Russia

the refinery that supplies 90% of its fuel is owned by Russia

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If you travel north of Berlin, in Schwedt you come across a landscape of chimneys and rusty metal that seems stuck in the sixties. It was there that communist Germany and the former USSR sealed their energy alliance, and the amazing thing is that this heritage continues to fuel the Berliners’ tank today. Although the official rhetoric speaks of a total break with the Kremlin due to the invasion of Ukraine, the reality at the PCK plant is different: the majority of the property remains in Russian hands, a Soviet vestige that Germany has not yet dared to completely expropriate. It literally depends on the operation of PCK Schwedt that Berlin does not stop. The plant pumps 90% of the gasoline and kerosene consumed by the capital and the state of Brandenburg; It is the energetic heart that powers everything from domestic heating to airplanes at the international airport. As pointed out by an analysis of Financial Timesany stoppage in their machines – no matter how brief – would cause an immediate strangulation. It is not just a question of figures, but a real threat to the daily lives of millions of people that the energy sector monitors closely. A trapped refinery The PCK situation is a direct result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Following the start of the war, Germany decided to withdraw to the Russian state oil company Rosneft operational control of the refinery, placing it under state trusteeship. The measure was adopted under the Energiesicherungsgesetz (Energy Security Law) with the explicit objective of guaranteeing supply and avoiding an operational collapse of critical infrastructures, as explained by the German Government itself. The guardianship affects the subsidiaries Rosneft Deutschland and RN Refining & Marketing, through which the Russian group controls stakes in three German refineries: PCK Schwedt, MiRo (Karlsruhe) and Bayernoil (Bavaria). On the whole, according to OSW datathese assets represent about 12% of Germany’s total refining capacity, making Rosneft one of the main players in the sector in the country. However, Berlin avoided expropriation of the shares. Rosneft retains 54% of PCK, a decision made out of fear of Kremlin retaliation against German companies in Russia and the risk of international litigation. as explained in the Financial Times. Since then, the German Executive has been forced to renew the guardianship regime every six months by parliamentary vote. The State runs the plant, but cannot sell it freely, nor invest on a large scale in its modernization, nor offer stable legal guarantees to banks and suppliers, a legal limbo. which analysts consider unsustainable in the long term. However, the fragility of this balance was revealed in 2025, when the United States imposed new sanctions on Rosneft as part of its policy of pressure on Moscow. The measure, adopted without prior coordination with Berlin, had immediate effects: banks blocked payments, suppliers suspended contracts and the refinery was on the brink of insolvency. as reconstructed Financial Times. To avoid a collapse of supply in the German capital, Washington granted a temporary exemption of six months, which allows PCK to continue operating until April 29, 2026. At the same time, he made it clear that Germany must once and for all resolve the issue of ownership of Rosneft assets on its territory. Since then, Berlin has been negotiating against the clock with the US administration to achieve a new extension or design a legal framework that avoids future sanctions. Among the options studied is the conversion of the current guardianship into a public law trustlinked to the sanctions regime of the European Union. The goal is to demonstrate that Rosneft lacks effective control over the refinery without resorting to formal expropriation. A key piece of the German energy system Schwedt’s case is not anecdotal. A forced closure would force fuel to be transported to Berlin by thousands of trucks a day, coming from other regions of Germany, a scenario that industry sources describe as logistically chaotic and economically unfeasible. In an economy already hit by high energy prices, the industrial slowdown and the costs of the energy transition, the impact would be immediate. Furthermore, PCK is the main economic engine of Schwedt, a city of about 33,000 inhabitants in the northeast of the country. It directly and indirectly employs thousands of people and is perceived by the local population as a matter of survival. “All buses, all police cars, all rescue services run on PCK fuel,” he explained. to Financial Times the social democratic mayor Annekathrin Hoppe. But the question everyone will be asking: How is it possible that Germany still has a Russian refinery? The answer is in history. PCK Schwedt built in the sixtieswhen the then German Democratic Republic was integrated into the Soviet bloc. The refinery was designed to process Russian crude oil transported through the Druzhba – “friendship” in Russian – pipeline. a pipeline of more than 4,000 kilometers designed to seal energy interdependence between Moscow and Eastern Europe during the Cold War. For six decades, the system operated without interruption. Even after German reunification and the fall of the Soviet Union, the flow of Russian crude oil continued, reinforcing a dependence that today weighs like an uncomfortable legacy. Unlike gas—where Germany nationalized strategic assets like Gazprom Germania, today renamed SEFE—, in oil, Berlin chose not to cross the line of expropriation. Breaking that bond has proven more difficult than expected. Although PCK no longer processes Russian oil and sources mainly Kazakh crude and marine supplies through Poland and Germany, the transition has been more expensive and technically complex. As explained by the public channel Tagesschaualternative supply is largely dependent on the ports of Rostock and Gdansk, and doubts remain as to whether these routes allow sufficient plant load to be maintained. Possible exits: sale, expropriation or permanent patch Given the expiration of the US exemption, Germany is considering three main scenarios. The first is for Rosneft to voluntarily sell its stake. In recent years there have been conversations with the Qatar Investment Authority, … Read more

A group of Spanish pilots wait in front of Russia for an alarm that will sound 500 times in 2025. They only have 15 minutes to launch their fighters

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A few minutes from Russian airspace, a handful of Spanish pilots live in the most tense routine that exists in peacetime: be ready to take off at any moment from an icy base from the Balticone where the sky is watched as if each blip on the radar could be the start of something bigger. Fifteen minutes. At Šiauliai, a Lithuanian air base that functions as first line of surveillance over the Baltic, the routine can be broken at any second with a siren and a countdown. When the alert goes off (in 2025 alone it did so up to 500 times), the Spanish pilots of the 15th Wing They put on their equipment, get into the vans and run towards the hangars with a single objective: to be in the air in less than fifteen minutes. It is a millimetric mechanic, repeated so many times in training that becomes automaticbecause the mission does not wait for anyone and because in that area an unidentified plane, without a transponder or without communication, can be the beginning of a serious incident. The shadow of an enemy. The function of these quick exits, called “scrambles”is to intercept and escort suspicious aircraft until they leave Allied space or their intentions become clear, and in the Baltic they are almost an everyday language. The route is especially sensitive because it connects Russia with the militarized enclave of Kaliningradand there intersect fighters, surveillance planes and traffic that sometimes fly without a flight plan or without the expected signals. The result is constant tension: some days there are several outings and other weeks everything seems calm, but the feeling is always the same, that the next warning can come when you are resting or half asleep. 15th Wing Fighter Mission since 2004. NATO started this baltic air police in 2004 to protect the space of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, and since then the countries have taken turns in rotation four months so that the umbrella is permanent. Over time, the deployment was expanded to other bases in the region, first after the first Russian invasion of Ukraine and later with further expansion, because the Eastern Front ceased to be a theoretical concept. In recent months, furthermore, the incursions became more disturbing due to a new detail: not only manned aircraft appeared, but also drones that crossed borders and forced us to react quickly. Spain and the fighters. The Spanish contingent arrived in December with more than 200 troops and eleven EF-18Ma modernized version of the Hornet that Spain operates and maintains ready to fly day or night. The planes are armed with air-to-air missiles and the pilots train with night vision goggles, because surveillance does not stop when the sun goes down. Behind each exit there is a system that monitors the sky relentlessly, control centers that detect traces on the radar and a decision chain that, when activated, turns the entire base into a fast, silent and perfectly rehearsed choreography. Drones change the script. The big twist is that now the problem is not only the classic military plane that approaches without identifying itself, but the emergence of cheap dronesslow, low and erratic, more difficult to classify and more complicated to stop with means designed for another era. It we have counted. In September last year, a wave of Russian drones penetrated Polish airspace during an attack on Ukraine, and then there were similar episodess that forced the activation of fighter jets in countries like Romania. In parallel, small unidentified drones began to be seen near airports, bases and sensitive facilities throughout Europe, fueling the feeling of vulnerability and suspect that someone is measuring response times and blind spots. Crow, the anti-drone. For this reason, in this deployment the 15th Wing arrived with a historical novelty for them: the Indra Crow systeman anti-drone defense that adds a different layer of protection to the base and its surroundings. Crow combines radars, cameras and sensors to detect small aircraft and, once located, attempts to take them down using signal jamming, that is, electronic warfare from fixed or mobile positions. Its range not only protects planes and runways, it also covers the nearby city, because the real goal is to shield critical infrastructure and reduce the risk of a cheap drone causing disproportionate damage. The cost dilemma. Behind this adaptation is a problem that NATO is being forced to solve at full speed: intercepting cheap drones with weapons designed to shoot down fighters is an unsustainable equation. Firing expensive missiles from a fighter jet to take down a small aircraft may work, but it turns every defense in a waste and opens the door to volume saturation. That is why procedures and tactics are being reviewed, looking for cheaper and more specific systems, and assuming that the fighter will no longer always be the best tool to put out the fire. The strategic signal. The arrival of fighters with anti-drone protection It reflects a Europe that begins to fortify the sky as if war were already knocking at the door, although it has not yet fully crossed. In the Baltic, each rotation is a political and military message: there is presence, there is a response and there is an intention to fill gaps that did not exist before. Thus, what was previously an almost routine escort and identification mission is becoming a comprehensive defense exercise against hybrid threatswhere the enemy can be a large plane, a tiny drone or a provocation designed solely to check if, when the alarm sounds, there is really someone capable of taking off in those fifteen minutes. Image | Pexels, Pavel Vanka In Xataka | There are “invisible” Russian submarines happily sailing through the Baltic and that has led Europe to unprecedented measures In Xataka | A Russian submarine has appeared off the coast of France. And Europe’s reaction has been surprising: have a laugh

Russia has turned Ukraine into a scene from Minority Report. He has sent a “soldier” named Svod to anticipate the future

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At the doors of fourth year of warRussia still has not found a consistent formula to break the Ukrainian defenses, despite having more troops, a much more stable flow of material and a wide repertoire of advanced technologies that, on paper, should have tilted the battlefield. If the war in Eastern Europe was already a unprecedented laboratory of war technologies, Moscow has taken the most unprecedented step of all. The problem that Russia is trying to solve. They counted in Forbes that, among the many causes of this below-expectation performance, there is one especially painful: the inability of many Russian officers on the front line to take quick tactical decisions and sustainable over time, precisely those that decide the outcome of local clashes that, accumulated, determine an entire offensive. This deficit does not arise from nothing, but from the combination of a military culture rigidly hierarchicaldesigned to execute orders rather than improvise, and from a generation of extremely young commanders with limited experience, pushed to lead units in a type of combat that mercilessly punishes hesitation and rewards immediate adaptation. The “soldier” Svod. The announced answer is Svod, a digital tool AI decision support system conceived as a tactical situational awareness system for front-deployed officers. Its function, according to the description of the Russian Ministry of Defensewould be to gather and merge in the same information space multiple sources of intelligence, from satellite data and aerial images to reconnaissance reports and open source material, to convert that chaos of signals into a common usable image. From there, the system I would apply advanced processing and models assisted by artificial intelligence to analyze what comes in, project operational scenarios plausible futures and guide the command towards the most convenient course of action. The underlying intention is not hidden: to accelerate the decision cycle, reduce friction between “what is happening” and “what is ordered”, and guide managers towards rmost effective answers in an environment where every minute lost translates into casualties, burned material and wasted tactical opportunities. Software connected to what already exists. Svod does not present itself as a device magical that a soldier hangs on his chest, but rather like a software architecture that is integrates into networks and media now available. It works as a layer that merges data and displays it to commanders on computers or tablets, with secure communications and decision support tools. The important thing is the effect it produces: converting a crowded battlefield of signs into something that looks legible, and that the tactical command has concrete guidance when the environment changes faster than the upper echelons can keep up. Deployment and focus. Furthermore, the plan wants to be implemented at full speed: after various operational tests in December 2025, it is expected to begin deploying it in April 2026 and extend it widely by September. In fact, the first units to receive it would be involved in the Pokrovsk axiswhere Russia concentrates part of its offensive effort. That portrays it as an immediate solution to correct command and control failuresnot as a quiet modernization ten years from now, and explains why it is prioritized where wear is maximum and the margin of error is minimum. A perverse incentive. In an army like the Russian one that rewards obedience and punishes improvisation, a local commander may be forced to attack even if he knows it is a bad idea. With constant pressure, some they execute and accumulate casualtiesothers seek to survive within the system by simulating results, sending small groups to mark their presence and using drones to appear successful. In this context, Svod intends to push more coherent decisions with the real situation, giving a shared and more immediate vision to the front without touching the core of the model: continuing to command from above, but with a tool that reduces “surprises” and imbalances. Minority Report in military version. There is no doubt, the bet has something of a futuristic scene that we had already seen in the cinema: just like works as Minority Report that had played with the idea of ​​algorithms that anticipate the future, Russia seeks to anticipate what is going to happen before it happens, with that “soldier” called Svod that calculates, projects and recommends. The promise is very easy to understand: if the system sees better and faster, it will be able to anticipate where the weak point is, when to press and when to readjust the attack. It is a way of turning combat into a prediction problemwhere human intuition and improvisation are replaced by a living map that attempts to order chaos. What it can contribute. If it works well, Svod could improve identification of objectivescoordination and detection of gaps in the Ukrainian defense, as well as other similar tools have proven valuable in other armies. The problem, most likely, is that its effectiveness will clash with the reality of the front: electronic warfare, degraded communications, incomplete data, and models that fail when the enemy learn and change patterns. In this sense, Ukraine has adapted quicklyand that makes it much more difficult for a system to accurately predict what will happen next. Still, the movement is more than significant: war is becoming a sensor competitionnetworks and decisions, and Russia is trying to have AI reduce a problem that has cost it too dearly. Image | Ministry of Defense of Ukraine In Xataka | 1,418 days have passed since Russia invaded Ukraine: the war has already lasted longer than the Soviet fight against Hitler In Xataka | The latest camouflages of Russian troops confirm an open secret: the war in Ukraine is the most Looney Tunes in history

Now that we know what is going to happen in Greenland, the most surprising thing is the name of the winners: Russia and China

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If the Trump’s words in Davos are confirmed, it seems that “nothing” is going to happen in Greenland. This leaves another reading that is beginning to gain strength among analysts: that the threats from the United States to force control of Greenland they have opened a crack which, without needing to fire a single shot or lift a single finger, immediately benefits two nations. The geopolitical gift. While Washington has presented the move as a maneuver to stop your rivalsin Europe it is interpreted as a direct threat to the sovereignty of an ally and to the very credibility of NATO. Meanwhile, in Moscow and Beijing it is read as proof that the Western order no longer holds about shared rules, but about impulses, blackmail and force. In this climate, the simple debate about “who’s in charge” and “how far the American umbrella extends” erodes the cohesion that for decades had been the main strategic brake (at least on paper) for Russia in Europe and the biggest structural obstacle for China in its global struggle. Russia far ahead. It we have counted before. In the Arctic, Russia is not starting from scratch or playing for the future: it is already installed and has been operating for years with a material and geographical advantage that the United States can’t match quickly. Moscow has a consolidated military presence in the north, with bases, infrastructure, operational experience and an integrated defense logic around its sea routes, its resources and its strategic deterrence, in addition to key assets such as its Northern Fleet and the symbolic and technical weight of having used the region as a space for testing and projection since the soviet era. So when Washington turns Greenland into an open crisis, Russia watches. two things at the same time: the opportunity to weaken Western unity and the risk that the Arctic will go from being a terrain of contained competition to a zone of direct confrontation, one in which any miscalculated move accelerates militarization and possible escalation. The Russian method. The Russian reaction to the tension over Greenland has been marked by a combination of irony, enthusiasm and cold calculation, like someone who suddenly finds a perfect lever to improve your position without visible effort. The message that is repeated around the Kremlin is transparent: the best thing that can happen to Russia is for the United States and Europe to dedicate themselves to fight among themselvesbecause that, first of all, distracts from Ukraine, poisons cooperation and pushes allies to distrust American leadership. In that framework, they counted in AP that Russian propaganda allows itself the luxury of celebrating that “Atlantic unity is ending,” of joking that Europe has no real tools against Washington and to present the entire episode as a didactic scene in which Russia’s rivals tangle themselves. Greenland as a smoke screen. One of the most immediate benefits for Moscow is that focus shift political and media: when the European agenda is filled with Greenland, Ukraine loses diplomatic oxygen and negotiation space. The tension is forcing European leaders to put out internal fires rather than focus on the war, and that rreduces pressure collective action on Russia just when Moscow is seeking concessions or relief in any negotiation process. Furthermore, the simple fact that NATO is discussing whether or not to “block” American expansion introduces a disturbing idea: that the alliance is not an automatic pact of trust, but rather a kind of club where the strongest can change the rules if it suits them. Putin and Trump. Russia, furthermore, seems to be watching your tone with the White House because his priority is not to clash with Trump while he tries to obtain advantages over Ukraine and rebuild his relationship with Washington. That is why he avoids openly condemning the pressure on Greenland (a few hours ago Putin said that they care about “zero”) and, instead, wraps it in a comfortable ambiguity. It is a position that, although passive, in reality It’s strategicbecause it lets the conflict cook within the Western camp without Moscow appearing as the instigator. At the same time, introduce a dangerous idea in the debate: that international legality is secondary to the will of a great power, something that Russia knows well and cynically exploits when it suits it. China doesn’t need Greenland. From Beijing, the opportunity is not so much in “winning” Greenland, but in observing how the United States fights with its allies and devalues ​​the system that gave it a strategic advantage over China. They remembered in the Guardian that, in Chinese eyes, the ideal scenario is not to conquer Arctic territory, but see how it breaks the discipline of the Western bloc, because the great multiplier of American power has always been its network of alliances. China may have interests in polar routes, research and resources, but its biggest prize It’s political: a Europe more distrustful of Washington, open to its own balance and more tempted to take refuge in trade as a lifeline in a world of tariffs and blackmail. The Polar Silk Road. It we have counted before. China has been building an Arctic story for years that presents it as a legitimate actor, with official roles where it defines itself. as “almost arctic” and with the promise of a Polar Silk Road supported by melting ice, new sea routes and faster transport between Asia and Europe. There is concrete signs of that ambition, such as the use of Northern Maritime Route to drastically shorten travel timesalthough that route depends largely on Russia and its control over the corridor. In that sense, each crisis between the United States and Europe is not only a political problem: it is an economic window for Beijing, because it messes up rules, pushes Europe to look for alternatives and gives China room to present itself as a “stable” trading partner, although that stability may be more rhetorical than real. Davos and a resignation. He clash over Greenland It is aggravated … Read more

Ukraine has unlocked a wild “online mode.” The one about Russia recruiting Africans on Discord to turn them into “can openers”

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The Ukrainian War I had already flirted with the language of the gamer world: rewards for objectives, loot lists and even a “military Amazon” improvised to redeem successes by real material. But if that seemed like a way to gamify logisticswhat is happening now goes up a level: it is no longer about buying drones with points, but about recruiting soldiers within the player communities themselves and turning them into human bombs. War as a global industry. On the Ukrainian front, Russia has ended up building a collection machinery that is not limited to looking for soldiers, but drags them from places increasingly unlikelyas if the war had become a global funnel. What was once a conflict between armies begins to look like a international recruitment network where young people enter, attracted by money, by a promise of the future or simply by a casual conversation that becomes irreversible. The result is a constant drip of foreigners who arrive in Russia, sign a paper, receive rushed training and disappear into the most brutal landscape of Europe, where the distance between signing a contract and death can be measured in weeks. Recruitment on a screen. The story Bloomberg told and starts with two young South Africans, regular Discord users and Arma 3 players, who end up talking about enlist in the Russian army with someone who identifies himself as @Dash. What seems like just another exchange in a digital community rises in temperature until it becomes a real plan: they meet in Cape Town, move together and end up visiting the Russian consulate, as if this bureaucratic step gave legitimacy to what, deep down, is already a flight towards war. On July 29, they embark on a trip to Russia via the United Arab Emirates and, after arriving, they meet “Dash” there. Shortly after, in early September, they sign one-year military contracts near St. Petersburg and they are trapped in the fast lane of a conflict that doesn’t stop to check if anyone really understands what they’re getting into. Contract, training and front. Only a few weeks pass between the signing and the front. After a brief period of basic training, one of the two is sent to combat in Ukraine, where he performs duties as an assistant marksman for a grenade launcher, a description that sounds like a military routine but is, in reality, the prelude of a disappearance. The last time he contacted his family was October 6. On December 17, a friend reported that has died in combat. The confirmation comes with a medical document that his family later obtained, dated months later, which states that he died on October 23, 2024 in Verkhnekamenskoye, in the Luhansk region. Nothing is known about the other young man: his whereabouts remain up in the air, as happens with many names who enter the war and get lost in the noise of the front. The scandal that breaks out at home. In South Africa, the case is not only read as a personal tragedy, but as a national problem, because since 1998 It is illegal to fight for or assist the armed forces of a foreign country. And it also arrives at a moment especially sensitive: More allegations of recruiting towards Russia have emerged in recent weeks, with investigations pointing to to catchment networks already told stories with acceptable costumes (escort courses, security training) that become suspicious when they lead to military contracts. This climate of public alarm worsens with arrests and judicial processeswhile the South African authorities, the Russian consulate and the platform itself appear wrapped in silence without clear answers and with families trying to piece together, through emails and calls, the map of a disappearance. The lie. Explained the medium that among the incentives that are put on the table appear always the same: money, attractive conditions, the possibility of obtaining Russian citizenship and the idea that the service could open educational or advancement doors. It is an offer designed to ring concrete and reasonableas if combat were hard but passable work, a dangerous but temporary experience. However, the story makes clear What happens when that promise lands in Ukraine: war is not a contract, it is rather a crusher, and for those who arrive without roots, a support network or the ability to get out of the wheel, destiny is reduced to a date on a piece of paper and a lost location in the east of the country. Kamikaze bodies. At another point in the same conflict appears a scene that has gone viral on networks, a video even more brutal: an African mercenary is “armed” with a TM-62 anti-tank mine attached to the body and sent towards Ukrainian positions with the intention of blowing himself up to open a bunker. The video shows crudeness without metaphors: the man protests, but a Russian soldier threatens him with a rifle, pushes him, expels him from a basement and orders him to run into the forest. in that language They call it a “can opener.”as if it were a piece of engineering, an instrument designed to break a door at the cost of disappearing, and the scene remains recorded for what it reveals: not only are foreigners recruited, they are used in missions where life is not a value to be protected, but rather the closest thing to a detonator available. Foreigners in war. Ukraine maintains that there are at least 1,436 citizens from 36 countries identified fighting in the Russian ranks, and that the real number may be higher. There is talk, again, of recruitment by financial promises, deception or pressureand warns of minimal survival: many do not survive more than a month after arriving at the front. The statement, however harsh it may be, fits with the landscape they draw these stories: people who enter through lateral routes, who arrive attracted by incentives or trapped by intermediaries, and who end up absorbed by a war that has been devouring troops until making replenishment a constant … Read more

Europe had few options in the face of the US threat in Greenland. Until Germany has remembered Russia with an unprecedented plan

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Growing pressure from the United States to take over Greenland has transformed a hitherto latent issue into a problem political and strategic of the first order for Europe and NATO, by explicitly placing for the first time the risk of an internal clash between allies. It was known that there were a couple of options on the table as a defense. Germany has just presented another unprecedented one. An unprecedented crisis. The insistence of the US administration on presenting control of the island as a necessity of national security, accompanied by rhetoric increasingly harderhas forced European partners to react not only in defense of Denmark’s sovereignty and Greenland’s right to self-determination, but also to protect credibility of an alliance designed precisely to prevent force from prevailing among its members. The problem is not only territorial, but systemicbecause it raises the extent to which NATO can manage a crisis caused from within without eroding its own foundations. Germany and the allied response. Faced with the difficulty of directly confronting Washington, Berlin has emerged as the actor in charge of articulating a solution that combines political firmness and strategic containment. Germany has chosen to channel the response through NATO. As? proposing a joint mission in the Arctic that makes it possible to strengthen regional security without turning the conflict into a bilateral battle between the United States and Denmark. The initiative seeks to save time, reduce tensions and offer an institutional alternative that frames American concerns within a collective logic, while sending a clear signal that Greenlandic sovereignty is non-negotiable. This German role reflects a commitment to multilateral management of the conflict and to prevent the crisis from leading to an open fracture within the alliance. From the Baltic to the Arctic. The German proposal takes as a direct reference the operation Baltic Sentrylaunched to protect critical infrastructure in the Baltic Sea from sabotage and covert activities linked to Russia and its ghost fleet. The idea is to replicate this scheme in the Arctic through a hypothetical “Arctic Sentry” missionwhich would include Greenland and allow increased surveillance, naval presence and allied coordination in an increasingly disputed region. This approach has a double function: on the one hand, respond to the security concerns raised by Washington about the Russian and Chinese presence in the Arctic, and on the other, prevent those concerns from being used as a pretext for unilateral action. Turning the Arctic into a space of collective management seeks to deactivate the security vacuum narrative that fuels American aspirations. The shadow of Article 4. Although it has not yet been formally activated, the idea of invoke Article 4 of the NATO treaty, which provides for consultations when an ally perceives a threat to its territorial integrity or security, has gained weight in diplomatic debates. The mere possibility of Denmark resorting to this mechanism reflects the seriousness of the situation and the growing nervousness in European capitals. Invoking Article 4 would not imply an automatic military response, but it would force the alliance to address it head on. an internal crisis that many would prefer to manage in silence. The underlying fear is that, if not managed institutionally, the conflict sets a dangerous precedent that normalize pressure between allies and voids the founding principles of NATO. Diplomacy, deterrence and limits. Beyond the military dimension, the European Union has explored diplomatic and economic options to contain the United States, from the reinforcement of political dialogue to the theoretical threat of instruments commercial pressure. However, Europe’s dependence on the American technology, defense and security umbrella drastically reduces the credibility of these tools. Economic sanctions, although powerful on paper, are perceived as unrealistic in a context marked by the war in Ukraine and the need to keep Washington engaged with European security. This imbalance reinforces the idea that the most viable path is to offer shared security solutions, such as the proposed Arctic mission, rather than a direct confrontation that Europe could hardly sustain. Greenland as autonomy. The economic dimension It adds another layer of complexity to the conflict, as Greenland relies heavily on Danish transfers and warily watches American promises of massive investment. From Brussels we study increase financial support European to prevent the island from being trapped in a relationship of dependency with Washington, especially with the prospect of future independence. This effort not only seeks to counteract American economic influence, but also preserve the social and political model that the Greenlanders might want to keep. In this context, the crisis reveals that the battle for Greenland is not only fought in the military field, but also in that of investment, legitimacy and the projection of soft power. A stress test. Altogether, the American pressure over Greenland has exposed the internal tensions of a NATO designed to deter external threats, not manage territorial ambitions of one of its members. The german initiative of transferring the problem to the field of collective security, inspired by the Baltic model, is an attempt to preserve allied cohesion and avoid an existential crisis. However, the simple fact that mechanisms are being considered like Article 4 It demonstrates the extent to which the alliance faces an unprecedented scenario, one in which unity no longer depends only on stopping external adversaries, but on containing power impulses within its own ranks. Image | Program Executive Office Soldier, pathanMinistry of Defense of the Russian Federation In Xataka | After the Nazi occupation, Denmark signed a pact in 1951. Since then, the US can ask for whatever it wants in Greenland In Xataka | Greenland has become an obsession for the United States for a simple reason: they believe in global warming

the Ukrainian drone that stopped Russia for six weeks with a machine gun and not a single human soldier

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On the Ukrainian front, where every meter conquered or defended is paid for with a human cost that is increasingly difficult to assume, ingenuity is has become a resource as valuable as ammunition. In this context of extreme wear and constant adaptation, some units are experimenting with little visible solutions that, without attracting attention, are beginning to change the way a battle line is held. When there are no soldiers left. In a war marked by a shortage of infantry and the extreme lethality of maintaining forward positions, Ukraine has begun to test a solution that until recently belonged to military science fiction: leaving the front in machine hands. During 45 consecutive daysa Ukrainian unit maintained front-line sectors without direct human presence, entrusting the defense to a single land vehicle unmanned, a bet that summarizes the crude logic of the current conflict: if something can receive enemy fire, it better not bleed. The doctrine. The experience was reported by the NC-13 Strike Company, integrated into the Third Corps of the Ukrainian Army, a unit created specifically to operate unmanned ground vehicles. Its commander, Mykola “Makar” Zinkevych, explained that the idea was radically simple: “robots don’t bleed,” and the ground drone was the only element present in the position, carrying out constant suppressive fire missions to deter Russian advances and force the enemy to confront a defense that could not be psychologically worn down or eliminated with human casualties. The droid TW 12.7. The system used was the Droid TW 12.7developed by the Ukrainian company DevDroida small tracked vehicle armed with a heavy machine gun M2 Browning .50 caliber. Far from being an isolated prototype, the drone was displaced between different positions at the request of local command posts, acting as a mobile punishment platform that turned each attempted Russian advance into a costly and risky operation. The Droid TW 12.7 Wear and tear… also for machines. Although the robot could remain in place for days, it needed withdraw every 48 hours for maintenance, resupply of ammunition and recharging of batteries, tasks carried out by a team located several kilometers from the front. The process, initially four hours, is reduced by half thanks to the purchase of additional batteries paid for by the soldiers themselves, a detail that illustrates the extent to which the Ukrainian war continues to depend on local initiatives and improvised financing even when talking about advanced technology. Limited autonomy. DevDroid affirms that the Droid TW 12.7 can operate at distances of up to 15 miles and has artificial intelligence-assisted navigation functions, although it is unclear to what extent it can act autonomously in combat. Even so, the simple fact that a single UGV has held positions for six weeks demonstrates that the value of these systems lies not only in their sophistication, but in their ability to replace human bodies in tasks where survival is minimal. From experiment to military doctrine. After this experience, the Zinkevych unit plans to expand the use of UGVs in both defensive and offensive missions, relying on new variants equipped with grenade launchers already approved for official use. The demand, recognizeis very high, but so are the costs, to the point that development continues to be partially financed through crowdfunding campaigns. The future of the front. If you like, the case Droid TW 12.7 It is not just a technological anecdote, but a sign of where to go war is headed modern in Ukraine: a battlefield where every meter can be defended with sensors, steel and algorithms instead of flesh and blood, and where the strategic value of a soldier begins to also be measured by his ability not to be physically there. Image | Tank Bureau In Xataka | Russia has reminded the planet that the war in Ukraine is a ticking bomb. And for this he has pressed a nuclear button: Oreshnik In Xataka | Ukraine has become an animal slaughterhouse: Russian soldiers appear with horses and drones blow them up

Russia has reminded the planet that the war in Ukraine is a ticking bomb. And for this he has pressed a nuclear button: Oreshnik

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Over the past few months, the war in Ukraine has seemed advance by inertia: fronts that barely move, stalled negotiations and constant wear and tear that threatens with normalizing the conflict in Europe. But in recent weeks Moscow has remembered, without the need for major territorial conquests, that it continues to have the ability to alter the chessboard with a single gesture: the nuclear one. The button that is always there. In a stuck war In the mud of the front and industrial wear and tear, Russia has once again remembered that it is still sitting on a strategic bomb pressing a button that does not need to be pressed completely to take effect: that of Oreshnik missilean intermediate-range system with nuclear capacity whose use, even with inert or conventional charges, functions as a political message rather than as a tactical weapon. The launch detection from the Kapustin Yar strategic polygon and the subsequent explosions near Lviv, a few kilometers from the Polish border, do not seek so much to destroy decisive objectives as to point out that Moscow can escalate whenever it wants and from wherever it wants, even from facilities associated with its strategic nuclear forces, deliberately breaking the “conventional” routine of the conflict. Symbolic weapon, real threat. It we have counted before: the Oreshnik, derived from the RS-26 program and capable of carrying multiple warheads that separate in flight, it is not a missile designed to win battles in Ukraine, but to cross psychological red lines in Europe. Its hypersonic speed, its potential range of up to 5,500 kilometers and the fact that Ukraine lacks defenses capable of intercepting it turn each launch into a demonstration of the structural vulnerability of NATO’s eastern flank. When Russia first used it against Dnipro in 2024 with dummy heads, he made it clear that he was not testing marksmanship, but rather strategic credibility. Now, by bringing the impact closer to the NATO border and the European Union, the message is even more explicit. Controlled climbing. The reappearance of the Oreshnik is no coincidence. It occurs while Ukraine refuses to give up territory in the negotiations, while Moscow insists that any Western troops deployed on Ukrainian soil would be a legitimate objective and while Washington, under Trump, intensifies pressure on Russia’s allies like Venezuela. The Kremlin justifies the attacks as retaliation for alleged Ukrainian attempts to attack the residence of Vladimir Putinaccusations that even US intelligence services they doubtbut the real logic is different: to raise the psychological and political cost of Western support without formally crossing the nuclear threshold. Energy, winter and strategic terror. As in previous winters, Russian missiles and drones are once again baiting the Ukrainian energy infrastructureleaving entire neighborhoods in kyiv and other cities without electricity or heating amid sub-zero temperatures. The Oreshnik fits into this strategy of calculated terror: not only does it damage critical facilities, but it amplifies the feeling of helplessness by introducing a weapon that symbolizes the maximum possible escalation. Ukraine responds by hitting power grids in Russian regions such as Belgorod or Oryol, but the strategic asymmetry remains intact. Europe as a target audience. Furthermore, by hitting near Lviv and, by extension, Poland, Russia is not just talking to kyiv, but with Brussels, Berlin and Paris. The Oreshnik is a reminder that Ukrainian theater is inseparably linked to European security and that any expansion of military support has an immediate reflection on the deterrence ladder. It is no coincidence that Moscow recently showed the deployment of the system in Belarus, further extending the reach shadow over the continent. The temptation of blackmail. Thus, with minimal and extremely slow territorial advances, and a growing human and industrial cost, Russia uses the Oreshnik missile as a substitute for victories on the battlefield. It is not a weapon to conquer Ukraine, of course, but rather to remind the world that the conflict cannot be closed by ignoring the Russian nuclear dimension. From that prism, each launch is a warning: Moscow does not need to detonate a warhead to reactivate the founding fear of the Cold War. Just show the button, press it even half and make it clear that it is still there, waiting, like a time bomb that sets the pace of all future negotiations. Image | Ministry of Defense of Ukraine In Xataka | Ukraine has become an animal slaughterhouse: Russian soldiers appear with horses and drones blow them up In Xataka | First it was Finland, now the US has confirmed it: when the war in Ukraine ends, Russia has a plan for Europe

Russia and the US face to face

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What started as an American operation apparently limited to imposing a naval blockade on sanctioned oil tankers off the coast of Venezuela has ended up becoming an episode of high strategic voltage in the North Atlantic. He assault has reached Europe, and Russia and Russia have appeared on the horizon. his ghost fleet. From the Caribbean to the Atlantic. What has happened is that Washington has boarded an oil tanker already reflagged by Russia while Moscow has sent naval assets, including a submarineto escort him. The case of the old Bella 1hastily renamed as Sailor and with a Russian flag painted with a broad brush in the middle of the chasesymbolizes the transition from an economic war and sanctions on the Latin American periphery to a direct, physical and potentially scalable clash between two nuclear powers in European waters. There is no simple rusty ship here, but a collision of red lines that until now had been carefully avoided. The ghost fleet comes out of the shadows. we have been counting. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Moscow, Tehran and Caracas have built a vast “ghost fleet” of more than a thousand aging tankerswith opaque ownership, non-existent insurance and false flags, designed to keep the flow of oil outside of Western sanctions. For years, the system relied on ambiguity and plausible deniability: registrations in administrative havens, shell companies in Dubai or Seychelles and flags of convenience that minimized political risk. The recent turn is radically different. Dozens of these ships have begun to raise the Russian flag directly, not out of discretion, but as a shield. It is a kind of flight forward: by declaring them Russian, the Kremlin raises the cost of any interdiction, transforming a legal problem into a strategic one. The perfect example. He Sailor is he most extreme example of that mutation. Pursued by the US Coast Guard from the Caribbean, he refused a boarding, fled into the Atlantic, changed his identity and received a Russian registration without formal inspections. With this, Moscow sought something very specific: deter Washington by raising the implicit question of whether the United States was willing to forcibly board a Russian-flagged ship on the high seas. The answer has left no room for doubt. The televised approach. The American operation was anything but improvised, with a video of the assault who has turned the helm. For weeks, the tanker was followed by a Coast Guard cutter while aerial assets were deployed in the United Kingdom, including special forces and surveillance platforms. The final boarding in waters between Iceland and Scotland It involved US military personnel and occurred despite the nearby presence of Russian naval units. According to Moscowit was a violation of international law. According to Washingtonthe ship had previously been stateless, was under a judicial seizure order and was part of an illicit transportation network of Iranian and Venezuelan oil. Munro following the tanker Bella 1 Repercussions. The crucial detail is not legal, but political. Russia had formally requested that the United States cease the persecution and, at send a submarine and other assets, introduced an element of direct military deterrence. The United States, by moving forward, de facto accepted a risk it had so far avoided: an incident between Russian and American forces outside the Ukrainian theater and without the usual diplomatic buffers. The disturbing change of scenery. Previously, the US tightening against the ghost fleet was concentrated in the Caribbean and around Venezuela, especially after Maduro’s captureconverted by Trump into a show of force and the pillar of a strategy to control Venezuelan oil. In that context, boarding oil tankers with a dubious flag off the Latin American coast implied limited risks: Guyana or fictitious records were not going to respond militarily. The jump to the North Atlantic changes everything. He Sailor was not intercepted near Venezuela, but on routes close to Europe, with the UK operational support and under the watchful eye of NATO allies. The scene, therefore, is no longer the American “backyard,” but rather a space where any miscalculation has direct implications for European security. Suddenly, sanctions enforcement overlaps with nuclear deterrence. Moment of the assault on the oil tanker The nuclear factor. No one needs to mention weapons for are present. Russia is a nuclear power that bases much of its doctrine on controlled escalation and ambiguity, and the United States perfectly understands the implicit message when Moscow escorts an oil tanker with a submarine. The Marinera incident demonstrates the extent to which the sanctions war has reached a dangerous threshold: it is no longer just about money or oil, but about strategic credibility. Each boarding of a ship re-flagged by Russia poses an uncomfortable question: How far is Moscow willing to protect its ghost fleet without crossing a line that provokes a direct response? And at the same time, how many times can Washington repeat an operation like this before the Kremlin feels the need to respond so as not to appear weak? In a stressful environment, an accidental collision or misunderstanding can escalate quickly. Europe and the crossroads. The seizure of Sailor occurs while Europe debate what to do with these oil tankers, increasingly associated not only with evasion of sanctions, but to sabotagedamage to submarine cables and serious environmental risks. Countries like Finland and France have already used special forces to board suspicious ships. However, the American case introduces a disturbing precedent: what is legal is not always prudent. If great powers normalize the use of force on the high seas against strategically reflagged ships, other less responsible actors may imitate the behavior. An old ship as a symbol. He Sailor It did not carry oil, nor is there conclusive evidence that it transported weapons. Its value is different: as a symbol. It represents the transition of the russian hybrid war from the shadow to open confrontationand shows that the United States is willing to push the pressure beyond the margins comfortable of the Caribbean. “Venezuela” is no longer a … Read more

The gold of the 21st century is not in Venezuela. China and Russia know it, and that is why the US wants Greenland no matter what.

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As if it were a Deja Vú2026 has exactly begun same as 2025: with Trump’s insistence on take over Greenland. It happens that it no longer seems like an isolated whim or a rhetorical eccentricity, but rather the convergence of a personal drive, a strategic opportunity perceived as easy, and a high-impact geopolitical calculation. Venezuela It has served to light the fuse. Greenland as an obsession. After the capture of MaduroTrump confirmed once again that the use of force abroad lacks the legal and judicial brakes that do constrain his domestic action, and that, in the face of clearly outmatched adversaries or allies, the reality is imposed on international law without too many immediate consequences. Greenland then appears (again) as the perfect prize: a huge, sparsely populated territory, defended by an ally incapable of military resistance and located in an area where Washington can dress territorial ambition in the language of “national security”. The reiteration of the message, the appointment of a specific envoy and the public statements that normalize even the military option indicate that this is not a joke or simple diplomatic pressure, but rather an obsession that grows as Trump’s internal political margin narrows. The founding paradox of NATO. The central problem is that Greenland belongs to the Kingdom of Denmarka full member of NATO, and any US action against it would place the Alliance before a paradox for which it was not designed. He Article 5, designed to deter external enemies, does not see clearly What happens when the aggressor is the hegemonic member. As has warned Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen, in that scenario “everything would stop”: NATO could continue to exist formally, but its credibility would be destroyed. No one would come to the defense of Greenland against the United States, not only due to a lack of political will, but also due to the absolute material asymmetry between Washington and the rest of the allies. The implicit message is thunder for Europe: security guarantees are no longer automatic, and force is once again in place above the treatyan outcome that directly benefits Russia at the moment of greatest tension since the end of the Cold War. Critical minerals. The economic and technological argument is supported in mineral wealth that lies under the Greenland ice, the result of an ancient geology that concentrates rare earths and other essential critical minerals for the energy transition. From the 19th century to today, different actors have tried exploit that potential, from Ivittuut cryolite during World War II to contemporary rare earth projects. However, the enthusiasm collides with a stubborn reality: extracting these resources is extraordinarily expensive, slow and risky. The almost total lack of infrastructure, the dependence on maritime or air transport, the complexity of processing (with minerals often associated with uranium) and restrictive environmental legislation mean that only a minimal fraction of exploration projects become operational mines, usually after more than a decade of investment. Extra ball. Furthermore, the memory of the environmental damage caused by past exploitations, whose effects are still detectable half a century later in extremely fragile ecosystems, explains why Greenlandic society only contemplates mining. like an opportunity if you actively participate in decision-making and project ownership. The loot exists, but it is neither immediate nor easy, and it certainly does not seem to be able to justify the American strategic urgency on its own. Hybrid war. The backdrop is a northern Europe increasingly militarizedwhere incidents against submarine cables, gas pipelines and critical infrastructure in the Baltic have normalized the idea of a permanent hybrid war. In this context, Washington observes how Moscow and Beijing test pressure tactics below the threshold of open conflict, while legal and judicial responses appear slow or ineffective. The explicit willingness of the United States to include military option for Greenland fits into that fait accompli logic: securing key positions before the strategic environment deteriorates further. It is not just about denying advantages to rivals, but about getting ahead of a scenario in which infrastructure, logistics and control of physical nodes are worth more than declarations of principles. The navigable Arctic and a port. Here a possible decisive derivative emerges. Science has been warning for some time a stage where the Arctic is heading, on a horizon of decades, to be navigable for most of the year. The sustained retreat of sea ice is transforming routes that were once seasonal into viable commercial corridorsdrastically reducing the distances between Asia, Europe and North America. Today, they capitalize on that advantage especially Russiawith the Northern Maritime Route, and Chinawhich presents itself as a “near-Arctic power” and invests in ports, icebreakers and logistics agreements. For the United States, which is late to this board, Greenland represents the perfect shortcut: an enclave located between the Atlantic and the Arctic, capable of hosting deep-water ports, air bases and logistics nodes from which to offset the Russian-Chinese advantage. Seen this way, more than a mine, Greenland is a port ahead of the world to come, a piece from which to influence the global trade of the 21st century and the control of routes that, for the first time in modern history, cease to be be closed by ice. A small island, a global change. If you will, the final paradox is that all this pulse revolves around a tiny territory of less than 60,000 inhabitantsone mostly opposed to integrating into the United States and in favor, at best, of a slow and cautious independence. However, its symbolic and strategic value is disproportionate. Greenland condenses the transition to a world where melting ice reconfigures maps, critical minerals redefine dependencies, and alliances are strained to the limit. For Trump, it is a source of political impact, potential money and demolition of the old order. For Europe, possibly proof that geography prevails again to the law. And for the international system, the warning that the Arctic is no longer a remote edge of the planet, but one of its new centers of gravity. Image | The … Read more

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