reality

Few phrases have been as repeated in the geopolitics of the West as “Iran is five years from the nuclear bomb.” For more than three decades, we have heard predictions that place the Iranian regime on the verge of crossing the atomic threshold, a stopwatch that restarts again and again without the prophecy becoming fulfilled. The real problem is not so much what we know about Iran’s nuclear program, as the immensity of what we do not know. And it is in that fog of uncertainty where the most dangerous decisions are cooked. A diffuse red line like Casus Belli. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has initiated a war against Iran framed in which the regime is “close to finishing the construction of a nuclear bomb.” This language transforms an old threat into an immediate danger, turning the rhetorical red line into a justification for war. Although the United States initially denies direct participation in the attack, political and military support has gone in crescendo. A Message of President Donald Trump In capital letters, “Iran can’t have a nuclear weapon!”, It works as a blank check for Israel. Thirty years of breached predictions. When a suspicion, and not an evidence, they are a reason for war, it is worth reviewing the newspaper library to put rhetoric in perspective. The feeling of “imminent nuclear bomb” in Iran is not new. It is a political construction that has been managing for decades, with Benjamin Netanyahu as its main architect. In 1992, Netanyahu already warned that Iran was “three or five years” to obtain nuclear weapons. In 2012, he starred in one of his most iconic moments at the UN, drawing a red line with a marker In a cartoon scheme of a pumpand ensuring that they would cross the line in the summer of 2013. Each period has been fulfilled without the weapon becoming materialized. What do intelligence agencies say. Although Israel had in the United States its main political ally, US intelligence agencies did not buy their rhetoric about Iran. In 2007, the National Intelligence Estimate De la CIA concluded with “high confidence” that Iran had stopped its nuclear militarization program, the AMAD Plan. The verification of this break came in 2015 with the Comprehensive Comprehensive Plan Joint (JCPOA), an agreement by which Iran limited uranium enrichment to 3.67% in exchange for the lifting of sanctions. The break that caught the fuse. Paradoxically, the withdrawal of the United States of the JCPOA in 2018, driven by the same rhetoric of the “imminent bomb”, caused the response that was intended to avoid. Iran began to enrich uranium at unprecedented levels: first 20% and then 60%, drastically shortening the theoretical deadlines for the pump and triggering the current crisis. Despite this, there are no evidence, beyond the expansion of enrichment plants, that Iran have the necessary technology or develop those weapons. Although, in honor of the truth, it is logical that there are no, since most of the activity is underground. Faith jump between enrichment and nuclear bomb. To understand how “near” Iran of the nuclear bomb is, you have to differentiate two key processes. The first is the fuel: the enrichment of uranium, the visible part of the process. It is about increasing the concentration of the fistible isotope 2 35 of the uranium from the 0.7% natural to 90% (the arms degree). Thanks to the withdrawal of the JCPOA, Iran accumulates a large amount of 60%enriched uranium. And moving from 60 to 90% is a technically feasible leap within a few weeks. However, Having the fuel is not having the enginewhat Anglo -Saxons call “weaponization.” A set of incredibly complex steps to convert the fistible material into a functional eye that can be mounted on a missile. They have to convert the uranium of arms degree, which is a gas, into a metal sphere. They have to surround that sphere with high precision explosives that have to detonate simultaneously in microseconds to compress the nucleus and start the chain reaction. And all this, in a package small and light enough to fit in the eyes of a missile and survive the launch. This is where we enter the field of almost total uncertainty. We know that this will investigated with the AMAD Plan, but its current progress is unknown. However, nobody knows it with certainty because intelligence on underground activities is very difficult to obtain. What we know with certainty. Despite decades of sanctions, sabotage, selective murders of its scientists and cyberbrains (like the famous Stuxnet, which destroyed uranium centrifuges), the Iranian nuclear program has not only survived, but has become stronger and more self -sufficient. Iran designs and produces its own advanced centrifuging. In fact, Israel’s main objective is to destroy the Fordow plant, that Iran built under a mountain to make it invulnerable to air attacks. In parallel, Iran has developed the largest and diverse ballistic missile program in the Middle East, and a fleet of trucks ready to shoot them. This resilience demonstrates that technical knowledge is deeply institutionalized in the regime, which is why Israel has eliminated those responsible for the nuclear program, as well as Iranian launches. At the same time, each Israeli attack can reinforce the conviction in Tehran that the pump is the only guarantee of survival, a fish that bites the tail, accelerated by Netanyahu’s rhetoric. They will go in the North Korean mirror or Pakistan. Beyond the rhetoric of the West, two countries offer key lessons about Iran. North Korea built its nuclear program to ensure the survival of the regime. Isolated and economically devastated, He saw the bomb as his only insurance policy against a overthrow imposed by the United States. The sanctions and pressure only reinforced their determination. Pakistan followed a strategic imperative. It sought to neutralize the military superiority of India. When India tried her bomb in 1974, the Pakistani bomb became a matter of national survival. Iran is a hybrid and more complex case. Share the survival … Read more