drone

an underwater drone has made history

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Ukraine, that lwar laboratory of the present and future, was a pioneer in the use of drones and in the creation of an unprecedented industry around the use of these quadcopters as elements front key. This is how we saw mother drones sending drones to annihilate other drones. In Ukraine too, another unprecedented milestone has just taken place. With drones, but this time under the sea. A before and after. Ukraine claims to have carried out the first combat attack successful in history with an underwater drone against a warship, specifically a Russian submarine of the Improved Kilo class docked in the port of Novorossiysk, one of the current main refuges of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. According to the Ukrainian Security Servicethe attack was carried out with a known unmanned underwater vehicle as Sub Sea Babycapable of sailing underwater to a densely protected port and hitting a specific target without being detected, something that, if confirmed, would represent a qualitative leap in modern naval warfare. The images. He broadcast video by kyiv shows an explosion next to the submarine while it remains moored, which would indicate that the drone managed to penetrate the port’s defenses and reach one of the most valuable platforms of the Russian arsenal, valued at about 400 million dollars and equipped with launchers of Kalibr cruise missiles used recurrently against Ukrainian cities. Blow to the heart of Russian flora. The attacked submarine belongs to one of the most silent and difficult to detect of the Russian Navy when operating submerged and in battery mode, and is part of a small group of six units assigned to the Black Sea Fleet before the war. Sources close to the Russian military they point because the impact would have occurred near the stern, damaging rudders and propeller, critical components that, even without piercing the hull, could leave the submarine out of service for long periods. If the damage is as serious as kyiv claims, Russia would stay with only four Kilo submarines operational in the area, significantly reducing their ability to launch missile attacks from the sea and reinforcing the Ukrainian strategy of hitting launch platforms rather than intercepting individual projectiles. The forced withdrawal. This attack cannot be understood without the context of the Ukrainian naval campaign started in 2023based almost entirely on unmanned systems. The massive use of surface drones loaded with explosives allowed Ukraine to damage or neutralize approximately a third of the Russian Fleet of the Black Sea and forced Moscow to withdraw many of its ships from occupied Sevastopol to Novorossiysk, in Russian territory, until now considered a relatively safe haven. Submarines like Rostov-on-Don they had already been attacked in port on previous occasions, but the use of an underwater drone dramatically expands the range of threats, by making it possible to avoid networks, floating barriers and defenses specifically designed to stop surface attacks. The logic of asymmetric war. For kyiv, the commitment to naval drones, both surface and underwater, responds to a logic of cost and survival. While a Russian submarine costs hundreds of millions of dollars and years to build, a Ukrainian naval drone can be manufactured for between 250,000 and 300,000 dollars. This asymmetry allows Ukraine to compensate for its numerical and technological inferiority compared to Russia, forcing the Kremlin to invest huge resources defensive and live in a constant cycle of adaptation. Each new Ukrainian tactic generates Russian countermeasures, which in turn are neutralized by new developments in periods ranging from weeks to a few months, permanently altering the rules of naval combat in the Black Sea. A sign of what is to come. The operational use of underwater drones as offensive weapons opens a completely new scenario, not only for this conflict, but for global naval warfare. The United States, China and other powers have years developing UUV for reconnaissance missions, mine laying or long range attacksbut Ukraine could have been the first country in demonstrating its real effectiveness in combat. If Novorossiysk is no longer a safe sanctuary and submarines can be attacked even in port, the Russian defensive posture will have to change again, extending even more resources and protection. At the same time, the attack reinforces the idea that the war in Ukraine has become in a laboratory where theoretical concepts are tested on a large scale, anticipating a future in which ports, naval bases and large ships will no longer be able to rely on the depth of the sea as their last line of defense. Image | SBU SCREENCAP In Xataka | Now we know the price North Korea pays Russia for its nuclear submarine: the most dangerous job of the war in Ukraine In Xataka | The drone war in Ukraine is complete nonsense: the manuals that were useful two weeks ago are a death trap today

The drone war in Ukraine is advancing at the speed of light: what was useful two weeks ago is a death trap today

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Since the first months of the Russian invasion, Ukraine has converted the use of drones in one of the central pillars of its defense, and has done so to the point of transforming a conventional conflict into a permanent laboratory unmanned combat. In this environment of constant adaptation, drones have not only redefined the way we fight on the front, but have imposed an unprecedented pace of technological change that forces armies, industries and training centers to update almost in real time to avoid becoming obsolete. Classrooms at war. The Ukrainian drone schools have become one of the most extreme laboratories of military learning in the world, forced to rewrite their training programs at a dizzying pace that in some cases reaches the two weeks. In a conflict where drones have become the main instrument of attack, reconnaissance and attrition, the distance between an obsolete lesson and a lethal decision can be measured in days. For these centers, adapting is not an academic question, but rather a direct line between survival and death on the front, in an environment where technology, countermeasures and tactics change constantly and rapidly. In Xataka We had seen everything in Ukraine, but this is new: drones are disguising themselves as Russian soldiers, and it is working Synergy. To stay relevant, instructors are not limited to manuals or simulators. They regularly visit the battle lines, maintain permanent contact with alumni deployed and testing new technologies before incorporating them into their courses. In schools like Dronarium, with offices in kyiv and Lviv, its R&D manager, the veteran known as “Ruda”, explains that technological evolution on the front is so rapid that it requires almost immediate adaptability. There is no two equal classes: Each lesson incorporates small adjustments resulting from what happened days before in real combat. More than 16,000 students have passed through this center, and their experiences are directly integrated into the curriculum, turning training into a living system that feeds back on the war. Two-way learning. One of the pillars of this model is communication direct and permanent with the combatants. Messaging groups connect deployed instructors and operators, allowing soldiers to share new enemy tactics, technical problems or improvised solutions, while receiving advice in near real time from the rear. In centers like Karlsson, Karas & Associates or Kruk Drones, this relationship does not end at the end of the course: it is maintained throughout the operator’s operational life. The instruction is clear: nothing is taught that is not strictly necessary in combat, and what is no longer useful is unceremoniously discarded, no matter how recent it may be. A war that reinvents itself. The central weight of drones on the battlefield explains this urgency. The majority of frontline impacts and casualties already depend on unmanned systems, requiring continuous modification of both platforms and employment tactics. New models appear, others are neutralized by countermeasures, and the rules of the game are constantly rewritten. This speed has set off alarm bells in the West: military officials such as British Minister Luke Pollard warn that NATO forces run the risk of becoming obsolete, trapped in acquisition cycles that last years in the face of a war that repeats every two or three weeks. {“videoId”:”x8j6422″,”autoplay”:false,”title”:”Declassified video of the clash between Russian fighters and the American drone”, “tag”:”united states”, “duration”:”42″} The industry learns from Ukraine. The schools they are not alone in this race. Defense companies that observe the conflict have begun to copy this model of direct interaction with the front, shortening your cycles developmental. Manufacturers of anti-drone systems and UAV platforms visit the battlefield, chat with operators and fine-tune designs in a matter of weeks, not years. Some executives recognize that the ways in which Ukrainians use technology have surprised them, forcing them to rethink basic assumptions. At the same time, the soldiers themselves benefit from this exchange, providing constant feedback and receiving improvements, spare parts and solutions adapted to their real needs. In Genbeta According to psychology, those who grew up in the 1960s and 1970s developed mental strengths that are being lost today Schools under fire. There is no doubt, this permanent adaptation has a cost. Drone schools are not only competing against the technological clock, they are operating under the direct threat from Russian attacks and with limited financial resources, often depending on donations to continue functioning. In this context, their fight is not only to stay updated, but to survive. Even so, their role has become central in modern warfare: they are the link that connects innovation, industry and real combat, and the best example of how Ukraine has turned the urgency of conflict into a flexible and brutally efficient national military learning system. Image | Heute, RawPixel In Xataka | The new episode of terror in Ukraine does not involve missiles or drones: it involves leaving a city without cell phones In Xataka | Europe faces a question it can no longer avoid: how to respond to a war that is rarely declared (function() { window._JS_MODULES = window._JS_MODULES || {}; var headElement = document.getElementsByTagName(‘head’)(0); if (_JS_MODULES.instagram) { var instagramScript = document.createElement(‘script’); instagramScript.src=”https://platform.instagram.com/en_US/embeds.js”; instagramScript.async = true; instagramScript.defer = true; headElement.appendChild(instagramScript); – The news The drone war in Ukraine is advancing at the speed of light: what was useful two weeks ago is a death trap today was originally published in Xataka by Miguel Jorge .

a mother drone with 16 tons of surprises

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If drones are the weapons of present and futureChina is several galaxies ahead of the rest of the planet with a single architecture. HE called Jiu Tianand it is the evolution of old war aircraft carriers adapted to new times: a huge mother plane that has just successfully completed its first overhaul. The rise of the aerial mother. China has given a decisive step in the global race for dominance of unmanned airspace with the inaugural flight of the Jiutian, a 16-ton colossus that not only symbolizes the maturity of its aeronautical industry, but also marks a turning point in the very conception of air power in the 21st century. Although officially presented as a civil platform Versatile for heavy transportation, emergency communications or advanced mapping, the Jiutian (next to the Jetankits version more openly oriented towards dual missions) represents the culmination of a strategy in which drones cease to be simple support vectors and become motherships capable of releasing swarmstransport loitering munitions, and completely alter the way the military views saturation operations, electronic warfare, and spectrum control. And much more. The official media they have insisted after its first test in modularity and the diversity of civilian roles, but the combination of load capacity, range, autonomy and mission architecture has aroused interest that goes far beyond the commercial: it is the birth of the “aircraft carriers of the sky” (or rather drone carriers), platforms that are inserted in the global strategic competition. The metamorphosis of the drone. The first characteristic that distinguishes the Jiutian (and the Jetank) is its size. At 16.35 meters in length and 25 meters in wingspan, it is placed in an unprecedented category: large tonnage drones with the capacity to transport 6,000 kilos of payload. Added to this is an autonomy of 12 hours and a range of 7,000 kilometers, figures that were previously only associated with manned transport or ISR aircraft. This structural base allows mounting mission modules completely interchangeable: from high-precision logistics containers to communications capsules to restore networks in disaster situations. However, beneath that multifunction façade hides the real qualitative leap: an internal compartment “hive” type capable of hosting dozens to more than a hundred smaller drones or loitering munitions, along with eight external points from which guided weapons, air-to-air missiles, glider bombs or electronic warfare charges can be launched. Two versions of the same revolution. The figures presented by the Chinese developers show that the two models share dimensions, maximum takeoff weight, payload and autonomy, which indicates that Jiutian and Jetank are part of the same family of megadrones aimed at covering everything from logistical needs to complex military missions. One where the Jetank stands out is in the more explicit emphasis on its ability to launch swarms in mid-flight and change roles in a few hours thanks to mission modules that are quickly assembled. Chinese analysts describe it as a “world-class” platformcapable of acting as a multipurpose transporter, swarm nurse, electronic warfare vector and even light bomber with precision munitions. Its open architecture system allows you to process, integrate and update sensors and software in an agile way, which transforms the drone on a flexible node within a broader network of manned and unmanned systems. In essence, both models are not simple UAVs: they are aerial ecosystems capable of adapting their function to any tactical or strategic scenario. A doctrine of formation. The real value of these drone carriers lies not only in their size or the weapons they can carry, but in the ability to release swarms of small drones (including kamikaze UAVs) that introduces a dynamic that surpasses the traditional logic of combat aviation. For example, a single Jiutian could deploy a swarm sufficient to overwhelm anti-aircraft systemscollapse sensors, overwhelm radars and allow other platforms to penetrate previously insurmountable defenses. In parallel, its autonomy allows, a priori, that the combination of reconnaissance, attack, electronic warfare and saturation be integrated into a single extended missionsomething that has rarely existed in unmanned platforms of this size. In recent conflicts like the one in Ukrainedrones have proven to be low-cost weapons with a disproportionate impact: their ability to destroy much more expensive equipment has rewritten the relationship between investment and military effect. China, with these developments, appears to have internalized that lesson and taken it a step further: from individual drones to turning one larger drone into the matrix from which hundreds are deployed. The future and 2049. He Jiutian development It is part of Xi Jinping’s goal of turning the Chinese Armed Forces into a “world-class army” by 2049. The exhibition in Zhuhai the previous year had already shown prototypes of combat drones equipped with AI capable of operating in tandem with manned fighters, and the flight of Jiutian confirms that the country is accelerating the technological pillars necessary to sustain a network combat model: megadrones, distributed artificial intelligence, swarms, modular sensors and platforms capable of exerting pressure on any regional theater. From that perspective, Jiutian and Jetank become in fundamental pieces for surveillance, reconnaissance, electromagnetic interference, saturation attacks and power projection missions in remote scenarios. Its design does not respond to an isolated program, but to a broader strategic architecture that China is perfecting to sustain its military rise. Image | CCTV, EPL In Xataka | One of China’s most disturbing weapons already has a flight date: a huge mother drone with 100 kamikaze drones on board In Xataka | China is sending drones to an island 100 km from Taiwan. The problem is that Japan and the US are filling it with missiles

This is how Moscow wants to stop Ukrainian drone incursions

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Losing your mobile connection when entering Russia has become, in recent days, a very real possibility for those traveling to the country. It is not a blackout zone or an operator error, but a measure that is part of the new approach with which Moscow is monitoring its networks amid the conflict with Ukraine. On November 10 began to be applied in Russia a mechanism that allows you to temporarily restrict the use of certain SIM cards when they reconnect to the country’s network. According to the Ministry of Digital Developmentit is a system aimed at verifying that the line belongs to a real user and not to a device used for other purposes. The idea fits with what Minister Maksut Shadayev advanced in August, when he explained that his department was studying blocking SIMs from abroad for a few hours when crossing the border. When the SIM reappears. In the case of Russian cards, the authorities have established a mechanism that is activated when the line reconnects to the national network after having been inactive for 72 hours or after a period of roaming. During this interval, access to mobile data and the use of SMS is suspended. It is not presented as a technical failure, but rather as a preliminary check that the network executes before allowing normal use of the service. For SIM cards that arrive from abroad, the system works more directly. When the line connects to the Russian network, the same temporary blocking that we have already talked about is applied, but with a clear procedure to remove it. The user receives an SMS from the operator that explains the restriction and includes a link to complete a captcha that proves that the card is in the hands of a person. If you prefer, you can do this by phone, where the operator confirms your details before reactivating services. The drone war is also going through mobile networks. The official explanation maintains that some SIM cards with data access can be found inside enemy drones and serve as a navigation or control channel. It is not an isolated idea. In Operation Spider’s Web, described by CSISUkraine used drones equipped with 4G/LTE-based systems and autonomous flight software. Even without stating that they all work the same, this precedent shows that mobile networks have become one more element of a conflict where each communication channel counts. One more measure in a much larger mosaic. Determining the real impact of these limitations on drone raids is not easy, among other things because there is no single operating model. The CSIS analysis reflects that even in systems that rely on mobile networks, autonomy plays a key role and that the weight of connectivity can vary depending on the mission. In this context, the restrictions applied by Russia fit as another tool, the exact scope of which depends on factors that are not public and that vary from one operation to another. For users, these measures mean living with a system that introduces an additional pause every time the SIM card changes context. The impact is especially visible in border areas, where mobile phones can automatically connect to networks in other countries and activate unwanted restrictions. Authorities have recommended configuring network selection manually to avoid this. Recovering the service involves following the steps we have mentioned. Images | Xataka with Gemini 2.5 In Xataka | In Ukraine the difficult thing is not to replace a drone but its pilot. So Russia has started the hunt with something unprecedented: Rubikon

In Ukraine, the difficult thing is not to replace a drone, but its pilot. So Russia has started the hunt with something unprecedented: Rubikon

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For two years, Ukrainian drone operators had managed to maintain a decisive tactical advantage: the ability to detect, harass and destroy Russian positions with an agility that Moscow could not match. Pilots worked in small teams, in makeshift basements or camouflaged trenches, piloting from a distance FPV that turned the front into a transparent space where the enemy could rarely move unobserved. All that has changed with an appearance. The dark turn. Yes, that domain has been abruptly broken with the appearance Rubikona Russian unit created to track, locate and eliminate not so much drones as to those who operate them. The testimony in the financial times by Dmytro, a Ukrainian pilot and former rapper, summarizes this change of era: he went from being a hunter to being hunted in seconds when a Russian drone detected him on a reckless walk. That moment, which two years ago would have been exceptional, has become part of the daily routine on a front where the survival of the operator has become a strategic objective for Russia and a critical weak point for Ukraine. The result is a complete investment of roles: Innovators, previously almost untouchable, are now a priority target. Rubikon structure and ambition. This Russian elite corps is not simply a drone unit, but an organization of about 5,000 troops endowed with ample financial resources, tactical autonomy and a defined mission: deny Ukraine the ability to operate its drone network. Unlike the heavily bureaucratic operation that characterized the Russian army in the early stages of the war, this unit acts with speed, initiative and an approach more reminiscent of the Ukrainian groups it seeks to destroy. Their main task is not to attack the infantry on the front line, but penetrate behind the frontup to 10 kilometers in depth, to destroy logistics vehicles, ground robots and, above all, locate the operators who control the Ukrainian defensive swarms. Emblem of the elite Russian unit And much more. For Russian and Western experts, Rubikon functions as a development center of unmanned systems: trains other units, analyzes tactics, refines procedures and continually adapts its way of operating. Each technical or doctrinal improvement that emerges from Rubikon ends up radiating to the rest of the Russian army, which explains why the Ukrainians detect unexpected qualitative leaps in the performance of enemy drones. This ability fast learning It is one of the most disturbing elements, because it allows Russia to correct in months the technological gap that Ukraine built for years. The new invisible dimension. The combat is no longer limited to the visible sky, but is fought in a domain more abstract and lethal: the electromagnetic spectrum. Both Ukraine and Russia deploy electronic intelligence stations, signal guidance equipment and jamming systems capable of defeating, jamming or even hijacking adversary drones. This rivalry makes any radio broadcast a potential risk. Operators, no matter how hidden, need clear lines of sight, elevated antennas, and transmitters relatively close to the front, factors that Rubicon systematically explodes. Their teams track antennas on hills, thermal shadows in forests and emissions that reveal the presence of a pilot a few kilometers away. Andrey Belousov inspecting the Rubikon unit The signs. The inhibitorsdespite their usefulness, generate visible electrical signatures that can attract attacks. And in the midst of these maneuvers, both sides resort to signal hacking video to observe enemy cameras or locate the exact source of a remote control. Expert Tom Withington resume this complexity with a precise image: it is a game of cat and mouse where physics dictates the rules, and where each action leaves a trace that the opponent can exploit. Pressure on the pilots. Plus: unlike the Russians, Ukraine lacks the necessary troops to maintain continuous shiftswhich creates physical and psychological exhaustion that becomes as dangerous as the enemy itself. Zoommer, a Ukrainian soldier from a small drone unit, explained in the Times that Rubikon can operate without breaks because it has enough staff to rotate every few hours, while they must remain alert almost all day. The arrival of this unit to Pokrovsk area (a city that has been in a desperate defensive struggle for a year) has transformed life on the front, going from manageable days to a constant tension in which any movement can mean death. Before, says Zoommer.the area was almost “a vacation”, now it is an invisible hell where every antenna, every fleeting signal and every movement outside the trench can be a fatal mistake. This pressure has forced the Ukrainians to change routines, camouflage positions with extreme care, hide transmitters, disperse equipment and create anti-drone cells that act as a defensive mirror of Russia’s own tactics. The loss of transparency. Drones had provided Ukraine with a crucial tool: the ability to see and hit farther and faster, giving its defenders situational transparency that compensated for numerical inferiority. According to the RUSI analysisup to 80% of current casualties are attributed to drone operations, underscoring their central role in a war in which artillery and infantry depend on these mechanical eyes. What’s happening? Than Rubikon and the like have eroded that advantage in forcing Ukraine to reallocate resources from offensive missions to the protection of its own operators. The result is that, while Russia advances at an increasing pace, Ukraine devotes more efforts to stopping than hitting, losing the initiative at a critical moment in the conflict. Moscow has quickly absorbed the enemy’s lessons and turned them into doctrine, a process that would normally take years and that here has been compressed into months, tipping the balance on an increasingly dynamic front. Psychological warfare. The latest analysis show that the front is no longer defined only by the technology deployed, but by psychological pressure endured by Ukrainian operators and by the transformation of the Russian army towards a more agile structure, represented in Rubikon. The pilots, who have become priority objectives, live under constant tension that forces them to minimize any movement and operate with the permanent feeling of being watched, because … Read more

There were thousands of mysterious holes lined up in Peru. We didn’t know why until a drone saw them from the air

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In the arid hills of Pisco Valleyin the south of Peru, extends a monument as mysterious as it is precise: a strip of almost a kilometer and a half made up of some 5,200 perfectly aligned cavities, known like Mount Sierpe or the Band of Holes. Discovered in 1931 by the geologist Robert Shippee and Lieutenant George R. Johnson during one of the first aerial expeditions over the Andes, the site baffled generations of archaeologists. Until now. A mysterious landscape. For decades, theories were proposed ranging from its defensive use to fog capture or water storage, but none of them quite fit. Now, a new study published in Antiquity provides a convincing hypothesis from a point of view that no one had valued: from the air. In this way, Mount Sierpe would have functioned as a accounting and barter system on a large scale, a kind of “spreadsheet” of the pre-Hispanic Andes. The geometry that speaks. The international team of researchers, led by archaeologist Jacob Bongers from the University of Sydney, used drones to map the site with millimeter precision. Aerial images revealed an organized structure into about 60 blocks or sections, each with distinct alignments and regular number patterns. Some areas show rows of nine by eight holesothers alternate between groups of seven and eight. This internal order, absent any defensive or agricultural logic, suggests an administrative purpose. Sediment analyzes extracted microscopic remains corn, totora and willow (plants traditionally used to make baskets and mats), which suggests that the cavities were lined with plant fibers and were used to store goods, possibly in packages or braided baskets. The holes of Mount Sierpe From local barter to administration. Researchers believe that Monte Sierpe was born as a space for exchange between highland and coastal communities, an organized market for balance the flow of goods in the absence of currency. Products (for example, corn, coca or cotton) could be deposited in each cavity as a visible representation of the value of one good compared to another, allowing quantities to be compared in a public and transparent manner. Centuries later, with the expansion of inca empirethat system would have been reinterpreted and expanded as an accounting tool to manage the tribute of local populations. Each block of holes would have corresponded to a different community group, and the variations in number and arrangement would reflect the contribution levels or work shifts required by the Inca State. In essence, Monte Sierpe would have been a physical data recorda stone matrix destined to organize the unwritten economy of the Andean world. A carved khipu. The most revealing finding is the similarity between the structure of the site and the Inca khipusthe rope systems with knots used to record censuses, taxes or resources. One of the khipus found near Pisco presents around 80 groups of lacesa figure surprisingly close to the 60 segments of Monte Sierpe. This correspondence suggests that the Band of Holes could have been a three-dimensional khipua monumental version of that woven numerical language, designed to coordinate the flow of goods and work between communities. Unlike the tablets or inscriptions of other civilizations, the Andean peoples turned geography itself into a support for information. Code in the desert. If you also want, Monte Sierpe redefines our understanding of pre-columbian organizational intelligence. Without writing, without currency and in a hostile environment, Andean societies managed to develop a visual, modular and mathematical method to represent their economy. Each hole would have been a cell a great living recordmanaged collectively, perhaps accompanied by ceremonies or ritual exchanges. Thus, in its apparent geometric simplicity, this “spreadsheet” carved into the rock reveals a advanced economic systembased on reciprocity and communal control of resources. What for the first explorers were simple rows of holes now emerge as the physical testimony of a civilization that, centuries before European contact, had already found its own way of turning the landscape into memory. Image | JL Bongers In Xataka | We have found 76 megatraps in the Andes. It’s amazing we hadn’t done it before. In Xataka | A secret room has just revealed how they ruled in Peru 2,000 years ago: with the help of drugs

A new futuristic Chinese drone has just appeared on the scene. Beijing has shown it in a video without saying a single word

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China has decided to show its new stealth drone in the most direct way possible: iincluding it in an official video and letting the image speak for itself. The device appears rolling from a hangar and forming with two J-20, a gesture that does not require subtitles to capture attention. It is an austere presentation, almost silent, but full of intention. The movement that changes reading. The official video published by the chinese air force for its 76th anniversary, it combines historical images with recent scenes, following a format that the institution has used for years. It is a simple production piece, focused on showing some of the advances that they consider relevant at this stage. Within this general route, the final section incorporates material that until now had not been seen on official channels, among them the inclusion of the GJ-11. It is a drone that belongs to the category of flying wing stealth platforms, a design that China has been researching for years and that fits with long-distance attack missions and surveillance tasks. What is known comes from sightings at test bases and analysis of their configuration, since Beijing has not published technical specifications. Some analysts interpret that its size and architecture allow prolonged flights, but that information is not part of official statements. Is it already operational? The official video does not confirm that the GJ-11 is in service, but it does fit with the indications that point to a program in an advanced phase. In recent months there have appeared at least three units in Shigatse, an active site where China tests systems in real scenarios. The inclusion of the drone in institutional material adds another element to the chronology, although by itself it is not enough to affirm that its operational deployment is a reality. The key doubts. Despite the relevance of the video, the Chinese Air Force has not offered details about the capabilities, range, sensors or weapons of the GJ-11. There is also no data on its production rate or on possible contracts associated with the program. The footage confirms its form and activity, but does not clear up technical unknowns that allow us to understand its exact role within the operational structure. The absence of this information keeps the program partially in the shadows. The appearance of the GJ-11 in an official video does not dispel all doubts, but it does consolidate an idea: China wants the drone to be part of its public story without the need to communicate technical details. Between previous indications and recent material, the image that remains is that of an advanced program that advances at its own pace. Images | People’s Liberation Army Air Force (Weibo) In Xataka | They have just leaked Russia’s best kept secret: their “invisible” nuclear bomber has exploded into the air

Russia’s biggest threat in Ukraine is not a drone or a missile. It is a film agency with 30 secret floors

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That the war in Ukraine has become the largest drone laboratory combat power on the planet is beyond any doubt. In fact, both Russia like, to a greater extent, Ukraine, have elevated these devices to configure a war industry unprecedented that places machines as the army of the future of any conflict. What was not so well known was where most of Ukraine’s drones came from. Origin and metamorphosis. What started three years ago as a location and props agency in basements and garages has mutated into a war industry on an almost industrial scale: Fire Point, whose owner and executives come from from the world of cinema and the construction of outdoor furniture, has gone from assembling drones with commercial parts to producing, according to its executives, hundreds of propelled and long-range munitions from at least thirty secret locations scattered throughout Ukraine. But there is much more, because the company has grown so much that it has currently consolidated itself with contracts for around billion dollars in a single year. A transit that reflects the rapid professionalization and commercialization of initiatives born out of patriotism and urgency in February 2022, when improvised underground workshops became an effective (although precarious and fragmentary) response to a large-scale invasion. Production, design and employment. Fire Point products, such as your FP-1 droneare simple machines in materials (polystyrene, plywood, plastics, and carbon fiber from cycling) but assembled with a logic of volume production: rocket-assisted takeoff, two-stroke engine, range measured in hundreds of kilometers and warheads of more than fifty kilos in some designs. Its catalog also includes the promising Flamingo missilea larger device, with a jet engine and a theoretical autonomy and load that, if confirmed at scale, could reconfigure the Ukrainian capacity to hit deep targets. The Ukrainian industrial philosophy here is clear: cheap, disposable, massive. Efficiency does not require reprocessing or longevity, only that some specimens cross the defense networks and fulfill their unique mission. An FP-1 Military strategy and effects. The proliferation of these munitions has allowed Ukraine to sustain a systematic campaign against energy infrastructure Russian companies (refineries and logistics nodes) seeking not only a tactical effect but also strategic pressure and leverage in eventual negotiations. In fact, the multiplicity of manufacturers domestic forces and technical adaptability have forced Russia to face a daily erosion of its apparent air immunity, forcing it to reallocate defensive resources and contemplate low-cost warfare as a decisive vector. Transparency and control. Fire Point’s meteoric rise has not been free of shadows: Public complaints and audits point out opaque awards, absence of mandatory price negotiations, questions about initial technical quality and the possible involvement of actors linked to the media and business environment close to power. In fact, the National Anti-Corruption Agency has inspected links with figures associated with the presidential circle and there are parliamentary calls to investigate pricesspecifications and the destination of multimillion-dollar benefits. Despite this, the public narrative combines suspicion and exaltation: national heroes and strategic businessmen who have shored up the defensive capacity, while activists and analysts demand more controls and transparency in war contracts. Industrialization and ecosystem. The phenomenon is not an isolated case but the center of an industrial revolution: Thousands of companies, hundreds focused on long-range drones and dozens competing for contracts, attract foreign funds, partners and joint venture projects. State agencies charter incentiveswhile international funds (such as the recent Norwegian-Ukrainian vehicle) show that the ecosystem is beginning to professionalize and seek commercial and technological legitimation beyond the emergency. For European and North American defense, Ukraine now offers a unique experience in unmanned missions and rapid design, which arouses interest both military as industrial. Ethical dilemmas. There is no doubt, the balance raises dilemmas: the domestic war economy reduces dependence on allied donations and scales offensive capacity, but it raises questions on democratic control, accountability and the risk that lucrative war businesses are perpetuated beyond strategic necessity. Plus: the proliferation of cheap and massive systems exacerbates the asymmetric nature of the conflict and poses risks of escalation and diffuse responsibility for selective objectives and collateral damage. Perspectives. In sum, the Fire Point history summarizes the Ukrainian phenomenon: industrial creativity (in many cases, they have no other choice) converted into a strategic muscle, an industry that emerged from volunteering transformed into key actor of the military apparatusbut also in focus of controversy due to its speed, its margins and the opacity typical of a country at war. The future challenge is twofold: to consolidate technological and productive capabilities that continue to perform in combat, and at the same time insert this thriving sector into frameworks of governance and transparency that prevent war efficiency from evolving towards economies of corruption or political capture. How Ukraine resolves this binomial will define whether its revolution dronistics It remains a collective merit or becomes an institutional burden. Image | xMezha In Xataka | They call it Skyfall, Burevestnik, or flying Chernobyl. The problem is not the name, it is what Russia’s latest missile does In Xataka | The war in Ukraine was a drone war. Now it is a war of drones that are not actually combat drones

the first “drone” attack in history

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If the war in Ukraine has shown us anything, it is that the rules of the game have changed. The drones dominate the battlefield and they don’t have to be cutting-edge creations: commercial and recreational drones They can perform precision attacks. However, the technical and even psychological foundations were laid more than 175 years ago, when the Austro-Hungarian Empire carried out the first bombing with unmanned vehicles of history against Venice. In the mid-19th century, today’s Italy did not exist. The territories were fragmented into a series of kingdomss, but within the framework of the liberal revolutions of 1848, some of those kingdoms tried to become independent from the control of the Austrian Empire. That same year, Venice rebelled and proclaimed itself the ‘Republic of San Marco’. It was a symbol of resistance to Austrian rule and, evidently, the Empire was not going to let it pass. Led by Marshal Radetzkythe Empire carried out a siege of the city, but as you might already guess, Venice is not an easy city to attack due to the “natural” defenses of the canals. Yes, in a war of attrition, disease and famine would take their toll on the population, but the Austro-Hungarians were in a hurry. Faced with the impediment of bombing and attacking the city in a conventional way, someone came up with an idea as crazy as it is tempting: bomb it with drones. Well, with the drones of the time. The UAVs of the Austro-Hungarian Empire against Venice The key name in this story is Franz von Uchatius. He was an artillery lieutenant who was also an inventor. Nothing like what he proposed had ever been done and I would have loved to have been in the room when he presented his idea, but basically the plan was loading hot air balloons with explosivesand control them in some way so that they would release the bombs on the city. Specifically, what von Uchatius suggested was launch 200 balloons both from the ground and from the SMS Vulcano (which we could consider as the first aircraft carrier in history), each loaded with about 15 kilos of explosives and a detonation system based on continuous combustion fuses (coal and cotton with fat). Each of the ‘drones’ It would have an activation system using copper wires and, in the case of some prototypes, galvanic batteries. Remote control? The wind and a series of estimated flight calculations, as well as a very strong desire for each of the balloons to fall where they had to fall: on the city’s population. On July 12, 1849 began the deployment of Austro-Hungarian drones, the first time humanity experienced that remote aerial threat. Now, the result was very different from what the attacking forces expected. Military failure… BUT Although they did the calculations, the balloon-bombers had no real guidance: they were pushed randomly by the wind. And the result was devastating for both forces, as impossible as it may seem. The first thing is that few bombs hit the city and the material damage was practically non-existent. In fact, changes in the wind and failure in those calculations caused some of the explosions to affect the Austro-Hungarian forces. Basically, the balloons were unpredictable. But do not think that the Venetian population had reasons to rejoice about this, since, although we may intuit that they would rejoice to see how the weapons of the enemies “revealed” against them, the truth is that the Venetians added a new concern to those they already had: an unlikely attack. The possibility of being attacked from the sky by devices like this It shocked the population and, although it was not the reason why the city capitulated days later (most likely it was due to the desperation caused by the siege), it was surely another item to add to the list of concerns. Although useless militarily, it was the conceptual germ of an unmanned aerial attack, something that was also used in the war between the US and Spain of 1898, later it was continued exploring in the World War I (where chilling new ways to kill each other were invented) and perfected in the modern era. Although the use of balloons with dangerous cargo has not stopped being used, and an example of this is the balloons with excrement that are thrown between North and South Korea. With all that this implies at a security level, since a few months ago they were feces, but they could perfectly have been explosives. Images | Timetoast National Library of France In Xataka | Using aerial balloons to smuggle tobacco is common in Eastern Europe. And then the airports have a problem

Ukraine and Russia are not only fighting a drone war, but also deception

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The phrase was literal from a Ukrainian high command. The war they have been fighting since the Russian invasion in 2022 is currently the closest thing to a cat and mouse hunt. In the current asymmetric conflict between Russia and Ukraine, where every night a kind of war is fought over energy infrastructurewhat has put both commands on alert is not only the destructive effect of armed drones, but the massive expansion of cheap decoys that force defenses to be spent. Curiously, Russia and Ukraine have resorted to the same thing: Second World War. Alarm. While the Russian Shahed cause blackouts and the Ukrainian Lyutyi and FP-1 they light refineriesboth parties they use decoys whose objective is to saturate, deceive and exhaust the enemy interception layer, and it is precisely this logic of multiplication (the effectiveness not only of the direct impact but also of the distraction) that turns these decoys (decoys) into a strategic multiplier capable of amplifying an already harmful campaign. The historical precedent. The tactic it’s not new: modern military history contains paradigmatic examplesfrom the shadow analemmas to the jet-decoys of the 20th century. And, of all, the case of the ADM-20 Quail illustrates better than any the conversion of vulnerability into advantage through transient imitators that consume defender resources. The Quail, small and cheap compared to the bomber it simulated, carried reflectors and simple patterns of flight to deceive radars and force the expense of expensive interceptors. Today that principle applies miniature and industrial scale with easily manufactured platforms that, although lacking lethal capacity, force the adversary to decide whether to fire a missile worth hundreds of thousands of dollars or take the risk of missing what could be the real target. A B-52 launching a Quail decoy The Russian range and its role. Moscow, which in 2024 industrialized the shahed of Iranian origin to saturate defensesalso produces lures like the Gerbera and the simple Parodiya; some are volumetric replicas with lower mass and range, others incorporate equipment electronic warfare to scout and mark radar locations, and some even carry small explosives to wound recovery teams. This variety pursues three purposes: inflict material wear on missile and air-to-air missile reserves, reveal defense positions, and complicate radar discrimination with reflectors Luneburg type that make targets the size of larger vehicles appear on the screens. The practical result is an increase in false positives that degrades the efficiency of the defense chain. An Lyutyi The Ukrainian range. Ukraine, later to scale its drone campaign, has combined attack vehicles such as the FP-1 either the Lyutyand with low-cost devices designed in local workshops (plastic tubes, wooden frames, metal foil to increase radar section) to explore corridors and distract responses while the units that cause real damage take another route. When working as “pathfinders”these devices allow Ukrainian planners to plot and verify secure routes, test defense sectors and create temporary penetration windows. In other words, its appeal lies in the reduced cost and ease of production, which makes the lure a repeatable tactical capital. Ukrainian decoy Cost asymmetry. The economy of confrontation is brutally simple: a Shahed of a few tens of thousands of dollars can force a response with air-to-air or surface-to-air missiles whose unit price can multiply to those of the target by factors of tens or hundreds. It we have counted: recent examples, like Sidewinders or similar missiles, reach prices that make them strategically scarce. That cost-benefit ratio tilts tactical and political decisions: waste a critical capability on potential decoys or hold on to it and accept the damage? Its proliferation makes the first option a safe way towards the depletion of stocks and the second in a bet for local resilience and operational trickery. Gerbera Lures Defensive capabilities. Although Ukraine has developed anti-aircraft artillery units and interceptor drones that have proven effective, comprehensive defense continues to depend on missiles and systems that are finite. Electronics, spectrum warfare and mobile units provide mitigation, but the physics of aerial combat continues to offer opportunities to those who have the volume and creativity to saturate. The introduction of decoys with EW components or communications relays adds another layer: they not only distract, but can map defenses, degrade chains and amplify subsequent attacks with greater precision. Foreseeable evolution. The scenario drawn by the combination of attack drones and lures is dynamic: iterative improvement of decoys (more realisticwith greater electronic signatures, with active deception capabilities) will match the technical challenge with costly countermeasures (better discrimination, multisensory sensors, finer intelligence). At a strategic level, the proliferation of these tactics erodes sustainability from the intensive use of conventional interceptors and pressures nations to invest in alternatives: low-cost missiles for home defense, AI-directed interceptors, mobile deployments, and greater reliance on offensive electronic warfare. Meanwhile, in the short term, the Ukrainian tactic of using lures as a multiplier It increases the likelihood of real material damage to critical Russian systems and highlights a legitimate fear in Moscow: that its defenses will be exhausted before the real threat is neutralized. So? If you like, the decoys work like power amplifiers: not only for what they destroy, but for what they force the adversary to burn, reveal or reconfigure. The lesson historic quail applied to mini-UAVs provokes a contemporary dilemma where economics, logistics and homemade innovation can tip the tactical balance. For Russia, the proliferation of Ukrainian decoys represents a operational and symbolic threat: The erosion of advantage in expensive systems and the realization that modern warfare rewards not just direct explosion but the ability to manipulate enemy perception and expenditure, transforming false targets into a strategic weapon in their own right. Image | StahlkocherGASTELLO DESIGN BUREAU, In Xataka | Ukraine accelerates the assault on Russia with an unprecedented army of robots: they are aquatic, carry rocket launchers and are lethal if stopped In Xataka | Ukraine cannot believe what it found inside Russia’s ballistic missiles: déjà vu

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