ghost

the only tools this expat needs to hunt down Iran’s ghost tankers

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From the 47th floor of his Singapore apartment building, Remy Osman, a British expat who works in the beverage industry, has a front-row seat to one of the world’s biggest geopolitical clashes. Armed with binoculars, a wide-angle camera and live tracking applications, Osman watches as a 333-meter-long supertanker moves at a snail’s pace along one of the busiest shipping routes on the planet. The scene contains a brutal irony: as detailed Financial Timesthat ship’s cargo has almost doubled in value since it set sail just two weeks ago, coinciding with Brent crude oil reached 120 dollars per barrel in the wake of the war between the United States, Israel and Iran. From his balcony, Osman hunts the ships of the so-called “shadow fleet”, sanctioned oil tankers that operate outside the law, but in broad daylight. The ship that caught Osman’s attention is the Hugean 18-year-old oil tanker. According to the sanctions list records of the US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)it is an Iranian-flagged ship operated by the National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC) and heavily monitored since 2018. Although the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz began at the end of February with attacks by the United States and Israel, the Huge It has been one of the few large crude oil cargo ships (VLCC) that managed to get out of that mousetrap. From his privileged vantage point, Osman has identified an unmistakable pattern: the Iranian oil tankers sail towards the east sunken in the water, revealing that they are loaded to the brim, and a week later they return in the opposite direction floating much higher, with their load considerably lighter. The most surprising thing is the nerve with which they operate in the midst of the current crisis. Ships that were previously hidden now display their names and flags as if to say: “We have as much right to navigate these waters as anyone else,” Osman himself said. to the Finance Times. This impunity has reached the point that almost two-thirds of the NITC fleet have started transmitting data accurate in their Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) after seven years of manipulation and concealment. Tehran’s lifeline The impact of this ghost fleet parading in front of Osman’s window is titanic. As the world suffers “the largest supply disruption in history” due to the closure of Hormuz, Iran continues to export its crude oilsurpassing the barrier of 2 million barrels per day. The millions of barrels that Osman sees disappearing on the horizon have an overwhelmingly single destination: China. The Asian giant absorbs around 90% of Iran’s oil exports. The data tracked corroborate this massive escapeplacing the “Iran-China” route in first place in dark operations, moving more than 1.6 million barrels per day. While Iran profits, the rest of the planet trembles. With some 20 million barrels a day taken off the formal board due to the physical blockade of Hormuz, the scenario of a barrel at $200 is already a real possibility. The global threat is proportional to the size of this illicit network: according to Fortunethe dark fleet is estimated at about 1,100 vessels, representing between 17% and 18% of all liquid cargo tankers in the world. The machinery to outwit the Western powers is a marvel of evasive engineering that occurs a few kilometers from Osman’s house. As explained Financial Timestankers do not sail directly from Iran to Chinese ports, but instead perform ship-to-ship (Ship-to-Ship) transfers on the high seas. The main scenario for this transfer is the Eastern Outer Port Limits, in Malaysian waters, an area with little supervision. On a single day last January, satellite images confirmed the presence of about 60 of these ships anchored there, operating with total impunity. To achieve this level of invisibility, they exploit legal loopholes in the sea. As detailed Fortune, The international maritime system is based on voluntary compliance: ships simply turn off their radio transponders, spoof their locations, or change their identities by scratching their registration numbers. In addition, they rely on “flags of convenience.” According to the statistics of Tanker TrackersIn addition to Iran and Russia, dark ships often fly flags of countries such as Panama, Cameroon or Sierra Leone. The final link in this chain is found in Asia. The report of Kharon reveals that the final buyers They are not the large state oil companies, but the so-called refineries teapot. These small, independent refiners absorb 90% of Iranian exports and give Beijing “plausible deniability” in the international community, even though these private companies are deeply connected to the Chinese state through joint ventures and front-line networks in Hong Kong. Attempts to stop this illicit transfer have been few and often frustrating. Although Malaysian authorities recently seized crude oil worth almost $130 million from two suspicious tankers, the outcome was laughable: after paying bail of just $75,000, the ships were released. The next day, Osman looked out on his balcony again and there was one of them, the Celebratebrowsing again fully loaded. The paradox in the shadows Still, the war has brought some complications. According to Lloyd’s Listthe escalation of war forced at least six ghost tankers that were sailing empty towards the Persian Gulf to turn around (the so-called U-turns) and abort its operations. But the network is resilient: as experts point out, the shadow fleet is designed precisely to operate under disruption. The great irony is that, while those sanctioned find cracks to navigate, the legal actors are desperate. The blockade has forced Saudi Arabia to use its oil pipeline through the desert against the clock to divert millions of barrels to Yanbuin the Red Sea, where an emergency armada of supertankers is queuing up in an agonizing attempt to evacuate legal crude oil and prevent economic collapse. How to conclude Fortune, The dark fleet did not arise because the maritime system is broken, but because it was always voluntary. Today, sanctions have pushed countries like Iran to build a highly effective parallel system. While the formal world looks for alternative … Read more

There are 30 centimeters left before the Montejaque ghost dam becomes a very real problem

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At the beginning of the 20th century, getting light to the most remote towns in the Serranía de Ronda and Grazalema was an impossible mission. Despite “being close”, they were areas that could only be accessed with a lot of effort and any infrastructure became a logistical problem. It was at that time when the Sevillian Electricity Company decided to make a clean break: build a dam on the Gudares River and produce the energy (up to 20,000 kW) right there. They commissioned the work to a Swiss company and built an 83-meter concrete structure near Montejaque, in Malaga. Then they realized that it was tremendously stupid: the limestone soil in the area turned the reservoir into a sieve and, in the more than a hundred years since its construction, it has never been in use. Until now. Although “use” isn’t exactly the word. Because, in reality, what has happened is that, given the enormous amount of water that has fallen in the area in recent weeks, the dam has filled. Of course, this filling is relative: from the first moment the water has been filtering through the cat’s cavevery close to there. But, thanks to it, it has been possible to ‘laminate’ Gudares Avenue and control the flows. The problem is that, right now and for the first time since we have data, Montejaque is about to overflow. 30 centimeters away from it, in fact. A ghost dam filled to the brim? And draining as if there were no tomorrow: at a rate of 200 cubic meters per second. The images are not only spectacularbut (also) are completely unheard of. There were no clear precedents, but the system (using siphons, as opposed to the usual spillways) has been put into operation before it overtopped the dam. And now what? In principle, monitoring and preparation. The town councils of Jimera de Líbar and Benaoján they have evacuated 150 people and monitor both the Guadiaro riverbed and the Hundidero-Gato cave system. This dam system stands between the reservoir and the closest towns, but no one is very clear about what could happen: it is expected to collapse the possible flood, but it has never happened and the UME continues to monitor the situation for what may happen. Calm. That is the message most repeated by the authorities and, from what we know so far, it is justified. However, it shows that too often we forget what is in the bush. The Montejaque concession has already declined, but it is still there, converted into a tourist attraction. From now on it will also be the constant reminder that we have to rethink all our water infrastructures. Image | Ronnie Macdonald In Xataka | Andalusia anticipates the storm and has already canceled in-person classes and activated the UME. The doubt is placed on the workers

an 11-meter-long “ghost jellyfish”

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A dark red creature, without stinging tentacles but with fleshy arms that extend like theater curtains, sailing silently in the absolute darkness. This, which can be quite scary, This is exactly what a scientific expedition has found in the Argentine Sea: a specimen of Stygiomedusa giganteaa jellyfish which has surprised by its large size when compared to that of a school bus. Hard to see. The Stygiomedusa gigantea It does not receive the nickname “ghost jellyfish” on a whim, since, despite its large size, the truth is that It is very difficult to find because of how elusive it is. To give us an idea, since the first specimen was described in 1910, hardly any have been officially recorded. about 130 sightings throughout the planet for more than a century. This makes this sighting that was made by the expedition ‘Lives in extremes‘ be really striking, although what has mattered is the quality and detail of the data obtained. How it was done. The scientific team, aboard the R/V Falkor research vessel, used the SuBastian ROVa remotely operated vehicle capable of descending to abyssal depths and transmitting 4K video. It was this robot that captured the jellyfish on the Argentine continental slope that has left many with their mouths open. The images point to a huge size of 11 meters when it has its ‘arms’ extended, which makes it comparable to a school bus. But also, unlike other jellyfish, the Stygiomedusa It does not sting, since it does not have poisonous tentacles. What it does have are four massive oral arms that it uses to catch prey and bring it to its mouth. Its color. Its reddish-brownish tone makes it practically invisible in the depths, where the red light of the solar spectrum is the first to be absorbed by water. To the eyes of other deep-sea animals, this jellyfish is effectively black and invisible, which makes it very easy to find food. Beyond the jellyfish. Although it has received practically all the attention due to its large size, the true scientific “treasure” of the expedition could be on the seabed. And the researchers from CONICET and the University of Buenos Aires were not only looking for pelagic fauna, but They wanted to map and study the underwater canyons, like the Colorado-Rawson canyon. And there, the SuBastian ROV’s sonar and cameras found something unexpected: the largest cold-water coral reef known to date in the region. Its characteristics. It is nothing less, since we are talking about an ecosystem dominated by the species Bathelia candida, a scleractinian coral that forms complex three-dimensional structures. The data indicates that one of its patches covers 0.4 square kilometers and extends the known distribution range for this species some 600 kilometers to the south. This is a vital discovery, because this coral acts as an “ecosystem engineer”, providing shelter, breeding and feeding grounds for an immense variety of fauna, including fish of commercial interest. Use of technology. The ship that has given rise to all these discoveries has traveled more than 3,000 kilometers from Buenos Aires to Tierra del Fuego, carrying out a systematic sweep of the ocean floor. To do this, they have used robots like the SuBastian, which allows marine biologists to do something that traditional trawl nets could not: observe the behavior of species in their natural habitat without harming them. This type of mission reminds us of a recurring maxim in modern oceanography: we know better the surface of Mars than the bottom of our own oceans. Finds like this giant jellyfish or new coral reefs are not just curiosities; They are key pieces to understanding how to protect biodiversity in a rapidly changing ocean. Images | Schmidt Ocean Institute In Xataka | Thousands of people are hooked on the most popular streaming of the moment: seeing rare fish 3,900 meters under the sea

The ships of the oil “ghost fleet” turn off their GPS to avoid being detected. Malaysia is going to hunt them with drones

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In the crystal clear waters of Southeast Asia, where the Strait of Malacca meets the South China Sea, a war is being fought that does not appear in conventional military reports. There are no trenches, but there are rusty helmets that turn off their GPS signal to disappear from international radars. This is the kingdom of the “ghost fleet”, an ecosystem of lawless ships that, according to the latest researchhas found its safe harbor in Malaysia, doubling its activity in just twelve months. However, the time for impunity appears to be running out: from the use of artificial intelligence to the deployment of naval drones, technology is beginning to illuminate the darkest corners of the ocean. The black market boom. The situation on the east coast of Malaysia has ceased to be an open secret and has become a global security problem. According to the specialized media Seatrade Maritime“ship-to-ship” (STS) oil transfers have recently doubled, going from just seven weekly operations to peaks of fifteen in just one year. This increase responds to an infrastructure designed to circumvent the sanctions imposed on Russia, Iran and Venezuela, using Malaysian waters as a gigantic clandestine service station before the crude oil continues on its way, mainly to China. Analyst Charlie Brown, of the organization UANIhas managed to capture a disturbing reality through satellite images and direct photos. In mid-January 2026, some 60 vessels linked to Iranian oil and another 30 with Russian and Venezuelan cargoes were waiting at anchor in Malaysia’s Exclusive Economic Zone. These ships not only operate outside the law, but they do so under deplorable technical conditions. Images distributed by UANI show tankers with false names broadbrushed on their hulls and flags of convenience hidden under tarps to deceive authorities. The metamorphosis of the threat. What began as a purely economic strategy to keep Moscow’s revenue flowing has mutated into something far more dangerous for European security. As the chronicles of my colleague Miguel Jorge relate in XatakaRussia has converted part of this fleet into covert hybrid warfare platforms. It’s not just about moving barrels; Now these ships incorporate “technicians” who, under a civilian guise, are usually special forces veterans or mercenaries linked to the Wagner group. These agents wield authority that often exceeds that of the ship’s captain and have been accused of photographing military installations and monitoring underwater cables in EU and NATO waters. An example of this tension was experienced with the oil tanker Boracaywhich after embarking Russian technicians in the Baltic, was intercepted by the French navy off Brittany after suspicious drones were detected flying over critical infrastructure in Copenhagen. The ghost fleet is today, in essence, an extension of the Kremlin’s security apparatus sailing with impunity under the flags of countries like Gabon or Gambia. A new fragmented energy order. From the academic level, the Elcano Royal Institute’s analysis highlights that this phenomenon is the symptom of a “deglobalization” of the gas and oil market. In your reportresearcher Gonzalo Escribano explains that international value chains, previously based on efficiency and transparency, are being replaced by “geoeconometrically armored” circuits. Europe finds itself at a crossroads: although it seeks to disassociate itself from Russian energy, the persistence of these black markets complicates strategic autonomy. This fragmentation has even reached the LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas) market. According to Bloombergsanctioned Russian gas transfers have been documented in Malaysian waters, a technically much more complex operation than crude oil. The ship Pearlmanaged by an opaque company based in a Dubai hotel, is the face of this new network that desperately seeks buyers in Asia for the gas that Europe no longer wants. The technological response: AI and drones to the rescue. Faced with a fleet that “turns off” the real world by hacking GPS signals (spoofing) and the shutdown of transponders, the response is being purely technological. The middle CNBC highlights thatof the ships loaded with Iranian crude in 2025, 96% made dark transfers and 77% falsified their location. To combat this “blackout”, Ukraine has shown the way with an innovation that has made conventional fleets obsolete: the use of artificial intelligence in naval drones. The drones Be Baby have multiplied its capabilities thanks to AI, allowing precision attacks from thousands of kilometers away. In a recent operation near the Turkish coast, these drones hit Russian ghost fleet tankers, specifically targeting their rudders and propulsion systems. The objective is not to sink them, which would cause an ecological disaster of catastrophic dimensions, but to render them useless and turn them into an unbearable economic burden for those who operate them. This “precision offensive” is forcing insurers and shipping companies to reconsider the risk of collaborating with Moscow, raising the costs of war for the Kremlin. The dilemma of safety and the environment. The proliferation of elderly ships, without liability insurance and with dubious maintenance, is an environmental time bomb. Lars Barstad, CEO of the operator Frontline, warned in the Financial Times that organizations such as the International Maritime Organization (IMO) appear to be “sleeping at the wheel”. Barstad notes that it is only a matter of time before a major disaster occurs, as these ships operate outside of any regulatory framework. Meanwhile, diplomatic pressure increases. The US has begun a campaign of aggressive seizures, such as that of the ship Sailor (before Bella 1), which was boarded by the US Coast Guard in North Atlantic waters after a chase from the Caribbean. This “gunboat diplomacy” of the 21st century, analyzed by the Atlantic Councilposes immense legal challenges: once a steel giant full of crude oil is seized, the maintenance and storage costs are astronomical. The end of the shadow. The current geopolitical dashboard report shows that Malaysia, Spain or the waters of the Caribbean are just scenes of a larger battle for visibility. The ghost fleet survives in the shadow of legal ambiguity, but the advance of artificial intelligence and constant satellite monitoring are tightening the fence. As the analysis concludes from my partnerthis is not a frontal … Read more

The Canary Islands and Galicia have set off the Navy’s alarm bells. Russia’s ghost fleet has arrived in Spain with warships

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Since the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and, above all, after the invasion large-scale ukrainian In 2022, Russia has been perfecting a form of confrontation that avoids direct clashes and moves in the shadows of international law: hybrid war. Sabotage, energy pressure, disinformation and opaque commercial fleets have become tools as strategic as tanks or missiles, and among them the called “ghost fleet”. Now everything indicates that they have found a new route: Spain. The “fleet” arrives from the south. At the end of January 2026, a Russian tanker sanctioned by the European Union was left adrift off the coast of Almería and was escorted by Spanish Maritime Rescue to a port in Morocco without being detained. He did it despite transporting more than 425,000 barrels of refined products of Russian origin. The episode, starring a ship integrated the ghost fleet (old ships, with frequent changes of name and flag and opaque structures of ownership) showed how Spain has become a key point of passage and incident management of a system designed to circumvent Western sanctions. Something happens. In the heart of the western Mediterranean, the Russian hybrid war was beginning to materialize not with missiles, but with timely breakdowns, gray areas of maritime law and routes connecting Russian ports with North Africa under the attentive, but limited, action of the European authorities. Morocco as a hinge, the Canary Islands as an entrance. A few days later, the arrival in Las Palmas de Gran Canaria of a oil tanker from Tangier set off alarms about a possible indirect entry of Russian fuel into Spain, using Morocco as an intermediate platform. Maritime security experts stressed that it was not an illegal operation in itself, but it was an unusual route which fits with the patterns of the ghost fleet, given that Morocco lacks sufficient refining capacity and has become a common destination for oil tankers linked to Russia. The Severomorsk Destroyer in 2023 The crux. The key, they insisted, is in the loading documentation, because the origin of the product remains Russian even if there are intermediate stops. In this context, the Canary Islands appear as a vulnerable link: a lightly guarded Exclusive Economic Zone, located in the transit axis of opaque oil tankers, which reinforces the idea that Spain offers the perfect combination of geography, infrastructure and control loopholes for this new phase of the Russian economic war. Silent pressure. Finally, and in parallel to these commercial and logistical movements, the most classic dimension of Russian naval power has ended up becoming visible in Spanish waters, forcing the Navy Spanish to intensify its surveillance operations. Within a week, Spanish units have followed the transit of several Russian vessels (including the destroyer Severomorsk and a mixed military-merchant convoy) from the Strait of Gibraltar to the Atlantic, with monitoring relays off the Galician coast and constant coordination with the command centers. Hybrid war. These missions, framed in the permanent surveillance of waters of national interest, show that the phenomenon is by no means isolated: while the ghost fleet operates on the economic and logistical level, the Russian naval presence reinforces the strategic pressure about key runners such as the Alboran Sea, Gibraltar and the Atlantic coast. Spain, the perfect route. The sum of these episodes draws a coherent pattern: the russia hybrid war has left the Baltic and the North Sea to settle in the Mediterranean and the eastern Atlantic, and Spain has become one of your most effective routes. It seems clear that all those breakdowns managed without detention, indirect discharges via Morocco, fuels of dubious traceability entering through the Canary Islands and Russian military ships crossing runners strategic are part of the same logic of attrition, ambiguity and saturation that we had already seen in other parts of Europe. And as in those cases, it is not a frontal attack, but rather a constant pressure that exploits the gray areas of trade, energy and maritime security, now placing Spain at the center of a board where war is not declared, it is navigated. Image | US Navy, Mil.ru In Xataka | Russia’s ghost fleet has changed its business model. Oil has given way to a much bigger target: Europe In Xataka | For years Europe has wondered how to stop the Russian ghost fleet. Ukraine just showed you the way: with AI

Russia’s ghost fleet has changed its business model. Oil has given way to a much bigger target: Europe

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Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia has not only built a vast fleet of tankers to avoid Western sanctions and continue exporting crude oil from the Baltic and the Black Sea, but has turned that logistical infrastructure into something much more ambitious. How much? The size of an old continent. The fleet in the shadows. According to Western and Ukrainian intelligence sources cited by CNN, Part of this so-called shadow fleet is being used as a covert platform for espionage and hybrid operations in European waters. We are talking about hundreds of ships that routinely sail near the coasts of EU and NATO countries, generating income of hundreds of millions of dollars for Moscow while, at the same time, expanding the radius of action of its security services away from Russian territory. “Civilian” crews with a detail. The pattern detected by the intelligence services is revealing. Many of these tankers, registered under flags of convenience and with mostly Asian or African crews, incorporate just before setting sail to one or two Russian citizens additional. The crew lists show as simple “technicians”but his background tells another story: former police officers, members of special units of the Ministry of the Interior, veterans of the Russian army or former mercenaries linked to Wagner. They are often the only Russians on board and, according to testimonies of Danish maritime pilots and European observers, exercise an authority that goes beyond the civilian chain of command, even imposing itself over the ship’s captain. Moran Security and privatization. Many of these men would be linked to Moran Security Groupa private Russian company with deep ties to the FSB, GRU, and the Kremlin’s military contractor ecosystem. Moran was sanctioned by the United States Treasury in 2024 for providing armed security services to Russian state companies, and his history connects directly with Wagner and with operations in scenarios such as Syria or Somalia. Its corporate structure (with registrations in Moscow and in opaque jurisdictions such as Belize) and its professional profile, explicitly oriented to recruit veterans of special forces, fit perfectly into the logic of hybrid warfare: formally private actors that allow the Russian state to operate with a high degree of plausible deniability. Espionage and internal control. The functions of these “technicians” would not be limited to protecting the cargo. Ukrainian and Western sources maintain that also supervise captains non-Russian vessels to ensure that the ships are acting in the interests of the Kremlin and that, in at least one documented case, took photographs of European military installations from one of these tankers. Furthermore, although details are scarce, intelligence services suggest that some of these men have participated in acts of sabotage. These would not be direct confrontations, but rather low-profile actions designed to collect information, generate uncertainty and strain the limits of the Western response. The Boracay case. He Boracay tanker illustrates this dynamic well. Sanctioned, with frequent changes of name and flag, two Russian citizens embarked in September in the port of Primorsk, near Saint Petersburg. Both were listed as technicians and were the only Russians among a crew of Chinese, Burmese and Bangladeshis. Coincidence or not, his crossing through Danish waters overlapped with a wave of sightings of drones near the Copenhagen airport and Danish military bases. Days later, the ship was boarded by the French navy against Brittany for irregularities in their documentation. No drones were found on board, but the presence of the two Russians came to light and they were discreetly questioned. For some analyststemporal correlation proves nothing, but for others It fits too well with the pattern of trial and error in the “gray zone.” Drones, sensors and something new. Beyond Boracay, Swedish and Danish authorities have detected on other ships in the shadow fleet antennas and masts not usually found on civilian merchant ships, as well as hostile behavior towards inspectors and an obsession with photographing critical infrastructure. In an environment like the Baltic, a strategic bottleneck surrounded by NATO countries, any anomalous activity becomes a disproportionate weight. For European security services, these ships are ideal mobile platforms: seemingly legal, difficult to intercept without diplomatic escalation and capable of approaching ports, cables, bases and airports without raising immediate alarms. Hybrid warfare at sea. All this fits with a broader strategy that senior intelligence officials, such as the new head of British MI6describe as constant testing “below the threshold of war.” Drones near airports, aggressive activity at sea, discreet sabotage and covert espionage are part of the same repertoire. The shadow fleet is not only an economic instrument to circumvent sanctions, but an extension of the Russian security apparatus, capable of operating in a space where Western legal and military responses are slow and politically sensitive. The European dilemma. Europe thus faces an uncomfortable decision. Intercepting ships without insurance, with dubious documentation or with armed personnel on board could stop these practices, but it also carries the risk of a direct russian reaction. As summarized on CNN a veteran Danish maritime pilot, no small country wants to be the first to make the move. The answer, if it comes, will have to be collective. Meanwhile, the shadow fleet continues growing and sailingdemonstrating that for the Kremlin the war is not only being fought in Ukraine, but also in the seas surrounding Europe, silently and in civilian uniform. Image | kees torn, Greg Bishop In Xataka | For years Europe has wondered how to stop the Russian ghost fleet. Ukraine just showed you the way: with AI In Xataka | A ghost fleet has mapped the entire underwater structure of the EU. The question is what Moscow is going to do with that information.

In 2024 a package bomb arrived on a plane. It was the beginning of the great threat to Europe: that of a “ghost” crossing the red lines

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Europe lives a strategic transformation that few had imagined possible in such a short time. What began as a series of “flats” (intermittent blackouts, suspicious fires, minor incursions) has become a coherent pattern: a campaign of directed hybrid war that is no longer limited to destabilizing, but rather deliberately explore the thresholds of what it can inflict without provoking a direct military response. It all started a year ago. The silent climb. The plot is explained more clearly from July 2024when several DHL packages exploded in centers logistics from the United Kingdom, Poland and Germany, devices powerful enough to shoot down a plane if they had detonated in mid-flight. The episode, an infiltrated bomb at the heart of the European air system, marked a before and after, because it showed to what extent Moscow was willing to strain continental security and because it exposed the fragility of an Old Continent trapped between an increasingly aggressive Russia and a United States whose commitment has stopped being reliableand. Since then, Europe no longer sees hybrid warfare as a peripheral nuisance, but as a structural threat which targets critical infrastructures, social cohesion and the European institutional framework itself. In Xataka Mercadona has found a vein to grow beyond its white label and prepared food: tourism The Russian laboratory. I counted this week the financial times that the Russian campaign has been refined in breadth and depth. European intelligence services have disabled plots to derail trains full of passengers, set fire to shopping malls, damage dams or contaminate water in urban areas. The attacks are not isolated improvisations: they respond to a “gig economy” model of sabotage in which young recruited by Telegramlocal criminals or foreigners with residence permits act as expendable pawns for unknown objectives. Plus: they are difficult to detect, impossible to anticipate and legally ambiguous, since they rarely there is a direct connection with Russian intelligence that allows them to be accused of espionage. The case of frustrated railway sabotage in Poland (an explosive planted on the Warsaw-Lublin line that came within seconds of causing a massacre) exposed that pattern in its clearest form: unimpeded entry and exit, cryptocurrency financingfalse identities issued by Moscow and a diffuse chain of command that leads to intermediaries as Mikhail Mirgorodsky or even networks managed by former Wagner members. And there is more. Yes, because each cell discovered suggests others not yet detected, and what is worrying is not the errors of saboteurs (sometimes incapable to delete videos of its own attacks) but the scale that this model offers to a Russia resentful of decades of diplomatic expulsions and doctrinally rearmed to a pre-war period. The doctrine that returns. The ISS analysts They recently reported that the archives of the KGB and the StB (Czechoslovak intelligence) reveal parallels disturbing differences between the sabotage manuals of the Cold War and what Europe witnesses today. The objectives listed decades ago (military bases, energy infrastructures, dams, communication systems, transportation) match almost exactly with the whites of the last two years. Equally revealing is the doctrinal sequencing: during times of peace, minor attacks with the appearance of accidents, in pre-war phases, massive sabotage, increased risk tolerated and increasing willingness to cause civilian casualties, and in open war, total activation of clandestine networks for lethal operations. The prelude to something more fat. It we count very recently. If you will, Europe seems to have entered fully into a intermediate stage: a pre-war phase where each incident also functions as offensive reconnaissance, a permanent exercise by razvedka boyem to measure Western reaction capacity, locate vulnerabilities and exploit any weaknesses. The episode of the unidentified drones airports and military bases European operations illustrate this dynamic: cheap raids, of uncertain origin, that revealed systemic failures in the continental air defense and that, due to their replicator effect (copies, jokes, hysteria, false alarms) multiply the psychological and financial wear and tear. A continent without a network. I remembered the new york times This morning an added problem for Europe: that if the Russian threat escalates, the other half of the problem is the growing disconnection with the United States. For the first time since 1945, Europe perceives that Washington is not unequivocally on your side in a matter of war and peace. The Trump administration is not only pressuring kyiv to accept an agreement In Moscow’s terms, it also redefines Europe as a suspicious actor, criticizes the democratic integrity of its governments and promises to openly support the European extreme right. The result is an unprecedented scenario: a Russia that intensifies its hybrid campaign, a Ukraine that depends almost entirely on continental support and a Europe that must finance your own safety while compensating for the withdrawal of US capabilities (satellites, long-range missiles, command and control) that it cannot replace before 2029the year that NATO considers the limit to have a credible deterrent. European leaders also face depleted budgets, electorates hostile to increased military spending, and a rising far-right that Moscow sees as a strategic multiplier. {“videoId”:”x8j6422″,”autoplay”:false,”title”:”Declassified video of the clash between Russian fighters and the American drone”, “tag”:”united states”, “duration”:”42″} The battle of money. The internal European debate on how to finance the resistance Ukrainian reflects the magnitude of the challenge. To support kyiv for the next two years, about $200 billion is needed, an unaffordable figure without activating the 210,000 million euros on Russian assets frozen in Europe. The problem? Right now it takes the name of Belgiumwhich guards the majority through Euroclear, and which fears retaliation from Moscow and the possible erosion of the credibility of the euro as a safe haven. Washington, despite its strategic ambiguity, is also pressing for these funds to be don’t touch each othersince its eventual return is part of the US scheme for a peace agreement favorable to Russia. One more thing. And yet, without that money, Europe would have to coordinate (outside the EU framework) a colossal loan and politically explosive. The crossroads are so profound that in Berlin and Paris they are … Read more

take down a Russian ghost fleet without the need for humans

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Europe has been dealing with the call for years “ghost fleet” Russian, a network of aging tankerspoorly insured and with opaque owners who have evaded sanctions, turned off transponders, manipulated routes and put European waters at risk with incidents, leaks and dangerous maneuvers. These ships have operated at border of legality to keep afloat energy income from the Kremlin, forcing Brussels to strengthen maritime controls and several coastal states to investigate suspicious incidents near critical infrastructure. The birth of an offensive. The night of November 28 marked a turning point silent but decisive in the war that has pitted Ukraine and Russia for almost three years. A few dozen km from the Turkish coast, far from the usual range of Ukrainian systems and in the heart of Moscow’s logistical rearguard, two Sea Baby naval drones (unmanned, guided by AI and armed with explosive charges weighing more than a ton) rushed at full speed against two oil tankers of the Russian “ghost fleet”the network of aging and opaquely owned ships that Moscow uses to circumvent Western sanctions. The hits against the Kairos and Virat not only showed a technological leap in the range and precision of Ukrainian naval drones, but also sent a strategic message to all actors in the global energy trade: any ship supporting Russian exports can become a military target, and kyiv is no longer limited by the geographic space of the northern Black Sea to impose that cost. The meticulous execution of the attacks (aiming propulsion and rudders to disable, not sink) reveals the extent to which Ukraine is trying to balance military effectiveness with the political risk before international partners, aware that it is hitting an economically sensitive terrain for Türkiye, Kazakhstan and several Western companies with energy interests. How the ghost fleet works. The so-called ghost fleet is one of the pillars that Russia has built since 2022 to maintain its income stream tankers, recruiting hundreds of tankers with decades of service, dubious insurers and convenience records, many of them under African flags like that of the Gambia. The Kairos and the Virat, pointed out by sanctions bodies from the United States, the United Kingdom, the EU, Switzerland and Canada, are perfect examples of this network: very old ships, with questionable maintenance, designed to operate in the legal shadows that allow real owners and routes to be hidden. Its function is key because oil continues to be the Kremlin’s financial key: only in October, Russia entered 13.1 billion dollars for sales of crude oil and derivatives, although the figure already shows a significant decrease compared to the previous year. Damaging these ships (and above all, showing that no part of the Black Sea is safe) turns each transit into a calculated risk. The ultimate goal it is erosive: increase insurance costs, slow down logistics, increase the risk perceived by intermediary companies and force them to reconsider their collaboration with Moscow. He sinking of the M/T Mersin off Senegal, although it is not proven that it was the work of Ukraine, it illustrates the growing deterioration of a fleet that operates with minimum standards. The transformation of the Sea Baby. The Sea Baby have established themselves as the spearhead of an unprecedented Ukrainian naval revolution. Their early versions acted as medium-range explosive platforms; but the updated prototype, shown by the SBU in October, has multiplied its capabilities: 1,500 kilometers of autonomy, high speeds, autonomous navigation supported by AI and up to 2,000 kilograms of payload. Now they can operate anywhere in the Black Sea, from Odessa to the Bosphorus, from Crimea to global oil routes. This expansion underlines an evolution with two simultaneous layers: Ukraine is destroying the historical Russian hegemony in the Black Sea, and it is doing no traditional boatswithout sailors and without risking lives, relying on a naval concept that Moscow has not managed to replicate with the same efficiency. The combination of drones, Western satellite reconnaissance, electronic intelligence and autonomous platforms makes the Russian navy look increasingly corneredforced to disperse fleets, reinforce escorts and operate with a caution that reduces their freedom of action. Geopolitical leap and message to third parties. That the blows occurred a few km from the Turkish coast is not a technical whim: it means that Ukraine has crossed a symbolic and geopolitical threshold. For the first time, it has attacked Russian naval infrastructure in areas where global trade, NATO and maritime law converge. The images verified by BBC show drones hitting ships that were assisted by the Turkish coast guard, in an extremely sensitive environment for Ankara. Türkiye reacted with a very low profilelimiting itself to putting out fires and rescuing crews, aware that openly protesting would go against its difficult balance between Russia, NATO and its own regional agenda. But the message is there: Ukraine is no longer limited to destroying Russian ships within the space that Moscow considered comfortable control; Now it can harass energy trade even when plying international routes. This reconfigures the calculations of insurers, shipping companies and states involved: even Kazakhstan protested after the Caspian Pipeline Consortium terminal was affected, underlining that the Ukrainian campaign is touching multinational interests. Hitting ships, but also infrastructure. One day after the attack on the oil tankers, the Sea Babies attacked the CPC marine terminal in Novorossiyskforcing it to stop operations. Is the third time In just a few months, Ukraine hits this crucial enclave. The emerging equation it’s clear: disabling ships is just one part; degrade the infrastructure that allows oil exports, another even more destructive for Moscow. Ukraine is applying a dual strategy that suffocates the Russian oil system at both ends: the ships that transport the crude oil and the points where they are loaded. The result is a predicted fall of 35% in Russian oil revenues in November and a fiscal impact that already force unpopular measures how to increase VAT or suspend payments to veterans, a sign that the Kremlin’s “war economy” is beginning to feel the accumulated pressure. A … Read more

A ghost fleet has mapped the entire submarine structure of the EU. The question is what Moscow will do with that information

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In January 2025 United Kingdom He raised his voice At the international level. The British Secretary of Defense, John Healy, explained that a nuclear submarine and two ships from Royal Navy had sighted a spy ship in the waters of the nation, and that it was the second time in just three months. The message did not stay there. The United Kingdom gave a name and a nation behind the incursion: Yantar and Russia. Now it has been discovered that the ship has been doing much more than that. The resurgence of a war. In recent months, NATO’s attention has moved to a less visible but increasingly critical front: the European seabed. The protagonist of this new concern is, again, The Yantara Russian spy ship that, disguised as a civil ship, toured during almost 100 days The waters of the Atlantic and the Mediterranean with an accurate objective: map and monitor the submarine cables on Europe and North America for their digital communications, their financial transactions, their energy and even their most sensitive military systems. We know all this Thanks to the Financial Timesthat after an investigation based on interviews with NATO naval officers and former members of the Russian north fleet, as well as in radar images of the European Space Agency, he has confirmed that the Yantar came to be located on critical cables in the sea of ​​Ireland and in front of Norway, on the strategic route to Svalbard. The role of Gugi. The Yantar operates under the orbit of the GLAVNOYE UPRAVLENIE GLUBOKOVODNIKH ISSLEDOVII (GUGI), the director of Deep Water Research created in the Cold War and known in the West as Military Unit 40056. Based on Olenya Guba, in the Kola Peninsula, this force is located on the border between the Russian Navy and military intelligence (Gru), dedicated less to science than to espionage. Gugi has about 50 platforms (From minisubmarines capable of reaching 6,000 meters deep to nodriza ships such as Yantar), designed to place sensors, manipulate or sabotage cables and, if necessary, destroy strategic infrastructure in a conflict scenario. Despite the blows suffered (such as the submarine fire Losharik in 2019 or the death of its historic boss by Covid), the organization has continued to receive resources Even in full war of Ukraine, which has allowed to commission new spy units. The Yantar The threat in the gray zone. The reactivation of Yantar’s missions Since the end of 2023 Indicates that Moscow has abandoned the initial caution he showed after invading Ukraine. Analysts like Sidharth Kaoushal (Rusi) They point that Russia has measured NATO’s red lines and is now more willing to take risks. The plans detected in the sea of ​​Ireland, where several cables converge that connect the United Kingdom and Ireland, fit into the Russian logic to act in The so -called “Gray Zone”: Operations of covert sabotage that do not equals an open military attack but can destabilize entire societies. In fact, Western Officers They warn That Moscow could, the case, cut energy or communications to force governments to the negotiation, or even alter the temporal signals that travel through the cables, with devastating effects in sectors such as high frequency financial trade. European vulnerability. The United Kingdom obtains the 99% of its communications Digital of submarine cables and three quarters of its gas through underwater pipelines. Ireland, which does not belong to NATO, is a particularly exposed point: cutting its connections would be to isolate it from the continent without directly attacking an allied member. He parliamentary report British of September 19 warned that the country “could not guarantee an attack or recover in an acceptable period,” also criticizing the fragmentation of responsibilities between ministries. In Denmark, the case of explosions of Nord Stream in 2022 evidenced the same bureaucratic dispersion. Although London has assigned the Royal Navy the mission of Protect these infrastructureexperts point out that the lack of anti -submarine frigates and patrol dependence limit the real response capacity. The Atlantic Bastion project. To close that gap, NATO and especially the United Kingdom they consider the creation of “Atlantic Bastion”: A defensive ring of sensors, submarine drones and acoustic stations in the seabed that reinforces the control of the Greenland-Islandia-Rio-Reinian corridor. Although the plan still lacks concrete financing, its need is increasingly evident. In parallel, surveillance ships such as The British proteus They rehearse with autonomous vehicles capable of documenting the activities of the Yantar and other GGI units, with the idea of ​​exhibiting public evidence and generating deterrence. Admiral Gwyn Jenkins, head of the Royal Navy, He warned This month that Gugi, after a period of relative stillness, “is returning.” Silent war. The activity From Yantar It is not an isolated case: between autumn of 2023 and November 2024, eleven Russian ships (military and supposedly civil) held a almost constant presence in British and Irish waters. Allied intelligence services suspect that Moscow already prepares sabotage scenarios against cables as a pressure measure on the countries that arm Ukraine. While until now these operations have been maintained under the threshold of the open confrontation, the possibility of Russia “turning off” the United Kingdom or Aisle Ireland is not a crazy hypothesis. As summarized Excapitan David Fields, former British naval aggregate in Moscow: “Russian military doctrine consists of hitting first, strong and where it hurts most, to prevent the enemy from even getting rid of war.” On that silent board, the Yantar has become the key piece of a underwater chess that threatens to redefine the limits of European security. Image | Defense ImageryAndrey Luzik In Xataka | A British nuclear submarine has discovered a Russian ship in front of its submarine cables. The second time in three months In Xataka | Research on submarine cables cut in the Baltic has taken a turn: it was not Russia, it was inexperience

The hoteliers promised them happy in a summer of record tourism. Until the ghost reserves arrived

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During the summer the restaurants receive Anything else What tourists, reserves and customers eager for a meal that puts the perfect icing on your vacation. In addition to all that they receive seedlings. For a long time and for the despair of the hoteliers it is common for the high season to increase the ‘Ghost reservations’a phenomenon that is carrying the business economy and has already forced them to Adopt measures. After all, it directly affects its profitability. Ghost reservations? Yes. Maybe it sounds weird, but they are nothing new and certainly have little mysterious for hoteliers, their great victims. The ‘ghost reservations’ are reservations Fallutas that leave a hole in the dining rooms (and the accounts) of the restaurants: a client calls, reserve table for two, three, four diners (may even more) and then it does not appear. Not just that. Nor does it call in advance to warn, so that the business only has the option of filling your hole with another client, something that is not always possible. The Anglo -Saxons call it ‘No-Shows’ and against what may seem affect All kinds of premises: From taverns to Michelin star restaurants, in which those vacancies can translate into a hole in hundreds of euros. It happens frequently? Depends. If we talk about socks and take as a reference the whole sector and the year is not a especially serious problem. At least so shows the Thefork platform, which recently elaborated A study about “ghost reserves”. According to their records, between January and July there was not a single month in which No-Shows They were more than 3.4% of the total reservations. It is a low fact and also reveals a slight descent with respect to last year. If we ask certain hoteliers, the thing changes. A few days ago The voice of Galicia interviewed to the owners of a marswish from Santiago de Compostela who claimed to be receiving “more plants than ever.” And it is not the only business that complains. Another hospitaler of the city speaks of up to six No-Shows A day. In Segovia there are also professionals who They lament of customers who leave them lying without giving explanations (or with pilgrim justifications) after commissioning roasts and the newspaper Minorca It echoed In August of the discomfort of some businesses on the island. “It is a problem, almost in each shift there are cancellations. You are called and they tell you that they are on the beach or that they have left elsewhere and decide to stay,” Antoni Sansaloni, representative of the Menorcan Sector Association, censorship. Is there more data? Yes. Thefork wanted to scratch a little to know details of the phenomenon, which has given us Two interesting perspectives: The first is its geographical distribution; The second, its causes. According to their data, the province most harmed by No-Shows It is Segovia, where they are 5% of the total reservations. They are followed by Menorca and Ibiza, with 4.2% and 4% respectively. In the opposite pole are Biscay (2.5%), A Coruña and Murcia, where the percentage remains at 2.7%. As for the causes, Thefork Point out Basically three. 55% of respondents say they do not appear to reservations for disasters and forgetfulness. 38% argue that if they have left hanging restaurants it has been for “unforeseen” that have also prevented them from warning. And 7% allege that they don’t call to cancel reservations for “shame.” Hoteliers have a somewhat different perspective and They warn that there are customers who reserve in several restaurants simultaneously. Are they a serious problem? The platform calculates that it carries losses that can go Between 5 and 20%depending on the type of business. “The problem is that they make you a roast reserve, that you have to prepare the pig, and that remains in the kitchen,” comment to The advance From a Segovian grill. “It affects us little, but when they make us a big reserve and fail, they destroy us,” agrees Another professional. The complaint is extensible to restaurants with Michelin stars that also They have been found With large groups that do not present or cancel the reservation, “a task” for those responsible, who usually work with closed menus and buy fresh product based on scheduled services. If a customer does not present the business does not recover the investment. Does summer influence? Yes. It is easily confirmed with a quick search on Google. Hoteliers who complain about No-Shwos They usually point out also that the problem is aggravated during the high season, coinciding with the increase in tourism. It is not surprising if one takes into account that restaurants reserves in general. “The rest of the year does not usually happen. The people here are usually always going to the reservation,” Explain A place in Santiago de Compostela. From Segovia Apostillan Also that ghost reserves are noticed above all on weekends “more pointers”, in which they receive especially visitors from the capital. “We are the dining room of Madrid and these issues are accentuated above all on weekends or the bridges in which many people come.” “During the summer months, reserves in the restaurants in tourist areas increase considerably due to the presence of travelers, both national and international. As a result, in this period the non-shows grow exponentially,” They corroborate From the Thefork platform. And can it be avoided? If not to eradicate it to 100%, the sector has moved file to reduce at least the impact of ghost reserves on their businesses. It is increasingly frequent to meet restaurants requesting a card number such as guarantee or deposits or directly do not accept reservations. Thefork herself decided Some time ago Take letters in the matter and expel those users who accumulate a number of frustrated reserves throughout the year, a measure that adds to those that had already been applying before, such as prohibiting multi reservations for the same day. Perhaps the best known case of a ghost reserve that came to … Read more

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