China has just launched its first undersea data center with total energy autonomy. The idea makes more sense than it seems

In the AI ​​race, having a robust data center infrastructure to power it is essential, but first you need energy to power it all. The United States may lead the chip industry (at least, the strategic ones), but China follows closely at an unstoppable pace and furthermore, has the energy. And he is already beginning to connect the dots, showing off his technical power and ingenuity: already It has the largest data center in the worldis also a pioneer to submerge them under the sea. Now it has taken a twist with the first underwater data center that ‘drinks’ directly from the wind that just opened. This project represents the perfect union of two of China’s strategic priorities: digital sovereignty and carbon neutrality. By placing computing infrastructure on the seabed and powering it directly with clean energy on siteChina is solving one of the great current technological problems: the insatiable energy consumption of AI and Big Data. The project. About 10 kilometers off the coast of Shanghai, at the bottom of the East China Sea, a steel cylinder receives electricity directly from wind turbines and is cooled with sea water. It is the Lingang Subsea Data Centeran ambitious project promoted by Shanghai Hailan Cloud Technology (HiCloud) and built by CCCC Third Harbor Engineering. It consists of a series of data storage and processing modules encapsulated in watertight and submerged containers, which are connected via two 35 kV submarine cables to offshore wind turbines operating off the coast of Shanghai. With a planned capacity of 24 MW in two phases, the first is already operational: it has a capacity of 2.3 megawatts and includes a ground control center, a vertical data module installed under the sea and two main 35 kilovolt submarine cables. Why it is important. In addition to the fact that it does not occupy land, in cities as crowded as Shanghai it represents a valuable saving in land and that it can be installed close to where it is needed (if there is a coast, obviously), because it solves at the same time three structural problems of the sector: Refrigeration. Seawater acts as a constant and free heat sink, eliminating the need for industrial air conditioning systems that consume 40 to 50% of electricity. The metric that measures the energy efficiency of a data center by comparing the total energy consumed versus that used purely by the servers is the PUE, which for a standard data center on land is an average slightly higher than 1.5. The project promises to lower it to a figure not greater than 1.15. Without consumption of fresh water. Traditional data centers evaporate millions of liters of water to cool their servers, but this uses thermal exchange with the ocean, so it does not consume water resources. Take advantage of the surplus from wind power. One of the handicaps of wind energy is that generation depends on the wind and not on demand, so if you do not have a battery, the energy that is not consumed is wasted. Thanks to this direct connection, the data center absorbs wind production in real time, functioning as a constant consumer that reduces the waste of renewable energy due to lack of destination, In figures. The magnitude of the project, with some official numbers: The budget is 1.6 billion yuan, about 200 million euros. Total planned operational capacity of 24 MW (2.3 MW in the first phase). The design PUE is less than 1.15. More than 95 percent of electricity comes from renewable sources. Context. The name of HiCloud is not new because in fact it is an old acquaintance: it is the person behind the underwater prototype in front of Hainan which began to install in 2021. However, the international reference is the Natick project from Microsoft (2013–2024), which demonstrated the potential of underwater centers: only 8 of the 864 servers failed, a much lower mortality rate than that of any conventional data center in the same period and also got a very low PUE of only 1.07. Despite this, Microsoft shelved the matter: viability in terms of costs and maintenance is another story. However, the Lingang project has top-level institutional support: is present on the List of Green and Low Carbon Technology Demonstration Projects of the NDRC, China’s top economic planning body. How they have done it. Servers are placed in pressurized steel cabins filled with inert gases to prevent corrosion and fire with a design that maximizes interior space and minimizes the impact of waves. Heat is dissipated by pumping seawater through radiators located behind the racks. The most complicated operation was raising the cabin in the open sea: the separation between the legs of the support structure and the steel piles on the seabed was only 0.18 meters and the maximum allowable deviation was 10 centimeters, so GPS and the Sanhang Fengfan crane vessel were helped. Roadmap. The project follows a staggered progression that leaves certain unknowns. First was the prototype in Hainan (2021-2024). In 2025 the project began in Shanghai, whose phase 1 concluded in October of that year and it has just been launched a few weeks ago. The key phase that will take capacity up to 24 MW has no official public date. Of course, the consortium of companies made up of HiCloud, Shenergy Group, China Telecom Shanghai, INESA and CCCC Third Harbor Engineering signed a cooperation agreement in October 2025 to scale to 500 MW linked to offshore wind, although where and when is unknown. Yes, but. That 2.3 MW of phase 1 is practically a demonstration, not commercial infrastructure as a large conventional data center operates between 50 and 500 MW. And in addition, it has to resolve the issues that Microsoft’s Project Natick left unresolved, such as underwater maintenance: HiCloud has not published protocols or long-term repair costs. And scalability to 500 MW is at the moment more of an intention than a project In Xataka | Where you see a mountain, China sees a … Read more

Europe has grown tired of being NASA’s “supporting actor.” And that is why it is starting to work with China

The European Space Agency (ESA) and the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) have teamed up to launch an ambitious mission, aimed at studying the mechanisms used by the Earth to protect itself from solar inclement weather. The SMILE mission was scheduled to launch this April 9, but a small technical problem has forced it to be postponed until a date that is still unclear. In any case, it is just a small stone on the road for a mission that reinforces Europe’s intention to join forces with the Today it is considered the direct competition of NASA on many space issues. Given the ups and downs that the United States faces in scientific matters, it could be an interesting idea. The terrestrial sunscreen under a magnifying glass. The SMILE (Solar wind Magnetosphere Ionosphere Link Explorer) mission has four instruments aimed at analyzing the interaction of solar winds with the magnetosphere that acts as the Earth’s shield. It is a necessary mission for many reasons. On the one hand, because many of the mechanisms used by the Earth to protect itself from solar radiation remain partly a mystery. And, on the other hand, because data analysis could help predict solar storms more accurately. Currently it is possible to know with high probability whether they will occur, but the situation is far from being exact. Since these types of events affect terrestrial communications systems, forecasting would be a key point. Four instruments. The instruments that SMILE has They are the Soft X-ray Imager (SXI), the Light Ion Analyzer (LIA), the Detector Plane Assembly (DPA) and the Ultraviolet Imager (UVI). The SXI is responsible for taking X-ray images to study the boundaries of the magnetosphere, while the DPA provides mechanical and thermal support. That is, it helps keep the imaging systems at a stable temperature, something essential given the proximity to the Sun. As for LIA, its function is to analyze ionized particles. Solar winds consist of a flow of ionized particles that form in the Sun’s corona and are released into space. They are directly related to the harmful effects of solar storms, so it is important to analyze them. For its part, UVI is responsible for taking images in the ultraviolet range of the spectrum. Above all, they will take images of auroras, closely linked to peaks in solar activity. European and Chinese contribution. The European Union has provided the SXI and DPA instruments, in addition to the Vega rocket that will propel the satellite and all its instruments into space. For its part, China has developed the UVI and LIA instruments, as well as the SMILE suite satellite platform. Spain is not missing either. One of SMILE’s instruments, the DPA, It has been developed at the Spanish National Institute of Aerospace Technology (INTA). Little recognition. NASA has given Canada a seat on the Orion capsule to travel to the Moon. Canadian Jeremy Hansen is one of the crew members of Artemis II, despite having never traveled to space. Canada has not participated in the technological development of the mission. Europe, on the other hand, has provided the engine system that has propelled the four astronauts towards our satellite. Even so, little mention has been made of ESA’s important contribution during the development of Artemis II. Why China. A long time ago, China stopped being an emerging space power and became one of the most consolidated on the current scene. With its Tiangong Space Station Located in low orbit, it is the only facility of its kind besides the International Space Station. Its lunar mission has great relevance thanks to the exploration of the Chang’e unmanned missions. Besides, hopes to take its own taikonauts (as Chinese astronauts are known) to the satellite in 2030. Its exploration on Mars is also important thanks to rovers like Zhurong. Tiangong Low hours for NASA? Donald Trump’s government wants to make drastic cuts to science with public investment in the United States and possibly NASA will not escape. Therefore, it may be a good time to seek other support in the space race, as ESA is already doing with SMILE. That does not mean that it will stop collaborating with NASA, but it is true that it is open to exploring new partners. If there is one thing that history has taught us, it is that the best way to advance in the space race is to put egos aside and move forward as a team. Closing yourself off only to a traveling companion can end up being counterproductive. Images | ESA | Shujianyang In Xataka | Astronauts’ food is not appetizing at first, especially in China

If the energy and technological future passes through “Electrostates”, there is one that has been living there for years: China

As the world panics over the lack of fossil fuels, the numbers in the Chinese renewable sector they are vertigo. Shares in battery giant CATL have soared 29.5% on the Hong Kong stock exchange since the conflict began. For its part, electric vehicle leader BYD has seen its sales abroad skyrocket by 65% ​​year-on-year in the month of March. This wave of buying is not new, but it has accelerated dramatically: last year, Chinese exports of solar panels to Africa increased by 48%, sales of electric vehicles rose by 27%, and sales of wind turbines grew by almost 50%. Survival and a career already over. The global turn to renewables at this critical moment is not driven solely by climate promises, but by a need for “energy security”. Fuel shortages in Asia have led vulnerable countries to take drastic measures: Indonesia’s president has announced the construction of 100 gigawatts of solar power over the next two years, while the Philippines is offering state loans of up to $8,300 to install home solar panels. As an analysis by my colleague Javier Lacort points outthe West has been promising alternatives for years, but China “is not winning the battery race; it has already won it,” controlling more than 80% of global manufacturing. Companies like CATL and BYD have already announced or built 68 factories outside China, investing more money abroad than in their own country. The rise of the “Electrostates.” The global landscape is being redefined. We are witnessing a contest between the traditional “Petrostates”, led by the United States, and the new “Electrostates”, anchored by China, which supplies more than 70% of all the green hardware in the world. Excluded from the United States and Europe by protectionist measures, the Chinese solar industry has found its salvation in the Global South. Last year, Chinese manufacturers shipped 18.8 gigawatts of solar panels to Africa. Diplomatically and economically, the war will cement China’s superpower status. The disconnection of Middle East crude oil could even erode the dominance of the “petrodollar” and catalyze the beginnings of the “petroyuan”as countries like Iran negotiate the passage of ships in exchange for payments in Chinese currency. Side B. Despite this overwhelming dominance, Beijing’s path has significant obstacles. In Africa, although cheap technology is welcome, alarm voices are growing about the creation of a new “dependency syndrome.” Some experts lament that while African countries see China as a savior, Beijing considers them a “dump” to get rid of its industrial overcapacity. In the West, mistrust is even greater for reasons of national security. The UK recently vetoed Chinese manufacturer Ming Yang’s plans to build a wind turbine factory in Scotland, alleging risks of espionage or sabotage in critical infrastructure. At the same time, Donald Trump’s US administration has decided from the beginning to withdraw fiscal support for green energy and prioritize fossil fuels so as not to depend on supply chains controlled by foreign adversaries. China is not invulnerable either.. Despite its renewable leadership, the country still imports 78% of oil that it consumes, and the Persian Gulf supplies almost half of those imports. The rise in the barrel is causing havoc due to cost inflation in its vital steel, aluminum and petrochemical factories, reducing its competitive margins. A geopolitical choice. Precisely because this dependence on fossil fuels punishes everyone equally, the green transition has become a race of pure economic survival to shield national economies. The crisis triggered by the war in Iran shows that resilience is today the main driver of global change. As Fatih Birol of the International Energy Agency points outclean energies will accelerate not only because of emissions, but because they are a “national energy source.” However, adopting this technology means choosing which side of the scale you want to be on. The energy transition is no longer a simple choice between fossil or renewable fuels. Today, the degree to which a country decides (or not) to rely on China will define its ability to decarbonize, making an environmental debate the most defining geopolitical decision of the next decade. Image | Unsplash Xataka | The country that controls the electric batteries of electric cars will control the future. And we already have a winner

To survive the end of oil, China has resurrected an old German technology from World War II: turning coal into plastic

While the world assumes that China’s energy transition is based exclusively on solar panels and electric vehicles — and, in part, it is, consolidating as the first great ‘electrostate’—, reality hides a much darker side. Faced with the outbreak of the Third Gulf War, Beijing has not even flinched. Beyond its immense strategic oil reserves, the secret of its resistance lies in an even more daring maneuver: the resurrection of German technology from World War II. An old German technology. Faced with the instability of oil imports, China has perfected the use of coal to produce petrochemical products. This synthesis technology (historically known as the process of fischer–Tropsch) was originally developed by Germany to sustain its military economy during World War II. Although it is widely known in the chemical industry, its main defect has always been the enormous pollution it generated. China has improved it. Far from settling for an outdated process, Chinese researchers have radically improved it. According to the state agency Xinhuaa team from Peking University has achieved a historic breakthrough by adding a minimal amount of methyl bromide (five parts per million) to the catalytic process. This surgically “turns off” the pathway that forms carbon dioxide as a byproduct, reducing these emissions from 30% to less than 1% and opening the door to near-green manufacturing to convert coal-derived synthesis gas (syngas) into olefins, the building blocks of plastics. At an industrial level, expansion is already a fact. As detailed South China Morning Postin Turpan prefecture (Xinjiang), construction has just begun on the world’s largest coal-to-ethylene glycol (a toxic compound used for plastics and antifreeze) project, with an astonishing capacity of 2.4 million tons per year. Even, as the magazine highlighted ACS Sustainable Chemistry & Engineeringresearch is being carried out on how to integrate this process (called PFTO) to chemically recycle tons of plastic waste, converting it into syngas and then back into light olefins. Did you see it coming? It is not the first time that China decides to take sides and prevent rather than cure. The Asian giant has decided to completely decouple its industry from maritime vulnerabilities and Western influence. “This is not China’s war, but Beijing began preparing for it years ago,” points out The New York Times. Everything accelerated during Donald Trump’s first term, prompting President Xi Jinping to demand complete “self-sufficiency” that would insulate China from any disruption to foreign supply chains. Time has proven them right. The war in Iran has brutally increased the price of crude oil, suffocating international petrochemical competitors that depend on black gold. In contrast, local Chinese coal has only gotten cheaper. According to Reutersthis has been a financial triumph: shares of companies such as Ningxia Baofeng Energy, which produces millions of tons of chemicals from coal, have risen 30% since the start of the conflict, while traditional Asian refiners such as Rongsheng Petrochemical have lost up to 27% of their stock market value. Furthermore, the Chinese media analyzed by Carbon Brief They insist on a unanimous nationalist message: in the face of a real emergency, coal is the only resource that the nation truly controls, acting as the great “ballast” guarantor of its national security. A change to other sectors. The change is undeniable. As revealed Bloombergthe country’s main coal miner, China Shenhua Energy, has cut its overall budget by 16%, but has almost doubled its investment in coal-to-chemical conversion, from 2.5 billion to 4.1 billion yuan by 2026. But at a devouring pace, as The New York Times provides information that measures the phenomenon: in 2020, China used 155 million tons of coal to manufacture chemicals; by 2024, the figure jumped to 276 million, and in 2025 it grew another 15%, single-handedly exceeding the total annual coal consumption of the entire United States. The research center CREATE confirms this trend in its reportconfirming that the use of coal in the chemical industry grew by 20% year-on-year only in the first half of 2025. Added to this is that, as the American media explains80% of Chinese nitrogen fertilizer (a third of the world’s supply) is already made with coal rather than oil or gas, allowing Beijing to keep its product at less than half the global market price. Behind it there is a very high cost. All this bold industrial maneuver has a severe climate cost that is already setting off international alarms. China’s draft 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-2030) has set extremely cautious climate goals. As the experts explain CREATE and collect Financial Timesthe set goal of reducing carbon intensity by only 17% is “disappointing” and leaves room for the country’s emissions to continue growing between 3% and 6% in real terms over the next five years. This new government plan de facto reverses the international promise to “phase down” coal consumption, replacing it with a consumption “plateau” and explicitly protecting the large-scale expansion of the coal-based petrochemical industry. Only chemical projects already planned to be built between now and 2029 could increase China’s annual carbon dioxide emissions by an additional 2%. The forecasts are resounding. According to Bloomberg, By 2030, China’s chemical roadmap will massively stop using oil as a primary fuel (thanks to the adoption of its electric vehicles) and will take advantage of its modernized facilities to seek 85% self-sufficiency in all advanced materials and chemicals, displacing traditional giants. A feared crisis of overcapacity. The European ideas laboratory MERICS warns of collateral consequences: The Chinese domestic economy, with consumer confidence stagnant since the pandemic, has no way to absorb all this gigantic new production of materials and plastics. As a direct result, Chinese factories are forced to export their immense surpluses to the rest of the world at fire sale prices. This aggressive price war propelled China’s trade surplus to a stratospheric record of $1.2 trillion in 2025. According to the complaint MERICSthese massive exports are cannibalizing the industrial base of other nations; In the European Union alone, up to 500 manufacturing jobs are being lost daily due to the total … Read more

Spain has been building a bridge with China for years. Now it is the European Union that needs to cross it

Pedro Sánchez is going to land in China this week for the fourth time in three years. No other Western leader comes close. Why is it important. What seemed like a diplomatic eccentricity has become a trend. A year ago, Spain seemed an outlier in Europe due to its favorable and close stance towards China. Today it is France, with its calls for tougher trade measures against the Chinese government, who seems isolated, according to analyst Noah Barkin in his specialized newsletter. Watching China in Europe. The context has changed everything: the war in Iran, the volatility of the Trump government and the tariff as a political weapon have pushed Europe towards where Spain already was. The context. In recent years, Spain has attracted a constellation of Chinese companies while maintaining a discourse of rapprochement with China that the rest of the EU viewed with skepticism, if not suspicion. The map of Chinese presence in the country is already considerable: The result of all this rapprochement is also reflected in capital flows: Chinese investment in Spain went from 149 million euros in 2024 to 643 million in 2025, an increase of 331% in a single year. Nevertheless, has done little to reduce Spain’s large trade deficit with the Asian giant. The pattern is known: investment arrives, but Spanish exports do not grow at the same rate. Openness has a price. Between the lines. Barkin describes it like this: Pedro Sánchez has positioned himself as the most openly pro-China and Trump-critical leader in Western Europe. This gives Spain a position as unique as it is uncomfortable. Being China’s favorite interlocutor on the continent means assuming the diplomatic costs of that position when the EU needs to maintain a common voice vis-à-vis China. The contrast. While Spain opens its arms, the European Parliament cautiously reopens its ties with China after eight years of distance. A delegation of MEPs visited China this week on the first official trip since 2018, with a clear message, according to coverage by Traffic light China: commitment does not mean concession. The European Union negotiates with one hand and shields with the other. Spain, on the other hand, has opted for the extended hand, practically alone. The big question. Is Spain a pioneer or a lever? A pioneer sets the path that others end up following because it is the right one. A lever is an instrument that others use for their own purposes. Barkin warns that Spain is following the Orbán model: welcoming Chinese investment without the necessary checks and balances. The comparison may be unfair in its nuances, but it points to a very real risk: that the Spanish opening strategy lacks the reciprocity that Europe needs to negotiate as a bloc. In Xataka | Donald Trump’s tariffs are having an unforeseen effect on China: its factories are getting stronger Featured image | ZQ Lee, Sam Williams

China has closed a huge chunk of sky for 40 days. And all we know is that space is bigger than Taiwan

In aviation, advisories restricting the use of airspace usually last just a few days and are linked to very specific operations, while areas without altitude limits are reserved on rare occasions due to its impact on air traffic. In strategic regions of the planet, any prolonged alteration in these patterns is often interpreted as more than a simple technical measure. It just happened in China. An unprecedented air closure. China has closed for 40 days (from March 27 to May 6) a huge maritime airspace without offering any clear explanation, delimiting areas through aeronautical warnings which are normally used for short exercises but in this case they are unusually prolonged. To give us an idea, the extension of that space exceeds the size of Taiwan, which makes the measure difficult to fit within operational normality. The official silence and the scale of the movement suggest a deliberate decision that goes beyond simple air traffic management. What these notices really mean. The NOTAM (Notice to Air Missions) are designed to warn of risks or temporary restrictions, but their usual use is far from the current scenario, since they usually last a few days and are linked to specific, clearly identified maneuvers. Therefore, the combination of an extraordinary duration and the absence of explanations points more to a position of sustained activity more than a specific exercise. A priori, this implies that airspace control is being used as an active tool within a broader strategy. A key space on the regional board. counted the wall street journal A few hours ago, the affected areas extended from the Yellow Sea to the East China Sea, covering areas in front of South Korea and Japan and being located in strategic corridors for any military operation in the region. Although they are far from Taiwan (several hundred km), their location does not seem coincidental and fits with scenarios where the air route control would be decisive. The scale of the reserved area reinforces the idea that this is not a limited trial, but something with deeper operational implications. Signs in the midst of a tense context. The closure also coincides with a moment of high tension in the Indo-Pacific, with military movements in Japan, pressure about Taiwan and diplomatic activity relevant in parallel. Not only that. It also occurs after a striking pause on Chinese military flights near Taiwan, followed of its resumptionsuggesting a recalibration of activity. In this context, the measure can be interpreted as a way to send strategic messages without the need for explicit statements. Ambiguity as a strategy. In short, and although there are precedents for similar airspace reservations, they had never been so long nor so widewhich marks a clear difference compared to previous practices. If you like, this ambiguity also allows China to maintain operational flexibility, test scenarios and, ultimately, generate uncertainty among its rivals without publicly committing. The result is a signal that is difficult to interpret, one that, possibly or precisely because of this, multiply your impact strategic. Image | LG Images In Xataka | In silence, China is making giant strides in a race that until now it was not leading: space. In Xataka | The US opted for the quality of the F-35 rather than quantity. China opted for the opposite and it is already a problem

97% of a key mineral for Europe comes from China. Spain has a plan of 197 million to turn it around

Constant technological development has unleashed a silent but relentless geopolitical war. At the center of the target are rare earths and critical minerals, essential for manufacturing everything from mobile phones to electric cars or wind turbines. Nowadays, how to explain Europa PressEurope is in a situation of extreme vulnerability: 97% of the magnesium we consume comes from China and 98% of the borate we import from Türkiye. However, the solution to this deep dependence could be buried under Spanish soil. A new plan. As detailed in the National Mining Exploration Program 2026-2030 (PNEM), the official document promoted by the Government of Spain20 of the 34 raw materials that the European Union classifies as fundamental have been detected in the Iberian Peninsula. Of them, 17 are considered strategic due to their high technological and defense impact. To map and take advantage of this “treasure”, the Executive has launched an ambitious plan. The financing table of the PNEM itself projects a total investment of 197 million euros for the five-year period 2026-2030, adding public financing, aid and private investment that is expected to be mobilized. A breath for Europe and an opportunity for Spain. The European roadmap, crystallized in the Fundamental Raw Materials Regulation (Critical Raw Materials Act or CRMA), is very clear: guarantee access to a safe and diversified supply. By 2030, the European Union has set a goal of extracting at least 10%, processing 40% and recycling 25% of its domestic demand for these materials. In this context, Spain is not a secondary actor, but is the only producer of strontium in Europe, hosting 15% of the world’s reserves in the Montevives and Escúzar basin in Granada, and holds the position of second largest copper producer on the continent. according to data provided by Europa Press. The main focus of exploration is located in the Variscan or Iberian Massif, an extensive geological strip that crosses the west of the peninsula from Galicia to Andalusia, passing through Cantabria, Asturias, Castilla y León and Extremadura. The official document highlights, within this great massif, the so-called Central Ibérica, Ossa-Morena and South Portuguesa Zones as priority areas for general exploration. The private sector takes positions. On a practical level, intentions are already being translated into business movements on the ground. In Extremadura the Junta has granted a license to explore an area of ​​49,500 hectares in the Cáceres regions of Los Ibores and Campo de Arañuelo. In Andalusia, specifically in Jaén, the Australian company Osmond Resources will promote the Orion projectcovering 228 square kilometers in the former mining region of Linares-La Carolina to search for unusually high concentrations of rutile, zircon and rare earths such as neodymium. For its part, the European Commission has already blessed seven strategic projects in Spanish territory to protect the supply, located in enclaves of Ciudad Real, Orense, Cáceres, Badajoz, Huelva and Seville. Cutting-edge technology versus “pick and shovel”. The National Mining Exploration Program does not contemplate blindly digging holes. The Ministry’s text outlines six great performances interconnected to locate these raw materials. The process will begin with an exhaustive review of historical data and geoscientific reports, followed by the preparation of highly detailed geological-mining cartography. From there, technology will take over. Geochemical soil prospecting campaigns and complex isotopic analyzes will be carried out to find anomalies in the terrain. In addition, cutting-edge geophysical techniques will be deployed, using everything from airborne gravimetry and magnetometry equipment (planes and drones), to remote sensing using high-resolution hyperspectral and satellite images provided by the European Space Agency. All of this will be complemented by carrying out physical surveys to confirm the mining interest of the anomalies. Finally, as the official plan highlights, all this huge amount of data will be processed using algorithms, artificial intelligence and machine learning to generate predictive models of mineralization. The inevitable clash: Mining vs. Biodiversity. However, technology collides head-on with strict environmental reality. The clearest example is in Campo de Montiel (Ciudad Real). There, the company Quantum Minería has been trying to exploit a promising monazite deposit to extract rare earths. But the project has encountered strong neighborhood opposition due to the very high water consumption it requires and an unexpected defender: the iberian lynx. The recovery of this feline’s territories in the area has become a major legal obstacle for the mining company, paralyzing permits due to fear of destroying its habitat. Although before the environmental alarms go off, it is important to make a fundamental point: this National Program serves to know what we have, it is not an authorization to dig it up. The Ministry’s own document clarifies that the plan does not establish “binding or indicative objectives” for exploitation. That is, it is a purely prospective roadmap and data collection that does not compromise or zone the territory to open real mines. The mine is in the “garbage”. Faced with this paralysis and the immense difficulty of opening new mines in natural areas, Spain has an ace up its sleeve: secondary mining and the circular economy. The National Program reserves one of its main transversal lines to respond to article 27 of the European regulations (CRMA), thoroughly investigating the economic potential of mining waste facilities that were closed or abandoned in the past. The Ministry document remember thatalready in the 80s, an inventory was prepared that cataloged 21,673 waste structures (rafts and waste dumps) spread throughout the national territory. Now, the State’s objective is to review this catalog and promote geochemical characterization work to recover those fundamental raw materials that, at the time, were not of interest or could not be extracted and were discarded. As pointed out Europa Press, Research teams from the University of Seville led by professors Joaquín Delgado and Antonio Romero are already working in Río Tinto (Huelva) designing experimental plants to recover valuable metals and rare earths from the acidic waters of abandoned mines. Even beyond the mine. A clear example of this circular bet is the RC-Metals projectled by the National Center for Metallurgical Research (CENIM-CSIC). … Read more

prepares total blockade of chip manufacturing machines arriving in China

The US has been exercising its control over advanced integrated circuit manufacturing equipment for five years now to prevent it from reaching China. It is the strategy with the one that has managed to slow downbut in no way slow down, the technological development of the country led by Xi Jinping. In 2021, it approved the first restrictions that prevented machines from extreme ultraviolet photolithography (UVE) of ASML and other advanced equipment arrive in China. From that moment on, the US Government has continued to deploy new sanctions with the purpose of increasingly limiting the access of Chinese semiconductor manufacturers to lithography and wafer processing equipment that comes not only from the US, but also from the Netherlands, Taiwan, South Korea or Japan. The US is exercising ownership of some of the patents that these machines use, and also their ability to influence the decisions made by their allies. However, the Administration led by Donald Trump still has room to tighten its siege on China. And presumably it will do so in the short term because several senators belonging to both parties (Democrats and Republicans) have proposed new legislation which seeks to impose an essentially total ban on exports of advanced chip manufacturing and wafer processing equipment to certain corporations in adversary nations. It is clear that China is in their sights. Objective: Prevent ASML’s UVP photolithography machines from reaching China State-of-the-art lithography equipment is extraordinarily complex and sophisticated. Currently, the most used by integrated circuit manufacturers to produce cutting-edge chips are deep ultraviolet (UVP) and extreme ultraviolet (UVE) machines. A priori, UVP machines are suitable for manufacturing semiconductors up to 10 nm. And with EUVs it is possible to go up to 2 nm. However, by refining the processes involved in transferring the pattern to the wafer and turning to multiple patterning It is possible to go beyond these integration technologies. The US is especially targeting SMIC, Huawei, Hua Hong Semiconductor, YMTC and CXMT This technique broadly consists of transferring the pattern to the wafer in several passes with the purpose of increasing the resolution of the lithographic process. It may have an upward impact on the cost of chips and a downward impact on production capacity, but it works. SMIC (Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corp), the largest Chinese semiconductor manufacturerhas resorted to multiple patterning for manufacture 7nm integrated circuits using ASML’s Twinscan NXT:2000i UVP lithography equipment. US export controls currently prevent the sale of UVP equipment to specific factories in China that may or may not appear on the US blacklist, but do not prohibit its sale to the companies that own these plants. This is precisely what the MATCH Law seeks to change (Multilateral Alignment of Technology Controls on Hardware) that US senators have proposed. In practice this proposal will, if successful (and it probably will), prevent ASML’s UVP machines and other advanced wafer processing equipment from reaching any facilities of major Chinese chipmakers. The US is targeting SMIC, Huawei, Hua Hong Semiconductor, YMTC and CXMT, and also their subsidiaries. He picks it up clearly. the published document by Senator Michael Baumgartner. In reality this proposal does not introduce new restrictions; what it does is change how shipping is allowed of advanced tools to prevent Chinese companies from continuing to develop sophisticated techniques, such as multiple patterningwith the purpose of producing cutting-edge chips. Be that as it may, in the medium term, China will need to have your own advanced lithography machines to be able to sustain its technological development. Image | Generated by Xataka with Gemini More information | Congressman Michael Baumgartner In Xataka | We already know what the chips that will arrive until 2039 will be like. The machine that will allow them to be manufactured is close

30% of heavy trucks sold in China are already electric, in Europe only 4%

China has been dominating with an iron fist for years the electric car race. Now it is opening a second front: heavy trucks. Just like they count Since Semafor, in 2025, almost three out of every ten heavy trucks sold in the country were electric or new energy. In Europe, the figure does not reach 5%. And the most striking thing is not the difference, but the speed at which that gap is closing. An unprecedented leap in a very short time. In 2021, new energy trucks barely accounted for 0.7% of heavy vehicle sales in China. In 2024, they were already 12.9%. Just like share the average, in 2025, almost 30%. That pace of adoption, according to Zhao Pei, a postdoctoral researcher at MIT, “leaves the rest of the world in the dust.” In Europe the figure remains around 4%, and in California, which is supposed to be the region of the United States where there is the greatest adoption of electric trucks, annual sales are counted in hundreds of units, according to the analysis firm Rystad Energy. lTrucks are more difficult to electrify. Heavy vehicles are the backbone of any country’s domestic trade, but electrifying them is much more complex than doing the same with a car. Their energy needs are enormous and the size of the batteries can reduce the charging capacity. Furthermore, there is still a lot of distrust of technology in the freight transportation sector. “They are a completely different game from passenger cars when it comes to electrification,” counted Mao Shiyue, researcher at the International Council on Clean Transportation. Politics and prices as catalysts. Since 2020, China’s central government forced factories in key sectors (steel, cement, energy) to incorporate a percentage of new energy trucks or face production restrictions on days of high pollution. Added to this were very generous subsidies to replace diesel trucks with electric ones. The result: a huge domestic market, highly integrated supply chains and fierce internal competition that has accelerated innovation. Today, the cost per kilometer of an electric truck in China is approximately one-third that of its diesel equivalent, they shared from the middle. Although the purchase price is double, the difference is amortized in about two years. The infrastructure that makes it possible. China has also deployed an entire network for its electric trucks to operate. To achieve this, they have been working for some time on what they call their “green corridors”, specific charging networks for heavy vehicles along highways. One of the largest, built by Qiyuan Green Power, connects Tianjin port with the Gansu industrial region across 2,200 kilometers and 27 stations. For its part, CATL, the world’s largest battery manufacturer for electric vehicles, it has developed a battery exchange technology that allows a dead battery to be replaced with a charged one in just five minutes, and already has more than 300 operational stations in the country. The weak point: long distance. Not everything is resolved. Trucks operating short, fixed routes have led the transition, but long-distance trucks, which can travel up to 1,000 kilometers a day, remain a challenge. The autonomy and capacity of current batteries are not always sufficient for these routes. And just as share From Semafor, a typical 49-ton heavy truck can travel between 200 and 300 kilometers on a load, enough to operate in ports and urban areas, but far from what long-distance interregional routes need. Now they arrive in Europe, and cheaper. More than half a dozen Chinese manufacturers plan to enter the European heavy truck market in 2026. According to account Reuters, among them stand out BYD, Farizon (Geely), Sany (which is currently the best-selling electric truck brand in China), Sinotruk and the startups Windrose and SuperPanther. The middle share that newly arrived manufacturers plan to set prices up to 30% below the European average, which is around 320,000 euros. Even so, that triples the cost of a conventional diesel truck, whose average in the EU is around 100,000 euros. Unstoppable speed. Phil Dunne, of the consultancy Grant Thornton Stax, counted Reuters that the European sector takes on average seven years to complete a development cycle for a new truck. Windrose, a startup founded in 2022, took three years to develop its Global E700 model, obtain approval to sell it in China, Europe and the United States, and prepare it to enter production. Its price in Europe will be 250,000 euros. “The speed at which the Chinese have come up with good products has surprised everyone,” Dunne said. Code red. Volvo, Daimler Trucks, Iveco, MAN and Scania dominate the European market and have the advantage of built-up trust among their customers. But they are aware of the risk. Volvo Group CEO Martin Lundstedt described Chinese manufacturers as “fast, innovative, determined and committed”. In parallel, associations such as ACEA and E-Mobility Europe they press the European Commission to accelerate support measures with lower tolls for electric trucks, fleet electrification mandates and subsidies tied to European production. What is at stake. China is the world’s largest importer of fossil fuels, has the most extensive road network on the planet and road transport represents almost three quarters of its volume total merchandise. If the electrification of its trucks advances at the planned pace, Rystad Energy calculate that China’s demand for diesel could fall by 20% from current levels before 2030. “We have one or two years to get ahead of ourselves. Or the Chinese will eat our toast,” counted Chris Heron, Secretary General of E-Mobility Europe. Cover image | aboodi vesakaran and Sany Group In Xataka | China has been boasting about its driverless robotaxis for years. Until more than 100 have stood at once in Wuhan

China says it has built its largest data center. And confirms that your problem is precisely in the chips

China has just turned on its new technological pride in Shenzhen: an AI cluster with 14,000 petaflops built entirely with Huawei Ascend 910C chips. the city has presented it as the first scale computing center with 10,000 cards with completely national technology. It is an undeniable milestone, but if we give it context, an alarm signal and a dose of reality. Why is it important. The Shenzhen cluster, with all its rhetoric of technological sovereignty, represents about 1% of the capacity of the largest US data center in operation today. In other words: China has built, with great institutional effort, what OpenAI already had available to train GPT-4 in 2022. The gap is not a question of ambition (China has it) or capital (it also has it) or energy (of course, he also has it). It’s a chip issue. What are they capable of manufacturing and in what volume today. Between the lines. The Shenzhen government statement highlights energy efficiency metrics and occupancy rates of 92%. It’s really good data. But the selection of indicators (the cherry picking) says a lot so it is omitted: there are no direct comparisons with the clusters of NVIDIA H100 that colonize the data centers of Microsoft, Google or Amazon. Posting only what you have is also a way of not publishing what you lack. The context. At this point no one doubts that China does not lack electricity, not even engineersnor money to build large-scale AI infrastructure. What is still missing, despite the advances, are the chips. Export restrictions imposed by Trump They have cut off access to advanced semiconductors from NVIDIA and TSMCand that has forced China to accelerate its own ecosystem. Huawei has responded with the Ascend 910Ca capable chip but that still has performance limitations and, above all, volume production. If wafers were not in short supply, this data center would be a hundred times larger. Yes, but. Can China close that four-year gap before it gets even bigger? The answer depends almost entirely on how much its domestic semiconductor industry manages to scale, and whether or not Western sanctions manage to stifle that process. At the moment, in Shenzhen they are celebrating an achievement as undeniable as it turns out that in the eyes of Silicon Valley they are still in 2022. Featured image | Huawei In Xataka | Memory prices have started to fall in some markets. There is still a long way to go to close the AI ​​crisis

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