Taiwan

Taiwan colonizing the United States with TSMC as the spearhead

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TSMC is the big name in the global semiconductor industry. We all have companies like NVIDIA, Qualcomm, Intel or AMD in mind, but It is TSMC that produces most of the chips of these companies. The Taiwanese company produces around 60% of the world’s chips, but when we talk about the most advanced chips, that dominance is practically total. It is a technological candy that has decided to expand and, after the plant in the United States, continues to buy land to expand its footprint. And it is a move that further unbalances the balance in terms of chips. Necessary expansion. TSMC’s base of operations is in Taiwan, but a few years ago, the company saw clearly that they had to expand their operations framework. It is something that responds to a double need. On the one hand, the more footprint they have in other countries, the more the technology industry will continue to depend on their technique. On the other hand, the main factor: the threat of china. China and Taiwan are going through a period of growing tension. We have seen maneuvers by China that I’m sure they’ve made the Taiwanese nervous.. Also Taiwan operations for show that they could defend themselves and countries like Japan and, above all, the United States They are very aware of the situation. 87% of TSMC’s more than 80,000 employees operate in Taiwan and any open conflict between the countries would mean a stoppage in the company’s operations. Little joke with this: if its chips move the world, let TSMC stop producing would cause an economic collapse. Arizona. There is a third factor that is encouraging this international expansion. Although Europe, the United States and China seeks national sovereignty in semiconductor matterthe reality is that companies need the cutting-edge chips that only TSMC can reliably mass produce. And, while financing semiconductor plants, countries have decided to invest millions to attract TSMC to their territories. The plant that will open in Germany either that of Japan They are two examples, but the one that is already operating is the American one. Although Trump, with his protectionist policies and ‘America First’, does not like it being a foreign company that cuts the cod, TSMC already has a huge plant located in Arizona from which it produces key components of the iPhone 16. This facility is the company’s most ambitious project far from Taiwan, and what started as a $12 billion investment in 2020 has become a colossal $160 billion-plus operation. They started to produce 4 nanometer chips at the beginning of 2025 and the idea is refine machinery to reach 2nm in 2029. New lands. Within the ‘Made in the USA’ strategy of the large American technology companies, TSMC Arizona is vital. And considering the economic opportunity that the AI ​​era has opened up, with the astronomical need for chips to create products like NVIDIA’s solutions for data centers, TSMC wants to grab as much of the pie as possible. As we read in The Wall Street Journala series of factors such as Taiwanese investment and a relaxation in US tariffs on Taiwan would allow TSMC to expand further. According to the media, last week the technology company purchased 900 acres – about 360 hectares – of land adjacent to its current property in Arizona. The total has been almost 200 million dollars and the intention is to expand the facilities to reach a dozen. TSMC + NVIDIA Made in the USA (more expensive). With this move, TSMC would discourage the competition from trying to invest to stand up to them because, as we say, they are the ones who dominate the production of advanced chips and who have the capacity to supply their enormous customer base. Apple is one of those that already buys chips from Arizonabut NVIDIA has confirmed that its B30 GPUs will be the first made in the United States. Now, there is a toll. HE esteem TSMC Arizona prices on advanced nodes are between 5% and 30%. There are several factors. In Taiwan they have the policy of “everything at one hour”, so any material the factory needs is very close, creating an extremely efficient chain. That does not happen in the American factory, where suppliers are far away and you have to resort to air transportation, which increases the price. There is also the fact that the wages They are higher in the US than in Taiwan. Headache. Despite these conditions, and being a foreign company controlling the show on home soil, TSMC has so dominated the process that the companies it’s worth it because they know that the chips they get will be the best for their products. Furthermore, from a political perspective, these additional costs may even be reasonable if they ensure that a conflict in Taiwan would not completely paralyze its economy. For TSMC, expansion is a great move. At the political level, countries that embrace their factories also have a reason to attract investment and Big Tech and the CEO of NVIDIA himself is clear that swith those who will lead the industry for decades. However, it is still an industry dependent on a single entity. Without leaving the United States, the country got his hands on Intel in the middle of last year in an almost unprecedented move to turn the company into the great american foundry. With TSMC expanding its network at home, they are going to have it complicated despite having the best technology available. Images | NVIDIA, TSMC, Intel In Xataka | The world’s technology industry practically depends on a single road: the one that leads to the Spruce Prine mine

While half the world looks for an alternative to Taiwan, Jensen Huang is very clear about the harsh reality: there is no

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In the technological world, the United States AIthe China’s semiconductor breakthroughs and the robotics explosion They were protagonists during the last months. But if there is something essential for these industries to function, it is Taiwan. In semiconductors, Taiwan is the one who splits the cod, and its technological diamond is TSMC. And the CEO of NVIDIA is clear that it is not worth burning money looking for the new TSMC immediately. Because it’s something that will take decades to replicate. Resilience. TSMC is about to turn 40 years old and is the company that manufactures for the elephants of the semiconductor sector such as AMD, Apple, ARM, MediaTek, Qualcomm or NVIDIA itself, among many others. They are the ones that have the most advanced machines of the European ASMLthose that have refined their processes to the extreme and are used even by manufacturers that have their own factories, such as Intel or Texas Instruments. It is something that affects the user directly, proof of this is that a mobile chip manufactured by TSMC is not the same as almost the same one made by Samsung. And to these processes is added a brutal manufacturing capacity that has dominated the industry. And, of course, looking to bite into that pie, different countries have tried to find their own TSMC. However, Jensen Huang, CEO of NVIDIA, has commented that efforts to diversify production must be made from the angle of resilience, not replacement. You don’t have to burn money like crazy. In recent months, Europe and the United States have begun to add manufacturing capacity in the semiconductor segment. The problem is that you cannot build a competitive industry in a short time: experience is needed and failure is not allowed. That, in an industry that is evolving at a very rapid pace due to the needs for chips for feed the artificial intelligenceis not contemplated. That is why Huang believes that the market is becoming selective and if guarantees are needed to manufacture chips, the one who gives those guarantees is turned to. Huang has been giving interviews for a few days and touching on key topics. For example, pointing out that The breakup between the US and China makes no sense because China is a very powerful trading partner, but also ensuring that Taiwan, as much as certain countries may not like it, will be the axis in the development of advanced computing in the coming years. China and the US investing millions. SIA is the acronym for Semiconductor Industry Association. It is the organization that seeks to advance policies that help the growth of the manufacturing industry in the United States. In your report Last year, they targeted 100 projects in 28 states totaling more than half a trillion dollars of private investment to triple the capacity of American industry by 2032. amd wants to be one of the protagonists of this operationbut also an Intel that seeks to position itself as a key factory on American soil and that has received strong government support. China is not far behind. With the explosion of robotics and AI, companies like SMIC or Huawei are developing alternatives to American technology to fuel their computing needs. They are looking for something else: industrial autonomy, and for that the Government has been releasing a series of funds to become one of the biggest names in the sector. If a subsidy package was launched in 2024 $47.5 billiona few weeks ago, other of up to 70,000 million to support that industry. Rvalidates directly with the US CHIPS of 52,000 million and 43,000 European million. The objective in both cases is the same: allocate obscene amounts of money to areas such as design, equipment, manufacturing and materials, as well as energy solutions that allow chips to be manufactured, but also to feed the companies in each country’s ecosystem. In the case of China, furthermore, there is an urgency to achieve these objectives as it is not able to have the advanced ASML machines and NVIDIA chips, something that the United States, Europe and Taiwan do have. India more of the same. But this is not a question of two great poles. South Korea also seeks become one of the great players of semiconductors, and another country that is designing an ambitious strategy to attract investment in semiconductors is India. Over the last few months they have been approving a series of aid packages (the last in January of this year, of 4.6 billion dollars) to boost the manufacturing of electronic components in the country. Apart from investing in their first state-of-the-art semiconductor factory (an investment of 11 billion dollars is estimated to achieve this), they are launching other aid and tax advantages to attract companies such as Samsung, Foxconn (also Taiwanese) or Apple to their territory. The goal is not to be a country that assembles the final product, but rather to manufacture critical components and move up the industrial value chain. Taiwanese expansion. The “problem” for these countries, and a great advantage for TSMC, is that they all seem to be very far away. India wants to achieve a chip made in 28 nanometer lithography, which is something that TSMC surpassed generations ago. AND China is fighting over 7 and 5 nm. Meanwhile, TSMC has refined its 3nm process and, as we say, TSMC’s great asset is not only that they have the experience and technology, but the ability to manufacture the best chips for customers who need those terribly refined chips. But there’s more: if China, Europe, the United States and India are moving, TSMC itself is diversifying. Yes Europe aspires to manufacture 20% of the planet’s semiconductorsit will be thanks to the TSMC plant planned in Germany. And although the US hates that it is a foreign company the one who has the upper hand in this great technological – and monetary – adventure of AI, TSMC has already settled on US soil. In the end, each territory seeks its … Read more

The US has just sent an unprecedented package to Taiwan. Inside are the instructions and weapons against an invasion

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USA has announced one of the largest arms sales deals ever signed with Taiwan, a package valued at more than 11,000 million of dollars that includes medium-range missiles, HIMARS systemsself-propelled howitzers, suicide drones, military software and anti-tank ammunition. The message is loud and clear to reach 130 km away. A package with a copyto. Formally, the operation is presented as an upgrade of the island’s defensive capabilities and as fulfillment of the US legal obligation to help Taiwan defend itself. In practice, however, the agreement is a strategic message in every rule, carefully formulated to strengthen deterrence against China without altering the diplomatic framework of ambiguity that Washington has maintained for decades. The fact that the announcement came during a televised speech by Trump in which foreign policy was barely mentioned underlines the extent to which the gesture was intended more as a structural signal than an immediate rhetorical coup. Missiles, HIMARS and drones. The content of the package is not coincidental. HIMARS systems and ATACMS missiles, already tested on the Ukrainian battlefield, they are designed to hit long-range targets with great precision, greatly complicating any Chinese amphibious or air operation (without rhetoric, against an invasion). to it they add up self-propelled howitzers, Javelin and TOW missiles, and kamikaze drones designed to overwhelm and wear down an adversary superior in numbers. It is a clearly oriented military architecture to asymmetric war: It does not seek that Taiwan can defeat China, but that it can inflict costs so high and so fast that an invasion ceases to be a politically acceptable option in Beijing. Washington and Taipei insist that these are defensive weapons, but the type of capabilities included points to a strategy of denial of territory and airspace in the early stages of a conflict. The strategic ambiguity. The size of the agreement also has an internal reading in the United States. During Trump’s second term, part of the establishment security and the hardest sectors towards China had expressed doubts about their real commitment to the defense of Taiwan, especially in a negotiation context trade with Beijing. A package that exceeds 11,000 million of dollars, greater than the total volume sold during the Biden presidency and equivalent to more than half of what was approved in Trump’s first term, serves to dispel these suspicions. Without explicitly committing direct military intervention, Washington de facto reinforces his support for Taiwan and demonstrates that the so-called “strategic ambiguity” does not equal passivity. The message is twofold: to China, that the cost of coercion will continue to rise; and to US allies, that the US security network remains operational in the Asia-Pacific. The red line narrative. The Chinese reaction has been immediate and predictable. Beijing has condemned the agreement as a violation of its sovereignty and has warned that Taiwan is a “red line” that should not be crossed in Sino-US relations. In its official speech, the Communist Party insists that rearmament of the island only turns it into a powder keg and accelerates the risk of war. However, the intensity of the response also reflects an uncomfortable reality for China: each new weapons package raises the military and political threshold for any pressure action. While the People’s Liberation Army increases daily with flights, naval maneuvers and large-scale exercises, the United States reply silently strengthening Taiwan’s capacity for resistance, without the need to modify treaties or formally recognize its sovereignty. Taiwan and the internal cost. For Taipei, the agreement comes at a politically complex time. President Lai Ching-te has proposed a historic special budget of 40,000 million dollars for defense, which includes air defense systems like the T-Dome and a wide range of long-range capabilities, but faces resistance from an opposition that controls parliament and questions both the cost and effectiveness of previous purchases. Even so, there is a growing consensus on the island about the need to increase military spending to at least 5% of GDP in 2030, in line with Washington’s implicit demands. American protection is not free: it comes accompanied by political pressure, budgetary sacrifices and a profound transformation of the Taiwanese defensive structure. Ukraine as a precedent. The parallel with Ukraine is inevitable. The same systems as the United States has sent to kyiv to stop Russia now appear in the package destined for Taiwan. In both cases, the strategy is similar: do not intervene directly, but arm a partner until it becomes a credible military barrier against a revisionist power. In Europe, this model is applied in open war. In Asia, as prevention. The result is an increasingly clear pattern in Western security policy: finance and equip allies key to acting as the first line of deterrence, reducing the need for direct confrontation between great powers. The final message. He arms deal with Taiwan does not guarantee peace in the Strait, but it redefines its balance. The United States does not promise to defend Taiwan no matter what, but it does ensure that any attempt to force reunification will be expensive, lengthy and politically explosive. Taiwan, for its part, accept the role of an advanced bastion, assuming the economic cost and strategic risk that this implies. And China is getting a clear, if carefully worded, message: Washington is not seeking war, but neither will it allow the status quo to be broken without consequences. Like in Ukrainedeterrence is not articulated with grandiloquent words, but with missiles, rockets and drones. And on the global board, that language remains the most eloquent. Image | 中文（臺灣）：​中華民國總統府, NARA, 總統府 In Xataka | China does not need bombs or missiles to impose its law. It is called “panda diplomacy” and it has just been applied to Japan In Xataka | China is sending drones to an island 100 km from Taiwan. The problem is that Japan and the US are filling it with missiles

Chinese researchers wanted to know if it was possible to block Starlink in Taiwan: now they have an awkward answer

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Communications have become the invisible thread that sustains any modern military operation. Troops, vehicles or missiles are no longer enough: without a stable and resilient network, the situation can become complicated. During the Ukrainian war, Starlink demonstrated be able to keep Ukrainian forces connected even under pressure, and has since been placed at the center of the debate over its role in military scenarios. According to South China Morning Posta group of Chinese researchers linked to defense institutions has examined to what extent that network could resist a large-scale interference attempt on a territory like Taiwan. Starlink is not a typical satellite network. Instead of relying on a few high-altitude satellites in fixed positions above the equator, it is made up of thousands of small satellites that orbit the Earth at low altitudes and on changing routes. This architecture allows a terminal on the ground to not always connect to the same satellite, but to jump between several in a matter of seconds, forming a flexible mesh that is difficult to interrupt. That dynamic behavior largely explains why it has become a key element in debates about electronic warfare. A laboratory experiment. The study that has put numbers to this scenario is titled “Simulation research of distributed jammers against mega-constellation downlink communication transmissions” and appeared on November 5 in the Chinese magazine Systems Engineering and Electronics. It is signed by a team from Zhejiang University and the Beijing Institute of Technology, an institution with a prominent presence in the country’s military research. It should be noted that it is not an operational document or an official proposal from the Chinese Army, but rather an academic simulation that explores, from a technical point of view, what it would take to interfere with a network like Starlink on a regional scale. {“videoId”:”x9ri2iu”,”autoplay”:false,”title”:”How China, the biggest polluter on the planet, has also become the complete opposite”, “tag”:”webedia-prod”, “duration”:”740″} A constellation designed to avoid interference. The study does not limit itself to describing that the terminals change satellites, but analyzes how this change thwarts any attempt at sustained interference. When a hostile signal affects a link, the terminal automatically redirects traffic to another visible satellite, and the network adapts the channel and frequency in real time. That reaction, combined with highly directional antennas capable of concentrating the signal toward specific points, reduces the impact of interfering emitters. The researchers highlight that even if a connection is momentarily blocked, the network can restore communication from another angle or frequency almost immediately. A thousand drones in action? The simulation was based on real data from Starlink’s orbital positioning and modeled how the signal would behave for twelve hours over eastern China. The researchers placed a virtual network of jammers 20 kilometers high, spaced between five and nine kilometers apart, as if they formed a checkerboard in the sky. The study considers that these nodes could be installed on drones, balloons or similar aerial platforms, capable of supporting coordinated interference systems. Using 26 dBW power and narrow beam antennas, each node managed to block an average of 38.5 square kilometers. With that efficiency, at least 935 units would be needed to cover a territory the size of Taiwan, not counting redundancies, failures or geographical barriers such as mountains. In Xataka China is sending drones to an island 100 km from Taiwan. The problem is that Japan and the US are filling it with missiles The authors themselves acknowledge that their results are only an approximation. They explain that they do not have real data on the radiation patterns of the terminals or measured signal suppression coefficients, which limits the precision of the simulation. They also do not know Starlink’s internal adaptation mechanisms against coordinated interference. Even so, they consider that the model serves to estimate the scale of the necessary effort and opens a line of study that allows quantifying, although imperfectly, how a blocking strategy would work in a real scenario. Images | starlink In Xataka | Starlink satellites have transformed war: China and Russia work on “Starlink Killers” to deactivate them (function() { window._JS_MODULES = window._JS_MODULES || {}; var headElement = document.getElementsByTagName(‘head’)(0); if (_JS_MODULES.instagram) { var instagramScript = document.createElement(‘script’); instagramScript.src=”https://platform.instagram.com/en_US/embeds.js”; instagramScript.async = true; instagramScript.defer = true; headElement.appendChild(instagramScript); – The news Chinese researchers wanted to know if it was possible to block Starlink in Taiwan: now they have an awkward answer was originally published in Xataka by Javier Marquez .

China is sending drones to an island 100 km from Taiwan. The problem is that Japan and the US are filling it with missiles

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The small Japanese island by Yonagunilocated just over 100 kilometers away from Taiwan, has gone in a matter of months from being a remote enclave with a modest self-defense detachment to becoming one of the most sensitive points of the strategic balance in Asia. The United States, China and Japan itself are carrying their disputes to the small enclave. An island as a front. The intensification of chinese drone flights over the island and the strait, intercepted on two consecutive occasions by Japanese fighters, has reinforced the perception in Tokyo that the first island chain is entering a phase of chronic instability. Japan, aware of the real possibility of a conflict around Taiwan, has decided to turn Yonaguni into a defensive node fully integrated: a place where operates a FARP American that extends the range of Marine Corps helicopters, where capabilities are consolidated electronic surveillance and where the installation of air defense missiles is progressing like the Type 03 Chu-SAM. Weapons and more weapons. This system, capable of tracking one hundred simultaneous targets and shooting down twelve of them with Mach 2.5 missilesimplies that Japan is beginning to give teeth to a position whose mere proximity to the democratic island makes it an advanced platform to detect, deter or even respond to a possible Chinese attack. For Tokyo, reinforcing Yonaguni is not a provocation but a life policy national: any attack on Taiwan, as as stated the new Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, would constitute an existential threat to the archipelago. Yonaguni Beijing’s reaction. China, which interprets any Japanese defensive measure as one more step in a strategic siege promoted by the United States, has reacted with increasing hardness. From historical comparisons to veiled threats, including the summoning of the Japanese ambassador and the suspension of economic exchanges, Beijing frames the installation of missiles in Yonaguni as an “offensive act” that violates the spirit of the bilateral normalization of 1972. The rhetoric has gone in crescendo after Takaichi’s words about the possibility of Japan intervening militarily in the event of an attack on Taiwan, something that China considers a space invasion diplomat reserved for Washington. The climate has deteriorated to such a level that a Chinese diplomat even published (and removed) a direct threat against the prime minister, while the central government canceled meetings, stopped imports and called for boycott trips to Japansinking the influx of Chinese tourists who represented almost a third of foreign visitors. In parallel, China has intensified its military demonstrations, spreading videos YKJ-1000 hypersonic missile destroying Japanese targets, a message designed to emphasize that any expansion of the Japanese military footprint will be met with a response. The strategic dilemma. Far from backing down, Japan has adopted a tone unusually firm. Under the leadership of Takaichi, the political heir to Shinzo Abe’s strategic nationalism, Tokyo has made Yonaguni the tangible manifestation of a doctrinal turn: accept that Japanese stability requires preventing China from dominating the Taiwan Strait. from there the proliferation of radar installations, electronic warfare capabilities and additional plans that contemplate systems such as US Patriots, US Army Typhon, HIMARS and the NMESIS equipped with NSM missiles, capable of denying access to Chinese ships around the Taiwanese eastern coast. USA discreetly supports this redesign: approved sales of NASAMS and spare parts to the Taiwan Air Force, deployed CH-53E helicopters in Yonaguni (an unprecedented milestone) and coordinates with Japan a doctrine that assumes that, in the event of an outbreak of hostilities, the Marines must operate from the lethality zone itself of Chinese missiles. All of this positions Yonaguni not only as an advanced observatory, but as a critical point whose defense and survival would determine the first stages of any crisis in the strait. Yonaguni Taiwan’s hardening. While Japan reinforces the front line, Taiwan assumes that time to prepare is running out. President Lai Ching-te has announced a massive increase in military spending, raising it by $40 billion until 2033, with a roadmap that will place it at 3.3% of GDP in 2026 and with the declared ambition of reaching 5% before 2030. What Taipei is proposing is not a simple rearmament, but a comprehensive redesign: new missiles and drones, integrating AI into existing systems, protecting against infiltration operations, dramatically improving procurement (often delayed in the United States), and measures against transnational Chinese repression targeting Taiwanese abroad. For Lai, the most dangerous threat is not a Chinese landing but internal erosion: that Taiwan “gives up” due to psychological or economic pressure. It flatly rejects the “one country, two systems” model and affirms that the only way to maintain peace is to make an invasion too costly for Beijing. The United States, through its de facto representation, has described the decision as a crucial step to strengthen deterrence. A strategic powder keg. The juxtaposition of Japanese military movements, Chinese threats and unprecedented rearmament of Taiwan produces a “traffic” that raises the risk of calculation errors. The experts warn that a poorly calibrated comment, a overflight unreported or a maritime incident could accelerate a spiral that is difficult to contain, especially when Beijing tries to use its contacts with Washington to simultaneously pressure Tokyo and Taipei. In this context, Yonaguni becomes symbol and detonator: too close to Taiwan to be irrelevant, too exposed to be invulnerable, and too strategic for either side to relinquish control or influence. Plus: the island is both within immediate range of Chinese missiles and within the American concept of advanced distributed operationsmeaning it could be both a multiplier of Allied defense and a priority objective in the first minute of a war. A fragile balance. In short, China hardens his stanceJapan resignation definitely to ambiguity, Taiwan accelerate the shielding of its sovereignty and the United States consolidates its role as operational guarantor. In the midst of all this, Yonaguni emerges as a microcosm where the resistance of that regional order is tested. An enclave of barely 1,700 inhabitants that, due to its geographical positionhas become a thermometer, border and barrier. Its immediate … Read more

Germany has spent three nights copying Taiwan. If Russia decides to invade it, it has had an idea: surprise them underground

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Last July, the Taiwan subway experienced an unusual day: Instead of passengers loaded with purses and suitcases, soldiers, soldiers and more soldiers armed with anti-tank missiles began to arrive at Taipei stations. The reason was twofold: to send a message inside and outside (China) of the country. That idea seduced Germany, and now that it has begun its rearmament it has launched in Berlin. A disturbing return. The exercise Bollwerk Bärlin III Last week, he returned to the German capital a scene that seemed banished to the memories of the 20th century: soldiers descending U-Bahn stairsjumping onto the tracks and advancing through smoke, simulated gunshots and cars taken over by “saboteurs.” For three nights, between 1 and 4 in the morning, about 250 members of the Wachbataillon (a unit known for its ceremonial role but with infantry functions) transformed stations like Jungfernheide into a real underground battlefield to practice assaults, close combat, evacuation of civilians and protection of critical infrastructure in a realistic environment in which nothing is altered or mocked up: the narrowness of the tunnels, limited visibility and changes in light are the same as they would find in a real war scenario. In the background: Russia. They remembered the TWZ analysts that this return to urban warfare in tunnels and stations, without embellishments or theatrical simulations, symbolizes a profound change in Germany’s strategic priorities and revealed the extent to which the shadow of a possible conflict with Russia has penetrated into the very heart of Germany. his military planning. The metamorphosis. The battalion in charge of displaying honors on state visits had been conceived for decades as a symbol of institutional stability, not as a combat force. However, its real operational mission (protecting the federal government and its facilities in the event of a crisis) today takes on an urgency that has not been seen for a long time. Hence the direct tone of his commanderlieutenant colonel Maik Teichgräber: Berlin is your area of ​​operations and they must prepare for “the worst case scenario,” which means training where you would really fight. The use of stations closed to the public allows practice quick entriesassaults on trains, neutralization of enemies and immediate removal of wounded, integrating snipers, perimeter security and coordination between units in a densely urbanized environment. The presence of additional scenarios (such as the former Rüdersdorf chemical plant or the Ruhleben police complex) underlines the desire to turn the capital’s defense into a multidimensional exercisecapable of absorbing everything from internal sabotage to coordinated incursions that seek to paralyze the political center of Germany. Global dimension of the trend. Which happens in Berlin It is also reflected in other regions of the world. How we countTaiwan uses its subway as a defensive artery during the Han Kuang exercises, aware that, in the event of a Chinese invasion, underground infrastructure they would be vital to move troops and supplies while the surface becomes a continuous target. In parallel, the United States has raised the underground war a priority for its special forces, responding to the proliferation of fortified tunnels, dense urban areas and the expansion of drone swarms that force troops to seek refuge underground. The growing autonomy of unmanned systems, already present in Ukraine, accelerates this trend: in a future where aerial surveillance will be almost constant, defending in depth will mean dominating not only streets and buildings, but subways, tunnels, pipelines and interconnected bunkers. The war of the future, according to these emerging doctrines, will be fought both upwards (against drones, sensors and loitering munitions) and downwards, in an underground network that takes on strategic value. Echoes of the Cold War. He training on the U-Bahn inevitably refers to a divided Berlinwhen the city was a western enclave surrounded by Warsaw Pact forces. At that time, the United States, the United Kingdom and France were rehearsing urban operations aimed at slowing down an invasion to gain political time, aware that holding the city indefinitely was unrealistic. Units like the (secret) Detachment A They practiced sabotage and unconventional warfare techniques from the shadows. Even stations, such as Pankstraße or Siemensdamm, were designed like nuclear shelters for more than 3,000 people for weeks, with armored doors and air filtering. The reunified Germany had left behind that architecture of fear, and today, faced with a panorama of uncertainty, it returns to study how to reactivate these civil protection capabilities. The contrast is evident: what in 1994 seemed unnecessary is once again considered a strategic necessity. Historical rearmament. we have been counting. The exercise is also part of a context transformation unprecedented german military apparatus. By 2029, Berlin plans spend 153,000 million euros per year in defense (around 3.5% of GDP), an enormous jump from the levels that for decades were a source of friction with Washington. It is a rearmament designed not only for modernize capabilitiesbut to adapt the country to threats that They are no longer theoretical: What happens 900 kilometers away, in Ukraine, conditions the entire strategy. This budget increase has led NATO to consider a symbolic turn that would have been unthinkable during the Cold War: that Germany would command the allied forces in Europe. Although that moment has not arrivedthe expectation underscores the pressure on Berlin to demonstrate that it can take on top responsibilities and is willing to prepare its military for complex scenariosfrom urban sabotage to large-scale conventional warfare. Strategic warning. Teichgräber put it clearly: Nobody can guarantee that the war that is currently devastating Ukraine will not one day reach German territory. That phrase sums up the background of Bollwerk Bärlin III. The Bundeswehr trains in the subway tunnels because it understands that contemporary conflicts do not respect borders or capitals. The hybrid warcoordinated attacks on critical infrastructure and the massive use of drones They make the interior of cities as vulnerable as their borders. If you like, what is at stake is not only the defense of Berlin, but Germany’s capacity to react facing a moment in which the strategic … Read more

It is one thing to support the US, quite another to defend Taiwan

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The latest diplomatic outbreak between China and Japan It does not seem to arise from an isolated gesture, but from a profound change in Tokyo’s strategic perception of the Taiwan Strait and Japan’s increasingly central role within the regional security architecture. The problem now is that China has forced it to make clear a position that until now it had found in the ambiguity the perfect setting. An archipelago between two fires. The statement of Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, suggesting that a Chinese blockade or attack on the island could constitute a situation existential threat for Japan, it immediately upset the fine balance of strategic ambiguity that Tokyo had maintained for years. His comment put into official words for the first time something that Japanese security teams were discussing privately. for decades: that, in certain circumstances, Japan could be forced to act alongside the United States in a war scenario around Taiwan, not to defend the island as such, but to preserve the sea routes, energy supplies and American bases that guarantee the survival of Japan itself. That nuance, normally invisible to the general public, is what triggered the Beijing reactionwhich interpreted the statement not as a technical analysis, but like a hint that Japan could intervene militarily in an area that China considers strictly internal. The clash and diplomacy. Beijing’s response was immediate and forcefuldeploying a full range of instruments of pressure designed to punish, intimidate and isolate Tokyo. China issued warnings to students and tourists to They will avoid Japan alleging alleged security risks, suspended diplomatic meetings, delayed film premieres, patrols intensified of its Coast Guard in disputed waters and raised the tone of the propaganda discourse, recalling the war of the past to underline its current military superiority. The intention was clear: send a message internal and external that any questioning of his stance on Taiwan will carry an immediate cost. However, the virulence of the reaction generated a double effect. On the one hand, it fueled a growing sense in Japanese society that China systematically uses economic and diplomatic punishment to shape the behavior of others. On the other hand, it reinforced within the Japanese Government the idea that Chinese pressure is not going to decrease and that the only viable response is through strengthen alliances military and preparation for real contingencies. Sanae Takaichi And more. The division of Japanese public opinion reflects this tension: approximately half of society believes that Japan should intervene in a scenario of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, and the other half fear that any involvement would plunge the country into a catastrophic conflict. Meanwhile, the Chinese state machinery intensifies a warning message which, far from universally intimidating, is prompting growing accusations of diplomatic harassment by Tokyo and calls to further strengthen deterrence. The United States has conducted multiple tests of the Typhon system, which includes four trailer-mounted launchers and support equipment capable of firing Tomahawk and SM-6 missiles. USA and the military board. In this context of escalation, the sudden withdrawal by the United States of the system of Typhon missiles temporarily deployed at the Iwakuni base adds an extra layer to the puzzle. Its initial presence, capable of launching Tomahawk and SM-6 missiles with a range sufficient to hit critical targets in eastern China, had unleashed worry in Beijing and Moscow, which interpreted its deployment as a preview of a network of US land-based missiles in the Indo-Pacific after the end of the INF treaty. The official goal was to conduct rapid transition testing in the event of war, but it also represented a explicit demonstration that Japan is a key piece in the US containment strategy. His withdrawal, just when China intensifies retaliation against Tokyo, does not reduce tension: it shows the flexibility with which Washington repositions its pieces and its intention to keep Beijing in permanent uncertainty. Japan, in turn, finds itself increasingly at the center of a strategic dilemma: it depends on American security umbrella for its survival, but the price of that dependence is that any crisis in the Taiwan Strait automatically becomes a Japanese domestic matter. The strategic ambiguity. The episode has shaken the guiding principle of security policies in East Asia: the strategic ambiguity. The United States avoids explicitly compromising its reaction to a Chinese attack so as not to offer certainty to Beijing or Taipei, while Japan had tried to align its position without standing out. Takaichi’s words break that ambiguity, even though he later insisted that they did not imply a doctrinal change. In doing so, they reveal the evolution of a country that has left behind the absolute caution of the post-war and that, faced with the real possibility of a high-intensity conflict in its neighborhood, begins to assume that its security can no longer be separated of a possible war over Taiwan. For Beijing, this transformation It’s disturbing: a more assertive Japan, more integrated into the US military framework and more willing to act preventively modifies the strategic equation in the entire region. For Tokyo, on the other hand, the current crisis illustrates precisely why trying to ease tensions with China does not avoid its pressureand why maintaining decision-making capacity and room for maneuver involves reinforcing its autonomy and military cooperation. The fragile balance. Taken together, the sequence reflects a turning point. China wants deter Japan through immediate punishment, and Japan wants deter China showing that it will not be intimidated, as the United States adjusts discreetly his presenceremembering that its military power will be decisive in any scenario. For its part, Taiwan becomes the axis around which the stability of Northeast Asia revolves. The result is a more tense, more transparent and dangerous balance than in previous years. A balance in which the words of a prime minister, the oversized reaction of a neighboring power and the apparently technical movement of a missile system they intertwine to reveal an uncomfortable truth: that the region is moving towards a stage where a misinterpreted gesture has the potential to … Read more

Japan has warned China about Taiwan. And China has taken it so seriously that they have surrounded some islands in Japan

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It started a few days ago, when the Japanese Prime Minister, Sanae Takaichi, declared before parliament that Chinese aggression against Taiwan could constitute a “survival threat situation”, the legal formula that would allow Tokyo to use force in support of its allies. With his words, he not only broke the “strategic ambiguity” maintained by Japan for decades, he thus opened a Pandora’s box that at this time hangs on a very thin line. The explosion. As we said, the Takaichi gesturewhich broke with decades of caution and “strategic ambiguity” around the Taiwanese issue, was interpreted by Beijing as a direct provocation and a sign that the new Japanese government was willing to align itself more openly with Washington and Taipei in the most sensitive scenario in the Asia-Pacific. The Chinese reaction It was immediate: summoned the Japanese ambassador with unusually harsh language, issued official editorials calling Takaichi’s words “fundamentally evil” and warned that any Japanese intervention would be a failure destined to turn “the entire country into a battlefield.” That aggressive turnmore typical of moments of maximum tension than of routine diplomacy, announced that Beijing was not willing to leave a change of position that affects one of its vital interests unanswered. The military front is activated. While charging politically against Tokyo, China opened a second front in the military terrain. The most “showy”: the arrival of its coast guard ships on a patrol mission within the waters of the Senkaku Islands (administered by Japan but claimed by China like Diaoyu), one more step in a theater where both countries have been competing for years, but whose meaning is different in the midst of a diplomatic clash. Simultaneously, the Taiwanese Ministry of Defense detected thirty aircraftseven ships and one official Chinese vessel operating around the island in just 24 hours, with maps showing drones approaching dangerously close to Yonaguni, the Japanese island located just 110 kilometers from the Taiwanese coast. Chinese patrol with the Senkaku in the background The red line. China it takes months combining these “joint patrols” with intrusive flights in the Taiwanese ADIZ as part of a pressure strategy persistent, but do it right after Takaichi’s statements He turned these maneuvers into a message addressed to Tokyo as well as Taipei. For Japan, see military drones Chinese bordering its southernmost islands is a warning that any clash in the Taiwan Strait would have direct repercussions on its territory, a reminder that its security is inexorably linked to the future of the self-governed island. After using water cannon to turn back a flotilla of Taiwanese fishing and coast guard vessels in 2012, the Japanese Coast Guard has shown increasing vigilance in defending the waters surrounding the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. In its territorial claim, Japan’s maritime border covers about 27 kilometers around the archipelago. The economic front. The second line of Chinese response came through economic waya tool that Beijing has perfected in previous disputes with Australia, South Korea or the United States. First issued a travel notice to its citizens warning of the “increased risks” in Japan, then urged reconsider studies in the country, directly affecting more than 123,000 Chinese students registered in Japanese centers, and then allowed the main Chinese airlines will refund free of charge tickets to Japan. This sequence, apparently dispersed, has a crystal clear logic: in a country where Chinese visitors represent nearly a quarter of total tourism, a diplomatic warning is enough to shake an entire sector. The Japanese stock market showed it: Shiseido, Uniqlo, Isetan-Mitsukoshi, Takashimaya and the airlines JAL and ANA suffered drops of between 5 and 12%, while Oriental Land, operator of Tokyo Disney Resort, fell almost 6%. Extra ball. It does not seem, therefore, that we are facing a simple stock market fluctuation, but rather the sign that a giant economic actor can, with a phrase on an official website, compromise vital income for a neighboring country and remind it of the asymmetry of economic power between the two. As I remembered French geopolitical analyst Arnaud Bertrand to put the situation in perspective, from China’s point of view, it is as if Macron officially announced that the French army would militarily defend Catalonia from Spain, just after the anniversary of Napoleon’s defeat and the end of the French occupation of Spain. In other words, a kind of disproportionate provocation if, in addition, we take into account that it occurs shortly after the 80th anniversary of the end of the japanese colonial occupation from Taiwan and Second World War. Sanae Takaichi The political dimension. Beyond tourism and education, Bloomberg told A few hours ago, Beijing allowed accounts affiliated with its media apparatus to announce that it was “fully prepared for substantive retaliation.” The insinuations range from targeted sanctions even trade restrictionssuspension of diplomatic contacts or symbolic military measures, a repertoire that China already applied harshly against South Korea after the deployment of the THAAD anti-missile system in 2017. That historical reference did not go unnoticed: then, the tourist boycott and the pressure on South Korean companies took away 0.4 points to GDP of the country, a figure strong enough to serve as a warning. For Tokyo, the threat does not come in a vacuum: China is its main business partner and supplier of critical materialsan Achilles heel that Beijing knows and exploits when you need mark limits. However, the Chinese offensive aims beyond Japanese punishment: it also seeks to deter other governments (particularly European) to speak out on Taiwan, after the recent gesture of the EU by welcoming a Taiwanese vice president for the first time in decades. And Taiwan in the center. we have been counting during the year. The element that gives coherence to this crisis is the Taiwanese issue. For Beijing, unification is an imperative political and militaryand any mention of the possibility of Japan intervening constitutes a red line. For Tokyo, geographical proximity turns any Chinese invasion into an existential threat: The fall of Taiwan could place the Chinese navy one step away from the sea … Read more

Less than 150 kilometers from Taiwan, the US does not stop accumulating missiles. It’s the closest thing to preparing for war.

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For some time now, the Taiwan position in it strategic balance global has become one of the main axes on which power competition is articulated between the United States and China. The island not only represents a point political identity for Beijing or a symbol of democratic commitment for Washington, but also a decisive geographical node in the military architecture of the Pacific. and then there is a narrow between both. The distances. Maritime access to the island, the air routes that surround it and the narrow strip of water that separates it from the Philippines and Japan define a good part of the board in which it is decided how far project Chinese strength and to what extent it can be contained from the outside. Thus, the crisis that is emerging is not made solely of declarations or doctrines: It is made up of specific islands, narrow maritime corridors, and political decisions made in small communities that suddenly become geopolitical borders. The war strait. It counted on a extensive Reuters report that the chain of continuous military exercises and the missile deployment anti-shipping in the northernmost islands of the Philippines reveal a US strategy that assumes that control of the Western Pacific straits is decisive in preventing the Chinese navy from operating freely in the open sea. And at that point, the province of Batanesuntil a few years ago a quiet territory dedicated to fishing and subsistence agriculture, has become a point of critical importance, due to its position in the extreme south from Bashi Channelthe narrow sea lane that connects the South China Sea to the western Pacific. Bashi is located between Mavulis Island and Orchid Island The arrival of an arsenal. The establishment of a rotating military presencebut practically permanent, with deployments of mobile missile systems capable of blocking the passage of surface ships, has transformed this territory into an essential component of the so-called First Island Chainthe containment line that the United States, Japan and the Philippines intend to maintain to limit China’s ability to influence beyond its coastal waters. Local populations, aware of the historical precedent from 1941live in fear of seeing how their daily lives can be suddenly interrupted by the logic of deterrence or escalation. Liaoning exercises in the Pacific The uncertainty of the Philippines. The Manila government operates in the paradox of a country that does not want to be dragged into a war, but that recognizes that geography makes inevitable any implications in the event of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait. The administration of Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has unambiguously reopened military cooperation with the United States, granting expanded access to bases in Luzon and reinforcing the number and duration of joint exercises. Given the possibility of an attack or a blockade on Taiwanthe Philippines is preparing not only for defense operations, but for the forced return of tens of thousands of Filipino workers from the island. The prospect of a sudden influx of refugees, disruptions to supply routes and the need to operate under conditions of scarcity have led provincial authorities to raise contingency plans agricultural and logistical processes that return daily life to a state of cautious alert. China and reunification. For Beijing, the Taiwan question is presented as an internal matter which does not allow external negotiation. The Chinese leadership maintains that reunification is a historic address that sooner or later it will come to fruition, and that any foreign intervention constitutes an unacceptable violation of its sovereignty. Hence, the US military presence in the Philippines, the deployment of missiles and the intensification of exercises are interpreted by China not as defensive measures, but as deliberate attempts to restrict their margin of action and condition their ability to respond. The increase in Chinese naval operations through from Bashi Channelthe presence of aircraft carrier groups in the western Pacific and low-intensity pressure tactics against Philippine patrols are part of a carefully calibrated game of signals. Washington’s ambiguity. This week, Donald Trump has reiterated that Xi Jinping knows the consequences of an attack on Taiwan, while refusing to specify whether the United States would intervene militarily. This gesture of opacity, faithful to the doctrine of strategic ambiguity, seeks to simultaneously maintain deterrence against Beijing and the control over decisions of Taipei, preventing the island from declaring formal independence that could accelerate the clash. The difference with respect to the previous government’s approach is one of tone rather than substance: if Biden tended to explicitly verbalize the defense of Taiwan, Trump shifts the emphasis toward risk perception by Chinese leaders. Ambiguity not only preserves diplomatic margin; It also avoids automatically locking the United States into open war if an unexpected escalation occurs. Key islands. As it is, preparation for a possible conflict over Taiwan is not happening in abstract power centers, but in island territories where daily life depends on supply ships and where every Pacific wind brings with it the memory of past conflicts. The expansion of presence US military in the Philippines, Chinese pressure to break the limits imposed by the island chain, and Washington’s calculated ambiguity form an unstable balance that is already changing life in those communities. The future of the region will not be decided only in great summits diplomatic, but in the capacity of a few narrow territories to become a barrier, access or trigger for a greater change in the global order. Image | PiCryl, BORN, rhk111, Army Map Service In Xataka | China has asked Russia for an airborne battalion and training. That can only mean one thing: they are preparing a landing In Xataka | The US studied what would happen if it went to war with China: now it has begun a desperate race to duplicate missiles

3,500 missiles point to Taiwan

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In the month of July he gave himself A situation which could pass perfectly through the stage of the filming of an action movie. In the early hours of a Monday, the stations of one meter began to fill, but instead of passengers loaded with wallets and suitcases, military, soldiers and more soldiers armed with anti -tanks. The place gave us an idea that this was not a movie, it was a simulation for what can happen: Taiwan. In fact, that possibility seems closer than ever from space. A huge display. I told this week The New York Times. Satellite images show that China is transforming its coast against Taiwan into a vast missile launch platform that constitutes the cornerstone of Xi Jinping strategy to force reunification and, at the same time, challenge US military power in Asia. He Pentagon estimates that the arsenal of the missile force, responsible for nuclear and conventional vectors, has increased by 50% in just four years until reaching about 3,500 units. Although the exact number of missiles located directly in front of the Strait is not known, the images leave no doubt: expanded bases, with tens of additional launch ramps and new facilities in key provinces such as Anhui or Jiangxi. New generation missiles. Among the displayed systems are the Dongfeng-17a hypersonic missile with great maneuvering capacity and difficult to interceptand the Dongfeng-26, known as The “Guam Express” due to its reach to US bases in the Pacific. These missiles can carry both conventional and nuclear heads and are transportable by road, which increases their mobility and complicates their tracking by enemy intelligence. The pentagon calculates that Beijing already has half a thousand df-26which makes this weapon a pillar of its strategy of denial of access against US forces in Guam, Japan or aircraft carrier deployed in the region. Exercises, deployments and messages. Practices on the Oriental China Coast They include simulated releases From agricultural fields, hidden or esplanade valleys next to highwayswhich demonstrates an effort to integrate missiles into the field in a flexible and dispersed way. The Times told that maneuvers have a double function: operational preparation and political signal. For Taiwan, the message is that resisting would be useless before an overwhelming arsenal; For Washington, that intervening would be too expensive. It is not, therefore, only military capacity: missiles They are the starting point of any Chinese coercion strategy and, in peace times, function as an instrument of intimidation through parades, tests and public exhibitions, such as The recent in Beijing in which missiles were Hypersonic and new ICBM. Expansion of Brigades 611 and 616. Brigade 611, in Anhui, ha Duplicate its size With training facilities, simulated tunnels and up to three dozen launch ramps, an unusually dense concentration that underlines the importance of the enclave. There, Xi Jinping It appeared Personally in 2024 to encourage troops to maintain a “crisis and combat mentality.” Further south, in Jiangxi, Brigade 616 is He has prepared To receive to DF-17with Adapted hangars to the dimensions of the new hypersonic missile. These deployments show how the Chinese oriental coast becomes a network of offensive nodes designed to saturate Taiwanese defenses and threaten United States facilities in minutes. Nuclear dimension and risks. The DF-26 Encarna the strategic ambiguity of Beijin, being able to equip yourself indistinctly With nuclear eyelets or conventional. Although American satellites could detect the transfer of nuclear heads from central deposits to these brigades, experts warn that the process It is not infallible And leave a very dangerous margin of uncertainty. A conflict around Taiwan would have, from the first moment, a Latent nuclear dimension. This ambiguity increases the risk of calculation errors and rapid climbing, especially if Washington decides to attack mobile pitchers in Chinese continental territory, which would mean a serious political and military decision. Drills and objectives. The Desert construction West of China of models of US warships and warships, some mounted on rails To simulate movement, confirms that Chinese missiles are not prepared only for static scenarios on land, but also to beat the US Navy In open sea. Chinese military plans plan to disperse mobile pitchers in caves and camouflaged locations, shoot and retreat, in a wear set to saturate and exhaust enemy antimisile defenses. Recent studies They conclude that the US air bases in Asia, many without sufficient reinforced shelters could be devastated in the first bars of a contest. Limits and vulnerabilities. The brilliant increase in capacities has not been exempt from problems. Scandals of corruption and purges internal have splashed to the missile force, and the Pentagon reports They alert that the quality of some nuclear infrastructure could be compromised. In addition, despite advances in radars and satellites, doubts persist about the efficacy of missiles in real combat conditions, especially against moving ships, where tactical uncertainty is much greater than against fixed objectives on land. The missile as a nucleus of power. If you want also, the accumulation of thousands of missiles on the coast Oriental reflects the conviction of Xi Jinping that the future of the Taiwanese issue goes through the coercion and threat of force use. That so -called as missile strength It is, in words of analyststhe “Crown Jewel” of the Popular Liberation Army: an instrument that expands the Chinese projection to the entire Western Pacific complicates any calculation of US intervention and places Taiwan under constant pressure. The “but” is that, the same strategy that seeks to ensure success, also contains the risk of a calculation error by precipitating a escalation nuclear unprecedented from the Cold War. Image | Maxar Technologies, Nara In Xataka | Taiwan has had an idea if Beijing invades her: surprise China underground In Xataka | While China debate about Taiwan, Europe does not waste time. Its greatest port has left a hole for war

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