Month: November 2025

In recent days all roads trace a common landscape: from Moscow exhibit and test “superweapons” that defy traditional categories (autonomous nuclear torpedoes, nuclear cruise engines, and indefinite-range missiles) while in Washington the political and media reaction accentuates a dynamic action-reaction that could return the world to an (il)logic of open competition between nuclear powers. Someone should stop it. Poseidon. He Russian Poseidon has returned to the forefront as the epitome of the hybrid between a fantasy factory and a real military program: an unmanned, reactor-powered underwater vehicle, conceived to transport a nuclear warhead to coastal targets or naval groupings, operate at great depth and high speed and (according to the official Russian narrative) bypass conventional defenses. The impact figures published in Moscow (speeds between 60–100 knots, operational depth ~1,000 m, “megaton” capacity that some sources stretch up to 100 Mt) feed the symbolic dread. However, analysts remember physical limits and Soviet precedents that qualify both the real effectiveness and the plausibility of “tsunami” type effects capable of sweeping away cities. In practice. Thus, the majority agrees that Poseidon It is best described as a capability designed for political and strategic cost: suitable to reinforce a “second strike” or to be used as a system of intimidation, not necessarily as an everyday weapon in an escalated conflict. Burevestnik and a persistence. We told it last week. Along with the torpedo, Russia has shown the Burevestnik (a nuclear-powered cruise missile that promises essentially unlimited range) and other platforms that the Kremlin lumps together under the label of “invincible weapons.” These initiatives obey a logic of modernization that combines technological ambition, industrial vulnerabilities (sanctions, reliability problems) and media staging: the public demonstration of tests does not detonate charges, but announces theoretical capabilities and forces adversaries to regroup resources and doctrine. Continuity with the Soviet tradition of studying large-scale underwater effects and the historical experience with essays they show that ideas can persist even when physics and engineering limit their real usefulness. Washington’s response. The political reaction in the United States, personified by presidential statements about “restarting testing” and public instruction to military departments, has been immediate (and disorderly). The announcements arrive in a critical moment (with the New START treaty close to expiration and with China throwing uncertainties about its own nuclear growth) and can be read as strategic messages, instruments of pressure and, sometimes, as gestures directed at the internal public. One thing remains clear: Trump’s formulation was more than ambiguous and it is not clear whether it refers to nuclear detonations (critical/non-critical), increased testing of delivery systems, or increased sub-critical experiments and simulations. There is no doubt, this ambiguity is dangerous because conditions perceptions and responses international without the technical and legal scaffolding that a decision of shock would demand. Burevestnik How “nuclear” is prescribed. On TWZ Several experts consulted describe the practical path to resume nuclear detonations: The president can order actions, but execution requires the involvement of specific agencies (Department of Energy, NNSA and national laboratories), budget authorization from Congress and logistics focused on the Nevada National Security Site as the only realistic site for contained underground testing. In any case, the deadlines they are long: A “simple burst” could be organized in months, a useful instrumented test would require 18–36 months, and a new design development program would take years. Furthermore, the cost would be high and would most likely provoke retorts from Russia, China and others, reigniting a cycle of arms races that post-Cold War agreements had managed to tacitly contain. Technical dimension. The technical usefulness of returning to explosive tests to maintain the national arsenal is, obviously, discussed: US laboratories maintain that, thanks to advanced simulations, subcritical experimentation and vast historical data, the reliability of nuclear warheads can sustain without detonations. The tests would serve, in theory, to validate new designs and increase confidence in specific features. In practice, they would reopen the door to developments that amplify offensive capabilities and complicate the balance of terror, in addition to generating environmental and proliferation risks. The media theater. Plus: not everything is technology. There is a strong performative component. Putin and the Russian media apparatus have known convert essaysimages and statements in one power narrative which includes synchronies with popular culture (television series) to magnify its psychological impact. In Washington, the improvised communication from social networks it has a similar but less institutionalized effect: statements without clarifying technique or procedure can be interpreted as a political will to rupture and push allies and adversaries to take asymmetric measures. Geopolitical consequences. The costs of a back to testing are not limited to budgets: there is talk of reactivation of the nuclear race, of degradation of international trustor the erosion of regulatory regimes (the CTBT and the verification architecture), in addition to a probable expansion of arsenals by China and other actors who do not participate in treaties today. Added to this is the risk that the US internal debate (political polarization, legislative pressures and the dynamic of “showing” without a technical roadmap) will generate hasty decisions. Worse still, the media normalization of “anti-coastal weapons” or “Frankenstein” torpedoes may facilitate usage doctrines that lower the threshold for tactical uses of nuclear weapons, an especially dangerous prospect. Uncertainty. In summary, the news of the last days They are, more than anything else, a warning: we are witnessing the sum of three processes (modernization and Russian technological experimentationpoliticization and theatrics of deterrenceand American answers marked by tactical uncertainty and political haste) that, together, fuel a dangerous inertia. The question is no longer just whether Poseidon either Burevestnik are fully operational, it is whether the international community, and especially the capitals with decision-making power, will recover the technical prudence and diplomatic rigor necessary to contain the escalation. 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