germany’s capacity to react facing a moment in which the strategic … Read more

It is one thing to support the US, quite another to defend Taiwan

The latest diplomatic outbreak between China and Japan It does not seem to arise from an isolated gesture, but from a profound change in Tokyo’s strategic perception of the Taiwan Strait and Japan’s increasingly central role within the regional security architecture. The problem now is that China has forced it to make clear a position that until now it had found in the ambiguity the perfect setting. An archipelago between two fires. The statement of Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, suggesting that a Chinese blockade or attack on the island could constitute a situation existential threat for Japan, it immediately upset the fine balance of strategic ambiguity that Tokyo had maintained for years. His comment put into official words for the first time something that Japanese security teams were discussing privately. for decades: that, in certain circumstances, Japan could be forced to act alongside the United States in a war scenario around Taiwan, not to defend the island as such, but to preserve the sea routes, energy supplies and American bases that guarantee the survival of Japan itself. That nuance, normally invisible to the general public, is what triggered the Beijing reactionwhich interpreted the statement not as a technical analysis, but like a hint that Japan could intervene militarily in an area that China considers strictly internal. The clash and diplomacy. Beijing’s response was immediate and forcefuldeploying a full range of instruments of pressure designed to punish, intimidate and isolate Tokyo. China issued warnings to students and tourists to They will avoid Japan alleging alleged security risks, suspended diplomatic meetings, delayed film premieres, patrols intensified of its Coast Guard in disputed waters and raised the tone of the propaganda discourse, recalling the war of the past to underline its current military superiority. The intention was clear: send a message internal and external that any questioning of his stance on Taiwan will carry an immediate cost. However, the virulence of the reaction generated a double effect. On the one hand, it fueled a growing sense in Japanese society that China systematically uses economic and diplomatic punishment to shape the behavior of others. On the other hand, it reinforced within the Japanese Government the idea that Chinese pressure is not going to decrease and that the only viable response is through strengthen alliances military and preparation for real contingencies. Sanae Takaichi And more. The division of Japanese public opinion reflects this tension: approximately half of society believes that Japan should intervene in a scenario of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, and the other half fear that any involvement would plunge the country into a catastrophic conflict. Meanwhile, the Chinese state machinery intensifies a warning message which, far from universally intimidating, is prompting growing accusations of diplomatic harassment by Tokyo and calls to further strengthen deterrence. The United States has conducted multiple tests of the Typhon system, which includes four trailer-mounted launchers and support equipment capable of firing Tomahawk and SM-6 missiles. USA and the military board. In this context of escalation, the sudden withdrawal by the United States of the system of Typhon missiles temporarily deployed at the Iwakuni base adds an extra layer to the puzzle. Its initial presence, capable of launching Tomahawk and SM-6 missiles with a range sufficient to hit critical targets in eastern China, had unleashed worry in Beijing and Moscow, which interpreted its deployment as a preview of a network of US land-based missiles in the Indo-Pacific after the end of the INF treaty. The official goal was to conduct rapid transition testing in the event of war, but it also represented a explicit demonstration that Japan is a key piece in the US containment strategy. His withdrawal, just when China intensifies retaliation against Tokyo, does not reduce tension: it shows the flexibility with which Washington repositions its pieces and its intention to keep Beijing in permanent uncertainty. Japan, in turn, finds itself increasingly at the center of a strategic dilemma: it depends on American security umbrella for its survival, but the price of that dependence is that any crisis in the Taiwan Strait automatically becomes a Japanese domestic matter. The strategic ambiguity. The episode has shaken the guiding principle of security policies in East Asia: the strategic ambiguity. The United States avoids explicitly compromising its reaction to a Chinese attack so as not to offer certainty to Beijing or Taipei, while Japan had tried to align its position without standing out. Takaichi’s words break that ambiguity, even though he later insisted that they did not imply a doctrinal change. In doing so, they reveal the evolution of a country that has left behind the absolute caution of the post-war and that, faced with the real possibility of a high-intensity conflict in its neighborhood, begins to assume that its security can no longer be separated of a possible war over Taiwan. For Beijing, this transformation It’s disturbing: a more assertive Japan, more integrated into the US military framework and more willing to act preventively modifies the strategic equation in the entire region. For Tokyo, on the other hand, the current crisis illustrates precisely why trying to ease tensions with China does not avoid its pressureand why maintaining decision-making capacity and room for maneuver involves reinforcing its autonomy and military cooperation. The fragile balance. Taken together, the sequence reflects a turning point. China wants deter Japan through immediate punishment, and Japan wants deter China showing that it will not be intimidated, as the United States adjusts discreetly his presenceremembering that its military power will be decisive in any scenario. For its part, Taiwan becomes the axis around which the stability of Northeast Asia revolves. The result is a more tense, more transparent and dangerous balance than in previous years. A balance in which the words of a prime minister, the oversized reaction of a neighboring power and the apparently technical movement of a missile system they intertwine to reveal an uncomfortable truth: that the region is moving towards a stage where a misinterpreted gesture has the potential to … Read more

Japan has warned China about Taiwan. And China has taken it so seriously that they have surrounded some islands in Japan

It started a few days ago, when the Japanese Prime Minister, Sanae Takaichi, declared before parliament that Chinese aggression against Taiwan could constitute a “survival threat situation”, the legal formula that would allow Tokyo to use force in support of its allies. With his words, he not only broke the “strategic ambiguity” maintained by Japan for decades, he thus opened a Pandora’s box that at this time hangs on a very thin line. The explosion. As we said, the Takaichi gesturewhich broke with decades of caution and “strategic ambiguity” around the Taiwanese issue, was interpreted by Beijing as a direct provocation and a sign that the new Japanese government was willing to align itself more openly with Washington and Taipei in the most sensitive scenario in the Asia-Pacific. The Chinese reaction It was immediate: summoned the Japanese ambassador with unusually harsh language, issued official editorials calling Takaichi’s words “fundamentally evil” and warned that any Japanese intervention would be a failure destined to turn “the entire country into a battlefield.” That aggressive turnmore typical of moments of maximum tension than of routine diplomacy, announced that Beijing was not willing to leave a change of position that affects one of its vital interests unanswered. The military front is activated. While charging politically against Tokyo, China opened a second front in the military terrain. The most “showy”: the arrival of its coast guard ships on a patrol mission within the waters of the Senkaku Islands (administered by Japan but claimed by China like Diaoyu), one more step in a theater where both countries have been competing for years, but whose meaning is different in the midst of a diplomatic clash. Simultaneously, the Taiwanese Ministry of Defense detected thirty aircraftseven ships and one official Chinese vessel operating around the island in just 24 hours, with maps showing drones approaching dangerously close to Yonaguni, the Japanese island located just 110 kilometers from the Taiwanese coast. Chinese patrol with the Senkaku in the background The red line. China it takes months combining these “joint patrols” with intrusive flights in the Taiwanese ADIZ as part of a pressure strategy persistent, but do it right after Takaichi’s statements He turned these maneuvers into a message addressed to Tokyo as well as Taipei. For Japan, see military drones Chinese bordering its southernmost islands is a warning that any clash in the Taiwan Strait would have direct repercussions on its territory, a reminder that its security is inexorably linked to the future of the self-governed island. After using water cannon to turn back a flotilla of Taiwanese fishing and coast guard vessels in 2012, the Japanese Coast Guard has shown increasing vigilance in defending the waters surrounding the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. In its territorial claim, Japan’s maritime border covers about 27 kilometers around the archipelago. The economic front. The second line of Chinese response came through economic waya tool that Beijing has perfected in previous disputes with Australia, South Korea or the United States. First issued a travel notice to its citizens warning of the “increased risks” in Japan, then urged reconsider studies in the country, directly affecting more than 123,000 Chinese students registered in Japanese centers, and then allowed the main Chinese airlines will refund free of charge tickets to Japan. This sequence, apparently dispersed, has a crystal clear logic: in a country where Chinese visitors represent nearly a quarter of total tourism, a diplomatic warning is enough to shake an entire sector. The Japanese stock market showed it: Shiseido, Uniqlo, Isetan-Mitsukoshi, Takashimaya and the airlines JAL and ANA suffered drops of between 5 and 12%, while Oriental Land, operator of Tokyo Disney Resort, fell almost 6%. Extra ball. It does not seem, therefore, that we are facing a simple stock market fluctuation, but rather the sign that a giant economic actor can, with a phrase on an official website, compromise vital income for a neighboring country and remind it of the asymmetry of economic power between the two. As I remembered French geopolitical analyst Arnaud Bertrand to put the situation in perspective, from China’s point of view, it is as if Macron officially announced that the French army would militarily defend Catalonia from Spain, just after the anniversary of Napoleon’s defeat and the end of the French occupation of Spain. In other words, a kind of disproportionate provocation if, in addition, we take into account that it occurs shortly after the 80th anniversary of the end of the japanese colonial occupation from Taiwan and Second World War. Sanae Takaichi The political dimension. Beyond tourism and education, Bloomberg told A few hours ago, Beijing allowed accounts affiliated with its media apparatus to announce that it was “fully prepared for substantive retaliation.” The insinuations range from targeted sanctions even trade restrictionssuspension of diplomatic contacts or symbolic military measures, a repertoire that China already applied harshly against South Korea after the deployment of the THAAD anti-missile system in 2017. That historical reference did not go unnoticed: then, the tourist boycott and the pressure on South Korean companies took away 0.4 points to GDP of the country, a figure strong enough to serve as a warning. For Tokyo, the threat does not come in a vacuum: China is its main business partner and supplier of critical materialsan Achilles heel that Beijing knows and exploits when you need mark limits. However, the Chinese offensive aims beyond Japanese punishment: it also seeks to deter other governments (particularly European) to speak out on Taiwan, after the recent gesture of the EU by welcoming a Taiwanese vice president for the first time in decades. And Taiwan in the center. we have been counting during the year. The element that gives coherence to this crisis is the Taiwanese issue. For Beijing, unification is an imperative political and militaryand any mention of the possibility of Japan intervening constitutes a red line. For Tokyo, geographical proximity turns any Chinese invasion into an existential threat: The fall of Taiwan could place the Chinese navy one step away from the sea … Read more

Less than 150 kilometers from Taiwan, the US does not stop accumulating missiles. It’s the closest thing to preparing for war.

For some time now, the Taiwan position in it strategic balance global has become one of the main axes on which power competition is articulated between the United States and China. The island not only represents a point political identity for Beijing or a symbol of democratic commitment for Washington, but also a decisive geographical node in the military architecture of the Pacific. and then there is a narrow between both. The distances. Maritime access to the island, the air routes that surround it and the narrow strip of water that separates it from the Philippines and Japan define a good part of the board in which it is decided how far project Chinese strength and to what extent it can be contained from the outside. Thus, the crisis that is emerging is not made solely of declarations or doctrines: It is made up of specific islands, narrow maritime corridors, and political decisions made in small communities that suddenly become geopolitical borders. The war strait. It counted on a extensive Reuters report that the chain of continuous military exercises and the missile deployment anti-shipping in the northernmost islands of the Philippines reveal a US strategy that assumes that control of the Western Pacific straits is decisive in preventing the Chinese navy from operating freely in the open sea. And at that point, the province of Batanesuntil a few years ago a quiet territory dedicated to fishing and subsistence agriculture, has become a point of critical importance, due to its position in the extreme south from Bashi Channelthe narrow sea lane that connects the South China Sea to the western Pacific. Bashi is located between Mavulis Island and Orchid Island The arrival of an arsenal. The establishment of a rotating military presencebut practically permanent, with deployments of mobile missile systems capable of blocking the passage of surface ships, has transformed this territory into an essential component of the so-called First Island Chainthe containment line that the United States, Japan and the Philippines intend to maintain to limit China’s ability to influence beyond its coastal waters. Local populations, aware of the historical precedent from 1941live in fear of seeing how their daily lives can be suddenly interrupted by the logic of deterrence or escalation. Liaoning exercises in the Pacific The uncertainty of the Philippines. The Manila government operates in the paradox of a country that does not want to be dragged into a war, but that recognizes that geography makes inevitable any implications in the event of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait. The administration of Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has unambiguously reopened military cooperation with the United States, granting expanded access to bases in Luzon and reinforcing the number and duration of joint exercises. Given the possibility of an attack or a blockade on Taiwanthe Philippines is preparing not only for defense operations, but for the forced return of tens of thousands of Filipino workers from the island. The prospect of a sudden influx of refugees, disruptions to supply routes and the need to operate under conditions of scarcity have led provincial authorities to raise contingency plans agricultural and logistical processes that return daily life to a state of cautious alert. China and reunification. For Beijing, the Taiwan question is presented as an internal matter which does not allow external negotiation. The Chinese leadership maintains that reunification is a historic address that sooner or later it will come to fruition, and that any foreign intervention constitutes an unacceptable violation of its sovereignty. Hence, the US military presence in the Philippines, the deployment of missiles and the intensification of exercises are interpreted by China not as defensive measures, but as deliberate attempts to restrict their margin of action and condition their ability to respond. The increase in Chinese naval operations through from Bashi Channelthe presence of aircraft carrier groups in the western Pacific and low-intensity pressure tactics against Philippine patrols are part of a carefully calibrated game of signals. Washington’s ambiguity. This week, Donald Trump has reiterated that Xi Jinping knows the consequences of an attack on Taiwan, while refusing to specify whether the United States would intervene militarily. This gesture of opacity, faithful to the doctrine of strategic ambiguity, seeks to simultaneously maintain deterrence against Beijing and the control over decisions of Taipei, preventing the island from declaring formal independence that could accelerate the clash. The difference with respect to the previous government’s approach is one of tone rather than substance: if Biden tended to explicitly verbalize the defense of Taiwan, Trump shifts the emphasis toward risk perception by Chinese leaders. Ambiguity not only preserves diplomatic margin; It also avoids automatically locking the United States into open war if an unexpected escalation occurs. Key islands. As it is, preparation for a possible conflict over Taiwan is not happening in abstract power centers, but in island territories where daily life depends on supply ships and where every Pacific wind brings with it the memory of past conflicts. The expansion of presence US military in the Philippines, Chinese pressure to break the limits imposed by the island chain, and Washington’s calculated ambiguity form an unstable balance that is already changing life in those communities. The future of the region will not be decided only in great summits diplomatic, but in the capacity of a few narrow territories to become a barrier, access or trigger for a greater change in the global order. Image | PiCryl, BORN, rhk111, Army Map Service In Xataka | China has asked Russia for an airborne battalion and training. That can only mean one thing: they are preparing a landing In Xataka | The US studied what would happen if it went to war with China: now it has begun a desperate race to duplicate missiles

3,500 missiles point to Taiwan

In the month of July he gave himself A situation which could pass perfectly through the stage of the filming of an action movie. In the early hours of a Monday, the stations of one meter began to fill, but instead of passengers loaded with wallets and suitcases, military, soldiers and more soldiers armed with anti -tanks. The place gave us an idea that this was not a movie, it was a simulation for what can happen: Taiwan. In fact, that possibility seems closer than ever from space. A huge display. I told this week The New York Times. Satellite images show that China is transforming its coast against Taiwan into a vast missile launch platform that constitutes the cornerstone of Xi Jinping strategy to force reunification and, at the same time, challenge US military power in Asia. He Pentagon estimates that the arsenal of the missile force, responsible for nuclear and conventional vectors, has increased by 50% in just four years until reaching about 3,500 units. Although the exact number of missiles located directly in front of the Strait is not known, the images leave no doubt: expanded bases, with tens of additional launch ramps and new facilities in key provinces such as Anhui or Jiangxi. New generation missiles. Among the displayed systems are the Dongfeng-17a hypersonic missile with great maneuvering capacity and difficult to interceptand the Dongfeng-26, known as The “Guam Express” due to its reach to US bases in the Pacific. These missiles can carry both conventional and nuclear heads and are transportable by road, which increases their mobility and complicates their tracking by enemy intelligence. The pentagon calculates that Beijing already has half a thousand df-26which makes this weapon a pillar of its strategy of denial of access against US forces in Guam, Japan or aircraft carrier deployed in the region. Exercises, deployments and messages. Practices on the Oriental China Coast They include simulated releases From agricultural fields, hidden or esplanade valleys next to highwayswhich demonstrates an effort to integrate missiles into the field in a flexible and dispersed way. The Times told that maneuvers have a double function: operational preparation and political signal. For Taiwan, the message is that resisting would be useless before an overwhelming arsenal; For Washington, that intervening would be too expensive. It is not, therefore, only military capacity: missiles They are the starting point of any Chinese coercion strategy and, in peace times, function as an instrument of intimidation through parades, tests and public exhibitions, such as The recent in Beijing in which missiles were Hypersonic and new ICBM. Expansion of Brigades 611 and 616. Brigade 611, in Anhui, ha Duplicate its size With training facilities, simulated tunnels and up to three dozen launch ramps, an unusually dense concentration that underlines the importance of the enclave. There, Xi Jinping It appeared Personally in 2024 to encourage troops to maintain a “crisis and combat mentality.” Further south, in Jiangxi, Brigade 616 is He has prepared To receive to DF-17with Adapted hangars to the dimensions of the new hypersonic missile. These deployments show how the Chinese oriental coast becomes a network of offensive nodes designed to saturate Taiwanese defenses and threaten United States facilities in minutes. Nuclear dimension and risks. The DF-26 Encarna the strategic ambiguity of Beijin, being able to equip yourself indistinctly With nuclear eyelets or conventional. Although American satellites could detect the transfer of nuclear heads from central deposits to these brigades, experts warn that the process It is not infallible And leave a very dangerous margin of uncertainty. A conflict around Taiwan would have, from the first moment, a Latent nuclear dimension. This ambiguity increases the risk of calculation errors and rapid climbing, especially if Washington decides to attack mobile pitchers in Chinese continental territory, which would mean a serious political and military decision. Drills and objectives. The Desert construction West of China of models of US warships and warships, some mounted on rails To simulate movement, confirms that Chinese missiles are not prepared only for static scenarios on land, but also to beat the US Navy In open sea. Chinese military plans plan to disperse mobile pitchers in caves and camouflaged locations, shoot and retreat, in a wear set to saturate and exhaust enemy antimisile defenses. Recent studies They conclude that the US air bases in Asia, many without sufficient reinforced shelters could be devastated in the first bars of a contest. Limits and vulnerabilities. The brilliant increase in capacities has not been exempt from problems. Scandals of corruption and purges internal have splashed to the missile force, and the Pentagon reports They alert that the quality of some nuclear infrastructure could be compromised. In addition, despite advances in radars and satellites, doubts persist about the efficacy of missiles in real combat conditions, especially against moving ships, where tactical uncertainty is much greater than against fixed objectives on land. The missile as a nucleus of power. If you want also, the accumulation of thousands of missiles on the coast Oriental reflects the conviction of Xi Jinping that the future of the Taiwanese issue goes through the coercion and threat of force use. That so -called as missile strength It is, in words of analyststhe “Crown Jewel” of the Popular Liberation Army: an instrument that expands the Chinese projection to the entire Western Pacific complicates any calculation of US intervention and places Taiwan under constant pressure. The “but” is that, the same strategy that seeks to ensure success, also contains the risk of a calculation error by precipitating a escalation nuclear unprecedented from the Cold War. Image | Maxar Technologies, Nara In Xataka | Taiwan has had an idea if Beijing invades her: surprise China underground In Xataka | While China debate about Taiwan, Europe does not waste time. Its greatest port has left a hole for war

Taiwan urgently needs talent for its chips industry. Surprisingly he is looking for it in summer camps

TSMC, The biggest chips manufacturer on the planethe goes hunting again year after year to be able to meet his needs. During 2023 recruited 6,000 engineers For its Taiwan facilities, and presumably this trend also remained for 2024. And between 2025 and 2028 it will start Several semiconductor manufacturing plants In the US, Germany, Taiwan and Japan. TSMC is one of the most successful companies in this sector, but with all probability other chips designers and manufacturers will also need to strengthen their templates. Anyway, for Taiwan, its semiconductor industry is strategic for three fundamental reasons: it represents between 13% and 15% of the gross domestic product from the country; It is the engine of its exports with a close value to 40% of the total; And finally, the production of avant -garde chips gives the country a huge relevance from a geostrategic point of view. For this reason for this Asian country it is crucial that TSMC, UMC, Foxconn, MediaTek and its other large technology companies have the workforce they need. One of the strategies that are using some Taiwanese companies or with important businesses in Taiwan to recruit young talent is summer camps and university courses. Its purpose is to capture young people who have the right skills, although, curiously, some of these camps are held abroad for a reason for weight: The birth rate in Taiwan It goes down while, as we have seen, Taiwanese companies that are dedicated to semiconductors need to constantly increase their templates. In Europe, 100,000 more engineers are needed The Taiwanese government supports this strategy. It is fully aware that its main semiconductor companies, especially TSMC and UMC, need a constant supply of well -trained engineers to support their growth. Its current demand cannot be filled only with Taiwanese students, which has led to the NTU (Taiwan National University) to implement A global degree program in semiconductors that precisely seeks to attract foreign students. In Germany a third of the technicians who have developed their work career in the chips industry will retire throughout the next decade In any case, the Taiwan integrated circuit industry is not at all the only one that needs to recruit new talent. During the next five years the global semiconductor industry will need to incorporate nothing less than One million qualified workers. This prognosis is no elucubration; It comes from SEMIan international organization that watches over the interests of the electronics industries and integrated circuits. According to their forecasts Europe will face a deficit of 100,000 engineers, and Asia will need 200,000 qualified technicians. These a priori figures may seem exaggerated, but they are not at all if we consider that for 2024 the chips industry grew by 19.1% compared to 2023 thanks to the demand for GPUs for artificial intelligence (AI) and consumer electronic products, as well as to the expansion of 5G communications throughout the planet and the development of the car market. In 2024 the global semiconductor industry invoiced 627.6 billion dollars. The problem facing semiconductor companies, According to semiis that as many people with technical profile are not being formed in universities as they will need in the short and medium term. In addition, many of the most experienced engineers are retiring or will do so before 2030. As a button shows: in the US a third of employees of integrated circuit companies You have 55 years or more. And in Germany a third of the technicians who have developed their work career in the chips industry will retire throughout the next decade. However, there is another challenge that also compromises the future of these companies: the next batch of engineers will have to have advanced skills in AI and Automatic learning. Image | TSMC More information | Reuters In Xataka | We already know what the chips that will arrive until 2039 will be. The machine that will manufacture them is close

The TSMC factory in Arizona is going well, although its chips are more expensive than those of Taiwan

Lisa her, the general director of AMD, He has just confirmed what we suspect since the beginning of this year: semiconductors that It is already manufacturing The new TSMC plant in Phoenix (Arizona) are Between 5 and 20% more expensive that the comparable integrated circuits produced in Taiwan. AMD will receive its first chips manufactured in this plant at the end of 2025, and given the increase in costs with all likelihood its market price It will be taller than that of semiconductors from Taiwan. Even so, Smooth his He maintains that the existence of this factory in the US is good news for all, for companies and users, because it contributes to the diversification of the supply of the chips and the strengthening of the distribution chain. According to histhanks to this plant and those that will arrive in the future will be more difficult for it to occur again A semiconductor crisis As serious as the one that triggered the Covid-19 pandemic between 2020 and 2023. Despite all the performance of the TSMC factory in Arizona it is high According to financial journalist Walter BloombergTSMC will increase the price of integrated circuits produced by 30% in the US to compensate for the costs triggered by tariffs on the production equipment of imported chips from Europe and Japan. Of course, the Government led by Donald Trump has not yet revealed how the import tariffs of photolithography machines used by TSMC, Intel or Samsung plants in the US will affect the importation tariffs. N4 and N4P lithographs are part of the TSMC Finfet Integration Technologies Family In mid -April 2024 CC Wei, the executive who at that time held the reins of TSMC, advance that the increase in costs derived from the manufacture of integrated avant -garde circuits in the plants that the company has outside of Taiwan It would be assumed by both TSMC and its customers: “If my client wants to manufacture in a specific area (out of Taiwan) then TSMC and the client himself will have to share the increase in costs (…) We are already discussing it with our customers.” Whatever it is beyond the costs linked to the production of chips in the US, The TSMC factory in Arizona is fine. This plant is manufacturing semiconductors in the N4 node (5 Nm). Lithographs N4 and N4P are part of the TSMC Finfet integration technologies family, although on paper the N4P process is a bit more refined. In any case, the plant we are talking about will not be the only one that this company will have in Arizona. The second factory will be operational in 2028 and will produce integrated circuits in N3 (3 Nm) and N2 (2 Nm) nodes. And finally, the third factory will not be listed at all until the end of this decade and It will produce chips in the node N2 (2 nm). TSMC can manufacture integrated 2 nm circuits In its US plants, although the Taiwanese administration will cauture the use of this technology in the country led by Donald Trump. “Private companies must make their own commercial decisions covered in their own technological progress (…) TSMC is building factories in the US with the purpose of serving their US clients because 60% of the world’s chip designer companies are based precisely in the US.” These words of Jw KuoMinister of Economic Affairs of Taiwan, are a declaration of intentions. It will be interesting to verify how the relationship of the US and Taiwan governments in the future prosper. Image | TSMC More information | SCMP In Xataka | The US confesses its worst nightmare: if China invades taiwan and controls TSMC the US economy will go to pique

If China attacks Taiwan, Russia and North Korea will also do so … but to Europe

An interview of the New York Times It has opened the possibility of a scenario that concerns a large number of nations. NATO general secretary Mark Rutte, explained The closest thing to a chess board where the movement of a key piece produced a geopolitical earthquake of extraordinary dimensions, according to the leader, everything would begin if China finally decides Attack Taiwan. What would come later would be the closest thing to world war. The context. The extensive interview He came to a key point: the fear of an escalation of Chinese military intervention on the island of Taiwan It has increased drastically He launched his invasion On a large scale of Ukraine. The approach: the war has served as possible model How both taipéi and the international community could answer if Beijing decides to invade. Of course, Rutte took the opportunity to spread the message we listen to incessantly: rearmamentbut from a disturbing perspective. Routte word. “There is more and more awareness, and let’s not be naive about it: if xi jinping attack Taiwan, he would first make sure his smallest partner in all this, Vladimir Putin, and say: ‘Hey, I will do this and I need you to keep them occupied in Europe attacking NATO territory’”, Routte declared. “It is very likely that this is how this advances. And to dissuade them, we need to do two things. One is that it, collectively, is so strong that the Russians never do it. And the second, collaborate with the Indo -Pacific, something that President Trump is promoting vehemently,” added. The strategic clamp. We have coming counting These months. As the military pressure China on Taiwan reaches levels unprecedentedthat key date of 2027 It is glimpsed on the horizon and, meanwhile, Western strategists begin to fear a more gloomy scenario: than Beijing, when launched into an eventual invasion of the island, activate its Russian partner to open a second front in Europe. That was about Rutte’s wordsthat this coordination would not be an improvised act, but a deliberate play. They remembered the Analysts on Twz That, although it seems alarmist, the warning fits with the growing alignment between Moscow and Beijing, which not only share strategic interests, but also reinforce each other in their respective wars: Russia with Chinese technical support in Ukraine, and China benefiting from the distraction that represents the European conflict for US military resources. NATO troops The 2027 horizon. A few months ago We point that Western intelligence reports agree that both China and Russia would be working with similar temporal horizons. Xi Jinping would have ordered the EPL armed forces to be ready to Take Taiwan in 2027a period supported For the CIA and by The statements of the then head of the IndoPacom, when talking about the call “Davidson Window.” In turn, the Rutte ownas well as high controls military from Germany and Ukraine, they argue that Russia could reconstitute your abilities To attack NATO territory Towards 2029. That is, by the end of this decade, both powers would be (it does not mean that it will be so) in technical and logistics conditions to open A double front which would test the American reaction capacity. In practice, this would mean that any Chinese offensive on Taiwan It could coincide With a Russian offensive on the eastern flank of Europe, forcing the United States to divide its resources between two simultaneous war theaters. Pressures on Taiwan. The United States Indo-Pacific Command data (INDOPACOM) leaves no doubt: Chinese military pressure on Taiwan has Increased 300% Annual, with Naval maneuversexercises amphibians, drills landing, rocket and operations releases of aircraft carriers Around the island. Admiral Samuel Paparo warned of a “boiling point” that could crystallize in a real operation if Beijing considers that Washington is too dispersed to respond effectively. Although some analysts consider unlikely that Russia is ready Right to attack NATO, others recognize that even a credible threat or hybrid war actions could force the United States to mobilize resources preventively. And the simple expectation of conflict would already be enough to dilute the American response capacity in the Pacific. Iran and North Korea. Beyond Russia, experts agree that China has other “saturation actors” to divert US attention and media. The recent offensive With B-2 Spirit bombings on Iranian nuclear facilities, it shows that Washington already has part of its arsenal committed in the Middle East. The maintenance of Two groups of aircraft carriers In the region, along with the sustained war Against the hutis In Yemen and the constant tension with Iran, they already suppose a drainage considerable operation. To this is added the latent threat North Koreawhose structural dependence on China makes it a strategic pawn willing to sow chaos if Beijing demands it. Neither Pyongyang nor Moscow would have to launch into a total war: it would be enough with actions of “Gray Zone” Sufficiently to force a reaction from the United States and its allies, dispersing strength, anticipating conflicts and undermining the logistics and tactical concentration that would require a Taiwan effective defense. Wear strategy. The key to the scenario that is emerging is not in the immediate brute force, but in asymmetric deterrence. China knows that a Taiwan invasion is not simply a military operation, but a total geostrategic bet. To have any chance of success, It must guarantee that the United States cannot concentrate your forces quickly in the region. Russia, North Korea and even latent conflicts in the Middle East are part of this architecture. In that context, a weakened, distracted or forced to defend their eastern flank while Washington has to operate on several fronts, would offer the “Window of opportunity” that Beijing needs. Hence the revitalization of the European rearmethe reinforcement of the Defenses in Finland and Poland, and the Increase in spending Military in almost all the countries of the Alliance, are not only reactive measures against Russia, but essential elements of the strategy to also deter China. Washington and unpredictable deterrence. The Trump … Read more

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